ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF CONCLUSIONS IN THE WHITE BOOK REGARDING THREATS AND CHALLENGES IN EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Among the many issues that were presented in the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Biała, 2013; Bezpieczeństwo, 2013),¹ there were also those related to the functioning of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Among other things, the White Book pointed to the significance of CSDP for Polish security and the need for EU Member States to broaden their collaboration in security and defence. In addition, the key problems occurring in the context of CSDP were underscored and some of their causes highlighted. The aim of this brief study is to present the factors responsible for weakening the effectiveness of CSDP as outlined in the White Book and consequently, their systematisation and extrapolation in the context of broader research.

The White Book underscores that Poland’s strategic work in respect to security should be based on three priorities. The first, maintenance of a determination and readiness to act in various spheres and fields of national security. The second, strengthening of international security community through a deepening of collaboration in respect to Euro-Atlantic matters, especially in the context of NATO, CSDP and strategic partners (to name but USA). The last priority, relates to the select participation of Poland in the international arena in respect to early prevention of threats and their origins, as well as the solution of already existing crises; a policy realised on the basis of an international mandate.

CSDP: EU CHALLENGES AND THREATS

In relation to Poland’s engagement in the initiative currently being realised in the context of CSDP, the authors of the White Book indicated several of the most important challenges and problems being faced by the EU in respect to a Common Security and Defence Policy.² In their view they are as follows:


² The sequence of factors listed is of no importance, but purely a liberty the present author has taken.
socio-economic issues such as the crisis in the Eurozone, fall in economic growth, low level of self-sufficiency in raw materials, the growing crisis in demography, as well as differences in living standards, income and access to goods and services of particular EU Member States and their citizens;

- the need to create a coherent EU policy in regard to Russia;

- intensification of work by the EU in common with NATO, mainly for the purposes of strengthening political coherence and increasing effectiveness of initiatives taken such as international operation security;

- the functioning of the 2003 European Security strategy (mostly no longer current), which is increasingly less applied to contemporary demands of the security environment. As a result, 2012 work on the European Global Strategy was undertaken, which is to result in the creation of a new EU security strategy (Biała, 2013: 160)\(^3\);

- changes arising in the context of the European Union that are related to enlargement and deepening of integrating processes (Lisbon Treaty). These are responsible for the need to redefine aims, tasks and priorities of EU security policy;

- the political will of EU Member States in respect to “the development of institutions, building of skills and active EU operational engagement in its neighbourhood” (Biała, 2013: 124). The development of European military capabilities shall serve such matters as initiatives of pooling, adaptation of the EU Battlegroup concept to the current demands of the immediate environment (for example through increasing the opportunities for their use), establishment of a permanent command-planning EU structure and broadening of collaboration with Eastern Partnership states;

- existential issues, among others, such as limited mutual trust between EU Member States;

- the need to furnish integration processes (also in security and defence) with a functional character, clearly underlining the fact that they have to meet the needs and interests of Member States;

- acceleration of the building of structures and procedures tied to CSDP, the European External Action Service, and in this regard to redefine common interests and strategic aims of EU Member States, as well as indicating the means of their realisation;

- the strengthening of EU profile as a strategic actor actively working on the international arena;

- comprehensive analysis of the fast-growing changes occurring among EU neighbours (the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe), as well as the evolution of the global power jigsaw taking place, which is related to among others, the world financial crisis and politics of so-called rising world-powers.

### CSDP: MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE EU

In summarising this part of the discussion one ought to emphasise that justifiably, the *White Book* highlighted the three most important issues from Poland’s point of view

in the common interest of EU Member States as far as CSDP is concerned (ibidem: 160). The first is the relative strength of EU security potential, including defence potential so as to meet the challenge of occurring and prognosed threats. The second is assessing the capability for individual protection (particular citizens), as well as protection of the collective (society) from various types of threats to their life and health. Finally, it is important to guarantee a safe environment for the development of the social and economic potential of Member States, as well as an optimum exploitation of this potential for the support of actions in the field of security.

In addition, it should be noted that the EU ought to conduct an active policy of “using opportunities and preventative reduction of threats, which is tied to the need to conduct international military and civil security operations” (ibidem: 160–161), as well as the maintenance of a state of readiness in terms of policy decision mechanisms, planning and training for the purposes of an effective response to real or potential threats. This is strongly tied, firstly, to the creation of mechanisms for joint operations between the EU and NATO and secondly, reform of planning systems and EU operational command.

One of the possible scenarios for the modernisation of CSDP is the formation of a so-called “European command (vanguard) in the field of security”, which could increase the effectiveness of joint action in the sphere of security and defence of the EU, strengthen civic and military capabilities in the sphere of crisis response and modernisation, and broaden partnerships of any industry on the part of defending EU Member States. In this context Poland should actively take part in initiatives of this type, which could take the form of collaboration in the context of the Weimar Triangle.

CSDP: CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS ACCORDING TO THE WHITE BOOK

The challenges and problems relating to CSDP indicated in the White Book can be divided into three basic categories:

1) internal causes related to the situation occurring in the context of the EU (for example, limited mutual trust on the part of Member States or the need to accelerate the construction of further CSDP structures and procedures);

2) external causes resulting from a situation in the international arena (for example, the intensification of activities conducted by the EU jointly with NATO and the number and escalation of new so-called hot spots occurring in various parts of the globe that impact on EU policy);

3) compound causes, where factors attributed to the above 2 come to overlap or combine (for example, a financial crisis that has both global and European implications).

Internal causes

The catalogue of issues in the joint security and defence policy for the EU presented in the White Book, is of a general nature and demands significant broadening. Among
the factors attributed to the first category (internal causes related to the EU) one ought to take into consideration also the following:

– the conflict over ‘leadership in the EU, as well as the growing crisis surrounding it. In future, should the role of EU leader be one tied to a single state, or perhaps several? If so, then in what configuration and on what terms and in what context? Is the concept of ‘a hard core ‘or ‘two speeds’ still relevant – or perhaps there is some form of dualism in referring to the concept of two EU budgets (one for the Eurozone and one other Member States), as well as in the field of foreign policy and defence planning;

– the significance of Member State national interests (Grosse, 2010). This can be observed, taking the example of the extent of the budget, for example a lack of consultation or exchange of information between states on the planned or conducted reduction of expenditure in the military sector. Another example is ‘the attachment’ of some states to their independence in the sphere of purchases or modernisation of arms. This weakens not only EU potential but also its integrity;

– the dependence of EU institutions on the need to gain support from Member States. In situations where there is a difference of position this can unduly extend or completely disable the decision making process. The large number of Member States and the range of views or interests means that cases such as these are not rare (Koszel, 2008; Smith, 2008). A good illustration of this in the past was the position taken towards conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq or Libya, the ballistic missile project and at present, the EU position taken towards Syria, Afghanistan and Iran, or indeed the future shape of the CSDP;

– the lack of serious debate on the position and role of the EU in the international arena. A number of questions and dilemmas accompany this, ones relating to for example the directions and concept of the further development of the EU, as well as the means of resolving key problems. One example is the lack of a comprehensive foreign policy strategy on the part of the EU (Zięba, 2007) and the differences between Member States that appear in relation to such policy priorities, it’s means of funding and realisation, among others. This situation, depending on the number and complexity of issues, as well as the tempo of processes arising on the international arena, accordingly weakens the position and image of the EU (Wojciuk, 2010; Sułek, 2013);

– the state of ongoing EU crisis. At present it is possible not only to speak of a financial or economic crisis, but indeed ‘a Europe of many crises’ (Roczniak, 2012: 49). Such problems relate to among others, society, institutions, political leadership, legitimisation etc – while at the same time embracing various sectors of integration, including security and defence. Onto all of this, there is in addition overlaid the issue of an EU of many cultures, escalation of radicalism and the strengthening of social movements against EU integration;

– the tensions leading to a conflict of a political or competence nature occurring between particular EU institutions or states. This is demonstrated by discussion on the subject of opening a permanent operational command (OHQ) initiated by the ministers of France, Germany and Poland. The proposition has met, however, with opposition from Great Britain who hold that increasing the effectiveness of EU command submissions should be realised not by creating new institutions, but by making exist-
ing procedures more effective. This has resulted in a heated discussion among not only Member States but also EU institutions (Rocznik, 2012: 253–255);

– the fall of interest in the question of security. The escalation of economic problems and the lowering of perceived levels of threat (in the context of terrorism) has caused that both among political elites, as well as public opinion, it is possible to observe a lower interest in the sphere of security and defence. This is accompanied by a fall of support for the idea of using military force or EU engagement in conflict situations;

– lack of comprehensive solutions regarding some aspects of the functioning of CSDP. One illustration is the EU engagement in fighting piracy on the shores of Somalia. The sea and air patrols conducted in the context of Operation Atlanta and the appropriate coordination of activities with NATO forces has turned out to be rather an effective instrument in removing piracy. It was not, however, possible to create effective solutions that would lead to the elimination of causes of this problem or indeed the sources of piracy itself;

– the delay in the realisation of accepted programmes and plans, as well as clear signs of stagnation in certain sectors of CSDP. A good example of this are the several-year delays relating to the Galileo navigation system, problems tied to the functioning of Battlegroups and deregulation of the arms market (Terlikowski, 2011; Galileo, 2013). All this corresponds to the lengthy nature of many decision-making processes. These are extended, among others, as a result of ‘unending’ consultations between particular states or organs, or as a result of complex procedures of an administrative and/or legal nature (the long process of forming many EU missions). This lowers effectiveness to a significant degree, and consequently the credibility of the EU, as well as its policies. An apt illustration of this was the belated reaction of the EU to the bloodletting and political crisis that arose in Ukraine at the beginning of 2014;

– obstacles of a strictly bureaucratic nature. These reflect the case of difficulties related to the realisation of a so-called civic operational aim and insufficient number of local experts. Though this was recognised formally by Member States, such obstacles of administrative and legal nature made their resolution difficult;

– the human factor; in some Member States there is a lack of appropriately trained personnel, especially in relation to activity in the international arena. Moreover, there are instances of corruption or a lack of professionalism among the political elites, as well as officials in public institutions.

**External causes**

Analysing, however, the external causes of CSDP weakness indicated by the White Book, one needs to in addition, also highlight the great extent of threats occurring on the international stage, which directly or indirectly have an impact on the general issue of EU security and defence. Threats as such possess both a geographic (hot spots such as Iran, Syria, Somalia and North Korea) and subject-specific dimension (terrorism, fundamentalism, separatism, conventional arms, arms of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts and finally, failed states) (Booth 2008; Security, 2008; Contemporary, 2010;
Europejska, 2009). The list of these threats in both cases is subject to constant modification and change, which further complicates the planning and administration of CSDP.

Of importance also is the impending decrease of USA military engagement in Europe. In the context of present American defence strategies the issue of European defence is being taken over in importance by other regions such as Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East. This is in line with decisions relating to a decrease of expenditure (487 billion dollars) for 2012–2021 by the US Department of Defence – and a further reduction is also possible in years to come. The 2011 Budget Control Act has plans put into place whereby a lack of agreement in respect to a reduction of the deficit to 1.2 billion dollars by 2021, the American budget shall be reduced by a further 500 billion dollars (Daggett, 2012; NATO’s, 2012). This in turn means that the EU has to take over from the USA a part of the relevant defence tasks and correspondingly, accept a greater participation in costs, such as the functioning of NATO. The scale of financial disproportion between the USA and EU in terms of funding designated for military expenses is shown in the table below.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>% change</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>€194 billion</td>
<td>€193 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of GDP</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
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<tr>
<td>As % of Total Government</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
<td>€390</td>
<td>€387</td>
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* A significant part of this percentage change is due to exchange rate variations. If instead of values in euros, values in dollars were used, the percentage change of the US total defence expenditure between 2010 and 2011 would be +1.5% and that of the defence expenditure per capita would be +0.9%.


The intensification of activity on the international stage by entities such as Russia and China is also becoming noticeable. This relates to various aspects of activity such as economic, military in the context of geo-politics and finally, espionage, which in turn forces the EU to take counter measures and consequently, the allocation of further resources and finances.

**Compound causes**

In respect to the third group, relating to compound causes (both external and internal factors combined) raised in the White Book, more focus ought to be devoted to such issues as the above mentioned variety of challenges that the EU is facing, as well as the high pace of change arising across the globe that necessitates EU engagement in many parts and as a consequence, the so-called dilution of available finances. One illustration

CSDP Destabilising factors

One key determinant responsible for the weakening at present of CSDP action is the financial crisis (Małkiewicz, 2010; Kryzys, 2011) that has both a global, as well as strictly European dimension (mainly EU). In the case of the EU this has resulted in, among others, the slowing of the economy, rise of unemployment and fall in budget revenues. This in turn has directly translated into a reduction of funding for the defence sector, including a fall of expenditure on modernisation and long-term research and development programmes. In total, in the past three years, defence expenditure for EU Member States has decreased by about US$45 billion (Valasek, 2011).

As a source of CSDP weakness it is possible to see also another factor recognised as a positive aspect in its functioning, namely one of the fundamental regulations determining that EU action on the international arena has to be in accord with the United Nations Charter – that is the decisions of the Security Council. From a legal point of this is absolutely correct, but from a strategic one, however, this principle can limit EU effectiveness in for example, the resolution of conflicts.

Another important challenge in this context are relations are rising in the geopolitical triangle of EU-NATO-USA. An analysis of foreign policy in this respect for the EU and its respective Member States, shows not only a difference of conception and/or particular interest, but also of particular consequence in respect to CSDP such as the fears of some Member States of EU militarisation and a ‘conflict-of-interest’ with NATO (Natkański, 2004; Turczyński, 2012; Demkowicz, 2007; Tavares, 2010; Soja 2011; McCormick 2011). One example here is the assessment of the situation in Afghanistan or Syria, the question of ballistic missile defence and many other related issues (Kiwerska, 2013; Partners, 2013).

One should also note the phenomenon of ‘two speeds’ taking place both in the context of NATO and CSDP, with various degrees of engagement being shown by particular Member States in its functioning. This in effect has been raised by general secretary of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who stated that European members at present only are responsible for 20% of defence expenditure of NATO states, which carries with it a variety of consequences. In his view the most important are as follows (Szef, 2011):
– the EU is losing the ability (capability) to take part in international crisis operations, which results from the limiting of military capabilities such as air force, reconnaissance or logistics. One of the latest cases in point was the operation in Libya where the EU needed support from the US;
– a low share of defence expenditure will lead to a fall in the importance of the EU on the international stage. This particular geopolitical hiatus can be filled by other entities such as China, India or Brazil. As a result the USA can place greater emphasis on relations with the preceding at the expense of EU, thus weakening transatlantic relations;
– this state of affairs can in addition, strengthen the pressure of American public opinion – increasingly opposed to paying out of their own taxes – to fund European security.

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It can be argued that the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (WBNSRP) justifiably advances such questions tied to the problems and challenges relating to a Common Security and Defence Policy for the EU. The research presented on account of its research nature has, however, it can be said a rather general formula and therefore should be viewed rather as an introduction to further debate on related issues. The list of so-called problems relating to CSDP as related in the White Book needs to be broadened, among others in terms of the factors outlined and then given a framework according to clearly defined criteria. One such possible solution is the division presented in the text embracing three main groups of precipitating factors: internal related to the situation in the context of EU, external arising out of the situation on the international stage and lastly, factors arising out of a combination of elements in the previous two categories.

The main causes responsible for the challenges and threats occurring in the context of CSDP, also underscored in the White Book, should be seen among several varied factors. In particular, the following determinants deserve to be distinguished: differences of positions and interests of Member States, financial problems (budget cuts) and the economic crisis in the EU, lack of a decided political mindset in relation to reforms and renewed collaboration in the sector analysed, as well as mechanisms described as Three Wise Monkeys whereby a ‘selective’ view is taken as far as recognition of a common enemy is concerned…

This particular ‘selective view’ ‘expired’ together with the end of the Cold War, and later again together with the ‘fading’ of fears relating to threats from fundamentalist Islamic terrorism (Jackson, 2011; Wojciechowski, 2013), exemplified among others by the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid or London. Such a point of view should, however, be reformulated on account of the threats relating to failed states, fundamentalism, terrorism, mass migration and major bloodlettings, exemplified by the situation in Ukraine at the beginning of 2014. This it can be said, is essential from the point of view of the EU, as well as its particular Member States.

Further reforms in the context of CSDP will significantly impact not only on the security of Poland or other Member States, as well as all of the EU. The head of the National Security office Stanis³aw Koziej emphasised this during a conference on new EU security strategies, held in Warsaw, October 2012. He went on to maintain that a new security strategy should be established, one that takes into account national interests and after establishing EU Member State mutual interests, one that clarifies relations arising on the EU-NATO horizon. This ought to be conducted into two stages. The first,
a strategic review of national security of every Member State based on a definition of its interests as strategic objectives. The second stage would embrace a review of the security of all the EU, with the aim of defining common interests lying at the basis of a new strategy (Koziej, 2012).

Increasing the effectiveness of CSDP is a very difficult task indeed. This is exemplified by for example, the conclusion to the European Council summit (19–20 December 2013) relating to a common security and defence policy. The above summarises a decade of work on the part of the European commission and EU Member States on further CSDP reform. Among others, the following were pointed out: the so-called impotence of the EU in this particular field, differences in security priorities of respective Member States, budgetary limitations, fragmentation of European arms markets and finally, difficulties in negotiating common positions on these and related matters.

As a consequence, further initiatives in the context of CSDP are only advanced by a relatively small ‘coalition of eager beavers’, which may result in the future in a differentiation of EU integration level as far as defence and security is concerned for particular Member States. So as to counteract this the European Council has established three priority actions such as increasing operational effectiveness, ‘visibility’ and strength of CSDP impact, growth of EU defence capabilities and strengthening of the European defence sector. The European Council in particular emphasised the means of their realisation and forecast another assessment, which is to be conducted in June 2015.

It is to be hoped that the planned actions will not only be realised but also contribute to the strengthening of CSDP, as well as at least to some extent, the limitation of challenges and problems arising in this sphere as indicated among others, in the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland.

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ABSTRACT

Among the many issues that were raised in the *White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland* (WBNSRP), there were also those related to the functioning of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Its importance for the security of Poland was indicated, as well as the need on the part of EU Member States to broaden collaboration in the sphere of security and defence. The key problems occurring in the context of CSDP were also emphasised and their causes indicated. The aim of the article is to present the factors responsible for the weakening of CSDP effectiveness, ones taken into account in the *White Book*, and subsequently to present a Framework for their analysis in the light of further scholarship.

ANALIZA I OCENA WNIOSKÓW ZAWARTYCH W BIAŁEJ KSIĘDZE BEZPIECZEŃSTWA NARODOWEGO RP DOTYCZĄCYCH WYZWAŃ I ZAGROŽEŃ DLA WPBiO UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

STRESZCZENIE

Wśród wielu kwestii, które zostały prezentowane w Białej Księdze Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej poruszono także zagadnienia związane z funkcjonowaniem Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony (WPBiO). Wskazano m.in. na znaczenie WPBiO dla bezpieczeństwa Polski czy konieczność rozszerzenia przez państwa członkowskie Unii Europejskiej współpracy w sferze bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Podkreślono również kluczowe problemy występujące w obrębie WPBiO oraz zasygnalizowano niektóre ich przyczyny. Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie czynników osłabiających efektywność WPBiO uwzględnionych w Białej Księdze Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, a następnie ich usystematyzowanie oraz ukazanie w świetle szerszej analizy naukowej.