G. M. HOPKINS AND SOME POLISH POETIC DOCTRINES

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Only a relatively few years have passed since the first publication of Hopkins' poetry in 1918, but it is now generally recognized as a superb achievement. Still, almost every important issue of Hopkins' criticism has been opened to critical disagreement and controversy; he has variously been underrated, overpraised and misinterpreted. Of all the problems of his criticism, the problem of tradition or "school" to which Hopkins' work shows most affinity seems to be the fundamental one.

The most generally widespread presumption is that Hopkins was a rare poet and his poetic theories nothing more than innocent experimenting with words. The results of those experiments, no matter how innocent and merely intuitional they were, are to be surprisingly congenial with the critical theories of I. A. Richards, William Empson and Herbert Read, whose critical studies really helped to promote Hopkins' poetry. Yet it should be remembered that those critics tend to overlook the fact that their criticism itself is derivative and represents but an extension and culmination of the nineteenth century movement in art which was motivated by the typically Victorian distrust of our rational faculty, or at least certain uses of it. This distrust, on the artist's side, resulted in a shifting of attention from the nominal subject of the work of art to the operation of the mind that perceives that subject; on the critic's side it resulted in a new interest, a new basis for aesthetic evaluation indeed. The principle for judging a work of art becomes the extent to which it imitates the way the perceiving mind works and not the extent to which the objects represented reflect the way they really are. It should not be overlooked that Hopkins could have participated in the movement being predisposed to do so through his studies and interests.

On the other hand, one has to take into consideration the fact that Hopkins was a classics scholar and as such best acquainted with Greek and Latin literatures and literary theories. Still, one can easily notice that his classical learning did not result in any kind of neo-classical style though this might
have been expected. Quite the contrary, Hopkins' poetry fulfills other expectations than those we usually associate with neo-classical literature; it is in fact modern poetry characterized by non-logical structure and subordinated to it non-logical syntax and far-fetched imagery. The question whether he could not possibly have found the models for his particular style in the classical literature has been answered after the publication of his diaries and correspondences and some newer critical studies. It seems to be unequivocal, with special reference to "The wreck of the Deutschland", written in 1879, and the sequence of sonnets written soon afterwards; it may be presumed that his classical learning helped the poet to find in Pindar's odes a new principle of lyric structure and in the classical device of hyperbaton a model for his associational structure and syntax.

Finally, the influence of Loyola has to be recalled as equipping the poet with the artistic form of the dramatic monologue which was the most congenial form to attain the new kind of verisimilitude whose goal was not an accurate report of the external world but an imitation of the thought processes of the mind stirred into action.

The general conclusion is that Hopkins' poetry is modern and therefore the article will attempt to present a comparison between some general notions of his system and those of the Polish Vanguard school. The comparison between these two historically and geographically distant phenomena is intended to indicate the modern in Hopkins' poetry or rather the persistence of certain tendencies in literary traditions, and not to suggest any direct dependence.

Basically, Hopkins' poetic system presents a fusion of two tendencies that seem different but are in fact complementary. The first one is Victorian in that it expresses the Victorian distrust of the rational faculty and turns to the activity of the mind as the only thing that can be verified. The distrust was caused by the popularization of some notions of physical and other sciences and is but an outcome of the historical process. Hopkins' interest in the development of the physical sciences, for instance, is representative of the general interest, and his planned article on Light and Ether is the best expression of his fascination with the laws of science (Abbott 1955a: 139 - 140).

Generally speaking, Hopkins' desire to find some scientific basis of aesthetic criticism, expressed many times in his writings and very early on, seems to be the best proof of his shifting attention. This tendency finds its culmination in the works of the New Critics, but a closer examination of Victorian literature testifies to the fact that the same tendency was the underlying target of most Victorian art and art criticism. Thus, Browning's dramatic monologue, whose aim is the psychological reaction of the reader, the imitation of the thought-process and not the accurate reflection of the external world, belongs to this category of works.

The other characteristic is based on Hopkins' classical studies, and again, the final effect of the studies seems to have much in common with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' belief in the chaos of ideas upon which the mind imposes a certain order, and the artistic method of imitating this by a work of art. Hopkins' essays show his preoccupation with the problem of hyperbaton and the reasons for such interest can be easily deduced. For instance, his essay on "The position of Plato to the Greek world", written in 1865, establishes that for Hopkins the criterion of Plato's achievement lies in his method of conversation, discussion instead of an unbroken announcement. For Hopkins, Plato's greatness lies in depicting the human mind at work, his awareness of the existence of many unexplained phenomena and the inadequacy and inconsistency of methods employed to analyze the unexplained (House 1966: 115 - 117). Hopkins shared this awareness with Plato, and his realization of the problem prompted him towards establishing his own methods.

It is fundamental for an understanding of Hopkins' system to realize that for this poet the organizing principle of poetry entails a complete revaluation of all its elements. He finds this principle in the concept of parallelism. In his essay on "Poetic diction" Hopkins states that although the very concept of parallelism may be conceived of as the artifice of poetry, it results in a certain parallelism of words or thoughts. This takes place because the principle both necessitates and engenders a difference in diction. An emphasis of structure "stronger than the common construction of sentences gives, asks for an emphasis of expression stronger than that of common speech or writing, and that for an emphasis of thought stronger than that of common thought" (House 1966: 85).

By the parallelism of structure Hopkins understands that kind of parallelism that is concerned with rhythm, metre, alliteration, assonance and rhyme. These elements are characterized by their recurrence, and the force of the recurrence is to begat a recurrence or parallelism answering to the parallelism of structure, the corresponding parallelism being that of words or thoughts. This explains the reason why in a poetic statement the relation between a sound and its meaning is very intimate, causal and natural, whereas in a common statement the relation is only arbitrary and conventional.

Hopkins insists that any parallelistic pattern must have an element of identity and of contrast but that the identity must not be extended to absolute duplication. Some variable features (or "modifications", as Hopkins puts it) prevent the pattern from becoming automatic and supply the utterance with an element of interest and surprise which designates the value and significance of a work of art.

It is generally accepted that the effect of interest and surprise in poetry can be achieved either by a certain deviation from some generally accepted norms or by its opposite - some introduced regularity. Regularity is inherent in any language both inside and outside poetry because the use of language
consists in obeying rules. But in poetry there is some extra regularity, some extra pattern superimposed on the pattern inherent in a language, and the range of the extra patterns extends from phonological to formal levels. The goal of the extra regularity is to achieve a very strict organization of the text. Metre, rhythm, and all other elements of versification affect expression and thought in such a way that concentration, the characteristic of poetry, is achieved. Parallelisms of versification involve the realization of some external connections between the elements that enter the relationship.

The constituent element of verse is “the same figure of sound” wholly or partially repeated (House 1968: 289). This term (the repeated figure of sound) has to be understood as including more than only the phonological level. It is noticeable that when analyzing even such an element of verse as rhyme, an element which is ex definitione based on a regular repetitiveness of equivalent phonemes or groups of phonemes, one will be faced with the problem of semantic interdependence between the elements of rhyme. It is now generally recognized that rhyme makes its special contribution to poetic structure in “virtue of a studiously and accurately semantic character” (Wimsatt 1967: 153). When Hopkins insists that rhyme is structural, he also means that once the principle of parallelism is accepted, the problem of the relation between metre and rhyme and meaning ceases to be an individual, free and incidental sphere of poetry. The rhyme words can scarcely appear in a context without showing some differences of meaning, and the nature of the difference is such that the binding effect of rhyme is supposed to have is stronger and more appropriate when a difference in meaning between the rhyme words is greater. Where there is a need for binding, there must be some difference in meaning or separation between the elements to be bound; otherwise, the maneuver of binding would be superficidal. But because words have no character as rhymes until they become points in a syntactic succession, it follows that in the broadest sense the difference of meaning in rhyme words includes the difference of syntax (Wimsatt 1967:158).

Words have double function in a language: (1) they refer (they convey meaning, they name); (2) they indicate internal relations (they convey grammatical functions, they connect or relate). Syntactic words function in the relation to their verbal or morphemic environment; semantic words symbolize concepts. In terms of a listener or a reader words and their immediate consistencies function transitorily or intrinsically, they are both means to other words as well as ends in themselves. The artistic use of words works in general to increase the transitivity of words since the most representative feature of poetic language is that it draws the reader’s attention not only to the idea communicated, but also and above all, to the way it is communicated. In other words, the poetic function of a language is to bring into prominence the substantial part of a word, to deliver it from its purely referential role (Bloome...

field 1967:309–317). The goal of rhyme, rhythm and other poetic devices is thus to deliver words from their referential role by forcing the reader to partially separate words from their “normal” meanings and perceive them as words. The bringing out of the substantial part of a word with the help of poetic devices is to remind the reader that a sign is not identical with its referent, that there is some fundamental dichotomy into objects and their signs. And really, the function of poetic devices is a constant reminder of this dichotomy. The need for indicating the dichotomy is substantial in poetry because without it the process of perceiving the relationship between an object and its sign becomes automatic, and what is automatic is dull to the point of becoming meaningless. Poetic devices are instances of the so-called linguistic foregrounding. As defined by Mukhovský, foregrounding is the “opposite of automatization, that is, deautomatization of an act; the more an act is automatized, the less it is consciously executed; the more it is foregrounded, the more completely conscious does it become” (Mukhovský 1964: 19). In poetic language foregrounding achieves maximum intensity to the extent of pushing communication into the background as the objective of expression, and of being used for its own sake.

It seems that in Hopkins’ writings we can find this awareness of the substantial need for words to have their own density and shape and weight, and also his realization of the fundamental dichotomy and the meaning of it. In his notes of February 9, 1888, he says:

All words mean other things or relations of things you may also say then abundances or attributes of a word of love, or beauty, or the like. To every word meaning a thing and not a relation belongs a passion or preoccupation or enthusiasm which it has the power of suggesting or producing but not always or in everyone. This ‘not always’ refers to its evolution in the man and secondly in man historically. The latter element may be called for convenience the preoccupation of a word. It is in fact the form (…). Words of art like words utter the idea and in representing real things they convey the preoccupation (House 1966:125).

In a poetic process, says Hopkins, two kinds of energy take part: a transitional part used to reason, and an abiding kind used to contemplate. The second one seems to be more important for the process because owing to it the mind is able to perceive and enjoy the comparison between the parts and the whole. In a well organized work of art the form penetrates deep and the relationship is very intimate:

The deeper the form penetrates, the preoccupation fuses the matter, the more effort will be required in apprehension, the more power of comparison, the more capacity for receiving that synthesis of (…) impressions which gives to the entity with the preoccupation conveyed by it (House 1966: 126).

The above seems to mean that the effort introduced into the process of apprehension because of the historical or individual connotations of the word...
testifies to its worldly. Since the substantial part of the word has been brought into prominence, in the poetic process the dichotomy into objects and their signs is deepened, and this, as has been already observed, is the main target of poetry. It is also worth noting that Hopkins' emphasizing the act of contemplation as substantial for a poetic process leads him finally to a statement that is, as it were, taken from Jakobson's or Mukaevsky's writings.

Poetry is speech trained for contemplation of the mind by the way of hearing or speech trained to be heard for its own sake and interest even over and above its interest of meaning. Some matter and meaning is essential to it, but only as an element necessary to support and employ the shape which is contemplated for its own sake (Horne 1966: 289).

Under the stipulation that finding out of correspondences should be understood as not merely indicating their existence but rather pointing out the persistence of certain tendencies in art and art criticism, it is still illuminating to see how the essentials of Hopkins' system and some modern criticism's standpoints overlap.

Viewed historically, literary criticism presents a certain consistent pattern and it is only in certain periods when the underlying question of the autonomy of art seems to be disappearing from the focus of general attention. However, we tend to disregard the necessary continuity of the tradition. For instance, Hopkins is so hard to be classified because his poetry satisfies other expectations than those we so easily identify with the nineteenth-century poetry. But an examination will show that starting with the nineteenth-century pursuit of fine craftsmanship and form we will have to come up to the most flourishing descendant of the doctrine of art for art's sake, to the school of pure formalist criticism, and although in England this was best discernible in the graphic arts, the twentieth-century Italian and French versions of "pure poetry" and Russian experiments in trans-sense language may provide another instances. The parallels that can be drawn between those schools, as well as those that can be drawn between Hopkins and Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz, Polish artist and art critic, concern a more general discussion on the nature and modes of poetry, the discussion that found its strongest stimuli in the nineteenth-century writings but had started much earlier. In fact, the question whether and in what sense poetry was "true" (because it is the core of all the discussions) worried many critics long before the Victorian outbreak of interest in the problem. Sidney tried to answer it by asserting that the poet does not lie because he does not affirm anything, Shelley understood the task of the poet as being in touch with the eternal patterns of things that underlie all reality, both trying to free poetry from a direct responsibility to scientific truth. The problem became most important in the nineteenth century when the critics became aware of the systematic development of science that made possible the investigation of reality, and this to a higher extent than any other kind of human activity could do. Thomas Love Peacock's

question of whether in a modern scientific world we have not outgrown the myths of poetry is representative of a widely accepted point of view that tries to see in poetry a direct reflection of reality, and this also is an idea that has long required refutation. The twentieth-century criticism tried to answer the question by finding for poetry a kind of meaning and a kind of usefulness which differentiated it from science, and although Richards' theory in its final shape tends to confuse the poem with its results, it is a valuable point in the long and perversing discussion. The nineteenth-century aesthetic school and French symbolism were, needless to say, just endeavours undertaken to free poetry from the direct entanglement with reality understood as liable to scientific investigations. Now, it seems only natural that Hopkins, who participated in the discussion, offered his own solution to the problem.

The general impression the reader can gather from Hopkins' early poems and his prose writings is his characteristic fascination with the sensuous richness of the world, but also the early-signalled conviction that some meaning has to be given to sensuous experience. His conversion to Catholicism helped him to find the meaning, and the Jesuit training enabled him to gain the advantage of a disciplined inner life. The two terms "inscape" and "instress" he tended to use quite early but tentatively in his undergraduate writings, were later given proper definitions becoming the keys to his critical doctrine. The conception of inscape arises from the realization that for the artist a mere vague impression of natural beauty is unsatisfactory. The term came to mean the distinctive pattern perceived in nature by the artist, the fixed type of beauty, the species of individually distinctive beauty, the distinctive form (the "created form held fast by evidence of creative power", Heuser 1968: 25). Both terms refer to unity of being: inscape to unity of being in feeling, inscape to unity of being in fixed position, and express Hopkins' desire to find the meaning behind sensuous experience. The realization of the unity of being helps to render metaphysical experience and is but a means for evoking metaphysical experience which might otherwise be rendered by religious mysteries or else philosophical meditations. The world is composed of numerous existences or types of existence, and we experience a metaphysical shock realizing it. We can realize it either through philosophy, that is, by deductive reasoning, or through art, and then it means by direct experience. Witkiewicz states that any artistic activity works to increase this experience of unity, oneness in both the artist and the reader: in the artist, because he objectifies himself through the objective material with which he structures his work and in this way realizes his own entity, and in the reader it may be realized through contemplation of this perfectly formed unity which every true artistic work is supposed to be. Experiencing form, and form alone, form free from any substance of reality, we are brought into the domain of metaphysics, says Witkiewicz. Witkiewicz understands form as structure, design existing for
its own sake and giving purely aesthetic pleasure to those who can properly experience its oneness. Not taking into consideration all the intricacies of Witkiewicz's system since the scope of the present study does not permit it, we can still draw parallels between the general assumptions of his and Hopkins' systems. The most striking resemblance is perhaps the insistence upon the unity of being done both by Hopkins and Witkiewicz in order to attain to higher “reality” of the metaphysical qualities, but it seems that some other resemblances can also be found. Witkiewicz's insistence upon form as structure reminds one considerably of Hopkins' understanding of the same problem: the form is of greatest importance, it is the ideal type in which the idea of the whole is manifested. Hopkins' insistence upon the subordination of the parts in a whole as a concrete example of the many particulars and one universal in an idea presents an immediate and solid instance of the principle of parallelism being put into practice. Witkiewicz postulates that the only justification of the form is the artist's “sincerity” since through it only can the postulate of the unity of structure be realized; Hopkins tried to give to his system some scientific basis although he also admitted that proportion, this mark of beauty, could be reached through intuition. Applied to his philosophy of beauty, the three terms: “instinct”, “inscape” and “pitch” mean perceiving the inscape of nature at their highest pitches and then uttering the vision in inscape of heightened sound, i.e., poetry. The most important is the conviction both the artists (Hopkins and Witkiewicz) share that a work of art is and must be analyzed and evaluated only by exclusively formal criteria. This conviction is expressive of Hopkins' and Witkiewicz' realization of the need for art to be freed from direct subordination to reality; in other words, it is expressive of their awareness of the intrinsic values of literature.

The awareness is also representative of the doctrines of the Polish Vanguard school just as it is to be, in fact, the target of all aesthetic systems of the twentieth century. Notwithstanding the differences in the actual reasons for such interest to appear because of the differences between English and Polish political and social situations, the reader will have to take into account some arresting concurrences.

The general demand to concentrate attention upon matters concerning form is to be found in both Hopkins' practice and the Polish Vanguard doctrine. The realization of the distinct character of the poetic language leads to the realization of the distinct character of the poetic entity and this seems to be the foundation of the demand. Mallarmé's insistence that poetry is structured with the help of words and therefore words, the material of poetry, should be considered and given attention, resulted in the attention being directed to the language. Trying to get rid of the “content” the French symbolists postulated that the matter is not only unimportant but that, in fact, it is undesirable. If to experience aesthetic pleasure the reader is to concentrate on the words, the way they are structured and put together, the rational sense may not be taken into consideration. This interest in the language of poetry conceived of as creation was sound and resulted in many desirable changes in European poetry. Hopkins' system presents many striking similarities although it is not to be said that he was necessarily influenced by the French symbolists. His interest in the language as the material of poetry was prompted by his personal interests and Pater's and Ruskin's teachings, but the fact remains and has to be considered that the most arresting feature of his system is his constant awareness of the possibilities contained in the language. His already quoted essay on referential and connotative meanings of words draws the reader's attention to the potential emotional and intellectual senses of words. His definition of poetry as speech “employed to carry the inscape of speech for the inscape's sake”, speech “framed for the contemplation of the mind”, emphasizes the aural qualities of poetry, and although derived from Pater's doctrine it has much in common with Mallarmé's and Valéry's understanding of the task of poetry. Hopkins also understands it as the work of a creator, creationist, and his whole system testifies to it. He goes further than merely analyzing the potentialities of words. He concentrates on bigger entities such as sentences or paragraphs or, even bigger still, rhythmic stanzas, and in this he resembles to a large extent Brzeźkowski's and Feifer's understanding of poetry as creating “beautiful sentences”. The essence of poetry becomes not the word itself but the intimate connections between words, their assoziational potentialities. It may happen that the actual thought conveyed in the sentence loses its immediate appeal to the reader, but it is sound, say the Vanguard poets, because it may be much better for people not to communicate. Bringing language into perfection is a complicated process, and it may demand that the artist and the reader do not understand each other, and this may sometimes take even a generation but it is worth doing if language is to be understood as a social means of communication. Hopkins represents a similar standpoint when he applies the notion of the two kinds of clearness in poetry: “either the meaning be felt without effort as fast as one reads or else, if dark at first reading, when once made out to explode” (Abbott 1965b:90). Accepting the second possibility, Hopkins makes it a means of powerful poetic expression. In order to evaluate a work of art from the aesthetic point of view the principle of comparison is to be taken into consideration. But, says Hopkins, in some cases likeness may be enforced between things unduly differing, contrast made between things unduly near, relations established at wrong distances and the result is failure (House 1966:74-75). The true means by which comparison, contrast, the enforcement of likeness is made just and pleasurable is by proportion (reached by intuition but also foundable on scientific grounds). In order to grasp the proportion (one part to another
and of the parts to the whole) which is the principle of beauty, the reader will have to exercise his energy of contemplation. Art exacts this kind of energy because where there is a very strict organization of the parts, their relations are so intimate that they may not easily be seen. The effort necessary in the process of apprehension testifies thus to the artistic qualities of the object of contemplation. Hopkins would deliberately withdraw the meaning from the reader assuming that the intellectual effort exacted from him is not only valuable as an act in itself but that it is a testimony of the poet’s artistic achievement (not to speak of the pleasure gained when the riddle is finally solved).

The Polish Vanguard school identified the “beautiful sentence” with metaphor in order to differentiate between prose that denominates from poetry whose task is to find pseudonyms. In his essay on “Poetic diction” Hopkins seems to have come to a similar conclusion claiming that the diction of prose must never be identified with that of poetry since it is only in poetry where the principle of parallelism works on the level of the structure of verse as well as on the level of words or thought. The critics of the Polish Vanguard treated metaphor as a means of the most economic kind of poetic expression. Their standpoint was that poetry should finally break off with the imitative and reproductive tendencies of the nineteenth-century art, and this seems to be expressive of the general tendency of the twentieth-century art. They understood the process of creation as an act of intellect; poetry was but the structuring of a new autonomous artistic reality. The role of metaphor in the creation was so particular because in the most economic way it was able to depict both emotional and intellectual essences. Needless to say, the new metaphor had nothing in common with the conventional one because its task was to create new meanings that had no counterpart in the world of reality. The new metaphor was used not to illustrate or catalogue elements existing in reality but to depict the psychological processes taking place when a work of art is created. What they demanded is in agreement with the general tendency of the European poetry of the times but can also be found in Hopkins’ practice. His use of metaphor, founded on the principle of the understandethought, seems to be even more elaborated because only a proper understanding of its function will illuminate the topic. The result of such an understanding of the function of metaphor is the withdrawn meaning, the emotional tone of the poems, and also the non-logical structure of them, particularly clearly expressive through the non-logical syntax. The non-logical syntax, through its use of hyperbaton and the other technical devices connected with it, was to imitate the associational thought processes. Brzękowski postulated elliptical syntax whose goal was, on the one hand, to select and confine so as the greatest possible discipline and economy of poetic expression was achieved, and, on the other, to illustrate the associational processes of the mind stirred into action and as such to stand in a clear contrast with the notion of the linear progress of thoughts. For both Hopkins and the Polish Vanguard school the goal was to get rid of the sterile clichés in poetry and find new, more appropriate means of expression. The most appropriate means would be those which would result in condensation, discipline, brevity, temperance and that is why elliptical syntax is so important. With the help of it the language is put into the focus of attention; words, sentences become all-important and the reader’s attention is concentrated not on the concepts the words and sentences stand for but on the language as the material of poetic creation. Each word, each sentence is important, and the poem, in fact, consists of a synthesis of such points. If a traditional poem presented the point of importance at the close of the logical argument, the poem written by Hopkins would be nothing but a synthesis of important points. It is worth noting that the Vanguard doctrine demands the same and sees in the elliptical structure of poetry the way to achieve it. This “development scheme”, characteristic of the Polish Vanguard (if this is a proper rendering of the Polish wiedza zakresniona), explains the problem in the best possible way. On the one hand, it draws the reader’s attention to the internal logic of the poem and gives the poet the possibility to be freed from any direct subjection to the external world; on the other hand, it is a constant reminder that a work of art is an autonomous entity.

From the above discussion concerning metaphor we could see how it dictates and engenders the particular structure of a poem and its diction. Now, the other role of metaphor should not be overlooked: the way it organizes emotions. Instead of pouring out his heart, the poet seeks to formalize his emotions, to find proper equivalents for them. Poetry is a disciplined structure and the poet is as well supposed to discipline his emotions. He must not present them in an outward and direct way. If he is a good poet, he must possess the “minor poetae” which prevents him from the immediate subjectivism, from some kind of emotional exhibitionism, and which makes him seek a substitute for the emotions. There is no need to repeat how exquisitely structured Hopkins’ metaphors are, what elegant substitutes he finds for his emotions, how strictly disciplined they are. The starting point of his poems are his personal experiences, but the way leading to their final shape is the equivalent of the opening situation, that is, the counterpart of the primary experience formed through the conscious interference of the poet himself. This conscious transformation is especially important in Hopkins’ case, particularly if one knows how many technical tricks he uses to hide his own personality behind his creation. Even if this timidity can be explained as being in concordance with his personality, what we finally are confronted with is this strictly disciplined and objectified equivalent of emotions the Vanguard critics so emphatically insisted upon. The corollary of such an understanding
of the creative work of an artist is the attention drawn to craftsmanship. Hopkins' craftsmanship is the effect of the activity of imagination, but imagination strictly controlled by intellect and poetic intuition and sensibility. This again is strikingly close to the way the Vanguard poets understood the function of imagination. In this way the evocative stressing of craftsmanship freed poetic imagination from its mystical envelope. The concept of creation was conceived of as founded on some psychic condition and expressive through the thought processes of the creator. It is worth noting how Hopkins' system concurs with this notion and the conclusions he arrives at, so long before the twentieth-century literary theorists, are therefore so valuable. The attention he draws to Platonic dialogues, the proper rendering of the emotional processes and their verbalization in his poems, the particular syntax he uses to depict these processes with, all testify to the proper understanding of the tendency of his time: the dramatic situation of the speaker of his dramatic monologues was invented to render the associational rather than logical structure of the mind. It is only natural that this fundamental tendency of the Victorian or at least the late Victorian period was transferred to English twentieth-century art and art criticism.

The Vanguard critics would also insist that poetry conceived of as structure governs over the chaos of reality because it consciously approves of certain rules of logic and insists upon strict obeying of them. This insistence upon the over-importance of form does not, thus, mean giving rid of "content"; this is not possible if poetry is to stay meaningful, or as Hopkins expresses it in the oft quoted essay "Poetry and verse":

some matter and meaning is essential to it [poetry] but only as an element necessary to support and employ the shape which is contemplated for its own sake.

This means that the poet's job is an act of conscious labour on his side and as such demands realization of the potentialities of the materials he works with; his supreme concern thus becomes the most exquisite organization of the material. Placing emphasis on form is the most important act of placing it in the proper relation of art to reality. In Hopkins' case the original experience, the starting point of his poems, may be of a mystic, religious character, but more important for our discussion of the form at least is his awareness that this experience must be given form, must be objectified, and that this process demands conscious effort on his side. The cognitive form is God's emblem, and the labour applied to make the form as perfect as possible testifies to the artist's deep religious feelings. The fascination with form becomes expressive of searching for new norms, new qualities and this appears again where the likeness between Hopkins' system and that of the Polish Vanguard critics can be found. Intellectual refinement, complication, are marks of the poet's conscious conquering of his material. From the reader's point of view, the compulsion is a stimulus to participate in the process of "foregrounding". Rhyme and rhythm are essential to the process and will be briefly analyzed here, all the more that there are again some correspondences between Hopkins' practice and that of the Polish Vanguard doctrine.

The most important similarity seems to be the insistence upon the semantic character of these two devices: (1) for the Vanguard critics rhyme is an organic, integral part of the utterance, a kind of external indicator of the internal relationship between sentences, connecting sentences close to each other by virtue of similarity and/or contrast in the emotional tone of the total poetic vision. Hopkins' insistence upon the semantic relationship between "rhyme-fellows" (Housset 1968:265) seems to testify to a similar kind of awareness, all differences taken into account; (2) the Vanguard theorists' realization of the semantic character of relationships in the rhythmic units resulted in their discarding of the conventional subordination to stiff and established rhythm-patterns. They insisted that the placing of words in a rhythmic unit should be based upon the principle of the necessity of the words being grouped by virtue of their semantic character and should never be done because of the demands of the imposed rhythmic structure. The only reason for which a word was given rhythmic emphasis should be the fact that the word functioned as some crystallizing centre in the utterance. Rhymical emphasis becomes thus an indicatory device introduced by the poet to direct his reader. Hopkins' search for rhythmic forms to express his excitations and extolations led him to violate simple metre but this, it seems, can be explained by his desire to find in Sprung Rhythm a means reflecting the pace of thought of the speaker under the stress of emotions. Hopkins' most sophisticated Sprung Rhythm cannot be seen as syllable-stress metre because in its final effect the Sprung Rhythm discards the metrical foot and works with rhetorical rather than metrical units. Harvey Gross observes in his Sound and form in modern poetry that Hopkins' confusion of the speaking of verse with metre, rhetorical stressing with basic structure gave ascent to the performative heresy (Gross 1955:93), and though he seems to be right because Hopkins' reader still encounters this kind of trouble, the fact of the poet's dissatisfaction with the current rhythms of poetry, unable to express the complex of thought and emotion, and also his insistence upon poetry being reinstated as spoken art, should be considered and given proper attention.

Hopkins' poetry popularity in the twentieth century resides in that it satisfies the expectations of the modern reader. To state this does not, however, mean to reject the earlier statement of the present study, that of Hopkins' poetical theory and practice being expressive of the nineteenth-century outlook and atmosphere. The confrontation of his system and the doctrine of the Polish Vanguard school was to testify to the process that began in the
to the activity of the mind as the only thing subjectable to the process of verification. This resulted both in the artistic form of the dramatic monologue (Koreczew 1969: 18-30) and the psychological criticism of I. A. Richards. This attitude is expressive of a character identified by the tendency to render the verisimilitude not through reflecting the external world but through imitating the work of the mind stirred into action. The artistic method must therefore be a monologue which juxtaposes logically disparate ideas either to indicate that the mind associates more or less according to Hume's principle (there is no such thing as objective causal nexus; the only thing that exists is subjective association of ideas), or to imitate the supposed chaos of ideas upon which the mind imposes order. And this artistic method dominates both Joyce's Ulysses and Eliot's Waste Land, the two works recognized as the touchstones of twentieth-century literature.

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