METAPHOR FROM A LINGUISTIC POINT OF VIEW

NINA NOWAKOWSKA

Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

I. Prior to the presentation of various conceptions of metaphor worked out within generative framework, some terminological explanation may be helpful.

1. The term metaphor is used in the present paper as a synonym for stylistic trope or, in a more general sense, for any instance of figurative language use. In this meaning its denotation is broader than that of metaphor proper, which constitutes only one instance of metaphoric expressions together with metonymy, synecdoche, allegory, personification and others. Such a terminological decision stems from the belief shared by many writers who, like Pöle (1971) would rather look first for the common denominator in the description of such locations and only secondarily point to structural differences among them. Furthermore, within the theory which constitutes the background of the discussion any claim to the effect that one type of trope is linguistically superordinate over another seems to be a pre-judgement. Kuryłowicz’s (1976) hypothesis of the overall character of metonymy above metaphor comes from his preliminary assumption of the subordination of the semantic under syntactic field in language, which assumption parallels Chomskyan conception of the centrality and full autonomy of syntax. But since the present paper contains also a review of certain anti-Chomskyan developments in the transformational generative grammar, in particular the so-called generative semantics, any similar presupposition is unjustified. It is not claimed, however, that descriptive grammar is capable of offering an adequate basis for such a delicate classification of poetic tropes as is normally executed by stylisticians (cf. Grzebiieniowski 1964: 301 ff). In the course of adopting the classical tertium comparationis to the requirements of semiotic description, Pöle (1971: 164 ff) upholds as valid the following division of metaphor: metaphor proper, e.g. wiosny słońce, — metonymy, e.g. rykuły spise, — synecdoche, e.g. chodzące niezrównane, — irony and anti-irony, e.g. nieżywe robu, — periphrasis, e.g. Gwiazda Poranna. To our best knowledge any specializations as to possible classifica-
tions of figurative expressions from a linguistic point of view lie entirely beyond the scope of interest of generative grammarians, including those who call themselves stylisticians and attempt to adjust the theory to the needs of poetics.

2. The next issue that calls for a short comment is usually referred to as lexicalized or historical metaphor. A fuller account of the question would lead too far into a discussion of the evolution of language; therefore, it is assumed that any lexicographically recorded figures of speech go beyond the subject of the present inquiry (actually most of the examples quoted after Peirce belong in this category). In view of the rapid development of English, thousands of suggestive sayings constitute the border area; for example it is a pure accident that *sincerity may admire the boy* has not been adopted as a standard expression as yet, whereas to be on *pot* almost certainly has. It seems that the study of diachronic metaphor should be preceded by a descriptive analysis, but the theory of language must differentiate between the two. In general terms, the concept of metaphor, but not that of lexicalized metaphoric idiom, involves a presupposition as to the appropriate intention on the part of the speaker-listener.

3. The intentional character of metaphor has been indicated in many papers. It happens, however, that the authors are either interested in the theory as such, or have taken for granted the poetic source of metaphor. A closer definition of the intention, especially with respect to the relationship between poetic and non-poetic metaphor, may be needed as soon as we pursue the question of interpretation. How far is this a function of grammar is not quite clear at present and will be considered later.

II. The development of generative studies inclusive of the observable contribution to the problem under discussion reveals various axes along which the various questions and proposed solutions might be grouped.

1. The basic question that emerges relatively early in whether the grammar should be capable of generating the strings underlying metaphoric locations. The purely syntactic, pre-Aspects studies usually offer a negative answer (cf. Chomsky 1964, Levin 1963, 1964). As soon as some aspects of semantic description come under consideration, the solutions become far from unanimous. On the one hand Chomsky (1965) distinguishes between grammar's direct and derivative generative capacities, on the other, Katz (1964), postulates the extension of grammar with a transfer device and traffic rules which generate interpretable semi-sentences. Further, Weirich (1966), in his counterposition to Katz and Fodor (1964), develops an elaborate semantic system in which lexical rules of various types account for deviant utterances. Finally, so called generative semanticists, primarily associated with McCawley (1968, 1970) and Lakoff (1968), refute most of Chomsky’s claims concerning the status of partial ill-formedness, i.e. grammatical and/or semantic deviance imposed by the selectional restrictions introduced in the grammar. While in Chomsky's (1965) selectional restriction model each string underlying a figurative utterance is marked with a certain degree of deviance, McCawley’s semantically-oriented grammar of the referential type is capable of describing every actually encountered language utterance. In its author's words, however, the latter is not so clearly a generative grammar any longer (cf. McCawley 1970: 168).

2. It should be noted that the knowledge of how metaphorical locutions might be generated or, alternatively, of what semantic interpretation they should be assigned is far from explicit, which most authors openly admit. Chomsky and his adherents remain persistent in their expectations for someone to develop a theory of performance. McCawley's group have safely escaped into the sphere of reference. It seems unfortunate that Weirich's insightful lexical studies, which in a sense inspired McCawley (1968), have been abandoned.

III. In the successive paragraphs of this section various details refer to the above schematic outline. Our primary concern is to show how the studies that are programmatically devoted to figurative language use, normally within some theory of poetics, are inter-dependent with the assumptions provided by the general theory which underlies these studies. The conclusion of the review is not very optimistic. Namely, it seems that the restrictions imposed by the theory are too idiosyncratic for any adequate study of metaphor to be developed within its framework. Wherever some insight into the nature of metaphor and/or poetry is gained, it is through violating Chomsky's theory in more than one way.

1. The writings of the pre-Aspects period share a lack of interest in semantic description (short of Katz 1964). Lexical items are introduced in sentence derivation by phrase structure categorial rules, and the issue of the relationship between deviant strings and actual poetic utterances remains predominant. On the other hand, most assumptions of Chomsky (1957), which model underlies those studies, have been adopted in the Aspects grammar. As a result the basic formulae of the poetic (or metaphoric) status of many deviant strings are translatable from one model into the other. The successive publications of two writers, i.e. Levin (1963, 1964, 1965), and Thorne (1965, 1969, 1970), in which each of them remains consistent in his solutions, adjusting them gradually to new versions of the grammar seem to illustrate the point sufficiently well.

Levin (1964) and Thorne (1965) spent some time over a now famous line from Cummings's "Anyone lived in a pretty how town," i.e. he danced his did. The proposed answers are different in each case, but the point in common
consists in offering a few sets of syntactic rules (more than one, as the utterance is multiply ambiguous), i.e.

1. \( NP \rightarrow \text{(Pronoun).} \ VP \rightarrow (V+T^*N), \ N \rightarrow \text{did} \)
2. \( NP \rightarrow \text{(Pronoun).} \ VP \rightarrow (V-/T^-V) \)
3. \( NP \rightarrow \text{(Pronoun + V).} \ VP \rightarrow (T+V) \)
4. \( NP \rightarrow \text{(Pronoun V + T).} \ VP \rightarrow V \)
5. \( NP \rightarrow \text{(Pronoun v - T - V).} \ V \rightarrow V \)

(1) and (2) are considered by Levin as possible inclusion in the grammar of English but are eventually rejected on the basis that either, if (1) were chosen thousands of unwanted sentences would be generated, or if V of (2) were further subclassified the grammar would increase in complexity beyond all reasonable limits. Consequently, in this article and elsewhere, Levin upholds Chomsky’s (1964) hypothesis that deviant utterances lie beyond the grammar’s generative capacity, although it is possible to define the degree of deviance of each ill-formed expression. For example, Thomas’s a grief ago violates a lower order rule than the line from Cummings; therefore it is less ungrammatical.

Thorne, instead of attempting to expand the grammar of standard language, proposes that each poetic piece be treated as a sample of a unique dialect. Hence to read a poem is to learn a language and its grammar, the structure of which meets the reader’s intuition of how to understand this particular poem. In the construction of new rules, deviant utterances should be considered in the context of the whole text in order that particular utterances could acquire proper structural descriptions. In the case of Cummings’s line, Thorne favours the first of Levin’s rules but considers also other options (2–5) and points to interpretative variations they would evoke. The inductive grammar of poetry (see also Thorne 1969 and 1970) leaves unspecified the relationship between competence and performance in language as well as the status of text analysis within the theory of the latter. In this manner it is methodologically rather weakly motivated. It has been also criticized (cf. Hendrick 1969) for its lack of differentiation between text, style, poetic idiosyncrasy, etc., which makes it hardly capable of offering any insight in the nature of poetry.

2. Together with the introduction of the subcategorizational component in the base, Chomsky (1965: 148ff) makes a distinction between direct and derivational sentence generation... “the grammar directly generates the language consisting of just the sentences that do not deviate at all with their structural descriptions. The grammar derivatively generates all other strings with their structural descriptions. These structural descriptions indicate the manner and degree of deviance of the derivatively generated sentences.” Along the dimension that interests us most there are three degrees of deviance, i.e. (1) violation of lexical category (e.g. sincerity may evade the boy, he danced-

his did), which is more serious than (2) conflict with strict subcategorization features (e.g. sincerity may evade the boy, which, in turn, is higher on the scale of deviance than (3) selectional restriction violation (e.g. sincerity may evade the boy, a grief ago). All the above, however, should be kept separate from purely syntactic ill-formedness which is ruled out by grammar regardless of the high degree of interpretability that some ungrammatical strings may be assigned, e.g. the book who you read was a bestseller. The scale of deviance is dependent on the hierarchical ordering of lexical features; therefore selectional rules tolerate violation most readily. Chomsky (227ff) remarks that “sentences that break these rules are often interpreted metaphorically if an appropriate context of greater or less complexity is supplied...” most likely within some theory of performance. Like Katz (1964), he conjectures that “... these sentences are apparently interpreted by a direct analogy to well-formed sentences that observe the selectional rules at question”. Furthermore, the degree of interpretability is related to the hierarchy within selectional features themselves. Noting the quasi-syntactic character of selectional features, Chomsky considers the possibility of relaxing the restrictions on the direct generative capacity of the grammar. This might be achieved in one of two ways. That is, the selectional rules might be eliminated from the syntactic component and their function taken over by the semantic component. Such an approach, in the author’s words, would account in a far better way for the relation of grammaticalness to intuitive deviance. Most metaphorically interpreted strings, e.g. a grief ago, (but not he danced his did), would be directly generated by the grammar. Alternatively, the functions of the semantic component might be taken over, in toto, by the generative syntactic rules. Chomsky leaves the options open, cognizant of the fact that the interrelation of semantics and syntax need be far better understood, and calls his decision that selectional rules are primarily syntactic “a conservative compromise”. Apparently, Weinreich on the one hand and generative semanticists on the other proceed in the direction of obliterating the distinction not only between these two components, but also between semantic systems and the system of knowledge and belief.

3. In a sense Katz (1964) semi-derivation should have evoked a good amount of criticism for unlawful violating of some fundamental assumptions of the theory. What Chomsky would adopt as an interpretive device belonging most probably in the grammar of performance (see above) is here an autonomous mechanism serving semi-sentence generation. Semi-sentences are these ungrammatical strings that underlie sentence-like comprehensible utterances and are contrasted, on the one hand, with fully grammatical sentences, on the other, with nonsense-strings that lie beyond the speakers comprehensibility. Basing his remarks to a great extent on Ziff’s (1964)
“simplest route from the regular grammar”, Katz proposes that sentences generated by grammar be grouped in comprehension sets in such a way that sentences in one comprehension set are paraphrases of one another. A semi-derivation of a semi-sentence differs from a regular derivation of a grammatical string within the same comprehension set in that the former requires additionally the application of a transfer rule for each rule of grammar that has been violated. Lest nonsense-strings should be generated in the process of compounding of violations the so-called traffic rules are also needed. In this version Katz’s formulae are to account for the syntactic derivation of certain deviant utterances, but, as the author notes, a decision procedure for grouping paraphrases as well as understanding semi-sentences involve grasping their semantic structure. Therefore, corresponding rules of transfer and traffic must be included in the semantic component. However, how they should be designed in order to be carried out with their syntactic counterparts is not known to him and is also absent from the interpretative semantic component worked out at the same time by Katz and Fodor (1964). It is mainly this absence of an account of figurative language use that caused Weinreich’s severe criticism of the interpretative semantics.

4. The application of the transfer device gave birth to a few interesting but mostly mishandled accounts of metaphor, for which state, it seems, one might also blame the first author of the theory. Fowler (1966) makes the claim that deviant utterances are understood through mapping them into respective non-deviant utterances which, in turn, derive their meanings from semantic interpretations of the sentences with which they can be matched. Therefore, according to Fowler, the common view that interpretation of deviance belongs in the performance skill is only partially valid. In the case of he danced his did transfer rules might operate as follows: he did dance (source) \rightarrow he did his dance (target)

Similarly Bickerton (1969) would incorporate the transfer device in the overall grammar, which, in this way, would take care of feature adjustment in metaphorical expressions.

Aarts (1971), on the contrary, attributes a similar mechanism to the reader’s performance skill. The role of this device consists in ruling out primary semantic features of lexical formatives and replacing them by their secondary semantic features (roughly connotations). It is hardly surprising that Aarts’s performance skill interprets Cummings’s line in a still different way from those mentioned so far:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{he danced his} \\
\text{[+]N} \\
\text{[+]Action} \\
\text{[+]Past} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{-linguistically acceptable but poetically trivial}
\end{array}
\]

5. As might be observed throughout studies of metaphor and related subjects, the competence-performance dichotomy causes a lot of confusion. Matthews (1971) points to many inadequacies in the writings of the authors who espouse the empirically valid distinction. Repeating Chomsky’s claim he formulates two adequacy requirements concerning the nature of metaphor. Firstly, the identification of metaphor occurs invariably on the performance level. On the competence level a metaphorical expression is correctly characterized in terms of semantically deviant strings related to the presence of selectional restriction violation. Secondly, as regards understanding metaphorical locations, they should be conceived in the same way as their literal counterparts, but the effect of the selectional restriction violation is to de-emphasize the features that figure in the selectional restriction violation as well as those other features most closely associated with it.

6. Lexical studies have been treated rather marginally within the generative grammar. On the other hand, their importance can hardly be exaggerated. Each attempt to account for intrasentence lexical relations seems to have led to serious revisions within the theory. This holds true of Katz and Fodor (1964) and Chomsky (1970) in comparison with Chomsky (1957), as well as of Gruber’s (1965, 1967) monographs, and last but not least, of various studies in word derivation by generative semanticists. Most of these accounts are too weak to deal with figurative language use, and Weinreich (1966) makes an outstanding exception in this respect. The lexical representation is in his model formally identical with the syntactic one, i.e., every relation that may hold between components of a sentence also occurs among the components of a meaning of a dictionary entry. His most serious departure from Chomsky and Katz and Fodor amounts to the claim that although semantic and syntactic primitives remain recognizable different, it is not true that semantics begins where syntax ends. Syntactic rules of two basic types, e.g., linking and nesting, may as well operate on semantically relevant complex symbols, which are further branchable. Weinreich believes that a semantic theory is of marginal interest if it is incapable of dealing with interpretable deviance. The so-called semantic calculator treats differentially fully grammatical and deviant strings. In case of the latter, the construal rules and/or rules of transfer take care of appropriate feature adjustment, and later the semantic evaluator computes a quantitative measure of the deviance of a sentence from normality.

Examples:

(A) a transfer rule converts (1) into (2) below with reference to a portion

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{of the expression: a red house occurred twice}
\end{array}
\]
of metaphor. Reddy attacks Chomsky's grammar from various points. Firstly, he regards a language model that makes a formal distinction between correct and incorrect strings on the basis of the way they connect concepts as empirically inadequate. The equation between metaphor and deviation from some selectional norm is for him a prejudgement.

All statements may be potential metaphors since it is only decisions about internal states that are communicated immediately and directly by human utterances. Secondly, Reddy postulates superordination of reference over meaning in linguistic explanations of metaphoric locations. Thus metaphorical expressions are those whose words have referents lying beyond the spectrum of the literal sphere of reference (LSR). "The LSR of a word is a set of referents the word may conventionally and literally take on." The size of the LSR spectrum is not formally defined; Reddy merely notes that its one end is delimited by gross physical objects and activities, i.e. real sensory events, internal images, dreams, symbolic and specific (e.g. scientific) renderings of events, whereas the other end of the spectrum comprises relational terms. It is worthy of note that in this way many utterances commonly considered instances of interpretable deviance are automatically equated with Chomsky's grammatical sentences, e.g.,

Excuse me, but your air is dripping on the table (in a lab).
I dreamed about this huge tree with eyes and ears that kept groaning.
The bullfighter walked off with the bleeding symbols of his victory.

In the third place, Reddy considers descriptions of metaphor a grammar should offer, admitting the vagueness of his suppositions. The inevitable cause of metaphor seems to be the interaction between the context of an utterance and the literal spheres of reference of the terms involved. The author conjectures that the study of context sensitivity should proceed to a degree "as yet undescribed in transformational models". His account of how metaphors are comprehended reads, with some abbreviations, as follows: "At some period in the processing of all utterances, it seems, listeners and readers make decisions, very much on the basis of context, as to whether the words in the utterance have referents within their literal spheres of reference. A negative result causes two very different things to happen. First, a referent may be discovered through the search for analogies and similarities in the context of the utterance or it may happen that different speakers will arrive at different referents or that no one will arrive at any referent at all. But secondly, unique referents of metaphoric words become less crucial to the understanding of the utterance. The meaning of the utterance is primarily whatever is implied by the fact that something was expressed in this curious and unconventional fashion."
IV. We should conclude this paper by taking a more definite stand on some of the above proposals.

1. The controversy between Chomsky and generative semanticists should be by no means treated with exclusive reference to definitive language use, but must be projected upon the general language theory. Repudiating the notion of selectional restrictions from grammar Reddy and others consider Chomsky's model of a theory empirically different from theirs. Chomsky, in turn, sees only methodologically distinct assumptions in both the grammars and regards generative semantics to be a weaker version than the so-called extended standard theory (cf. Chomsky 1968, 1970). It is most interesting that both the positions are safe from criticism from outside a given theory. Let us take for instance the paramount definition of language in each school. McCawley (1968: 180) states: "I will be treating the English language not as a class of sentences but as a code which relates messages (semantic representations) to their encoded forms (the surface forms of sentences)." Does the distinction belong in the domain of empirical assumptions or pure methodology? Chomsky would most probably subscribe to the latter. His grammar naturally accounts for the relation between meanings and surface forms but additionally, or rather primarily, the grammar is a well-defined model of sentence generation. In this sense semantic content as well as surface structure are relational terms, whereas the initial symbol $S$ is a linguistic prime. The generative semantics, though its authors frequently declare their connections with formal logic, is far less rigorous in executing basic notions of the theory. In Chomsky grammaticality, definiteness, selectional restrictions are all well defined terms, and it is evident of minor import for the theory itself which component of grammar defines various degrees of linguistic deviation. Having rejected the grammatical states of partial ill-formedness imposed by selectional restrictions, Reddy and others substitute Chomsky's notions of such linguistically vague concepts as intention, context sensitivity, spheres of reference, etc.

2. The basic question that emerges in the course of the above considerations is whether human language approximates the logically well-defined ideal generated by Chomsky's grammar. The introduction of the competence-performance dychotomy speak for itself. The trouble is, however, that contrary to Chomsky's suppositions his competence model seems to offer scarce assistance in formulating an adequate theory of performance, in particular that part which would deal with figurative language. Most of the studies surveyed above are misfired in at least one of two ways. That is, they either remain within the sphere of declarative statements concerning the intentional character of metaphoric performance, in which they resemble Reddy's claims, or they offer evidently counterintuitive interpretations of a selected number of metaphors, in particular of the unfortunate he danced his did.

V. 1. As concerns poetry the nature of metaphor has so far been rendered in the most accurate way by Russian formalists and Prague linguists, in particular Jakobson and Mukafovsky. Regardless of minor differences in the related writings, poetic language use has been defined there as the act (Einstellung) toward the message as such (Jakobson 1966) or as the application of language with emphasis on the linguistic material, i.e. code (Jakobson 1929, after Schonewald 1961 and Mayenowa 1970). The place of metaphor in relation to other poetic devices may not be considered in the present paper. We may, however, abstract metaphor as such, and define it tentatively as an instance of intentional exploration of the code potentials for the sake of the structure and meaning of the message. Exploration of the code potentials is apparently a broader image than violation of the code restrictions. Language may be violated in the sense of Chomsky's deviation from grammatical rules of a competence model, but independently it may also be explored by moving unusual connotations of words to the fore. The communicative value of a metaphoric message with unconventional elements foregrounded (such as parallelism of structure and meaning, putting forward secondary and further semantic features, etc.), differs in many ways from the value of purely referential message. It is obvious that metaphor conceived in this manner approximates Reddy's intuitions but is hardly translatable into Chomsky's diacritic, and, moreover, it seems scarcely conceivable in terms of any theory of performance that would be underlined by the sentence generation model. Therefore if we decide to insist on the validity of generative linguistics for the description of metaphorical locations we are bound, after all, to pursue the line sketched out by McCawley, Lakoff, Reddy and others.

If the grammar, however, is to offer a methodologically adequate and empirically distinct version from Chomsky's model, at least two undertakings should be completed as soon as possible. In the first place such notions as intention, presupposition, context sensitivity, etc. ought to be validated methodologically, and the unclear status of the competence-performance distinction must be clarified. Secondly, lexical studies need be conducted in a more thorough way, and a theory of meaning should be adequately related to a theory of reference.

3. The details of concrete proposals would carry us too far beyond the scope of the present paper. In most general terms, it seems that a revised version of grammar may as well adopt some findings of functional linguistics. It is possible, for instance, that the grammar would generate acts of speech in Bühler's (1934) sense, (in a way, such a grammar would correspond to Austin's, 1962, theory of performatives, already considered by Ross, 1970). Consequently the notion of competence must be enriched with the functional contents of which all speech acts are characteristic. In addition to Bühler's Darstellung, Ausdruck and Appell, Jakobson (1960) distinguishes the phatic,
metalingual and poetic language functions which are respectively the sets toward the contact, code and message. Actual utterances are most commonly combinations of all or some functional elements, but one of them is always predominant. It has been a common practice to disregard in linguistic studies all but referential messages to the extent that purely emotive and poetic utterances were called parasitic. In logically oriented language models this tendency has proceeded to the extreme; — hence the introduction of the concept of grammatical deviance which evoked such a strong protest among some scholars. It is not quite clear at present how metalingual and poetic (or aesthetic in Mukhovský’s terms) functions are interrelated in metaphoric expressions. It seems that each metaphor is metalingual to the extent that it exploits certain code potentials, and that it is poetic in that it hardly ever gets a proper description beyond the specific structure of the message a part of which it constitutes. If the revised grammar is to uphold the competence—performance distinction (though it is far from clear where the boundary should fall) it may be the case that most details of the message structure ought to belong in the description of the latter. At the same time it may be noted that some metaphors, as lexicalized idioms or well-known quotations from classics, are conceived as primarily metalingual in that they may be disambiguated and described by a grammar of Weinreich’s type. Others, however, are predominantly of poetic character, that is, the functionally motivated neutralization has proceeded in their structure so far that they may be interpreted by literary critics but never by linguists.

4. The above very loose remarks do not explain in the least degree how metaphors are actually generated. A general constraint on grammars of competence (in our case “the functional competence”) ought to take care of a proper degree of the semantic specification that a grammar provides lest overspecification of meaning should result (cf. Kooij 1971). In this sense the matter of each of the specific formalizations we decide to choose is methodologically relevant. Although referential models of McCawley’s type are adequate in this respect, they have been disregarded on the basis that they are not concerned with lexical relations. It seems, however, that Fillmore’s (1968) case grammar may suit the purpose. Semantic cases are, as was noted by Chomsky (1970) “... a notation for expressing the semantic relation by the interplay of deep structure grammatical relations and specific properties of particular lexical items”. It is evident that metalingually (and poetically) marked utterances are characterized by an “interplay” quite distinct from that in referential expressions. For example, the relaxation of the condition of animateness for certain semantic cases may result in personification; the opposite process often brings about reification; the deletion of Adnominal Dative almost invariably causes metonymy and synecdoche, etc. Classification of tropes may proceed along various dimensions such as when in the process of derivation the foregrounding of elements may occur. In this manner we would be able to differentiate between simile and metaphor proper, between synecdoche and metonymy, catachresis and metaphor proper, personification and animation; or, on the other hand, between the categorial foregrounding, as in he danced his did and the focus laid upon lower order lexical features, as in a grief ago. The grammar of performance might, in turn, be preoccupied with specifying the relations between functionally marked strings and their concrete realizations as text portions. Within the frameworks of such a theory, poetry, which is the commonest context for metaphors, should be formally specified as characteristic of the aesthetic foregrounding. In this way particular metaphors could be further interpreted with respect to larger textual units.

Consider for illustration the below two examples that are meant to close our schematic and highly tentative suggestions concerning the relevance of generative grammar for the description of metaphoric locations.

Example 1.

All hands to the deck! the metalingual marking consists in the deletion of the Adnominal Dative: sailors; synecdoche

Example 2:

April is the cruellest month, breaching
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain. (Eliot, “The Waste Land”)

(a) metalingual marking:
- animation of April (Agent/Cause) with respect to cruel, breed, mix, stir
- animation of land (Dative) with respect to dead
- animation of roots (Dative) with respect to dull

(b) not so clearly metalingual, but undoubtedly aesthetic, secondary reification of memory and desire (Objects) with respect to stir and the Agentive April

(c) A relevant description of the message structure should consider the above complex metaphor as a sequence of iterative images that resemble one another formally (all are present participle constructions, and moreover, they possess certain recursive phonetic characteristics) and cognitively (they iterate the agency of April). A more precise analysis, however, should account for the fact that the successive images differ as far as the intensity and other lower order semantic features of the
performed actions are concerned (cf. cruelty, breeding, mixing, stirring), which contributes largely to the effect of the metaphor. Furthermore, the description might also contain a comparison with the images that follow in the poem, i.e. Winter kept us warm... Summer surprised us... with respect to similarities, analogies and differences in structure and meaning.

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