Intellectuals, Power, and Knowledge
Studies in the Philosophy of Culture and Education
Contents

Acknowledgments ................................................................................................ 7
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 11

Part I

CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER 2
Agents, Spectators, and Social Hope: Richard Rorty and American Intellectuals ............................................................... 48

CHAPTER 3
Wolf Lepenies: Homo Europaeus Intellectualis Revisited ......................... 76

CHAPTER 4
Zygmunt Bauman and the Question of the Intellectual in Postmodernity .. 95

CHAPTER 5
Between the Community and the Text. French Philosophy, Politics, and the Figure of the Intellectual – from Sartre to Foucault .............. 121

CHAPTER 6
The French Hegel and Postmodern Thought ..................................................... 148

CHAPTER 7
Knowledge and History. The Postmodern French Humanities and Deleuze's Nietzscheanism ................................................................. 161
Part II

Chapter 8
Globalization and Higher Education ............................................ 181

Chapter 9
Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Transformation of Higher Education in Central and Eastern Europe ........................................ 201

Chapter 10
The Institution of the University: The Current Discourse on the European Higher Education and Research Space .......................... 221

Chapter 11
Gone with the Modern Wind? National Identity, Democracy, and the University in the Global Age .................................................... 246

Chapter 12
The Identity Crisis? Philosophical Questions about the University as a Modern Institution .............................................................. 260

Chapter 13
The Emergent European Educational Policies Under Scrutiny. The Bologna Process from a Central European Perspective ............... 275
Acknowledgments

This book originated in some discussions I had at a number of institutions in recent years: at the University of California at Berkeley where I held my Kosciuszko Foundation postdoctoral visiting fellowship; the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies of the Free University in Berlin where I was a visiting scholar; the Central European University in Budapest where I was both a visiting professor and then an International OSI Policy Fellow; the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in Washington DC, where I was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow; numerous conference places mostly in Europe; and, last but not least, my home Department of Philosophy at Poznań University. I was lucky to have had wonderful people around me and some excellent libraries to consult. My Department and the University were also kind enough to allow me to travel extensively to do research for the present collection of essays. In addition I am grateful for the grant I received from the Polish State Committee for Scientific Research (KBN) for the years 2001–2003 (0032/H01/2001/20), which has helped me to advance some parts of the project.

I would like to thank the following people for helping me in one way or another to improve or clarify my arguments over the years, for various parts of the project: Martin Jay, Zygmunt Bauman, Richard Rorty, Philip G. Altbach, Voldemar Tomusk, Jürgen Enders, Lech Witkowski, Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska, Anna Pałubicka, Piotr W. Juchacz, Yehuda Elkana, Peter Darvas, and others. I must also thank
the two wonderful, enthusiastic project managers I was lucky to work with in recent years: Pamela Kilpadi of the Center for Policy Studies at the Central European University in Budapest and Sally Blair of the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington DC. All mistakes and limitations of the book are certainly mine, though.

Additionally, I am grateful to the editors of the journals and the collections of essays who had originally accepted these papers for publication and now have kindly agreed to let me reproduce them here: especially Roger Deacon, Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp, Martin Ehala, Monika Kostera, Jan Sadalak, Jan De Groof, Zbigniew Drozdowicz, and Voldemar Tomusk. I also want to thank the Polish Ministry of Education and Sports for the financial support I received from them for the publication of the present volume, which was strongly recommended to them by the two reviewers, Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska and Aldona Jawłowska, for which I am very grateful. Finally, my thanks go to the editors of the Dia-Logos series of Peter Lang, Tadeusz Buksinski and Piotr W. Juchacz for their continuous support of my projects.

The provenance of the essays (sometimes slightly modified for the purposes of the present volume) is as follows. I am most grateful to each of the editors and publishers for the permission to reproduce the papers here.


Chapter 4 ("Zygmunt Bauman and the Question of the Intellectual in Postmodernity") appeared in a Working Paper Series of the Center
for Western European Studies, University of California, Berkeley, no. 22, September 1997, pp. 1–22.


Chapter 6 ("The French Hegel and Postmodern Thought") is an unpublished manuscript.

Chapter 7 ("Knowledge and History. The Postmodern French Humanities and Deleuze’s Nietzsheanism") appeared in Master of Business Administration. A Journal, no. 6(47), November–December 2000 (Warszawa: the Koźmiński Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management), pp. 26–32.


Introduction

1. Philosophy in Contemporary Culture: Between Science and Literature?

Philosophizing, in general, seems to move between two extreme models, that of science and that of literature. The more it moves away from one, the closer it comes to the other. These differing models are not interchangeable, not mutually accessible, nor are they commensurable. Each powerful move in one or the other direction gives birth to violent questions about philosophy's future, status, place and role in culture (see Chapter 6).

What has changed with the advent of postmodern philosophy to the philosophical scene is that the equilibrium worked out over the years has been altered and the scale has begun to move in the direction of literature. Not that until recently philosophy had science as its model (for, since Hegel and Nietzsche, philosophers have not needed science for their identity), but it surely was at a safe distance from literature. Postmodern philosophy seems to have brought with it, among other things, a much higher valuation of literature and its models for philosophical investigations. This influence can be seen first of all in Continental, mainly French, philosophy, but also in historiography, sociology or anthropology. But is philosophy gradually turning into literature? And, what, in the long run, is the

1 Sociology had very similar hesitations for a long time, as Wolf Lepenies shows in his *Between Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology*, transl. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). See Chapter 3.
significance of its deviation from science and toward literature (see Chapter 1)? The issue is one of growing modesty, moderation and caution in philosophical discourse as opposed to its more traditional certainty and to the modern, Enlightenment conviction of the infallibility of science. The advent of postmodernity came also to mean the end of the traditional modern figure of the intellectual, with his specific roles and tasks in modern, mainly Continental, culture (see Chapter 2).

The fundamental paradigm of the Western tradition – the paradigm of knowing as descended from Plato – is currently being eroded. This paradigm is not as attractive to contemporary culture as to earlier times. Indeed, there have always been opponents who doubted that “man’s essence is to be a knower of essences,” as Richard Rorty put it in his magisterial Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Postmodern thinking in philosophy has exposed doubts over the hegemony of only one vision of the human being (according to which his paradigmatic activity is precisely that of knowing). The exposure of these doubts has begun to undermine the predominant conception of philosophy. It may be the case that man apart from knowing – paradigmatically by means of science and science-oriented philosophy – also feels, self-creates, and takes care of himself. In postmodern culture, sentiment is opposed to reason and solidarity is counterbalanced by self-creation (Richard Rorty), the Platonic commandment “you shall know!” is opposed by the (also Platonic) suggestion “take care of himself!” (in the late Michel Foucault), the “wisdom of philosophy” is confronted with the “wisdom of the novel” (in Milan Kundera’s Art of the Novel). Thus, even if philosophy is not threatened with the extreme of becoming literature, it is confronted with a possible change in its predominant conception in the future. The change in its relationships with science makes it necessary to consider new alliances as well as to look for new

---

supporters and new strategic treaties. As postmodern philosophy has successfully put into question the universal model of philosophy, perhaps philosophers might want to look for philosophical answers that are somehow more transitory, less binding and much more local in time and space (see Chapter 4).

It seems to me that the traumatic events of the last century have caused enormous transformations in philosophical thinking (see especially Chapter 4). The changes in Continental philosophical consciousness at the end of the 20th century cannot be fully understood without taking into account the wars and revolutions of the last century as well as the social and political engagement of philosophers (and, in the context of Part 1 of the volume, intellectuals) in consort with them. Indeed, philosophy in this century has been a field of ideological battles, of struggles not only for its own future as a discipline, but also for the future of the university, the nation, the state, Europe and, even, the world. I see postmodern philosophy as, among other things, a return to a philosophy of the awareness of the historicity of thought as well as of the philosopher’s weighty, individual responsibility for his philosophical proposals.

No matter where Continental postmodern thought took root (from Marx, Freud, structuralism or the French Hegel, as read by Alexandre Kojève in the 1940s and later confronted with the French “new Nietzsche” in the 1960s and 1970s3), it is closer to literature than to science (see Chapter 7). The role of philosophy in culture is changing from a provider of fundamental knowledge in synthesis with science and theology, to a superscience of global and universal aspirations, and finally to a substitute of religion for the secular intellectual.

From a cursory review of some of philosophy’s recent roles, one can see that the relationship in question has become more and more transitory: philosophy as a weapon in struggles with the political and

---

economic status quo; philosophy as an individualistic “care of the self” or (Nietzschean in spirit) “aesthetic of existence”; philosophy as advanced and high-level cultural criticism. All the above examples, present in the recent philosophical discourse, are commonly referred to as “postmodern”. Surely, there are different types of postmodernisms and types of philosophy. The result, though, is a growing awareness that there is no pre-existing entity called philosophy that determines precisely what it is and is not. Therefore, increasingly, philosophy is what is named philosophy by the participants in philosophic discourse. It is they, those deeply involved both in contemporary culture and in traditional philosophical questions, who determine the new conceptualizations of philosophy according to more or less contemporary needs.

Thus, there is no longer only one relationship between science and philosophy, be it of concert or of antagonism. Rather, I believe, there are as many relationships as there are conceptions of philosophy — meaning precisely conceptualizations, that is to say, answers to the question: “what is philosophy?” A multitude of viewpoints, a multiplicity of possible descriptions, a diversity of perspectives and horizons have long been a genre specific of literature and the novel since the time of Cervantes. Milan Kundera, in his exciting *The Art of the Novel*, says that the novel is a utopia, a “paradise of individuals” in which everyone can have his own view, everyone can be right. Before, the world of the novel and that of traditional philosophy never fit together since they were nourished by different ideals. Today the kinship between these two spheres may be greater than ever before (see Chapter 1).

Even so, philosophy will never become literature. It has a different history in respect to which each successive philosopher and each successive philosophy describes his and its own place. To participate in the “history of the novel” is to be part of the great tradition of the novel; to participate in the “history of philosophy” is to be part of the great tradition of philosophy. The novelist and the philosopher choose a different history and a different tradition for themselves, but at the same time they attempt to expose and transcend their most important predecessors in literature and in philosophy (see Chapter 1).
The choice of predecessors to transcend is the beginning of a search for identity, the beginning of fashioning a self-image. In this sense there would be no novel “in general” as there would be no philosophy “in general”. The morals provided by philosophy and by the novel flow from reading the history of philosophy and the history of the novel (according to both Rorty and Kundera). Is there thus a danger of philosophy becoming literature? No, there is not, as they differ in their respective traditions without which – or outside of which – neither of them can exist.

What positive aspects would result if postmodern philosophy turned philosophy, in general, away from science? First, there would be an end to the Enlightenment ethos of personal participation in constant progress, the ethos of the individual moving along on an infallible road leading humanity to future happiness (the ethos discussed in the majority of essays in Part 1 as embodied by modern intellectuals). Second, there would appear a greater sensitivity to the here and now – rather than to, and instead of, sanctioning a promised, future telos. Third, there would be a deepening awareness of the heteronomy and heterogeneity of different philosophical discourses, an awareness of the riches issuing out of cultural differences. Fourth, there would be an expanding discussion of the public role of the philosopher, of the expectations directed toward him and of the possible fulfilment of the social hopes invested in him. Fifth, finally, there would emerge a re-evaluation of the self-image of the philosopher: is he a social engineer, a scientist or a poet? Is he a private or public thinker? Is there a way in which perhaps he could be a combination of these? Each role has had in the twentieth century its influential actor, each of them brings about different dangers and different possibilities. Whatever the fate of the “postmodern turn” – and regardless of the fact whether, with the passage of time, it will really be a “turn” or just a momentary and transitory change in philosophical thinking – some questions have been forcefully posed as to the definition of the philosopher and his role in culture – his

4 These are the questions underlying Richard Rorty’s *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See Chapter 1.
Introduction

tasks, obligations, place and finally (social, political and intellectual) responsibilities. Although neglected and disregarded by analytic philosophy, these questions have led, in Continental philosophy in its postmodern variation, to extremely important discussions both in France and the US. They will not be, I suppose, without repercussions for philosophy in general, even though they emerged out of local struggles and local needs (as was the case at the end of the eighties with discussions about the Nazi entanglements of Heidegger’s philosophy after the publication of Victor Farias’ book *Heidegger et le nazisme* and about the young Paul de Man’s wartime journalism\(^5\)).

The oscillation of philosophy between science and literature is at the same time the philosopher’s oscillation between the scientist (including the social engineer) and poet. In antiquity, the debate between philosophy and poetry was won by the former and, consequently, Plato banned poets from the polis. In postmodernity, banned poets may perhaps be returning as victors and trying to ban (traditional, epistemology-oriented and universalistic) philosophy. Yet what has changed since the ancient *polis* is that literature, poetry and philosophy have all acquired their own histories – none of which can by any means be banned from culture (see Chapter 1). It may be that postmodern philosophy was just another reminder, stronger than all previous ones, that the world changes much more radically than traditional philosophy can see from its perspective of *sub specie aeternitatis*. It may also be that postmodern philosophy was just another philosophical reminder that the world is approaching the global age, especially in culture, morals, and politics.

---

\(^5\) For “Heidegger affair”, see especially the books and papers by Hugo Ott, Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, Tom Rockmore, Joseph Margolis, Luc Feery and Alain Renaut, Thomas Sheehan, Dominique Janicaud, Hans Sluga, Jacques Derrida, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-François Lyotard, François Février, Richard Wolin, Hans-Georg Gadamer and many others. For the “de Man affair” see especially the books and papers by Jean-Luc Nancy, Catherine Gallagher, Werner Hamacher, Wlad Godzich, Dominick LaCapra, Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman, Alice Yaeger Kaplan, Ortwin de Graeff, J. Hillis Miller, Rodolph Gasché, Lindsay Waters, Christopher Norris and others. All the books and papers on these two themes appeared generally between the mid-eighties and mid-nineties.
Thus, while on the one hand philosophy is growing more alienated from culture — moving closer to science — and becoming more culturally dead, on the other hand it is moving further away from science, accepting in increased measure literature’s conventions, forms, and even tasks and obligations. The world of textualism is quite tempting for philosophy, and it is definitely far distant from a traditionally scientific, not to mention scientistic, account of the world (see Chapter 6). As there is no one single philosophy, so there is no one single postmodern philosophy (there are rather individual, idiosyncratic, unique projects of particular postmodern philosophers. Perhaps it is even better to speak of Rorty’s, Lyotard’s, Derrida’s, or Foucault’s philosophies rather than of their neopragmatism, postmodernism, deconstruction or archeology/genealogy). One point can surely be made with respect to the different postmodern philosophical proposals — namely, that they generally manifest an aversion or distaste for the scientific method. They eschew scientific discourse in philosophy and the means and goals traditionally ascribed to science while expressing admiration for the aims and methods of literature and the arts.

It is still hard to think of the postmodern turn at the moment; it doesn’t threaten the dominant paradigm of philosophy with collapse. And though philosophy finds a growing number of anomalies within itself, the road to critical mass is still a distant one. The questions posed by postmodern thinking are fundamental in nature, but they can still be easily ignored in mainstream philosophy. Yet what they propose is an examination of philosophy and philosophers (but also sociology and sociologists, history and historians, anthropology and anthropologists etc.) in a new cultural setting, in which everything (that has over the ages been so carefully gathered together and so intensely discussed) has to be re-tested. There are probably two roads open to philosophy at the moment: either it becomes ever more scientific, and thereby alienated from culture, or it moves closer to literature and as a consequence becomes powerless. The scientific road would lead philosophy away from society at large; the literary road would remove from philosophy the cultural authority traditionally accorded it by society. Philosophy is confronted by a
more dramatic crossroads than the other humanistic disciplines since it was precisely philosophy that once was the “queen of the sciences” and the ground of all the other disciplines. A “philosophical point of view” used to be extremely important and the philosopher’s voice over the centuries has attempted, with varying results, to dominate the cultural conversation. In a contrary vein, postmodern philosophy no longer wants to dominate the conversation, to be the foundation for the whole edifice of culture or to look for “philosophical” solutions to all traditionally “philosophical” questions.

Consequently, the relationships between philosophy and science on the one hand and literature on the other have changed. Though the relationship of philosophy with science has not changed much in mainstream philosophy, enormous transformations are occurring within its tiny postmodern segment. Science within this new constellation is no longer a model or an ideal, and the heretofore bilateral exchange of influence moves in one direction only. Specifically, postmodern philosophy undermines the traditional foundations of science and science’s unshaken belief in certain and unfailing methods. It questions science’s belief in its emancipatory significance for culture and humanity in general; it questions the emancipatory significance of intellectuals in postmodernity, or late modernity. In a word, postmodern philosophy performs a negative, destructive task for the purpose of deepening our awareness of the dangers of the Enlightenment – and the modern – belief in Reason (much as postmodern philosophy itself, in varying degrees, has ceased to believe in Progress, History, or Truth). The participation of philosophy and literature (or, to be more exact, of some philosophers and some writers) in the most traumatic events of the twentieth century gives much food for thought. This question involves their respective roles in changing the world and mankind, constructing a paradise on earth and fitting whole nations and societies into a dimension politically chosen in advance.6

6 For this theme, see especially Chapter 4 and generally Zygmunt Bauman’s consistently negative accounts of modernity in such books as Modernity and the Holocaust (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989), Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: Polity Press,
Paradoxically enough, by moving away from science and getting closer to literature, postmodern philosophy has a chance to become—or is already here and there becoming—moralist. The recent Jacques Derrida in his texts on “ethics” and “responsibility” or the late Michel Foucault in his vast project of the “history of sexuality” and “aesthetics of existence”, and surely Zygmunt Bauman in all his recent reflections on the “postmodern ethics,” are such moralists.7 A turn from science, from epistemological thinking in philosophy and legislative thinking in ethics, opens hitherto totally unknown possibilities to this segment of philosophy, bringing it, potentially at least, closer to life, to the individual and the community. Philosophy itself will decide what obligations it will take upon itself as it confronts its past adventures with modernity. If critical mass be reached some time in the future, a transformation of philosophy might take place, and if not, what we today call postmodern philosophy may simply cease to be called philosophy.

2. Power and Knowledge:
The Modern Intellectual and the Modern University

It is interesting to try to see the relationship between the concept of postmodernity (as used in the philosophy of culture) and that of globalization or the global age (as used in many non-philosophical areas, but also in the philosophy of education). “Postmodernity” was certainly the catchword at the beginning of the nineties, just as “globalization” was the catchword at the the end of the decade and

continues to be until today. To see how the relationship between power and knowledge changes, it is interesting to look at the two magisterial products of modernity discussed in the present volume: the modern (and usually leftist) intellectual engaged in changing the world (Part 1), and the modern nation-state focused, and welfare-state supported, institution of the university (Part 2).

As Andy Green noted, "historically, education has been both parent and child to the developing nation state. The national education system as a universal and public institution first emerged in post-revolutionary Europe as an instrument of state formation. It provided a powerful vehicle for the construction and integration of the new nation-state and became one of its chief institutional supports. Since then, few nations have embarked on independent statehood without recourse to its ideological potential; even the older states, at least in periods of war and crisis, have continued to view education as a valuable source of national cohesion and a key tool for economic development. However, the role of the nation-state is now changing, and with it the place of education".8 The place of higher education especially, let us add, is changing; which is of greatest interest to us in the second part of the present volume.

Two modern achievements, the modern figure of the intellectual and the modern institution of the university, have been undergoing a radical crisis of identity. As we develop this theme in Chapter 12, the decline of the philosophical project of modernity is turning out to be a painful process for modern culture: once again it has to reformulate the aims of its social institutions (for us here, the aims of the university) and the tasks of its cultural heroes (for us here, the tasks of the intellectual). If it is successful, the institutions and cultural heroes in question will regain their cultural vitality; if it is not, they will fall into cultural sterility. The traditional modern figure of the intellectual seems untenable in a more and more postmodern cultural surrounding. The modern institution of the university may face a similar fate in a more and more globalized surrounding; either it is

---

going to accept the rules of bureaucratic, consumer-oriented corporations, or it will have to try once again to find a new regulative idea which would have to be as transformative as the role suggested for the university two hundred years ago by German Idealists and Romantics. The breakthrough in the conception of the university two hundred years ago was an event equal in importance to the vast social and cultural transformations of that time. It is hard to tell whether there will appear new ideas about the university comparable in significance.

As Zygmunt Bauman in *The Individualized Society* remarks, the present educational crisis is first and foremost “a crisis of inherited institutions and inherited philosophies”. They were meant for a different kind of reality and they find it increasingly difficult to absorb, accommodate and hold the changes “without a thorough revision of the conceptual frames they deploy. ... Among many aspects distinguishing modern civilization from other modes of human cohabitation, the marriage between knowledge and power is perhaps the most conspicuous and seminal. Modern power seeks enlightenment and guidance in scholarship, while modern knowledge follows August Comte’s succinct yet precise recipe savoir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pouvoir – to know in order to have the power to act. And since modern civilization has been all along mostly about acting, about making things different from what they were and about using power to enforce change – the marriage placed the practitioners of knowledge, the discoverers of new truths and disseminators of old ones, either close to or in competition with the rulers and in the top rank of spiritual authority”.9 Traditionally, the practitioners of knowledge were located at modern universities; nowadays, however, they are increasingly outside academia and in the for-profit sector of the economy (see Chapter 10).

The questions about the modern university and about the modern intellectual are inseparable from a more general question about modernity as a large cultural, social and political project. The institution of the university may be soon affected by the gradual

---

completion of this project. Another modern product, the figure of the intellectual in the form we are familiar from Zola to Sartre (and perhaps even to the middle Foucault) in France, as it is discussed in the present volume, is already affected by it. It is both the intellectual and the modern institution of the university that turn out to be closely, for better or for worse, associated with modernity. Doubts about modernity go hand in hand with doubts about the figure of the intellectual and the modern university. Therefore, incidentally, one can often hear that “the confidence of intellectuals in their own activities has been reduced and there is no one available to speak for the university”.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, in this context it is interesting to study the relationship between the figure of the modern intellectual and the institution of the modern university – from the perspective of the tasks imposed on both by the that large-scale project. Thus, the history of the university and the history of the intellectual in the 20th century being parallel, the present volume consists of essays in the philosophy of culture (devoted to the intellectual) and in the philosophy of education (devoted to the modern university) and attempts to link the two modern themes together.

Part I
Let us begin with a generalisation: Richard Rorty’s approach to literature is consistently – to use his own opposition – “solidarity-related”; what he calls the “other side”, literary self-creation, remains programmatically and intentionally undiscussed. One gets the impression that literature, and the novel in particular, is being burdened with an (“unbearable”) heaviness of responsibility. Does the novel in Rorty’s reflections appear as a source of multifarious metaphors, of whole worlds born out of a writer’s imagination? Is there in it another dimension, where mundane obligations no longer bind the human being and where one can give rein to usually hidden desires and passions? The answer is in the negative.

The world of fiction of which Richard Rorty writes is a pragmatised one, where fiction itself is supposed first to build, and then defend, a democratic, liberal order. At the other extreme, there is philosophy with its right to choose self-creation (encapsulated, perhaps, in fragments of Derrida: telecommunicational fantasies from The Post Card or quasi-polemics from Limited Inc.). The situation as outlined by Rorty might be described in the following manner: while the writer has to be responsible (in a manner similar to Sartre’s conception of littérature engagée), the philosopher may indulge in a certain amount of irresponsibility, or may cease trying always to say
something relevant about social problems. It is as if, after more than twenty five centuries, the "poets" are being ordered back into the *polis* and made to think about the state and laws, which relieves at least some philosophers from the respectful Platonic duty of "enlightening the darkness" of the world.

In today's intellectual climate, it is probably easier to accept a new role for philosophers than to contemplate placing some of the burden of responsibility for the success of what are, like it or not, contingent experiments in liberal democracy, on the shoulders of poets. In taking one step forward, Rorty seems to be taking two steps backwards, as his pragmatism does not permit the abandonment of society to the mercy of spiritless technocrats and social engineers of the future. (Interestingly, the opposite direction is taken by Derrida, who accords this "strange institution called literature" the right of *tout dire*, of saying everything, and the power of breaking away from existing rules and conventions, of questioning and dislocating them. The writer can say whatever he wants to, or whatever he is able to, from the safety of an institutional zone protected against any censorship, since for Derrida the institution of literature is closely linked to "the coming about of the modern idea of democracy".\(^1\) So while in Rorty literature "fights" for democracy, in Derrida literature can already "make use" of its charms.) The picture one gets from Rorty's *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, and related essays in *Philosophical Papers*, is that philosophy and poetry are, to a large extent, on the "private side", while on the "public" side one finds the novel together with politics. For Rorty, conceptual difficulties in philosophy and individual idioms in poetry do not seem to change the world; instead, the key to social reality is held by liberal politics and the novel that shapes human sensitivity. This very pragmatic solution rejects the roles and obligations which culture traditionally ascribes to literature and philosophy. What I wish to investigate here is what may have pushed Rorty to such conclusions (as I read them) and where he finds justification or support for them.

---

A pragmatic line of reasoning is seemingly simple, and certainly convincing: liberal society does not need "philosophical foundations" any more. The natural sciences are no longer, as Rorty puts it, "the most interesting or promising or exciting area of culture" and the imagination of the youth is moved by the arts and politics. The cultural hero of postmodernity is a "strong poet", rather than a warrior, priest, sage or natural scientist who is searching for objective truth. Ironists do not take philosophers as their moral advisors any more, as the whole French and German Enlightenment tradition would wish, but turn instead to literary critics, as they fear getting stuck in one single vocabulary – the one in which they have been educated. Therefore they change perspectives, and compare re-descriptions by various figures against each other rather than against their "origins". Finally, they read a lot of books (which is a guiding trait of intellectuals), "spend[ing] more of their time placing books than placing real live people". Literature, together with literary criticism, has more to say and more to do; traditional philosophy is culturally less interesting and in this account offers less. Thus, various possibilities suggest themselves: either we deal only with literature, or we try to think of another possibility of the other, of philosophy, taken off the Kantian pedestal, or we think philosophy through with the help of a specific kind of literature (as Frenchmen do, from Bataille through Klossowski and Foucault to Derrida), or – finally – we remain silent in the manner of the young Wittgenstein, pretending that nothing has changed in philosophy in the time of postmodernity. And that last possibility will probably be the cultural end of philosophy.

Culture and society need many "vocabularies of moral deliberation" (as Rorty calls them in his text on Freud, "Freud and Moral Reflection") which constantly have to be coined, developed,
transformed and updated as the world changes. The Kantian idealistic morality of duty, with one side of moral philosophy falling to pieces (the other side being politics, as in Marx or Bentham), caused an essential pauperization of possibilities of moral deliberation. The result of this closing of possibilities of moral philosophy (of ethics) was in Rorty’s view the opening of possibilities of enriching moral reflection by “novelists, poets and dramatists”. Culture could not stand void – so it was filled with the nineteenth-century novel. And since then “literature” has cared more than “philosophy” for the said vocabularies of moral deliberation, the central role in culture of which can only be doubted if a “human nature” common to all (an essence from which philosophers were the only ones entitled to deduce, and pass on to others, how one ought to behave) is believed.

So far I have made reference to the “self-creation”/“solidarity” and the “private”/“public” distinctions, but one can easily add to them other pairs, more or less metaphoric, coming from Rorty’s work, such as “sublimity” and “decency”, “private narcissism” and “public pragmatism”, “private irony” and “liberal hope” or “Trotsky” and the “wild orchids”. All of these seem to be different accounts of a fundamental Rortyian opposition between the romantic and the pragmatic (“romantic” as used in “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism”, and “pragmatic” in the sense of “Pragmatism and Philosophy”). Pragmatic and romantic conceptions of philosophy are the two reactions to “Plato-Kant canon”, two different and opposite responses to metaphysics (as well as to Husserl with his vision of philosophy als strenge Wissenschaft). As philosophy can no longer be science in an unquestionable way, let it be politics – Dewey’s answer – or metaphor – the answer of Heidegger after his

5 Ibidem, p. 156.
"turn" (to put the thought in the form of another of Rorty's essay titles, "Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics"). These are answers going in opposite directions, for it is not easy to make politics metaphorical or metaphor political (suffice it to say that Walter Benjamin was afraid of the aestheticization of politics⁸; and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in his Heidegger, Art, and Politics called National Socialism, "national-aestheticism"⁹). These are two incommensurable, metaphilosophical conceptions of the role of philosophy in culture. But Rorty would be willing to be at the same time – and this is a key point of my reading – both pragmatist and "strong poet", both utopian social engineer and visionary, so as to both serve his community and make use of the intellectual pleasures derived from self-creation. For he bears in mind that in the future we will not be turning to the philosophers for rescue and advice as our ancestors turned to the priests: "we shall turn instead to the poets and the engineers, the people who produce startling new projects for achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number".¹⁰

Rorty consistently avoids choosing between the romanticism of the poet and the pragmatism of the politician and social engineer; we have to agree here with Nancy Fraser who says that "it is the desire to overcome the implacable split between public and private life that is at the root of many theoretical and political difficulties".¹¹ It may be perhaps so that while the romantic need turns Rorty towards philosophy, the pragmatic one directs his attention to literature, and to the novel in particular. Philosophy, as inessential for and insignificant in today’s culture and as devoid of transformative powers as it seems to be, is located by Rorty in the same camp as poetry, while the novel which transforms vocabularies of moral

---

¹⁰ Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 26, emphasis mine.
deliberation and shapes liberal sensitivity gets closer to politics and liberal social engineering. Theory is “de-politicized”, politics “de-theorized”, as Thomas McCarthy puts it in his reaction to Rorty. Philosophy – following Zygmunt Bauman in *Intimations of Postmodernity* – either hides behind the silent walls of the Academy, or allies itself to literary criticism and poetry. The direct link between (philosophical) theory and (political) practice is broken. As Rorty puts it, “we philosophy professors are people who have a certain familiarity with a certain intellectual tradition”, much “as chemists have a certain familiarity with what happens when you mix various substances together”, and nothing more.

To sum up briefly: the pragmatic impulse, the ideals of liberal democracy, and the priority of democracy over philosophy all push Rorty’s thinking towards literature as a kind of democratic utopia (and towards the novel, as Milan Kundera’s “paradise of individuals”). The romantic impulse, on the other hand – from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind* to Derrida – pushes his thinking towards the self-creational kind of philosophy. There is no third way. *Tertium non datum*. Both impulses constitute at the same time his liberal sensitivity – what is important is other people’s suffering, their pain and humiliation – *as well as* what he has referred to differently over the years as “self-enlargement”, “self-invention”, or – in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* – “edification” (derived from Gadamer’s *Bildung* in *Truth and Method*). Both impulses are constantly present, and both give birth to confessions such as, on the one hand, “what matters is our loyalty to other human beings

---

clinging together against the dark”,17 and on the other hand: “the pragmatist philosopher has a story to tell about his favorite, and least favored, books – the texts of, for example, Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey and Russell”18, or, to put it even more strongly: “nothing is more important than saving our liberal institutions”19 (the pragmatic impulse) and “redescribing ourselves is the most important thing we can do”20 (the romantic impulse). It is difficult to abandon either of the two sides, nor can they be brought into agreement with each other: the only solution seems to be the public-private split. Hence, perhaps, Rorty’s specific attitude towards literature (and the novel) that satisfies the need for communal thinking as opposed to a post-philosophical attitude to philosophy that satisfies the need for “privatized thinking”. Let us add that this is merely a general tendency in his considerations rather than some rigid distinction. We will attempt now to place his philosophical reflections on literature in the wider context of his views on the role and place of philosophy in contemporary culture.

2.

Rorty, in asking – in a quite pragmatic manner – what literature and philosophy can give us, elevates the former by juxtaposing its usefulness with the apparent uselessness of traditional philosophy. He brings them close to each other, treating them as “two kinds of writing”. He does not make use of criticism already traditional today, that is, showing the philosophical background of literary works (their themes, questions, oppositions and conceptuality) as if this were the second “bottom” of literature, nor does he seek the “literariness” of philosophical works. As a matter of fact, he does not change the status

17 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 166.
20 Richard Rorty, PMN, pp. 358-359.
of literature; instead, together with his whole conception of philosophy as developed since Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), he takes off from philosophy in terms of the place accorded to it so far (at least since Kantian times).

For in the cultural conversation going on, the philosopher has so far had a privileged position: the first and the last word belonged to him; it was he who knew best as he knew the widest—philosophical—context of questions and answers. For it was he who used to decide, in the last instance, about the claims to knowledge of all the other domains of culture. Rorty says that the central concern of the all hitherto existing philosophy was a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing so). Therefore, on the one side of that landscape there was philosophy as a Kantian “tribunal of pure reason”; on the other side of it there were claims made by all other areas of culture which philosophy either rejected or accepted. Philosophy would “ground” knowledge claims, since it was a “foundational” discipline, overwhelming and legitimating other domains. The abandonment of the Kantian perspective (still being reinforced in the twentieth century by Russell’s and Husserl’s ideal of a “scientific” and “exact” philosophy) would be an attack on the philosopher’s self-image; it would be an abandonment of the idea that his voice “always has an overriding claim on the attention of the other participants in the conversation.”

To be more precise, this would cause the collapse of the idea that there is some “philosophical method” or some “philosophical point of view” which enables the philosopher, thanks to his profession, to express interesting opinions, *ex officio*, on the subjects of, for example, psychoanalysis, the moral dilemmas of humanity or the value of literary works. Philosophy in Rorty’s account becomes less important and thereby the philosopher himself, the philosopher whose opinions

---

21 Ibidem, p. 3.
have so far been important owing to the importance of the philosophical discipline itself, becomes less important. Philosophy cannot escape from history, which prompts Rorty to ask why it was assumed to be an autonomous discipline, foundational for the whole of culture? It was the case, he explains, because the German idealists of the nineteenth century told us that such a discipline was the “hope of mankind”\(^{23}\), and we kept believing them. To sum up, Rorty, in elevating literature, places philosophy at the same time on an equal footing with other disciplines, devoid of any of its old privileges. Old philosophy, or philosophy with a capital “P”, as Rorty sometimes claims, is a dubious domain, considering, pragmatically, its twentieth-century failings on the one hand, and its cultural deadness on the other.

Rorty neither applies philosophical conceptuality to literature, nor seek its “philosophical core”, “blind spots” or unsaid “margins” to which one can supposedly get by removing surface layers of vocabulary or style. He does not ask a question about the essence of literature, asking instead about what it is doing, or how it is working. For example, he suggests that the novel improves human sensitivity to suffering and cruelty (which is, incidentally, a peculiar, liberal-pragmatic reduction of the richness of literary senses and benefits). Here a question arises as to whether Rorty is interested in literature as literature or perhaps as a better, more effective tool than – for instance – philosophy? Is not Rorty’s writing about literature instrumental with respect to literature, since what is perhaps at stake is merely literature’s juxtaposition to philosophy? That is, showing what post-Philosophical philosophy ought to be, or might be, by means of idealizing, or even caricaturing, literature and, in broader terms, so-called highbrow literary culture. Today’s “supremacy of literary culture”\(^{24}\), placing literature in the center of culture and treating both science and philosophy as literary genres (as did the philosophers he described as “textualists”) may be a result of Rorty’s new ideal (once the sciences – in philosophy and in culture – are not that ideal any

\(^{23}\) Richard Rorty, CP, p. 148.  
\(^{24}\) Ibidem, p. 150.
more). Testimony to this is the way in which he accounts for the work of the literary critic – as strong misreading. What, according to Rorty, is the way of reading texts in literary criticism and in literature? Given Rorty’s perception that there is no such method, that there are no general, ahistorical and permanent criteria of evaluation, he prefers self-creational possibilities (which may mean imposing one’s own vocabulary on someone else’s text, a redescription carried out in one’s own terms rather than in terms of a given text or inherited ones).

Another question – is not Rorty producing for his own pragmatic needs a picture of literary criticism that suits him, on the basis of, for example, philosophical conceptions or their application. Literary criticism would be an outlet for the self-creational desires of the critic or the philosopher. The text would serve only the critic’s own aims. In this instance, Rorty’s “method”, following Harold Bloom, might be as follows: the critic shapes the text for his own needs, imposing onto it a vocabulary which “may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and seeing what happens”. Rorty applies that “method” – and admits it explicitly – in his discussions of Derrida. When Jacques Bouveresse (in a congenial volume on Rorty and his responses: Lire Rorty. Le pragmatisme et ses conséquences) reproaches him that he makes the Derrida he needs, Rorty answers that he takes from him whatever he wants, rejecting what is left. He uses him as a grain to be ground in his own mill (comme le blé pour mon propre moulin). And he justifies this approach in terms of being a “strong misreader” endowed with the right to his own redescritions. He is rightfully proud that he can, as he puts it, “get more out of the text than its author or its intended audience could possibly find there”. Literature replaces philosophy as a “presiding cultural discipline”, as science in the nineteenth

26 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 151.
28 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 152.
century was replaced with philosophy as a secular substitute of religion.

In the nineteenth century, the secular intellectual began losing faith in science in the same fundamental way that the Enlightenment lost its faith in God. Rorty says that, in the nineteenth century, "'philosophy' became, for the intellectuals, a substitute for religion", since

\[
\text{[it was the area of culture where one touched bottom, where one found the vocabulary and the convictions which permitted one to explain and justify one's activity as an intellectual, and thus to discover the significance of one's life.}\]
\]

In other words, as noted right at the beginning: philosophers are important, because philosophy is important. But in the nineteenth century, with the beginning of what Rorty calls the culture of the man of letters, that is the culture of the "intellectual who wrote poems and novels and political treatises, and criticisms of other people's poems and novels and treatises", the importance of philosophy began to be doubted. Consequently, scientists became isolated at the beginning of the twentieth century from the majority of intellectuals, just like theologians had been isolated before. Poets and novelists became, to use Rorty's favorite formulation, the moral teachers of the youth, and the more philosophy wanted to be "scientific" or "exact", the more it drifted away from the rest of culture and thereby the more absurd became its traditional claims to being a foundational discipline for the whole of culture.

Rorty, within the framework of C.P Snow's dichotomy of "scientific culture" and "literary culture", seems to place philosophizing, together with literary criticism and poetry, within the latter culture, with all the consequences thereof. Who is the "literary intellectual" or – in the broadest Rortyan terms, "cultural critic" – and what is his role in culture? He feels he may comment on everything in culture that is

29 See ibidem, p. 228.
30 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 4, emphasis mine.
31 Ibidem, p. 4.
going on around him. He is a prefiguration of a philosopher of the “post-Philosophical” era, one who has abandoned traditional pretensions to Philosophy (with the capital “P”). This is Rorty’s congenial description: “He passes rapidly from Hemingway to Proust to Hitler to Marx to Foucault to Mary Douglas to the present situation in Southeast Asia to Ghandi to Sophocles”. He is a “name dropper”, a master at using proper names as sets of descriptions or ways of seeing the world. He specializes in searching for similarities and differences between big visions of the world painted in the most general lines. Deprived of historical constants, doomed to redescriptions of redescriptions, he is doomed to be quickly forgotten. Not finding immortal sentences or true statements, he leaves behind merely mortal, ever-changing vocabularies. According to Rorty, the “temporalization of rationality” discovered by Hegel in his *Phenomenology* was one of the most significant steps on the road to pragmatic incredulity towards – atemporal and ahistorical – Philosophy.

Rorty’s account of the relationship between philosophy and literature, while convincing, is perhaps too simple. It is similar to the approach taken by Zygmunt Bauman in *Intimations of Postmodernity*, where it is suggested that, in the past, philosophy and literature (when the former was still Philosophy) stood on opposite sides of a dichotomy, paradigmatic cases of the oppositions subjective/objective, rational/irrational, scientific/non-scientific, doxa/episteme (opinion and knowledge), contingent/universal, and historical/ahistorical (and still earlier the opposition of logos and mythos, that is to say, philosophers and poets). Nowadays – if one were to abandon the traditional account of truth, objectivity and rationality – philosophy would not stand on the side of the objective, the rational, and the atemporal. One side of the dichotomy would have to disappear, and the dichotomy itself would share its fate. So what might separate philosophy and literature today? The answer common to Rorty and

---

33 Richard Rorty, CP, p. xl.
34 Ibidem, p. xli.
Bauman is different books, different traditions, and, finally, a different history; for philosophy, like literature, cannot escape from its history and historicity, although it is sometimes difficult to remember that (the philosophy of Rorty himself is just a contingent product of liberal American culture of the end of the twentieth century). It so happened, but it could have happened in a quite different way. In a word, philosophy today can daringly envisage only what Hegel so beautifully called "grasping one’s time in thought".

Philosophy and literature see the present (and the past) in different styles, one could say (referring to Nietzsche, Deleuze and Derrida): in terms of their contingent vocabularies, which are endowed with different degrees of sensitivity and embedded in different conceptualizations shaped by their respective histories. But claims by both disciplines to be coining a neutral vocabulary (since discovering such a vocabulary is totally out of the question) are equally unjustified. What is significant is Rorty’s attitude to the practical achievements of both spheres of culture. He advises us to compare the role played by novelists and literary critics in liberal democracies in the Western world with the apparently rather insignificant role played by philosophers.36 Whose sensitivity to pain was changed by traditional philosophy? Did the latter manage to change the world for the better?

If one assumes all of Rorty’s points of departure, it may turn out that philosophy is merely “a kind of writing”. But all those who see some specific, universal and emancipatory tasks for philosophy, those who seek one never-changing “philosophical context” in which one can place in front of a philosophical tribunal of reason all other disciplines and all other participants in a cultural conversation, would find it very difficult to agree with such a seemingly reductionist argument. As to whether philosophy is outdated as a profession, Rorty answers that “professions can survive the paradigms that gave them birth”.37 For the philosopher who is able to answer the question of an inquisitive student “what Hegel meant” will always be needed. The practical problem – “who will be teaching Hegel” – guarantees

36 See e.g. Richard Rorty, “Brigands et intellectuels”, op. cit., p. 486.
37 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 393.
the survival of philosophy today, like questions of, for example, Heidegger tomorrow, or of Rorty the day after tomorrow. For who else if not the philosopher is able to provide us with that "commentary on the details of the tradition", the depth and extent of which distinguishes the philosopher from "the amateur, the philistine, the mystic, or the belletrist"?38

3.

What is required now is a brief excursus on Rorty's attitude towards the history of philosophy – for the choice of one's own history of philosophy determines the self-image of the philosopher. Rorty says that "the self-image of a philosopher – his identification of himself as such (rather than as, perhaps, an historian or a mathematician or a poet) – depends almost entirely upon how he sees the history of philosophy". The adoption of a new vocabulary, he continues, an independent gesture on the part of every philosopher – "is motivated almost entirely by a perception of one's relation to the history of philosophy".39 The choice, between Hegel or Plato40 (between, on the one hand, philosophy seen as "one's time grasped in thought", and on the other, "an escape from conversation to something atemporal which lies in the background of all possible conversations") is made simply by reading the history of philosophy and drawing a moral conclusion.41 A similar attitude to the history of the novel is taken by Milan Kundera, one of Rorty's recent favorites. Perhaps it would be easier to understand Rorty's attitude towards philosophy, as well as his account of the history of philosophy, by comparing it with Kundera's account of the novel and its history from The Art of the Novel. Let us first add, though, that what binds Rorty, Lyotard or

38 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 41.
39 Ibidem, p. 41.
41 See ibidem, p. 174.
Foucault so closely with Kundera, are histories, stories, micrologies, written narratives. Without developing that theme, for there is not enough space for it here, let us use a couple of well chosen citations. Kundera’s claim: “I am making stories, juxtaposing them and that is how I am asking questions” is echoed by Lyotard when he says that he is merely “telling ... a story, unfolding a little story of my own” and advising us to “set to work forging fictions rather than hypotheses and theories”. Rorty’s response might be, as already noted, that he is telling stories about his most and least favored books, and Michel Foucault’s agreement might be found in the following statement: “I am fully aware that I have never written anything other than fictions” (and Maurice Blanchot elaborates, “I am a fabulist composing fables whose morals one would be unwise to wait for”).

Rorty seems to want philosophy – together with the novel – to recognize that the world is ambiguous, that there is no single, absolute truth but a multitude of relative and contradictory truths. He would like to accept Kundera’s “wisdom of the novel” (la sagesse du roman) which is the “wisdom of uncertainty”. He is seduced, paradoxically enough, by the truthfulness of an ambiguous and relative world that philosophy does not want to accept. “The world of a single Truth” is not only a totalitarian world, as Kundera presents it. It is also, let us add, the world of traditional philosophy, a world made of a different material than the “relative world of the novel”. “Totalitarian truth excludes relativity, doubts, questions and can never accept what I would call the spirit of the novel”. The method of truth, of epistemologically-oriented traditional philosophy deriving from Kant, of the truth of philosophy as foundational discipline for the rest of

culture, is similar. The "wisdom of the novel" seems closer to Rorty than the "wisdom of philosophy", if I can put it that way, as the former took better care of the freedom of the individual – for it is the novel that is a "fascinating imaginary space where no one is the owner of truth and where everyone has the right to be understood".48 In the face of the dangers facing a fragile and unstable culture, it comes in handy to find that the "precious essence of the European spirit is, like in a silver jewelry box, in the history of the novel, in the wisdom of the novel".49 And Rorty, the philosopher, the pragmatist, believes in it for he is convinced by his liberal opinions and his philosophical views. The wisdom that allowed the West to shape itself in the way it is shaped today did not come from philosophers, nor was it defended by philosophers. It came mainly, according to Rorty, from a literary imagination, from the sensitivities and loud voices of writers, which was given to them only temporarily,50 even incidentally, by the project of modernity that may be coming to its completion.

4.

The point is not that the philosopher has to write about literature; instead, the point may be that he re-thinks the very knot of relations between philosophy and literature. It is sometimes not the investigation of how philosophy approaches its "object" and "sharpens" its philosophical "tools" (Hegel) that lies at the heart of the question; it may also lie in the relations between the two. In Derrida, deconstruction is an intended re-thinking of the two domains at the same time. Is Rorty's project similar to Derrida's? Or is it perhaps manifestly philosophical, instrumentally making use of literature for more pragmatic needs (for example, for the devalorization and denigration of Philosophy with the capital "P")? It is worth noting that the attitude of Zygmunt Bauman to literature is

48 Ibidem, p. 130.
49 Ibidem, p. 130.
similar: he does not investigate today’s blurring of boundaries, the merging of the two genres, but uses the literary genre as an example, a case from history described by the pen of a man of letters, an object of a sociological deliberation (with reference, for example, to Kafka and his *Diaries* from *Modernity and Ambivalence*\(^{51}\)). Derrida is different – his aim – as *Positions* explain – is to “deconstruct practically the *philosophical* opposition between philosophy and myth, between *logos* and *mythos*” which can be done only textually, with the help of an “*other* writing”, neither “philosophical”, nor “literary”.\(^{52}\) Deconstruction of the opposition between philosophy and literature gives birth to a metaphilosophical (for the very opposition is philosophical) or a no-longer-philosophical undertaking.

Rorty does not hide his intentions towards literature. He exposes its past, present and future to a simple test – to the question of its *utility*, of its benefits for developing liberal democracies. (He admits it explicitly in his polemic with Umberto Eco when he says that he imposes on each book his own “grid”, which is the narrative of “the pragmatist’s progress”\(^{53}\)). So he contrasts, for instance, the public uselessness of Heidegger’s philosophy against the public benefits derived from reading Dickens’ novels, and thus confronts a philosophical theory with a literary narrative. The novel, in his view, has turned out to have been more fruitful than philosophy in the history of the modern West, which is to say that “when you weigh the good and the bad the social novelists have done against the good and the bad the social theorists have done, you find yourself wishing that there had been more novels and fewer theories”.\(^{54}\) It is thanks more to “our novelists than to our philosophers or to our poets” that the West has worked out an “increased ability to tolerate diversity”, by means of a realization of and a sensitivity to intolerance.\(^{55}\)


\(^{54}\) Richard Rorty, “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens” in PP 2, p. 80.

\(^{55}\) Ibidem, p. 81.
Perhaps the single most important approximation can be seen in Rorty’s introductory statement that for ironists theory has become “a means to private perfection”, rather than a tool for social communication. Thus we are on the one side of Rorty’s fundamental opposition between the private and the public, within which there appears still another opposition: ironist writers who are fully private and ironist theorists who do not totally abandon their public mission (despite being socially totally “useless”). The former – writers like Proust – remain in their writings in relation to their own, private, idiosyncratic past, rewinding objects, people and events (using, for instance, that *memoire involontaire*), making redescriptions of their surrounding in their own vocabulary, in their own terms. They aim at autonomy, redescribing in their works those who once described themselves. They free themselves from foreign authorities, showing their relativity, their finiteness, their transitoriness.

Ironist theorists, on the other hand, still retain vestiges of public ambitions. They write about Europe, the march of the Spirit or Being, they invent – as Rorty puts it – “a larger-than-self hero”. They want to remain in relation to a past which is broader than their own – preferably the past of a species, a race or a class. They are not content with merely ordering small things in their own way (details, accidents, or narratives); they also want to describe a big and important thing, and draw their power from it. To sum up, they prefer affiliation to self-creation. What is disharmonious in their works is their (immodest) feeling of superiority as philosophers, coming from the belief that it cannot be by any means so that certain beloved, philosophical words – words like “Aristotle”, “physis” or “Parmenides” to Heidegger – are nothing more but their private counterparts of other words beloved by others (far more numerous, incidentally), such as “Combray” or “Gilbert” from Proust’s *Remembrance of the Things Past*. “Proust succeeded because he had no

56 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 96.


58 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 100.
public ambitions – no reason to believe that the sound of the name ‘Guermantes’ would mean anything to anybody but his narrator”; and “Heidegger thought he knew some words which had, or should have had, resonance for everybody in modern Europe, words which were relevant not just to the fate of people who happen to have read a lot of philosophy books but to the public fate of the West”.59 But, as a matter of fact, these words are not endowed with different significance – they are merely private sets of (favorite) words. Europe and its fate do not depend more on a list of books read by Heidegger or on any other list of any other books, comments Rorty. When one contrasts Nietzsche’s or Heidegger’s ironist theorizing with the modern novel, it turns out that the former is just “one of [several] great literary traditions” – comparable to the novel if we take into consideration its achievements, but much less significant if we take into account its influence on politics, social hopes and solidarity.60

As Kundera tries to show, the novel has invented its own – imaginary – democratic utopia, a future society in which nobody dreams of thinking that God, Truth or the Nature of Things is on his side. In such a utopia nobody would dream of thinking that there is something more real than pleasure or pain. A democratic utopia would be a community in which the most important virtues of mind would be tolerance and curiosity – rather than the search for truth.61 In such a Utopia people would suffer and cause far less pain than they do today; it would be a utopia of brotherhood realized in many currently unimaginable ways.

5.

Thus, Rorty tends to write of such writers and of such literature which is (or in his reading can be) socially – not even only individually or self-creationally – useful. For even when he writes of Nabokov – and he does that superbly – he does it in order to show

60 Ibidem, p. 120.
that although he was a writer aiming at autonomy (self-creation), nevertheless he studied the cruelty inherent in the search for that autonomy. So, paradoxical as it may seem, Orwell and Nabokov get closer and closer to each other in Rorty’s reading – as he puts it, “both of them warn the liberal ironist intellectual against temptations to be cruel”.62 And the fear of causing pain, of being cruel, constitutes in his view the liberal sensitivity.

Let us say a couple of words about French postmodern thought: their engaging in discussions of (non-representational) literature was a wholly critical undertaking. French culture resisted the representational paradigm – so philosophers started to deal with “literature of illegibility” (Sollers) or “opaque speech” (Foucault).63 Since Mallarmé, literature has no longer wanted to reflect the world, to be “a copy of a copy”, to stand on the other end from the world itself. It wants instead to become a full part of that world and not merely a mirror of nature. The language of literature does not want to represent reality – there is an awareness of a “fundamental inadequation” (as Barthes says in his “Inaugural Lecture” at Collège de France64) between the linguistic order and the order of the world; the category of representation has become a banner-like object of a critical investigation – and rejection – in the French humanities in recent decades. The myth of mimesis that has constituted art (together with literature) since Ancient Greece, is violently questioned in the works of Bataille or Artaud – and in those of their post-war commentators. Rorty’s thinking about literature is of a completely different nature – and pertains to a completely different sort of literature. It is Dickens and Proust, Nabokov and Orwell, and finally Kundera – but Kundera the literary theorist and essayist, the author of Art of the Novel rather than as the author of his novels. This is, to be sure, a philosophical (to be more precise, a pragmatic) choice on Rorty’s part – “details” and “cruelty”, the concern for pain hidden under the mask of aestheticism, as well as moral protest – and the

63 See Chapter 5 in the present volume.
"depreciated legacy of Cervantes" is an instance in the face of which one accounts for one's writing. Obviously, both philosophy and literature may be just literary genres, two kinds of writing. Rorty never said that philosophy is literature - they are separated by the abyss of tradition and history, that is, on the one hand one has Father Parmenides, on the other Father Cervantes, on the one Kant and on the other Flaubert. Philosophy can be seen as a "family romance"\(^{65}\), and philosophers as commentators on certain writers of the past.

In Rorty's account of literature, one can focus on the importance of his attempts to blur the traditional opposition: the moral and the aesthetic (that is, by way of an example, literature with a "moral message" and literature that is "merely aesthetic"). Rorty in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* draws a distinction between books that help us to become autonomous subjects and books that help us to become less cruel. Among the latter - those referring to cruelty rather than to autonomy - there are books treating of the influence of practices and social institutions on other people and those pertaining to the influence of our personal idiosyncrasies on others. Instead of the traditional distinction between "moralists" and "aesthetes", Rorty suggests the basic question to determine a genre of a given work ought to be: "what purposes does this book serve?"\(^{66}\) The purposes to be considered are not the good and the beautiful, but either the maintenance of an old, existing absolute vocabulary or the working out of a new absolute vocabulary (there seem here to be remote analogies to the Kuhnian distinction between "normal science" and "revolutionary science"). Books that transform a final vocabulary form the tiniest but perhaps the most important part of all - for they can transform the most.

A reminder: there is no "nature of literature", Rorty stresses. The aim of some writers (Plato, Heidegger, Proust or Nabokov) is to find "private perfection", the aim of other writers (Dickens, Mill, Dewey, Orwell, Habermas or Rawls) is to serve "human freedom". They cannot be evaluated on a common scale, making some inferior or


\(^{66}\) Richard Rorty, *CIS*, p. 142.
superior to others. Just like there is no "aim of writing", there is also no "aim of theorizing". It does not help to contrast both kinds of "writers" (rather than philosophers and writers, let us add) with each other – writers of "self-creation" against writers of "solidarity" – as there is no higher, synthesizing account that could grasp self-creation and justice, private perfection and solidarity, in a single view. It was precisely the search for such a "synoptic vision", a single account, that first brought about and then directed Rorty's interest in philosophy. How is one to bring one's "Trotsky" and one's "wild orchids" into agreement, he asks in an autobiographical text, how is one to be at the same time a "friend of humanity" and an "intellectual and spiritual snob"? The answer to that pervasive question appears only in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, for in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature this question, fundamental to Rorty's thought, remained untouched (although that text contains many themes forecasting Rorty's solution to the problem). The answer which is given simultaneously takes away from philosophy the hope of ever reaching such an account, such a vision (which is impossible on the level of theory): it states that the vocabulary of self-creation is private, non-shared and incompatible with argumentation, whereas the vocabulary of justice is public and common, a means serving, precisely, argumentation. These two vocabularies, like the aims that Rorty's two kinds of writers have in common, as well as the requirements of self-creation and of solidarity, are "equally valid, yet forever incommensurable", in his memorable expression. Between the private and the public there seems to be no opposition, but instead a tension – and incommensurability.

Coming to the end of this little story, let us say that literature (and the novel in particular) has a settled position in Rorty's philosophical conception: in the face of the powerlessness of Continental philosophy on the one hand and the cultural demise of analytic philosophy on the other, in the face of the restricted influence of

67 Ibidem, p. 141.
69 See prefiguartions of "self-creational" themes in PMN, e.g. pp. 359–360.
70 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. xv.
philosophy in general on delicate matters of social life in a time of the
collapse of the traditional Enlightenment figure of the intellectual, the
chance, perhaps the last chance, of shaping liberal sensitivity is
provided by the novel (and let us bear in mind that we belong to a
culture that was not only nourished by the “Bible, Socrates, Plato, and
the Enlightenment” but also, as Rorty says, by “Rabelais, Montaigne,
Sterne, Hogarth and Mark Twain”). That may be the reason why
Rorty invests all his “pragmatic” hopes in literature, leaving
philosophy with the role of adviser or of “Romantic”, of individual
self-creation. Thereby he replaces the critical and yet softened tooth of
philosophical thinking (partially saved in Lyotard’s idea of
“resistance through writing” or “bearing witness to differends” from
_The Differend_, in the late Foucault’s texts on Kant and the
Enlightenment, or in Derrida’s attempted transcendence of both
philosophy and literature in order to deconstruct their philosophical
opposition by means of particular “acts of reading”) with the
sharpened and newly valued tooth of the novelist. Nevertheless, his
general perspective is rather pessimistic: intellectuals cannot do much
today, aside from those writers among them that are most needed by
liberal society. As for the philosopher, well, let him for the moment
just advise us that it is important to read novels...

---

From a (specifically postmodern) French perspective, these issues could be seen as partly obsolete. And Rorty could be seen as a traditional metaphysician engaged in outdated, modern questions that should have been rejected as uninteresting a long time ago. In this context, let us merely think about the country and patriotism, the citizen and his/her national loyalty, the figure of the intellectual and his/her social responsibilities, as well as about the reformulation of Sartrean “engagement” in the form of the opposition between “agents” and “spectators” of the public arena (or about, in very harsh terms, the Left’s “disengagement from practice [that] produces theoretical hallucinations”.\(^2\) In *Achieving Our Country*, Rorty is in the midst of current public concerns – again, as a philosopher, intellectual, academic and citizen. I find that multi-faceted side of Rorty is very interesting and highly provocative – to philosophers, intellectuals, academics and citizens alike. He constantly reaches for new audiences and appears to be inspiring to new readers; that is partly where his genius comes from.\(^3\) The academic Left in Rorty’s view is generally publicly and politically irrelevant in any direct way. Rorty’s pragmatism and its applications contained in the book, on the other hand, are certainly not.

1.

When reading *Achieving Our Country*, it is important to bear in mind that Rorty is American. Therefore, his view of the Left, of the intellectual, of the nation-state, patriotism, cosmopolitanism and globalization must be seen in this particular American context (the most obvious counter-example would be, in most general terms, peculiarly “French” perceptions of all the above). I am in agreement with Rorty when, in the opening paragraph of the book, he says that

---


"[e]motional involvement with one's country – feelings of intense shame or of glowing pride aroused by various parts of its history, and by various present-day national policies – is necessary if political deliberation is to be imaginative and productive". However, I would also be inclined to supplement the involvement to which Rorty refers with other involvements he rarely mentions: the emotional involvement with one's smaller or bigger region (for example, with Europe), or with the planet, which still sounds awkward, but for some people is increasingly important in describing their emotional identities and loyalties. Rorty's approach to America raises issues of parallel loyalties and parallel emotional involvement: global loyalties (and global concerns) are the best examples here.

The problem is how to balance parallel loyalties in a time of the (relative) decline of the nation state and its confrontation with new supranational and regional, political and economic entities. America, with its strong patriotic feelings, national consciousness and national pride, especially following 11 September 2001, is one of the world's few counter-examples to the general trends. Europe, on the contrary, is in the process of a deep-reaching social, political and economic integration. What counts to many in terms of their emotions and loyalties, are certainly their national "countries", but also their "regions", or their "Europe", or, finally, their "planet". In other words, what is increasingly visible to many, with the advent of globalization and its technological and communication revolutions, is the global dimension. So the questions are: what does "global citizenship" mean, both in the world and in the United States? What is the sense of "cosmopolitanism" and "patriotism" today? What is global democracy and global awareness among citizens of nation-states? Rorty's book is clearly about America, and it is obviously not a good place to look for discussion of the above issues.

Without getting into too much detail at this point, I would suggest that Rorty, in his explicitly "American" book, is somehow stuck (and

---

4 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 3.
rightly so) in the perspective of (Ulrich Beck’s) "first modernity" and he clearly underestimates the "second modernity", i.e., he remains attached to the national rather than post-national framework of thinking. It was Zygmunt Bauman who was the first to formulate the following advice (and he clearly had in mind sociologists when suggesting a "sociology of postmodernity" rather than "postmodern sociology"): "the model of postmodernity, unlike the models of modernity, cannot be grounded in the realities of the nation state, by now clearly not a framework large enough to accommodate the decisive factors in the conduct of interaction and the dynamics of social life".6

Rorty’s preoccupation with the American nation, patriotism, and the country clearly shows his public preferences: the United States in its local contexts (although he understands the global context very well and is simply not developing this aspect much further beyond his sketchy discussions about globalization). America is a special place and a special nation. More importantly though, it plays a special role in the theories and practices of globalization.7 Rorty tells us a different story – an important story, but still parallel to other possible stories grounded in new, possibly "second", "post-national", "cosmopolitan" accounts of America, its Left and its intellectuals. It would be interesting to see how the told and untold (national and post-national) stories interrelate.

To sum up, it would be useless to look in Rorty for a perspective that would not be American, and especially for a global perspective. However, this is not surprising if we take into consideration his numerous declarations of the cultural and geographical determination of his new pragmatism and his frequent references, from Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature onwards, to “us relatively leisured intellectuals, inhabiting a stable and prosperous part of the world”, i.e., to American academics.8

---

Whenever Rorty, in many of his books and papers, uses the term “intellectual” in all its ambivalence (of which he is perfectly aware) with respect to America, a feeling surfaces that the term does not fit his American usage. However, there is no other term of similar calibre in English. “The intellectual” was born in Continental France a hundred years ago and what immediately comes to mind is the Zola-Sartre (and perhaps to the “middle” Foucault) sequence of generally leftist thinkers, writers, artists and academics. The word carries with it the images of protests, rallies, declarations, marches, riots and petitions. The intellectual, as Sartre put it in a memorable formula, is “someone who meddles in what is not his business and claims to question both received truths and the accepted behavior inspired by them, in the name of a global conception of man and of society”. This is also echoed in Edward Said’s conception of the intellectual as “disturber of the status quo”. In the past two decades, Rorty has repeatedly mentioned that the last American intellectual was Dewey. The word itself is unpopular, often sounds awkward and sometimes offensive (as Allan Stoekl put it in his *Agonies of the Intellectual*): “but have we ever had a Zola, a Sartre, even a Foucault – let alone a Heidegger?” It is very difficult to discuss the future of the Left in the context of modern intellectuals as their age may already have ended (in a modern and Continental sense of the term and in Continental francophone postmodern philosophy). At the

---


13 For the early Rorty on Dewey see *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).

same time, there is no other word to substitute for the one Rorty uses, either in Europe or in the United States.

The authority of the modern intellectual was founded upon the idea of history that is developing toward its “natural” end – toward the emancipation of humanity from “poverty, ignorance, superstition and lack of entertainment”.15 The intellectual was listened to as a “spokesman of universality”, a “conscience of us all”, says Foucault in turn.16 Or, as Rorty puts it in a different way, philosophy since the times of the Enlightenment became for the intellectual a substitute for religion, became that part of culture in which one “would find the vocabulary and the convictions which permitted one to explain and justify one’s activity as an intellectual, and thus to discover the significance of one’s life”.17

An intellectual par excellence was a writer speaking from the position of man, humanity, nation, proletariat etc.; describing and analyzing the current situation from the point of view of the abovementioned entities, identifying himself with a subject endowed with a universal value and, in the name of it, advising what people should do in order for the progress to last. “Responsibility of an intellectual is inseparable from a (shared) idea of a universal subject”.18 But that idée d’un sujet universel, just like the idea of unquestionable universality, belongs to the times from Zola to Sartre, at least in France.19 These are the times of modern commitment legitimated by the metanarrative of emancipation (a part of a cultural “project of modernity”) that may already be over. What is perhaps the case is that the cultural fertility of a certain historical proposal has been exhausted, and thus the role of an intellectual legitimated within that project, and by that proposal, may have collapsed.

Rorty is very concrete in his thinking about "intellectuals" – he generally speaks of the American intellectual of the end of the twentieth century as one who works at the university. On the other hand, Zygmunt Bauman, Jean-François Lyotard and Michel Foucault write about the intellectual "in general", basically by abstracting from the national situation in England, France or anywhere else. Although Rorty often reminds us about the different situation of the intellectual in different countries, he clearly restricts his reflections to the American intellectual, both in his earlier writings and, certainly, as emphasized by the very subtitle – "Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America" – in Achieving Our Country. He is very consistent about this in the book – a story about the American intellectual today seen in the context of his/her intellectual and political transformation in the twentieth century, as if a contemporary version of Julien Benda’s "betrayal of the intellectual".

3.

We come now to the issue of modern thought, postmodern thought, and the global age. The question is to what extent even postmodern thought (post-Nietzschean, non-foundational, postmetaphysical, interpretive rather than legislative etc., referring to various sets of descriptions by various thinkers) must take into account recent social, cultural (and economic) changes brought about by globalization? What does globalization mean for the new pragmatism in this particular case? What is philosophically – from the pragmatist's point of view – more significant to the society or to the state (with some notable geographical exceptions): the demise of the cultural and philosophical project of modernity, or the dawn of the global age, with its hardly acceptable but omnipresent priority of economy and market, to democracy and the state (which is Rorty's "money" perspective, mentioned several times in Achieving Our Country as the one totally absent among the academic Left)? Sociology keeps trying to develop its new post-national "framework of reference" with the works of Giddens, Bauman and Beck who are afraid of their
discipline becoming obsolete and irrelevant in an increasingly postnational and globalizing world. What about philosophy? What can Rorty’s new pragmatism do vis-à-vis the social and human challenges of globalization?

These are very serious challenges, but it was Rorty who suggested that some questions die with their epochs, and it is uninteresting to ask others when a new epoch is just round the corner. The questions of democracy, to give an example, seem to require a brand new context today, perhaps a brand new language on the part of social sciences (the best arguments in favour of it were provided recently by Ulrich Beck, and David Held with his collaborators).

Rorty’s excellently pessimistic contemplation of the world of globalization testifies to his understanding that quite soon some problems raised in Achieving Our Country may indeed become obsolete. It is very hard to align his explicit pessimism about future developments in society and the economy related to globalization processes with the “hopeful” and “future-oriented” brand of philosophizing presented thus far. (The pragmatist theme of “hope”, Rorty’s trademark, will be discussed separately in more detail below). Somehow Rorty’s “possible world”, reminiscent of Orwell’s 1984 and seen as a potentiality of globalization (and developed not so much as a “possible world” anymore in inter alia “Globalization, the Politics of Identity, and Social Hope” from his recent Philosophy and Social Hope21) is as gloomy as Foucault’s studies of the omnipresence and omnipotence of power from the 1970s. It is useful to give an example of Rorty’s perception of the dark side of globalization here (with which I am, I must hasten to add, in full agreement):

Globalization is producing a world economy in which an attempt by any one country to prevent the immiserization of its workers may result only in depriving them of employment. The world economy will soon be owned by a cosmopolitan upper class which has no more sense of community with any workers anywhere than the great American capitalists of the year 1900 had

with the immigrants who manned their enterprises ... This frightening economic cosmopolitanism has, as a by-product, an agreeable cultural cosmopolitanism ... If the formation of hereditary castes continues unimpeded, and if the pressures of globalization create such castes not only in the United States but in all the old democracies, we shall end up in an Orwellian world ... The aim will be to keep the minds of the proles elsewhere – to keep the bottom 75 per cent of Americans and the bottom 95 per cent of the world’s population busy with ethnic and religious hostilities, and with debates about sexual mores.22

It is interesting to note the consistently philosophical dimension of Rorty’s suggestion to American intellectuals to “tell inspiring stories” in the opening paragraphs of Achieving Our Country: “Those who hope to persuade a nation to exert itself need to remind their country of what it can take pride in as well as what it should be ashamed of. They must tell inspiring stories about episodes and figures in the nation’s past – episodes and figures to which the country should remain true. Nations rely on artists and intellectuals to create images of, and to tell stories about, the national past. Competition for political leadership is in part a competition between differing stories about a nation’s self-identity, and between differing symbols of its greatness”.23 “Telling stories” is exactly what (pragmatist) philosophers should do. As Rorty explains in “Texts and Lumps” (reprinted in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1), “the pragmatist philosopher has a story to tell about his favourite, and least favoured, books – the texts of, for example, Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey and Russell. He would like other people to have stories to tell about other sequences of texts, other genres – stories which fit together with his”.24 “Telling stories” is one of the strongest and most visible themes in Rorty’s philosophical writings generally. It marks his passage from (grand) theories to narratives, from telling the truth to maintaining the conversation of humankind, present already in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

23 Ibidem, pp. 3–4, emphases mine.
(1979) and criticized strongly ever since. However, there is a crucial difference between telling stories about past philosophers and their books and telling (inspiring) stories about a nation’s past: philosophers write about past books, intellectuals qua intellectuals write about past events. Both do so while thinking about the future. But the competition between them in both philosophy and in public life is similar, and here comes another set of Rortyan themes: that of persuasion, rhetoric and pragmatic effectiveness.25 The most persuasive stories about past philosophy win (and hence our changing view of what counts and what does not count, or what is still useful and what is dead, and who our intellectual predecessors are in philosophy and who are not – all of which form our very personal philosophical identity, as do, apparently, the most persuasive accounts of our national pasts). Just as “interesting philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and cons of a thesis” and usually it is a “contest”26 between an old and a new vocabulary (vision, metaphor, utopia), so public life should be a competition of “differing stories” about a nation’s past, leading to the inspirational belief in its future.

Rorty presents in his writings a very clear “division of labour” between philosophers on the one hand, and artists, novelists and intellectuals on the other. Increasingly, in Rorty’s account, ironist philosophy becomes publicly useless at best, dangerous at worst; it becomes “more important for the pursuit of private perfection rather than for any social task”.27 On the other hand, to achieve more human solidarity and less human suffering, it is ethnography, journalism, the movie, and, especially, the novel that are more useful than “the sermon and the treatise”,28 i.e., more useful than traditional theology and philosophy. Surprisingly enough, artists and novelists in Rorty are located on the public side of life (and that of solidarity), while

27 Ibidem, p. 94.
28 Ibidem, p. xvi.
philosophers, especially ironists opposed to metaphysicians, are located on the private side (and that of self-creation). What actually leads in Rorty to moral change and human progress is the novel rather than philosophy.

One of the serious mistakes of the followers of postmodern French philosophy in America (from whom the members of the academic Left predominantly recruit themselves) be it (some) admirers of Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Lacan or, finally, Paul de Man, is the belief that philosophy can be applied directly to politics. The crucial passage (from Rorty's "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?") draws an important distinction between a "private writer" and a "writer with a public mission":

The quarrel about whether Derrida has arguments thus gets linked to a quarrel about whether he is a private writer - writing for the delight of us insiders who share his background, who find the same rather esoteric things as funny or beautiful or moving as he does - or rather a writer with a public mission, someone who gives us weapons with which to subvert "institutionalized knowledge" and thus social institutions.29

Philosophers with "a public mission" are dangerous, and politics is not exactly attacking social institutions from the inside of the academy with (theoretical) "weapons" provided by deconstructionism, feminism, or Foucauldianism in their various manifestations.

Rorty's criticism of the academic Left and academic politics did not start with Achieving Our Country. It goes back (at least) as far as 1989 when he delivered the Romanell Lectures at the University of Virginia (reprinted as "De Man and the Academic Cultural Left" in Essays on Heidegger and Others), as well as to his "Two Cheers for the Cultural Left" and his entry about "Deconstruction" in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism in the mid-1990s. It is crucial to see Rorty's criticism in Achieving Our Country in the context provided by his earlier philosophical writings about the academic Left and his

---

pragmatic criticism of Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and De Man. Otherwise it is relatively easy to misunderstand the philosophical motives behind his harsh criticism. Let me recall just a few ideas from "De Man and the American Cultural Left", already expressed in 1989:

The American Cultural Left, however, influenced by Foucault as well as De Man, sees the contemporary democratic states, including our own, as either imperialist powers or disciplinary societies or both ... Just as the Marxists in the 1930s thought of Dewey as "the philosopher of American imperialism", so the contemporary Cultural Left views us pragmatists as at best socially irresponsible and at worst apologists for a repressive ideology.30

The cultural Left in that older description, much intensified in Achieving Our Country a decade later, wants the "special talents and competencies" (of philosophers, historians or literary critics) "to be directly applicable to political purposes", wants its specialized skills to be "politically relevant".31 Or in still another description, the academic Left, as does Hillis Miller, "takes both literature and philosophy far too seriously".32 If, for reading Achieving Our Country, we needed Rorty’s single previous paradigm definition of the "cultural Left", it would be (following Henry Gates) a "Rainbow Coalition" of deconstructionists, feminists, people working in gay and ethnic studies, and so on. Members of the cultural Left typically believe that we have recently acquired a radically new understanding of the nature of language and of literature" and they are deploying "new philosophic-literary weapons" to "reinvigorate leftist social criticism".33 Foucault, Derrida and De Man play, for today’s radicals of the Left, the role that Marx, Lenin and Trotsky played fifty years ago, in Rorty’s description in "Deconstruction". At the same time Rorty is well aware that deconstructionist literary criticism is merely one of the symptoms of a much deeper change of, and distrust towards, the self-image of the Western intellectual.

30 Ibidem, p. 133.
31 Ibidem, p. 133.
33 Ibidem, p. 129.
That is the picture of the academic Left that reappears in many of Rorty’s texts from the 1990s onwards, and it is crucial to understand this context while reading Rorty’s bashing of the Left in his book on intellectuals. Rorty’s academic Left in more philosophical terms is represented by those who took melancholic and pessimistic postmodern French philosophy (combined with Nietzsche in French interpretations of Deleuze, Klossowski or Derrida) “far too seriously” and who believed they had found a “method” for reading the social fabric that was subversive, revolutionary and, primarily, “scientific”. Rorty, on the other hand, is optimistic, future-oriented, reformist and clearly “methodophobic” (against theory, against method, giving priority to democracy above philosophy; priority to literary culture above philosophical and scientific culture). At the same time the academic Left represents for Rorty an “unfortunate regression to the Marxist obsession with scientific rigour”.34

Thus there are serious philosophical reasons, apart from clearly public and political ones, why Rorty cannot agree with the academic Left: the distrust of a scientific method, an ironic stance towards the public; the sharing of “hope” as opposed to gaining access to “knowledge” and, at the forefront, a disbelief in the usefulness of “theory” in solving social problems and advancing revolutions.

4.

Let us recall now the serious charges leveled against the Left in Achieving Our Country and discuss them in more detail. Firstly, the difference between the current academic Left (with the reservations outlined above about the scope of the term used) and the Left of the 1930s is that between “agents” and “spectators”.

Paradoxically enough, Rorty seems to agree with the diagnosis provided by Allan Bloom in his Closing of the American Mind that “the spirit of detached spectatorship ... may already have entered such a student’s soul”.35 Incidentally, for both it is Nietzsche who is to be held

35 Ibidem, pp. 9, 11.
responsible for the degeneration of the American academy (Bloom’s story was distinctly about “how higher education has failed democracy and impoverished the souls of today’s students”\textsuperscript{36}). Because the current academic Left becomes spectatorial and retrospective, it therefore “ceases to be a Left”.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, it has “no projects to propose” and “no vision of a country to be achieved”.\textsuperscript{38} It is a “spectatorial, disgusted, mocking Left”.\textsuperscript{39} It prefers to “theorize”\textsuperscript{40} and to have “knowledge” rather than to share “hope”.\textsuperscript{41} It represents “a retreat from practice to theory”\textsuperscript{42} and lacks “national pride”.\textsuperscript{43}

Rorty uses formulations that go to the very heart of the disciplines the Left especially likes to cultivate, the books it tends to write, the lessons it tends to teach its students, and to the heart of its current public status. The formulations are devastating and it is certainly hard to forget the most biting of them, especially for those who have not yet realized the depth of the dividing line between French postmodern philosophy in its various versions (and in different American appropriations) and Rorty’s new pragmatism.\textsuperscript{44} Rorty uses the power of his rhetoric to denounce publicly the cultural pessimism of the Left in sentences like “hopelessness has become fashionable in the Left – principled, theorized, philosophical hopelessness”,\textsuperscript{45} or to denounce its social utility when he states that “it exaggerates the importance of philosophy to politics, and wastes its energy on sophisticated theoretical analyses of the significance of current events”,\textsuperscript{46} which reminds us of Vincent Descombes’ criticism of contemporary French thought in his reflections on “philosophy of


\textsuperscript{38} Ibidem, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibidem, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibidem, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibidem, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibidem, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibidem, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{44} See Marek Kwiek, \textit{Rorty’s Elective Affinities}, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{45} Richard Rorty, \textit{Achieving Our Country}, op. cit., p. 37.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibidem, p. 37.
current events", as well as Rorty’s leading theme of the “priority of democracy to philosophy”.

The Left in Rorty’s view provides no clues for reading the world, and for passing from theory to practice. As he put it in a memorable criticism of Frederick Jameson: “[A]fter reading Jameson, you have views on practically everything except what needs to be done”.47 The thinking of the Left is too abstract, “too high to encourage any particular political initiative”.48 Not only do Leftist scholars produce “many thousands of books which present scholastic philosophizing at its worst” but they also offer “the most abstract and barren explanations imaginable”.49 Finally, their “spectatorial approach” to the problems of the country and its “disengagement from practice” produces “theoretical hallucinations”.50 These are harsh words indeed, clearly resulting from Rorty’s public passion and backed by philosophical assumptions of his new pragmatism.

The academic Left, in Rorty’s reading, retreats from secularism and revives ineffability.

We are told over and over again that Lacan has shown human desire to be inherently unsatisfiable, that Derrida has shown meaning to be undecidable, that Lyotard has shown commensuration between oppressed and oppressors to be impossible and that events such as the Holocaust or the massacre of the original Americans are unrepresentable.51

At the same time the Left is unable to “engage in national politics”. If globalization is the single most important social challenge to America at the turn of the century, Rorty’s denouncement of the Left as having nothing to say about it sounds like a serious charge. There is admittedly a challenge, but “it is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization”.52

47 Ibidem, p. 78.
48 Ibidem, p. 78.
49 Ibidem, p. 93.
50 Ibidem, p. 94.
One line of criticism about Rorty’s account of globalization and its effects concerns his optimistic belief that “we intellectuals, who are mostly academics, are ourselves quite well insulated, at least in the short run, from the effects of globalization”. I cannot agree with Rorty here. This paper is not an appropriate forum in which to develop the theme of “the university and globalization” but it is certainly true that the world of economy and of the market is knocking at what have thus far been the closed doors of the academy. The literature about market forces invading the university, “the entrepreneurial university”, “academic capitalism”, “leasing the ivory tower”, as well as about the end of collegiality, the introduction of economic rationality and corporate governance in higher education, threats to academic freedom and increasing market orientation abound worldwide. The countries affected most strongly are, for example, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as those countries, mainly in Latin America, which are reforming their higher education systems under the influence of the World Bank. It is a crucial topic in thinking about intellectuals if intellectuals, as Rorty rightly claims in the case of America, are mostly academics. The transformations pertaining to academics pertain at the same time to intellectuals – and it is not a cultural-philosophical version of French theorists (the collapse of the figure of the intellectual associated with the end of modernity as a cultural project, the end of the Enlightenment ideals of the power/knowledge etc.), but a very practical version described by numerous anglophone sociologists and higher education scholars in recent decades.

5.

Rorty’s hotly debated proposal to “put a moratorium on theory” is hardly surprising in the context of his new pragmatism. It is fully understandable in the case of the philosopher for whom it is clear that

53 Ibidem, p. 89.
54 See Chapter 10.
America does not need further political revolutions, but merely small steps in the spirit of reformism. The theory of social democracy is not needed for reforms in laws or regulations or for step-by-step piecemeal changes. Big theories are useful for major political revolutions but do not seem to come in handy in small revisions of what is already achieved. Additionally, it is also useful to see the proposal in a strictly American sense where “theory” (in academic circles) simply means any French-inspired postmodern way of thinking (as in a once famous collection of essays, Against Theory, or in Paul de Man’s Resistance to Theory). It would be tempting to limit Rorty’s proposal to “postmodern theory” but clearly it is wider and concerns abstract social theorizing instead of concrete engagement for a particular cause on the part of the academic Left.

The academic Left seems to play the tunes of scholarship and citizenship at the same time: those of professors of prestigious universities and those of devastating critics of the system and unmaskers of its dirty political tricks. For them “reformism is not good enough”, but at the same time they have nothing to say about an alternative system. As Rorty puts it:

“[T]he system” is sometimes identified as “late capitalism”, but the cultural Left does not think much about what the alternatives to a market economy might be, or about how to combine political freedom with centralized economic decision making. Nor does it spend time asking whether Americans are undertaxed, or how much of a welfare state the country can afford, or whether the United States should back out of the North American Free Trade Agreement. When the Right proclaims that socialism has failed, and that capitalism is the only alternative, the cultural Left has little to say in reply. For it prefers not to talk about money. Its principal enemy is a mind-set rather than a set of economic arrangements ...

It is useful to remember, at the same time, that the registers of scholarship and leftist (or civic) engagement are different. The academic Left should not be criticized by Rorty for the thousands of intelligent or naïve books they wrote, as they come as part and parcel

---

56 Ibidem, p. 78.
57 Ibidem, pp. 78–79.
of the academic enterprise and we would be arriving at a very
difficult question about which books, in the long run, are intelligent
and which are not (let us think of Hegel or Nietzsche in this context,
and their extremely difficult prose, hardly readable to their own
German contemporaries). It is not the books and the theories per se
that beg criticism; it is the lack of their public and social relevance,
accompanied by explicit pretensions of taking part in a social
revolution. Rorty’s criticism of all books and theories presented by the
academic Left qua scholars is misguided. On the other hand, his
criticism of books and theories that are declared “weapons” in
political struggles with “the system”, political, subversive acts of
resistance, seems absolutely right. (Thinking of Sartre in this context,
let us recall his famous statement in “What is Literature”: “[a] day
comes when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must then take
up arms”.58) I am in agreement with Rorty when he criticizes the
cultural Left for being haunted by “ubiquitous specters”,59 especially
by “power” in a Foucauldian sense. However, it would certainly be
much more useful in political terms if the Left saw the power as
described in current globalization debates – the power as analyzed in
political science, political economics and some sections of sociology. I
refer to the power of, for example, transnational corporations,
transnational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund
or the World Bank, to power in the context of the changing relations
between the market and the state, or the economy and politics, and
the whole complex of issues associated with these global shifts which
are analyzed in contemporary globalization studies. Certainly, Rorty
is right when he argues that the academic Left cannot be asked to deal
with the consequences of globalization (including Zygmunt Bauman’s
“human consequences” of it).

With reference to Rorty’s persuasive rhetoric, it is interesting to
note his mocking observation that it is only humiliations for reasons

58 See Jeremy Jennings & A. Kemp-Welch, Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus
Affair to Salman Rushdie (London & New York: Routledge, 1997) and Intellectuals in
Twentieth-Century France. Mandarins and Samurai, ed. by Jeremy Jennings (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1993).

other than economic status that count for the Left: "nobody is setting up a program in unemployed studies, homeless studies, or trailer-park studies, because the unemployed, the homeless, and residents of trailer parks are not "others" in the relevant sense". Rorty is indeed correct here, but it would be hard to avoid "real politics" (and keep substituting it with "cultural politics") if the Left began "talking about money". Under globalization pressures, talking seriously about almost anything politically relevant without clear reference to "economy" (and market) looks misguided. It is one of the most pervading themes of the global age – the replacement of "politics" with "economy", the addition of an economic dimension to all social discussions, in various parts of the world and with different intensity.

I am very hesitant about Rorty's dismissive attitude towards "taking the long view" and "looking beyond nationhood to a global polity" and his view of both as "useless". Rorty is correct if he means future philosophical visions of "the theory", or of the generally French philosophy-inspired humanities. Philosophy, and especially postmodern French philosophy, may even be an obstacle in carrying out useful public-relevant long-term analyses. But forward-looking scholars such as Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, David Held, Saskia Sassen, Manuel Castells and very many others seem to be producing inspiring ideas while taking long views (although it is true that none of them is a philosopher). Looking forward towards the global age is publicly useful in the long run and it may be useless in both the short and long run for the current politics of the Left. It is often the level of abstraction that is an obstacle in political work. Theoretical language, although necessary, is generally useless in politics, including leftist politics. Again, it is useful to bear in mind the scholarship/politics split in this context.

---

60 Ibidem, p. 80.
So what, according to Rorty, is the Left to do? — "To start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action".63 The problem is that the Left Rorty analyzes is an academic Left and is very weak in the outside world. The Left is to speak of "specific social practices and specific changes in these practices".64 For the time being it is loud but powerless, engaged but abstract, committed but theoretical, revolutionary and hallucinatory in books but hopeless in deeds. Rorty’s critical attitude is reinforced by pretences the Left makes, through its revolutionary rhetoric combined with its inability to see the outside world. The main problem is how to combine being an academic and being a leftist activist, a part of the political movement. Rorty is an academic but he never sees his books as revolutionary acts of engaged politics, and his philosophical theories as subversive “tools” to be used to change “the system”. Scholarly books are scholarly books, we could try to generalize, and politics is politics. “Piecemeal reform within the framework of a market economy”65 — Rorty’s scope of actions for the Left today — is far away from revolutionary visions of the postmetaphysical and non-phallogocentric total revolution.

6.

It is interesting to think of Rorty’s criticism of the “academic Left” (often referred to as the “Foucauldian” Left) in the context of his overall view of Michel Foucault. Foucault, in Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), is an ironist unwilling to be a liberal. One can see some incoherence here, for the liberal is someone for whom — according to the definition by Judith Skhlar often referred to in this book — “cruelty is the worst thing we do”. Foucault’s philosophy is

64 Ibidem, p. 103.
65 Ibidem, p. 105.
filled with images, descriptions and analyses of cruelty over the recent centuries. And yet what is crucial for Rorty's new pragmatism is social "hope", rather than descriptions and analyses of cruelty: "liberal ironists are people who include among these ungroundable desires their own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may cease". The theme of "hope" appears in many of Rorty's texts, including titles such as "Method, Social Science, and Social Hope" from Consequences of Pragmatism, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope" from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity or "The End of Leninism, Havel, and Social Hope" from Truth and Progress. Finally, his recent Penguin collection of essays is entitled Philosophy and Social Hope and has an entire section entitled "Hope in Place of Knowledge: A Version of Pragmatism" and also includes such texts as "Failed Prophesies, Glorious Hopes" or "Globalization, the Politics of Identity and Social Hope". I take "hope" to be one of the most important themes in Rorty's philosophy. To put it in broad terms, that part of French philosophy which followed Heidegger and Nietzsche (often having previously abandoned Marx and Hegel) does not seem to leave much social hope for the future, being a disillusioned discourse about reality rather than a hopeful proposal for the future. That is exactly what Rorty, as a liberal and democrat, is unable to accept.

The two poles - hope/hopelessness and the present/future (connected with a different attitude towards utopias in the two traditions) - can be seen as determining significant differences between Rorty and the majority of French postmodern philosophers. It also marks the difference between Rorty and the "academic Left" in Achieving Our Country. To quote Rorty again: "hopelessness has become fashionable on the Left - principled, theorized, philosophical hopelessness". The two poles also include: optimism versus melancholy; belief in the salutary power of democracy versus

---

well-grounded in Rorty’s philosophy. Hence Rorty’s harsh treatment of the major part of contemporary French philosophy in the 1990s. (When Michel Foucault takes hope away from his thinking, he becomes dangerous. As Rorty puts it in an interview: “Foucault has been the most influential figure on the culture of the American Left, but his influence has been dangerous. The result has been the ‘disengagement’ of intellectuals”\textsuperscript{78}).

The difference between Rortyan pragmatists and the philosophers from the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Foucault line (whom the “academic Left” in Rorty’s descriptions took to heart) consists also in the fact that they did not share optimism about the future of liberal, democratic societies. Thus, for Rorty’s new pragmatism, “hope” has priority over “knowledge”, “tomorrow” over “yesterday”, and finally, “democracy” over “philosophy”. It is crucial to remember, while reading his criticism of the Left in \textit{Achieving Our Country}, that the choices Rorty makes in his prioritizing are very well-grounded in his way of thinking about philosophy and philosophy’s role in culture and, consequently, in his account of intellectuals in society.

It is also important to bear in mind while reading \textit{Achieving Our Country} that the intellectuals from the (academic, cultural, Foucauldian, etc.). Left do not have much in common with Rorty’s “liberal ironists”. Constructing the figure of the “liberal ironist”, Rorty notes his own differences with “an ironist who is unwilling to be a liberal” and with “a liberal who is unwilling to be an ironist”:\textsuperscript{79} Neither of them fit into his utopia sketched in \textit{Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity}, although for different reasons. According to Rorty,

the citizens of my liberal utopia would be people who had a sense of the contingency of their language of moral deliberation, and thus of their consciences, and thus of their community. They would be liberal ironists – … people who combined commitment with a sense of the contingency of their own commitment.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{78} Richard Rorty in Giovanna Borradori, \textit{The American Philosopher}, op. cit., p. 111.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibidem, p. 61, emphasis mine.
Under such conditions, Foucault is not allowed into Rorty's utopia because he lacks commitment in the specific Rortyan sense of sharing the "hope" mentioned above, while Habermas is committed and full of the social hope in question, but does not have a sense of the contingency of his own vocabulary of moral reflection. Certainly, considerable parts of Rorty's arguments against Foucault can be employed against the "academic" Left more generally.

As in the Foucault-Habermas story, Rorty's disagreement with the Left is both philosophical and political. Rorty had no doubts (contrary, for example, to Habermas\(^81\)) about possible "we's": according to the idea of the "priority of democracy to philosophy", the "we" of liberals is quite satisfactory and there is no need to look for another "we". Therefore Rorty's differences with Foucault are "political", as opposed to his "merely philosophical" differences with Habermas.\(^82\) It is also interesting to contrast Rorty's and Habermas's belief in the significance of philosophy in culture. Rorty does not accept "radical social theory", choosing instead (at best) "continual social criticism" (in a typescript entitled "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy"). That is to say, he prefers criticism as provided by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, and movie-makers as they are able to show pain and humiliation in their tiniest details. What then would guard Rorty's utopia against pain and humiliation? Only "particular descriptions" that would force reforms. "Only particular descriptions of injury and concrete suggestions about ways of avoiding injury".\(^83\)

Rorty is more dubious than Habermas about the social utility of philosophy. Instead, he advises that most of one's liberal hopes for the relief of unnecessary, socially-countenanced pain and humiliation be put into novels, articles and reports that make specific kinds of them visible, and in proposals for changes to social arrangements, such as laws, company regulations, administrative procedures or educational practices.\(^84\) The tone used in Achieving Our Country is

---

\(^81\) See e.g. Jürgen Habermas, *The New Conservatism* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989).
\(^83\) Ibidem, p. 17.
\(^84\) Ibidem, p. 21.
very similar indeed to that already employed in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*: we have enough theory (including ‘theory’ which is mainly of postmodern French inspiration) on the Left; we now need concrete proposals for changes in laws and regulations.

In his social thinking, Rorty is clearly in favour of the concrete rather than the universal and his choice is motivated by a political judgement of rich North Atlantic constitutional democracies, which do not need “unmasking” any more and in which “communication” is already “undistorted” (to refer to Foucault and Habermas). Although such a political choice may be risky, and perhaps mistaken, it would be shown only by ‘trial and error’ rather than by (Habermas’s) strong theoretical strategies.

Rorty leads his discussion with Lyotard, in turn, towards “our different notions of how politically conscious intellectuals should spend their time”\(^8\). As to whether one should “bear witness” (to differends, truth, or the past) this is a question about the intellectual’s self-image. Reformism or revolution, progress through utopian fantasies or through bloodshed – that is the choice; Rorty has no hesitations about his pragmatist choice regarding what to do and what to suggest to others:

[W]e Deweyans have a story to tell about the progress of our species, a story whose later episodes emphasize how things have been getting better in the West during the last few centuries, and which concludes with some suggestions about how they might become better still in the next few.\(^8\)

The difference is the difference in seeing their own tasks, different traditions and different obligations. Perhaps in broader terms, Lyotard’s inclination to look toward the past, against any utopia and utopianism, fearing violence and totalitarianism, in a “future-oriented” (Rorty) America may sound strange. French philosophers are haunted by spectres of the bloody past, a *mémoire du crime*, while American philosophers do not seem haunted by any historical event

---


\(^8\) Ibidem, p. 212.
with a similar degree of intensity. The French look with fear to the past and wonder what to do so that the past never returns; Americans look forward and are bold in inventing social utopias.

7.

Rorty returns to the above philosophical ideals in *Achieving Our Country* once again: there are few new themes present there, but it is their new presentation and new application for new, non-philosophical audiences that makes this book special and appealing. It makes use of the full array of Rorty's pragmatist ideals, with very scarce reference to his utopia of "liberal ironists" and to his prolonged critical debates with postmodern French philosophy and the Left inspired by it. Rorty's criticism of the "academic Left" seems to be a small part of a much wider challenge that this version of philosophy has been for American social thought over the past two decades. The book reaffirms Rorty's firm stance toward the relationship between philosophy and politics, expressed many times during the past decade or so and is best summarized in his own words in "Truth Without Correspondence to Reality" (1994):

It is unfortunate, I think, that many people hope for a tighter link between philosophy and politics than there is or can be. In particular, people on the left keep hoping for a philosophical view which cannot be used by the political right, one which will tend itself only to good causes. But there never will be such a view; any philosophical view is a tool, which can be used by many different hands.87

This is one of the most manifest differences between Rorty and the academic Left, and yet another underlying philosophical theme of *Achieving Our Country*.

Questions about the intellectual’s place and role in society, his tasks and obligations, the status he ascribes to himself and that society ascribes to him have recently become a significant part of the ongoing discourse in the humanities. There are different reasons in different countries for this, but whether in English-speaking countries, in Germany or, especially, in France, questions about the intellectual have been important points of reference in numerous discussions at the end of the 20th century. Lepenies’ thinking convincingly shows that the dominating French discourse on the subject requires a significant supplement today, for it depicts merely a part of a larger whole which does not confine itself to France alone French questions about the intellectual (from the Dreyfus affair at the turn of the 20th century to Sartre to, in turn, le silence des intellectuels in the eighties of the last century) do not exhaust the catalogue of all the questions that can and should be asked today; nor do they restrict our account of the issue of the intellectual to the adventure of being seduced by the Marxist (or Stalinist) thinking which started with the October Revolution of 1917 progressing to the middle of the seventies on the part of French writers and philosophers, followed only by their disappointment with and gradual distancing from it after the Algerian war of independence and the events of 1956 (for it is, indeed, possible to see the history of French intellectuals of the 20th century

And that is perhaps the most important difference in a discourse devoted to the intellectual between Germany (and America) on the one hand, and France on the other. The cultural specificity of these countries can here account for a lot: America, with the exception of Dewey in the thirties, seems not to have had great, public intellectuals, nor to have had great discussions about their social engagement and the responsibility associated with them and deriving right from French history. The socially engaged intellectual like Sartre who not only speaks – but who is listened to as well – does not find a comfortable place in the German tradition (and let us remind ourselves here of Lepenies from \textit{Between Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology}:

In Germany, writing and reading are traditionally solitary acts, and a literature consciously concerned with affecting society and firmly anchored in it has always been counted superficial and un-German.\footnote{Wolf Lepenies, \textit{Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology}, transl. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 204.}

Perhaps that is the reason why melancholic French thinkers seem to go in their discussion backwards, while American and German theorists, to risk for a moment a simple overgeneralization, look forward, past the present towards the future. America is traditionally a “future-oriented country” with its own myths and dreams of the promised land; “the American dream” is not the one from intellectual treatises, being rather a part and parcel of the social world subjected to a hard test no sooner than by the Vietnam war, and most recently by the September the 11th tragedy.\footnote{The University, Globalization, Central Europe, ed. by Marek Kwiek (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003).} Neither Edward Said, nor Paul Bové, Noam Chomsky or

\textit{Homo Europaeus Intellectualis} Revisited

\textit{Wolf Lepenies: Homo Europaeus Intellectualis Revisited
Richard Rorty – to name but a few from among those writing most extensively in the USA on the subject of the intellectual at the end of the 20th century – return to the moral dilemmas of past events. They rather put a different question: what is to be done today?

In a similar manner, German thinkers seem to have looked with amazement, at least until it became an international debate, at the fierce French discussions on the political engagement of Martin Heidegger in 1933, which took place at the end of the eighties – regarding the case rather as closed, at least in Germany.4 The French specificity, on the other hand, seems to consist in asking questions about the present via detours taken with the help of questions asked about the past; hence recent returns to Dreyfus, Benda, Sartre, often just in order to settle current philosophical accounts and wage current philosophical wars.5 So, while thinking about the question of the intellectual today, it is important to bear in mind the fact that our discourse about this figure remains in the shadow of a historically based French discourse on the subject, neglecting to a large extent the simultaneously ongoing (not so dramatic, heroic, spectacular!) German and American discourses.

2.

The theme of the “intellectual” plays a key role in Wolf Lepenies’ writings; it seems that his work from Melancholie und Gesellschaft to Die Drei Kulturen to Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa as well as to his inaugural lecture in Collège de France given in 1992 (La fin de l’utopie et le retour de la mélancolie. Regards sur les intellectuels d’un vieux continent) and, finally, numerous articles published in recent years can be read right from the perspective of the modern intellectual. In the present text I intend to trace Lepenies’ account of

the intellectual and to locate it within the opposition that has structured Lepenies’ thinking in the recent quarter of a century or so: that of melancholy and utopia. The knot of melancholy-utopia-intellectual is a knot of three inseparable elements in his thought. None of them exists independently in his works: “Melancholy and utopia – it is between these two poles that resides the greatness and misery of European intellectuals”. It is one of the most stimulating, most constant – and fruitful – themes in his work; the one that provides insight into his account of violence and revolution, terror, totalitarianism, as well as today’s post-Cold-War world. The pair provides Lepenies with tools to analyse the situation of intellectuals in the West and in the East of Europe after 1989. It turns out today that the pair of melancholy/utopia not only enables one to see the past of intellectuals from a different perspective, but also enables us to take a careful look at their place in today’s world, after the – simultaneous, as he stresses – downfall of the two great utopias of modernity: the communist utopia of ends and the capitalist utopia of means. Lepenies shows us in his works that the pair of melancholy/utopia is useful in discussing the role of the intellectuals: the specific melancholy of intellectuals which derives from the inadequacies of the world they live in and which they are not able to change, and their utopia which derives from the inhibition of action and transference of unsatisfied dreams from this world to a better one. The utopia Lepenies writes about derives from intellectuals’ melancholy and, at the same time, is a means to cure them from it.

Utopia in Lepenies’ account is a product of the representatives of a social class that has lost its public and political significance, or a class that aspires to have such significance knowing that it is (here and now) impossible. Utopia is a shadow of melancholy, its twin. It is born whenever a social activity is blocked and reduced to helpless passivity. When the possibilities of action decrease, reflection grows, but the intellectual-melancholic suffers because he is not able to act – he can only think.

---

Weltschmertz, melancholy, and hypochondria resulted from the enforced hypertrophy of the realm of reflection, from imposed loss of an ability to exercise real power, and from the consequent pressure to justify one’s situation.\(^7\)

The intellectual turns away from the world in which he is unable to act, he retreats from society into himself, suffers from his own fate as well as that of the world itself, trying to express this common fate (like Paul Valéry – who tries to changer ses doulers en œuvre) and, finally, suffers for what he is left with – which is merely reflection. *Homo europaeus intellectualis*, as Lepenies named him in his lecture given in Collège de France, is not a social scientist attempting to conquer the world in order to understand and to provide prognoses about it, nor is he the scientist or the technician. He is the melancholic, the intellectual who is *chroniquement insatisfait*, who thinks and doubts, and finally retreats from this world in search of a better one, experiencing his powerlessness.

What Lepenies shows in his *Melancholy and Society* is that utopian thinking derives from the lack of satisfaction with the intellectual’s social *status quo*. This lack of satisfaction does not in any way lead – nor in its intention is supposed to lead – to action. Utopias, as presented by Lepenies, are not revolutionary manifestos which show the point of departure (the present miserable state of affairs), the point of arrival (the future radiant and happy society) and the ways supposed to lead from the former to the latter. It is already in the case of the first utopia presented by Robert Burton in *Anatomy of Melancholy* from 1621 that Lepenies expresses the idea in a clear manner: Burton “designed his utopia of England because as a poor intellectual he could never hope to put his ideas into practice”, and utopians, in general, “would not think and design in such a way if they were able to act”.\(^8\) The intellectual-melancholic-utopian while producing utopia is a therapist (with respect to himself and his class) rather than a revolutionary. Utopia is born out of melancholy and is a

---

means to fight it. It is supposed to cure its producer rather than the world – to cure him from his chronic lack of satisfaction, unfulfillment of his public and political aspirations, and depravation of dreams of participation in real political power. Utopia does not call for action – "precisely because it is documented in literature, utopian thought is a sign of inhibition of action" (p. 146). Action is impossible, and the intellectual is an unhappy, unfulfilled man of action.

Utopia as a product of the intellectual-melancholic is organised by the notion of order: if in a better world there is no melancholy, then there is also no place in it for boredom: utopia divides time to the last dot, since it would appear easiest to create new life in order to preserve utopia (Campanella). Free time does not exist in utopia, because there are no empty spaces available to be excluded from the plan. Work as well as leisure time is regimented.9

To get rid of melancholy, boredom, ennui, the utopian plan must be all-encompassing and order and boredom must be mutually exclusive. But the crucial point is that the notion of order, plan, and the finite space of possibilities collides with and finally makes impossible the very reflection on it. Utopia of the melancholic-intellectual is born out of reflection about inadequacies of this world but leads to a picture of a better world in which, to quote Lepenies once again, "there is no longer any place for reflection, because everything is "in order".10 When there is no longer any place for reflection, one can speak of paradise (for what might one want to change in an absolutely perfect world?); when there is no longer any place for reflection, though, one can also speak of the hell of totalitarianism (in which any change cannot be even thought of). In utopia, history unexpectedly stops, comes to a standstill and finds its end. Time stops as it is measured by changes. In the new world of utopia – born out of complaints about the inadequacies and imperfections of the present world – nothing else can be changed, or

---

9 Ibidem, pp. 91–92.
10 Ibidem, p. 147.
as Lepenies puts it, the space created is “definitive”.¹¹ Utopia has managed to dispel boredom, get rid of melancholy, make hypochondria go – by stopping time and history.

Let us just remind ourselves that the themes of the “end of history” and the “end of thinking” have been present in philosophy at least since Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*: together with Hegel as a “judging self-consciousness” and Napoleon as an “acting self-consciousness”, history had become completed at the moment of the battle of Jena. Hegel cannot do without Napoleon, and the other way round in this account – it is in Napoleon that Hegel finds his certainty of being a sage (rather than a mere philosopher) who possesses Absolute Knowledge, for it is owing to him that the reality he is describing in *Phenomenology* is definite. The question about man after the end of history – as well as about the intellectual after the end of it – is a key one for Alexandre Kojève, a great commentator of Hegel in France, who exerted a peculiar and long-lasting influence upon the whole generation of French thinkers and writers in the period of, roughly, 1930–1960. Kojève would ask what “post-historical” man is supposed to do if action that negates reality is no longer necessary, being rather irrational as the post-historical world is the world of embodied truth? What about human happiness and human satisfaction? Is not man doomed to suffer from post-historical boredom? What is he supposed to do with his “unemployed negativity” – the négativité sans emploi of Georges Bataille, still another reader of Hegel – and whom is about to be the intellectual, the bearer of this jobless negativity after the end of history? What happens with the negativity of someone who, all of a sudden, has nothing more to do or, to ask a more fundamental question, and following the path indicated in Lepenies’ of the impossibility of reflection in utopia the moment history comes to a standstill: when everything is finally known, and when society is finally perfect, what will the intellectual be able to do and will be able to know? (What will happen with the whole tradition dating back to Ancient philosophy according to which the essence of being human is knowing?) What will he be able to write if writing is associated with the ongoing –

changeable, never-ending, unpredictable — history which is about to end? Lepenies’ answer is unambiguous on this point: with the ban on melancholy in the society of the future, there will be no longer any place available for reflection, or for the intellectual for that matter. Hegel’s questions (am I not God if I have possessed Absolute Knowledge and have become the first Sage?) that have haunted French twentieth-century thought from Kojève, Bataille, Blanchot to Denis Hollier, find in Wolf Lepenies their explicit answer. The following could be said: utopia as a product of the melancholic-intellectual is a world of which he is no longer a part. The perfect world does not need people whose task consists in looking for its imperfections (for “it is certainly true that intellectuals can best fulfil their mission as heretics and as critics, as deviants and as oppositionals”, Lepenies adds elsewhere.12 None of the social roles enumerated by him above is needed in the world of utopia; furthermore, each of them can easily become dangerous there. “Dans l’utopie, la mélancolie est strictement interdite”... The interdiction existing in literary utopias is in fact transformed in societies claiming to be the realisation of utopias into the “duty of imposing happiness” – with the help of violence, if need be. Happiness, joyfulfulness, youthfulness are all characteristics of utopias realised so far, like faith, in making new man. The new man in new society has to be happy. He is not entitled to express in public his unhappiness, his melancholy or lack of satisfaction. He is not allowed to discuss, think, or write.

In the suggested opposition between die klagende Klasse and die Menschen guten Gewissens (or as he puts it elsewhere l’espèce qui se plainte and les hommes de bonne conscience,13 Lepenies goes beyond the traditional opposition of the “two cultures” put forward by C.P. Snow. He shows that the two poles: melancholy and utopia, do not affect social scientists, e.g. sociologists. Sociology is precisely the “third culture” born out of the impossibility of becoming a “social”

13 Wolf Lepenies, Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1992), p. 17; La fin de l’utopie et le retour de la mélancolie, op. cit., p. 18.
version of natural sciences on the one hand, and the impossibility of choosing the option of literature in describing social world on the other. The division Lepenies has in mind does not come between the culture of humanists and men of letters on the one hand, and that of natural scientists on the other. The whole book entitled Die drei Kulturen (and translated into English as Between Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology) is devoted to the contest between the men of letters on the one hand and the social scientists on the other in claiming to offer the key orientation for modern civilisation, to constitute the guide to living appropriate to industrial society as well as to the very status of knowledge about industrial society that has been taking place from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. No longer is the dilemma of choosing between the natural sciences and the humanities, that old contest between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften, at stake; the point of Lepenies’ analyses is the controversy between the literary intelligentsia and that of representatives of the social sciences, which, in turn, refers us to the controversy between the culture of reason and the culture of feelings, Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment14 (or, on a different plane, the dangers of a scientification or literaturisation of sociology). The tension pervading his works and born between complaining humanists and self-complacent social scientists does not appear in the opposition of the “two cultures”. Social science is located beyond the alternative that the intellectuals, i.e. artists and writers, face: melancholy or utopia, being at the same time “par delà la mélancolie et en-deça de l’utopie”.15 The traditional opposition of “two cultures” requires a significant supplement in the form of a “third culture”, the culture of the social sciences, or sociology in particular. Otherwise the history of twentieth-century intellectuals – as well as earlier “intellectuals avant la lettre” – will be incomprehensible.

The intellectual does not act although he wants to. He wants to but he cannot. Deprived of real influence on the exercise of power, he

---

15 Wolf Lepenies, La fin de l’utopie et le retour de la mélancolie, op. cit., p. 20.
retreats from this world to a better world of reflection. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Lepenies says in "The Future of Intellectuals", the Enlightenment dreams about interpreting and changing the world began to fade when Napoleon had changed the map of Europe. Engineers to carry out technical progress and bureaucrats to manage the masses were needed; there was no longer any place left for an unproductive intellectual elite believing that principles could govern society. As the author comments on this period, "the result was resignation and revolt on the part of intellectuals. They consoled themselves with the idea that their realm was not of this world". In Lepenies' narrative, basically there is no significant place accorded to the "Dreyfus affair" in France and the birth of the term "intellectual" in France at the very end of the nineteenth century; as opposed to Bernard-Henri Lévy from Les Adventures de la liberté, he passes over that particular moment as a less important one than two other events: possibly Diderot's article about the "philosopher" written for his Encyclopedia that ascribes modest Enlightenment tasks to the philosopher, and the Russian October Revolution of 1917. The year 1917 in his account completed 1789 - "the intellectuals had at last changed the world too". Communism and then fascism would promise the fulfilment of an old dream that ideas can become part of reality. The attractive force of communism to intellectuals Lepenies explains by means of its relation to action - after the collapse of fascism "only one ideology of action remained, and it was towards this ideology that the handicapped man of action, the intellectual, directed himself, whether he agreed with it or not". If one wanted to supplement Lepenies' narrative about the "handicapped man of action" with some details of the French context, then it would be worth pointing out that the fascination communism exerted on French intellectuals was strongly shaken for the first time in 1954 with the advent of events in Algeria. After the manifesto of

18 Ibidem, p. 117.
19 Ibidem, p. 117.
"121 intellectuals" in connection with the Algerian war, there appeared a new kind of ideology directing intellectuals towards the Third World (see the career of Frantz Fanon). To quote Lévy:

our intellectuals had still not been cured. Certainly, they no longer cared for the Soviet Union or believed in Stalin. But their faith in genuine, authentic revolution, which would put an end to the ills of the West, remained intact.20

3.

Lepenies' proposals and intuitions go in another direction, though. He is not concerned about the revival of l'engagement as presented by Sartre in "What Is Literature?"21, nor is he concerned about the tasks put forward by Michel Foucault to the French intellectual when he tried to go beyond the Sartrian conception of the intellectual as a writer in his unfinished and unelaborated opposition – intellectuel universel/intellectuel spécifique.22 The year 1989 is a key date here; Lepenies on numerous occasions stresses that "1989 has not only happened to the East. It has happened to the West as well".23 We shall focus on the consequences it brought about for the constellation of questions about melancholy-utopia-intellectuals. First of all, something happened to melancholy, something happened to utopia, and something happened to the intellectuals, both in the West and in the East of Europe. The dream of a free world of parliamentary democracy became reality in Central and Eastern Europe (as Lepenies wrote in his Italian lectures of 1992, "Die Utopie von gestern schien

23 Wolf Lepenies, "Science and Scholarship after the End of History" (Bonn, 1995), p. 3.
zur Wirklichkeit von heute geworden”. Melancholy caused by the lack of public and political influence gave way to euphoria – and there appeared the phenomenon of “active melancholics”, intellectuals who, in a manner unexpected to others as to themselves, after years spent in opposition, gained power. The traditional balance in the constellation of the three elements in question was lost: is it possible to be the intellectual and to rule at the same time? Is it possible to be simultaneously a man of action and a melancholic? Is it possible to be a utopian and govern society? What is to be done – and thought – when the then traditional concept of the intellectual ceases referring to intellectuals in power? Who are they to become – former intellectuals, former melancholics, former utopians? How is the Central European political “culture of intellectuals” to face the Western European “culture of experts”.

Intellectuals in Central Europe were brought to the offices of power by mechanisms which are totally unknown in the West from first-hand experience; to return to Lepenies:

Their fight for human rights, the classic ideal of the modern European intellectual, has endowed the intellectuals of east and central Europe with certain unalienable rights and with a degree of political credibility which no intellectual in the West has been able to acquire. They also display ... a fresh emotional enthusiasm which has been absent from the discussions of Western intellectuals for a long time.

Neither their political nor economic experience brought them to power – it was due to their “artistic sincerity” and “moral probity” that they gained it. Lepenies’ fascination with intellectuals from behind the former Iron Curtain is a function of his disappointment with the West. The moment of measurement of their place and role in the two parts of Europe seems to be crucial here. From this measuring operation, the former come as victors. Linnaeus’ description: levis,

26 Ibidem, p. 916.
argutus, inventor – versatile, shrewd, inventive – with respect to homo europaeus, the highest form of homo sapiens, fits European intellectuals from the East best. In 1989 there returns to Europe the hero who disappeared as a species in the 20th century and who was to never come back. Between the social role played by and social recognition ascribed to the intellectual in the two parts of Europe, there arises an asymmetry. The contrast in question is best shown in the following sentence: "The fight for human rights must be a concern for intellectuals; the adjustment of the value-added tax is none of their business".27

Lepenies in his studies referred to extremely important events whose status nevertheless may turn out to be merely ephemeral. No matter what happens – of which the author of Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa is perfectly aware and of which he writes – the end of the twentieth century witnessed a heroic comeback of a hero who, as a part of society rather than a solitary figure, was born a hundred years ago in France and labelled himself l'intellectuel. Lepenies says that:

at the end of the century we are realising, with the fall of the communist regimes in eastern Europe, a rehabilitation of the intellectual. We are watching his heroic comeback to the political stage.28

And it is precisely in such a situation, under such circumstances, that intellectuals, forced by historical developments, are entitled to break the rule given by Kant and taken from Bacon: de nobis ipsis silemus, let us keep silence about ourselves. The year 1989 once again gave an impetus to return to a reflection on the political and public role of the intellectual. For they played an important role in the events of that year.

The events of 1989 (as well as earlier and later developments) seem not to have found a conceptual elaboration and not to have led to theoretical repercussions in the discourse devoted to the intellectual. Perhaps the greatest influence these events have exerted

27 Ibidem, pp. 911, 914.
28 Ibidem, p. 917.
is on two philosophers-sociologists: Zygmunt Bauman and Wolf Lepenies, both for different reasons closely connected with Central Europe. No matter whether one reads such collective volumes in the English speaking world as *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics* or *Knowledge and Power. The Changing Role of European Intellectuals* or *Intellectuals and Public Life*, or finally such French discussions about intellectuals as books written by Bernard-Henri Lévy, Pascal Ory or Jean-François Sirinelli, the references to the events of 1989 and to the “return of the hero” are invisible in the West.\(^{29}\) Lévy, for instance, notes in passing merely the following:

> In Tienanmen Square, in Prague, and at the Berlin Wall, we looked for signs of an epoch drawing to a close, an epoch in which intellectuals had perhaps enjoyed their greatest influence.\(^{30}\)

And it was right there that the “asymmetry” Lepenies has in mind started to be visible. The theme in question was never elaborated on by the thinkers in question.

What are the specific types of intellectuals that Lepenies can see in Central Europe? First, “active melancholics” and second, “non-profit intellectuals”\(^{31}\). Both types can be encountered only in this part of the world. “Active melancholics” are the intellectuals who after 1989 took power in the post-communist countries (to a varying degree and for a varying period of time, let us remind ourselves); they are such “moralists” already referred to in this text who, being actors, dramatists, philosophers, poets, film directors, artists, musicians, “retained a measure of moral credibility, dignity and ability to inspire the young”,\(^{32}\) and who participated in opposition movements and then in successful revolutions. “Non-profit intellectuals”, a species extinct in


the West for a long time, in the mental changes that Europe awaits can play a crucial role in science (just like, in Lepenies’ view, “competent rebels” can play such a role in the economy and “cosmopolitan patriots” can play it in democracy). The key question about the “mentality gap” existing between the East and the West, with respect to three of the most important domains: science (culture), economics, democracy, shows the place of culture as the most significant in the ongoing transformation. While, according to Lepenies, in the economy and politics the East merely joins the West (i.e. a free market replaces central planning and parliamentary democracy replaces one-party dictatorship), in the sphere of culture the East can meet the West. Let us listen carefully to the following quotation:

I wish to argue that this [cultural system of our societies – MK] is an area where we in the West should take the recent historical developments on our continent as a most welcome opportunity to learn from each other instead of simply using it as a pretext to teach others.

This possibility of learning from each other – in the domain of culture, without any experiments of looking for a “third road” in the economy or in politics – would allow one to retain the diversity of cultural orientations which traditionally formed the richness of Europe. Lepenies’ conclusions are far-reaching. If 1989 “has happened to the West as well”, to remind ourselves of his fundamental conviction, then the West should try to make use of the lessons given by history. The culture of experts showed its limitations because nobody expected such a possibility: “the defeat of communism is thus much less a reason for triumph than for modesty – for all of us”. The error of the Western political culture of experts consists, in Lepenies’ view, in cherishing the illusion of a final victory, as if forgetting about the failure of the utopian convictions of this culture which accompanied the end of the socialist utopia. For capitalism is a utopia

33 Wolf Lepenies, “Science and Scholarship after the End of History”, op. cit., p. 2.
36 Wolf Lepenies, “Science and Scholarship after the End of History”, op. cit., p. 4.
of means, not being a utopia of utopian ends. The point was put explicitly in a Paris lecture when he said that:

capitalism since its origins has been supported by the conviction that the progress of science and technology constitutes an infallible means to transform the entire world into a vast universal civil society. This illusion has to be renounced today.\textsuperscript{37}

The end of the utopia of ends influenced the end of the belief in an irresistible progress of science and technology. Not to take the connection between the two utopias into consideration is both dangerous and myopic.

It is only from such a perspective that the following theme can be looked at: Lepenies belief in the necessity of connecting the Europe of thought and the Europe of politics, cultural elites and political ones. If culture and the world of thought are to go hand in hand with today's transformations in the East and in the West, then the crucial figure is the intellectual traced in the present text all the time. Hence, studying "the relative advantages of backwardness"\textsuperscript{38} in the East, Lepenies concludes that the experiences that the figure of the "non-profit intellectual" brings about can help in a self-analysis of Western intellectuals today. To show the idea in a nutshell, let us quote two sentences from two texts: "we should even take his example as a chance for changing some of our own intellectual attitudes" and "he will do something we badly need: he will teach us differences".\textsuperscript{39} When a narrow culture of experts fails, then it is necessary to return – in a critical manner – to the tradition of the Enlightenment and its "philosophe". It turns out once again that the ethos of the Enlightenment intellectuals is revived with the help of Central European intellectuals, while the history of modern intellectuals is the history of their own overestimation of themselves – Diderot's "philosophe" returned to the European stage, with the propriety,

\textsuperscript{37} Wolf Lepenies, \textit{La fin de l'utopie et le retour de la mélancolie}, op. cit., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{38} Wolf Lepenies, "Science and Scholarship after the End of History", op. cit., p. 13.
personal courage, commitment to civil society and unshakable belief in the possibilities of reason in making the social world better, all of which characteristics are being exhibited precisely by “the intellectuals who came to power in the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe”.40

The lost ethos of personal courage and intellectual modesty (rather than self-complacency) was what was found in 1989 according to Lepenies. And if he writes about the relative advantages of backwardness and about learning from each other, then he surely means the potential cultural gains that can be provided by the clash of the culture of cynical experts and that of sentimental moralists. If culture is to fulfil its fundamental tasks – and perhaps the most important is the shift in mentalities – then the Enlightenment intellectual has to come to the stage once again in the manner he did in Eastern Europe. Have Lepenies’ dreams about the spiritual uplifting of Western Europe due to the events of 1989 come true? No, they have not, for in his view the West has not thought over its victory, has not paused for a while to reflect on itself:

we were unwilling to draw the consequences of 1989 with respect to a change of our mentalities. Because everything was changing in the East, we were convinced that everything could stay the same as ever in the West.41

4. Thus, the key task for the intellectual could be described in the following manner: although the time of utopia is over (note the title theme of la fin de l’utopie in a Collège de France lecture), the intellectual is not entitled to look for his shelter once again in melancholy (the title theme of le retour de la mélancolie). The best example can be taken from those “active melancholics” of Central and Eastern Europe who help in rehabilitating the figure of the intellectual and bring to mind the Enlightenment ethos. Denis Diderot can become a founding father

figure in a return to the Enlightenment in thinking about the intellectual: he not only warned against an overestimation of the role of reason but also of his own role. As Lepenies describes him,

his intellectual does not live in an ivory tower, and his daily life is not one of exile. Because he knows that humankind can live only in society, he aims to develop fully his own sociability, to make himself useful and pleasing to his neighbours. Civil society is just as commendable for him as an earthly divinity: he knows its principles better than anyone else and sees in its perfection his highest aim.42

The question about the knot of melancholy-utopia-intellectual finds here its answer for today: in a world without utopia, the intellectual cannot fall back into melancholy and he should turn to the tradition of (non-Eurocentric) Enlightenment in his search for an ideal of social commitment. For the first time in the twentieth century, let us add, the intellectual has a chance to go beyond the charmed circle of melancholy/utopia. It is for the first time that he is not seduced by the "ideology of action" – which previously turned out to be so disastrous for several generations of writers, philosophers, and artists engaged in a revolutionary changing of the course of the world.

Lepenies tries to return the intellectual to the tradition of a non-overestimation of his own possibilities – his role, status, and place in society – but, at the same time, introduces culture to a crucial place in the transformations occurring in the world. Minimal changes have suggested that the economy and politics do not suffice in the face of the challenge confronting the form of the utopia-free world: culture, science and the arts are to return to an essential place in social life. The question is whether Lepenies does not excessively heroicise "active melancholics" – the intellectuals of the East excessively celebrate the political "culture of moralists", and excessively admire "non-profit intellectuals" as potentially example-giving figures? Obviously, his discussions do have necessary restrictions and quantifiers, but, it seems, he needs the figures painted the way he paints them to draw a contrast with the situation of the intellectual in

the West. The more colourful the Central European post-communist world is, the more powerful the contrast he wants to focus his attention on is. And he is appealing to a Western world, so the contrast in question plays a pedagogical, so to speak, role. One could say that both elements of the opposition are "ideal types", never encountered in reality in the long run. But although the reality prompts us with an answer that there is less and less "non-profit intellectuals" in the rapidly commercialising world of culture and the arts, that moralists who had led revolutions and headed opposition movements were long ago deprived of power in democratic elections in favour of cold experts (who are often far away from what Lepenies referred to in Collège de France as probité morale and engagement courageux en faveur des droits de l'homme, to say the least), and that the "fresh emotional enthusiasm" from debates and discussions of the years following 1989 have long gone – just to stick to Polish grounds – nevertheless the human type shown by Lepenies is extremely stimulating. Was it the case and were the people around actually like that? How has the East changed until today, and what will be the direction of these changes in the long run? How about the idea that we here take the economy, and democracy into account – and learn differences from each other? Are we here becoming a "poorer West", desperately trying to make up for lost decades? Lepenies is one of few thinkers in the West who clearly sees these questions and tries to expose them, inspiring both the sides in question. In the fervour of ideological controversies about the "end of history", philosophical debates about the "death of the intellectual" and sociological discussions about the "collapse of communism", Lepenies' discourse about the intellectual from the perspective of melancholy and utopia and his attempt to make us return to the tradition of the Enlightenment philosopher sound very interesting indeed.
Zygmunt Bauman and the Question of the Intellectual in Postmodernity

1.

Zygmunt Bauman is one of the few contemporary thinkers with whom it is worthwhile to think together about our postmodern condition. Thinking together with him does not necessarily mean following his roads and accepting his conclusions. However, it may also mean thinking in a way which is parallel to his thinking, one that sometimes crosses with it at some points of convergence, sometimes departs from it for various, often idiosyncratic and individual reasons. Although reading Bauman requires close attention, as his particular works are interrelated and mutually complementary, nevertheless the attention paid to them is amply rewarded.

Consideration of Bauman’s thinking is rewarding because the perspective of his sociological hermeneutics (as he sometimes calls his thinking) is extremely productive for today’s thinking of culture. It is productive in itself as well as confronted with proposals and suggestions of other postmodern critics and critics of postmodernity, especially (in a strong sense of the term) philosophical ones. A peculiar paradox, at least as far as I can see it, is the notion of Bauman as philosopher: Bauman’s questions have a stronger appeal to a philosophical discourse of postmodernity than to a sociological one. There is a growing number of sociological volumes devoted to “intellectuals” of today, but none of them seems to compare in their intellectual horizons with diagnoses and suggestions of the author of Legislators and Interpreters. The controversy that has recently taken
place in France and in the USA among philosophers finds in Bauman its most interesting supplement. Therefore, crossing traditional disciplinary boundaries, it is worthwhile to read him in the context of philosophical discussions, as it is precisely in these discussions that Bauman’s voice – although indirect and rather from behind main currents of a philosophical discourse of today – is a voice that deserves the highest attention. And let the author of *Intimations of Postmodernity* forgive me the fact that I am trying hard here to associate him with what perhaps is not dearest to him, not closest to his thinking from his own perspective (i.e. with postmodernism and neopragmatism, to use these two vague terms). The point is, though – and let us provide it as legitimacy of a sort – that *habent sua fata libelli*: books have their own fate, their fate depends on the direction we push them in (i.e. we – readers), depends on what books we will put them next to in a great library of humanity. Their fate depends on what we will manage to do with them, for what purpose we will be able to use them, what interests we will have while reading them and writing about them. Nietzsche wrote about it, Walter Benjamin did, finally Richard Rorty used that saying when he was asked what provides legitimacy for his reading of Donald Davidson on the one hand and Jacques Derrida on the other. Davidson does not seem too sympathetic to Rorty’s endeavours, which reduce him to an intellectual shield in struggles of Rorty’s neopragmatism with its opponents. Derrida, until very recently, has kept silence on the subject. But great polemics are taking place all the time. Moreover, they are highly interesting. There emerge groups of “defenders” of both philosophers against their Rortyan “pragmaticization” who take care of purity and undisturbed transmission of their masters’ views...  

---

1 See Richard Rorty, “Réponse à Jacques Bouweresse” in a splendid volume *Lire Rorty. Le pragmatisme et ses conséquences* (Paris: L’eclat, 1992), p. 156, or the answer Rorty gave to F. Farrell’s complaints from *Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism*: “... I do not think it matters whether Davidson would or would not be sympathetic to such an extrapolation. If you borrow somebody’s idea for a different purpose, is it really necessary to clear this novel use with the originator of the idea?”, a typescript, p. 1.

2 See my *Rorty’s Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1996). Let me provide only two examples
Given a certain (a)methodological charity, perhaps it not so interesting to get into details of the essence of “misunderstanding” in such readings of works of Davidson, Derrida (or Bauman, for that matter) that suggest (be they even non-existing) connections and parallels, because the fate of books is as contingent as our whole postmodern being. There are no non-contingent and universal foundations, thus there is also no author’s foundation of a text that a 

priori

provides him with greater rights and more important voice in the “cultural conversation” taking place. The voice of the author, traditionally important, has already become at the same time one of many equally valid voices of readers and commentators. On the one hand, one has to take into consideration that “modesty of the age” about which Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe writes almost in the form of the manifesto in his La Fiction du politique, on the other hand it is just with the help of the power of precisely that modesty that philosophy has a still greater possibility – a chance? – to become a commentary to already written and currently being written philosophical works: a commentary to a still enlarging and changing canon of works, a commentary to commentaries. And a commentary always gives birth to a (Bloomian) temptation of a “strong misreading”, a “poetic misprision”, since, as he says in The Anxiety of Influence, the meaning of a poem can only be a poem, but another poem – a poem not itself.

3 “… Could it not be derisory to claim that one is engaged in philosophy, or – still worse – that one is a philosopher?”, asks Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in his Heidegger, Art and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 1.

4 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 70. “Strong poets” make the history of poetry by misreading one another – it might be asked whether “strong philosophers” could not be making the history of philosophy by misreading one another, by producing their own idiosyncratic sequences of philosophers (just like Rorty creates and uses the sequence “Plato-Kant” or “Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida”)? The majority of “proper” interpretations of philosophy is worse than mistakes, says Bloom. “Perhaps there are only more or less
Thus, let us imagine here – Bauman’s poem read in the mirror of other poems... What inclines one to make such a reading is also an extremely metaphorical and highly individual style of his writing. It happens in Bauman, let us bear this in mind, that a whole book is supported by several metaphors chosen with impressive erudition and ingenuity. It is difficult to imagine a “rational” discussion of a traditional philosopher with metaphors; a metaphor can be confronted with another metaphor, but it is not comfortable in the way arguments are. Just like in the case of Rorty, the construction of an “ironist” produces a distance and pushes the edge of irony in two opposite directions at the same time (“I am saying this, but maybe I am saying that? I am saying this, but only ‘ironically’, how could I take it ‘seriously’” etc. etc.), depending on the actual direction of an attack and the sophistication of polemics. In Bauman, the support of his vision of modernity and postmodernity on several carefully chosen metaphors may bring about similar helplessness of a (traditional) critic. For, let us ask, what is the meaning of the opposition of “legislators” and “interpreters”, “pilgrims” and “wanderers” really supposed to be? What is the meaning of metaphors of “vagabonds”, “nomads”, “tourists” or “flaneurs”, especially if we like at look at them with the cold eyes of an analyst of the present and decoder of texts devoted to it – strangers and insensitive beings to the poetry of words and the magic of pictures? The method of decoding, deciphering – just like one deciphers the truth – must fail here totally. What a reader is left with is the (Nietzschean) awareness of perspectival character of interpretation: getting out of what the whole history of Western metaphysics has always required him to do, as Derrida noted for the first time in his discussion with Lévi-Strauss in “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”. One cannot get away with deciphering metaphors because in struggling argumentatively with a metaphor, and consequently refuting it, one remains with a meaningless, devoid of significant senses, text.

creative or interesting misreadings”..., p. 43. Rorty’s redescriptions and re-contextualizations versus Romantic “genius” in poetry?

Metaphors are fundamental in Bauman’s thinking of the world – let us listen to a characteristic statement from *Two Essays on Postmodern Morality*; as the metaphor of a nomad as an ideal type is “imperfect and misleading”, the only unambiguous task left is: “to look for other metaphors....”  

Bauman confronts an old metaphor with a new one. Instead of confronting it with argumentation against an old metaphor, a scrupulous investigator of postmodernity does not confuse levels in thinking of the world and in feeling it, neither in himself, nor in confrontations with others. Who fights with the help of metaphors, dies by metaphors, it could be said. Is metaphor a contribution to a picture of a status of the postmodern intellectual? Because it is difficult to argue with a metaphor, it is also difficult to argue with someone who “passes rapidly from Hemingway to Proust to Hitler to Marx to Foucault to Mary Douglas to the present situation in Southeast Asia to Ghandi to Sophocles”, as Richard Rorty says in his *Consequences of Pragmatism* about the post-Philosophical intellectual. It is difficult to argue with someone who is a “name dropper”, an expert of proper names with which he plays, someone afraid of getting stuck in one vocabulary, one – be it even self-chosen – perspective, one and privileged view of the world. Bauman and his metaphors... Metaphors in Bauman’s texts... An explicit – practical – end of a certain way of practising the humanities, philosophy, be it even sociology; an end of a certain figure of the humanist to which modernity managed to get us accustomed. Perhaps the beginning of a new way of thinking of culture in the post-legislative, post-metanarrative, post-Philosophical epoch (as that state is called by Bauman, Lyotard and Rorty, respectively)?

In Bauman, that way of thinking derives from a deep and irreducible suspicion of the project of Modernity, which finally, through its “gardening” dreams, had led to the Holocaust, after which “nothing will be the way it was”. Lyotard in *Le Diffrèrend* calls Auschwitz *le signe d’histoire* or *l’évènement*, Lacoue-Labarthe names it

---


a *caesura* (*la césure*) of the speculative in his *La Fiction du politique*; apart from saying with the latter that in Auschwitz “God died”, that a dark, so far unseen side of modernity manifested itself, one can also say that (German) speculative philosophy with its emancipatory wishes, supported by Reason and History, died there as well. That philosophical side is studied by Germans and Frenchmen, from Theodor W. Adorno in *Negative Dialectics*, Emmanuel Lévinas e.g. in his texts about Blanchot, the whole recent German *Historikerstreit* – the dispute of German historians with the participation of Habermas and Tugendhadt, to Lyotard from *Heidegger et “les juifs”*, Lacoue-Labarthe in *La Fiction du politique*, and many others. How to “philosophize after Auschwitz” – that was the question put forward for the first time by Adorno, and in that form it has been present in our culture ever since. By his own means, on his own, and following his own paths, Zygmunt Bauman comes to similar, fundamental questions about modernity in his *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Let us listen to him:

Modernity, as we remember, is an age of artificial order and of grand societal designs, the era of planners, visionaries, and – more generally – “gardeners” who treat society as a virgin plot of land to be expertly designed and then cultivated and doctored to keep the designed form.8

It seems to be one of the most beautiful (para)definitions of modernity, obviously, knowing Bauman’s *façon de parler* – a metaphorical one. Let us think of it for a while and let us read it slightly differently, from a different side and in different vocabularies. “Planners” and “visionaries” may be – let us assume the following descriptions as a “possible world” – traditional intellectuals of the period of modernity, those of great ambitions and superior status in culture; more or less important, more or less philosophically-minded, those who planned the Jacobean Terror and those who planned the Bolshevik terror. (How different faces can assume metaphors of planners can be testified by “glass houses”, in Poland, following

---

Stefan Żeromski and German Glasarchitektur, the hope for “bright” future, while for George Orwell – the nightmare of an accomplished utopia, the man subjected to the gaze of the Other, deprived of intimacy, as it is obsessively present in Sartre, Foucault or Barthes, which is beautifully shown – under a general label of “the denigration of vision” – in Martin Jay’s impressive study9. Bauman’s gardener is not Jerzy Kosinski’s Gardener from Being There – he is rather a self-conceited erudite, aware of his exceptional place in culture, interpreter of the present and planner of the future. Gardeners taking care of a “virgin plot of land” – society, rather than society seen as e.g. “English garden” in which work consists in cultivation and maintenance of the status quo. Gardeners as executioners – those who pull weeds out of the social plot of land (supported by the great idea of “racial hygiene”) or who kill (be it even with Zyklon B) bugs, fast disseminating and parasitic on assumption. Sanitary action, hygienic challenge, getting rid of filth and bugs. They were specific gardeners, indeed. So in modernity a virgin plot of land needed planning – and that was done by experts in ideas hired by Leviathan, and needed putting into practice, for which Leviathan had different personae.

What might the euphemism “to keep the designed form” used by Bauman in the above quotation mean? It might mean, for instance, terror to which precise, disciplined and rational bureaucracy was employed; and that bureaucracy lacked just a grand vision of a perfect society, a vision of a better and more just world (which will be e.g. Judenfrei, or in which there will be no bourgeoisie or no other “weeds”). “Modern dreams are given absolute power” – says Bauman, and thereby modern genocide is born. And these grand visions are postmodern métarécits, Lyotardian great narratives from his La Condition postmoderne to which one can only feel distrust today; “gardener” vision of modernity is the vision in which telos is already known – the end of present sufferings (and crimes) is future happiness planned by smart minds here and now. Given a traditional role and modern status of intellectuals, these smart minds are never

lacking, they are being created and they create themselves. Fortunately, there are fewer and fewer gardeners today. Fewer and fewer candidates for gardeners. For it is no longer that easy to cultivate the garden, and the Idea of future Emancipation no longer appeals to human hearts.

2.

Zygmunt Bauman’s books are a perfect pretext to – as well as a perfect point of departure for – the discussion of postmodernity. Bauman’s texts can be located in a certain wider manner of thinking about culture and society present today, and perhaps therefore we would like to assume in that essay the following as (sort of) guiding principle: we will be reading Bauman and commenting on his texts directly, we will be undressing his metaphors and suggesting different ones, linking his thinking with that of those he never refers to, or does it rarely and unwillingly. We will be presenting a more general commentary to a more detailed one, taking samples from his various books and looking at them through a magnifying glass of a philosophical investigation. We will place some fragments in "proper" contexts, listening carefully to the author’s intentions, some others we will violently pull out of the context, without taking into account possible damage and destruction of harmony of the author’s well-groomed garden of thought. Bauman’s text will be providing life-blood to our reflection, it will be giving it more power with power of its own.

Let us take into consideration the opening sentence from Freedom published in 1988. This sentence he borrows from the so-called common knowledge, merely in order to promptly repudiate it: “You can say what you wish. This is a free country”.10 The author dismantles it and listens to its possible senses when he says (e.g.) that

\[ \text{We can do what we wish, without fear of being punished, thrown in jail, tortured, persecuted. Let us note, however, that the expression is silent about how effective our action will be. “Free country” does not guarantee that what} \]

\[ \text{10 Zygmunt Bauman, } \text{Freedom} \text{ (London: Open University Press, 1988), p. 1.} \]
we do will reach its purpose, or what we say will be accepted. ... And so the expression tells us also that being in a free country means doing things on one's own responsibility. One is free to pursue (and, with luck, to achieve) one's aims, but one is also free to err.\textsuperscript{11}

And there is no way to disagree with the above. We can, however, look at the above sentences from a different perspective of the person who made a living of speaking and writing, whose task it was to speak and write, who was even listened to: from the perspective of the man of letters endowed with the Enlightenment authority, one of those \textit{les philosophes}, an inhabitant of \textit{la république des lettres} and then – following the "Dreyfus affair" – just \textit{l'intellectuel}.\textsuperscript{12}

So: "You can say what you wish. This is a free country". Philosophy (and, more generally, the whole culture of today), despite misleading appearances of having found a solution to that problem by way of taste, decency, even the law, is still having trouble within itself with those who are taking that statement too seriously. Questions of an ethical nature are being born all the time. Nobody knows for sure which standards to appeal to, as together with the exhaustion of the Enlightenment project (which has brought its own figure of the intellectual to highest peaks), what is also getting exhausted is the power that place was still recently giving and which those in question made use of. As long as it was clear what the role and place of the intellectual in culture was (an intellectual in a European, especially French sense of the term, rather unknown in the United States, which seems not to know or have known such role as played by Habermas in Germany or Sartre and later – at least functionally – Foucault in France), it was easy to pass judgements on others as the canon of behavior then was as known as the model of one meter from Sévres near Paris. Today, however, in a totally new and – still – unexpected situation, there appear questions for which

\textsuperscript{11} Ibidem, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{12} See in this context about the "Dreyfus Affair" the chapter "Emil Zola: the Citizen Against the State" from \textit{The Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience} by Egal Feldman (Wayne State University Press, 1981) or Jean-Denis Bredin, \textit{The Affair. The Case of Alfred Dreyfus} (New York: George Braziller, 1986), the third section entitled "Two Frances", pp. 245–358.
there are no ready answers. Numerous philosophers participate in thinking about these questions. A question is a spark from which an interesting polemic takes its origin.

Let us take the following point into consideration, departing for a moment from Bauman’s books to take a long detour to return to them after a while: what may underlie such a concentration of attention and energy on seemingly simple questions about the life on the one hand, and the work on the other hand, of several twentieth century philosophers and theorists, or on absurd and seemingly easy to refute theses of several inspired historians (revisionists) of the Holocaust. So, to put it clearly: for instance, Martin Heidegger, Paul de Man, Robert Faurisson (bearing in mind relative insignificance and caricatural nature of the latter figure). What Heidegger said, as well as what he did not say in keeping silent when others were speaking out against or leaving a Germany full of hatred at the time, and when others were speaking having returned to post-war Germany. Why did Heidegger remain silent right until his death? Even in the interview with Heidegger that appeared in Der Spiegel, his silence was indeed “unbearable” and “inexcusable”, as Lyotard and Lacoue-Labarthe say.¹³

Was Paul de Man a hidden anti-Semite, when he was writing in war-time Belgium? Was he an anti-Semite later on, at Yale? What is common to Nietzsche, Heidegger, de Man, and Derrida in all these ethical contexts? What is going to happen to deconstruction (as an American school of literary criticism) in the light of all these “revelations”, widely used e.g. by the press? And finally Robert Faurisson, who explicitly negates the existence of gas chambers in Auschwitz: What did he betray and break away from that he was able to incite such an intellectual storm in France? Surely he must have betrayed something, for, just like in the case of previous questions, the wounds were so painful that they required years of polemics from various French thinkers. How to “live with Faurisson” (to treat that casus a little bit wider), how to “discuss” with him, without bringing

¹³ As Jean-François Lyotard in Heidegger and “the jews” (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) and Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe in already referred to Heidegger, Art and Politics put it.
him to the (undeserved) level of a partner in discussion who is endowed with equal rights? These are ethical questions in France and in the United States (although, it is important to bear in mind, that, in Lyotard’s formulation, L’affaire Heidegger est une affaire française). These are some of the questions asked by philosophers who take their culture seriously and who have sensitive ears to what is going on in it. How frail must be the place in culture of the intellectual in France today if a Faurisson is able to annoy to such an extent so many eminent philosophers?

Pierre Vidal-Naquet, in all his essays from the volume Les Assassins de la mémoire: ‘Un Eichmann de papier’ et autres essais sur le révisionisme, returns constantly to one fundamental question: if is one to get into “polemics” with the theses of revisionists, how might one not ennoble them by means of locating them within a scientific debate? How does one write knowing that the discussion with Faurisson is, as he puts it, “absolutely impossible”\(^{14}\), how to fight with lies and bad faith – and fight or not fight?

These and similar questions are being currently asked all over the world, in books and articles, during seminars and conferences. What is this “freedom of the intellectual” and what is his ethics today? When leaders of human souls feel disturbed, they seek out solutions to the disturbance through self-analysis, they deal with themselves or with their predecessors, they look for their own definitions of themselves (and therefore Zygmunt Bauman says in Legislators and Interpreters that all definitions of intellectuals are “self-definitions”\(^ {15}\)). When their self-image is shaking, so is their place in culture, their lifelong vocation, the meaning of their work as well as the effort to question the reality. It is not accidental that the questions about thinkers shown here as examples are important today; some twenty years ago nobody would have cared much about them, no one would have paid so much attention (let us also remember that, generally, they are still not important in America except for some Continentally-
A well-formed, modern ethos of the intellectual is commonly known; it seemed to be present in culture for good. Now culture changes its mind and seems to take rights and privileges away from the intellectual.

Within the horizon that interests us here, let us take into consideration, by way of an example, a couple of great figures from philosophy of the recent two hundred years, philosophers who determined the shape of today's Continental philosophy – (Kojève's) Hegel and (Derrida's and Deleuze's) Nietzsche. Alexandre Kojève said: "... the future of the world, and thereby the meaning of the present and the sense of the future, will depend, in the final analysis, on the contemporary interpretations of Hegelian works". To shorten it and to disregard nuances – the future of the world will depend on our reading of Hegel. It is important today to remember the earnestness of that belief and the constant presence of it in the tradition of philosophy, common, incidentally, also to Husserl from his last lectures in Prague and Vienna and to Heidegger after Kehre to whom one can attribute a (paraphrased) saying – the future of the (German) world – but also that of Europe – will depend on our reading of Hölderlin). Let us read Hegel and let us read Hölderlin, let us read the Thinker and let us read the Poet, and we shall influence the world directly and effectively...

16 Perhaps one should separate an intellectual's "speaking" from his "writing"? Perhaps the intellectual is only the one who is writing (starting with – written – Zola's "Manifesto of the Intellectuals"), although one can also look at the collection of famous pictures: Sartre and Foucault, two giants of post-war France, Foucault speaking with a megaphone, Sartre handing in leaflets to passers-by. Smiling, happy, speaking to the crowd gathered around. May '68 is in turn a (written) "narrative explosion" (Lytard), but also a madness of loud speaking after years of silence, the beginning of struggle with the "confiscation of a discourse", as Foucault and Deleuze called it. So perhaps he should speak – but only if he had written before?


known, dominated (almost) whole French post-war thought – as Michel Foucault said in *L'Ordre du discourse* in 1970: “our whole epoch is trying to disengage itself from Hegel”. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in an anthropologized reading of Kojève used to dominate a great part of the French philosophical imagination for over a quarter of a century.\(^{19}\) A violent contrast to – and antidote against – Hegel became Nietzsche, but not the Nietzsche as seen over the period of thirty years by Walter Kaufman in the USA (in his influential *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*) but rather the Nietzsche as seen first by the French of the sixties (and then later in the eighties in America by e.g. Alexander Nehamas and Richard Rorty\(^{20}\)). Nietzsche who is light and “perspectival”, the author of “Truth and Lies in the Extra-Moral Sense” rather than the author of *The Will to Power*, a self-creator who asks about “style” (Derrida) and who has a “sense of humor” (Rorty), rather than a philosopher full of seriousness and convinced of his “mission”, “used” (or “abused”) later on by still more serious philosophers like Heidegger.

The passage from Hegel to Nietzsche took place in French culture in the sixties, and since then it is quite rare to hear someone saying that the (Kojèvean) “future of the world” may depend on the reading of Nietzsche, or of any other philosopher. The philosopher who is most explicit about it is Richard Rorty, which brings violent storms to his philosophizing from both sides, both from the (philosophical and political) right and from the left, that is also what Zygmunt Bauman says, although not in a vocabulary of philosophy and that of philosophy but in the vocabulary of sociological reflection or in fundamental metaphors built by him. Bauman’s “powerlessness of an intellectual”, his gradual “retreat to the Academy”\(^{21}\), subsidized and

---

\(^{19}\) Of which reminds Vincent Descombes in his *Modern French Philosophy* (op. cit.) in a chapter on “Humanization of nothingness”, pp. 9–54.


\(^{21}\) Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1992). Let us listen to these descriptions: “Having reached the nadir of their political relevance, modern intellectuals enjoy freedom of thought and expression they could not dream
devoid of any contact with resistant matters of reality, his interpretive rather than legislative reason, his metaphors of a “vagabond” and a “tourist” – translated into philosophical language – may just mean the awareness of the end of traditional attitudes not of a philosopher, but of intellectuals in general. His *Intimations of Postmodernity, Legislators and Interpreters,* and finally *Modernity and Ambivalence* seem to testify, in a totally different language, to the same phenomenon of postmodern world: diagnozed by Lyotard *l’incredulité à l’égard des métarécits,* incredulity common and justified, brings about a crisis of the producer of those metanarratives (as Lyotard put it crudely in his *Tombeau de l’intellectuel*). Reading Bauman in such a context – among such thinkers as Foucault, Rorty, Lyotard or his favorite, Baudrillard – may turn out to be extremely instructive, accounting for the very same phenomena in a different vocabulary, in totally different metaphors, and within a different tradition of thinking about culture in general.

One can think whether it might not be the case that the pair Hegel/Nietzsche is somehow parallel to that of modern and postmodern intellectuals, such as Hegel (from behind whom Kojève the Marxist and the Heideggerian is winking at us), and Nietzsche, who is depicted as standing in opposition to Hegel in the strongest way perhaps by Deleuze in *Nietzsche and Philosophy.* In asking what Hegel was doing – and what Nietzsche was doing, and how French thought made a radical passage from the former to the latter, we are really asking about a (new) figure of the intellectual today, as the change of his or her status may be also a consequence of that passage. Nietzsche may turn out to be a key turning point for today’s discussions, from Derrida and Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus,* Lyotard in *Economie libidinale,* or – in the USA where discussions of Nietzsche became fervent in the eighties with Allan Bloom on the one hand (with his “Nietzscheanized America”) and
Richard Rorty on the other (in whom Nietzsche is opposed to Heidegger – the one who “took philosophy (too) seriously”, as he says in the title of one of his reviews\(^2\)). “The New Nietzsche”, to hint at David Allison’s influential volume, becomes in that context an important question today, and the link between the “intellectual”, “freedom” and Nietzsche may be a link of a fundamental importance.

Thus, to sum up, one could think of two opposite poles in thinking about the role of philosophy. At one pole there would be Hegel (and Kojève) who link the fate of the world to philosophy (as well as a “serious” Heidegger – who tells us to read Hölderlin – and even the “last metaphysician” and the “inverted Platonic” Nietzsche in the reading of the latter) At the other pole there would be the same Nietzsche, but this time as a model of self-creation, some one who is not bothered by the fate of the world because has different questions and different concerns (closer e.g. to Marcel Proust). The differences of positions taken appear still today e.g. when what Heidegger did (wrote, said) in the famous year of 1933 is being discussed. Lyotard and Lacoue-Labarthe write that Heidegger’s silence about the Holocaust is impardonnable, while Rorty wants to separate Heidegger’s “life” from his “work” saying that the latter as a person turned out to be “a nasty figure”, which, nevertheless, does not affect much his philosophy (and it is easy, according to him, to conceive of “another possible world” in which he actually leaves Germany – and we are still reading his philosophy today unchanged\(^3\)).

3.

Having finished that somehow long detour, let us have a quick look at a certain traditional and well-rooted model in sociological and philosophical thinking of culture; Zygmunt Bauman says about it the following:


All wills are free, but some wills are freer than others; some people, who knowingly or unknowingly perform the function of educators, instil (or modify) the cognitive predispositions, moral values and aesthetic preferences of others and thus introduce certain shared elements into their intentions and ensuing actions.24

And here we are, with that one simple sentence, in the very heart of controversies that we are interested in – from the Platonic notion of basileia (leading to philosophers-kings), from the “Seventh Letter”, via Kant’s “Was ist Aufklärung?” and its Foucauldian interpretations, via Hegel – for whom it was a period of “madness”, as he puts it, when he thought of himself as being an incarnation of the Absolute Spirit (as a mortal can only be God for Kiryllov from Dostoyevsky’s The Possessed), to Heidegger’s Führung and his belief that the philosopher can be a part of something greater, e.g. of that “movement” glorified perhaps for purely philosophical reasons rather than personal and mean ones... The quotation from Bauman leads us also to the consideration of the belief from Marx’ “Theses on Feuerbach” that Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber draufan, sie zu veränder, which Derrida takes into account in his Specters de Marx.25 It is one of constant motifs of the tradition of philosophy: there is a group of people who know more than others due to having access to a truth, who disclose truth with the help of their intellects and – if need be – present it to the world in a softer, more common way. The religious metaphor of a shepherd and the herd fits here perfectly, a philosopher-prophet would always tell people “what to do”. He is an unquestionable authority because he knows the deepest (the metaphors of removing surface layers of appearances to get to a hidden essence!) context, the philosophical one. An authority that looks at things and judges them “from a philosophical point of view”, that is, from the point of view of the world, humanity, the universal rather than the particular, the eternal rather than the contingent, etc. The conversation with the philosopher

required the interlocutor to raise (Platonic "cave" metaphors again!) to a philosophical level. As Rorty wrote in his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* – the philosopher expressed his opinion about all questions, and his voice was the most important one in almost any discussion (as he was supported by the authority of philosophy itself).

Bauman says that "the free individual, far from being a universal condition of humankind, is a historical and social creation".\(^{26}\) Freedom of an individual cannot be taken for granted, it is a relative novelty in the history of mankind, "a novelty closely connected with the advent of modernity and capitalism".\(^{27}\) Bauman’s melancholic remark about the advent – and possible departure – of freedom has to be supplemented by a more optimistic vision. This vision must be supported by an awareness of common contingency, the vision of freedom as a historical, social creation, but also one that human beings create themselves: the vision of freedom in self-creation and through self-creation in the situation in which there is no other "road to freedom". And when Bauman refers (allusively) to Orwell from *Animal Farm* – why there are supposed to be voices of equal and more equal, free and freer wills – then one could suggest an answer that such voices and such wills may be coined in arduous, individual effort, and that, surely, their freedom and significance of their voices do not come today from some legitimacy, from power of the discipline they represent, in the name of which they express their views. So, given that the place traditionally (historically and socially) accorded to the intellectual in culture is becoming more and more barren, one perhaps might attempt to enrich the standing of the intellectual on a quite different basis, with one’s own effort, with the help of power of one’s own projects. Rorty’s "freedom as recognition of contingency"\(^{28}\) and Bauman’s (quoted from Agnes Heller) motto about "transforming our contingency into our destiny" from *Modernity and Ambivalence* may have a lot in common. However, there is one important exception – Rorty’s account leads optimistically to


\(^{27}\) Ibidem, p. 7.

the awareness of the possibility of surpassing oneself, Bauman’s account may (though does not necessarily have to) lead to fatalism. That fatalism can be heard in Agnes Heller:

An individual has transformed his or her contingency into his or her destiny if this person has arrived at the consciousness of having made the best out of his or her practically infinite possibilities. A society has transformed its contingency into a destiny if the members of this society arrive at the awareness that they would prefer to live at no other place and at no other time than here and now.29

It seems better not to feel fulfilled, to aim always at something which cannot be reached, rather than to live with the possibility that one is a citizen of the only accessible, and at the same time the “best” of possible worlds (as we remember Faust promising to give in to Mephistopheles in Goethe the moment he is satisfied with a “moment”, saying “Let it last! It is beautiful!”). It may be better not to fix the level of possibilities on the one of reality. It may be better to trust (Romantic) imagination, with all postmodern reservations, than (totalitarian) self-complacency of inhabitants of Oceania or Eurasia. It is important to remember about threats of fatalism and of melancholy of that Bauman’s vision.

Thus freedom in Bauman’s account is a construct to which we are not allowed to get accustomed because the world, of which it is a product, is contingent itself, and may disappear any time at all. That is a philosophically justified melancholy, but it may be also connected with the type of melancholy or pessimism so evident in Michel Foucault – in his account of “power”. Freedom, Bauman says, is not a property, a quality that belongs or does not belong to an individual, rather “freedom exists only as a social relation”: “It makes sense only as an opposition to some other condition, past or present”.30 Just like there are no free and coerced, there are also no ruling and ruled, those who hold power and fight to maintain it and those who are deprived

of it and dream of having it, as “power is everywhere”, it is of a “capillary” nature, as it penetrates everything... Freedom is a relation rather than a property that some (chosen) possess and others (temporarily worse-off) do not possess, but might, if only they made more of an effort, took another step on the road leading to emancipation, if they only wished to – preferably by means of the revolution which would “seize” power. Power in this account is not something that one seizes, then losses, power works from a multitude of points, from below, in a word: “power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere”, as Michel Foucault says in the first volume of his History of Sexuality.\textsuperscript{31} One does not “have” freedom (Bauman) just like one does not “have” power (Foucault) Freedom – like power in such an account – exists only between individuals. Both accounts are pessimistic. The first leaves little room for the will to individual freedom, the second leaves little room for hope for resistance, for which Foucault was reproached many times during his life and afterwards.\textsuperscript{32}

If we were to look for one important moment to the most famous Odyssey of Spirit, the Hegelian Phenomenology, then it would be that the idea of freedom can organize thinking about history and history of philosophy. From the freedom of an “oriental despot”, and only his, via freedom of some, that is to say, freedom of that “tip of an iceberg” in Ancient Greece in Hegel’s memorable expression, to the culmination of freedom in the period of (post)revolutionary France – in a radical contrast to that “misery” of German life, on the one hand; on the other hand the dialectic of Herrschaft und Knechtschaft and struggle for recognition, freedom is only recognized as freedom by the Other, who is deprived of it (who promptly, however – owing to his work – turns out to be more free than his master as the latter


\textsuperscript{32} The role of “hope” with reference to Foucault is most important to Richard Rorty. The reproaches I have in mind come e.g. from Michael Walzer from the text on “lonely politics of Michel Foucault” in his The Company of Critics or from Edward Said from his “Foucault and the Imagination of Power” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. by D. Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
appears from a distance to be just a dead end of history, une impasse existentielle, as Kojève says of him\(^{33}\).

The Idea of Emancipation turns out today to be a more and more modern illusion, perhaps the most persistent metanarrative. Incredulity towards it, however, is something else than incredulity towards freedom. There is perhaps the possibility of freedom without the Idea of Emancipation. How is one to reconcile a lack of arche and telos with a lack of simple history as an incarnation of the Idea of emancipation of the humanity (Napoleon on the outskirts of Iena would be such a simple history), preferably with the help of the power of Reason appreciated by Enlightenment – with dreams of “free man” mentioned in declarations and constitutions of the times of the Revolution? It seems, to push the differences to an extreme, that the answer today might be the (Nietzschean-Bloomian-Rortyan) self-creation, but it might also be the (Baumanian-Baudrillardian) fatalism and melancholy, to sketch here caricatures of two extreme possibilities of attitudes. Since how is one to describe such statements as Bauman’s: “In our society, individual freedom is constituted as, first and foremost, freedom of the consumer”\(^{34}\) from Freedom or “[n]o determination, no chance; just a soft, pliable game without set or predictable denouement, a game which exhausts itself fully in the aggregate of players and their moves. ... This world promises no security but no impotence either; it offers neither certainty nor despair; only the joy of a right move and the grief of a failed one” from a gloomy, para-Baudrillardian picture drawn in Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies.\(^{35}\)

Indeed, the first choice to be made would be to abandon “the vocabulary parasitic on the hope of (or determination for) universality, certainty and transparency”, because we are fully aware of the omnipresence of contingency. The question arises, however, whether or not we can afford the luxury of “abandoning all hopes” (to refer to a classic formulation)? Instead of lost hopes there may be

enough room for other hopes, smaller, more moderate. One of these might perhaps be (philosophical, literary, artistic, emotional etc.) self-creation. Then there might be a chance that one may be a consumer, which may be inescapable today, but not a consumer first and foremost. “Freedom of a consumer” and the very Baudrillardian la société de consommation are strongly pessimistic motifs if one is to use them to study the postmodern society. Sometimes Bauman, like Baudrillard and Foucault, does not leave the reader much to hope for. Bauman may appear to be as a grave-digger of modernity, one who enters postmodernity with a sense of depression. At other times, Bauman presents a bright and ravishing picture of today’s culture, as in Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern Morality and in Postmodern Ethics, to which I devote the last section of my paper.

4.

Bauman’s books are to a large extent works of a moralist in the best sense of the term who is bothered by moral dilemmas of modernity and postmodernity. Life in Fragments and Postmodern Ethics seem to be the culmination of these moral deliberations.36 Let us confine ourselves here to the former book, though. Bauman says in it the following:

There is neither cause nor reason for morality; the necessity to be moral, and the meaning of being moral, can neither be demonstrated nor logically deduced. And so morality is as contingent as the rest of being: it has no

36 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). As Bauman put it clearly in Postmodern Ethics, “I suggest that the novelty of the postmodern approach to ethics consists first and foremost not in the abandoning of characteristically modern moral concerns, but in the rejection of typically modern ways of going about its moral problems (that is, responding to moral challenges with coercive normative regulation in political practice, and the philosophical search for absolutes, universals and foundations in theory). The great issues of ethics – like human rights, social justice, balance between peaceful co-operation and personal self-assertion, synchronization of individual conduct and collective welfare – have lost nothing of their topicality. They only need to be seen, and dealt with, in a novel way” (Postmodern Ethics, op. cit., pp. 3–4, emphasis mine).
ethical foundations. We can no more offer ethical guidance for the moral selves, no more “legislate” morality, or hope to gain such ability ...37

However, today’s loss of belief in foundations as such is not by any means reducible to the past belief that ethical foundations have not been discovered yet, a fact that the author makes clear. What results from it for us, those living in postmodernity? It means for us sharpening of our own moral responsibility, as we are “facing the chaos”, which is to say at the same time that we are “forced to stand face-to-face with [our] moral autonomy and so also with [our] moral responsibility”.38 The postmodern world appears to Bauman as a chance for one’s own responsibility and one’s own choice rather than the responsibility and choice grounded in metanarratives. Each moral step is difficult because it is one’s own step; we are deprived of any big moral background and big moral advisors of modernity. So, the consciousness of contingency is total. We ourselves are contingent as children of time and chance (as Rorty likes to put it), our personality is contingent, as well as society in which we are leading our (contingent) lives. Philosophy that we are dealing with assumes a contingent form, the form determined just by other contingencies (as a great skeptic Odo Marquard says in a subtitle of a fragment from his Apologie des Zufälligen: “We human beings are always more our contingencies than our choices”39). We are drowning in an ocean of contingencies having lost the grounds of a clearly fixed determination... Deprived of a supporting point, accustomed to it for such a long time, we are waving our hands crying for help that will never come because it cannot come... “Ethical paradox of postmodernity” – “moral responsibility comes together with the loneliness of moral choice”, as Bauman says in Intimations of Postmodernity...40

How is one to live in a moral world devoid of traditional foundations? How is one to live in a post-1989 world “without an

37 Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments, op. cit., p. 18.
38 Ibidem, p. 43.
40 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, op. cit., p. xxii.
alternative” (i.e. without the other pole of a nourishing utopia)? How is one to live if philosophy is supposed to be just a (Rortyan) “conversation of mankind”? How, and for how long, one can – meaningfully, usefully and “interestingly” – converse about philosophy within the framework of a philosophical language game? What at the same time, however, is the alternative to that postmodern cultural conversation (of those “name-droppers” from Rorty’s Consequences of Pragmatism) – perhaps the only alternative is a much worse deep illusion of one’s own philosophical necessity and, in broader terms, the necessity of philosophy itself...

Bauman writes about “ethically non-grounded morality” – “uncontrolled and unpredictable”. The loneliness of moral choice is that of man devoid of higher than “here and now” senses, of plans further than the hic et nunc generation. But it is always to be born in mind that the greatest fear (at least in modernity) had always come from those in whose eyes had been sparked by the certainty of a rightly chosen Idea, rightly chosen telos, rather than from mere psychopaths. Telos used to sanctify crimes of today, sanctify present wrongs, being a bright point in the future which gives birth to darkness on the earth today (let us remind here of Bakunin and Nietzsche’s “Catechism of the Revolutionary”: “the revolutionary breaks any possible connection with a civilized world. If he is in touch with it, it is only in order to destroy it” or “What ought to be moral for the revolutionary is what cooperates with revolution, what ought to be immoral and criminal for him is what stands in its way”). “Legislative”, modern thinking brings about “gardener” practice, weeds are being pulled out on the basis of hygienic procedures. A legislator-gardener as a modern incarnation of evil, evil that is born simply because someone “knows better” what others want? How, in Max Horkheimer’s words, to “be on the side of the temporal against merciless eternity”? How to live when no “horror!” (to use the unforgettable expression of Kurtz from the ending of Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness) can be explained by means of tension between (inexisting but promised) future and (all-too-known) present? When the present is no longer merely another point of a pilgrimage to a known goal, no longer another – still higher each time – stage in coming to the promised land, no longer another suffering here for the
sake of future brightness there? Bauman says that modernity “was an effort to make sure that in the end it would be proven that it had not been in vain; to force the legitimation in advance to confirm itself ex post facto”.41

Obviously, the “effort” here may be also a soft euphemism: one could perhaps just say: it was often hatred, a crime, a lie (not the Greek, “noble” one). Obviously, hatred, crime and lie which were modern and rational – because, as Bauman says, “feelers of hesitations go deep: to the very heart of the ‘project of Modernity’”.42 Modernity and the Holocaust is a moving testimony to Bauman’s disappointment first, Bauman’s disappointment, then his disbelief and anger, then, finally, his accusation of modernity. Therefore the author does not spare philosophers of modernity when he says that “universal was the weapon and honor of philosophers” – but today little in the world seems to depend on what, and if anything at all, they are saying, as “the philosophers’ truth ran short of eligible bachelors to be married to; there seems to be no escape from spinsterhood”.43 There is no longer any history – there is just a chronology, there is no progress – just development, no great plans – just contingency, and in Bauman’s view philosophers are not to blamed for it. As, in his vivid description summarizing in a way a hundred or so years of history of philosophy, “it is not the philosophers who failed to place the groundless and contingent being on secure foundations; it is rather that the building gear has been snatched from their hands, not in order to be given to others, less deserving and trustworthy, but to join the dreams of universal reason in the dustbin of dashed hopes and unkept promises”.44 Thus today’s culture – in a common view of Bauman on the one hand, and “postmodernists” (in its European rather than American sense of the vague term) on the other – seems not to be looking for successors of philosophers, nobody seems to compete with them today, as they

41 Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments, op. cit., p. 22.
42 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, op. cit., p. 65.
43 Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments, op. cit., p. 25.
44 Ibidem, p. 25.
used to compete with priests and scientists in the past. Great metanarratives – with the one of Emancipation in the forefront – have been severely dirtied and dreadfully abused. Hence incredulity, hyper-sensitivity and carefulness of the philosophical discourse of postmodernity. Especially considering the fact that while the role of normative, universal ethics seems to be commonly criticized, the sense of justice and injustice (Lyotard’s “wrong” as opposed to a mere “damage”, his tort and his dommage) or the sensitivity to pain and humiliation (e.g. in Rorty’s utopian figure of a “liberal ironist”) are still growing. Philosophers, to sum up, do not give their privileges to someone else as they received them once from priests, it is rather that the very privileges disappear, turning out to be a useful illusion produced for the needs of modernity...

To return to Bauman, “Legislators cannot imagine an orderly world without legislation; the ethical legislator or preacher cannot imagine a world without a legislated ethics”. The decline of ethics does not necessarily have to mean the decline of morality, in a new vocabulary of moral deliberation of – post-ethical, post-legislative – postmodernity, one of the key words will surely be responsibility. As people at large with unprecedented freedom given to them may be building their moral identity just on responsibility. Moral autonomy may be constituted by responsibility itself. Is philosophy (together with ethics) in such a case a merely (intellectual) “vagabondage”, just like a philosopher is a postmodern “vagabond” of the philosophical tradition? Is philosophical vagabondage to endure the test of time, will it reconcile with its relatively inferior status granted to it by postmodern culture? “The path of vagabondage is created during the journey itself” and nobody knows where it will lead us to – “the point is not to lose the ability to move” (Bauman).

I want to stop my discussion of Bauman and the question of the intellectual with the following quotation from his Copernican Lectures given in Toruń, Poland (and let me add that it is one of the most clear-cut and courageous descriptions of what may be going on in the humanities at the moment): “the stakes is the value of the capital

45 Ibidem, p. 36.
accumulated by old-fashioned firms called philosophy, sociology, or the humanities, in which we all are at the same time paid functionaries and shareholders. The stakes is the current use and exchange value of commodities gathered over the years in firm’s warehouses. The stakes is the usefulness of firm’s statutes and regulations which we have learnt by heart, and in the application of which we have become masters. The stakes is the peace of mind, blissful certainty of authority, the sense of meaningfulness of what one is doing...” If Bauman is right in his diagnosis, there is a lot of work to be done.
Those who love wisdom (philosophers, and then sages\(^1\)) and those who love power has always exerted a mesmeric influence on one another. The roads of the philosopher and the City, the philosopher and the ruler, the roads of truth and politics has always crossed, with various results. We know from history famous alliances, commented on over the centuries, taken either (more often) as a warning or (less often) as an ideal to be imitated by future generations: Plato and

---

\(^1\) See A. Kojève’s lecture from 1938–1939 about “philosophy and wisdom” from *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (transl. by J.H. Nichols, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1968): it was Hegel who was supposed to have become the first Sage rather than the Philosopher, that is, the man who was the incarnation of Absolute Knowledge. To claim that required of him “unheard-of audacity” (p. 76), not to say divinity, which, as Bataille reminds us in *The Inner Experience*, bordered on madness. “It is true, one cannot reach wisdom if one does not believe in one’s own divinity”, Kojève will note. And Bataille will echo him: “... in a portrait of him as an old man, I imagine seeing exhaustion, the horror of being in the depths of things – of being God. Hegel, at the moment when the system closed, believed himself for two years to be going mad” (*Inner Experience*, transl. by L.A. Boldt, New York, SUNY Press, 1988, p. 110). Thus Hegel had the audacity, courage, boldness to go beyond many of those who only sought wisdom by claiming that it was him who had finally reached it. What is one supposed to say with respect to the “divine Hegel” and the “divine Kojève”, or even, from a different perspective, the “divine (Leo) Strauss”? *Les philosophes ne m’intéressent pas, je cherche des sage...*, Kojève will frankly say.
Dionysius from Syracuse, Aristotle (already wiser, being rich with Platonic experience) and Alexander the Great, Hegel and Napoleon (e.g. in Kojève’s version) or, later, Friedrich of Prussia (in Popper’s version and as his own “contribution to the war”), finally Heidegger and Nazism as well as Lukács and Stalinist Marxism. These were different alliances, with different degrees of intensity, conviction and faith, and derived from different motivations – from naiveté and noble outbursts of spirit, heart, and mind, to collaboration with evil and a choice of the lesser evil, to cold philosophical and political calculation. Each pair of relationships referred to here would require a separate analysis and a reflection specific to them, for something radically different was needed during the various periods in the lives and philosophy of Hegel and Heidegger, and still different were the motives of Lukács. I would not like to leave the impression that I am unaware of the huge abysses separating the aforementioned philosophers’ alliances with power however (I am intentionally using the word “alliance” in a rather ambivalent and indeterminate sense). These were different philosophers and these were different powers: it is difficult to compare any of the two cases – Plato’s and Aristotle’s relation to power is incommensurable, just like (at first sight) might seem the involvements of the closest in time to each other and to us, Heidegger and Lukács. The only thing I want to show at this introductory stage of my discussions is the fact that even the greatest philosophers (or should one perhaps say: especially the greatest?) have entered into or have been dragged into complicated relations with power, regardless of whether we consider Ancient Greece, Rome

---

2 See e.g. Tom Rockmore, *Heidegger and French Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 148–149) who categorically rejects any comparison between the political involvements of Heidegger and Lukács, by pointing to the fact that the latter harshly criticized Stalinism and never hid the nature or the extent of his engagement, which cannot be said of Heidegger (which is perhaps best shown in a political biography by Hugo Ott, translated as *Martin Heidegger. A Political Life*, London: Basic Books, 1993, especially Chapters IV and V).

3 Which is strongly stressed by Hannah Arendt in a brilliant text “Truth and Politics” from *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought* which refers the reader back to Aristotle’s statements in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. 
or post-Weimar Germany. I am convinced that the junction of truth and politics, philosophy and power, the question of the “spiritual” or “intellectual” revolution, of the thinking/action distinction, of “Epicurean gardens” on the one hand and political and philosophical “propaganda” on the other hand (to refer here to the famous debate between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève⁴), of the “microphysics” of power as opposed to its Marxist account etc. etc. – that all these remain today – as they almost always did – as the most important points of focus for thought, both about the past, as well as, first of all, about the present and the future.

2.

This way of thinking about philosophy and politics seems to be strictly connected with the account of the philosopher’s place in society or – in the attempt made here to give a definition of the role – more generally, of the writer in culture. It is surely worthwhile to think over and refer to each other these three separate, although related, categories: the philosopher, the intellectual, and the writer. For the time being, let us think about “writing” in the broadest sense so that we can try to picture and then sketch out their differing choices and obligations, decisions and expectations, as well as those which are accorded to them by others. I would like to trace a common ethos in French thinking starting at the end of the nineteenth century to current postmodern times. I have chosen France because it is the French shadow that is darkest with respect to the philosopher and the intellectual, it was there that until recently (or perhaps still?) they were highly respected with their place having been inscribed in the social structures and cultural atmosphere since les philosophes and the Dreyfus affair.

⁴ Leo Strauss’ “Epicurean” attitude, a strictly isolated way of life for a philosopher who lives “outside the world”, practices pure theory with no necessary connection to “action” is “fundamentally mistaken”, according to Kojève (see especially their debate recently expanded with years-long correspondence in V. Gourevitch and M. Roth’s edition of Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, New York: The Free Press, 1991, p. 151).
Let me say the following at the very beginning: I want to trace two themes that have been struggling and coexisting for over a hundred years, to show their constant presence and unchangeable opposition on the basis of a couple of examples. One of the themes we want to call the communitarian, the other we want to call the textual, not without some parallels and analogies to Richard Rorty's pair of solidarity and self-creation (from his brilliant and highly influential *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*), as writers following the former theme think mainly about "community" and "society", those following the latter think mainly about the "text". It is not a traditional opposition between knowing the world and expressing one's self, that of knowing and expression, though. Marxian opposition in the *Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach* remains closed within the world – the command being to "change" the world, rather than to "interpret" it. The opposition that I want to draw here – starting in French culture with Zola on the one hand and Flaubert on the other5 – takes into consideration both the world and the text. And in such a form seems to exist in Sartre with his opposition between "poetry" and "committed" literature, in Barthes with "writers" and "authors", in Hegel in the influential account by Kojève and in Nietzsche according to Deleuze (from *Nietzsche and Philosophy*), as well as in the opposition between dialectic and transgression, until a doubtfully successful attempt to step outside it by Michel Foucault in his "intellectuel universel"/"intellectuel spécifique" opposition. (Furthermore, I would like to see in the Rortyan distinction between self-creation and solidarity the same, European, French roots, the same contradictions and questions that existentialists – whose

5 The opposition between Zola and Flaubert is perhaps one of the strongest out of many possible examples and it can be seen e.g. in the following statement by Sartre from "Introducing Les Temps modernes": "The writer is *situated* in his time; every word he utters has reverberations. As does his silence. I hold Flaubert and the Goncourts responsible for the repression that followed the Commune because they did not write a line to prevent it. Some will object that this wasn't their business. But was the Calas trial Voltaire's business? Was the administration of the Congo Gide's business?" – Jean-Paul Sartre, *What is Literature?* and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 252.
heroism is so manifest in Rorty – found themselves in. If I were to find in French culture a figure of a philosopher of somehow analogous hesitations – and a similar attempt to get out of them – I would point, paradoxically enough and not without doubts, at Georges Bataille who stood at the same time on the side of Hegel and on the side of Nietzsche and did not want to unite dialectics with transgression, but wandered in his thought from one to the other – which is shown by Foucault in his “Preface to Transgression”, a contribution to the issue of Critique devoted to Bataille. (Despite the difference in cultures, time and space, despite the lack of any traces of Bataille in Rorty’s thinking, the inability, or rather the peculiar, programmatic and still being justified unwillingness to choose between Hegel and Nietzsche, or between solidarity and self-creation, seems to bind the two together, separating them, at the same time, from e.g. Sartre, Barthes, or Deleuze).

Thus, to return to the main line of argument – we get the “community” and the “text”. It is worth noting that “community” (communauté) has recently become one of the most important terms on which some interesting philosophical discussions focus and whose point of departure is often Bataille’s thought and his subsequent projects (Contre-Attaque, Collège de Sociologie, Acephale) – let it suffice to remember here the books by Jean-Luc Nancy, Maurice Blanchot and Jean-François Lyotard.6 I suppose that the opposition distilled here is one of constants in French thinking over the last hundred years or so – what gets changed is the point of gravity, bringing the scales to the earth either on the one, or on the other side.

I take Barthes’ attempt of a description of the situation in “Authors and Writers” to be paradigmatic. Who is the writer and who is the author – who is our textualist and who is our communitarian? What is at stake is, to be sure, the relationship to words, to language. The author works in words, acts in words, the

word itself is neither an instrument, nor a tool, nor a vehicle for him. He asks the question "how to write?" and, paradoxically enough, as Barthes puts it, that "narcissistic activity has always provoked an interrogation of the world". The author takes literature as an aim and the world keeps returning it to him as a means (somehow like in Kant’s "asocial sociality" or Hegel’s "cunning of reason", let us add). Literature in his view is non-realistic but it is precisely owing to that very unreality that allows it to ask questions of the world, that gives literature the power to "disturb the world". It would be absurd to ask him about his own commitment – his ("true") responsibility is towards literature, just like in Milan Kundera’s ideas of the "wisdom of the novel" and its "history" from The Art of the Novel and, especially, from his recent Les Testaments trahis. The author is the one who desires to be the author, his subject matter is the "word".

This is not the case with the "writer", merely a writer, to remember Barthes’ priority right at the beginning. The writer writes in order to communicate to the world, he has political aims for which the word is just a means, an insignificant vehiculum. He bears witness, proves, demonstrates, instructs, gives lessons; language for him "supports a praxis, it does not constitute one", language is an instrument of communication, a mere vehicle of "thought". The

---


8 See Milan Kundera, Les Testaments trahis (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), especially the leading idea that the novel is le territoire ou le jugement moral est suspendu. It may be the case that Zygmunt Bauman goes in the very opposite direction, as can be seen from his text "Angst in Postmodernity, or on Truth, Fiction, and Uncertainty" (unpubl. typescript). Bauman opposes Kundera to Eco saying that what separates them are different experiences, of totalitarianism and of postmodernity, respectively. Truth relegated from the real world may find its shelter – precisely in the world of fiction, in the novel. The novel would not have to be the "paradise of the individuals" as in Kundera from The Art of the Novel, as the postmodern world does not lack diversity, but it may be that the world of constant truths can no longer get through today's polyphony. Unlimited possibilities seem to be provided by the world itself, so the shelter for a coherent vision of the world may be fiction. At the same time, Bauman’s vision is an alternative to the one drawn by Rorty in his "Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens" in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

9 Roland Barthes, “Authors and Writers", op. cit., p. 189.
author is like a priest, the writer – like a clerk. Textual authors and communitarian writers form a typology that derives straight from the reversal of Sartre’s opposition in his renowned text “What Is Literature?”: Barthes reverses this hierarchy claiming that all interesting men of letters were écrivains rather than écrivants, protesting against Sartre’s degradation of poetry and the edification of prose. Out of the same opposition: aestheticism and language games versus social and political commitment, Barthes supports the other pole to Sartre, forming (in his Zero Degree Writing) an alternative outline of history of literature since the times of Flaubert – precisely, since 1848 – until the present, within which the “task of the author” is not “taking a position”, as Sartre of that period explicitly wants and in which the function of the author is not, or at least is not only and exclusively, appeler un chat un chat and modern literature is not that “cancer of words” but in which Flaubert and Mallarmé (as well as the later no more socially useful Proust and the surrealists) occupy a significant place.10 As Sartre notes, and it is important to bear that in mind:

A day comes when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must then take up arms. Thus, however you might have come to it, whatever the opinions you might have professed, literature throws you into battle.11

And the writer takes up arms, but in Sartre’s ideal the very act of writing is arms, as is the pen serving to help the oppressed rather than the oppressors, for to understand the society in which he lives, the writer has just one way – to accept the point of view of its least

10 See Jonathan Culler, Roland Barthes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), chapter “Literary Historian”. Sartre says the following: “The simplest surrealist act – Breton will write twenty years later – is to get out into the street and shoot, as long as one can, with one’s luck, towards the crowd”. That is precisely what Paul Hilbert, the hero of the Sartrian “Herostrate” did, when he decided to “kill half a dozen of them”, only half a dozen as the gun had only six bullets... See Roman Kubicki, Zmierzch sztuki. Narodziny ponowoczesnej jednostki? [The Decline of Art. The Birth of The Postmodern Individual?] (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Humaniora, 1995).

privileged members.\textsuperscript{12} Which obviously gives birth to unhappy consciousness and bad conscience as Sartre in "Introducing Les Temps modernes" puts it:

That legacy of irresponsibility has troubled a number of minds. They suffer from a literary bad conscience and are no longer sure \textit{whether to write is admirable or grotesque}. ... \textit{The man of letters writes while others fight}. One day he's quite proud of it, he feels himself to be a cleric and guardian of ideal values; the following day he's ashamed of it, and finds that literature appears quite markedly to be a special form of affectation. In relation to middle-class people who read him, he is aware of his dignity; but confronted with workers, who don't, he suffers from an inferiority complex.\textsuperscript{13}

The balance between literature-profession and literature-martyrdom, between saving through literature and the total uselessness of it, gave an impulse for the writing of \textit{Roads of Freedom} and shaped the figure of Mathieu as a young intellectual looking (like Sartre himself) for his place in the world and gradually growing to political commitment; it also produced a later "judgement of Baudelaire" as well as the monstrous-sized study of Flaubert.

Sartre turned to Julien Benda with a (famous) reproach that the clerk is not among the oppressed as he is "unavoidably a host of oppressing classes and races". The writer is expected to write in a simple and comprehensive manner, his language is supposed to be transparent and unambiguous rather than to form an amoral and aberrational "poetic prose" in which transparent meaning is covered with unclear and ambiguous senses. While for Sartre, Flaubert was the beginning of the end of French prose, for Barthes he was a turning point for literature engaging – precisely – with itself.

For Sartre – the giant of hard work – the question of writing was fundamental: "What is writing? Why does one write? For whom? The fact is, it seems that nobody has ever asked himself these questions",

\footnote{\textsuperscript{12} As he will say a little later, in "A Plea for Intellectuals" (from Between Existentialism and Marxism, New York: Pantheon, 1974, p. 255), a speech given in Japan in 1968.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{13} Jean-Paul Sartre, "Introducing Les Temps modernes", op. cit., p. 250, emphasis mine.}
he will note at the beginning of “What Is Literature?”. There are many reasons to write; it may be an escape from the world, it may also be a tool to conquer the world. But “one can flee into a hermitage, into madness, into death. One can conquer by arms. Why does it have to be writing, why does one have to manage one’s escapes and conquests by writing?”.

According to Sartre, the writer has just one single subject – freedom. He writes as a free man to other free men (and it is here that writing meets democracy, like in Kundera, or Derrida with his strongly defended idea of tout dire, let us add). Thus to write – means to desire freedom in a specific way. It means to speak to one’s contemporaries, to stick to one’s epoch, without wanting to lose anything from it. There may be more beautiful epochs, surely there are – but this one is ours, Sartre will say in “Introducing Les Temps modernes”. The task of the writer is to produce transformations in the surrounding society: both in man’s situation as well as in his account of himself. The task of the writer is to provide the society in which he lives with an unhappy consciousness – to present its picture to itself and calling it either to accept that picture as its own or to change it.

The place of the writer in society in the last three centuries has taken various forms, according to the evolution outlined by Sartre. In the eighteenth century, just before the revolution – in the times of the Encyclopedists – the writer was seen as a “guide and a spiritual leader” of society. The product of the intellect at that time was seen as action – it produced ideas which brought about upheavals; one could contribute with one’s pen to a “political emancipation of man in general”. The writer appears to be a rebel, a rioter, a trouble-maker – he wants to change the world. Therefore the eighteenth century was for French writers the only “chance of paradise, soon lost” in history. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are according to him a period of mistakes and declines. They brought about a growing rejection of ties between literature and society; starting with the “icy silence” of Mallarmé, to Flaubert writing to “be free from people and things”, to Proust who was supposed to feel no solidarity towards other people but merely notice their “coexistence”, to Breton and the surrealists.

---

First writing was intended to destroy the world (1848–1918), then – to destroy literature itself. The key slogan appears here – the irresponsibility of literature and writers. “The temptation of irresponsibility” has belonged to the literary tradition for a century, Sartre will say in his “Introducing Les Temps modernes”\(^\text{15}\), which roughly corresponds to my “textual” theme in French culture.

Sartre’s thinking about philosophy and politics can be traced in an only recently published (1994) correspondence with Maurice Merleau-Ponty from 1953, the year of the abrupt end of their cooperation in Les Temps modernes. What is the place of politics with respect to philosophy, what would it mean to withdraw from the world towards philosophy and philosophical books, what should be the philosopher’s attitude towards the “requirements of the moment”, to current political events? How far, if at all, is the intellectual to be “committed”? It was a passionate and violent controversy that separated people who had been friends until then. Merleau-Ponty did not want to allow himself to be trapped within a framework of Sartre’s simple opposition between philosophy and politics – and put forward his account of what it was to practice philosophy. What was Sartre not willing to forgive his adversary? The point was not only to locate philosophical studies before politics; still more it was an attempt to justify such an individual gesture and generalize it for others. Let us listen to Sartre’s reproaches directed to Merleau-Ponty:

\[\text{But I reproach you with something far worse, with the fact that you withdrew in circumstances in which you ought to make a decision as a man, as a Frenchman, a citizen, and an intellectual – taking your philosophy as an alibi.}\]

Merleau-Ponty makes use of his right to choose, and that is what he can do. But he cannot criticize anyone – and Sartre in particular – in the name of his apolitical position, according to Sartre. In Sartre’s view, philosophy itself is a form of wasting time. One is a philosopher only after one’s death – in one’s lifetime, he says, we are people who

\(^{15}\) Jean-Paul Sartre, “Introducing Les Temps modernes”, op. cit., p. 249.

\(^{16}\) “Sartre/Merleau-Ponty: Correspondence”, Magazine littéraire, 320, Avril 1994.
among other things write philosophical books (which is perhaps not the most important activity).

The controversy between the two philosophers concerned the question whether and to what degree philosophy was taking an attitude towards the world, to what degree it was an activity. As Merleau-Ponty, clearly hurt, put it: "Philosophy, even if one does not choose between communism and anti-communism, is some attitude in the world rather than the withdrawal from it". The philosopher, an active member of society, does not necessarily have to face up to every event - no matter whether that would be the Rosenbergs' execution, the war in Indochina or arrests made among French communists, for what he focuses on is the oscillation between an event (as a catalyst for thought) and a general reflection in the context of which a given event may be inscribed. Merleau-Ponty, defending himself against Sartre's accusations, makes it explicit that he does not want to be a "topical writer", similarly, incidentally, to Vladimir Nabokov who in his text "On a Book Entitled Lolita" - as Richard Rorty reminds us - says the following: "Lolita has no moral in tow. For me a work of fiction exists only in so far as it affords me what I shall bluntly call aesthetic bliss. There are not many such books. All the rest is either topical trash or what some call the Literature of Ideas". With all genre differences and proportions respected, Merleau-Ponty defended himself against being taken over by that topical trash, keeping faith in what paradigmatically was put by Julien Benda in The Betrayal of the Intellectuals and which in turn was described by Sartre as simply "abstract daydreaming" and "blabbering".

3.

If we say at this particular moment that Barthes' "authors" are "Nietzschean" while his "writers" are "Hegelian" (in the sense of the opposition construed by Gilles Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy\(^\text{17}\)),

\(^{17}\) See Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (Paris: PUF, 1962), where he says e.g. that "there can be no compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche", that Nietzsche's
we will thereby step into a totally new complex of questions. That is, "Nietzschean" in the specific sense of the Nietzsche contrasted by the generation of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault — wanting to "flee from Hegel", as the latter put it in L'Ordre du discours\(^\text{18}\) — with the Hegel as he was appropriated and sold to the French mainly by Alexandre Kojève, but also Jean Hyppolite and the whole generation preceding the aforementioned one.\(^\text{19}\)

Thus we can get the following opposition: Nietzsche, Barthes' authors, Sartre's poetry, textuality contra Hegel, Barthes' writers, Sartre's prose, communality. We thereby enlarge the stakes: no longer only literature, but also philosophy, no longer the man of letters, but also the philosopher — which may have been clear since the very beginning of our considerations, as it was at the beginning of those put forward by Sartre in his "What Is Literature?". One French figure is Hegelian and Nietzschean at the same time — Georges Bataille who read both of them together, who thought both dialectically and transgressively, who listened to Kojève (although, some say, sometimes snored during his lectures), who belonged to and left the surrealists and then founded subsequent, secretive "communities".\(^\text{20}\) Bataille's work, without going into too many details here, reveals two sides at the same time: in Summa atheologica it reveals Nietzsche, and in The Cursed Share it reveals Hegel and Marx.\(^\text{21}\)

\(^{18}\) Michel Foucault, appendix to Archeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972), p. 235.

\(^{19}\) And perhaps it is no accident that both Foucault and Althusser, as well as Derrida, participated in Jean Hyppolite's seminars, and that the early works of the first two concerned only Hegel. Foucault's text is lost, while a part of Althusser's text can be found in a special Hegelian issue of Magazine littéraire (no. 293, Novembre 1991).

\(^{20}\) On "communities" in Bataille, see especially Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community, op. cit.; also Allan Stoekl, Politics, Writing, Mutilation: The Cases of Bataille, Blanchot, Roussel, Leiris and Ponge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).

\(^{21}\) See e.g. Jean-Michel Besnier, La Politique de l'impossible. L'intellectuel entre révolte et engagement (Paris: La Découverte, 1988).
diametrically opposed projects which cross over and nullify each other, if one could have a look at them from a single, higher, synthesizing perspective. Bataille does not choose between them, both communities — a textual and a political one, the one that focuses on "writing", "negativity" as well as "poetry, laughter, and ecstasy" (that is, on what Hegel did not think over in his system in Bataille’s account), and the one that focuses on economic and political "tasks" and "missions" — remain in a state of war with each other. It is like two intellectuals in one person, as Allan Stoekl notes, and, furthermore, "this duality of Bataille’s project, in one sense, is no different from the split we have seen running through French intellectual activity in general in the twentieth century". It is as if Bataille was at at the same time, both Zola and Flaubert, or both Maurice Blanchot who searches for a "community of readers" and Alexandre Kojève who searches in reading Hegel "a work of political propaganda". As if both Rorty, the songster of self-creation, and Rorty, the songster of solidarity, loved alternately “Trotsky” and the "wild orchids"...

The Sartrian opposition between the aesthete and the committed writer, as well as its Barthesian inversion in the form of authors/writers, have not been seriously challenged until Michel Foucault — whose intellectuel universel, to be replaced by intellectuel spécifique, takes on the meaning of both parts of the said dichotomy. The point is writing, the writer and his place in French culture:

23 Which can be seen most clearly in the text “Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme” of 1946 in which Kojève makes it explicit that “every interpretation of Hegel, if it is more than idle talk, is nothing but a program of struggle and one of work ... And this means that the work of an interpreter of Hegel takes on the meaning of a work of political propaganda”. “Hegel, Marx, and Christianity", Interpretation, vol. 1, 1970, p. 42. Stanley Rosen in Hermeneutics as Politics notes about Kojève’s work that “it was not an act of philological scholarism, but an act of revolutionary propaganda”. That opinion is also held by Vincent Descombes who writes in his Modern French Philosophy about Kojève’s “terrorist conception of history”, by the aforementioned Jean-Michel Besnier or Shadia B. Drury in Alexandre Kojève. The Roots of Postmodern Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
the intellectual par excellence used to be a writer – as universal
consciousness, free subject, he was opposed to those who were just
competences in the service of the State or the Capital – as technicians, judges,
teachers. Since then ... the threshold of writing (écriture) as a sacralizing mark
(marque sacralisante) of the intellectual has disappeared.24

The writer fighting to maintain his political privileges has become in
Foucault’s view a figure of the past – all that “feverish theoretization
of writing which we witnessed in the sixties was undoubtedly just
a swansong”25, and besides, it produced “such second-rate
(médiocres) literary works”. It was no accident that Foucault – as
opposed to, for instance, Jacques Derrida – often stressed that he
had never felt to have a vocation of a writer. “I don’t consider that
writing”, he said in 1978, “is my job and I don’t think that holding a
pen is – for me, I am speaking only of myself – a sort of absolute
activity that is more important that everything else”.26 Foucault’s
response to Sartre and Barthes, to the split present in French culture
for over a hundred years – and especially to the particular place
accorded to the writer – was to put forward the figure of the
“specific intellectual” who is no longer derived from the jurist and
the writer but from the savant and the expert (like in Oppenheimer
or earlier already in Darwin).

Thus Foucault in my reading rejects both the traditional functions
of writing (and writer): the avant-garde (textual) and the political
(communal) one. So what is he left with? Not much, it seems,
although at the same time there remains the unperformable: the local
struggles described above and – rather impossible, in the long run –

24 Michel Foucault, “Entretien avec Michel Foucault” in a monumental volume of
26 Michel Foucault, “On Power” in the volume Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. by
L.D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 96. Let us add here, by way of contrast,
that Derrida on numerous occasions wrote and talked about his passion as a writer,
see e.g. “Une ‘folie’ doit veiller sur la pensée” in Points de suspension. Entretiens (Paris:
Galilée, 1992), pp. 349–376 or in This Strange Institution Called Literature, ed. by
the struggles with one's own incarnation as the "universal intellectual". For how is one to make generalizations from local positions about precisely those positions, how is one to generalize without making reference to a recent role (whose clearly criticized representative is obviously Jean-Paul Sartre, the guru of post-war France), bashing it, showing its incoherence, invalidity, or even harmfulness? How to be both a local specialist and a theoretician of that local, intellectual specialization? How to convince others of that role, being oneself – functionally – a man from the previous epoch? Michel Foucault had to fight such a fight with himself, he had to promote in the name of universal reasons and in its terms a new – "specific" – function of the intellectual. He was, to be sure, perfectly well aware of this contradiction and it is perhaps therefore that in his work – like perhaps in no other work of a living contemporary French philosopher – there are so many discussions about the place of the intellectual (or – the philosopher – depending of the period of his work) and his possible role in culture and society.

A careful tracing of Foucault’s changing answers to that question would be a fascinating task that would throw additional light on the intellectual ruptures and subsequent new beginnings of the one who always wrote in order “to have no face” (Archeology of Knowledge), to attempt to “think differently” (The Use of Pleasure) – starting with the early seventies, the famous conversation with Gilles Deleuze, genealogical struggles with Power, to the first volume of The History of Sexuality, its last two volumes as well as to dozens of texts and interviews from that feverish and extremely prolific period of his life. It was already in Archeology of Knowledge that he said in an often referred to and commented on passage: “Do not ask me who I am, nor tell me to remain the same: that is the morality of a civil state; it rules our documents. Let it leave us in peace when we are to write”.

Foucault often stated in his interviews that had never been a Freudian, Marxist, or structuralist: that he had been seen as an anarchist, leftist, disguised Marxist, nihilist, anti-Marxist, technocrat, and new liberal, but “none of these descriptions is important in itself; on the other hand, taken together, they nevertheless mean something.
And I must admit I rather like what they mean”. Precisely so, without consenting to any other’s description of himself, he all the time kept looking for a paradefinition of what he was doing as a philosopher, sociologist, and finally, as a man. As Maurice Blanchot puts it:

what seems to me to be the difficult – and privileged – position of Foucault might be the following: do we know who he is, since he doesn’t call himself (he is on a perpetual slalom course between traditional philosophy and the abandonment of any pretension to seriousness) either a sociologist or a historian or a structuralist or a thinker or a metaphysician?

We still do not know “who he is”, as he does not want to join known and respected traditional disciplines which he detests as long as he has not redefined them. Michel Foucault, looking for himself, for many years was asking, among other things, what the philosopher is doing when he is philosophizing. He kept asking about himself and others. He also kept asking about himself as opposed to others and in distinction to them, searching for some general meaning of his own work. Let us remember here at least several ideas that appear in his writings in this context.

4.

In 1972 in a conversation with Deleuze – later to be known as “Intellectuals and Power” – Foucault said that during the May 1968 events in France:

the intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. But there exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this

---


discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in the manifest authority of censorship, but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societal network. Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of power – the idea of their responsibility for “consciousness” and discourse forms part of the system. The intellectual’s role is ... to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of “knowledge”, “truth”, “consciousness”, and “discourse”.29

So if the traditional intellectual is – as we already know – the writer, there is no possibility of resistance on the part of either écrivants or écrivains, either poetry or littérature engagée, against that “enigmatic”, “at once visible and invisible, present and hidden, ubiquitous” Power. It can be said, exit the writer, but who enters the stage? The one who enters is precisely the one about whom it is known from Foucault’s descriptions what he is supposed not to do and whom he is supposed not to be. Although the opposition of the two types of intellectuals is merely a “hypothesis”30, it is directed against the whole French intellectual tradition.

Theory in Foucault’s account is not supposed to be a support for practice which, in turn, would be its application; theory does not serve practical applications, being local, regional and non-inclusive. “This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious”. The point, as Foucault explains to Deleuze, is “to sap power, to take power”; “it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A ‘theory’ is the regional system of this struggle”.31 The writer’s thinking of the world may have been universal, but in Foucault’s vision suggested here the specific intellectual is reduced to playing the role of one of the many links in an ongoing struggle – he is neither a spokesperson of the will of those who fight, nor is he their representative (which


31 Michel Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power”, op. cit., p. 208.
means drawing radical conclusions from questions of representation),
nor is he even an interpreter of their struggles from a safe place
behind his desk. Theory becomes practice. Those who until then had
been accorded a specific place in culture – of its “consciousness”,
“conscience” and “eloquence” – become potential providers of tools
for analysis, of that famous “toolbox” with the help of which one can
make a topographical description of a battlefield... For Foucault, his
own philosophy was not the theory of his practice, his political
practice not being an application of theories presented in
philosophical books of which he was the author. As François Ewald,
Arlette Farge, and Michelle Perrot say in a moving commemorative
volume entitled _Michel Foucault. Une histoire de la vérité_: “there are
only practices, theoretical practices or political practices, totally
specific ones”.

The intellectual’s work according to Foucault does not consist in
shaping others’ political will. It rather consists of conducting analyses
on the grounds of disciplines familiar to him whose aim is, as he puts
in a conversation with François Ewald,

to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb
people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is
familiar and accepted, to re-examine rules and institutions and on the basis of
this reproblematization (in which he carries out his specific task as an
intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (in which he has
his role as a citizen to play).

Michel Foucault is fully aware of the demise of the old, traditional,
prophetic function of the intellectual. Those who speak and write
today are still haunted by the model of a Greek wise man, Jewish
prophet or a Roman legislator. (And it is important to note that it
was also Sartre who in last years of his life considered breaking with

---

33 _Michel Foucault, “The Concern for Truth” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. by
L.D. Kritzman, op. cit., p. 265.
34 See the interview with Foucault conducted by B.-H. Lévy, recalled recently in
the latter’s _Les Aventures de la liberté. Une histoire subjective des intellectuels_ (Paris:
the conception of the "committed writer". In 1974 in a discussion with Herbert Marcuse he said that workers "can better express what they feel, what they think ... For me, the classical intellectual is an intellectual who ought to disappear,".35) Foucault himself wants to take care of the present, as the most important question – is the one about the present.36) And that is what he was doing, discussing in his books over the years the relationship between experience (madness, illness, transgression, sexuality), knowledge (psychiatry, medicine, criminology, sexology, psychology), and power (institutions connected with the control of the individual – psychiatric or penal ones). As he said in Discipline and Punish, what was at stake there – and surely not only there – was "writing the history of the present"37) that would perhaps "make the present situation comprehensible and, possibly, lead to action".38) That large theme of the "ontology of the present" guided Foucault's thinking in the last years of his life and he found the protoplast of this way of thinking about philosophy (we have known at least since Borges that we produce our predecessors) in Kant from the text "What Is the Enlightenment?", about which he would write and lecture in the Collège de France. The task of philosophy is to describe the nature of the present and us in that present, he would say39), inscribing his thought in the tradition running from Kant to Weber to the Frankfurt School. The late Foucault made every attempt to inscribe himself in the Kantian tradition of making mature use of reason, but he read Kant through the Baudelairean figure of the dandy. In ethics as the aesthetics of existence in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self he seems to


36 As Foucault said: "Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present", "The Concern for Truth", op. cit., p. 262.


39 Michel Foucault, "Critical Theory/Intellectual History" in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. by L.D. Kritzman, op. cit., p. 36.
break with the opposition, difficult to maintain in practice, that we are still thinking here of. He moves towards himself, towards building his own ethics of self-transformation. Intellectual work seems not to go beyond the oppositions drawn by Sartre and Barthes, beyond our textualism and communitarianism, or romanticism and pragmatism. Foucault becomes Rorty’s “knight of autonomy” when he notes (in 1983) that for him intellectual work is related to what you could call aestheticism, meaning transforming yourself. ... I know very well, and I think I knew it from the moment when I was a child, that knowledge can do nothing for transforming the world. Maybe I am wrong ... But if I refer to my own personal experience I have the feeling knowledge can’t do anything for us and that political power can destroy us. All the knowledge in the world can’t do anything against that.

Thus it is not much that Foucault’s intellectuel spécifique, a new figure suggested for our postmodern times, can do. Local and regional struggles with power die out, theory is no longer like a fellow-traveller of the masses fighting to take power. Parasurrealistic – that is, modernistic! – transforming one’s existence in a poetic manner has little to do with the Sartrian pole of “activism” and “commitment”, with making laws, suggesting solutions valid always and everywhere, prophesizing about the future on the part of (intellectual and philosophical) legislators from a universal place accorded by culture in the past. But, on the other hand, that aesthetic of existence does not seem to go beyond the other pole of Sartre’s and Barthes’ oppositions – aesthetic, narcissistic, dandyish, textual. The attempt to go beyond a framework imposed on writing and philosophizing some hundred years ago, as we try to outline it here, seems to be misguided and unsuccessful. The final acceptance of the fact that “my problem is my own transformation” and that what is at


stake is the “transformation of one’s self by one’s own knowledge”\textsuperscript{42}, that, to refer to the well-known citation, “we have to create ourselves as a work of art” (for our self is not pre-given to us and we may not discover its truth)\textsuperscript{43} – seems to lead back to modernistic oppositions. The point is not merely “a certain amount of knowledgeableness”, it is also “the knower’s straying away from himself”; “There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all”, as he will say in the “Introduction” to the second volume of \textit{The History of Sexuality}.

I would be willing to accept one such attempt of the said \textit{penser autrement}, the conception of the specific intellectual, never developed and made more precise, never put into practice or experienced. The “aesthetic of existence” of the last two (published) volumes of \textit{The History of Sexuality} and numerous interviews preceding them\textsuperscript{44} has shown difficulties in going beyond the pre-existing constant in French thinking. The intellectual in a classical sense, banned and criticized returned; that is to say, who returned was Foucault \textit{writing} rather than (“locally and regionally”) \textit{acting}. It turned out that even the idea of ethics as the aesthetics of existence is an idea of a writer who obviously has a different place and different obligations in today’s postmodern era, rather than an idea of one who was born out of the “expert” and “savant”, i.e. of the specific intellectual. When the turmoil of the (post-May ’68) struggles with power disappeared,

\textsuperscript{42} Ibidem, p. 14.


\textsuperscript{44} Let us remember here the most important texts for the “aesthetics of existence”: “Introduction” to \textit{The Use of Pleasure} (which earlier functioned as a separate text), the “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” text (from P. Rabinow’s collection, and then for the first time in French in the Kantian issue of \textit{Magazine littéraire}, Avril 1993), “L’éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté” (\textit{Dits et écrits}, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 708–729), “Une esthétique de l’existence” (ibidem, pp. 730–735), as well an English interview given to Dreyfus and Rabinow and published as “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress” (in \textit{The Foucault Reader}, op. cit.).
when consciousness of the moderate possibilities of the philosopher as a philosopher came, what remained was to seduce with one’s pen and show oneself as an example for others: a classical idea of providing an exemplum for one’s descendants. Some parts of The History of Sexuality are disarming in their sincerity, in their tone of personal confessions, in their seriousness of histories put down by a feverish hand. Foucault – to return to Sartre – was engaged ("committed") in his writing: not in politics or ideology, but in a new, still being thought-out morality and ethics. For the idea of morality as obedience to a code of rules "is now disappearing", and as he says, "has already disappeared. To this absence of a morality, one responds, one must respond, with a research which is that of an aesthetics of existence".45

5.

Numerous critics see in Michel Foucault the passion of a moralist (e.g. Richard Bernstein), with the reproaches often directed to him being precisely his "cryptonormativism" (e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser), and his unwillingness to accept his indebtedness to the Enlightenment; for some commentators the philosophy of the late Foucault is the "philosophy of freedom" (John Rajchman).46 He is not exactly the communitarian or the textualist in the sense presented in this text. Who is he? Although in his theory he probably did not manage to transcend Sartre’s opposition (Sartre, that “man of the nineteenth century who wished to conceive of the twentieth century”), in practice, in his written work, one can look for new ways of answering the latter’s questions. Hence radically different

evaluations and interpretations of Foucault as a philosopher, a philosopher of politics or a moral philosopher exist. In practice, the author of The History of Sexuality does not fit in on horizon of meaning outlined in the opposition discussed here, for although for some he is a dispassionate “aesthete”, for others he is a passionate “moralist”, a par excellence political philosopher, a radical critic of the status quo, an originator of a new politics of resistance, a new liberal etc.; for some he is a follower of Kant and the light side of sociologie de la modernité, for others a follower of the dark, irrational side of modernity, that of Nietzsche via Bataille, like in Habermas’ or Ferry/Renaut’s criticism. And the point is probably not that there are divergent interpretations, that is something we are quite used to – the point may be that we need new categories and new dichotomies to attempt to domesticate, to tame Foucault’s thought.

A possibility was suggested by Foucault himself by way of a digression in a long conversation with an Italian communist, Duccio Trombadori, in 1978, almost totally unnoticed in literature devoted to him. He discusses there the question what kind of books he had been writing in his lifetime and draws a distinction between livre d’exploration and livre de méthode, or a still different one between livre-experience and livre-verité. Book-explorations and books on the method, book-experiences and book-truths, let us say. To be sure, in philosophy the downgraded ones have been and still are book-explorations and book-experiences – those most precious to Foucault.

47 Arnold I. Davidson makes it explicit in summarizing sentences of his text: “Unless moral philosophers supplement their discussions of moral codes with ethics à la Foucault, we will have no excuse against the charge that our treatises suffer from an unnecessary but debilitating poverty”. That is perhaps the strongest opinion about Foucault’s ethics I managed to encounter. See “Archeology, Genealogy, Ethics” in Foucault. A Critical reader, ed. by D.C. Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 232.

48 See the (once) influential pamphlet of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties. An Essay on Antihumanism, in which Foucault = Heidegger + Nietzsche (like Derrida = Heidegger + Derrida’s style) (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990), a chapter on “French Nietzscheanism” or e.g. p. 123.

Books were as rich an experience as possible, so that the writer could come out of them as someone else, someone new and changed, precisely – transformé. The book transforms both him and what he thinks: “Je suis un expérimentateur en ce sens que j’écris pour me changer moi-même”.\(^{50}\) The author is a writing experimenter who transforms himself rather than a theoretician. He does not know at the beginning of his road what he is going to think at the end of it. Thus, to the question about the sense of philosophical work, we get two possible answers – we either explore the unknown and transform ourselves (and somehow incidentally – we also change others, as a book is an invitation to a common participation), or we present truth and evidence for it to others.

Returning to alliances with power, returning to philosophy and politics, let us say that it is perhaps because book-truths were – or potentially could be – moving on the same tracks with power (with it or against it); communicating, proving, justifying, legitimizing, validating (like in the case of Barthes’ “writers”). The question is whether the same can be said of philosophical book-explorations? It seems to me that the answer is in the negative, for they seem to be on a different plane, the plane of transforming oneself rather than the world (the plane of changing the world only after a round way of changing oneself). I fully agree here with Richard Bernstein – evidently far from being an enthusiast of postmodern thinkers – who presented the following diagnosis of postmodern philosophy:

In the early writings of Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault and Rorty these questions [ethical-political – MK] do not even seem to be considered. Yet as we follow the pathways of their thinking and writings something curious begins to happen – for each of these thinkers begins to gravitate more and more to confronting the ethical-political consequences of their own thinking.\(^{51}\)

I am personally convinced that it pertains to Derrida – recently just a moralist, and no less so than to Rorty and Foucault. “Something curious begins to happen” and that “something” in question may be

---

\(^{50}\) Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits*, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 41-42.

associated with a decline in the super-project of modernity that makes some questions suddenly appear to be more significant to a growing number of people.

I have not written here about Heidegger’s and de Man’s “affairs”, as they are commonly referred to (about the debates of the greatest minds at the end of the century on the subject of the rectorate of the former in 1933 and his silence about the Holocaust and about the latter’s youthful collaborationist and anti-Semitic writings and their potential connections with a literary theory developed later); nor have I written here about the violent, passionate discussions in France and in America about the questions of the “philosopher” and “politics”, for that is what was finally at stake there (as Krzysztof Pomian so penetratingly put it, the problem of the relationship between philosophy and politics in the twentieth century has become “the one of ‘to be or not to be’ of philosophy”\(^{52}\)). From that perspective, our century still remains unstudied and unthought, and – to add a still new dimension to our considerations – we have a feeling that whenever we speak of Heidegger, to use Pomian’s words, *de nobis fabula narratur*... Perhaps not precisely about “us”, but nevertheless the theme of the “boys of these (Stalinist) years” is worthy of being taken into account. So I have not written about all these discussions, as I am doing it elsewhere, but maybe it is worthwhile just mentioning that questions about these times, read perhaps not accidentally today – will tell us more about ourselves, our current history, perhaps even about our future... For it may even be so that our discussions will not pertain to Heidegger *himself* or de Man *himself*; these could be left to Heideggerians and deconstructionists. Maybe it is worthwhile thinking about what the history of the aforementioned two thinkers can tell us about our history, about ourselves.\(^{53}\) What I see as important is what the history of the two can say us of our history, about ourselves here and now. For, I suppose, the thinking of past choices, attitudes, past silence, writing and acting

---


is the thinking of the constitutive elements of our not so distant past rather than of some "aberrations", "mistakes", human "failings" or "weaknesses". If we left aside the general question: what to do with those biographical-philosophical discoveries?, we would place ourselves somehow somewhere else, next to Heidegger’s or de Man’s past, and in our calm, European, Mediterranean and civilized past. And what we mean here is the thought that deliberately served ideology, that hid behind it, profiting from it. That gap is very important – we mean using ideology in promoting one’s own thought in a naive belief that one (as an intellectual, as a philosopher) can be the "guide of leaders"... And that is the way we completed the cycle and, approaching the end of the story, returned to the Platonic theme – "they should only follow the one who leads..."

Hannah Arendt in Between Past and Future says that nobody ever doubted that "truth and politics never remain in good relations with each other" (and Merleau-Ponty adds that "the relation between philosophy and politics has always existed, not for good, but for bad"). Truth and politics – that is, philosophy and politics – are "two opposite ways of living". For when a philosophical truth enters politics, it is almost certain that freedom will feel endangered. Who will dare to reject a – transcendental – truth of philosophers? Who will defy an all embracing, coherent and logical – ideological – vision of the world within which the philosopher provides us with all possible questions and all possible answers? Is the philosopher himself strong enough to resist the temptation to impose its truth on others as an obligatory norm? Hannah Arendt has found a congenial description for such a situation: the "tyranny of truth". Therefore in Arendt’s account the philosopher is a recluse rather than a homo politicus; a philosophical truth is apolitical by its very nature. It is disclosed by the philosopher – in loneliness. Like the Foucault from The History of Sexuality, Arendt seems to appreciate learning by example – "the only form of ‘convincing’ which a philosophical truth can afford without deforming its nature". The philosopher begins to "act" when he transforms a theoretical statement into truth included in an example which for him is a limiting experience. He cannot go any further, he does not have the right to. The philosopher’s position
is thus to be located outside of the political field, such a philosophical being alone cannot be associated with “any political commitment or devotion to any cause”. The philosopher’s truth does not mix – directly – with the things of this world and if he wants to mix with it (which, incidentally, according to Sartre is a definitional task of the intellectual: se mêler de ce qui ne le regardait pas), then he turns to tyrants and Führers, from Plato to Heidegger, as she notes in her “Heidegger at Eighty”.

Finally, it is not difficult to guess that, to a considerable extent, I agree with the author of Thinking, as in the Sartre/Merleau-Ponty debate I am taking the side of the latter, and from the opposition of communitarians and textualists, I prefer the textualists. But that is merely my “individual gesture” of which Sartre wrote in his letter to Merleau-Ponty, to which I can allow myself as long as I am not justifying it with respect to others and as long as I am not imposing it on anyone. In an endlessly polyphonic and colourful postmodernity, there is enough place for freedom and for individual gestures insofar as they do not – in a Rortyian manner – humiliate others and cause them pain. Nietzsche said – “The philosopher means something for me as long as he is able to give an example”. And perhaps the point today is to give the right to different examples, the right for them to be merely examples. Some of them will spread, some will not; some will be fashionable, others will quickly fall into oblivion; some will get through to the reading public, for others no one will ever be convinced. Philosophy today may teach us, as Zygmunt Bauman put it, “how to live wisely in a state of uncertainty”54 – it may be, as Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska said in a conversation with Stefan Morawski, “not a love of Wisdom, but a love of many possible wisdoms none of which claims ‘final’ ambitions for itself...”55 That is what I mean when I speak of the multitude of possibilities of personal examples today.

54 Zygmunt Bauman, Ciało i przemoc w obliczu ponowoczesności [Body and Violence in the Face of Postmodernity] (Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, 1995), p. 31.
What we are interested in here – within questions pertaining to the topicality of Hegel – is the powerful and permanent influence he would exert on pre-war and post-war French thought (the years of 1930–1960, roughly speaking) but only insofar as it became an object of sharp discord and wide criticism by the next generation of thinkers and philosophers, the postmodern generation. Thus we will be dealing here with the generation of Alexandre Kojève, Jean Hyppolite and Georges Bataille, who interpreted and commented on Hegel – mainly from his *Phenomenology of Spirit* – against which rose the likes of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. While for the former group Hegel was that master of thinking, the *maître à penser*, for the latter group he was only (but not less than) the figure it was necessary to break free from. The paradigmatic shift of focus from Hegel to Nietzsche was revealed in the most powerful way in two books: Gilles Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962) and Pierre Klossowski’s *Nietzsche et le circle vicieux* (1969). Since then, it has been Nietzsche rather than Hegel who seemed to provide French philosophical thought with a tone.¹

¹ Incidentally, some explicit enemies of postmodern thought – like Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut – in their (once) famous pamphlet *French Philosophy of the Sixties* (transl. by M.H.S. Cattani, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) – present the whole French “thought of difference” as only a radicalization of themes derived from German philosophy. Hence also comes the very structure of their book – it is devoted to French Nietzscheanism (Foucault), Heideggerianism (Derrida), Marxism.
A question that needs to be asked here would be, for instance, the following: what was so peculiar about Hegel that a whole generation of Hyppolite pupils (including the most brilliant participants in his seminars – such as Derrida and Foucault) turned against him with such solidarity? Who was this Hegel that would dominate French intellectual life for over thirty years, from Kojève’s initially small, irregular and elitist lectures in Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes from 1933–1939, to the Hegelian seminars in the Collège de France at the turn of the sixties and seventies. The question about that Hegel – read mainly from the famous Chapter Four of his *Phenomenology* devoted to the “dialectic of mastery and slavery” – will help us in dealing with the issue of the complicated relationship between Hegel and postmodern thinkers in France today. We get the impression that the current (or perhaps – recent, to which we shall return further in the text) French anti-Hegelian scene cannot be understood without asking the questions as to what that Hegel was, where he came from and what the circumstances of his appearance were.\(^2\)

The point here is not to analyse French Hegelian studies from the pre-war and post-war periods, for it was not they that exerted such a powerful influence on the past and present cultural landscape of France, and especially its philosophical landscape. Hegel did not just dominate France after the war – he tyrannized and paralysed it with his presence, his discourse and conceptuality, like all “masters of thinking”.\(^3\) After the war, Hegel imposed the horizon of questions and answers, he was the single most serious philosophical authority. Michel Foucault expressed this thought in the name of his generation in *The Discourse on Language*, i.e. in his opening lecture at the Collège (Bourdieu) and Freudianism (Lacan). From such a perspective, we all are merely repeating – Plato...

\(^2\) The present text asks questions about the passage from Hegel to Nietzsche as well as about Hegel himself in French thought. The unavoidable questions, in this context, about Nietzsche – “the new Nietzsche”, according to the title of a collection of texts edited by David Allison, famous in the Anglo-Saxon world – I consider elsewhere.

de France in 1970 – when the battle with Hegel carried out with Nietzschean weapons was already definitely won: "... our age, whether through logic or epistemology, whether through Marx or through Nietzsche, is attempting to flee from Hegel".4

But why should one "flee from Hegel" at all – and is it possible to flee from him? How is one to break with Hegel if in philosophy one lives and breathes his dialectic, one thinks his language, argues with his arguments? That peculiar inability, that stiffening of the tongue when it attempts to oppose Hegel has perhaps been best expressed by Emmanuel Lévinas (in the text "Hegel and the Jews" from the collection of essays Dificile liberté); he said the following: "it is surely not easy to oppose Hegel's speech. It is so not only because thought lacks audacity but because it is as if language becomes disobedient. There is hardly anything more deplorable than to 'express one's view on Hegel', to classify him..."5 It is as if language becomes disobedient, says Lévinas, language becomes "completely mute", says Foucault, thinking somehow stops, not wanting, not being able, to find familiar points of departure... How can we avoid the situation, also mentioned by Foucault, whereby if we set out on an anti-Hegelian journey – at the end of it there will be Hegel, who within his system, and especially within his dialectic, forecasts every opposition against himself? How can we be "other than Hegel" rather than anti-Hegelian, how can we avoid battles on the ground chosen by him, how can we take a non-Hegelian strategy? It is precisely the Nietzsche as presented by Derrida, Klossowski and Deleuze that came as the greatest help for the whole generation of French philosophers. He became, as the latter puts it, "the absolute opponent of dialectic", as Nietzsche's philosophy is the "absolute anti-dialectic", and between the two, Hegel and Nietzsche, "there can be no compromise".6

5 Emmanuel Lévinas, Dificile liberté (Albin Michel, 1963).
Alexandre Kojève is of interest to us here as the one who shaped—
together with Jean Hyppolite—the picture of Hegel in post-war
France, influencing e.g. Bataille, Lacan and Merleau-Ponty through
his lectures (in Spectres of Marx Derrida says that nobody can deny the
fact that the reading of Hegel by Kojève “played a formative and not
negligible role, from many standpoints, for a certain generation of
French intellectuals”7, to which in turn Richard Rorty replies
mercilessly—“so what?”, it is no reason for him to be of any interest
today—and that is a really meaningful and interesting difference8).
Georges Bataille is of interest to us here insofar as in our account he is
a figure at the philosophical crossroads, the philosopher who suits
neither the former nor the latter French generation described here, a
philosopher who is both Hegelian and Nietzschean, reading at the
same time Hegel and Nietzsche and approaching the reading of one
of them with conceptual tools taken from the other. And finally,
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida are the two postmodern figures
in whom a retreat from Hegel (though in Jean-François Lyotard it was
a retreat from Marx9)—with the help of Nietzsche read in a new way
— took the most clear forms.
The manifesto of the generation of Hyppolite students was Gilles
Deleuze’s book, Nietzsche and Philosophy, published in 1962. It was
here that Nietzsche was for the first time presented as anti-Hegel and
his anti-Hegelianism was recognized as his philosophical mark (such
a reading was then widely accepted by two big Nietzschean
conferences in Royaumont in 1964 and then in Cerisy-la Salle in 1972,
the papers of which were published in two thick volumes, not
accidentally entitled Nietzsche aujoud’hui). The Hegel/Nietzsche
opposition needed by the whole generation is clear and simple: “... 
dialectic is work and empiricism is pleasure. And who said that there
is more thoughts in work than in pleasure?”—or, in Deleuze’s words—

7 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the
8 Richard Rorty, “A Spectre is Haunting the Intellectuals”, European Journal of
9 As I am trying to show in more detail in my Polish book Rorty and Lyotard. In the
Labyrinths of Postmodernity (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1994).
“Nietzschean ‘yes’ opposes Hegelian ‘no’, affirmation opposes –
dialectical negation, difference – dialectical contradiction, joy,
pleasure – dialectical work, lightness, dance – dialectical heaviness,
beautiful irresponsibility – dialectical duties”.¹⁰ Let us remember: “Il
n’y a pas de compromis possible entre Hegel et Nietzsche” is
Deleuze’s fundamental conviction. It is impossible in his view to
understand the whole of Nietzsche’s work if one does not note
“against whom” its main concepts are directed. And the enemy is
Hegel. “Hegelian themes – says Deleuze – are present in his work like
an enemy whom he fights”¹¹ Nietzsche intended to reveal all
“mystifications” which were to find their last refuge in dialectic, he
intended to free Hegel’s thought from the burden of its dialectic.
Nietzsche’s philosophy is just incomprehensible in Deleuze’s account
if one does not take into consideration its “fundamental pluralism”:
“pluralism is a purely philosophical way of thinking invented by
philosophy: it is the only guarantee of freedom of a particular mind,
the only principle of violent atheism. Gods dies, but they died of
laughter hearing that some God said that he was the only one”.¹²
Nietzsche seen through Deleuze’s eyes – as well as through those of
Pierre Klossowski in his book Nietzsche et le circle vicieux and of
Jacques Derrida in Eperons. Nietzsche’s Styles, and recently in America
of Alexander Nehamas in Nietzsche. Life as Literature – suggests a new
way of thinking – an affirmative thought which, finally, “excludes
each negativity”.¹³ Instead of the speculative elements of negation,

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 171.
creates an artwork – we would say, in the manner of the late Foucault from his
“aesthetics of existence” – out of himself. “Nietzsche exemplifies through his own
writings one way in which one individual may have succeeded in fashioning itself –
an individual, moreover, who, though beyond morality, is not morally objectionable.
The individual is none other than Nietzsche himself, who is a creature of his own
texts. This character does not provide a model for imitation, since he consists
essentially of the specific actions – that is, of the specific writings – that make him up,
and which only he could write”. Nietzsche. Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard
opposition and contradiction – Nietzsche offers the elements of difference, affirmation and pleasure. Nietzsche’s superman in Deleuze is to be directed against a dialectical conception of man, transvaluation – against a dialectical elimination of alienation. Nietzsche’s work, to sum up, is according to Deleuze “saturated with anti-Hegelianism”.14

Alexandre Koèze conducted his seminars in a mood of renaissance in Hegelian interests that he helped inspire that extended to the end of the twenties under the influence of e.g. Marxism and the Russian revolution. When Alexandre Koyré reported in 1930 during an international Hegelian congress “the state of Hegelian studies in France”, he was forced to remark at the very beginning that his paper would be brief and poor in comparison with the others, for neither at that time nor earlier was there any Hegelian school, nor even an eminent student of Hegel.15 The reasons enumerated by Koyré are manifold: first of all, difficulties in comprehending Hegel, the total oblivion in to which he had fallen in the 1860’s when the translations of his writings into French had been made, then – a “return to Kant”, and, finally, Hegel’s Protestantism. They had led to a dominating “attitude of hostility”, as Koyré remarks; Hegelianism was also degraded due to some highly unfavourable opinions expressed by the greatest philosophical authority in France after the first world war, Leon Brunschvicg.16 The turning point in the reception of Hegel was the book by Jean Wahl, Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel (1929) of which Jean Hyppolite was to write later that it had been a shock for all – une sorte de révélation. Thus Hegel appeared in the France of the thirties – as if from nowhere (incidentally, out of the three Hegelian pioneers – Wahl, Koèze, Koyré – the latter two were Russian émigrés whose interests and personal fates had thrown them, before their arrival in France, to the Husserlian-Heideggerian Germany of the twenties). So right after the second world war everything that was avant-garde, modern and progressive referred to Hegel and his

16 Ibidem, pp. 207, 208.
dialectic of “mastery and slavery” from *Phenomenology*. Finally, in the sixties, to paint to the end the picture that interests us here, the Hegelian page was turned once again – the point was, as Foucault put it in the passage quoted above, to “flee” from Hegel. Vincent Descombes comments on this situation in his excellent (especially in the more historical passages) book *Modern French Philosophy:*

> The difference separating the two generations [that of the three ‘H’s – Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger – and that which loved the three “masters of suspicion” – MK] lies in the inversion of the sign that marked the relationship to Hegel: every minus was substituted by a plus. The reference point remained the same.18

Without going into too much detail about the evolution of Kojève’s views (as I am doing it elsewhere), and starting from his Hegelian lectures edited and published by Raymond Queneau as well as from some of his post-war texts (and especially the correspondence with his most serious philosophical adversary, Leo Strauss, published four years ago, which provides an additional dimension to their polemics about the figure of the “tyrant” and the “philosopher”), I would be inclined to say, agreeing with his numerous French and American commentators, that his work is a splendid example of the genius of propaganda. A genius which promotes Hegel, Marx and Heidegger – as well as Kojève – at the same time as being a “very talented story-teller” (Descombes), who provides his revelational – and revolutionary – interpretations as Hegel’s message to France on the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution.19

---

17 German *Herrschaft* and *Knechtschaft* is English *mastery* and *slavery* and French – from Hyppolite and Kojève – *maître* and *esclave*. A new French translator of *Phenomenology*, Jean-Pierre Levebvre (1991), referring to a biblical dimension of the pair *Herr und Knecht*, suggests still another possibility: *maître* and *valet*, rendering *Knechtschaft* as *servitude*. In Poland, new proposals by Marek J. Siemek go in the same direction as these of Levebvre, presented in “L’oeuvre en mouvement” in a Hegelian issue of *Magazine littéraire* (nov. 1991, no. 293), p. 24 – starting from different positions, they arrive at similar linguistic conclusions.


19 It is sometimes said that Kojève gave France “interpretations” of Hegel, while Hyppolite gave it “commentaries”, the former being subjective, often unfaithful and
historical circumstances actually favoured such a prophetic reading and commenting: the period of Hegelian seminars reminds us in its intensity of the writing of the Phenomenology itself – cannon sounds during the battle of Iena, Hegel competing his work, and Napoleon, that l’âme du monde à cheval, parading in front of Hegel’s windows on his horse. The war, violence, interventions in Spain, and generally, a culmination of pre-war tensions in the form of the outbreak of the world war. Precisely – "world" war, on a "world" scale, like the Napoleonic wars were "world" ones for the first time in history. Once again the clue to thinking about the world was History with a capital "H" (Czesław Miłosz in a short text about Albert Camus, "Fraternal Interlocutor", wrote that in the forties and fifties French intellectuals were fascinated by History – "we [here in Central Europe – MK] were also fascinated by it, but in a different way. They longed for personal saturation with historicity. We were saturated with it in abundance...").

One of the participants in Kojève’s Hegelian seminars was Georges Bataille, who at the same time attempted to write about Nietzsche, becoming the first in France to protest against his appropriation by Nazi ideology. Sometimes it is said that Bataille’s intention was anti-Hegelian right from the start and that the tool for his struggles with Hegel was to be Nietzsche read extremely intensely and personally. (As Bataille put it in On Nietzsche: “Except for a few foreign to Hegel, the latter being an example of an objective, cold and modest philosophical work. It is no accident that in numerous contemporary works devoted to Hegel and written by French historians of philosophy – Kojève’s book is not even mentioned... This is simply unbelievable considering the influence of the latter on post-war French thought. Jacques d’Hondt, an established French Hegelian authority, says that Hyppolite presented a deep commentary, while Kojève merely interpreted some aspects and some chapters of the Phenomenology – that he had specifically chosen. See Magazine littéraire, no. 293, p. 32.

20 For instance in such texts as "Nietzsche and the Fascists" or "Nietzschean Chronicle" translated into English in Visions of Excess. Selected Writings 1927–1939, transl. by Allan Stoekl (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).

21 See Bruno Karsenti, "Bataille anti-hégélien?", Magazine littéraire, nov. 91, no. 293, pp. 54–57. For the deplorable results of reading Bataille as a mere sociologist see a very poor book by Michael Richardson, Georges Bataille (London: Routledge, 1994).
exceptions, my company on earth is mostly Nietzsche” or “My life
with Nietzsche as a companion is a community. My book is this
community”22). But personally I share the view – and I am not
isolated in this respect as the same applies to e.g. Denis Hollier23 –
that Bataille, being the only French philosopher of the period that
interests us here, is neither Nietzschean nor Hegelian (staying close to
both). It is perhaps that he is the only one who needed in his thinking
both a transgressive as well as a dialectical element – in his Summa
atheologica (Inner Experience, Guilty, On Nietzsche) he revealed a
Nietzschean part of his work and in The Accursed Share its Marxian-
Hegelian side. Divided into two, Bataille wrote under the sign of both
philosophers, rejecting at the same time a unambiguous and
permanent subordination either to Nietzschean textuality (the
“irresponsibility” of which Pierre Klossowski writes so much) or to
everything that is brought about by socially-oriented thinking. One
the one hand, he was looking in a Nietzschean manner for Hegel’s
non-knowledge, what remains un-thought in his system and what he
found in “poetry, laughter, ecstasy” as blind spots of the system,24
being distant from the community and the political and social mission
of the philosopher and close to a transgression restricted to the text;25
on the other hand, he was writing his counter-history of civilisation in
which work was a mark of slavery rather than a road to emancipation
and where social power was associated only with destruction, and not
production.

The “dialectic of mastery and slavery” since Kojève, through
Bataille with his idea of a “general” rather than “restricted” economy,
to Foucault and Derrida, was a constant in French thought, Descombes

From among a couple of books I know, the most philosophically interesting for me
was Jean-Michel Besnier’s La politique de l’impossible (Paris: La Découverte, 1988).

22 Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, transl. by B. Boone (New York: Paragon House,

23 See Denis Hollier, “Le Dispositif Hegel/Nietzsche dans la bibliothèque de
Bataille”, L’Arc, 38, pp. 35–47.

24 Georges Bataille, Inner Experience, transl. by L.A. Boldt (New York: SUNY Press,

25 See Allan Stoekl, Agonies of the Intellectual (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
The French Hegel and Postmodern Thought

Chapter Four of the Phenomenology became the most frequently discussed – as well as appropriated and then digested – passage from Hegel’s writings. Not surprisingly, the opposition against Hegel’s domination in the years of 1930–1960 appeared both in Foucault and Derrida e.g. in their considerations on the dialectical conception of history, on the place reason occupies in history as well as on the dialectic itself. Let us consider several texts representative of the period, leaving aside others, sometimes devoted to Hegel to a large extent (such as Derrida’s Glas): Foucault’s “A Preface to Transgression” and “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” as well as Derrida’s “Positions” and “Hegelianism Without Reserve”. For what we mean is not so much, and not simply, to show the relation of the two thinkers to Hegel’s philosophy but rather to indicate opposition to Hegel – precisely with Nietzsche, and it is here that this can be seen most clearly. The atmosphere surrounding the “new Nietzsche” in question can be seen from the opening sentence from Klossowski’s book on Nietzsche: “How is one to speak of ‘Nietzsche’s though’ without ever referring to what has been said about him”, besides, Nietzsche is supposed to have rejected the attitude of a “teaching philosopher”, to give up writing “in care of the human condition”.26 And it is no accident that Michel Foucault, when asked about his philosophical identity, said in “Le retour de la morale”, his last interview – given while he was correcting the last two volumes of his History of Sexuality – that there were two fundamental experiences which had shaped his philosophical development: Heidegger and Nietzsche. Mentioning his “fundamental Nietzscheanism”, he says precisely the following: “Je suis simplement nietzscheen” – I am just a Nietzschean.27

The homage Foucault paid to Bataille, the founder of Critique – in “A Preface to Transgression” – powerfully shows “the Nietzschean turn” in France:28 the author writes there about our falling “asleep in

28 One also speaks of the “aesthetic turn” – see James J. Winchester, Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Turn. Reading Nietzsche After Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida (New York: SUNY
dialectic and anthropology” (which, I suppose, refers us back directly to Hegel and Kojève) from which only Nietzsche can wake us up. Discursive language, however, like in the passage from Lévinas cited above, becomes “ineffectual” and “nearly silent”.29 There remain non-Hegelian, non-philosophical writers such as Klossowski and Blanchot (or also, in Foucault’s view, Bataille) who were the only ones to find proper words to express the experience of transgression. Foucault says that “perhaps one day it [the experience of transgression – MK] will seem as decisive for our culture, as much a part of its soil, as the experience of contradiction was at an earlier time for dialectical thought”.30

If the experience of contradiction corresponds to Hegelian dialectical thinking, that of transgression must correspond to some totally new thinking – maybe the thinking of Foucault himself? Philosophical language is to be characterized by “profound silence” and in a language stripped of dialectics, the philosopher is aware that “we are not everything”. A new search for limits is to replace an old search for the whole, and transgression is to replace the Hegelian movement of contradictions. The language of philosophy remains “bound” as long as it is not able to think about the ultimate experience.31 The genealogist, as opposed to the historian, learns that “behind things” there is no timeless and essential secret but rather the secret that they have no essence.32 The Foucauldian genealogist is as anti-Platonic as Nietzsche and as anti-Hegelian as Deleuze.

And finally Jacques Derrida who always struggles with Hegel in different forms, stating explicitly about his relation to Hegel that “we will never be finished with the reading or rereading of Hegel, and, in

Press, 1994). Especially important, in my view, are the moral implications of this turn in French philosophy, discussed by Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity as an opposition between moralists and aesthetes.

30 Ibidem, p. 33.
31 Ibidem, p. 41.
32 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, op. cit., p. 142.
a certain way, I do nothing other than attempt to explain myself on this point".\textsuperscript{33} Hegelianism for him is "the ultimate reassembling of metaphysics",\textsuperscript{34} the culmination of the logocentric tradition running from Plato. Derrida does not create, however, a totally anti-Hegelian stance, being aware of the difficulties of philosophical thinking against Hegel. Referring to Lévinas, and disclosing his own strategy towards Hegel, he says: "as soon as he speaks against Hegel, Lévinas can only confirm Hegel has confirmed him already".\textsuperscript{35} The game with Hegel goes on the margins of Bataille’s reading of him as presented in Derrida’s \textit{Writing and Difference}. Bataille took Hegel too seriously, he took absolute knowledge too seriously.\textsuperscript{36} Comparing Hegel’s “mastery” and Bataille’s “sovereignty”, Derrida comes to the conclusion that Hegel did not see the possibility of existence of anything outside his system – for instance, poetry, laughter and ecstasy – which are neither knowledge nor provide it. Excess, dépense – are beyond reason. And it is no accident that a considerable part of post-war French thought mentions the theme of Hegel’s “madness” from the period before he had completed his system: namely, how is one to accept the fact of being the incarnation of the Absolute Spirit, of announcing the end of history, without being at the same time – God? Although there is no definition of the Derridean différence, if there were one, it might perhaps be the suppression of the Hegelian Aufhebung wherever it operates, as he says in \textit{Positions}. Hence the affinity of the différence with all operations against Hegel’s dialectical speculation. Both in Derrida, as well as in Foucault, the opposition to Hegel gives birth to the escape towards Nietzsche (and, incidentally, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, the next generation of French

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy. Hegelianism Without Reserve” in \textit{Writing and Difference}, op. cit., p. 253.
\end{itemize}
philosophers and today's opponents of both Nietzschean postmodernists and of their Nietzsche, who publish collective volumes entitled provocatively *Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas nietzscheens* (1991) – why are we not Nietzscheans... So, who are we?

To sum up this little stroll taken through French postmodern thought, let me say that I did not mean to deal in detail with any of the postmodern figures described here, or with any commentators of Hegel first and then Nietzsche. What I meant here was the topicality of Hegel today; and I merely attempted to outline his constant and permanent presence in subsequent generations of French philosophers. From his explicit presence in the first generation to the presence-as-negation presence in the battle fought from new, Nietzschean positions. And whenever we open Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* in its Hegelian passages, we have to bear in mind the fact that he wrote his book in a totally different culture, although at the same time as Kojève, Hyppolite or Bataille – nowhere in the world was Hegel so alive and so topical, so close as well as so controversial, as in post-war France.
The general context for this essay is the following: postmodern philosophy was strongly influenced by Nietzsche, especially in his postwar French readings from Bataille to Blanchot to Deleuze to Klossowski. It was Nietzsche in these readings who provided the basic contours of a new self-image of the philosopher (or the humanist, more generally): instead of (modern) thinking about changing the social and political world, philosophers now found new terrains for thought, no longer associated with history, and less and less associated with politics. From the perspective of this essay, it is interesting to think about philosophy through the lenses of the self-images philosophers (more or less consciously) assume. Any transformation in the self-image of philosophers entails a gradual transformation of the role and place of philosophy in culture. For what philosophy is, in its broadest terms – is what philosophers regard (regarded, or will regard) as acceptable as philosophy. The passage from the Hegelian to the Nietzschean self image in France in recent decades heralded the advent of postmodernity – if we accept the idea that what philosophers think about themselves while practicing philosophy is culturally significant.

What remains to be done, and what is still left to be done here, is to reconsider the postmodern (or Nietzschean) vision of the
philosopher’s role in society in the face of what is increasingly called the Global Age: is there a new self-image currently sought that could respond to the challenges that globalization theory and practices bring about? What is the place of philosophy in the rapidly changing Academe, and what is the place of the Academe itself (from the traditional university to higher education in general, or “tertiary education” in more recent terms) in a rapidly changing social environment? What remains to be done is also to trace the interconnections between (cultural, philosophical, intellectual) postmodernity and the (economic, political, social) Global Age. It was much easier to think of the “postmodern turn” before globalization became a dominant social concept in the 1990s; now, it might be safer to avoid the term “turn” altogether.

To start with the Nietzschean spirit in philosophy: Gilles Deleuze’s contribution to the appearance and development of the postmodern orientation in the humanities and social sciences is still undervalued. Instead of writing about the unique themes he introduced to postmodern discourse (such as e.g. rhizomes and trees, difference and repetition, schizoanalysis, minor languages, war machines or nomad art), I would like to focus on his Nietzscheanism which, I suppose, has turned out to be the most useful in the humanities generally today. I appreciate his impressive monographs on Hume, Bergson, Kant, Spinoza and Leibniz, as well as the books he co-authored over the years with Félix Guattari; but it was his book on Nietzsche – *Nietzsche et la philosophie* – that exerted the greatest, although hidden influence, on French, and subsequently American thinkers over the last three decades. It was Deleuze who introduced to the intellectual arena a new figure of the philosopher: called Nietzschean first and then merely postmodern. It was in Deleuze’s book(s) and articles that a whole generation of seminal writers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard found their much less socially-bounded, much more individualistic, self-creational and relativistic self-images. Nietzsche as read by Deleuze provided a powerful impetus for a generational change in France in the sixties, which continues to affect us today, in the account of the role, place and tasks of the humanist – be it the philosopher,
sociologist, historian, literary critic etc. – in culture and society. The example provided by Nietzsche, and read for current purposes by Deleuze, turned out to be very appealing indeed. Both of them show what can and what cannot be expected from today’s humanist. Deleuze is inspiring, brilliant, and far-reaching in his conclusions. He combines the analytic talent of a philosophical reader with the visionary talent of a philosophical prophet.

Few participants in current discussions about postmodernity actually refer to the early Gilles Deleuze (neither to the early Pierre Klossowski, frankly speaking) or from their fundamental books about Nietzsche; much more is written in this context about Michel Foucault’s or Jacques Derrida’s Nietzscheanism. But, and this is the main point of the present essay, the “postmodern turn” we may be currently witnessing also results from the “Nietzschean turn” the humanities took in recent decades: in the passage from the Hegelian (surely, as read more by Alexandre Kojève than as read by Jean Hyppolite) to the Nietzschean self-image of the philosopher, came the change of expectations directed toward the philosopher (and philosophy as a discipline itself) by the Nietzschean in spirit, the change of his or her awareness of participation in culture, history, and politics that occurred in the sixties in the French humanities. If there had been no new Nietzsche-inspired self-image of the philosopher in France, suddenly growing and suddenly more and more appealing to philosophers’ imagination, there would have probably not been the books by Foucault, Derrida or Lyotard in the forms we know them today. A powerful impulse questioning the (modern) role of the philosopher as the one who changes the world of public and political affairs originated in a specifically reinterpreted (French) Nietzsche by a new generation of thinkers opposed to a specifically reinterpreted (French) Hegel. And that was done in a powerful manner by Gilles Deleuze.

The generation of Foucault and Derrida, Deleuze and Klossowski thought that between Hegel and Nietzsche there could be no compromise. But they still meant a postwar French Hegel and a new Nietzsche read in France, two intellectual constructs, needed especially by the second generation of French thinkers to settle their
philosophical and intellectual relations with their predecessors. Vincent Descombes is basically right when he says in his *Modern French Philosophy* that the signs put next to Hegel and next to Nietzsche got changed in the sixties: wherever there was a "minus", there appeared a "plus", and vice versa.¹

One can discover a number of parallel interpretations of the Hegelian-Nietzschean shift regarding the re-evaluation of the role and place of the philosopher in culture and society that took place in French thought in the sixties with the help of the aforementioned thinkers: Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, and Klossowski.² Each of them take as their point of departure a different aspect of the "change of sign" from plus to minus mentioned by Descombes. For even in the fifties Nietzsche was a rarely explored margin in French philosophy (and were it not for Georges Bataille or Maurice Blanchot, he might have been hardly heard of). So what was so appealing about Nietzsche in the sixties? He attracted philosophers with his otherness, methodophobia, idiosyncrasies, personal overtones, vividness of metaphoric, versatility of styles, multitude of genres, as well as, more philosophically speaking, with his criticism of oppositional (binary) thinking, stressing the role of style in philosophical discourse, underlining the significance of perspectivalism, the possibilities of judging without criteria etc. etc.

2.

Before we pass on to the, in this respect, fundamental book by Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, let me say a few words about the book by Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux*, by way of an


introduction to his problem. The two books together provide a brand new perspective in reading Nietzsche. It is obvious right from in its opening statement that the book by Klossowski was conceived as a challenge to several generations of Nietzsche’s readers, commentators and scholars: “This is the book that may testify to rare ignorance: how are we to talk about ‘Nietzsche’s thought’ without ever referring to anything said about him before?”3 Even in his text “Nietzsche, le polythéisme et la parodie” (dating from 1957) Klossowski, probably without thinking about the approaching Nietzschean turn in the French humanities, wrote about Nietzsche “we always tell him to say more and to say less than he said; we actually tell him to say more when we ally with him, and less – when we reject or distort him”.4 Bataille and Blanchot, Klossowski and Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault, Lyotard and Barthes, all of them clearly “ally with Nietzsche“ in a powerful strategic and anti-Hegelian alliance, and clearly “tell him to say more”. Some members of this alliance produced works of commentary, others produced works that merely used him, hardly ever mentioning him.5

Thus Nietzsche in extreme versions is either an object of a thorough deliberation (Klossowski, Deleuze) or is a silent accomplice, a tacitly assumed and never fully expressed horizon of thought (Foucault). Nietzsche’s thought in Deleuze is presented as an ordered, anti-Hegelian system; in Klossowski, in turn, Nietzsche does not present his philosophy but his “variations on personal themes” that rotate “around madness as if it were its own axis”.6 Klossowski’s energetic interpretation, following Nietzsche, asks the question who the philosopher could be. In a violent, anti-Hegelian move Nietzsche, as read by him, is not willing either to think from the perspective of the “care for the human condition”, or to be a traditional “teaching” philosopher.

5 This division is widely used by Alan D. Schrift in his very interesting book, Nietzsche’s French Legacy. A Genealogy of Poststructuralism (London: Routledge, 1995).
6 Pierre Klossowski, “Nietzsche, le polythéisme et la parodie”, op. cit., p. 188.
Who is the adversary, who is the enemy one is to defeat? The more fully thought is able to nail him, Klossowski says, the more powerful it becomes. To determine its adversary is to produce one’s own space, to expand it, to breathe with it.7

And it is precisely in this question that I can see the clue to the Nietzschean turn in French philosophy and it is by means of this question that I am going to show the role played by Gilles Deleuze in this turn. Hegel in the late fifties and early sixties became the enemy of a whole generation; it was the Hegel mainly from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in an influential interpretation popularized in France by Alexandre Kojève’s *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, and it was mainly against this Hegel that arguments were presented and misreadings were shown; it was the young Hegel who was being attacked. Let us remind ourselves of Foucault’s words from his opening lecture delivered at the Collège de France in 1970 – when the battle with Hegel fought with Nietzschean weapons had already been won: “the whole of our epoch ... attempts to flee from Hegel”.8

3.

In Gilles Deleuze’s study *Nietzsche and Philosophy* the enemy and the adversary in question is the same Hegel.9 Nietzsche’s philosophy supposedly forms “an absolute anti-dialectics”; “anti-Hegelianism runs through his work as its cutting edge”, his pluralism is for dialectics its “most ferocious enemy” and “its only profound enemy”.10 Between Hegel and Nietzsche “there is no compromise”.

---

Or still differently: “we will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche’s work if we do not see ‘against whom’ its practical concepts are directed. Hegelian themes are present in this work as the enemy against which it fights”.

Thus the context is quite clear: the common enemies for Nietzsche and Deleuze are dialectics and Hegel. Nietzsche in Deleuze is lightness, pleasure, affirmation, joy, irresponsibility; Hegel and dialectics, in turn, mean heaviness, work, negation, duty and responsibility. Nietzsche replaces a “speculative element of negation” with a “practical element of difference: the object of affirmation and pleasure”. Deleuze attempts to make Nietzsche more “dialectic” in his reading and is not willing to fight Hegel on the terrain chosen by him, hence Nietzschean pairs of oppositions seem paradoxical and non-philosophical. If on the one hand we have dialectical negation, on the other we have differentiating affirmation and the “ethics of joy” corresponding to it. Thought is supposed to become “light”, “affirmative”, “dancing” – finally, it is supposed to “exclude any negativity”.

11 Ibidem, p. 162.

12 In various interpretations of of the Deleuze/Hegel/Nietzsche relationship at least two positions can be indicated: according to the one, Deleuze reads Nietzsche as a characterization of his own philosophical stance and he is against Hegel and dialectics (see Ronald Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, London: Routledge, 1989; Michael S. Roth, Knowing and History, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); according to the other, simultaneously with the strategy of total opposition against Hegel, he chooses another path: he “refuses to descend and struggle on Hegel’s own terrain” and attempts to “move away from the dialectic, to forget the dialectic” (see Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, pp. 27, 53). Deleuze in the latter account is seen as attempting to destroy the binary character of his and Nietzsche’s position with Hegel’s, so that Nietzsche as “anti-Hegel” should not suggest the beginning of a new dialectical process. Alan Schrift in his previously mentioned Nietzsche’s French Legacy chooses a version of full opposition between Hegel and Nietzsche in Deleuze. But the problem I mean here – the problem of Nietzscheans writing “against Hegel” – is most clearly put in a brilliant book by Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire. Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

13 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 9.

14 Ibidem, p. 41.
Deleuze attacks dialectics with Nietzschean weapons claiming e.g. that it avoids putting the fundamental question: “Who is to perform critique, who is capable of it?” We are told about reason, spirit, self-knowledge, and man; but who is in question in all these concepts? The question “who?” is the most important one – dialectics makes use of the pairs universal/particular, general/specific, infinite/finite which are merely symptoms, and the question to be asked is: who is particular, specific, and finite. Who is the subject in question, what are the forces in play? The solutions presented by dialectics are fictitious, Deleuze says, for its problems are fictitious because it treats symptoms in an abstract manner. Nietzsche in the comprehensive, not to say systematic, account presented by Deleuze is against any thought referring to the negative, opposes any thought that makes use of the power of the negative, any thought that moves within an element of the negative and uses negation as a driving force, power and quality. Nietzsche opposes the famous power of positivity of the negative with his own discovery: the negativity of the positive, according to Deleuze. It is not difficult to identify the enemy fought by Nietzsche in Deleuze’s account: philosophy is to become the art of interpretation and judgement, asking with respect to everything the question “who?” The meaning of Nietzsche’s philosophy in Deleuze is the affirmation of multitude, becoming and chance. “The lightness of what affirms against the heaviness of the negative; joys of will to power against dialectics; affirmation of affirmation against the famous negation of negation”, he writes at the end of his book. (The figure of the philosopher found and highly valued in Nietzsche was subsequently supported by a series of fragments in a more popular book about Nietzsche. In the first part of the aforementioned fragments there is a section entitled “Who is the Philosopher?”. Let us just remind ourselves of the exact titles of the fragments chosen by Deleuze in this popularization: le philosophe masqué, le philosophe critique, le philosophe intempestif, le philosophe physiologiste et médecin as

---

well as le philosophe, inventeur de possibilités de vie and le philosophe législateur.\textsuperscript{16} It can be seen from the very titles what model of philosopher – from among the many possible ones – will be promoted by this popular guide to Nietzsche. To refer to \textit{Ecce Homo}: “the very last thing I would promise is to make humanity ‘better’”.\textsuperscript{17}

4.

Let us summarize the above fragment. First, a clearly marked enemy of both Deleuze and Nietzsche as read by him is the Hegel from the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, especially from the chapter on the dialectics of mastery and slavery; that is to say, the Hegel read and popularized in France by Alexandre Kojève in his \textit{Introduction to the Reading of Hegel}. Dialectics is “popular speculation”, and under the Hegelian picture of the master there is always the slave, just like below the Deleuzian picture of Hegel there is always the dialectic, foundational for post-war French thought, about “mastery and slavery” by Hegel, although read by means of Nietzsche’s \textit{Genealogy of Morals}.\textsuperscript{18} Second, the crucial words of this brilliant study are decidedly anti-Hegelian: affirmation, lightness, dance, joy, irresponsibility, i.e. the words leading directly to the next generation of French philosophers, the philosophers of difference (which for the first time had probably appeared on the margins of Hegel and Nietzsche in Georges Bataille\textsuperscript{19}). Third, what is most important to us is not the slow change in the French “master of thinking”; the new readings of Hegel by Klossowski and Deleuze, or previously by Bataille and Blanchot (with the notion of \textit{écriture fragmentaire} in Nietzsche suggested by the latter) show that no

intellectual hegemony is long-lasting, as is evident in French culture; they do show, however, the new terrain later on boldly explored by postmodern thought.

To an extent, the eccentricity of Deleuze’s (and Klossowski’s) reading of Nietzsche will be treated as a model and source of inspiration for Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard in their philosophical investigations. Although Foucault explicitly devoted to Nietzsche only two short pieces (“Nietzsche, Genealogy and History” and “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”), all his thought is immersed in Nietzscheanism; Lyotard in his Libidinal Economy merely mentions him, but the book is considered as a violent explosion of his Nietzscheanism; Derrida uses Nietzsche in his long-lasting struggles with Heidegger and indirectly with the whole body of “metaphysics” with Plato and Hegel as its main proponents. But what is important in my view is something else: it is the first time that a brand new attitude of the philosopher in culture was so highly and explicitly valued: from Deleuze’s (and Klossowski’s) reading of Nietzsche one can read a certain coherent proposal concerning the place of the philosopher in culture.

5.

If we are talking about current philosophical descriptions (narratives, histories or micrologies) as being precisely about “philosophical” descriptions, then the evolution of the very notion of “philosophy” must be seen as a very deep and thorough one indeed. And it is after Nietzsche that one has to locate a large part, if not the whole body, of so-called postmodern thought. In many respects, perhaps, the very notion of “Nietzschean” could be synonymous with that of “postmodern”. Postmodern thinkers are in such a close relationship with Nietzsche that they are often not willing to see it, or are not capable of seeing it thoroughly. Perhaps the most fully aware of this affinity was Michel Foucault who did not want, like Derrida, to “overcome” Nietzsche and to leave him behind in a closed chapter of “Western metaphysics”. “The only sign of the affinity with such
thought as Nietzschean is precisely to use it, to distort it, to make it shiver and cry”, Foucault once said in an interview. I would like to stress once again that postmodern thinkers are Nietzschean in the sense ascribed to Nietzsche by Deleuze (also in the sense ascribed to him two decades later in a famous interpretation presented by Alexander Nehamas in his Nietzsche: Life as Literature\(^{20}\)). What does it mean, without the burden of philosophical descriptions?

The philosophical choice we are talking about here, made in the sixties, was also a moral and political choice made on the margins of the political, social, and ideological events in France at the beginning and middle of the sixties: the philosopher no longer recognized as his or her own the “Hegelian” (in Kojève’s version) mission of his necessary participation in vast historical transformations. Together with the passage from Hegel to Nietzsche (as well as to Freud and Marx, the other two “masters of suspicion”), there occurred a significant change of the self-image of the philosopher in culture. The response provided by Nietzsche (called “the New Nietzsche” in America following a pioneering publication by David B. Allison) in readings presented by his new interpreters is extremely important from the perspective of questions about this self-image, and the first, most significant moves were made by Deleuze (and Klossowski) who drew a picture of a newly interpreted, specifically French Nietzsche.

The Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit was primarily to link philosophy to transformations occurring in the surrounding world: the idea was to show that certain political proposals may be legitimated by certain philosophical proposals, and thereby philosophical knowledge may and should lead to political changes. Philosophy stood close to history and to politics. But the link in question was not satisfactory for the younger generation of French philosophers, currently called postmodern. The questions about progress in history, about a single “History” with its meaning deciphered by philosophers, emanated from postwar French Hegelianism; on the other hand, Nietzsche’s vision could provide

merely a multitude of separate and never realizable small-scale “histories” produced on the basis of different “perspectives”. On the questions of historical change, progress, and a clear account of the relation between philosophical thinking and political activity in Hegelianism, there began a debate in which a newly-coined Nietzscheanism furnished arguments against the institutionally entrenched Hegelianism after the second world war. The opposition between Hegel/Nietzsche with respect to the role of the philosopher and philosophy in history (that is, in what Emil Cioran called faire l'Histoire, “doing History”, in his History and Utopia) is clear: it is about the philosophers' responsibility for history consisting in giving or refusing legitimation to political programmes and choices that became more and more difficult to support. The passage to Nietzsche and the turn against Hegel can also be seen as a turn against a certain place of the philosopher in culture and history supported by (a specifically read) Hegel. In modern times, philosophy has several times tried to stay close to power; in postwar France, philosophy tried to stay as close to power as possible, and the ideal of the philosopher as a totally “committed writer” in the manner of Sartre, and supported by the powerful account of Hegel as provided by his new commentators, was very strong indeed. Philosophy was supposed to change the social world, and philosophers were supposed to legitimate History. The responsibility of this self-image of the philosopher was supposedly too heavy to bear. So there appeared intellectual space for Nietzsche in his interpreters. And when Nietzsche came, the road to postmodernity was opened (incidentally, were it not Nietzsche, there would have been someone else, I suppose).

The attack launched by Deleuze on Hegelian negativity – and on its “work” – was an attack on Hegel’s vision of history within which all events under the philosopher’s gaze gain some meaning in the course of history. Without the belief in the power of negativity and the
power of the philosophical gaze, the homogeneous and retrospectively realized history could turn out to be a contingent web of events – of unknown hierarchy of significance and undisclosed meaning in history. Negativity led in Hegel to change, and change has always been progressive. A philosophical account of history could only show its subsequent manifestations occurring along a single route; progress by negation was supposed to lead to the end of history. The gaze of the Hegelian philosopher provided a clear picture of those events that were significant from a philosophical point of view. History, philosophy, politics, and knowledge were interrelated with one another. It must have given additional power to philosophy and its representatives, philosophers; it must have influenced the social and political image of the philosopher.

The Deleuzian Nietzsche brings about a new relationship between the philosopher and History, for he also brings about a new vision of history. The Hegelian philosophy of history was to look back, to give meaning to the past so that the present could have its meaning. Philosophers who put the present in a meaningful and always progressive series of events, as Kojève wanted to convince his readers, were responsible for the future. In the Deleuzian account of Nietzsche (as well as in the neo-Nietzschein account of Deleuze), philosophy is gradually deprived of this increasingly heavy burden of social and political responsibility.

Deleuze refers to what he calls "pluralism" in Nietzsche's philosophy; genealogy is opposed to dialectics, and histories about the world are opposed to a single History about it. But as there are many of them, they can no longer be legitimate judgements on politics, morality or aesthetics, for they cannot be subsumed under a single superior vision, with the figure of Reason in the background. In Hegelian dialectics there is no room for a constant interplay of different driving forces on which depended the meaning of a given object, just like there is no room for the previously mentioned genealogical question "who?" Let me add right now that a different

account of history leads to different conduct in the present: while the Hegelian “work of negativity” gave meaning to history as a narrative about progress; the Nietzschean genealogy sees all attempts to present a mere sequence of events as one, single history unfolding through its numerous manifestations as reactionary thinking: thinking that comes directly from the perspective of the slave rather than from that of the master, to refer to the master/slave dialectics again, as in the Hegelian view of history it is the slave and his vision of history that counts. On the one hand we have a grand narrative, on the other a multitude of little narratives written from various perspectives and under the influence of many forces.22

The elimination of negativity for Deleuze (and for Nietzsche in this reading) becomes a crucial point on which the sense of their history depends (the “new way of thinking” means affirmative thought, that is to say such thought that finally “excludes any negativity”). As negativity is deprived of its power, it is deprived of the possibility of work (and let us remember here Bataille’s “unemployed negativity”, négativité sans emploi) and the change associated with it disappears, and hence progress itself. The questioning of negation as the driving force of history at the same time changes history as a sequence of historical events, and deprives the philosopher of his or her Hegelian role of providing these events with meaning, putting them in order and coming to conclusions with respect to present and future actions. The web of close relationships between history/knowledge/action is broken. And what follows is the separation of those who act from the justification taken by them hitherto, the knowledge of history provided by philosophers. Hegel gave us the possibility of understanding the world and to exert an influence on the changes it undergoes; the French Nietzsche appeared at the moment when the understanding of a less and less understandable world (in which it was more and difficult to explain and philosophically legitimize the dramas of the surrounding world,

22 As Clément Rosset writes: “Deleuze’s thought is not in the service of any thought, any purpose, any particular theme”. “Sechèresse de Deleuze”, L’Arc, 49, 1987, p. 91.
with the Holocaust at the forefront) was becoming an increasingly heavy burden.

Nietzsche, to put it briefly, provided the opportunity to separate philosophy from politics, leaving engagement in historical change to the private choices of thinkers rather than to duties automatically ascribed to the community of philosophers. Political change no longer had philosophical legitimization on the basis of the new Nietzscheanism, for Nietzsche (i.e. in the reading by Deleuze) brought about une nouvelle conception de la philosophie, une nouvelle image du penseur et de la pensée. What is most important for me is the second part of the statement, the "new image of the thinker". The thinker in question no longer legitimates political change, no longer attempts to decipher and to give sense to the surrounding political world by means of providing a homogeneous history – but he does not go as far in his aspirations as (Roland Barthes’) “pleasure of the text” yet either.

7.

The most important point for me here is the following: in the new French readings of Nietzsche some postwar philosophers sought ways to free themselves from “history” and from responsibility toward its past, present and future events, sought a new self-image, the aforementioned Deleuzian nouvelle image which, with the passage of time, they could see as their own. And François Ewald was not exaggerating when he wrote recently about Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy: “Nietzsche would not have been for us what he has become for us today without the first Nietzsche [et la philosophie]”. I would be willing to add in this context: the same thing happened with the newly born self-image of the philosopher. Without Deleuze and his Nietzsche, the self-image of interest to us here would have been (at least slightly?) different.

---

One is surely entitled to ask at this point whether such deep transformations of the self-image of the philosopher originated only and exclusively from reading Nietzsche? Obviously they did not. Nietzsche so seen was merely a point of convergence for some thoughts and some attitudes in culture, probably unavoidable in postwar France. (Hegel’s response would be easy: it was the “cunning of reason” that helped to give birth to a temporary interest in, as well as appropriation and reinterpretation of, Nietzsche for particular French needs; it was not an individual gesture of a group of philosophers but a wide and meaningful world-historical gesture). It was not that the knowledge of Nietzsche distorted and corrupted the traditional picture of the philosopher, infecting the French humanities with a new vision of what the philosopher as a cultural hero could be; it was rather that the philosopher in question, wanting to flee from a burdensome arena of social obligations, was looking for and finally found, his or her new philosophical patron. The fact that the humanities found its patron in Nietzsche resulted from a web of contingent events as well as from the appearance at more or less the same time of “strong readings” of his philosophy. Gilles Deleuze’s works gave the French humanities their first impulses, later on maintained and brilliantly used by the whole of postmodern thought.

8.

What will happen with the Nietzsche-inspired postmodern self-image of philosophers provided by Deleuze and Klossowski in the 21st century cannot even be guessed at; the transformations the modern university is undergoing right now – in the face of the challenges of globalization, in the face of the possibility of the decline of the nation-state and the general collapse of the cultural, political, social and economic project of modernity – will surely change not only the self-image of philosophers, but of all academics as well. Philosophy gave rise to the modern institution of the university two hundred years ago and now it will have to find its new niche in the Academe, as the general move is increasingly toward an entrepreneurial and
managerial institution no longer based on philosophical Humboldtian and Kantian foundations. The self-image of philosophers will sooner or later become altered – hopefully, not entirely out of the modern context of the Hegelian/Nietzschean debate, part of which were Deleuze and the postmodern way of practicing philosophy.
Part II
Па́рт
In this article, the question of the role of higher education in general, and of the university in particular, in contemporary society and culture, is linked to two parallel processes: first, the questioning of the role of the nation-state in the global age, and, second, the gradual decomposition of the traditional welfare state in the majority of OECD countries. The first theme is much more historical and philosophical; the second, much more sociological and public policy oriented. The point of departure that is assumed is that the university in its modern form was closely linked with the nineteenth-century political invention of the nation-state and that the university in the last half of the twentieth century has been increasingly dependent on the welfare state as it gradually began to pass from its elite to its mass (and in current predictions) to its near-universal participation model. What is happening right now, in very broad terms, is, first, a major redefinition of both the general responsibilities of the state vis-à-vis society, according to the familiar model of the welfare state, and, second, a major revision in thinking about the role of the state in contemporary politics and economics brought about by globalization processes (and hence the possible weakening, if not demise, of the nation-state).

Few institutions in the contemporary world are being affected, at the same time, by both reconfigurations, for there have been few institutions so closely dependent, at the same time, on the two fundamental paradigms, the welfare state and the nation-state. Certainly, the modern German-inspired university in the form in
which it exists in Europe, as well as with some modifications in America, is one of them.

As a recent American publication, Challenges and Opportunities Facing Higher Education: An Agenda for Policy Research, states in its conclusions, "first, policy for the coming decade cannot be fashioned successfully by fine-tuning policies that are currently in place; policy makers need an entirely new conceptual approach to policy frameworks and subsequently to the individual components of policy. Second, policy - and policy research - must be conceived holistically. Although policy is likely to be implemented piecemeal, it must be designed within the context of a broader perspective". This article attempts to provide that broader perspective, the main question being the possible impact of globalization on higher education, or globalization as a new paradigm for rethinking higher education policy.

The most general point of departure is the conclusion that hard times have come for higher education all over the world. It is not accidental that following the end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism in the Central and Eastern European countries, and along with the further spread of free-market economies and neo-liberal economic views all over the world, public higher education institutions, and the universities in particular, are under siege worldwide. The current problems of public higher education are connected with the much more profound problems of the public sector in general.

The financing and the management of higher education institutions was at the top of the agenda worldwide in the 1990s. Interestingly, the patterns of reforms and the directions brought about were similar in countries with different political-economic systems and different higher education traditions, not to mention their different technological levels and cultural outlooks. No matter what

---

level of fiscal prosperity might be expected, the general conclusion has been expressed in numerous recent educational policy reports, that hard times are coming for educational institutions and their faculties.\footnote{See Harold A. Hovey, "State Spending for Higher Education in the Next Decade: The Battle to Sustain Current Support" (Washington, DC: The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, 1999); Chester E. Finn, Jr., A Different Future for Higher Education? (New York: Fordham Foundation, 2000), available on-line.}

Budgets are going to be squeezed, state support, already small, is expected to become even smaller, owing to other huge social needs, to the universalization of higher education, to its expanded scope, diversity, and numbers, and owing to growing social dissatisfaction with the public sphere in general, higher education included\footnote{There are very few social scientists who discuss the issue of higher education and the emergent knowledge society and believe that globalization may actually press for increases in spending for education from the public purse, at the expense of other programs of the welfare state. One of them is Vito Tanzi who in his recent paper on "Taxation and the Future of Social Protection" claims that "globalization may create pressures for increased spending for education, training, research and development, the environment, infrastructures, and for institutional changes partly to increase efficiency and partly to comply with international agreements. These expenditures are consistent with the traditional or basic role of the state in its allocation function. Thus, expenditure for social protection, which is a newcomer in the role of the state, could be squeezed between falling revenue and increasing needs for more traditional types of spending. In such a situation, the state will need to rethink its role in economy (in The Global Third Way Debate, ed. by Anthony Giddens, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p. 196). This approach is very rare indeed. Although theoretically it is possible to claim increases in the share of the public funds for national public higher education systems using the "knowledge-based society" argumentation, in practice it has never worked in any of the major OECD countries or European transition countries. The situation of financing higher education reminds that of raising taxes for the sake of raising the standards of welfare provisions: everyone would like to have better public universities but no one is willing to pay higher taxes for this reason (compare the generally supportive attitude towards welfare opposed to the unwillingness to be taxed accordingly).} (as Philip G. Altbach recently phrased it with reference to the academic faculty: "the [academic] profession's 'golden age' ... has come to an end\footnote{Philip G. Altbach, "An International Academic Crisis? The American Professoriate in Comparative Perspective", Daedalus, 126, 4, Fall 1997, p. 315.}).
So the global direction taken by governments worldwide, with huge intellectual backups provided by international organizations, is favoring lifelong learning for all and a near-universal participation in increasingly market-oriented, financially independent, higher education institutions. This direction is currently very explicit, especially in Anglophone countries. As Harold A. Hovey claims in a penetrating report, “State Spending for Higher Education in the Next Decade: The Battle to Sustain Current Support”.

higher education in the United States is generally not competing successfully with the attractions of other demands on state spending. In his account the underlying question about spending will be whether, at the margin, higher education spending is contributing more than spending at the margin in other programs. This question will be raised in a political dimension with the adverse electoral consequences of cuts in higher education compared with cuts affecting public schools, health care providers, and others active in state politics.

Generally speaking, the fiscal predictions for public higher education spending are bad; merely maintaining the current level of services, in this case, in the United States, seems very difficult.

2.

Thus, to open a wider perspective, globalization processes and fierce international competition have brought back to the world agenda the issue of the role of the state in the contemporary world. As the World Bank publication, The State in a Changing World (1997) states in its

---


opening paragraph: “around the globe, the state is in the spotlight. Far-reaching developments in the global economy have us revisiting basic questions about government: what its role should be, what it can and cannot do, and how best to do it”. It is necessary to understand that rethinking the university today is inseparable from first rethinking the state, for the modern university was put, by its German philosophical founders, at the disposal of the nation-state, and, second, the university is traditionally a vast consumer of public revenues. Thus, rethinking the state moves in two parallel directions: the nation-state today and the welfare state today. Both ideas are clearly linked to the modern institution of the university, and fundamental reformulations of both will surely affect it, at least in the long run. Generally, the state is increasingly perceived in a global context as a “facilitator”, a “regulator”, a “partner”, and a “catalyst” rather than as a direct provider of growth or of social services. What is being evoked is a redefinition of the responsibilities of the state towards society and a high level of selectivity in regard to the activities to be supported with public funds. “Choosing what to do and what not to do is critical”, as the World Bank publication phrases it – and in this context, hard times are ahead for higher education worldwide.

The 1998 OECD publication, *Redefining Tertiary Education*, speaks of a “fundamental shift” and a “new paradigm” of tertiary education for all, as well as about a “historic shift” and a “cultural change”. The author fully agrees with the statement that “it is an era of searching, questioning, and at times of profound uncertainty, of numerous reforms and essays in the renewal of tertiary education”. The question of the university today cannot be answered in isolation, even though this question goes hand in hand with questions about cultural and civilizational changes brought about by the Internet and information technology, with the issues of globalization, the welfare state, the nation-state, etc.

As a result of all these changes, it may happen that certain activities traditionally viewed as belonging to the sphere of social

---

responsibility of the state might no longer be viewed in this way. Higher education is certainly a serious issue in this context, particularly in regard to a trend suggested in public policy towards subsidizing consumers rather than providers, that is to say, students rather than institutions of higher learning (or "the client perspective" in OECD terminology) as well as a shift not only away from government, but also away from the very higher education institutions and their faculties toward their "clients".\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, there are serious indications that the nation-state as a political and cultural project is in retreat in surroundings determined by the processes of globalization, which in itself is a subject of heated debates. As Dani Rodrik, an influential American political economist, put it recently,

\begin{quote}
we need to [be] upfront about the irreversibility of the many changes that have occurred in the global economy. ... In short, the genie cannot be stuffed back into the bottle, even if it were desirable to do so. We will need more imaginative and more subtle responses.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

Responses of this sort are also needed in the domain of higher education policy issues. Capital, goods, technologies, information, and people cross borders in ways that were unimaginable only a few years ago. The power of the state as such is increasingly viewed as mere administration and less as the governance of (national) spirit.\textsuperscript{13} Sociologists describe the current situation as a "partial shift of some components of state sovereignty to other institutions,

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
from supranational entities to the global capital market”.14 The possible decline of nation-states brings about vast social, economic, and political consequences of a global nature. Susan Strange in her book *The Retreat of the State* writes that the state is undergoing a metamorphosis and “can no longer make the exceptional claims and demands that it once did. It is becoming, once more and as in the past, just one more source of authority among several, with limited powers and resources”15 Martin Albrow goes even further when he states that society and the nation-state have “pulled apart”. Thus, national identity seems to be ceasing to play the crucial role in the social lives of contemporary technologically advanced, free countries in the late modern era. And, again, it is necessary to remember that national identity laid at the foundations of the modern university in its German formulation.

3.

It is necessary to ask two questions. Does the current passage to late modernity and to the information age as well as the decline of the role of the nation-state and the increasing power of globalization processes and the (possible and gradual, at least in its most lavish forms) decomposition of the welfare state mean that the radical reformulation of the social mission of the university is unavoidable? Will the university (in North America and in Central Europe alike) be able to come through the transitory crisis of public trust and of its founding values as well as through the dramatic crisis of its own identity in a radically new global order? In the face of globalization and its social practices, are the processes of the “corporatization” of the university and the accounting for its activities in terms of business

---


rather than of education irresistible? Is the response to decreasing public trust and decreasing state financial support to be found in new ideas (by once again reformulating the philosophical foundations of the modern university) or in new management? Surprisingly enough, these questions are of equal significance for North America and for Central and Eastern Europe in its period of vast social and economic transformation. The significance of the transformations of universities in the global age cannot be fully captured outside the context of the changes that the economic order, the welfare state, and the nation-state are currently undergoing.

The modern university derives from the intellectual work of German philosophers: from Kant and Fichte to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Its concept is relatively new and was born, along with the rise in national aspirations and the rise in the significance of nation-states, in the nineteenth century. A tacit deal made between power and knowledge, on the one hand, provided scholars with unprecedented institutional possibilities and, on the other, obliged them to support the national culture and to help in the shaping of national subjects, the citizens of nation-states. The alliance between modern knowledge and modern power gave rise to the foundations of the modern institution of the university.

The place, social function, and role of the university as one of the most significant institutions of modernity were at that time clearly determined. But currently it is no longer known what the exact place of the university in society is, for society itself has substantially changed. As the late Bill Readings observed in his breathtaking reflections about the "post-historical university": "... the wider social role of the University as an institution is now up for grabs. It is no longer clear what the place of the University within society nor what the exact nature of that society is".17

16 See Albert Blackwell, Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Founding of the University of Berlin (Lewiston, Edwin Mellen Press, 1991); Hermann Röhrs, The Classical German Concept of the University and its Influence on Higher Education in the United States (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995).

The uncertainty regarding the future location of the institution of the university in culture is growing step by step along with structural changes occurring in the economy and in politics today. The nation-state as a political and cultural project seems to be declining in the surroundings determined by globalization. One could risk making the following statement: in the age of globalization, national identity ceases to be the most important social glue and therefore its production, cultivation, and inculcation – that is, the ideals that stood behind the modern project of the university as conceived by its German intellectual founders – ceases to be a crucial social task.

The university, in its traditional modern form, is no longer a partner of the nation state; therefore, along with the decline of modernity as a social, political, and cultural project, the political and economic role of the nation-state decreases in the global circulation of capital. And the decreasing role of the state goes hand in hand with the decreasing role of its modern ideological arm – the university.

While these transformations are easy to perceive in economics and

---

18 Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh (Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, p. 19) write: "...no political ideology or economic theory has yet evolved to take account of the tectonic shift that has occurred. The modern nation-state ... looks more and more like an institution of a bygone era." See also Saskia Sassen (Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, op. cit.), as well as Jean-Marie Guéhenno (The End of the Nation-State, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995). Guéhenno clearly links the year 1989 with the collapse of the nation-state: "1989 marks the twilight of a long historical era, of which the nation-state, progressively emerging from the ruins of the Roman Empire, was the culmination" (p. xii).


21 Andy Green (in Education, Globalization, and the Nation State, London: Macmillan, 1997, p. 3ff.) asks about the role of education in the "post-national era" and claims that, according to globalization theories, the system of national education becomes "defunct, at once irrelevant, anachronistic, and impossible."
politics, the situation is a bit different in the other pole of the power/knowledge relationship, that of knowledge. Power and its character get changed and therefore, out of necessity, knowledge and its character get changed.

Awareness of the fact that the university, invented and proposed to the world by the nineteenth-century German thinkers, is therefore a culturally and historically determined product, is increasingly common. Nothing determines in advance its shape, tasks, and functions, as well as the expectations directed at it and the requirements imposed on it by the culture and society in which it is immersed. The university in its modern form is a child of modernity; it ages along with modernity and is susceptible to political, economic, and social transformation as much as any other (modern) institution. Or, as Peter Scott put it recently, "[glo]balization is perhaps the most fundamental challenge faced by the university in its long history ... more serious even than the challenge posed by totalitarianism in our own century".

New cultural, social, political, and economic surroundings brought about by globalization seem to require a totally new language, which, surely enough, is at nobody’s disposal right now. So the old measures and vocabularies continue to be used to describe phenomena of the new world (of “new global order”, or “new global disorder”, some commentators argue). Generally speaking, there

---

22 As Janice Dudley claims (in Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives, ed. by Jan Currie and Janice Newson, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1998, p. 27): “The state is cast as increasingly irrelevant when confronted by the ‘reality’ of ungovernable international/global market forces. Nation-states are essentially ineffective in the face of global market forces, so that the era of the powerful nation-state would appear effectively to be over. National economic management and national political and social policies are becoming increasingly irrelevant. International markets and international capital markets operate outside of the control of national governments. ... The state is reduced to the role of the ‘night watchmen’ of classical liberalism—maintaining law and order, protecting the sanctity of contract, and providing only the level of welfare necessary to protect property and facilitate the free operation of capitalist markets."

seems to be common agreement that globalization, as a wide set of social and economic practices, introduces to our social world a brand new quality: "a sense of rupture with the past pervades the public consciousness of our time", as Martin Albrow writes.\textsuperscript{24} Ulrich Beck in \textit{What Is Globalization?} describes the passage from the "first" (national) to the "second" (global) modernity in sociological terms as "a fundamental transformation, a paradigm shift, a departure into the unknown world of globality".\textsuperscript{25} One can justifiably claim to be witnessing, right now, "the end of the world as we know it".\textsuperscript{26} Evidently, the significance of the transformations of universities in the global age cannot be fully captured outside the context of changes that the world economic order and the nation-state are currently undergoing, which, to turn to more philosophical grounds, is paralleled by the possible collapse of modernity.

The uncertainty about the future location of the institution of the university in culture grows along with structural changes occurring in the economy, culture, and politics. It is often the case that small nation-states are no longer equal partners for big capital.\textsuperscript{27} The nation-state as a political and cultural project – but, unfortunately, not nationalism – seems to be declining in the surroundings determined by globalization, which in itself is a topic of a heated debate in political science (these processes can be clearly observed both in the countries of the European Union, in the Central and Eastern European countries, as well as in the countries of both the Americas). One has to agree with Ulrich Beck, who claims that one constant feature of globalization is the overturning of the central premise of modernity, "the idea that we live and act in the self-enclosed spaces of national states and their respective national societies".\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{24} Martin Albrow, \textit{The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity}, op. cit., p. 1.
Globalization is "the time/space compression", the "overcoming of distance", la fin de la géographie (Paul Virilio), as it enables people, goods, and information to travel freely.

4.

One could risk the following statement: in the age of globalization, national identity may cease to be the most important social glue and therefore its production, cultivation, and inculcation – that is, the ideals that stood behind the modern project of the university – may cease to be crucial social tasks. The traditional, modern social mission of the university as an institutional arm of the nation-state has been unexpectedly questioned after two centuries of cultural dominance. The university as we know it – the modern university – is in a delicate and complicated position at the moment: the great cultural project of modernity that has located the university at the very center of culture – in partnership with the institution of the nation-state – may be gradually outliving itself. After 200 years – merely 200 years! – it is no longer known to what, if any, great regulatory idea the university in search of its present raison d'être might refer. In its modern beginnings, as Bill Readings shows, echoing Kant in The Conflict of the Faculties, the regulatory idea in question was Enlightenment reason; then, in Schleiermacher and Humboldt, the idea was culture in an active sense of Bildung, cultivating oneself as a


30 The texts about the institution of the university written by German philosophers of the turn of the nineteenth century were gathered in the French volume, Philosophies de l'Université: l'Idealisme allemand et la question de l'Université, ed. by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (Paris: Payot, 1979).

31 See Bill Readings, The University in Ruins, op. cit.

subject of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{33} Should we thus today, as Alain Renaut puts it, oublier Berlin?\textsuperscript{34}

The university seems no longer to be capable of maintaining its modern role as a cultural institution closely linked to the nation-state of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Europe. In the globalizing world of today, references made to national culture as the raison d'etre of the university sound less and less convincing, especially if one considers that the state itself, the partner and the other side of the agreement, is itself undergoing transformation, and disregarding its past, that is, its modern obligations\textsuperscript{35} with respect to the university.

The academic world perfectly well understands that there will probably never be a return to the level of public funding of universities (both in the natural sciences and in the humanities) of the Cold War era, a period of tough (inter)national competition.\textsuperscript{36} The United Europe, for instance, does not seem to need narrowly national universities, for teaching and research are expected to aim at harmonization rather than at the isolation of particular national traditions.\textsuperscript{37} And references to reason or culture with respect to universities are no longer persuasive in society.

These ideas are no longer politically (and economically) resonant because the global configuration of politics and economy has changed. Within the new global configuration, paradoxically enough, the economy is increasingly less dependent on politics. It is worthwhile to consider, once again, the thesis suggested by Dani Rodrik that "the most serious challenge for the world economy in the

\textsuperscript{33} Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Founding of the University of Berlin. The Study of Religion as a Scientific Discipline, ed. by Herbert Richardson (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984).

\textsuperscript{34} Philosophies de l'Université: l'Idéalisme allemand et la question de l'Université, ed. by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, op. cit., p. 138; Claude Allègre, L'Âge des savoirs: pour une renaissance de l'Université (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).

\textsuperscript{35} See The University and the City: From Medieval Origin to the Present, ed. by Thomas Bender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

\textsuperscript{36} See Harold A. Hovey, "State Spending for Higher Education in the Next Decade: The Battle to Sustain Current Support", op. cit.

\textsuperscript{37} See Chapters 10 and 13.
years ahead lies in making globalization compatible with domestic social and political stability – ... in ensuring that international economic integration does not contribute to domestic social disintegration". The power of the state as such is increasingly viewed merely as administration and less and less often as the governance of national spirit.38

5.

As the idea of "culture" (and especially, but not exclusively, "national" culture) may cease to be effective for the functioning of the institution of the university, that is, the idea of "culture" worked out by German philosophers and accepted all over the world as a regulatory idea standing behind the functioning of the university,39 new ideas may have to be sought. It turns out, however, that grand ideas like those that might resist being deprived of social reference are very difficult, if not impossible, to find in the set of ideas that are currently available. At the same time, the ruthless logic of consumerism brings forth the idea which was greeted warm by the best American universities: "excellence in education", behind which there are the ideals of the most useful, best-selling, and most rapidly attained knowledge (or merely certification). As numerous commentators of the phenomenon write, it is appropriate that the university, as an institution, become a bureaucratically governed,


consumer-oriented corporation. To quote just one recommendation: "the only thing that higher education has to do, it seems, is sell its goods and services in the marketplace like other businesses..."

From this perspective, the crucial words for the description of the university are the following: managerial, corporate, entrepreneurial, as well as corporatization, marketization, and "academic capitalism". The questions to be asked can be formulated in the

40 The late Bill Readings wrote with great accuracy about the "University of Excellence". From a more practical perspective, two other works are more significant: David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating and Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), and Reinventing the University: Managing and Financing Institutions of Higher Education, ed. by Sandra L. Johnson and Sean C. Rush (New York: JohnWiley, 1995) which do not leave a shadow of a doubt about the general direction in which the university as an institution is moving. Its aim is "providing an attractive product at a fair price—giving society value for its money" (David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell Jr., op. cit., p. 26). In the second book one can find such statements as the following: "Higher education will never be the same. Political and corporate America have already responded by fundamentally restructuring the way universities operate" (Reinventing the University: Managing and Financing Institutions of Higher Education, ed. by Sandra L. Johnson and Sean C. Rush, op. cit., p. 22). The time has come for the universities to respond...

41 David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell, Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating and Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities, op. cit., p. 31.

42 It is important to note two significant books that have appeared within a decade: Janice Newson and Howard Buchbinder, The University Means Business: Universities, Corporations, and Academic Work (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988), and Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives, ed. by Jan Currie and Janice Newson. Both present precise reports and detailed interpretations by sociologists and political scientists of the phenomena occurring in the anglophone universities. They explain the ways the ideology of the free market enters the university in the form of practices drawn directly from the corporate world (high-level management, rectors as CEOs, nominated rather than elected deans; accountability, privatization, performance indicators, etc.).

43 "Academic capitalism" is the term coined by Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie. The diagnosis they present is fully correct: "globalization of the political economy at the end of the twentieth century is destabilizing patterns of university professional work developed over the past hundred years. Globalization is creating new structures, incentives, and rewards for some aspects of academic careers and is simultaneously instituting constraints and disincentives for other aspects of careers" (Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 1).
years ahead lies in making globalization compatible with domestic social and political stability —... in ensuring that international economic integration does not contribute to domestic social disintegration”. The power of the state as such is increasingly viewed merely as administration and less and less often as the governance of national spirit.38

5.

As the idea of “culture” (and especially, but not exclusively, “national” culture) may cease to be effective for the functioning of the institution of the university, that is, the idea of “culture” worked out by German philosophers and accepted all over the world as a regulatory idea standing behind the functioning of the university,39 new ideas may have to be sought. It turns out, however, that grand ideas like those that might resist being deprived of social reference are very difficult, if not impossible, to find in the set of ideas that are currently available. At the same time, the ruthless logic of consumerism brings forth the idea which was greeted warm by the best American universities: “excellence in education”, behind which there are the ideals of the most useful, best-selling, and most rapidly attained knowledge (or merely certification). As numerous commentators of the phenomenon write, it is appropriate that the university, as an institution, become a bureaucratically governed,


consumer-oriented corporation. To quote just one recommendation: “the only thing that higher education has to do, it seems, is sell its goods and services in the marketplace like other businesses...”

From this perspective, the crucial words for the description of the university are the following: managerial, corporate, entrepreneurial, as well as corporatization, marketization, and “academic capitalism”. The questions to be asked can be formulated in the

40 The late Bill Readings wrote with great accuracy about the “University of Excellence”. From a more practical perspective, two other works are more significant: David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating and Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), and Reinventing the University: Managing and Financing Institutions of Higher Education, ed. by Sandra L. Johnson and Sean C. Rush (New York: JohnWiley, 1995) which do not leave a shadow of a doubt about the general direction in which the university as an institution is moving. Its aim is “providing an attractive product at a fair price—giving society value for its money” (David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell Jr., op. cit., p. 26). In the second book one can find such statements as the following: “Higher education will never be the same. Political and corporate America have already responded by fundamentally restructuring the way universities operate” (Reinventing the University: Managing and Financing Institutions of Higher Education, ed. by Sandra L. Johnson and Sean C. Rush, op. cit., p. 22). The time has come for the universities to respond...

41 David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell, Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating and Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities, op. cit., p. 31.

42 It is important to note two significant books that have appeared within a decade: Janice Newson and Howard Buchbinder, The University Means Business: Universities, Corporations, and Academic Work (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988), and Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives, ed. by Jan Currie and Janice Newson. Both present precise reports and detailed interpretations by sociologists and political scientists of the phenomena occurring in the anglophone universities. They explain the ways the ideology of the free market enters the university in the form of practices drawn directly from the corporate world (high-level management, rectors as CEOs, nominated rather than elected deans; accountability, privatization, performance indicators, etc.).

43 “Academic capitalism” is the term coined by Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie. The diagnosis they present is fully correct: “globalization of the political economy at the end of the twentieth century is destabilizing patterns of university professional work developed over the past hundred years. Globalization is creating new structures, incentives, and rewards for some aspects of academic careers and is simultaneously instituting constraints and disincentives for other aspects of careers” (Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 1).
following manner: What is the future of the university deprived of its modern culture-, state-, and nation-oriented mission? Does the university really have to drift towards the model of a better and better managed corporation, a bureaucratic structure fighting in the marketplace with other, similar, isolated bureaucratic structures in search of consumers of the educational services they want to keep selling (i.e., to drift "from the collegial academy to corporate enterprise", as Ian McNay describes the process? What, in a social sense, would a (potential) university of mere consumers be like?

Or, as is evident in a splendid volume, *Universities and Globalization*, already referred to here, the questions could be the following: Are we in danger of having practices at universities drawn directly from the world of business? Will the university under these circumstances be able to maintain its critical judgments about society? Will scholars become entrepreneurs ("academic capitalists")? Is academic activity still unique in our culture? Is globalization a "regime of truth" in Foucault's sense, a new fundamentalism, the impact of which on higher education will be revolutionary? Finally, is higher education merely a private commodity or is it still a public good? At the same time, a less cultural and philosophical context and a more economic and political one could be described as follows:

Most Western democracies are now in the throes of a reform of their welfare state institutions. The modern university, as a significant claimant on public resources, is part of [the welfare state]. ... [T]he overriding influence in all


45 See especially discussions about the "unique" place of higher education in society contrasted with its current "survivalist" mood in *The Postmodern University? Contested Visions of Education in Society*, ed. by Anthony Smith and Frank Webster (London: Open University Press, 1997). The only option still open for the university to defend itself today is to stress the unique nature of the university experience as such which, to tell the truth, is not sufficient.


47 All these questions underlie this extremely useful collective volume.
countries is that the state can no longer afford to pay the escalating claims, especially in light of the increasing internationalization of the economy.\(^{48}\)

To return for a moment to the question of the use of the university today if it no longer provides the legitimization of power by building national identity: perhaps the university could play an important role, for instance, in supporting the (already partially forgotten) ideals of civil society?\(^{49}\) The question arises: Who needs these ideals? Society, surely, since, paradoxically enough, society now has no good place from which to learn them. But how to pass from national ideals to civil ideals that would in principle be deprived of merely local references? The process of the passing of American universities from the ideal of (American) culture to the ideal of a financially independent (educational) corporation – commonly referred to as their “corporatization”\(^{50}\) – is surely not worth being copied without further discussion of its implications. The only question is to what extent there is still any choice in our increasingly homogeneous world. If there were such a choice, and let us assume this possibility optimistically, the university could become a center for pluralistic, multiperspective thought that would deal with the ideals of civil society in an increasingly corporate-like world of global capital.\(^{51}\) A university that consented to function within a framework determined purely by the logic of the (neo-liberal) economy would, with the passage of time, become a mere corporation (and it would find no consolation in the fact that it was an “educational”


\(^{49}\) It is very interesting to read together, in this context, two texts by Stanley N. Katz: “Can Liberal Education Cope?” (an address he delivered in 1997) and “The Idea of Civil Society” (one he delivered in 1998), the former available at his Princeton University Web site, the latter published in *The University, Globalization, Central Europe*, ed. by Marek Kwiek (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Peter Lang, 2003).


corporation). That would be the end of the university as a modern institution. Therefore, one has to agree with Slaughter and Leslie,\textsuperscript{52} who argue that "higher education as an institution and faculty as its labor force face change unprecedented in this century". Such a situation would obviously not mean the end of the university as such; merely the end of a certain way of conceiving of itself, a conception with which, over a period of two centuries, society has become familiar. The university without its state- and nation- orientation (that is, de-ideologized) seems to be forced by external circumstances to look for a new place for itself in culture, for if it does not find such a place, it will become an educational corporation tasked with training specialists rapidly, cheaply, and efficiently – preferably very rapidly, very cheaply, and very efficiently.

Social and cultural changes today take place with a speed that was unimaginable a few decades ago. The world is changing more and more rapidly, but the university has increasingly less influence on the direction these changes take (if it ever, indeed, had any influence). It is no longer a partner in power (of the nation-state); it has become one among several budgetary items that, preferably, should be cut or reduced. One thing is certain: nothing is permanent or guaranteed in culture, neither is any status nor any place, role, or social task. This fact is well known by all those whose influence in culture has been radically reduced (and let us refer here to the figure of the "intellectual" discussed in Part I of the present volume).

6.

Thus, the potential decline of the cultural, political and philosophical project of modernity and of the nation-state entails the potential decline of the institution of the modern university, requiring the latter to search for a new place in culture and new ideas to support the organization of its functioning at the very moment when the harmonious co-operation of power and knowledge – or, more

precisely, of the politics of the nation-state and the national consciousness provided by the university – has ended. Globalization brings about the devalorization of all national projects, one of them being the institution of the (nation- and state-oriented) university. If behind the university there are no longer the ideas of nation, reason, and (national) culture, then either new ideas have to be discovered or the university is doomed to surrender to the all-encompassing logic of consumerism. Within this logic, the university, free of its associations with power, devoid of modern national and state missions, exists merely to “sell” its educational and research “products” as a bureaucratic educational and research corporation. The study of the future of the institution of the university is inseparable from the study of it within the large cultural, philosophical, and political project of modernity with its ideas of the nation-state and, later on, of the welfare state.

To sum up, rethinking the social, political, and cultural consequences of globalization is a crucial task for social sciences today. The weakening, if not the decline, of the nation-state, viewed even as giving only some terrain of power to new transnational political and economic players, is strictly linked with violent globalization processes which, consequently, may lead to the redefinition of such notions fundamental to the social sciences as democracy, freedom, and politics. It may also lead to the redefinition of the social role of the university. In the situation generated by the emergence of the global market, the global economy, and the withdrawal of the state (also called the decomposition of the welfare state), a constant deliberation is needed about new relations between the state and the university in the global age.

For the moment, one of the tentative conclusions for the author would be the following: one should avoid looking at higher education issues in isolation from what is going on in the public sector generally and, nowadays, in the institution of the state. These changes do and will influence thinking about higher education; so, it is necessary to know the turns they are making. It is no use to keep referring to the rights gained by the university during the period of modernity (the rights gained in the times of national states), as modernity in its
classical form may no longer be with us. Redefined states may have somewhat different obligations and somewhat different powers, and it is not quite certain that national higher education systems, as well as universities, will belong to its most basic sphere of social responsibility. The state, worldwide, is itself fighting to find its own place in a new global order, and, no matter what it declares to the general public, higher education issues may seem to it to be of secondary importance.

Academics are living in a period of revolutionary change. Although they know the point of departure, the point of arrival still, fortunately, remains unknown. The challenge is to try to influence the changes so that academic institutions can thrive as in the past.
1.

The purpose of this article is to show the necessity of grounding current discussions about higher education reforms in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in a wider context of global social, economic, and cultural change. Its working assumption is that any thinking about reforms in higher education in general, outside a particular context of reforming the whole public sector (within a reformulation and a revision of the principles of functioning of the welfare state in its traditional formulation), remains incomplete. Similarly, any thinking about the institution of the university in particular (i.e., about a small and elitist part of higher education) while disregarding the past context of its modern, nation-state-oriented, social role, place, and function, provided by the Humboldttian model in the new post-national global age, remains incomplete.

The thesis of this article is that the main factors contributing to the need to rethink higher education institutions today are linked to the advent of the global age. Although the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not yet feeling the full force of the ensuing pressures, higher education here is likely to be affected very soon by globalization-related processes. Higher education all over the world, including Central and Eastern Europe, is no longer the unique part of
the public sector that it used to be, either in explicit political declarations, in public perceptions, or in practical terms (including funding). Higher education in CEE countries is doubly affected by the local post-1989 transformations and by more profound and more long-lasting global transformations. To neglect either of the two levels of analysis is to misunderstand a decade of failed attempts to reform higher education systems in this part of the world.

2.

With regard to higher education, several working assumptions can be made. First of all, the transformation of higher education seems inevitable worldwide, as much in the wealthy OECD countries, including some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as in the developing countries, the forces behind change being global in nature. These forces are similar, even though their current influence varies from country to country and from region to region. The scope of the transformation is unclear, though.

The main forces that are driving the transformation of higher education today are old forces (governmental and public pressure for transparency and accountability, the focus on costs, effectiveness, productivity, quality assurance, etc.) and new ones (new providers of higher education, rapid advances in technology, changing social demands for renewable skills in the global age, etc.). The old forces call only for the changing of policies, but the new forces may require new ways of thinking about policy scholarship and policy making as well. In a non-American setting, the new forces of change in higher education would also include the internationalization of higher education research and teaching (including the predominance of English in the terms of the Internet and electronic communication) and globalization viewed, among other important aspects, as a renewed and critical focus on the services of the welfare state, the declining role of the nation-state in the global economic and cultural surroundings, and the corporate culture/business attitude invading the academic world today in an increasingly competitive and market-oriented global environment.
This article does not develop the theme of old forces driving transformations of higher education. These forces have been sufficiently covered in current research, both from a global perspective as well as from that of the Central and Eastern European region (a vast majority of the publications available on the subject of the reform of higher education in this region concern these traditionally important issues). The focus here is on the forces driving the transformation of higher education systems that are completely new and that require a wider context for research analysis. The forces of globalization are of primal importance, yet they appear to be underestimated in current higher education policy and research, especially in continental Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe, as compared with policy and research in Anglophone countries. These forces are undoubtedly bound to change the nature of the academic enterprise to a degree that today seems almost unimaginable. In order to demonstrate the power of the forces of globalization that are transforming higher education, it is important to evoke the political, economic, and social contexts of globalization-driven transformations in thinking about the nation-state and the welfare state, as the author has done elsewhere.1

In the American context, new forces for change mean new providers, new technologies, and a new society. Here the whole globalized underpinning of higher education transformations is already taken for granted.2 In the context of Central and Eastern Europe, however, these forces need to be supplemented with more basic ones, those of globalization and internationalization. In the American context, the decline of the role of the nation-state in the economy that has been determined by powerful transnational players and the reformulation of the principles of the functioning of the welfare state along neo-liberal lines, as well as the corporate way of


thinking about traditional public services, come naturally as part and parcel of the American social and economic transformations of the 1990s. But in the context of Central and Eastern Europe, an area that is much more dependent on the European political and economic scene, especially in the case of the countries about to enter the European Union, these issues in connection with higher education reforms may still seem irrelevant. The point made in this article is that the most powerful forces to affect higher education in the region are the new forces, not the old forces with which European higher education research and policy, at both national and European level, seem to be predominantly concerned.3

3 Formally speaking, the “European social model” has not been defined as such in any single place. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 includes a social chapter and the “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” adopted in Nice in 2000 includes a chapter on “solidarity”. The Charter consists of seven chapters: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, Justice and General Provisions. Chapter four on “solidarity” (articles 27 through 38) includes articles on e.g. right to collective action and bargaining (28), to fair and just working conditions (31), rights related to family and professional life (33), right to social security and social assistance (34), healthcare (35), environmental protection (37), and consumer protection (38). Overview to the article 34 states that “The right to social security is a traditional fundamental right recognized for everyone. It involves receiving from society (the public authorities) the means to satisfy the rights of an individual that are essential to his or her dignity and the free development of his or her personality. At source it is linked to the right to an adequate standard of living. This necessitates the implementation of social services to protect individuals in the situations mentioned in article 34: maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependence or old age, and loss of employment. This right is applied in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices, but where the social services mentioned do not exist, there is no obligation as a result to create them”. Further on it is stated that “Poverty and the social exclusion to which it leads are today recognized as a breach of human dignity, and a hindrance to the enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental rights of the person. In paragraph 3, the combat of social exclusion and poverty are set out as objectives for the public authorities. The right to a minimum income and the right to housing are not expressly set out here, but can be deduced from the right to social and housing aid which must be respected and implemented in the context of the combat against social exclusion, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices” (Overview to art. 34). If we see how this particular article is implemented in Central and Eastern Europe, it is evident that the acquis communautaire of the EU does not include the social acquis.
Thus, in discussing the setting for higher education reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, it is not sufficient merely to cite old forces in operation (and quantitative changes resulting from them). The new forces (and qualitative changes resulting from them) are even more important. The older forces result from several decades of steady growth of higher education institutions to the point of the near-universalization of higher education in the affluent countries of the West. New forces, by contrast, come from the new political, economic, and social contexts (post-modern, post-industrial, global, post-Cold-War, postnational, etc.), possibly bringing about a revolution in higher education of an unprecedented scale and nature. Although both types of forces are important, the new forces appear to be underestimated in higher education policy writing in Central and Eastern Europe. The author, however, is in full agreement with Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, the authors of Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, who claim that "the changes taking place currently are as great as the changes in academic labor which occurred during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. ... [T]he globalization of political economy at the end of the twentieth century is destabilizing patterns of university professional work developed over the past hundred years" and conclude that "higher education as an institution and faculty as its labor force face change unprecedented in this century".4

Globally, we might be on the threshold of a revolution in thinking about higher education. Higher education is asked to adapt to new societal needs, to be more responsive to the world around it, to be more market-, performance-, and student oriented, to be more cost effective, accountable to its stakeholders, as well as competitive with other providers. Traditional higher educational institutions seem challenged – and under assault – all over the world by new teaching and research institutions that claim to do the same job better, cheaper, and with no (or little) public money involved. New providers, responding to a huge societal demand for new skills, conveniently delivered, include for-profit educational firms, for-profit arms of

traditional non-profit universities, virtual institutions, franchised institutions, corporate universities, etc. (and their extensive use of new technologies). The traditional basic structure of higher education seems unable to cope with growing and unprecedented workforce requirements in the West, especially in America. Locally, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, academics are not prepared for these global challenges at all as they are customer driven rather than institution- or government driven, and the region is far away from the American spirit of consumerism with respect to public services. But the American model of the state is bound to become increasingly attractive, considering its power and its promotion by American and, especially, transnational institutions.

3.

Another working assumption of this article is that public policy in Central and Eastern European higher education needs to be especially aware of the global context of current worldwide transformation. It is certainly not sufficient to understand today that reformed institutions are needed. The point is to perceive why it is that they need to be changed and what the role of the state, the public services it provides, including higher education, will become. The message of this article could also be that it is impossible to understand transformations in higher education today without understanding the concurrent transformations of the social world, including transformations of the state and of citizenship in the global age. As one of the most striking features of the new world is its increasingly global nature, neither policy makers nor policy scholars in higher education can ignore the huge social, economic, political, and cultural consequences of globalization.

Thus, generally speaking, in analyzing the changing social, political, and economic context of the functioning of higher education in Central and Eastern Europe, a double perspective should be taken into account: a local (post-1989) context and a global one. The issue becomes increasingly important given that after a decade of various attempts at reform, on the one hand, in many countries of the region the system is on the verge of collapse and that, on the other hand,
there is increasing political, economic, and social pressure to rethink globally the very foundations of higher education in contemporary societies. The final result of current tensions will inevitably be the introduction of new legal contexts regarding the functioning of higher education and the implementation of new higher education policies. The impact of the resulting transformations is likely to be severe, considering the role higher education is currently playing in the countries undergoing transition and that knowledge generally is likely to play in future "knowledge-based societies". It is important to move back and forth between the two contexts.

As a British sociologist, John Urry stated in general terms, there are two implications of globalization for higher education institutions: "attempts to defend their position as ‘publicly’ owned and funded bodies will mostly fall on deaf ears and one can expect further uneven privatization" and what we will have is "an increased regulation of higher education somewhat comparable to that experienced by many other industries and occupations". In a new social and political environment introduced by theories and practices of globalization, it is not only the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), from among transnational organizations, that are extremely interested in stimulating new varieties of higher education on a global scale. Most recently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been concerning itself with the unrestricted importing and exporting of higher education within a set of complex rules deriving from the WTO protocols. The issue, in the long run, is especially vital


7 As Susan L. Robertson suggests in her introduction to a special issue of Globalisation, Societies and Education (vol. 1, no. 3, November 2003), "there is clearly a
for poor and developing countries, including those of Central and Eastern Europe. As Philip G. Altbach observes in his recent article in *International Higher Education*: "with the growing commercialization of higher education, the values of the marketplace have intruded onto the campus. One of the main factors is the change in society's attitude toward higher education – which is now seen as a 'private good' benefitting those who study or do research. In this view, it seems justified that the users should pay for this service as they would for any other service. The provision of knowledge becomes just another commercial transaction. The main provider of public funds, the state, is increasingly unwilling or unable to provide the resources needed for an expanding higher education sector. Universities and other post-secondary institutions are expected to generate more of their funding. They have had to think more like businesses and less like educational institutions". The conclusion of the attitude Altbach summarizes, clearly favored by transnational organizations, is the following: "in this context a logical development is the privatization of public universities – the selling of knowledge products, partnering with corporations, as well as increases in student fees".8

The main factors contributing to the need to rethink higher education institutions today are connected with the advent of the global age and with globalization pressures. Although the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not yet feeling these pressures in higher education, they are soon likely to be affected by globalization-related processes. Higher education worldwide, including higher education in Central and Eastern Europe, is no longer a unique part of the public sector. Higher education in Central and Eastern Europe is doubly affected by the local post-1989 transformations and by deeper and more long-lasting global transformations. To neglect any of the two levels of analysis is to misunderstand a decade of failed attempts ("ten lost years", as Tomusk puts it explicitly⁹) to reform higher education. Public higher education (except for elite research universities) in a decade is increasingly expected to be focused on teaching rather than on research, and on the needs of students rather than on those of academics. There will be a clear shift from the question, "what is it that higher education needs from society" to the opposite question, "what is it that society needs from higher education".¹⁰ That puts higher education in a new position vis-à-vis society. Within a decade, Central Europe and the Baltics will most likely be part of the European Union, as parts of Eastern and Southeastern Europe will probably also be. The implication for these states is more market orientation¹¹ and full exposure to globalization processes that still appear to be irrelevant. The fundamental assumption about the globalizing and globalized world is the primacy of economics over politics and culture, and the primacy of the private (sector) over the public (sector); hence, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, despite the existence of the so-called "European Welfare Model", the expectation is of a dramatic diminution of the public sector and of the scope of the public services


¹⁰ See Frank Newman, "Intellectual Skills in the Information Age", op. cit.

Globalization is the political and economic reality with which the countries of the region will have to cope. It will not go away; it will come to the region and stay, as Jan Sadlak rightly remarks (without, however, making reference to Central Europe): “the frank acknowledgement that globalization has become a permanent feature of our social, economic, and cultural space is essential in order to take advantage of what it can offer as well as to avoid the perils it may involve”.12 Consequently, public finances, including the maintenance of public services, will be under increasing scrutiny in Central and Eastern Europe, following globalization (meaning primarily economic) pressures and the reform of the welfare state worldwide, with significant consequences for the public sector. (Strange as it may sound today, some contemporary public policy analysts compare the reform of public higher education with the reform of the energy sector, telecommunications, and the health care system. Within a decade in the region, that line of thinking, with analogies with other “deregulated” sectors, will in most probability be generally accepted among policymakers.) What is expected is that the idea of the uniqueness of higher education in general, and of the university in particular, will finally – under strong financial pressures resulting from the universalization of higher education accompanied by the decomposition of the traditional welfare state ideals – be rejected, closing the chapter opened two hundred years ago in Germany with the modern university invented by Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schleiermacher, and others.

Thus the re-invention of higher education in the region should be accompanied by both conceptualizations and activities of the academy itself. Otherwise unavoidable – and necessary – changes will most likely be imposed from the outside. This eventuality calls for critical thinking. The world is changing radically, and there are no

indications that higher education institutions will be spared the consequences of these deep changes. They will most likely have to change radically too. The academy must start thinking about its future, drawing on its human resources. Currently, in Central and Eastern Europe, draft laws and discussions about reforms are being neglected by the academic community at large. And a new legal context for the functioning of higher education, rather than corrections to old laws on higher education, are of utmost importance in bringing about the necessary transformations. It would be useful for the academic community to have a comparative view of three legal, economic, and cultural contexts in which it used to operate, currently operates, and will operate: the first being the 1980s (the communist period), the second being the 1990s (the transition period), and the third being the opening of the new century in which changes to come are most probably unavoidable. Although it is necessary to realize that “things will never be the same”, it is also necessary to attempt to envisage how they might actually be.

Rethinking the social, political, and cultural consequences of globalization is today a crucial task for the social sciences. The decline of the nation-state – which is viewed as a transfer of power to new transnational political and economic players – is strictly linked to violent processes of globalization which, consequently, may lead to the redefinition of such fundamental notions as democracy, citizenship, freedom, and politics.\(^\text{13}\) It may also lead to the redefinition of the social role of the university. In the situation generated by the emergence of the global market, the global economy, and the withdrawal of the state, a constant deliberation is needed about new relations between the state and the university in the global age.\(^\text{14}\) For the moment, a tentative conclusion could be the following: let us not look at higher education issues in isolation from what is currently going on in the public sector and in the institution of the


state. It is important to understand this reality and to use the critical thinking inherent to the academic world to make another attempt to think through higher education in a new social environment.

4.

What influences higher education today? Following what was stated above, the main global factors contributing to the transformation of higher education can be summarily labeled as "globalization". They can be put into three separate categories: first, the collapse of the crucial role of the nation-state in current social and economic development, with its vision of higher education as a national treasure contributing to national consciousness; second, the reformulation of the functions of the welfare state, including new scope for public-sector activities to be funded by the state; and, third, the invasion of the economic rationality/corporate culture into the whole public sector worldwide. Higher education is no longer to be viewed as a unique part of the public sector, nor are the problems of reforming higher education in Central and Eastern Europe unique. These are global problems for which global solutions are sought by global organizations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and OECD, as well as, most recently, the World Trade Organization, which are more than ever before interested in higher education. Moreover, the following other factors are determining a new situation for higher education: new technologies, new student bodies (increasingly diversified ages, returning and working students, learners involved in life-long learning), new higher education providers: for-profit, corporate universities, virtual universities, mixed (traditional/virtual) providers, new – increasingly global – student expectations, and increasingly competitive, market-oriented, success-greedy social environments, and phenomena.15

Pursuant to the idea that higher education is no longer a unique part of the public sector in Central and Eastern Europe, one should ask who the competitors of public higher education institutions are. They are of a twofold nature: first, they are the newcomers in the field of higher education and, second, other public institutions and public services provided today by the state.

Other educational providers are, for instance, private national institutions, private foreign institutions, national and foreign corporate certification centers, national and foreign virtual education providers, and mixed education providers. In an increasingly market-oriented social environment, prospective students (and their families) may be increasingly market oriented as well (that fact is confirmed by sociological research in postcommunist transition economies). The unreformed institutions may not be able to face the pressure, and may either be reformed on a day-to-day basis suggested by economic rationality, or may lose their students to other market-oriented providers.

The second group of competitors are other public institutions and public services such as, for instance, primary and secondary education, pension systems and organizations caring for the aged, basic health care, social insurance, institutions of law and order, prison systems, public administration, etc. The competition with other sectors of the public sphere is generally a zero-sum game. Even though some sectors win, others must lose. At the same time, the total amount of public money received in taxes is likely to be smaller rather than larger, following the trend in all major OECD countries.

Thus another thesis is that public higher education institutions in Central and Eastern Europe will be increasingly under public scrutiny. The reasons are manifold. The following are the most important of them. First, there is the widespread public perception of the academic community as still being immune from public criticism,

as elitist, non-transparent, and non-accountable to society – hence, decreasing public support is accompanied by declining public trust in higher education institutions generally. Second, the public funding of higher education and research is, in general, decreasing. There are other pressing new societal needs that require high levels of funding, especially in Central and Eastern Europe during the times of social transformation.

To give a Polish example, in 1999–2001 Poland was introducing and running four major reforms. These concerned the health care system, the administration and administrative division of the country, social security, and primary education. At the same time, there is currently no pre-given model for the services that are accepted for funding from the public purse. Neither Western European models, nor the previously used planned-economy models, nor most recent transnational models constructed along neoliberal lines, are fully accepted. The public is witnessing a general failure of the current education system in terms of helping young people to adapt to the world around them. Academic knowledge in a filtered form, rather than skills and knowledge of the surrounding world, is what is being transferred in higher education systems to the students today. What also supports the thesis that public higher education will be under severe scrutiny is the fact that all (public and private) institutions, including governmental agencies, the corporate world, the institutions of civil society, and the core institutions of the public sector, are being currently forced to change. In general terms, all this change is a reflection of the end of the stable world governed by modern traditions. In this context, the inherited prestige of higher education in general, and of the institution of the university, in particular, is unlikely to be able to resist change.18

The increasing public scrutiny is also the final consequence of the enlightening mission of higher education. Members of the public are finally able to judge their higher education institutions (awareness of the performance of higher education institutions has become widespread, accompanying the massification of the systems in Central

---

and Eastern Europe). The region is beginning to witness a new generation of students with a new, often fundamentally consumerist, attitude, especially in the private sector of higher education. The cost of higher education (and research) in an increasingly mass model of its functioning requires an enormous amount of funding that most probably none of the countries in the region are able to provide. Higher education is already one of the most expensive public services financed by the state today (a direct consequence of advanced research and rapidly growing numbers of students). Finally, two different reasons need to be mentioned. In the global, increasingly post-national age, the national pride that used to guide the public attitude to higher education is not of prime importance any more. The end of the Cold-War competition also means the end of the international race in the sciences and the end of the space race as a part of a larger confrontation within a bi-polar world of hostile superpowers. There is also growing public awareness of the tax money spent for the state in general, and for its specific public services, including, in particular, public higher education. The awareness in question is at the same time accompanied by a general avoidance of taxes on the part of both transnational and local corporations. It is most likely that public higher education institutions in the region will soon have to account for every penny spent, every research project conducted, every course offered, every new department created and old department maintained, as well as for every PhD student and full-time tenured professor. The institutions may have to considerably increase the workloads of their faculty members, reduce the scope of their research agendas, and shift their priorities to teaching – mainly undergraduate teaching. In the long run, most higher education institutions in Central and Eastern Europe except for top-ranking universities may increasingly be teaching institutions. These changes may be accompanied by the lowering of the social prestige of institutions and their faculties and by the relative lowering of salaries (compared to other professions) and of social understanding for the need for non-applied research. Research activities may in part move to corporate laboratories, think tanks, and wealthy private as well as selected state-supported elite research universities.
5. What is important to understand is that in the past decade of mainly failed higher education reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, the social and economic surroundings have changed dramatically. The state has sharply reduced the level of funding of public higher education and has begun to reform the public sector generally. And what is extremely important is that very significant transformations in thinking about higher education in particular (and the public sector in general) have in the meantime occurred worldwide, especially in Anglophone countries. It appears that worldwide tendencies in a rapidly globalizing world can no longer be disregarded, especially in those regions, to which Central and Eastern Europe belongs, that are undergoing vast social and economic transformations. While it was acceptable, ten years ago, to disregard the global context in thinking about higher education, it is impossible to do so now. The world is no longer what it used to be, for processes of globalization have apparently brought about transformations of an unprecedented nature and scale. The world about which we have been thinking in philosophy, sociology, political science, and political economy (that is to say, depending on the discipline: the modern world founded on reason and rationality, social communication, and dreams of a social order, the world separated into national entities and closed in the formula of the “nation-state”, the world of a social contract in which there is a strict connection between welfare state, capitalism, and democracy, finally, the world in which there is a clear priority of politics with regard to economics) is disintegrating along with its gradual passage to the global age.

Thus, again, it is important to view the changing academic surroundings and the current problems of higher education in Central and Eastern Europe in a more global context, for it is in this context that higher education systems here will be operating sooner or later. The problems faced by Central European academe are not exactly –

and not distinctly – Central European problems. These may be reinforced by local issues, but the main structure of the transformations going on is common to large, especially developing, parts of the world (and still quite uncommon in Continental EU countries). The changes in higher education are going hand in hand with the changes in the public sector generally, and the issue of the massification of higher education – and hence rapidly growing costs and generally a declining level of education – is global. The German-inspired nation-state-oriented and welfare-state-supported university, in the long run, is most probably beyond reach in any part of the world today.

Thus, no clear and consensual model for the reform of higher education in Central and Eastern Europe has been found after almost a decade of permanent reforms or attempts at reform (in Poland, to give a local example, there were a dozen of draft laws on higher education in the last decade). The models provided are divergent; the very world is in the process of being made. The exact features of the global world being entered are still unknown; hence, the nature of higher education of the future is equally unknown. A number of persuasive visions of the future exist, but their usefulness depends on the direction that the reform of the state will take globally. It is this reform that will, in the final analysis, affect the region as well. The state’s functions, role, and tasks have been under severe scrutiny. The state in its new global surroundings may be forced to shift its priorities, and state-supported massified higher education may not be among them. The redefinition of the responsibilities of the state in a deregulated, globalized world may be a very painful process, not only for higher education, but for the larger part of the traditionally conceived public sector, especially, but rather later than sooner, in welfare states of Western Europe.

Higher education is certainly not among the priorities of the slimmed minimalist state (supported by transnational organizations) and state support in general, and from short-term to long-term perspectives in the transition countries, does not have to be among “core tasks” of the state. Consequently, the ideal suggested by e.g. the World Bank leads not only to downsizing (dubbed also “rightsizing”) of the state but also to setting new spending priorities. Changes in the role of the state require shifts in spending patterns: “the aim is to make the composition of
The fundamental issue is whether or not the state, in times of harsh economic competition, will be able to finance public higher education institutions in light of its unavoidable further massification and the constantly rising costs of advanced research activities. In most general terms, the issue is whether or not higher education is still viewed as a public good or is already seen as a private commodity, and how successfully higher education can compete with other publicly funded services today. Although it is always theoretically possible that the states in the region will dramatically increase their support for higher education and research, considering the current situation described above, including the pressures of globalization, it seems very unlikely indeed.

The issue of free higher education guaranteed by constitutions in certain Central and Eastern European countries (including Poland – art. 70 of the Constitution) is a hot political issue. For the faculty, the status quo seems acceptable, for it is known. Reforms and their consequences are unknown, i.e., potentially threatening. The general direction in favor of greater accountability and heavier workloads (accepted as a future reality) is evident. As far as the public is expenditures consistent with the tasks of government in a market economy and conducive to long-run growth. Indeed, robust empirical evidence supports the view that government spending tends to be productive and to promote economic growth where it corrects proven market failures and truly complements private activity ... but rarely otherwise” (World Bank’s World Development Report 1996, From Plan to Market, Washington DC: Author, 1996, p. 115). Policy options suggested (this time not to transition countries but on a more global scale) by World Bank’s State in a Changing World are basically following the same direction. The role of the state in economic and social development is increasingly seen as that of a “partner, catalyst, and facilitator” or a “facilitator and regulator” rather than as that of a direct provider of growth. The report takes as its point of departure the conclusion that “the world is changing, and with it our ideas about the state’s role in economic and social development”. Markets and states are complementary and consequently the state is essential for “putting in place the appropriate institutional foundations for markets”. There is growing recognition that in many countries the monopoly public providers of infrastructure, social services, and other goods and services “are unlikely to do a good job” (World Bank’s World Development Report 1997, Washington DC: Author, 1997, p. 144). The new responsibilities of the state need to be redefined and societies need to accept them. What is needed is a “strategic selection of the actions” that states will try to promote, coupled with greater efforts to “take the burden off the state”, “more selectivity” in state’s activities and “greater reliance on the citizenry and private firms” (p. 3).
concerned, reforms are not, for a number of reasons, perceived as pressing. It is still relatively easy and cheap to earn higher education degrees. However, the public awareness that reforms will raise standards, make studies more competitive, and most probably more expensive, is correct. It is also important to note that currently the students are not particularly market-oriented (there is a limited correlation between the types of studies and the type of future employment); hence, credentials are still viewed as a fetish. Another stakeholder in higher education, industry, is eliciting only a very limited need for advanced research owing to a difficult economic situation. Therefore, there is still only light pressure, on the part of industry, for highly qualified workforce. Finally, on the part of transnational institutions that are traditionally viewed as supporting reforms in the region, there is still only light pressure for reforms in public higher education. Other public-sector areas are viewed as more important and more in need of reform today (especially the health care system, the pension systems, and social security).

The attitude of the public, of the industry/business community, and of transnational institutions is likely to change soon. That of the state and of the faculties (of higher education institutions themselves) is unlikely to change. Reform will come as the result of a long process given that the main stakeholders involved, the state and higher education institutions (the staff), are unwilling/unable to proceed with reforms. But as the result of public debate and business community requirements for the labor market, as well as supranational recommendations to cut public expenses generally, the state and the institutions (faculty) will be forced to introduce far-reaching changes in order to avoid the possible loss of social credibility.

6.

Given that because of the current global ideological climate and powerful globalization pressures public higher education institutions (except for top-ranking universities) in Central and Eastern Europe do not have much of a chance to avoid the processes of privatization (in the
long run and in various senses of the term\textsuperscript{21}), they should be well aware of current stakes rather than ignoring them in a "business as usual" attitude. In order to avoid being merely an object of future transformations, the academic world, in the current situation, should understand the general direction of the changes affecting their institutions and try to influence the transformation. They should participate in the creation of, and in the debates about, the legal contexts of the functioning of higher education and mobilize themselves along with the personnel of think tanks in order to lobby for the best choices available. They should form coalitions of experts, legislators, and academics in order to influence both the state and public opinion in favor of their views, make use of international recommendations when reasonable, but oppose them when not, and always remember that the old, golden era of the academy will never return.

It is of primal importance, nowadays, to be able to keep a thin balance between looking backward and looking forward, between taking the past (the modern idea of the university) and taking the future as points of reference in discussing the condition of higher education in the region. It is important not to be retroactive and past-oriented. The world is in a period of history in which the traditional, philosophy-inspired, nation-state-oriented, and welfare-state-supported, modern university, for a variety of reasons, may be no longer culturally, socially, and economically acceptable. These are facts that cannot be changed. The future of higher education is taking shape right before our eyes, and it is the task of the academic community not only to analyze these transformations but to influence them as much as possible.

\textsuperscript{21} As Gary Teeple in \textit{Globalization and the Decline of the Social Reform} (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995) reminds, privatization of the welfare state can take different routes: "One route, for instance, involves government attempts to transfer the production of a service or a good from the public to the private sector while maintaining public financing. ... Another avenue of privatization takes the route of state-regulated services and benefits that are mandatorily provided by the private sector. ... The least visible and yet a widely taken route of privatization is the policy of incremental degradation of benefits and services" (pp. 104–105). In the context of the last route, it is worth mentioning the case of public higher education in many transition countries; suffice it to analyze the national statistics concerning public investment in higher education and research and development in the last decade.
The Institution of the University: The Current Discourse on the European Higher Education and Research Space

1.

The institution of the university is playing a significant role in the processes of the emergence of the common European higher education and common European research spaces. What is clear, though, is that in neither of them, is the university seen in the traditional way we know from the debates preceding the advent of globalization, the speeding up of the process of European integration and the passage from industrial and service societies to postindustrial, global, knowledge and information societies.\(^1\) The institution, in general, has already found it legitimate, useful and necessary to be evolving together with radical transformations of the social setting in which it functions. The new world that is approaching assumes different names in different formulations and the social, cultural, and economic processes in question are debated in multiple vocabularies of the social sciences: for some theorists, the processes of the last two decades or so are referred to as "postmodernity" (Jean-François Lyotard, Zygmunt Bauman), for others – as "the second modernity" (Ulrich Beck), "reflexive modernization" (Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash), "globalization" (Roland Robertson) or the "global age" (Malcolm Waters); still other descriptions include the "network society" (Manuel

Castells), the "knowledge and information society" (Peter Drucker) or, on more philosophical grounds, the "postnational constellation" (Jürgen Habermas). For almost all of these analyses, globalization is widely understood to be of primary importance. As the German sociologists, Ulrich Beck, vividly describes current transformations:

A new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a new kind of global order, a new kind of society and a new kind of personal life are coming into being, all of which differ from earlier phases of social development.2

In this new global order, universities are striving for their new place as they are increasingly unable to maintain their traditional role and tasks. Both the official discussions on the common European space in higher education and research as well as a large part of the accompanying academic debates on the subject, increasingly acknowledge that the current role of universities could be that of engines of economic growth for countries and regions, contributors to the economic competitiveness of nations or suppliers of highly-qualified and well-trained workers for the new knowledge-driven economy – which is undoubtedly a radical reformulation of the traditional3 account of the role of the university in society. Without much discussion on the principles (such as those accompanying the emergence of the Humboldtian model of the university in the beginning of the 19th century or the major 20th century debates about the "idea" of the university), the university in the European context seems to be about to enter, willy-nilly, a new era of its development.4

From among a plethora of factors, some should be especially emphasized here: the pressures of globalization on nation-states and its public services and the strengthening of the common European political and economic project at the turn of the 20th century; the end of

---

the “Golden age” of the Keynesian welfare state (so positively inclined towards national public research and strong national public higher education systems) that we have known it in the almost three decades of the second half of the 20th century; and the emergence of knowledge-based societies (and economies) in the countries of the affluent West. In more general terms, the processes directly or indirectly affecting the institution of the university today would be the gradual individualization (and recommodification) of our societies, the denationalization (and desocialization) of our economies, as well as the universalization of higher education and the commodification of research. The recent European discussions under scrutiny here leave no doubt about the direction of these changes in the role and social and economic tasks of the institution in emergent societies.

The present paper focuses on the recent debates about common European higher education and research spaces. Their emergence will have far-reaching consequences for both the EU-15, as well as the enlarged Europe and other postcommunist transition countries. The ideas of both European spaces are evolving and are still not clearly defined. One thing is certain, though: we are confronting a major redesign of what research and teaching in the European public sector are supposed to be; of how public higher education institutions, including universities, are supposed to function and be financed (at least from EU funds); and what roles students and faculty, under increasing pressure, should assume in European higher education systems. At the moment, the European Higher Education Area is much more of a desired ideal to be achieved within the ongoing Bologna process, with very limited funding available for its implementation in particular countries; the ideal of the European Research Area (ERA), by contrast, has already determined the shape of the 6th Framework Programme of Research – the biggest source of EU research funds, totaling 17.5 billion EUR for 2002–2006 – and the ways in which research activities in Europe are currently funded from EU sources. Thus while the effects of the ideal of the European Higher Education Area still remain largely at the level of governmental good wishes about the direction of change in particular national higher education systems in the years to come, the effects of the ideal of the
European Research Area are already visible on the practical level of where clusters of research funds are to be channeled and what new research-funding instruments are available. The European Research Area is at the same time an operational component of a comprehensive “Lisbon agenda” of the European Union agreed on in 2000 which aims at redefining both the European economy, as well as the welfare and education systems by 2010. Over the last couple of years, the vocabularies used in the processes of the integration of higher education\(^5\) and of the integration of research in Europe have become increasingly similar; the visions of the future of our public universities – on the European level – have become more convergent than ever before; and the more or less tacit agreement on the different speeds at which different parts of Europe will be changing their educational and research and development landscapes is becoming increasingly clear (with the major dividing line between the EU-15 and accession countries, or the transition countries more generally).

2.

The first communique about the European Research Area published by the European Commission in 2000, *Towards a European Research Area*, hardly ever mentions universities (actually the term is used three times or so in connection with the situation of research in North America). Higher education is not mentioned in the document at all. On reading the document, it is clear that neither European universities nor European higher education in general have been significantly taken into account at the outset of thinking about a common research space in Europe. What figures prominently instead is dynamic private investment in research, intellectual property rights and effective tools to protect them, the creation of companies and risk capital investment, research needed for political decision-making, and more abundant and more mobile human resources, or in other words “a dynamic European landscape, open and attractive to researchers

\(^5\) See Chapter 13.
and investment". It is symptomatic for the initial period of the development of the European Research Area that while describing the situation of research in Europe, their traditional location at universities is not commented on at all. The opening paragraph of the paper states that

even more so than the century that has just finished, the 21st century we are now entering will be the century of science and technology. More than ever, investing in research and technological development offers the most promise for the future. In Europe, however, the situation concerning research is worrying. Without concerted action to rectify this the current trend could lead to a loss of growth and competitiveness in an increasingly global economy. The leeway to be made up on the other technological powers in the world will grow still further. And Europe might not successfully achieve the transition to a knowledge-based economy. Why such a negative picture?

So the problem crudely stated is that “the situation concerning research is worrying”. What are the main reasons for this, according to the communique? The principal reference framework for research activities in Europe is still “national” and the static structure of “15+1” (Member States and the Union) leads to “fragmentation, isolation and compartmentalisation of national research efforts and systems”. There is no “European” policy on research, and “national research policies and Union policy overlap without forming a coherent whole”. What is needed is a “genuinely European research agenda” that will “go beyond filling the gaps of national research programmes to include concerns which are of a Europewide relevance and which will address a number of problems that contemporary European societies are faced with”. What is therefore needed is a “real European” research policy, a “more dynamic configuration”. As was explained three years later, “the nature and

---

7 Ibidem, p. 4.
9 Ibidem, p. 186.
scale of the challenges linked to the future of the universities mean that these issues have to be addressed at European [rather than national – MK] level”.

It should come as no surprise that the initial reaction of the Confederation of EU Rectors’ Conference (of May 2000) to the first communiqué about the European Research Area was more than reserved:

The Confederation finds it a source of concern that the central role of universities in research and training is not included in considerations concerning a European research area. Public research efforts which take place in universities are not recognized in the Communication. Not once are universities mentioned as places of research; not once are universities recognized as the institutions where the researchers of the future are being educated and trained; not once are universities represented as centres of national, regional or local acquisition and transfer of knowledge, nor is this function promoted.

The Confederation criticized the limited view of what constitutes “research”, the view that led to the downplaying of the role of universities in research activities. Research was limited to mean only research and development. It stressed the fact that universities are the places where most public research takes place and the most by far of basic research. Leaving out universities in discussions means “cutting out a very large part of the innovative and creative facets of research, as it means leaving out almost all basic research; and it means ignoring the education and training of future researchers”. As evidenced by further documents, especially following the communique on the role of universities of 2003, the reactions of the academic world to the initiative to work towards a common European research space were much more favorable.

13 Ibidem, p. 2.
The documents of the European Commission devoted to the European Research Area rarely refer to the Bologna process of the integration of higher education systems, but if they do, they do so very approvingly: to give an example, as European higher education institutions are very diversified, "the structural reforms inspired by the Bologna process constitute an effort to organize that diversity within a more coherent and compatible European framework, which is a condition for the readability, and hence the competitiveness, of European universities both within Europe itself and in the whole world".\^{14}

At the same time while documents of the Bologna process refer to the ERA, the documents of the European Union related to the "Lisbon agenda" in general clearly refer to the Bologna process (to give an example from Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council:

The European Council calls for further action in this field: to introduce instruments to ensure the transparency of diplomas and qualifications (ECTS, diploma and certificate supplements, European CV) and closer cooperation with regard to university degrees in the context of the Sorbonne-Bologna-Prague process prior to the Berlin meeting in 2003\^{15}.

Finally, the 2003 Berlin communique of the ministers of education involved in the Bologna process emphatically calls the European higher education area and the European research area "two pillars of the knowledge based society", mentions "synergies" between them and sends a clear message to institutions of higher education: "Ministers ask HEI [higher education institutions – MK] to increase the role and relevance of research to technological, social and cultural evolution and to the needs of society".\^{16} Comparing the Berlin

\^{14} European Commission. The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 5.
\^{15} Presidency Conclusions. Barcelona European Council (2002, available on-line), art. 44.
communiqué with the most recent documents about the ERA, apart from the necessary and unavoidable lip-service on both sides, a general convergence of views can be shown. The divergence in views is growing in respect to one issue in particular, though: while the European Commission (following the Lisbon agenda) uses an increasingly economic perspective, the Bologna process confirmed again in Berlin the role of the "social dimension" in the process of integration of European higher education systems; consequently, as the Berlin communiqué states it, the need to increase competitiveness "must be balanced with the objective of improving the social characteristics of the European Higher Education Area, aiming at strengthening social cohesion and reducing social and gender inequalities both at national and at European level. In that context, Ministers reaffirm their position that higher education is a public good and a public responsibility".17

Documents of the European Commission rarely refer to the classical models of the university; if they do, they do not label them explicitly as outmoded but rather indicate trends undermining their significance. On the Humboldt tradition, the communiqué about the role of universities states the following:

European universities have for long modelled themselves along the lines of some major models, particularly the ideal model of university envisaged nearly two centuries ago by Wilhelm von Humboldt in his reform of the German university, which sets research at the heart of university activity and indeed makes it the basis of teaching. Today the trend is away from these models, and toward greater differentiation.18

The communication, as is obvious from the Commission's documents, takes a much more economic than cultural or social perspective (the latter seeming closer to the Bologna process documents) towards universities: "Given that they live thanks to substantial public and private funding, and that the knowledge they produce and transmit

has a major impact on the economy and society, universities are also accountable for the way they operate and manage their activities and budgets to their sponsors and to the public”\(^{19}\) (How similar it is to what can be heard on the other side of the Atlantic: “colleges and universities are thoroughly dependent on the goodwill of the public and of their elected representatives in state and federal government”\(^{20}\)). The tone and the perspective of the documents related to the higher education area and to the common research area differ here considerably.

4.

Another issue raised by the European Commission is the following: are transformations facing European universities radical – and if so, why? As a recent (2003) communication on investing in education and training puts it, “the challenge in education and training is likely to be even bigger than envisaged in Lisbon”. The challenge can be summarized in the following way:

Providing an engine for the new knowledge-based European economy and society; overcoming accumulated delays and deficits in relation to key competitors; accommodating a severe demographic constraint; and overcoming high regional issues that will be exacerbated by enlargement during the vital transition period. ... Simply maintaining the status quo or changing slowly would clearly be hugely inadequate in the face of such a massive challenge.\(^{21}\)

Thus the European Union needs “a healthy and flourishing university world”; it needs “excellence” in its universities. At present, though, just as the situation of research is “worrying”, the situation of the universities is bad as universities are “not trouble-free” and are not

\(^{19}\) Ibidem, p. 9.


"globally competitive ... even though they produce high quality scientific publications". European universities generally "have less to offer" than their main competitors. Following criticism of the first communications about the common European research space on the part of the academic community, this time the European Commission is trying to be as careful as possible about the role of universities, stating, *inter alia*, that universities – although not in general but only "in many respects" – still "hold the key to the knowledge economy and society"; universities are also "at the heart of the Europe of Knowledge". At the same time the stakes are very high and universities in the form they are functioning now are not acceptable. The largely economic perspective is quite clear. The idea is conveyed in many passages in fairly strong formulations.

So universities face an imperative need to "adapt and adjust" to a series of profound changes. They must rise to a number of challenges. They can only release their potential "by undergoing the radical changes needed to make the European system a genuine world reference". They have to increase and diversify their income in the face of their worsening underfunding. The great golden age of universities’ Ivory Tower ideal (not mentioned) is over: "after remaining a comparatively isolated universe for a long period, both in relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding guaranteed and a status protected by respect for their autonomy, European universities have gone through the second half of the 20th century without really calling into question the role or the nature of what they should be contributing to society". But it is clearly over now, and no one should be surprised. Thus the "fundamental question" is the following: "can the European universities, as they are and are organised now, hope in the future to retain their place, in society and in the world?".

---

23 Ibidem, p. 5.  
24 Ibidem, p. 4.  
26 Ibidem, p. 11.  
27 Ibidem, p. 22, emphasis mine.  
28 Ibidem, p. 22.
It is a purely rhetorical question in the context of the whole communication, the universities in Europe – as they are and as they are organized today – will not be able to retain their place. Restructuring is necessary, and a much wider idea of European social, economic and political integration applied to the higher education sector, expressed in the ideals of a common European higher education area, comes in handy. Let us remember the goal of the common research area in another formulation: “the creation of a frontier-free area for research where scientific resources are used more to create jobs and increase Europe’s competitiveness”.29

5.

Universities are responsible to their “stakeholders”; university training does not only affect those who benefit directly from it; inefficient or non-optimum use of resources affects the society at large. Thus the objective, the Commission argues, is to “maximise the social return of the investment” or “to optimise the social return on the investment represented by the studies it [i.e. society – MK] pays for”.30 The communique sets three major objectives in creating a Europe of knowledge and in making European universities “a world reference”. Let us discuss them briefly.

The first objective is “ensuring that the European universities have sufficient and sustainable resources”. The communication acknowledges that the worsening under-funding of universities makes it difficult to maintain a high profile in both teaching and research. It is difficult to keep and attract the best talent. In comparison with American universities, the means available in Europe, on average, per student are two to five times lower. Universities have to find new ways of increasing and diversifying their income, have to use available financial resources more

effectively ("the objective must be to maximise the social return of the investment"), and they have to apply scientific research results more effectively, it is argued. The Commission identifies four main sources of university income: public funding for research and teaching in general (traditionally the main source of funding), private donations, income by selling services (including research and lifelong learning) and using research results and, finally, contributions from students (tuition and enrolment fees). It realistically acknowledges that "given the budgetary situation in the Member States and the candidate countries, there is a limited margin of maneuver for increasing public support" which we can read as highly improbable, if not impossible.31 Private donations are not fiscally attractive to potential donors and universities are not able to amass private funds. Selling services and research results is not attractive to universities as regulatory frameworks do not encourage them to do so (e.g. royalties are paid to the state). As to tuition fees, they are "generally limited or even prohibited" in Europe (again some countries of Central and Eastern Europe are exceptions). As far as the inefficiencies of the system are concerned, the communication mentions the high dropout rate among students (40 per cent on average), a mismatch between the supply of qualifications and the demand for them, the differing duration of studies for specific qualifications, the disparity of status and conditions of recruitment and work for pre and post-doctoral researchers, and the lack of a transparent system for calculating the cost of research. European universities do not create technological ("spin-off") companies and do not have well-developed structures for managing research results.

The second objective is "consolidating the excellence of European universities". There is a need for long term planning and financing in creating the right conditions for achieving excellence in research and teaching, the paper argues. "Excellence does not grow overnight", and yet governments still budget on an annual basis and do not look beyond a limited number of years. There is also a need for efficient management structures and practices: universities should have an

effective decision-making process, developed administration and financial management, and have the ability to match rewards to performance. There is a need for developing European centers and networks of excellence. Areas in which different universities have attained or can be expected to attain excellence should be identified – and research funds should be focused on them.

And the third objective is “broadening the perspective of European universities”. European universities are functioning in an increasingly “globalized” environment, the paper acknowledges. But the European environment is less attractive. Compared with the USA, “financial, material, and working conditions are not as good; the financial benefits of the use of research are smaller and career prospects are poorer”. Another important dimension for universities is serving local and regional development and strengthening European cohesion. Technology centers, science parks, local partnerships between universities and industry should be encouraged. The three objectives sound very reasonable but are merely sketched out in the present document. Given their importance, and often controversial character (tuition fees, “spin-off” companies, transformations of the academic profession etc), each of the objectives rightly deserves separate treatment in the future.

Let us refer briefly to a booklet published by the European Commission, *Education and Training in Europe: Diverse Systems, Shared Goals for 2010*. The introductory picture of the European higher education systems is as follows:

The Europe of education and training reflects the diversity of languages, cultures and systems that are an inherent part of the identity of its member countries and their regions. Education and training have for a long time developed within national contexts and in relative isolation from each other. Countries and regions have a wide variety of education and training

---

32 Ibidem, pp. 11–21.
institutions, apply different admission rules, use different academic calendars, award hundreds of different degrees and qualifications reflecting a wide variety of curricula and training schemes. This diversity is valued very highly by nations as well as citizens: diversity is one thing all Europeans have in common. ... In the European Union the organisation of education and training systems and the content of learning programmes are the responsibility of the Member States – or their constituent regions as the case may be.\textsuperscript{33}

But the Lisbon Council of 2000 and its aftermath brought about a dramatic shift in thinking about national vs. European levels of competence in higher education: “at its meeting in Lisbon in March 2000, the European Council (the Heads of State or Government of the EU countries) acknowledged that the European Union was confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the knowledge-driven economy, and agreed a strategic target for 2010: To become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. These changes required not only a radical transformation of the European economy, but also a challenging programme for the modernisation of social welfare and education systems. The European Council called on the Education Council (the education ministers of the EU countries) and on the European Commission to undertake a general reflection on the concrete objectives of education systems, focusing on common concerns while respecting national diversity”.\textsuperscript{34}

Current developments, especially the creation of the European Research Area, are the consequences of this shift of interest which has signaled Europe is taking the idea of knowledge-based economies very seriously (the term “knowledge-based economy” was apparently first defined in 1996 in an OECD book of that title; the description runs as follows: “the term ‘knowledge-based economy’ results from a fuller recognition of the role of knowledge and technology in economic growth. Knowledge, as embodied in human beings (as


\textsuperscript{34} Ibidem, p. 7.
'human capital') and in technology, has always been central to economic development. But only over the last few years has its relative importance been recognized, just as that importance is growing. The OECD economies are more strongly dependent on the production, distribution and use of knowledge than ever before".35 What followed with both the common European higher education and research areas, must be viewed in this context.

European universities have not been the focus of reflection at the European Union level since 1991, when Memorandum on Higher Education in the European Community was published. The competencies of the European Commission for higher education policy are limited. As Towards a European Research Area puts it, "the Treaty [of Maastricht, 1992 – MK] provides the European Union with a legal basis for measures to help to support European cooperation in research and technological development. However, the principal reference framework for research activities in Europe is national".36

The Treaty of Maastricht introduced two new articles in the section on "Education, vocational training and youth": article 149, point 1, states that "the Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity". The authority of the EU is limited by statements that the Community shall support and supplement the action of the Member States "while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content and organisation of vocational training". At the same time, the EU shall


36 European Commission, Towards a European Research Area, op. cit., p. 7, emphasis mine.
adopt measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, "excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States".\textsuperscript{37} It is certainly a good point to remember the principle of subsidiarity and its scope of application:

the Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.\textsuperscript{38}

Higher education is one of those areas which do not fall within the exclusive competence of the European Union; the involvement of the EU is strictly defined and limited to some actions only.\textsuperscript{39}

In the most general terms, the new (Draft) \textit{Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe}, submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome (and then rejected in December 2003) follows the same lines of thinking about education and training. Section 4, "Education, Vocational Training, Youth and Sport", consisting of two articles (art. III-182 and III-183), does not introduce any major changes. The Union is supposed to contribute to quality education by "encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and complementing their action". In the spirit of the previous formulation of the issue, the Union shall "fully respect the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity".\textsuperscript{40}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{37} The Treaty on European Union, 1992, art. 149, 150.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibidem, art. 5.
\textsuperscript{39} Kurt De Wit and Jef C. Verhoeven, "The Higher Education Policy of the European Union: With or Against the Member States?" in Higher Education and the State. The International Dimension of Higher Education, ed. by Jeroen Huisman, Peter Maassen and Guy Neave (Amsterdam: Pergamon, 2001).
\textsuperscript{40} Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003), art. III-182.
\end{flushright}
Following the European Council meetings in Lisbon in 2000 (which gave rise to the "Lisbon agenda" of transformations in the European economy, welfare, and education) and in Barcelona in 2002 (the Barcelona European Council set the goal of European universities becoming "world quality reference" by 2010), the European Commission is clearly "enlarging its field of operation and policy implementation in education".41

The reason is clearly stated by the Commission: while responsibilities for universities lie essentially at national (or regional) level, the most important challenges are "European, and even international or global".42 The divergence between the organization of universities at the national level and the emergence of challenges which go "beyond national frontiers" has grown and will continue to do so. Thus some shift of balance is necessary, and the Lisbon agenda combined with the emergence of the European Research Area provides new grounds for policy work at the European level no matter what particular Member States think of it and no matter how they view the restrictions on engagement in education issues imposed on the EU by the Maastricht Treaty.

The Lisbon European Council of 2000 described the new economic and social challenge of the following decade as a "quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people's lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy". Reaching a "strategic goal" (already quoted) for the next decade requires setting programs for building knowledge infrastructure, enhancing innovation and economic reform, and – of most interest to us here – "modernising social welfare and education systems".43 The shift to a digital, knowledge-based economy will be a powerful engine for growth and competitiveness, the communication argues.

Consequently, the idea of a European Area of Research and Innovation was affirmed, with research and development’s role in “generating economic growth, employment and social cohesion” mentioned. The communication evoked the full exploitation of “the instruments under the Treaty and all other appropriate means”.44

It is interesting to note that in the case of presidency conclusions of the Lisbon Council and of the Barcelona Council (of 2002), both stressing the role of education, research and development, universities are not mentioned at all; the word is absent except for two minor contexts: university degrees and an enhanced communication network for libraries, universities and schools. The necessary steps mentioned in Lisbon include mechanisms for networking, improving the environment for private research investment, the benchmarking of national R&D policies, a high speed transeuropean communication network, taking steps to increase the mobility of researchers and introducing Community-wide patents.45 Again, neither higher education institutions nor universities appear as subjects, or objects, of these steps.

Let us remember here Roger Dale’s argument about the selectivity of the shift in educational policies from the national to the European level: “as the politics of education moves to a European level as national economies become increasingly Europeanised, the education sector settlement – the arena on which the agenda for education comes into contact with the means of achieving the agenda – shifts selectively from the national to the European level”. Very broadly, we might suggest that those elements linked directly to the reproduction of national social formations will remain at the nation-state level, while those more directly associated with the extended reproduction of the mode of production will move to the European level (increasingly the site and focus of that extended reproduction)”.46 The shift Dale evokes is seen in subsequent communiqués about the ERA.

44 Ibidem, p. 3.
46 Roger Dale, “The Construction of an European Education Space and Education Policy” (2003), p. 5, available on-line; see also Susan Robertson and Roger Dale,
8.

The European Commission, except for the 2003 communique on "universities", prefers a much wider reference to "education and training". In *Investing Efficiently in Education and Training: an Imperative for Europe* (2003), the role of higher education is relatively simple, as an introductory sentence puts it: "education and training are crucial to achieving the strategic goal set for the Member States at the Lisbon European Council to make the European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy (and society) in the world". No mention of "more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" is made this time\(^1\) which clearly shows that the second part of the ideal is somehow inferior to the first. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that what provides the perspective for looking at higher education is the "relevance of education/training to the Lisbon goal" rather than relevance to anything else or anything more general.\(^2\) Making Europe a leading knowledge-based economy would be possible "only if education and training functioned as factors of economic growth, research and innovation, competitiveness, sustainable employment and social inclusion and active citizenship".\(^3\) What is needed today is a "new investment paradigm" in education and training – what is going to change are not only the variables of the investment model but also the underlying parameters.\(^4\) The communication mentions briefly the Bologna process (and the Bruges process in vocational training) as examples of moves in the right direction but hastens to add that "the pace of change does not yet match the pace of globalization, and we risk falling behind our competitors if it is not increased".\(^5\) Again, it is


\(^2\) Ibidem, p. 6.

\(^3\) Ibidem, p. 6.

\(^4\) Ibidem, p. 9.

\(^5\) Ibidem, p. 10.
interesting to note the extent to which the phenomenon of globalization is present in the documents related to the common European research space while being largely neglected in the Bologna process documents.

In terms of financing, generally, in several recent communiqués, the issue of *private* investment in both research and higher education was raised. *More Research for Europe. Towards 3% of GDP* makes it clear that the increase in R&D investments in the EU (from current 1.9% to 3% of GDP in 2010) is expected to come largely from private rather than public funds. Thus the main challenge is “to make R&D investment more attractive and profitable to business in the European Research Area”\(^{52}\) And what is needed is “boosting private investment in research” as another communiqué calls one of its subsections.\(^{53}\) Still another communiqué reminds us that

> it is very important to realize that the largest share of this deficit stems from the low level of private investment in higher education and research and development in the EU compared with the USA. At the same time, private returns on investment in tertiary education remain high in most EU countries.\(^{54}\)

Consequently, if we take together low *private* investment levels in higher education (low private share of the costs of studying) and high *private* returns on university education (higher professional status combined with higher salaries), the answer provided is to add to public funding by “increasing and diversifying investment in higher education”.\(^{55}\) As Henry and colleagues have described the apparent paradox, “though education is now deemed more important than ever for the competitive advantage of nations, the commitment and capacity of governments to fund it have weakened considerably”.\(^{56}\)

---


\(^{55}\) Ibidem, p. 13.

It is obvious that the idea conveyed to universities is that they should "do more (teaching and research) with less (public money)" but possibly with more private funds; though when and how private investment is to finance the research activities of universities is a much more pressing issue in Central and Eastern Europe than in the EU-15; it is enough to review the statistical data about business sector's share of funding for research in both parts of Europe. From the perspective of the transition countries, "boosting" private investment in research seems largely unrealistic today, as opposed to boosting private investment in studying which has already happened in hundreds of both public and private institutions with a considerable percentage of fee-paying students.\footnote{See Voldemar Tomusk, "The War of Institutions, Episode I: the Rise, and the Rise of Private Higher Education in Eastern Europe", \textit{Higher Education Policy}, 16, 2003; see also \textit{The University, Globalization, Central Europe}, ed. by Marek Kwiek (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003) and Marek Kwiek, "The Missing Link: Public Policy for the Private Sector in Central and East European Higher Education", \textit{Society for Research into Higher Education International News}, 2, June 2003.} For most accession countries, though, to reach the EU goal – a level of 3% of their GDP on research and development by 2010 – is largely impossible, especially taking into account current levels of funding in most of them. It is also interesting to note that the policy of the revenue diversification in higher education in less industrialized countries (including some parts of Central and Eastern Europe) may be not effective.\footnote{D. Bruce Johnstone, "Cost Sharing in Higher Education: Tuition, Financial Assistance, and Accessibility in Comparative Perspective" (International Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project, SUNY-Buffalo, 2003), available on-line.}

9.

How do the documents about the European Research Area refer to universities in Central and Eastern Europe? They emphasize the "frequently difficult circumstances of universities in the accession countries as regards human and financial resources",\footnote{European Commission, \textit{The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge}, op. cit., p. 3.} "the
worsening of these factors [divergence between national organization of universities and the European challenges they face – MK] which will come with the enlargement of the Union, owing to a greater level of heterogeneity of the European university landscape which will ensue".60 Similarly, a communique on More Research for Europe reminds us that the share of business funding is very low in most accession countries and concludes: “the diversity of situations in Europe calls for differentiated but co-ordinated policies to establish a common upward momentum to reach the 3% objective”.61 Even though we may be not especially fond of describing the catastrophic situation of both private and public funding for research activities in most accession countries by way of euphemisms like the “difficult circumstances of universities”, the “heterogeneity of the European university landscape”, and the “diversity of situations in Europe”, we must acknowledge the fact that huge gaps between the EU-15 and most of the accession countries are clearly recognized in the documents about the emergent European Research Area. The Bologna process documents, by contrast, do not use even euphemisms to describe the different points of departure in the integration project. Not a single official document acknowledges the massive difference between universities in the affluent countries of the West and universities in transition countries, all signatories of the Bologna process (which now comprises 40 European countries). What is widely acknowledged instead is a wide linguistic and cultural diversity among European institutions. Let me quote here a passage from the Salamanca Convention’s message, “Shaping the European Higher Education Area”:

European higher education is characterized by its diversity in terms of languages, national systems, institutional types and profiles and curricular orientation. At the same time its future depends on its ability to organise this valuable diversity effectively to produce positive outcomes rather than difficulties, and flexibility rather than opacity.62

60 Ibidem, p. 10.
While the documents related to a common European research area at least mention the problems faced by transition countries (or rather by the ten accession countries), the Bologna documents do not acknowledge or try to conceptualize this important issue.

10.

The Bologna process is based on the underlying assumptions (not really formulated in a single place\textsuperscript{63}); that both Europe and the world are entering a new era of knowledge-based and market-driven economies competing against each other; Europe as a region will have to struggle against its two main competitors in higher education and research and development: the USA and Japan (Australasia); the knowledge society depends for its growth on the production, transmission, dissemination, and use of new knowledge, or as the \textit{Towards ERA} communication described it: “in the final years of the 20th century we entered a knowledge-based society. Economic and social development will depend essentially on knowledge in its different forms”;\textsuperscript{64} the underlying goal behind the current transformations of educational systems and research and development, whether expressed directly (in documents about the common European research area) or indirectly (and accompanied by the “social dimension” in the Bologna process documents), is more or less to meet the target set out by the European Council in Lisbon (in 2000): Europe by 2010 must become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The creation of the European Higher Education Area must also be completed by 2010

\textsuperscript{63} See the substantial criticism in Guy Neave, “Anything Goes: Or, How the Accommodation of Europe’s Universities to European Integration Integrates – an Inspiring Number of Contradictions” (Paper delivered at EAIR Forum, Porto, September 2001); see also his paper on “The European Dimension in Higher Education: An Excursion into the Modern Use of Historical Analogues” in \textit{Higher Education and the State. The International Dimension of Higher Education}, ed. by Jeroen Huisman, Peter Maassen and Guy Neave (Amsterdam: Pergamon, 2001).

\textsuperscript{64} European Commission, \textit{Towards a European Research Area}, op. cit., p. 5.
(how to develop the benchmarks of success and what is going to happen after the deadline are other issues). Europe is at the crossroads; it is trying to combine higher competitiveness and social cohesion in an increasingly globalized world and it is in the process of transition towards a "knowledge society". Thus knowledge will become the key issue in the years to come. As a Third European Report on Science & Technology Indicators 2003 argues,

of course knowledge per se is not a new asset; it has always been a basis for human activity. However, what is radically new is the pace of its creation, accumulation and diffusion resulting in economies and society following a new knowledge-based paradigm. Working and living conditions are being redefined; markets and institutions are being redesigned under new rules and enhanced possibilities for the exchange of information. Moreover, knowledge is not only becoming the main source of wealth for people, businesses and nations, but also the main source of inequalities between them.65

With respect to the Bologna process, even though the Trends III report prepared for the Berlin summit mentions "globalization" no more than five times in total, it states overtly that ministers and higher education institutions should "ride the tiger of globalisation rather than hope it will disappear". In general, though, the underlying assumptions are not developed in more detail in any of its documents or reports.

11.

To conclude, let us repeat briefly our initial claims: the recent European discussions (exemplified here mainly by the documents of the European Commission) leave no doubt about the direction of these changes in the in role and social and economic tasks of the institution in

---


emergent societies. The institution of the university seems already to have found it legitimate, useful and necessary to evolve together with radical transformations of the social setting in which it functions. For in the new global order, against the odds, universities are striving to maintain their traditionally significant role in society. The role of universities as engines of economic growth, contributors to economic competitiveness and suppliers of well-trained workers for the new knowledge-driven economy is more and more often acknowledged – which is undoubtedly a radical reformulation of their traditional social roles. The university in the European context seems about to enter, willy-nilly, a new era of its development. The main reasons worth mentioning here include the pressures of globalization on nation-states and its public services, the strengthening of the project for a "common Europe", the end of the "Golden age" of the Keynesian welfare state as we have known it, and the emergence of knowledge-based societies and knowledge-driven economies. More generally, under both external (like globalization) and internal pressures (like changing demographics, the aging of societies, the maturation of welfare states, post-patriarchal family patterns etc), the processes affecting the university today are not different from those affecting our world today: the processes in question being the individualization (and recommodification) of our societies and the denationalization (and desocialization) of our economies. On top of that, we are beginning to feel the full effects of the universalization of higher education and the commodification of research.
Let us start with a very general statement: the widely observed processes of globalization are bringing about transformations of an unprecedented nature and scale. The modern world we have been thinking about in philosophy, sociology, political science or political economy (founded on reason and rationality, social communication and dreams of the social order, nation-state, and the priority of politics over the economy) is disintegrating right in front of our eyes along with the gradual passage to a global age.

Therefore today, the questions about democracy may require deliberations in a different vocabulary: a vocabulary that would be able to break away from the less and less socially appealing myth that was at the foundations of modern social sciences, according to which we keep analyzing the world from a standpoint in which the primary point of reference is the territorially-bound nation-state. As Zygmunt Bauman, the eminent Polish and British sociologist, put it with reference to sociology:

the model of postmodernity, unlike the models of modernity, cannot be grounded in the realities of the nation state, by now clearly not a framework large enough to accommodate the decisive factors in the conduct of interaction and the dynamics of social life.¹

It is an enormous challenge to the social sciences to adapt themselves conceptually to the new world in which, perhaps, the nation-state may not play the decisive role ascribed to it by modernity. Perhaps a globalized world will require a brand new theory of the state and a renewed theory of democracy in a situation in which the nation-state is declining, although it has not yet disappeared and surely will not disappear, but nevertheless is becoming weaker and weaker in its confrontation with the new global political entities, such as e.g. supranational political entities, or in its confrontations with international organizations, transnational corporations, nongovernmental and independent systems of commercial arbitration, ratings provided by international rating agencies or with the limitations of various military, political and economic treaties and unions. In the face of a seemingly unavoidable giving way, at least partially, to the new political players (including transnational corporations, no matter how they view themselves), classical questions concerning freedom, democracy, the state and politics may in my view require a radical reformulation.

The key question would be about the chances of creating a new form of social justice and the possibility of accepting a new social contract in a situation in which the connections between the nation-state and society are becoming weaker and the choices made in the traditional political structures of the state are being replaced by nongovernmental choices of an increasingly economic character. Ulrich Beck, the influential German sociologist, warns us that in the case of globalization “political freedom and democracy in Europe are at stake”. I would add, following Beck – in Europe, and not only there. The issue has become really global.

In the face of globalization on the one hand and the cultural passage to late modernity on the other, the questions about the decline of the nation-state are being asked continuously by sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, economists and historians. The nation-state as a product of modernity is under

---

question: in this context, the crucial oppositions are for instance those between “national disintegration” and “international integration”, “globalization” and “national social stability”, “market” and “society”, “market” and “state”, “economics” and “politics”, “economics” and “democracy” etc. The current question about the nation-state is at the same time a question about the future of capitalism, the future of a market economy, as well as the future of democracy and the welfare state; it is also a question about political freedom and the still binding, modern social contract according to which there is a clear connection between social and material safety and political freedom. It was Ulrich Beck who strongly formulated the thesis about the broken historical bond between capitalism, welfare state, and democracy. “If global capitalism in the highly developed countries of the West dissolves the core values of the work society, a historical link between capitalism, welfare state and democracy will break apart. Democracy in Europe and North America came into the world as ‘labour democracy’ in the sense that it rested upon participation in gainful employment. Citizens had to earn their money in one way or another, in order to breathe life into political rights and freedoms. Paid labour has always underpinned not only private but also political existence. What is at issue today, then, is not ‘only’ the millions of unemployed, nor only the future of the welfare state, the struggle against poverty, or the possibility of greater social justice. Everything we have is at stake”. The association of capitalism with basic political, social and economic rights, in Beck’s view, is not “some favour’ to be dispensed with when money gets tight”. Rather, “socially buffered capitalism” was an answer to the experiences of fascism and challenges of communism. Therefore, “the simple truth is that without material security there is no political freedom and no democracy, only a threat to everyone from new and old totalitarian regimes and ideologies”.

3 Ibidem, p. 62.
4 Ibidem, pp. 62–63. As Anthony McGrew formulated the point: “For if state sovereignty is no longer conceived as indivisible but shared with international agencies; if states no longer have control over their national territories; and if territorial and political boundaries are increasingly permeable, the core principles of
The question about the possibility of the decline of the nation-state in my account is parallel to that about the human and social consequences of globalization and that about the end of modernity (and, at the same time, about the possible decline of the institution of the university in its modern formulation). These questions form a web that modern thought, without modifying its guiding premises, seems unable to cope with. The new cultural, social, political and economic surroundings brought about by the processes and practices of globalization seems to require a brand new vocabulary. As we obviously do not possess it yet, we keep approaching the phenomena of a new (global) world with old measures and outmoded language.5

Speaking in the most general terms: there is quite an astonishing degree of consent to the view that the specter of globalization and its social and economic practices introduce a new quality to our world: “a sense of rupture with the past pervades the public consciousness of our time”6, and Ulrich Beck describes in sociological terms the current passage from the “first” (national) to the “second” (global) modernity of democratic liberty – that is self-governance, the demos, consent, representation, and popular sovereignty – are made distinctly problematic”. See his “Globalization and Territorial Democracy” in The Transformation of Democracy? he edited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 12.

5 One of the most radical positions recently taken in the globalization/welfare state debates is that of Ramesh Mishra presented in his controversial book Globalization and the Welfare State (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999). In most general terms, for Mishra the collapse of the socialist alternative is a cause of globalization and the decline of the nation-state is its effect. Consequently, “globalization, which must be understood as an economic as well as a political and ideological phenomenon, is without doubt now the essential context of the welfare state” (p. 15). His general description runs as follows: “three major developments in recent decades have altered the economic, political and ideological context of the welfare state in important ways. They are: the collapse of the socialist alternative, the globalization of the economy, and the relative decline of the nation state. Although overlapping and interrelated, each of these has implications for the welfare state which require us to reconsider some of the basic ideas and assumptions which have guided thinking about social policy and social welfare since the Second World War” (p. 1).

as a “fundamental transformation, a paradigm shift”. It can be said that we are facing the decline of the world we have been accustomed to. The question of the role played by the nation-state in the contemporary world and of its future in the face of globalization is a crucial one.

2.

The questions I would see as the most important in this context would be the following: is Francis Fukuyama right, after almost a decade has passed since he formulated his initial stance, when he says in his *The End of History and the Last Man* that the vast part of the world does not know any ideology that could “challenge liberal democracy”, and, which is still more difficult to accept casually, when he says that we are unable to envisage a world “essentially different” from our own world, and better at the same time? Is George Soros, a successful practitioner of capitalism, right when he mentions in his recent *Crisis of Global Capitalism* the “weak” and “difficult” relations between capitalism and democracy? Can the increasingly advanced processes of international integration lead to national political and social disintegration? To what extent has the nation-state participated in, and still participate in, the increasing disintegration of itself by liberalization of the economy, reducing duty barriers, privatization, deregulation and giving bits and pieces of it sovereignty to various political entities by introducing new legal regulations? Is the nation-state still a necessary guarantor of contracts signed and economic promises made? Is it possible for democracy to exist without classical social guarantees, that is to say, in separation from what Beck has called the “work society” – a society that to a lesser or greater degree guarantees material safety to its working citizens? Does globalization

---

necessarily introduce a zero-sum game – for someone to win, someone else has to lose? And if it does, who will be the winners and who the losers of globalization?

And let us ask further questions: to what extent is the nation-state still a socially relevant point of reference through which the state can claim the loyalty of its citizens? What is the authority of the state that, unavoidably, in face of increasing competition on the market for goods and services, gradually retreats from the functions that once, at the time of their emergence in the cultural surroundings of modernity, were its raison d'être? What is the current resonance of such notions as the “nation” or the “national interest” and where does “national identity” come from? What will the social and political consequences be of the state’s retreat from participation in and governance of these most basic, and until recently strategic, domains of the economy or the last domains of social services (e.g. healthcare or higher education)? What are the consequences of the parallel existence of political multi-powers and of the separation of power from the traditional authority of the state? Is the change of balance of power from a relatively autonomous nation-state towards an anonymous, international market as long-lasting as ideologues and followers of neoliberalism want it, or we just have a temporary imbalance from the hitherto existing state-market equilibrium?

And to go even further: is it really the case that the events of “1989” (in Central and Eastern Europe) determined the fate of modernity as a certain cultural and political project? Is the end of modernity – or, as some commentators have put it, the passage to late modernity (Anthony Giddens), and the shift to the “second, global modernity” and the “new Enlightenment” (Ulrich Beck) or, finally, to “postmodernity” (Zygmunt Bauman) – unavoidable, or it was determined by economic globalization and most advanced inventions of high technology? Do we still live in the modern world of national states and, equally, national societies, or have we already found ourselves in a “postnational” world in which there are new rules of the game in every social and political domain, as well as in the economy? Is it really so that the stakes in the current globalization processes are the redefinition of the most essential notions from political philosophy, as some sociologists, political scientists and philosophers
want (from freedom to democracy to the state, market and politics), or we can observe a merely exaggerated attempt to conceptualize a seemingly new world in seemingly redefined terms? In other words, do we face the necessity of working out a new formula of the social contract – guaranteed so far by the nation-state – or we are entering an increasingly globalizing new world without any wider social agreements, in the form that we used to have in the modern age? Where does the fear of integration take its roots from all over the world?

Is globalization, neoliberalism and the social, political, economic and cultural processes strictly associated with them an expression of a “new totalitarianism”, a “two-headed monster of technology and finance”, a “cancer” in the healthy social fabric, a “new faith” and the “good word” as preached by the most important international monetary and economic institutions, as the influential French leftist critic, Ignacio Ramonet, described them recently?10 Is globalization a “social process” or “political rhetoric”?11 Is – and if yes, to what extent – globalization a vast political project promoted in the form of the neutral language of economics and the social sciences? Or maybe neoliberalism is a political project (with almost Marxian aspirations) that is engaged in constructing a new “metaphysics of the free market” (as mentioned by Beck)? Is it the case that after God, Reason, and History – the time has come for the Market, free and deregulated? All the signs indicate that this may be the case.

Thus, there are serious indications that the nation-state as a political and cultural project is in retreat right now in surroundings determined by the process of globalization, which in itself is a subject of heated debates. As Dani Rodrik, an influential American political economist, put it recently: “we need to be upfront about the irreversibility of the many changes that have occurred in the global

---

economy”.12 I have to agree once again with the diagnosis suggested by Ulrich Beck who says that the only constant feature of globalization is the overturning of the central premiss of the “first” i.e. national modernity: the rejection of the idea that “we live and act in the self-enclosed spaces of national states and their respective national societies”.13

Capital, goods, technologies, information and people cross borders in a way that was unimaginable even a couple of years ago: therefore globalization is called “the contraction of time and space” (Bauman) and “the overcoming of distance” (Beck). Within a new global configuration, the economy becomes less and less dependent on politics. Therefore I suppose it is interesting to think about the thesis put forward by the above mentioned Dani Rodrik in his book Has Globalization Gone Too Far?:

the most serious challenge for the world economy in the years ahead lies in making globalization compatible with domestic social and political stability - ... in ensuring that international economic integration does not contribute to domestic social disintegration.14

The power of the state as such is increasingly seen as merely administration and less and less often as the governance of (national) identity.15 Saskia Sassen, an American sociologist of globalization, describes the current situation as the “partial denationalizing of national territory” and as a “partial shift of some components of state sovereignty to other institutions, from supranational entities to the global capital market”16).

4.

The potential decline of nation-states will bring about vast social, economic, and political consequences of a global nature. But what does it actually mean: the decline of the nation-state? This common expression finds numerous explanations. Just to give several of the most recent examples: Susan Strange in her book *The Retreat of the State* refers to the “reversal of the state-market balance of power” and says that the state is undergoing a metamorphosis brought on by structural change in world society and the economy. “... [I]t can no longer make the exceptional claims and demands that it once did. It is becoming, once more and as in the past, just one more source of authority among several, with limited powers and resources”.17 Martin Albrow goes even further when he states that “effectively the nation-state no longer contains the aspirations nor monopolizes the attention of those who live on its territory. The separation of the nation-state from the social relations of its citizens is by no means complete, but it has advanced a long way” or, to put it in a nutshell, “society and the nation-state have pulled apart”.18 Ulrich Beck describing the “second modernity” claims that

the advent of globalization involves not only an erosion of the tasks and institutions of the state, but also a fundamental transformation of its underlying premisses. The second modernity brings into being, alongside the world society of national states, a powerful non-state world society different from previously existing forms of political legitimization, which is made up of transnational players of the most diverse kinds.19

Globalization in his account brings about a society that is multidimensional, polycentric and contingent, and in which the national and the transnational coexist with each other. What is at

stake in the globalization campaign is not only the fate of the nation-state: it is also political freedom, democracy and the substance of politics, for if global capitalism dissolves the core values of the work society, "a historical link between capitalism, welfare state and democracy will break apart". Welfare state was an integrated national state in which there was no big difference between wealth and national wealth – which may no longer be the case, which in the most dramatic way was presented by Robert B. Reich in *The Work of Nations* and by the passage from the metaphor of the citizens being in the same large boat (called "the national economy") to the metaphor of the citizens being increasingly in different, smaller, individual boats. In Reich's view, Americans (or citizens of any other nations, for that matter) are no longer in the same economic boat, there is no longer any common economic fate of citizens of a given nation. The centrifugal forces of the global economy tear at the ties binding citizens of national states together.

Finally, in thinking about the nation-state today it is important to avoid the global/national duality, as Saskia Sassen keeps reminding us both in her *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* and in the recent *Globalization and Its Discontents*: it is not simply that the national state is just losing significance, it is not simply that "what one

---


21 Robert B. Reich's theses seemed very radical in the beginning of the 1990s when his *Work of Nations. Preparing Ourselves for the 21st Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992) was published. After a decade, in the (unknown then) context of the "knowledge societies" (and knowledge economies), they seem much more plausible: "We are living through a transformation that will rearrange the politics and economics of the coming century. There will be no *national* products or technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There will no longer be national economies, at least as we have come to understand that concept. All that will remain rooted within national borders are the people who comprise a nation. Each nation's primary assets will be its citizens' skills and insights". And further on: "Underlying all such discussions is the assumption that our citizens are in the same large boat, called the national economy. There are different levels of income within the boat, of course ... Yet all of us are lifted and propelled along together. The poorest and the wealthiest and everyone in between enjoy the benefits of a national economy that is buoyant, and we all suffer the consequences of an economy in the doldrums (pp. 3-4, emphasis mine)."
wins, the other loses”, because “the state itself has been a key agent in the implementation of global processes, and it has emerged quite altered by this participation” and it is engaged in “the production of legality around new forms of economic activity”. In this light the alternatives of “states or markets” may not be as sharp as it looks at first sight and thinking about the nation-state, national identity and democracy leads us to thinking about globalization and the question whether we regard it as still a “choice” or already a “reality”. To the question of whether the state will disappear, my answer would be it will not; but what remains will certainly not be the state as we know it. It will no longer be a provider of public and social services and it will become more of an arbiter between competing, mainly economic, forces, guaranteeing fair play for all the participants of the game.

Thus, national identity, as we have indicated, seems to have ceased to play a crucial role in the social life of contemporary technologically advanced, free countries of our late modern society (as Susan Strange puts it: “today it is much more doubtful that the state ... can still claim a degree of loyalty from the citizen substantially greater than the loyalty given to family, to the firm, to the political party or even in some case to the local football team”).

5.

Finally, to move on to the contemporary “question of the modern university” (as can be seen from such splendid volumes as Currie and Newson’s Universities and Globalization or Peter Scott’s The Globalization

---

25 See the exchange between Thomas L. Friedman and Ignacio Ramonet in Foreign Policy, Fall 1999, which shows the difference between French and American attitudes toward globalization.
of Higher Education\textsuperscript{27}), the questions asked above could be reformulated with respect to this institution: is the university in danger of introducing practices of management taken directly from the world of business together with the Geist of globalization? Will the university in its late-modern version still be able to give birth to judgements that are critical of society and to provide a haven for their authors? Are scholars about to become – to use two descriptions from American sociology of the academic profession – “entrepreneurs” and “academic capitalists”? Is academic activity destined to have an exceptional status, and the university as an institution an exceptional place in our changing culture? Is globalization, to draw the picture a bit larger again, a (Foucauldian) “regime of truth”, a new intellectual fundamentalism, as one can hear e.g. in France? And, finally, is higher education merely a private and individual good or still a public and social good?

At the same time a less cultural and philosophical and more economic and political context could be described in the following manner: Western democracies are in the process of a vast reformulation of their institutions of the welfare state; and the modern university, as a significant user of public resources, is a part of it. The state, it seems, is unable to satisfy the growing needs of the Academy if it wants to satisfy a large number of other needs with decreasing financial resources at its disposal.\textsuperscript{28}

Social and cultural changes today occur with a speed that was unimaginable to us a few decades ago. The world is changing faster and faster and the university has a smaller and smaller influence on the direction these changes take. It is no longer a partner for power (of the nation-state); it has become one among several claimants with budgetary needs. Participants in the current debate about the future of the university certainly have to avoid the survivalist mentality;


otherwise what Zygmunt Bauman says about globalization in general – “it is not about what we all ... wish or hope to do. It is about what is happening to us all”\textsuperscript{29} – will, in particular, come true in respect of the globalization of higher education. The logic of consumerism provides us with the (American) idea of “excellence in education”, behind which there are the ideals of the most quickly acquired, most useful and best-selling knowledge. As numerous commentators of the phenomenon write – it is right here that the university as an institution becomes a bureaucratically-governed, consumer-oriented corporation.\textsuperscript{30}

6.

To sum up: rethinking the social, political and cultural consequences of globalization is a crucial task for the social sciences. The decline of the nation-state – even seen as only existing to give some of its powers to new transnational political players – is inextricably connected to the violent globalization processes, which, consequently, may lead to the redefinition of such fundamental social science notions as democracy, freedom and politics. In the situation generated by the emergence of the global market and the global economy, a constant dialogue is needed about the new relationship between capitalism and democracy, as much as about new relationship between the economy and politics. Philosophically speaking, the decline of the nation-state goes hand in hand with the end of modernity, and postmodernity, philosophically seen as the end of the political and cultural project of the Enlightenment (called “The Modern Project” by Habermas), may turn out to be merely the

\textsuperscript{29} Zygmunt Bauman, \textit{Globalization. The Human Consequences}, op. cit., p. 60.

\textsuperscript{30} From a practical perspective, see: \textit{Wise Moves in Hard Times. Creating and Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities} by David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell, Jr. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996) which does not leave a shadow of a doubt about the general direction in which the university as an institution is moving. Its aim is “providing an attractive product at a fair price – giving society value for its money” (p. 26).
vanguard that points to processes leading in a more or less unavoidable direction towards a new, unknown, global age. The philosophy that gave a conceptual framework to modernity and the Enlightenment (and at the same time to the modern institution of the university and the modern figure of the intellectual) should try to prepare its instruments to meet the brand new challenges brought about by globalization: it is its prime social responsibility today.
The university in the form we are familiar with – the modern university – derives from the intellectual work of German philosophers: from Kant and Fichte to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Being a modern institution, it is relatively new and was born together with the rise in national aspirations and the rise in the significance of nation-states in the 19th century.¹ A tacit deal made between power and knowledge provided scholars, on the one hand, with unprecedented institutional possibilities and, on the other, obliged them to support national culture and to help in fostering citizenship among the people of nation-states. The alliance between modern knowledge and modern power gave rise to the foundations of the modern institution of the university. Both European, as well as American universities were either founded or transformed² on the

¹ See Björn Wittrock, “The Modern University: the Three Transformations” in The European and American University since 1800, ed. by Sheldon Rothblatt and Björn Wittrock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): “Universities form part and parcel of the very same process which manifests itself in the emergence of an industrial economic order and the nation-state as the most typical and most important form of political organisation” (p. 305).

basis of the project written by Wilhelm von Humboldt for the University of Berlin (1808).³

The place, social function and role of the university as one of the most significant modern institutions were clearly determined. But currently, when the cultural, political, and philosophical project of modernity is undergoing radical transformations (toward late-modernity, or even postmodernity), it is no longer certain what the exact place of the university in society is, for society itself is changing. As Bill Readings has observed penetratingly in his reflections about the "posthistorical university": "... the wider social role of the University as an institution is now up for grabs. It is no longer clear what the place of the University within society nor what the exact nature of that society is".⁴ The uncertainty about the future position of the institution of the university in culture (as well as – in the economy) is growing together with the structural changes occurring in the economy, culture, and politics: small nation-states are often no longer equal partners with global capital.⁵ The nation-state as a political and cultural project – but unfortunately not particular nationalisms – is declining in the surroundings determined by globalization⁶ (these processes can be clearly seen both in the case of

³ Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren Wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin" in Philosophies de l'Université. L'idéalisme allemand et la question de l'Université, ed. by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut et al. (Paris: Payot, 1979). The most important exceptions were universities following the French (Napoleonic) model and universities following the Anglo-Saxon tradition.


⁵ See e.g. Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams. Imperial Corporations and the New World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).

⁶ As Ulrich Beck explains, while transnational corporations are growing in number and diversity, what is decisive about them is that, in the course of globalization, they are able "to play off national states against one another". Beck goes on to argue that "looked at from outside, everything has remained as it was. Companies produce, rationalize, hire and fire, pay taxes, and so on. The crucial point, however, is that they no longer do this
the countries from the European Union and the Central and Eastern European countries entering it, as well as in the countries of the two Americas.\textsuperscript{7}

One could risk the following statement: in an age of globalization, national identity ceases to be the most important social glue and therefore its production, cultivation and inculcation – that is, the ideals that stood behind the modern project of the university – ceases to be a crucial social task. And let us remember here what Humboldt wrote in his “Deductive Plan of an Institution of Higher Learning to be Founded in Berlin”: what is at stake is “an essential matter of national Bildung”.\textsuperscript{8}

The traditional, modern social mission of the university as an institutional arm of the nation-state has been seemingly unexpectedly questioned after two centuries of cultural domination. The university as we know it – the modern university – is in a delicate and complicated position at the moment: it may be that the great cultural project of the Enlightenment that has located the university in the very center of culture – in partnership with the institution of the nation-state – has finally outlived itself. After two hundred years it is no longer certain what the great regulatory idea could be to which the university in search of its present \textit{raison d’être} could refer. In its modern beginnings, in Kant in \textit{The Conflict of the Faculties}, the regulatory idea in question was the Enlightenment concept of reason.\textsuperscript{9}

\textit{under rules of the game defined by national states, but continue to play the old game while nullifying and redefining those rules. It thus only appears to be a question of the old game of labour and capital, state and unions". Consequently, “while one player continues to play the game within the framework of the national state, the other is already playing within the framework of world society ... It is as if employees, unions, and government were still playing draughts, while the transnational corporations had moved on to chess (\textit{What Is Globalization?}, op. cit., pp. 64–65, last emphasis mine).

\textsuperscript{7} As the above mentioned Barnet and Cavanagh say: “... no political ideology or economic theory has yet evolved to take account of the tectonic shift that has occurred. The modern nation-state ... looks more and more like an institution of a bygone era”, \textit{Global Dreams}, op. cit., p. 19.

\textsuperscript{8} Wilhelm von Humboldt, “Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren Wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin”, op. cit., p. 351.

then, in Schleiermacher and Humboldt, the idea was culture (in an active sense of Bildung, cultivating oneself as a subject of the nation-state, that is as a just citizen of the German nation-state about to be born). 10

The university seems to be no longer capable of maintaining its modern role of a cultural institution closely connected (sometimes very closely, or too closely, which would require additional comments) with the nation-state of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Europe and with the welfare state of the second half of the 20th century. 11 In the increasingly globalized world of today

10 See in this context Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Founding of the University of Berlin, ed. by Herbert Richardson (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984). The texts about the institution of the university written by German philosophers of the turn of the 19th century were gathered in the French volume Philosophies de l'Université. L'idéalisme allemand et la question de l'Université, op. cit.

11 The golden era of the Western European welfare state seems to be over and nation-states have fewer and fewer policy options open to them today; there is no discussion with facts, data and their interpretations. Jürgen Habermas in his Postnational Constellation. Political Essays (transl. by M. Pensky, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001) is in agreement here with Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, Scott Lash and Zygmunt Bauman as well as many other contemporary thinkers: “the welfare state mass democracies on the Western model now face the end of a 200-year developmental process that began with the revolutionary birth of modern nation-states” (p. 60). He dubs the new reality the “postnational constellation” and presents his diagnosis: “the phenomena of the territorial state, the nation, and a popular economy constituted within national borders formed a historical constellation in which the democratic process assumed a more or less convincing institutional form”. What happened today is that “developments summarized under the term ‘globalization’ have put this entire constellation into question” (p. 60). The dilemma national governments face today derives from the zero-sum game into which they have been forced and is described by Habermas in the following manner: “necessary economic objectives can be reached only at the expense of social and political objectives”. The dilemma is elaborated in the form of two theses: “first, the economic problems besetting affluent societies can be explained by a structural transformation of the world economic system, a transformation characterized by the term ‘globalization’. Second, this transformation so radically reduces nation-states’ capacity for action that the options remaining open to them are not sufficient to shield their populations from the undesired social and political consequences of a transnational economy” (p. 51). Habermas acknowledges the significance of the impact of current global transformations on the traditional European welfare state models and on the
references made to national culture as the raison d'être of the university sound less and less convincing, especially considering the fact that the state itself, the partner upholding the other side of the agreement, together with the transformations it is undergoing under global pressures, is disregarding – out of necessity? – its past obligations with respect to the university.

The whole (university) world is perfectly aware of the fact that there will probably never be a return to the level of financing universities (both in the natural sciences and in the humanities) from the Cold War era. A United Europe, it seems, does not need a narrowly defined national university, for teaching and research are to aim at harmonization rather than isolation of particular national traditions (in a widely understood "European" or sometimes "global" identity – that is to say, more or less "American", although some reservations may have to be introduced here). References to reason, culture or to mere practice, usefulness and effectiveness are no longer persuasive in culture. These ideas are no longer politically and economically resonant because the global configuration of politics and the economy has changed: within the new configuration, the economy is increasingly less dependent on politics. Power as such is increasingly seen as merely administration and less and less often as the governance of (national) identity. References made to (Humboldt's) culture and (Kant's) rationality as regulatory ideas standing behind the functioning of the present institution of the university no longer ring social and political bells as they do not seem necessary anymore in an era of globalized capitalism: the idea of capacity of national governments to conduct national policies, traditionally ascribed to the nation-states. His conclusions are clear-cut and reflect a deeply historical perspective in seeing recent half a century in Europe: "no matter how one looks at it, the globalization of the economy destroys a historical constellation that made the welfare state compromise temporarily possible. Even if this compromise was never the ideal solution for a problem inherent within capitalism itself, it nevertheless held capitalism's social costs within tolerable limits" (p. 52).

national culture ceases to be crucial for the present functioning of the state and the state as such, also out of necessity (for instance, out of the fear of economic isolation) seems to be increasingly less national in the classical sense of the term.

Thus, the *raison d'être* of the university as a significant partner of the nation-state has exhausted itself. The university, in its traditional modern form, can no longer be the partner of the nation-state as this is incompatible with the development of global consumerism. Therefore, together with the decline of modernity as a social, political and cultural project there has been a decline in the political and economic role of the nation-state, brought about by the global circulation of capital, and the decreasing role of the state goes hand in hand with the decreasing role of its modern ideological arm – the university.\(^{13}\) While we can see quite easily the transformations in the economy and politics,\(^ {14}\) it is a bit more difficult to see the changes occurring at the other end of the power/knowledge relationship, the one of knowledge. Power and its character have changed and therefore, out of necessity, knowledge and its character had to change. (The historicity of the two projects was perhaps most fully presented in Michel Foucault’s historical-philosophical accounts of modernity: human sciences and social sciences in their current forms

---

\(^{13}\) Andy Green in his *Education, Globalization and the Nation-State* (London: McMillan Press, 1997) asks about the role of education in a “post-national era” and claims that according to globalization theories the system of national education becomes “defunct, at once irrelevant, anachronistic and impossible” (p. 3ff.).

\(^{14}\) As Janice Dudley claims in a collective volume *Universities and Globalization. Critical Perspectives* ed. by Janice Newson and Jan Currie (London: Sage, 1998): “The state is cast as increasingly irrelevant when confronted by the ‘reality’ of ungovernable international/global market forces. Nation-states are essentially ineffective in the face of global market forces, so that the era of the powerful nation-state would appear effectively to be over. National economic management, and national political and social policies are becoming increasingly irrelevant. International markets and international capital markets operate outside of the control of national governments ... The state is reduced to the role of the ‘night watchmen’ of classical liberalism – maintaining law and order, protecting the sanctity of contract, and providing only the level of welfare necessary to protect property and facilitate the free operation of capitalist markets” (p. 27).
appeared by reason of the powerful demand of modern states already born or about to be born. Although Foucault only talked about criminology, psychology, psychiatry, medicine etc. – perhaps similar genealogical questions could be asked about the institution of the university?)

Perhaps the institution of the modern nation-state and that of the modern university have so far remained in harmonious and fruitful equilibrium because the modern centres of power and knowledge have remained in equilibrium? Two parallel products of modernity, the nation-state and the modern university, have been in an amazing and long-term symbiosis (and it is worth keeping in mind that before the appearance of the modern university it was not easy for scholars and philosophers to live: as Krzysztof Pomian claims in his The Past as an Object of Knowledge, there was no institutional place for them unless they were directly useful to monarchies or churches. Describing scholars’ main activity in pre-revolutionary France he said: “writing letters was one of the most important actions taken by any erudite...

An awareness of the fact that the university, invented and presented to the world by nineteenth century German thinkers, is a culturally and historically determined product is increasingly common. Nothing determines in advance its shape, tasks and functions, or the expectations made of it and the requirements enforced on it by the culture and society it is immersed in. The university in its modern form is a child of modernity, it grows older together with it and is susceptible to political, economic and social transformation as much as any other (modern) institution. The tradition of twenty five centuries of Plato’s Academy, or of eight centuries of the University in Bologna, seems irrelevant.

Modern university would not have been invented if Enlightenment thinkers had not been able to show, for the first time in the history of European consciousness, that the progress of knowledge and the progress of politics go hand in hand (as shown by Allan Bloom in his controversial The Closing of the American Mind). According to Bloom, the Enlightenment was a brave philosophical undertaking because its aim was to restructure political and
intellectual life in such a way that in its totality it should fall under the supervision of philosophy and science. Thus, higher education provided the foundations for liberal democracy and was a reservoir of its principles. But what happens, we may ask, when the traditional political architecture is changed, silently and irresistibly, by the processes of globalization? What happens when political progress does not seem to be strictly connected with the progress of knowledge? What happens when knowledge in the sense of knowledge developed at the traditional modern university, according to the best German ideals of the dyad of teaching and research, ceases to be politically crucial? When its past social necessity is replaced with merely possibility? What I mean here is the case of classical studies: they were necessary, perhaps even crucial for the arts and sciences, as long as the social world was seen from the perspective of comparisons with, or debates about, antiquity. As long as eyes were turned backwards in search of a new model (and the model supposedly was ancient Greece at the time of Pericles). But when the perspective changed, the importance of classical studies decreased considerably and what remained was classical philology. Perhaps a similar story could be told about the modern university.

The question may be the following: what universal legitimizing set of ideas can be found for the university when the grand narrative (Lyotard’s métarécit), within which the university was useful for the fostering of liberal, reasonable citizens of the nation-state, seems to be over? Is it possible at all in these increasingly postmodern times to find such a firm (and convincing) grand narrative? The scientist – as well as the humanist and the philosopher – has long ago ceased to be the historical hero he or she used to be in the Enlightenment, and, to an extent, in Positivism.15

Perhaps, as the idea of “culture” (and especially, but not exclusively, “national” culture) ceases to be effective for the functioning of the institution of the university – the idea of culture worked out by German philosophers and accepted all over the world

15 Among philosophers, this decline in the social role of these figures is most notably shown by Richard Rorty. See Chapters 1 and 2.
as a regulatory idea standing behind the functioning of the university – new ideas have to be sought. It turns out, though, that finding such grand ideas, ones not deprived of social reference, is very difficult, if not impossible, in the set of ideas we currently have at our disposal. At the same time the ruthless logic of consumerism provides us with the idea of “excellence in education” (where the university as an institution goes over to the side of bureaucratically-governed and consumer-oriented corporations, the crucial words for the description of the university becoming “managerial”, “corporate”, and “entrepreneurial”.

Thus the university is increasingly free to teach and do research, as it has ceased as an institution to function in an ideological manner. Therefore its attractiveness for the state has decreased. The direct link that has existed in the last two centuries, and the direct contract between the state and university, has been broken. It is difficult to say by which side of the contract: one side is afraid to speak it out loud, the other is never willing to ask so as not to lose its last illusions. The university seems no longer required for the preparation of citizens of nation-states for reliable service to the nation as the service itself is becoming increasingly less important, and the state itself in the form we know it is becoming less and less significant.

Thus: national consciousness, as we have already indicated, has ceased to play a crucial role in the social life of current technologically

16 The late Bill Readings writes precisely about the “University of Excellence”.

17 It is important to note two significant books that have appeared within a decade: Janice Newson, Howard Buchbinder, The University Means Business. Universities, Corporations and Academic Work (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988) and Universities and Globalization. Critical Perspectives , ed. by Jan Currie and Janice Newson (London: Sage, 1998). Both present a precise report and detailed interpretation by sociologists and political scientists of the phenomena occurring at anglophone universities. They show the way the ideology of the free market is entering the university in the form of practices drawn directly from the corporate world (high-level management, rectors as CEO’s, nominated rather than elected deans; accountability, privatization, performance indicators etc.).

18 The modern institution of the university in Poland does not fall under the evolution described here for obvious historical reasons. But it may face, or already does face, the same challenges that globalization and its ideology bring about.
advanced states, and national identity has ceased to be the most important social glue of the late-modern society. The hitherto existing social task, taking care of the intellectual life of the inhabitants of the rational nation-state, no longer suffices for the present functioning of the institution of the university. The university, surely enough, still functions, but in an increasingly defective manner: it either refers to the logic of production and consumption (of knowledge), that is to say, it sells its products with better or worse results; or struggles violently against the state, which is generally, all over the world, less and less willing (and able) to support the university, which in turn refers to its rights gained in modern culture. (The fact that the state, in practice rather than in theory, is less and less concerned about the fate of the university derives from a cold calculation that is rarely affected by a deeper consciousness of the cultural changes I am writing about here: the university is no longer a partner with the state; it has become a petitioner, and is treated like a petitioner. As the editors of an important recent book *Higher Education Under Fire* sadly remark: *we are no longer a high priority...*19).

The questions to be asked could be formulated in the following manner: what is the future of the university if deprived of its modern culture-, state-, and nation-oriented mission? Does the university really have to drift toward the model of a better and better managed corporation, a bureaucratic structure fighting in the marketplace against the competition of other, similar, isolated bureaucratic structures in search of consumers for the educational services they want to sell? Is help in gaining professional knowledge as significant a social mission as, until recently, the help in gaining national consciousness was? What, in a social sense, would a (potential) university of mere consumers be like?20


20 See especially discussions about the “unique” place of higher education in society contrasted with its current “survivalist” mood in *The Postmodern University? Contested Visions of Education in Society*, ed. by Anthony Smith and Frank Webster (London: Open University Press, 1997). The only option still open for the university to
The university in its modern form was invented in order to transform the social world into a more reasonable one with the help of the state and without revolution. What is today's university to do? What can it change when we hear about the non-alternative character of the present world and when some, like Francis Fukuyama already a decade ago, mentioned the “end of history” in this context? Is the university merely to cultivate a tradition and be a source of older knowledge and older wisdom on the one hand, and on the other to train the so-called professionals in the most profit-making and most marketable fields?

The present questions about the university can be derived once again from the “foundational” texts of this institution: the texts by German Idealists and Romantics. In this context it is worthwhile returning to texts by Newman and Dewey, and closer in time to Allan Bloom, E.D. Hirsch and Richard Rorty in America or to Nietzsche, Jaspers, Heidegger, and more recently Jürgen Habermas, Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Zygmunt Bauman in Europe (and in Poland to texts by Kazimierz Twardowski, Władysław Strózewski, Sergiusz Hessen, Florian Znaniecki, Klemens Szaniawski, and most recently, by Zbigniew Drozdowicz, Lech Witkowski and Jerzy Brzeziński). It would be interesting to study in this context also Rousseau’s attacks on academia and Nietzsche’s attacks on the institution of the university.

The questions about the modern university are inseparable from a more general question about modernity as a large cultural, social and political project. It is only in this context, I suppose, that we can reach the intentions that modernity ascribed to the university, and try to reformulate it for the purposes of today’s, changed and still changing, world of late-modernity. It is surely possible to pretend that nothing has happened (and nothing will happen) but the state no longer sees its direct interest in more seriously financing an institution that may have already lost its state- and nation-oriented role in society.21

defend itself today is to stress the unique nature of the university experience as such which, to tell the truth, is not enough.

21 I am leaving aside in this text the fascinating, although ideological, discussions that took place in the USA in the 1990s about the university. They mirror the current
The institution of the university is not the only one that is affected, or may be soon affected, by the gradual completion of the project of modernity. Another modern product, the figure of the intellectual in the form we are familiar from Zola to Sartre (and perhaps even to Foucault) in France, is undergoing an equally radical crisis of identity. It is also the intellectual that turns out to be closely, for better or for worse, associated with modernity. Doubts about modernity, incredulity towards it (and towards its metanarratives - the paraphrased definition of postmodernity according to Lyotard) go hand in hand with doubts about the figure of the intellectual. Therefore, incidentally, one can often hear that “the confidence of intellectuals in their own activities has been reduced and there is no one available to speak for the university”. Undoubtedly, in this context it would be interesting to study the relationship between the figure of the intellectual and the institution of the modern university - from the perspective of the tasks imposed on both by the project of modernity.

The decline of modernity turns out to be a painful process for culture: once again it has to reformulate the aims of its social institutions and the tasks of its cultural heroes. If it is successful, the institutions and cultural heroes in question will regain their cultural vitality; if it is not, they will fall into cultural sterility. The traditional figure of the intellectual seems untenable in a more and more postmodern cultural surrounding (it was the already several times struggles for intellectual hegemony between conservatives and the left, and from that perspective either attacked or defended the university. From a philosophical point of view they are not important, although from the point of view of American culture and society they proved crucial for the process of gradually changing the attitude of the American public to the institution of the university. Let me mention three of them here: Martin Anderson, Impostors in the Temple (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals. How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1992), and Dinesh D’Souza, Illiberal Education. The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (New York: The Free Press, 1991). Philosophically, more important seems to be Bruce Wiltshire’s The Moral Collapse of the University (New York: SUNY, 1990) and, especially, Allan Bloom’s best-selling and controversial The Closing of the American Mind, published in 1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster).

Anthony Smith and Frank Webster, “Changing Ideas of the University” in The Postmodern University?, op. cit., p. 5.
mentioned French theorist, Jean-François Lyotard who gave us a "tomb for the intellectual"23). The modern institution of the university may face a similar fate: either it is going to accept the rules of bureaucratic, consumer-oriented corporations, or it will have to try once again to find a new regulative idea or a totally new role in culture about which little is known at the moment and which would have to be as transformative as the role suggested for the university by Kant, Humboldt, Fichte or Schleiermacher (the differences between them notwithstanding).24 The breakthrough in the conception of the university two hundred years ago was an event equal in importance to the vast social and cultural transformations of that time. It is hard to tell whether there will appear new ideas about the university comparable in significance to the ideas of German Idealists.

We have to bear in mind in this context that the role of the institution of the university proposed by German thinkers at the turn of the 19th century was strictly connected with what was going on in the surrounding world of that time. The idea of a modern university was not born out of nowhere. It can be called the alliance of power and knowledge, following Michel Foucault; it can also be called the alliance of science and politics (the ultimate consequence of which was the relationship of American science with American politics during the Cold War, about which Noam Chomsky recently writes as about the blank pages of the American academia25). But the idea of the modern university can also be recognized as making perfect sense in terms of the needs of newly or about to be born nation-states and a natural intrusion of the sciences into the changing social surroundings.


24 Let us remember what was the situation of the university before German ideas became accepted. As Björn Wittrock in "The Modern University: the Three Transformations" says, "there can be little doubt that radical German philosophy helped resurrect the very notion of a university at a time when the university in Europe had been more threatened than perhaps at any time before or afterwards" (op. cit., p. 314).

Following this theme, one could ask the following: what can the basis be today for the university as an institution, in a world that is more and more disenchanted and pluralistic, cosmopolitan, multicultural and multiethnic (and I mean here a strictly determined institution defined by the Great Charter of European Universities signed in 1988 in Bologna26).

Suddenly, after two centuries of standing arm in arm with the nation-state, the modern institution of the university has to look for a new raison d'être, a new justification, a new legitimation of its – extremely high – place in culture. Obviously, it can be said that nothing has changed, because firstly, the processes I am mentioning here, as can be seen from the accounts of American sociologists and political scientists, take many years; and secondly, they have not necessarily appeared here, in Central Europe. But we do know anyway that the evolution of the social world in Central Europe is very fast indeed and it may turn out that in a moment we will face similar problems to those that the university already faces in Anglophone countries from New Zealand and Australia to Canada and the USA. It is a good idea, I suppose, to think about them in advance, and look for possible solutions even before the precise problems are present.

It would be possible to escape the traps of globalization with respect to the institution of the university if the university found some great idea (and a great narrative standing behind it) that it could see as its own. The idea of reason and the idea of (national) culture were such ideas, perhaps the ideals of civil society could become such an idea. But we need to make sure these ideals are not too “grand”, so that they will not be rejected together with a general rejection of (or “incredulity toward”, as Lyotard put it) the grand narratives of modernity. How are the ideals of civil society to be

---

26 It was Zbigniew Drozdowicz who reminded us about the contents of that charter in his book Excellentia Universitatis. Szkice o uniwersytecie [Excellentia Universitatis. Essays on the University] (Poznań: Humaniora, 1995) and it was Jerzy Brzeziński who commented on this charter in a Polish context in his “Considerations about the University” in Edukacja i zmiana społeczna [Education and the Social Change], ed. by Jerzy Brzeziński and Lech Witkowski (Toruń: UMK, 1994).
recontextualized so that they do not appear too modern, that is to say, too enchanted and ideological? How are the ideals of civil society to be worked through so that they do not disappear together with the large social projects brought about by the Enlightenment and French Revolution? If such a direction of thinking fails, the probable outcome for the university would be a conversion to the pure logic of gains and losses, production and consumption, from which there is no escape towards its traditional roles and tasks. One could ask about the relevance of discussions about the university presented at the university itself, that is, from the inside. No matter who asks, though, it is worthwhile to ask because the discourse of globalization does not take into account the subtleties of tradition that indicate the fundamental place of the university in culture.

What is important is to look at the status of the university through the status of its most ideologically (or culturally) significant disciplines in modernity: philosophy, history or literary studies (depending on the period of time and the country in question). It is no accident that these disciplines are in the deepest ferment and that it is in them that the most important debates about postmodernity and modernity (as well as its other product – the figure of the intellectual) are held. Present cultural, political and economic transformations seem to undermine the foundations of the modern model of the university. It seems to face a radical reformulation of its founding ideas. For two hundred years no identity crisis of the university has been so serious, but after two hundred years a tectonic shift may be coming in the fundamental role played so far by the nation-states that contributed to the appearance of the modern university in the form we know it. Therefore the questions about the cultural future of "Europe" are – in a small part – also questions about the future of the university, a child of modernity born from the inspiration provided by German philosophy.
The Emergent European Educational Policies Under Scrutiny. 
The Bologna Process from a Central European Perspective

1. 

The Bologna process of creating the European Higher Education Area and the simultaneous, gradual emergence of the European Research Area can be viewed as two sides of the same coin: that of the redefinition of the roles, missions, tasks, and obligations of the institution of the university in Europe's rapidly changing and increasingly market-driven and knowledge-based societies and economies. Both teaching and research are undergoing substantial transformations today and the institution of the university, that until fairly recently had been an almost exclusive site for hosting these two interrelated activities, in all probability will not be able to avoid the process of substantial, in part planned and in part chaotic, transformations of its functioning.

Whatever view we share about the two parallel processes, they are already relatively well advanced in some countries and being promoted all over Europe, including Central and East European accession countries and the Balkans (called here most often, for the sake of brevity, the “transition countries” or “the region”). While the effects of the emergence of the European Research Area are basically restricted to the beneficiaries of research funds available from the EU, the Bologna process may potentially influence the
course of change in the national higher education systems of its 40 signatory countries. Some may call the process a true European integration of the various higher education systems, notwithstanding their huge differences; though official documents usually refer to the "diversity" of countries and institutions involved – but one thing is certain: the Bologna process in its present geographical, economic and political composition faces the tremendous challenge of keeping to a single pace of changes in all the countries involved. Judging from the experience of well over a decade of social and economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, to keep the process going at one speed is going to be very difficult; in the coming years, most probably, further developments in the process will require separate tracks accompanied by recommendations for the most urgent parts of the reforms, separate recommendations for future challenges and, most importantly, separate sets of policy recommendations for clusters of countries implementing reforms at different speeds – if the reforms are not going to become just a theoretical exercise for a number of countries in the region.

Even though there were separate tracks in the setting up of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and the European Research Area (ERA), there has been clear convergence between them recently. (We can distinguish between three tracks in recent developments: the Magna Charta Universitatum signed in Bologna in 1988 by rectors of European universities initiated the track of higher education institutions, followed by the Salamanca and Graz Conventions in 2001 and 2003; the Sorbonne – Bologna – Prague and Berlin meetings have been all on the track of national ministers of education/governments; and the last track is that at EU level which consists of various communiqués by the European Commission as well as other documents, the first being Towards a European Research Area in 2000, the two most recent being The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge and Researchers in the European Research Area: One Profession, Multiple Careers, both of 2003). Recently, the supranational, intergovernmental and inter-institutional levels are being increasingly mixed. As Pavel Zgaga stresses in his recent report, in the light of EU
enlargement, the convergence between the Bologna process and EU educational policy-making will be even more visible.\(^1\)

The whole process might come to a halt if the academic profession is not convinced of the new opportunities it provides, and is not supported by new incentives to implement it. On the other hand, I have to agree with Albert Amaral and António Magalhaes’s warning signal that "If the Bologna convergence process gets out of the control of academics and becomes a feud of European bureaucracy, then one may well see a process of homogenization, and this represents another factor endangering the traditional role of the European universities".\(^2\) There is a danger that the Bologna process may turn out to be a theoretical exercise in the region. But the two parallel processes of creating a common European higher education area and a common European research area, the practices of "core" European countries, are not theoretical at all: what already occurs is the rechannelling of European research funds, changing research and development policies, as well as the recognition of diplomas for educational and professional purposes and mobility for academic and professional purposes on the increasingly integrated European labor market. The danger is that there may those who are in it (and may be winners) and those who will potentially be out of it (and may be losers), especially as far as EU funding for research activities (as a consequence of the emergence of the ERA) are concerned. As Guy Neave put it in his thought-provoking paper on European integration in higher education, "the 'Bologna process' has now reached the stage when principles begin to assume institutional form".\(^3\) What he meant, I believe, was that it is high time to review the Bologna process before practical decisions are made.

---


\(^3\) Guy Neave, "Anything Goes: Or, How the Accommodation of Europe's Universities to European Integration Integrates - an Inspiring Number of Contradictions". Paper delivered at EAIR Forum, Porto, September 2001, p. 2.
On reading documents and reports, the Bologna process in its present form seems relatively closed to global developments in higher education: it may be perceived as largely inward-looking, focused mostly on European regional problems and European regional solutions, in the relative absence of references to global changes in higher education and the huge political and economic changes underlying them.4

There are many issues in which Bologna has been (until recently) relatively uninterested, for example the GATS negotiations and the role of "borderless" education, the emerging private and for-profit sectors in higher education, the role of powerful market forces in higher education, the clearly declining public funds which governments are able and willing to spend on higher education,5 the differences in the challenges faced by the EU-15 and the transition countries etc. Some recommendations provided by the Trends III report seem abstract, especially with respect to the transition countries.

The general feeling one gets while reading the Bologna documents is that they talk about relatively homogeneous higher education and research structures with fairly similar problems and facing fairly similar challenges for the future. Despite numerous references to the "diversity" of systems, cultural and linguistic differences, varying degrees in the implementation of the process in various countries so far, it is very difficult to read the Bologna documents as if it applies to the same degree to Germany or France on the one hand, and Albania, Macedonia and Russia on the other, to give the most striking examples of Bologna signatory countries. What level of generality in describing challenges and providing recommendations for action is


5 As Henry et al. sadly remarked, "though education is now deemed more important than ever for the competitive advantage of nations, the commitment and capacity of governments to fund it have weakened considerably". Miriam Henry, Bob Lingard, Fazal Rizvi, and Sandra Taylor, The OECD, Globalisation and Education Policy (Amsterdam: Pergamon, 2001), p. 31.
needed if they are to refer to the countries in question? What do these contrasted national systems of higher education have in common today the moment we leave the most general level of analysis? The relevant analysis comprising both the EU-15 and the transition countries is going to be a huge challenge for the future.

Certainly, it is possible to introduce changes in these second tier countries on an official, especially legislative level. It may be relatively easy, compared with other spheres of action, to change the laws on higher education and its accompanying legal framework, especially if the Bologna process assumptions of catching up with the West are used for promotional purposes. Who in the region, at least declaratively, would not want to be integrated with (West) European universities in common higher education and research “areas”? But certainly changing the law is not the only way to reach the objectives of the Bologna process although it may be understood in this way by many officials, especially at a governmental level. This attitude is summarized by *Trends III*,

before Bologna, everyone knew that national higher education systems were indeed as different and incompatible as they looked. Bologna must avoid the risk of producing seemingly converging and compatible structures that could turn out to be, in spite of common terminology, just as irreconcilable as the old ones.6

Consequently, it is going to be another huge challenge for Bologna to avoid a reform on paper, and especially to go beyond national laws in many transition countries.

3.

*The Magna Charta Universitatum* (signed by European university rectors in Bologna in 1988) which precedes the Bologna process *per se* by a decade and is referred to in both the Bologna Declaration and the Salamanca Convention message, is a document in a different register than that of all later declarations and communiqués; it is general and

---

humanistic, and from the perspective of current global and European developments in higher education it is very vague indeed.

Being a general declaration, it obviously contains few details on how to proceed; but most of all, it is written in the vocabulary of a pre-knowledge economy and a pre-globalization era. Consequently, and not surprisingly, there is no mention of globally competitive knowledge economies and societies, the drivers of economic growth, more and better jobs, social cohesion and social exclusion/inclusion, external pressures on higher education, emerging market forces, changing European (or any other) labor market requirements, long-term risks for private investment in public research etc. – all of which are mentioned in later ERA and EHEA documents. Instead, there are some traditional ideas of universities' roles and tasks. It is interesting to note how hard it is today to give a meaning to such statements as e.g. “centres of culture, knowledge and research” are “represented by true universities”. The idea that the university is an institution which “produces, examines, appraises and hands down culture by research and tradition” (emphasis mine)⁷ would find very few followers among promoters of either the ERA or the EHEA (a counter example from the new vocabulary comes to mind from the European Commission’s Communiqué on the role of universities: “the knowledge society depends for its growth on the production of new knowledge, its transmission through education and training, its dissemination through information and communication technologies, and on its use through new industrial processes or services”;⁸ or from a World Bank framework policy paper on Constructing Knowledge Societies: “the ability of a society to produce, select, adapt, commercialize, and use knowledge is critical for sustained economic growth and improved living standards”.⁹ From the perspective of developments of the recent decade, the Magna Charta Universitatum comes somehow as a remembrance of things past. In the context of the ERA developments, it is hard to find the continuation of ideas about the

university as an institution whose "constant care is to attain universal knowledge" and which is a "trustee of the European humanist tradition" in current discussions about the "Europe of Knowledge".

It looks like it is not only no longer possible to talk about European integration of higher education and research as exemplified by the Bologna process and the ERA initiative in the language of the founders of the modern German research university (von Humboldt, Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher and others), but it is also no longer possible to use solely the language used by rectors of European universities 15 years ago for a description of the recent course of events in both the global and European spheres. The working vocabulary used for debates on the future of the university - the vocabulary of the ERA, EHEA and global accounts of higher education and research (including those provided by UNESCO, OECD, and the World Bank) - has changed substantially since 1988, and this shift in vocabulary underlies the shift in the way we evaluate the roles and tasks of our educational institutions in society.

The next document along the path of academic institutions' declarations and responses is the Graz Declaration on the role of universities in 2003. It is a direct response to the European Commission's communiqué on the subject. Generally, it shows how the emphases of the association of universities has moved away from The Magna Charta Universitatum and toward both EU (ERA) and governmental (Bologna) lines of thinking. Although the preamble sounds fairly traditional (cultivating European values and culture, European cultural and linguistic diversity, fostering a stronger civic society across Europe etc.), as we move on in the text, the problems discussed are those of Bologna and ERA, with the same level of practicality. A good example is a new way of thinking about resources for universities:

universities should be encouraged to develop in different forms and to generate funds from a variety of sources. However, higher education remains first and foremost a public responsibility ... ¹⁰

The shift in vocabulary is also significant, just to mention "negotiated contracts of sufficient duration to allow and support innovation" between governments and universities. It is interesting to note how the specificity of EU and governmental documents bring about new concepts and a new level of specificity in university declarations. This brings about both good and bad consequences; good, as similar issues are discussed in similar language; bad, as the university begins to view its most sensitive issues from the perspective of its potential funding opportunities. The balance between long- and short-term perspectives in thinking about universities is currently certainly shaken; the moment the market vocabulary enters the discourse on universities' responsibilities towards society, any long-term perspective is hard to maintain on the part of the universities. Not surprisingly, in the final paragraphs about "universities at the centre of reforms", universities declare full support for changes but make it implicitly conditional on acknowledging their current and future role.11

Power and knowledge (to use this traditional parlance) already seem to speak the same language; so the time has come for mutual guarantees for the future (by the way, I am not entirely sure that under present conditions there is any other option possible in the long run, especially in the region). It may be concluded that today, and maybe especially today, the struggle between the "idea of the university"12

11 See ibidem, p. 5.
12 Karl Jaspers in his famous The Idea of the University (transl. by H.A.T. Reiche and H.F. Vanderschmidt, Boston: Beacon Press, 1959) describes the university as an institution "uniting people professionally dedicated to the quest and transmission of truth in scientific terms" (p. 3). The modern founding fathers of the German research university (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, von Humboldt), introduced a radically new perspective: "uniting people" (students and professors working together for the sake of science, rather than professors working merely for students), "professionally" (rather than in an "amateurish" way characteristic of the institutions of Enlightenment), "the quest and transmission" (rather than merely transmission to students, i.e. instruction becomes accompanied by research) of truth and "in scientific terms" (originally referred to the German ideal of Wissenschaft). So almost all components of the definition contrast the new idea of the university with the old, Medieval, one. The aim of instruction and research is the "formation of the whole man", "education in the broadest sense of term" – Bildung (p. 3).
and the possible cuts in financial support, including public support, is fought on very uneven terms indeed. This is clear to all stakeholders, and that is one of the reasons for the changes in the tone, vocabulary and emphasis in university declarations and communications between *The Magna Charta Universitatum* of 1988 and today.

4.

One of my tasks in the present paper is to analyze whether and how the Bologna process may affect national higher education systems in the region. The Bologna process occurs within interrelated spheres: the official sphere of ministers of education/governments, conferences of rectors and university associations, and the accompanying changes in laws on higher education, laws on for-profit, laws on (educational and other) non-profit associations, on research funds etc.; the official sphere of particular higher education institutions, namely that of senior university management; and finally the practical sphere of particular institutions and their faculty. There is a huge gap between the good will (and good intentions) of ministers of education in the majority of those countries of the region which are officially members of the Bologna process and the reality of the functioning of higher educational systems in these countries. There is a huge gap between the intentions expressed by the officials and the capabilities to act they – and the institutions themselves – can currently offer for the integration project (also, the motivation for joining the Bologna process seems often more “political” than “educational”).

Higher education in the region, generally and with a few exceptions, has been in a state of permanent crisis since the fall of Communism, from the paralysis of substantial research functions

---


through steadily decreasing public funds, the mushrooming of both public and private diploma mills and corruption, to a lowering of the professional ethos and morale, with the combination of the above depending on the country. There has not been enough general reflection on the transformation of higher education systems in the region over the last decade.

Paradoxically enough, in the majority of countries in question the position of the universities, in areas other than academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and the international mobility of students and faculty, has severely declined in the last decade. Even though it may be quite possible to go on with the Bologna process in these countries in terms of legislation, it is much more difficult to go on with it in terms of implementing the ideas at the institutional level (leaving aside for the moment the whole idea as to what extent it is beneficial to the countries in question to follow all the recommendations of the process).

Let us remind ourselves again that the Bologna process is based on the underlying assumption (not really formulated in a single place) that both Europe and the world are entering a new era of knowledge-based and market-driven economies competing against each other; Europe as a region has to struggle with its two main competitors in higher education and research and development: the USA and Japan (Australasia); the knowledge society depends for its growth on the production, transmission, dissemination, and use of new knowledge; the underlying goal behind current transformations of educational systems and research and development, whether expressed directly (in ERA documents) or indirectly (accompanied by the “social dimension” in Bologna documents), is more or less to meet the target set out by the European Council in Lisbon (in 2000): Europe by 2010 must become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. Also the creation of the European Higher Education Area must be completed by 2010 (how to develop benchmarks of success and what is going to happen after the deadline are other issues). Europe is at the crossroads; it is trying
to combine higher competitiveness and social cohesion in an increasingly globalized world and it is in the process of transition towards a “knowledge society”. Thus knowledge, and consequently the knowledge rich and the knowledge poor, becomes the key issue in the years to come.15

The Bologna process seems somehow inward-looking: while globally, the impact of globalization on higher education policies is widely acknowledged, none of the official documents – from Sorbonne to Bologna to Prague to Berlin, and none of the accompanying declarations (Salamanca and Graz) – even once uses the word “globalization”. (Even though the Trends III report prepared for the Berlin summit mentions “globalization”, it does so no more than five times in total, which is a reflection of its descriptive rather than analytical ambitions, it states overtly that ministers and higher education institutions should “ride the tiger of globalisation rather than hope it will disappear”.16) In general, though, the underlying assumptions are not developed in more detail in any of its documents or reports. Unquestionably, though, globalization is one of the main driving forces behind current transformations of the public sector, welfare state model and educational policies worldwide,17 much

15 To refer here to an interesting distinction drawn recently by a European Commission’s communication on Investing Efficiently in Education and Training; as it argues, “with an increasing premium on skills, the polarisation between the knowledge rich and the knowledge poor puts strains on economic and social cohesion. Access to employer funded training is often limited to those who are already well qualified and some groups get locked into the lower end of the labour market. An important challenge is to develop education and training throughout life in such a way that change and restructuring in the economy have no adverse effects on social cohesion” (Brussels. COM (2002)779, p. 8). Although European social policies are very much focused on making increasing use of educational opportunities throughout life for their citizens, in most if not all transition countries, this dimension seems largely absent, despite efforts of governments to promote lifelong learning. The educational offer is still tailored for the student of 19–24 years of age.


17 For strong supporters of the view, see Ramesh Mishra, Globalization and the Welfare State (Chettenham: Edward Elgar, 1999); Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995).
weaker; globalization is also one of the main reference points in the overall EU Lisbon strategy.

Consequently, the Bologna process so far seems relatively weak on the analytical level. It may be worrying that the main and supporting documents of a huge intellectual and institutional undertaking which aims at changing the way our universities function do not attempt to present a wholesale analytical approach to current challenges and solutions based on perspectives wider than European ones. As Erkki Berndtson in a paper on Bologna rightly remarks,

the goals of the Bologna Declaration (and of the Prague communique) have been presented as solutions to the problems which have never been outlined systematically. This may have been one of the reasons for the fast development of the process, but without a systematic analysis of problems and challenges which the European Higher Education Area faces today, there is a danger that the cosmetic features of the reform will be strengthened.19

The ambivalence of the Bologna process concerns the process of globalization itself: roughly, following Dirk Van Damme, there may be at least two contrasting (and simplified) global views of Bologna. The first view may present it as merely an introduction to a much wider-reaching integration of national educational systems in the future, resulting from competitive pressures from other parts of the world resulting in turn from global liberalization in the operations of higher education institutions worldwide (especially in the two biggest “exporters” of educational services, North America and Australasia). The second, contrasting, view may present Bologna as a large-scale defensive mechanism to avoid the pitfalls of globalization as seen (and mostly disliked) globally today and to stay together in Europe


against the global odds. Thus the first view may imply a strong convergence between Bologna and the globalisation processes on a regional scale, especially in the future, while the second may imply an attempt to make national educational systems stronger against the forces of globalization and to stay away from whatever is seen as its excesses in higher education, especially the processes of privatization, commercialization, commodification etc. Due to the ambivalence of the process, I find it difficult to say which of the views would be a more accurate description of it today. The two threads are certainly very much interwoven in the Bologna documents. Both “protectionist” threads for the European model (especially in references to education as a public “good and responsibility” which means mostly calls for public funding from national states in the future) and “expansionist” threads of attracting foreign students and researchers in a global competition for talent can be found. As Van Damme put it convincingly, “Europe is seeking its own way out between the Scylla of academic capitalism and the Charybdis of protectionism”.

5.

Concerns may be raised about “cosmetic” changes to be introduced by the Bologna Process; but others, including myself, are more concerned about potentially misguided policy decisions which might be taken in some transition countries based on either regionally-irrelevant analyses or recommendations. There may also be concerns about various senses of “harmonization” for higher education, some of which may potentially lead to some still unspecified core (European) curricula, as evidenced by such pilot projects as “Tuning Educational Structures in Europe” (now in the second phase). There are strong semantic differences between “convergence”, “harmonization” and finally “uniformity” but at the same time there are

concerns that traditional semantic differences might get increasingly blurred as Bologna progresses.\textsuperscript{21}

Another issue is the following: are the problems facing most of the current EU-15 countries and their higher education systems the same as the problems facing the countries in transition? I believe the most important aspect of the Bologna process in its current geographical, economic and social scope is its analytical (and consequently practical) blindness to some of the most pressing problems in transition countries today. The analytical flaw of documents and reports may be the lack of any description of old challenges that the transition countries still face, and consequently the lack of clear recommendations on how to proceed in these countries plagued by two different sets of challenges at the same time, old and new ones.

To put it in a nutshell, while the affluent European countries face merely new challenges brought about by the emergence of the knowledge-based economy, globalization pressures on higher education and research activities, life-long learning etc., almost a dozen of the transition countries, to varying degrees, face old challenges as well. A recent report by the World Bank (\textit{Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education}) rightly says that developing and transition countries are confronted with a “dual task”: “a key concern is whether developing and transition countries can adapt and shape their tertiary education systems to confront successfully this combination of old and new challenges”.\textsuperscript{22} The report states that tertiary education can indeed play, in developing and transition countries, a catalytic role in rising to the challenges of a knowledge-based economy but

\textsuperscript{21} The concern is the traditional diversity of European universities. As Zygmunt Bauman stressed well before the Bologna declaration was signed, “it is the good luck of the universities that despite all the efforts of the self-proclaimed saviours, know-betters and well-wishers to prove the contrary, they are not comparable, not measurable by the same yardstick and – most important of all – not speaking in unison. Only such universities have something of value to offer to the multivocal world of uncoordinated needs, self-procreating possibilities and self-multiplying choices”. See Zygmunt Bauman, “The Present Crisis of Universities” in \textit{The Idea of the University}, ed. by Jerzy Brzeziński and Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), p. 25.

\textsuperscript{22} World Bank, \textit{Constructing Knowledge Societies}, op. cit., p. 2.
this is conditional on these countries' ability to overcome the serious problems that have plagued tertiary education systems and have pushed some systems into a situation of severe crisis.\textsuperscript{23}

The Bologna process seems to focus on new challenges and new problems (i.e. the problems of Western countries); but the countries of the region, in contrast, are still embedded in challenges and problems of the old type generated mostly in the recent decade by the process of shifting from elite to mass higher education under severe resource constraints.\textsuperscript{24} Even though the way Western Europe has dealt with the passage from elite to mass higher education has been well documented, the global environment in which the process took place will not recur. It was a process which took place under different political, economic, and social constraints. Both higher education and research and development had totally different reference points; the universities were still national treasures lavishly funded by nation-states in the period of the consolidation of the expanded welfare state model, politics still mattered more than the economy, national prestige often more than particular decisions about resource allocations.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibidem, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{24} See Marek Kwiek, “Social and Cultural Dimensions of Current Transformations of the Institution of the University” and “Globalization and Higher Education”, both in the present volume.

\textsuperscript{25} As Gøsta Esping-Andersen put it recently, “most European social protection systems were constructed in an era with a very different distribution and intensity of risks and needs than exist today. ... The problem behind the new risk configuration is that it stems primarily from weakened families and poorly functioning labor markets. As a consequence, the welfare state is burdened with responsibilities for which it was not designed” (“A Welfare State for the 21st Century” in The Global Third Way Debate, ed. by Anthony Giddens (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). Ulrich Beck calls ours the “post work” society which turns upside-down all major assumptions of the postwar Keynesian welfare state. Ramesh Mishra in Globalization and Welfare State comments on the European (Continental) welfare from an American perspective: “True, many European nations have inherited a large welfare state from the golden age and, for the moment, seem to be able to hold on to them. But can they hold out against global pressures?” (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999, p. 70). This is a crucial point, especially in medium-term and long-term perspectives. The answer is negative in the case of the
But this time is over. It is a real challenge in some European transition countries today to undergo the passage from elite to mass higher education, to have steadily declining public funds almost each consecutive year and develop higher education systems towards the “Bologna goals” which have to be met by “knowledge-based economies”; with no external funds, and virtually no, on average, government funds. The Trends III report makes it clear that it is unrealistic to believe that the Bologna reforms are costless: public funds have to come if the reforms are to succeed. For the countries of the Region, it is almost guaranteed, again on average, that the funds will not come from any source. The chronic underfunding of higher education, widely documented by any statistical data we want, taken in any way we want (such as the percentage of GDP devoted to higher education, the percentage of GDP devoted to research, funding per student etc., compared to the USA, the EU-15 or the OECD) makes it very difficult to implement the Bologna recommendations in any other than a theoretical way.26 It makes it difficult to face old and new challenges.27 There are no specific recommendations or

eight new EU postcommunist transition countries which in fact never had a chance to have Western-style welfare systems.

26 Let us remember Martin Carnoy’s advice, though: “To what extent public resources for education in a particular country really cannot be increased, and to what extent the ‘shortage’ of public funding represents an ideological preference for private investment in education is crucial to educational policy-making in the new global environment. It does make a major difference to educational delivery how the role of the public sector in education expansion and improvement is played out” (Globalization and Educational Reform: What Planners Need to Know, Paris: UNESCO – International Institute for Educational Planning, 1999, p. 51).

27 Higher education has to compete with other forms of state spending; other social needs are growing rapidly and higher education has not been competing successfully with other programs in recent decade in most CEE countries. The chances for increasing public funding for it are low. Seeing higher education policies in isolation from larger welfare state policies would be taking a short-sighted perspective: as significant (and funds-consuming) part of the public sector and part of the traditional welfare state, it is right now under severe pressures, even though pressures may not be as strong as pressures on reforms of healthcare and pensions. Knowing the zero-sum game character of fiscal decisions of national governments, it is useful to view higher education through the debates about welfare state reforms and transformations of the public sector.
prescriptions for the transition countries on how to proceed based on the experiences that the EU-15 or OECD countries had during the same process of passing from elite to expanded models of higher education two-three decades ago.

It is a crucial point in educational policy for the countries in transition: how to combine educational reforms pressed by two types of challenges, old and new, traditional and knowledge economy- and globalization-related? How to weigh their relevance today – should transition countries look to past or current experiences of other advanced and affluent countries in thinking about their higher education systems? How to progress in basic reforms related to much higher demand and the consequent massification of higher education if the material basis for these reforms, the welfare state, is either already dismantled or in the process of decomposition or even never had a chance to exist?^28

^28 One of the major differences between affluent Western democracies and the European transition countries is that the point of departure of welfare transformations is different. Paul Pierson, one of the leading welfare scholars, rightly notes that “in most of the affluent democracies, the politics of social policy centers on the renegotiation and restructuring of the terms of the post-war social contract rather than its dismantling” (“Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies”, op. cit., p. 14). In CEE countries, in most general terms, there is no social contract to renegotiate and welfare provisions need to be defined from the very beginning. Consequently, an already “dismantled” welfare state may be built along neoliberal lines without actually renegotiating the postwar European social contract. Ideologically, there is an important difference between the potential dismantling of the welfare state (in Western Europe) and the actual dismantling of the remnants of bureaucratic welfare of the ancient regime CEEs. Christiane Lemke rightly assumes that emerging patterns of social support and social security in CEEs “diverge from the typology described in the comparative welfare state literature inasmuch as the transformation of postcommunist societies is distinctly different from the building of welfare states in Europe” („Social Citizenship and Institution Building: EU-Enlargement and the Restructuring of Welfare States in East Central Europe”, Center for European Studies Program for the Study of Germany and Europe. Working Paper Series 01.2, 2001, p. 5). She seems to be wrong, though, when stating that the applicant countries had to adapt to the rules and regulations of the EU, “including the social acquis” and that the idea of European-wide social standards “gained a higher profile” in CEEs (p. 14). It was not the case.
Not surprisingly, both the *Trends III* report and official documents from Sorbonne to Berlin generally disregard market forces in higher education; whenever the reports uses the word “market”, it is almost always “labour market”. Not only in its descriptions but also in its projections and recommendations for the future. GATS negotiations is a different and complicated issue which I am not going to develop here. What I want to stress, though, is the fact that the sole passage in the *Trends III* report where the possible market orientation of (segments of) higher education and research are mentioned, is a short passage on GATS. Its brief criticism will not make the emergence of market forces in higher education slow down or stop; it will not annul global trends with respect to the relations between the state and the market and will not stop public sector reforms already undertaken worldwide.29

It is especially interesting to note the omission of market forces in higher education in the context of the reference point for the Bologna process (as well as for the ERA) being the USA, “the prime competitor”, where market forces are increasingly important. Obviously market-driven and market-oriented higher education does not go in tandem with the European social model, but in such an overarching integrating initiative as Bologna, with the objectives of the ERA behind it – the plain political and economic goal of making the European Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy (and society) in the world”30 – it is a flaw to disregard the theme altogether.

The EU-15 (with notable exceptions) is one of the last places in the world which is relatively resistant to market forces in education and research; again, some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for a


variety of institutional, political and economic reasons, are much more influenced by market forces and their higher education institutions are already operating in highly competitive, market-driven and customer-driven environments. At the same time, from a global perspective, there are no doubts about the direction of change. My guess is that no matter if the Bologna process wants it or not, or Bologna process documents and analyses mention the phenomenon or not, the change is taking place everywhere and market forces will come, and in numerous places have already come, to European higher education institutions. It is a fact, whether we like it or not. The world today is too strongly interrelated (globalization!) to assume that although market forces are affecting higher education globally, the last bastion of resistance will be the signatory countries of the Bologna process (especially that market forces have already come as part of a much wider package of institutional changes to the welfare state model and they will not go away31). We may not care about the market; but we have to care about the universities increasingly exposed to its forces.32

31 Paul Pierson reminds us that the pressures on the state are structural and will not easily go away: “the welfare state now faces a context of essentially permanent austerity. Changes in the global economy, the sharp slowdown in economic growth, the maturation of governmental commitments, and population aging all generate considerable fiscal stress. There is little reason to expect these pressures to diminish over the next few decades. If anything, they are likely to intensify”. Paul Pierson, “Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies” in a book he edited, The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 411.

32 While Paul Pierson admits that welfare states face an unprecedented budgetary stress today, he claims that it is related to “post-industrial” changes characteristic of affluent democracies. Perhaps the most important is the question whether in the absence of globalization welfare states would be in a radically different situation. His answer is negative (“Post-Industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States” in a book he edited, The New Politics of the Welfare State, op. cit., p. 82). I believe Pierson’s theses are very strong, but I am not sure we get from him the convincing arguments that globalization just does not matter. The affluent industrialized countries are strongly influenced by global pressures, as is the selection of policy options at their disposal; there is an interplay of international and domestic factors and it is very hard to distill them in today’s world. For it is not only the real impact that globalization is having on
Both the private sector in European (and especially Central and East European) higher education systems and the emergence of powerful market forces in the educational and research landscape in Europe will have to be further analyzed, discussed and incorporated into the Bologna process if it is not to turn into a "theoretical" exercise, especially but not exclusively in the region. Knowing the high stakes for both Bologna and ERA initiatives, I am sure this omission will soon be corrected.

7.

My concern about Bologna is that it is not trying to raise to the conceptual level which would be required to assist higher education systems in the region with integration into Western European systems within the European Higher Education Area. My perspective is that Bologna might be a good chance – a useful policy agenda – to assist with reforming those national higher education systems in the region which need reform most; it might provide clear recommendations on what to do and how, presenting almost a blueprint for reforms, even though their scope would be quite different in different countries. In this respect though, Bologna does not meet the expectations of the academic world in the region; it is still unclear in its visions and recommendations for action with respect to the region. At the same time, which is understandable, there is no way to use it as a lever for external, additional funds for educational reforms. Although the success of the process is conditional on public funding for the project, it is obvious to many that no public funding will accompany further

societies; it is also the way social, economic, and political problems are actually perceived as problems. Pierson may be right about the real influence, in measurable terms, of the internationalization of economy on the welfare state. He is very much correct about the growing domestic pressures common to all major affluent welfare states. But the way they are perceived by policy makers, the way they are framed for public discussions, the way they enter the social world through the social sciences, experts and the media – seems crucial. In this sense, globalization is much more than a simple economic phenomenon.
steps in the process (“the Bologna reforms cannot be realised without additional funding”). So what should be done, that is the question.

Today, there are crucial differences in thinking about reforms in Western Europe and in transition countries generally. Reforms to be undertaken in Western Europe are much more functional (fine-tuning, slight changes etc.); reforms to be undertaken in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans, by contrast, should be much more substantial (or structural). There is little common ground between the two sets of reforms, except for technical details, and the Bologna process in its official documents so far has not drawn a clear distinction between functional and structural reforms, and the regions for their future implementation. The differences between the condition of higher education systems in these parts of Europe are very substantial indeed; and so, surely, should be the analyses, descriptions, and policy recommendations. The problems and challenges, and consequently the depth of the reforms required, are different in the transition countries; fine-tuning and small adjustments undertaken


34 It is interesting, in the context of our discussions about the “intellectual” in Part I, to cite Voldemar Tomusk’s recent harsh criticism the Bologna Process (in his paper on “Three Bolognas and a Pizza Pie: notes on institutionalization of the European higher education system”); he reminds us that “hardly anybody involved in the Bologna Process does not consider her- or himself an intellectual, perhaps even of the highest calibre. Still, it is hard to see these individuals experiencing any moral dilemma about what they are doing, although there seem to be more than enough reasons for them to be afraid for their reputation. It suffices to mention the European Commission aggressively hijacking a sector without a mandate for doing so, academic activists writing political reports filled with contradictions, and knowledge workers contracted by the Commission producing knowledge for which they themselves have created a need and which they themselves consume in order to create more such knowledge”. He continues his criticism with the statement that “it is unfortunate that one particular logic has gained near-complete dominance over the European higher education project, and those whose calling is normally to problematize such issues and expose them to public scrutiny have either found this particular topic irrelevant for them, perhaps for the reason that no funding has been made available for critical studies, or have assumed the role of messengers of a particular agency” (International Studies in Sociology of Education, vol. 14, no. 1, 2004, p. 93).
within the Bologna process are perfectly suitable for many Western institutions, but without any accompanying structural transformation in East and Central European institutions they may lead to merely theoretical or cosmetic changes when what is needed is a transformation of the underlying structures in higher education systems, at least in some countries of the region.

8.

My concerns about Bologna are both general and specific and they refer to the process as a whole and to its potential impact in the region. They are based on theoretical assumptions (such as e.g. the traditional “idea of the university” and the universal role of the university35) on the one hand and a practical knowledge of the functioning of higher education in many countries of the region on the other. Some concerns derive from traditional notions of the sovereignty of nation-states and their sovereignty over educational policies,36 and from irreconcilable differences between educational systems arising from different cultures, languages, traditions and inheritance from the past; but other concerns derive from a more technical and pragmatic understanding of the global picture of changes in higher education whose role is downplayed in Bologna. Still other concerns derive directly from an awareness of the budgetary situation of the public sector in many countries of the region, and trends that have emerged there over the last decade or so (often towards welfare state retrenchment rather than towards a “European Social Model” as emphasized in the EU Lisbon Strategy).

Martin Carnoy draws a very useful distinction between the three factors that in practice are crucial to the approach governments take in educational reform, and hence in educational responses to globalization:

Their objective financial situation, their interpretation of that situation, and their ideological position regarding the role of public sector in education. These three elements are expressed through the way that countries “structurally adjust” their economies to the new globalized environment.37

Even though, as we have emphasized here, the dimension of globalization’s challenges to higher education is certainly severely underestimated in Bologna documents, the phenomenon is one of the underlying factors behind the wider Lisbon strategy of the European Union: its role is crucial for understanding the whole package of reforms, including those in the education and R&D sectors. It is interesting to apply the above statement to transition countries involved in Bologna and make comparisons with the EU-15. All the three parameters are drastically different: the objective financial situation does not require any statistical data, it may be taken for granted in the majority of transition countries; secondly, as a consequence of the mostly objectively disastrous financial situation, the interpretations of the differences in objective financial situations may be even more dramatic; finally, in a number of transition countries escaping the model of command-driven economies, the ideological position regarding the role of the state in the public sector differs considerably from the position taken, with few national exceptions, on a European level: the ideal of the state about to emerge once the chaos of the transition period is over is the American model of cost-effectiveness and self-restraint rather than the “European social model” of the current EU-15 – which, by the way, is also testified to in recent EU progress reports about accession countries.38 There are several


38 As Zsuzsa Ferge shows, “the EU suggestions for some reforms of social security may steer these countries in a more American than European direction” (“European Integration and the Reform of Social Security in the Accession Countries”, a paper submitted to The Journal of Social Quality, p. 1). Based on careful reading of the Accession Reports from the Community to the ten applicant countries, Ferge finds a “hidden policy agenda” there: “the Union has a different social security agenda for the accession countries than for the EU members. ... The hidden agenda suggests to the accession countries measures contrary to the European model, such as the privatization of pensions and health, or the cutback of already low social expenditures” (p. 1, emphasis mine).
determinants of this but certainly a general dissatisfaction with the inefficiency and incompetence of state bureaucratic bodies is one of them, another being the increased role of market mechanisms in public sector reforms already undertaken (ranging from healthcare to pension systems to the decentralization of primary and secondary education) and the role of the private sector in the economy in general. Again, it would be interesting to see how the Bologna process documents are going to conceptualize these crucial differences.

To use another set of Carnoy's distinctions - between “competitiveness-driven reforms”, “finance-driven reforms”, and “equity-driven reforms” in higher education39 - it is possible to argue that not only are two speeds of reforms necessary (as some of the reforms required are merely functional, and others are structural), but also the current drivers of reforms are different: while in the EU-15 it is competitiveness (decentralization, improved standards and management of educational resources, improved teacher recruitment and training), in at least some transition countries, by contrast, it is mostly the wish to change the “business climate”, to make use of structural adjustments and reduce public spending on education (which results equally from the objective situation, its interpretation, and the ideological stance governments take). These complications in the picture of “European” higher education systems are not discussed in Bologna documents, and I believe they should be.

Concerns may be raised about the potential bureaucratization of the process and the potential transfer of power concerning higher education policies to some supranational European body; but at the same time, the Bologna process provides opportunities for improving - and hopefully reforming - inefficient, outmoded, and in some places sometimes corrupted, institutions which should really play a central role in the new “knowledge economy” coming to the region.40


Concerns may be raised about the break with traditional tasks and the roles of higher education institutions as evidenced by the roles and tasks suggested for them by both Bologna and the ERA (as Jürgen Enders remarks, universities today are “rather vulnerable organizations that tend to be loaded with multiple expectations and growing demands about their role and functioning in our knowledge-driven societies”41). But on the other hand, the traditional rhetoric may cover institutional or professional interests rather than a genuine love of the search for truth, disinterested research and other traditional ideals of the university.

The new vocabulary in which both higher education and research is cast in both Bologna and ERA initiatives may be worrying; but at the same time, especially in connection with the ERA, the vocabulary used, and the concepts employed, are standard in current global discussions about higher education and research and development, from UNESCO to the OECD to the World Bank. It is hard to use any other vocabulary today and be engaged in meaningful contemporary debates on the future of higher education and research. Concerns should be raised about the apparently economic definition of the role of higher education in ERA discussions. Although the ideals behind Bologna are cast in a slightly different vocabulary, the message is similar: we need practical results from our institutions; universities will have to change and the kind of research they do as well as the kind of teaching they offer will have to change too; the responsibility of universities is no longer the search for truth in research and for teaching moral and civic constitution (Bildung of the traditional German model of the university) to students/citizens; it is more like, if not exclusively, competitiveness, mobility, and the employability of graduates; the responsibility of universities is towards the economic growth of Europe as a whole, supporting a knowledge-based economy, contributing to new skills for the new emerging workforce of the emerging competitive, global age.

The Bologna process has a bi-polar character: it derives from the ideas of cooperation (or solidarity) and competition. The *Trends III* report is very explicit about that while acknowledging that the initiation of the Bologna process has to do with “a sense of threatened competitiveness vis-à-vis prime competitors like the US, rather than from sheer enthusiasm for the increasing intensity of cooperation within European higher education”. From my perspective, it is equally important to remember about a play of interests within the emergent European Higher Education Area, and the competition among European higher education institutions. Some countries are already global players in higher education; some are already exporters of higher education to Central and Eastern Europe in various, but mostly highly lucrative, disciplines. It is hard to combine the competitive spirit presented to non-European global competitors and the solidarity spirit presented at the same time to (Central) European partners. Can we imagine total cooperation and solidarity as driving motives in contacts with the countries of the region on the part of institutions from countries with strong market traditions and a good share in the global educational market (like e.g. the UK or the Netherlands)? My guess is that the motive of cooperation may be stronger in the region and that of competition may be stronger in Western Europe. Finally, within national systems and between national institutions, the competition motive is bound to be on the rise, proportionate to the increase in competition for shrinking national (public) funds.

9.

Finally, what I am concerned about is the potential use of the Bologna process in the region compared with its use in Western Europe. I am very much afraid that while Bologna may be quite successful in promoting its agenda in Western Europe (especially combined with the

funding and resources already available and the additional incentives already included in the implementation of the European Research Area), it might fail in the transition countries. That would mean that the gap between the higher education systems of East and West will get even wider. While Western European institutions seem to be much more afraid of losing their autonomy, freedom to teach and do research in the way their national priorities and funding allocations still lavishly allow them to do, for educational institutions in several transition countries the Bologna process might be the last coherent reform agenda, should it be further developed to include this purpose. I hope the “transition” dimension will be developed in the future so that the countries of the region could use the Bologna process for their benefit and the gap in question might finally at least stop getting wider.43

43 This article is a part of the project coordinated by Voldemar Tomusk (Open Society Institute, Budapest) and its full version will be available in the forthcoming book he is editing, The Bologna Process – Voices from the Peripheries (Kluwer Scientific Publishers, 2004).
DIA-LOGOS
Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften
Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences

Herausgegeben von
Edited by
Tadeusz Buksiński & Piotr W. Juchacz


Bd./Vol. 3 Marek Kwiek (ed.): The University, Globalization, Central Europe. 2003.


Bd./Vol. 5 Danuta Sobczyńska / Pawel Zeidler / Ewa Zielonacka-Lis (eds.): Chemistry in the Philosophical Melting Pot. 2004.


www.peterlang.de
Two modern achievements, the modern figure of the intellectual and the modern institution of the university, have been undergoing a radical crisis of identity. The decline of the philosophical project of modernity is turning out to be a painful process for modern culture: once again it has to reformulate the aims of its social institutions (the university) and the tasks of its cultural heroes (the intellectual). The traditional modern figure of the intellectual seems untenable in our increasingly postmodern cultural surrounding. The modern institution of the university may face a similar fate in our increasingly globalized surrounding: either it is going to accept the rules of bureaucratic consumer-oriented corporations, or it will have to try once again to find a new regulative idea.

Thus, the history of the university and the history of the intellectual in the 20th century being parallel, the present volume consists of essays in the philosophy of culture (devoted to the intellectual) and in the philosophy of education (devoted to the modern university) and attempts to link the two modern themes together.

Marek Kwiek is professor in the Department of Philosophy and director of the Center for Public Policy at the University of Poznań (Poland). He is a philosopher, social scientist, and higher-education policy analyst, author and editor of 7 books, including *The University, Globalization, Central Europe* (2003).

www.peterlang.de
Rorty wrote his *Achieving Our Country* as a philosopher, intellectual, academic and citizen, and each of these perspectives leads to a different emphasis in reading his book, and to a different story (and “storytelling” is one of the themes of the book). The emergent pictures vary: the philosopher tells a story of the growing isolation and cultural sterility of analytic philosophy in the United States of America after the Second World War; the intellectual tells a story of the political bareness and practical uselessness of (the majority of) American leftist intellectuals in the context of the emerging new global order at the turn of the 21st century; the academic tells the story about humanities’ departments at American universities, especially departments of literature and cultural studies, and their students, and contrasts their possible future fate with the past fate of departments of analytical philosophy and their students; and, finally, the citizen tells a story about the nationhood, politics, patriotism, reformism (as well as the inherent dangers and opportunities of globalization). Rorty plays the four descriptions off against one another perfectly and *Achieving Our Country* represents him at his very best: Rorty is passionate, inspiring, uncompromising, biting and very relevant to current public debates. Owing to the intelligent combination of the above perspectives, the clarity and elegance of his prose, and (although not revealed directly) the wide philosophical background provided by his new pragmatism, the book differs from a
dozen others written in the 1990s about the American academy and American intellectuals. It also sheds new and interesting light on Rorty’s pragmatism, providing an excellent example of the application of his philosophical views. One has to note that, generally, it is almost impossible to think of any piece written by Rorty outside of the context of his philosophy, and Achieving Our Country is no exception to this rule.

There are a number of themes on which I want to focus my attention in the present paper. Most of them are interrelated, some are political and economic, some academic, and many merely philosophical. They include: the issue of patriotism, global citizenship and what I would call “parallel” national/regional/global loyalties in the context of Rorty’s view of loyalty to America as a nation state; the theme of “telling stories”, both in philosophy, history, and politics, by philosophers, intellectuals, historians, artists and novelists; the extremely harsh criticism of what he calls the “cultural Left” or “academic Left” in the context of his philosophical disagreement with postmodern French philosophy (especially with Michel Foucault and Jean-Francois Lyotard) from which the American Left’s overall intellectual strategies originated and which Rorty has discussed on many occasions in the past; the theme of social “hope” (and optimism) as opposed to “knowledge” (and pessimism) in the context of Rorty’s romantic and heroic version of pragmatism; the issue of “real politics” opposed to “cultural politics” on the part of the academic Left in the context of the roles and tasks of the institution of the university, in modernity, and, increasingly in the global age; Rorty’s resistance to “theory” and scientific methods, both in philosophy and in political leftist reformism; and, finally, the transformations about to be brought by globalization to the functioning of the academic community and Rorty’s view of the process. I find these themes crucial for understanding Rorty’s sense of the public sphere today.

---

nostalgia for a revolution; and certainty versus permanent doubts. Philosophy in America and France has been the intellectual product of two different cultures; one was fed by the utopia of unlimited freedom and unlimited possibilities; the other was plagued by the spectres of nationalisms, totalitarianisms, and hence was seduced by faith in the emancipation of humanity, to put it in very general terms. In Rorty’s image of the past, America had the feeling that it was “the country of the future”. There was no such a feeling in the Europe of the twentieth century generally speaking, with the exception of the “new” Italy, Germany or Soviet Russia. Therefore, it is difficult to speak of any social “hope” in today’s French postmodern philosophy in any sense Rorty gives to the term.

In Rorty, the belief in the role of “hope” in philosophy and social criticism is considerable and allows him to distance himself from Foucault and Lyotard, for example. In politics, “hope should replace the sort of knowledge which philosophers have usually tried to attain”. Besides, the most important distinction for the American pragmatists was that between the past and the future and which “can substitute for all the old philosophical distinctions”. It is useful to sketch a brief overall comparison of Rorty’s criticism of (mainly postmodern) French philosophy with his criticism of the academic Left in Achieving Our Country. Criticism of the latter combined with the former is even more devastating as it is based on Rorty’s strong philosophical beliefs. It is not accidental that the words “academic” and “Foucauldian” with reference to the Left are often interchangeable.


72 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, op. cit., p. 24.
Rorty claims in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* that Foucault is excluded from the circle of his beloved “liberal ironists” by virtue of a lack of “hope” for a change for the better in the present and a lack of chances given to the future. The liberal ironist in Rorty’s account should combine two projects: his private project of self-creation and his public project of expanding the range of consciousness of the common “we”.73 It does not suffice to recognize evil in Rorty’s view; one also has to participate in the development of a moral consciousness that would fight that evil in the future. Thus hope must be present – the hope that evil and cruelty can be overcome, the hope that is apparently absent in Foucault. According to Rorty, Foucault does not provide us with reasons to choose a social direction in the potential development of society. Rorty sees Foucault as a stoic, “a dispassionate observer of the present social order, rather than its concerned critic”.74 He lacks the “rhetoric of emancipation” and his work can be characterized by “extraordinary dryness” produced through a lack of identification with any social context on his part.75 By saying that he would like to write so as “to have no face” (a memorable expression from *Archeology of Knowledge*) Foucault excludes himself from membership of Rorty’s utopia. As Rorty says about Foucault in “Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity”:

He forbids himself the tone of the liberal sort of thinker who says to his fellow-citizens: “We know that there must be a better way to do things than this; let us look for it together”. There is no “we” to be found in Foucault’s writings, nor in those of many of his French contemporaries.76

In the same text there is a memorable and indeed very unfair argument that Foucault writes “from a point of view light-years away from the problems of contemporary society”. Let us remember, however, that pragmatism is the philosophy of “solidarity” rather than that of “despair”77 and the criteria applied to other thinkers are

73 Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, op. cit., p. 64.