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Constructions of Migrant Integration in  
British Public Discourse

Konstrukcje Integracji Migrantów w  
Brytyjskim Dyskursie Publicznym

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## SUMMARY

This thesis employs a critical-analytical approach to discourse to analyse the discursive construction of migrant integration in the UK public sphere. I take as my starting point the assumption that in order to understand problems within society, the question of *how* societies speak about these problems needs to be addressed. The thesis employs a discourse analytical approach which holds that, because at its essence language is a form of social interaction, an analysis of both the micro and macro contexts of a discourse is vital in order to fully explain a particular social phenomenon. Following Fairclough and Wodak (1997), I contend that discourses are socially constituted and constitutive in nature. This relies on the Foucauldian approach to discourses as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972: 50), i.e. a discourse event is not only influenced by context, but also that discourse event itself influences the context.

I argue that the discursive construction of integration in public sphere in the UK between 2000 and 2010 shifted from multiculturalism and a celebration of cultural pluralism to one of neo-assimilation informed by a wider spread of neo-liberal discourse. To do this, I analyse three types of discourse: political texts, media texts and recordings of focus groups with incoming non-nationals.

My work is situated within the critical paradigm. Linguistically, it is embedded Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (cf. Fairclough 1995; Fairclough and Wodak 1997) and socially in the Frankfurt School of thought. Thus, a major contextual factor that is accounted for in my analysis of integration discourse is power relations and how this affects the production and reception of texts and discourses.

To analyse the empirical material, I use the Discourse Historical Approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Krzyżanowski 2010) which relies on Hallidayan functional linguistics. The DHA has previously been proven to be an excellent tool for analysing racism and nationalism and it is particularly applicable for qualitative linguistic analysis incorporating fieldwork, such as this thesis. As well as the micro-level of the text or utterance, through its multi-level approach to context, the DHA also takes into account wider social practices.

In my introduction I outline the problems, hypotheses and research questions that frame the investigation and present my ontological and epistemological positions.

In chapters 1-3 I firstly argue for the discursive nature of the public sphere and then point to how racism, immigration and integration are discursively constructed. In chapter 4 I introduce a history of discourse studies and CDA and outline my categories for analysis. Chapter 5 provides the historical and socio-political context of integration in the UK and Chapter 6 explains how my empirical material was collected. Chapters 7 and 8 provide a detailed analysis of the political texts and media texts and Chapter 9 highlights how these ‘top-down’, elite, discourses are received, challenged and internalised in the ‘bottom-up’ discourses of focus groups with incoming non-nationals. Finally, in the conclusion I summarise the analysis, relate my findings back to my initial hypotheses and research questions and indicate potential practical applications of the research.

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Ideologies... have no heart of their own. They're the whores and angels of our striving selves.

John le Carre, *The Secret Pilgrim*

By repetition, each lie becomes an irreversible fact upon which other lies are constructed.

John le Carre, *Absolute Friends*

Poznań, dnia 21.02.2015

## OŚWIADCZENIE

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.....  
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## Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, the United Kingdom has experienced a large scale upswing in inward migration. When this migration started it was never envisaged that those that came would settle in the country long term and as such incoming non-nationals were neither seen as potential citizens nor political actors.<sup>1</sup> In reality though, migration was permanent and this has altered the make-up of the UK inexorably. Migration, according to Horner and Weber (2011), is not just a moving across geographical borders but also a moving across “conceptual borders of identity, belonging and entitlement” (2011: 139-159). As such long-term settlement of incoming non-nationals affects how individuals, communities and nations discursively imagine themselves and their cohabitants spatially, temporally and corporeally (Fortier 2006). It also forces governments and, more widely the discursive public sphere, to confront the dilemma of how to “reconcile cultural pluralism with political membership” (Favell 1998: 22). That is, large scale continued immigration throws into question how non-nationals are integrated into the community, and the ‘imagined’ nation (Anderson 1983).

Over the period of seventy years since the end of World War Two, successive British governments have followed an integration policy path that runs from race relations to multiculturalism and yet currently within the public sphere, politicians, media

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<sup>1</sup> I have decided to use the term ‘incoming non-nationals’ to refer to any person or persons who enter the UK regardless of their legal status, method of entry or nationality. I have decided not to use the term ‘immigrant’ because of the continued confusion over the concept as well as both conceptual slippage and the negative semantic load that it continues to carry, especially in mediated public sphere discourse. Although rather lengthy, the phrase is hopefully both as semantically neutral and accurate as possible. Where necessary I differentiate between different types of migrant, i.e. asylum seeker, refugee, EU migrant, A8 migrant or Third Country National (TCN). In the rare cases where ‘immigrant’ is used, it refers to all types of migrant. The obvious exceptions to this rule are the instances of reference or quotation of other writers’ work and discourse excerpts that are being analysed or used as examples.

and the general public argue that multiculturalism is failing as policy concept to deal with cultural pluralism. In the UK, as throughout Europe, immigration has been an increasingly politicised and mediatised issue and there has been a considerable and noticeable discursive shift to the right on approaches to immigration and integration (cf. Triandafyllidou, Wodak and Krzyżanowski 2009; Wodak, Mral and KhosraviNik 2013; Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2008).

One of the key aims of the thesis is to more fully comprehend how discourse is created and flows throughout the public sphere and how the discourse affects the workings of society, i.e. whether, and if so, how, the discourse contained within policy documents and newspaper articles discourse influences incoming non-nationals' experiences of integration. In this thesis I argue that the discursive construction of integration in public sphere in the UK between 2000 and 2010 shifted from multiculturalism and celebration of cultural pluralism to one of neo-assimilation informed by a wider spread of neo-liberal discourse. I take as my starting point the assumption that in order to understand problem within society, the question of how societies speak (and indeed who speaks) about these problems publically needs to be addressed. I take a discourse analytical approach which holds that, because language is a form of social interaction, a thorough analysis of the micro and macro context of a discourse is vital in order to fully comprehend the phenomenon. It is not though just a belief that a discourse event is influenced by context but also that a discourse event itself influences the context. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) refer to this as the socially constituted and constitutive nature of discourse directly relies on the Foucauldian approach that discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault 1972: 50).

My work sits within the critical paradigm. Socially this is embedded in the Frankfurt School and linguistically in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA, cf. Fairclough 1995; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Wodak 2001; Krzyżanowski 2010).<sup>2</sup> Thus a major contextual factor that should be included in any analysis of public discourse is power relations and how this affects the production and reception of texts and discourses. The

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<sup>2</sup> In Chapter 4 a number critiques of critical approaches to discourse that practitioners need to address will be introduced. One of these is the use of the capitalised 'CDA' without the concomitant use of the definite article 'the'. However, purely for sake of brevity and ease of reading, the abbreviated CDA will be used throughout the paper, although it should be remembered that this does not amount to complete approval of the use of such a term. Likewise, purely for the sake of brevity, CDA should be taken to mean CDS as well.

thesis starts from the ontological axiom that the social world around us, within which we all live and wherever that may be, exists and has been formed by social biases, inequalities and imbalances of power. Thus, epistemologically, I find myself drawn to attempts to uncover true nature of these inequalities that are discursively hidden or distorted with the aim to empower those in society who are in some way affected by injustice.<sup>3</sup>

### **Why Critical Discourse Analysis?**

From a linguistic perspective, taking a critical ontological, epistemological and theoretical approach to a social problem naturally leads itself to working within the critical discourse paradigm. The public sphere is a discursive arena, albeit one that is highly diffuse and anonymous, in the sense that we have now moved away from the agoras of ancient Greece to highly mediated public spheres. Within this, there are three main types of actor: politicians, the media and the general public. The first two of these could be described as ‘elite’ actors as they are in hegemonic positions of power and influence. The general public, and in this group I include in-coming non-nationals as well as residents and citizens from ethnic minorities, are, to a greater or lesser extent, excluded from agenda-setting positions.

To qualitatively and critically analyse the materials included in the discursive construction of UK public discourse on integration, I will apply the Discourse Historical Approach (Wodak et al. 1999).<sup>4</sup> I have chosen this approach because it has already proven to be an excellent tool for analysing racism and nationalism (cf. Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak et al. 1999; Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2008). Moreover, it lends itself to qualitative linguistic analysis often incorporates fieldwork, which will play a major role in my analysis of the public sphere.

In terms of linguistic analysis, the DHA is three dimensional. Firstly, the topics of a discourse are identified. After this, the discursive strategies are investigated and

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<sup>3</sup> See Chapter 4 for an explanation of the subjective, problem oriented nature of critical approaches to discourse analysis.

<sup>4</sup> Before proceeding any further, it should also be noted that both CDA and within this, the DHA are both approaches to linguistic analysis and should not be conceived of as theories.

then finally, the linguistic means of realising these strategies are examined (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). That third dimension of DHA, and indeed any form of robust critically discursive analysis of texts and utterances, should be grounded in functional linguistics (cf. Halliday 1985; 1994).

The DHA is also appealing because, rather than focusing purely on language, the approach looks at wider social practices and analyses them linguistically. This is realised through its multi-level approach to the context within which a discourse exists. At the micro level is the text-internal co-text, this is followed by the intertextual and inter-discursive relationship between texts (diachronically and synchronically). The meso level includes the social institutional variables of a certain situation. Finally, at the macro level, the wider historical, social and political context of a particular discourse is analysed. Because of its wide scope, this final level necessitates a novel interdisciplinary approach that synthesises systemic functional grammar and CDA with critical social theories. This enables the object of analysis to be better understood.

Finally, and again proving the efficacy of critical discourse as an approach to my ontological and epistemological standpoint, the DHA also offers a prospective critique and is problem-oriented in that it aims to “contribute to an improvement of communication” (Wodak 2009: 88)

### **Problems, hypotheses and questions**

One of the central epistemological tenets of critical discourse analysis is that research should be progressive and problem-oriented, that is, that linguistic analysis, based on functional grammar, should be used to interrogate a societal issue. A justification for such an approach, which is interdisciplinary in nature, will be forwarded in Chapter 4. Below are four questions that the thesis is oriented towards answering:

P1.<sup>5</sup> Traditionally understood nation states, especially in Europe, are being challenged by the cultural pluralism that long-term immigration brings to their socie-

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<sup>5</sup> In the following pages ‘P’ denotes problem, ‘H’ denotes hypothesis, ‘RQ’ denotes research question and ‘SQ’ denotes sub-question.

ties. The UK is a good example of a country where this phenomenon is occurring.

- P2. The discourse of integration in the UK, and the policies and regimes of control that form and inform them, are highly normative in nature. However, these discourses fail to understand the reality 'on the ground' and policies do not allow for multiple identities and belongings that are part and parcel of migrant experiences. This in part stems from the failure of liberal political theories to conceptualise the Other (cf. Cole 2000)
- P3. Linked to this, due to societal inequalities and power relations in the UK, the discourse of integration excludes incoming non-nationals and new citizens from the sites and modes of discourse production.
- P4. Within the British public sphere there is a consensus that integration is a good thing. However, there is insufficient questioning of what integration includes and this has allowed the discourse to become more exclusionary.

As stated at the outset, in order to understand societal problems, one needs to investigate the discourse(s) surrounding the issue. Thus, based on the problems above, my research is heuristically oriented towards the six discursive hypotheses proposed below. Hypothesis H1 is the main one and the supporting hypotheses H2-H6 stem from this.

- H1. Discourse affects social action. The discursive construction of integration leads to the creation of insufficient integration strategies. This negatively impacts on how new citizens and incoming non-nationals integrate into UK society, which in turn leads to less cohesive communities.
- H2. The public sphere is discursive in nature. The discourse of integration in the British public sphere is primarily dominated by elite social actors found within politics and the media. Non-elites, especially ethnic minorities and previous incoming non-nationals, are denied agency and excluded from contributing to the discussion on what integration is and should be in the future.
- H3. Discourses of integration are not static and over time. The discursive construction of integration in the UK changed in response to politicised and mediated real world events between 2000 and 2010.

- H4. There is a high degree of intertextuality and interdiscursivity between integration and other policy areas and concepts.
- H5. A key context in discourse is power. There is a contradiction between, on the one hand, the explicit rhetoric of integration as being a two-way process based on multiculturalism, and, on the other hand, implicit the neo-assimilatory and conformist discursive practices.
- H6. There is a contradiction between top-down normative discourse of integration and bottom-up lived experiences of integration by incoming non-nationals.

In order to operationalise the hypotheses above and provide a framework for the analytical chapters, the following research questions and sub-questions have been devised to guide my investigation.

- RQ1. How was integration discursively constructed in government policy between 2000 and 2010?
  - SQ1: Which ‘fields’ (Bourdieu 1993), i.e. concepts, policy areas and events, was integration discursively connected to?
- RQ2. How was integration discursively constructed by the media over the same period?
  - SQ2. To what extent was the political discourse recontextualised over the same period?
- RQ3. How is integration discursively constructed by incoming non-nationals themselves?
  - SQ3. To what extent is there a dissonance between these constructions and the public sphere discourse of integration?
- RQ4. How do these discursive constructions actually affect the integration of incoming non-nationals?
  - SQ4. Are all types of migrant affected equally?

## Challenges of recent research and practical aims

The dynamics of the public discourse on integration in the UK is an under-researched phenomenon and the research and analysis contained below has both academic and practical aims. This thesis is original and fills a number of gaps within research in various fields. The research will also add to the fields of analysis of public discourse, critical discourse analysis and integration theory. My discursive analyses of interview results, combined with the in-depth analysis of local and national media and political discourses of integration will provide new academic material on critical discourse analysis and on the under-studied subject of integration. From a linguistic perspective, the work below will shed much needed light on the discursive nature of the public sphere. Within the more specific field of critical discourse studies, the thesis indicates the usefulness of the Discourse Historical Approach is a tool for critical analysis of discursive constructions of racism and of public discourse. It will also indicate the connections between ‘elite discourses’ (Van Dijk 2010) and migrants’ own conceptualisations of integration (Krzyzanowski 2010).

There is a large body of existing literature on how migrants are discursively excluded from countries and communities. However, the discourse surrounding the concept and practice of integration and, crucially, how it is experienced by those involved has not been sufficiently critically analysed. Indeed, there has been no large-scale critical-analytic discourse work published that focuses on integration. Outside of the UK the only comparable work has been on integration within Flemish-speaking Belgium (Blommaert and Verschueren 2001) but rather than using CDA, they employ discourse pragmatics. Smaller scale linguistic works on integration have mainly looked at political texts or media coverage at a national level, and have failed to include analyses of migrant experiences. These include: *‘Not playing the game’: Shifting patterns in the discourse of integration* (Horner and Weber 2011) and *The rhetoric of acculturation: When integration means assimilation* (Bowskill et al. 2007). Bauböck (2006) notes that qualitative studies on migrants’ self-interpretation of citizenship and integration practices are lacking within the literature and that focus groups are well suited to this type research. While discursive work on migrants’ experiences is limited, publications of note include: *New discourses of migration in post-communist Poland: Conceptual metaphors and personal narratives in the reconstruction of the hegemonic discourse*

(Fabiszak 2010b), *The Discursive Construction of European Identities* (Krzyżanowski 2010), *Polish Families and Migration Since EU Accession* (White 2010) and *Lost in Communism, Lost in Migration: Narratives of the Post-1989 Polish Migrant Experience* (Galasiński and Galasińska 2007).

Within critical discourse analysis, the focus has been on exclusion and racism without explicitly linking those to integration per se. However, this large body of research will provide the background to my empirical analysis and inform my theoretical approach. Teun van Dijk is the most well known proponent of the socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis (1993) and more recently has looked at ‘elite racism’ (2005). Elsewhere, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2009) have used the Discourse Historical Approach to good effect in analysing exclusion, anti-Semitism and racism in public discourses in Austria. A lot of discourse research in the UK has focused on media representations of migrants or ethnic minorities: O’Halloran (2008) uses a corpus-based approach when analysing the Sun newspaper’s articles on immigration, whilst Richardson’s *(Mis)representing Islam* (2004) looked at the discursive construction of Muslims in both broadsheets and tabloid newspapers. Here the comprehensive work of the RASIM project at Lancaster University should also be noted. This project qualitatively and quantitatively looked at the discursive representations of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees in British papers between 1996 and 2006 (Baker et al. 2008). Analyses of local newspapers have been carried out for London (Buchanan, Grillo and Threadgold 2004), East Anglia (Rasinger 2010) and Brighton (Bennett, in press). Elsewhere, Leudar, Hayes, Nekvapil and Turner Baker (2008) have looked at how media and native hostilities to refugees and asylum seekers in Manchester influence biographical self-representations of refugees and asylum seekers (cf. MEDIVA project and Bennett et al. 2013 for a more in-depth analysis of media representations of migration, cf. Krzyżanowski 2014 for research on journalistic practices).

Where academic research has been about integration, it has not been discursive or linguistic. However, a number of authors have published important work on integration theory and analyses of immigration and integration policy. Firstly Adrian Favell’s *Philosophies of Integration* (1998) is a comparative analysis of French and British immigration policies over the last 40 years. Mason (2010) has studied integration and national identity whereas DaLomba (2010) has studied how legal status impacts upon integration. Ager and Strang (2004, 2010) have created a conceptual framework of

integration in response to Berry et al.'s (1989) acculturation strategies. Elsewhere, a lot of work has been done on citizenship and integration by, for example Bauböck (1996, 2006) and Fortier (2008).

Thus, although a lot of individual research has been undertaken, there has yet been a large-scale, interdisciplinary analysis of the discursive construction of integration in the British public sphere. It is therefore quite clear that there is a gap in the existing literature that this doctoral thesis fills. By analysing integration across multiple discourse genres (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) I will be able to build up a much more complete view of how integration into the UK is discursively constructed and experienced. In fact, such a large-scale and comprehensive study has not been carried out in the UK before. Furthermore, the use of interviews and focus groups with migrant groups will allow me to compare the differing experiences of different types of migrants. This, again, is an original approach to the research on integration.

Following from my epistemological approach and the key tenet of CDA as problem-oriented, as well as its academic uses, the thesis also has certain practical applications in terms informing local and national integration strategies which are becoming more and more politicised and mediated in the wake of increased migration. The work will hopefully add to and develop social policy research into integration theory by providing an in-depth analysis on how migrants and other stakeholders view the process of integration. This is something which Bauböck (2006) notes has been lacking in the literature on integration up to now. The thesis also has a number of practical outcomes directly applicable to policy formation both nationally and locally. It is hoped that findings from the research will feed into and improve the understanding of how incoming non nationals experience integration this in turn could aid integration strategies at the local level.

### **Plan of the thesis**

The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapters 1-3 form the theoretical part. Chapter 1 looks at the discursive nature of the public sphere. Firstly the history of the public sphere as a concept is introduced. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the discursive nature of the public sphere and here I forward a model for the functioning of the

discursive public sphere. Based on the hypothesis that immigration and integration discourses rely on discourses of inclusion and exclusion, Chapter 2 is given over to an explanation of the discursive nature of racism and exclusion. After indicating a number of theories of racism, I follow Wodak (2001) and van Dijk (2005) to argue for a discursive explanation for the existence of racism in today's society. Chapter 3, the concluding chapter of the theoretical part of my thesis, is an attempt to explain the concepts of integration and citizenship. As well as defining these two 'fuzzy' concepts, I also point to their inherent, yet implicit, discursiveness. It will be argued that integration is a performative, and therefore discursive, process and also that both citizenship and integration are now based on neo-liberal conceptions of what it is to be a 'good' member of society.

Chapter 4 provides the methodological grounding of the work. In this chapter, the fields of both discourse analysis and its constituent CDA will be expounded. I explain how discourse and text should be understood, point to the historical development of these fields and offer a critique of the approach. I also detail the Discourse Historical Approach which will be widely used to analyse the empirical material.

In Chapter 5 the wider historical and social context of the research is explained. This includes the demographic changes that have occurred during the post-war period in the UK, a summary of integration and immigration policies and an explanation of the two as increasingly politicised and mediatised phenomena. A number of wider macro-level processes and events in which the discourse is embedded will also be considered.

Chapter 6 provides a description of the empirical material that is analysed later. After initially arguing for the importance of triangulation in my analysis, the data collected, as well as the methods of collection are explained in depth. This includes brief synopses of each focus group. Finally I address some of the limitations of the data.

Chapters 7-9 are devoted to a critical discursive analysis of the data using the DHA. Using a large number of discourse excerpts, each chapter shows the diachronic changes in the discourse and points to the high levels of interdiscursivity and intertextuality found within the material. Chapter 7 offers a detailed analysis of official government discourse between 2000 and 2010. Chapter 8 shifts the focus to media representation of integration which is a key component of the movement of the discourse of integration through the public sphere. The chapter begins with a corpus analysis and moves to a more fine-grained qualitative analysis of the discourse found in both local and national newspapers. Lastly, Chapter 9 provides an analysis of three focus groups

held in Brighton in 2013 with different groups of foreign-born residents. The focus groups were chosen on the basis of method of entry and legal status. In some ways, should be considered the most crucial aspect of the data. Firstly it aims to show how discursive social practices (for example citizenship and integration policy as well as media representations) affect both their day-to-day lives and their experiences of (non)integration. Secondly, in a nod towards the critical research paradigm that this thesis is firmly grounded in, the chapter tries to redress the balance of the almost total silence of migrant voices found within not just the political and media sites of public discourse on integration but also in academic work on the subject.

Finally, in the Conclusion a brief summary of the three analytical chapters will be given. I will then interpret the findings and relate them to the research questions and initial hypotheses outlined above. Finally, I will introduce a socio-prognostic critique, point to wider implications of the work and offer potential directions for follow-up research.

## Chapter 1: The Discursive Public Sphere

The concept or model of a public sphere has become vital to academic projects concerned with political discourse theory. As Fraser (1992) argues, no critique of modern democracies can succeed without considerable reference to the public sphere, and similarly neither can any attempt to interpret alternative models.

Discourse is one of the key factors in the functioning of the public sphere. At base, the functioning of the public sphere rests upon acts of communication amongst private actors (individuals, interest groups) but also between these private actors and *the* public actor, the state. It is “a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalised arena of discursive interaction” (Fraser 1992: 59).

This theoretical chapter is divided into two separate parts. In the first, I will attempt to trace the history of the public sphere as a concept from its beginnings in Aristotelian writings through to Jürgen Habermas’ seminal works on the subject. From here I will move to outline a number of critiques of Habermas’ work and finally the post-modernist concept of public spheres. Such an investigation will lead to a working definition of the public sphere which will act as a starting point for the remainder of this work. In the second section I will move to a discussion on public discourse, and within this, two strands of public discourse that will be investigated and critically analysed in the work: media discourse and political discourse (and within this, policy discourse). The first of these, the media, plays a crucial role in the transmission of the second (official governmental, parliamentary and policy discourse) to ‘lay members’ of the public sphere, namely the citizens or denizens of a particular state.

Whilst within linguistics, and especially (critical) discourse analysis, there has been considerable work carried out on analysing public discourse, the public sphere itself has been under-theorised. As such, this chapter will necessarily be interdisciplinary in that it reaches out to and draws upon texts and theories that come from discourse oriented political sciences which are relevant and applicable to my study of discourse in the public sphere.

## **1.1 The Public Sphere**

Today, the term public sphere, although widely used, has come to mean varied things to different scholars and public commentators. According to Dahlgren, it is the space ‘where information, ideas and debate can circulate in society, and where political opinion can be formed’ (Dahlgren 1995: ix). For Calhoun, communication within the public sphere may seek to influence the state, civil society or even private individuals (Calhoun 2001). Alternatively, for Habermas a public sphere is constituted by private individuals who are concerned with public issue, it is: “A domain of our social life where such a thing as public opinion can be formed [where] citizens . . . deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion . . . [to] express and publicize their views” (Habermas 1997: 105). Many outside academia subscribe to a very narrow definition of the public sphere, though, as merely pertaining to the media. The media in modern society play a central role in how the public sphere operates. It is the primary vessel of information; a way by which news and opinion can be transmitted on a wide scale to large populations. Or, as Habermas would have it,: “when the public is large this kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence: today, newspapers and periodicals, radio and television are the media of the public sphere” (Habermas 1997: 105). Indeed, one can now talk of post-national diasporic public spheres (Appadurai 1996) or transnational public spheres or spheres which are only now possible due to globalisation and advances in technology (Fraser 2007). The possibility of such communication with larger audiences and the expansion of the public sphere are relatively new phenomena - the import of the media in the construction and mediation of the public sphere was extensively anticipated and explicated by Habermas (1989). Thus, to talk of the public sphere as merely a mediatised or mediated society is

to ignore previous and indeed current conceptions of public debate and the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed.

A wider definition of the public sphere points towards a space, or spaces (both real and virtual), where communication takes place surrounding issues of public interest and where an often uneasy consensus is reached. Even this very simple definition is fraught with uncertainties and begs more questions than it answers. What constitutes an issue of public interest? How is consensus reached? How is discussion mediated and controlled? And maybe most importantly for this chapter on integration and migrants, two further questions appear and require investigation: who constitutes a public? And how does one gain access? Or in other words, how does one gain the symbolic tools (Cohen 1985) required by a certain society to partake in public discussion? To answer some of these questions, to paraphrase Goode (2005), an excavation of the concept of the public sphere is required.

### **1.1.1. The Aristotelian Public Sphere**

Aristotle's conceptualisation of society was in stark contrast to that of Plato's in the sense that it questioned for the first time the notion of 'good'. For Aristotle, the good of a city was not as one-dimensional and unified as Plato had conceived of it. Rather, there was a difference between individual (private) and state (public) good (Goçan 2008) and as such a possibility of dissonance between the two existed. Aristotle distinguished the private as consisting of the *oikos* (household) - men, women, slaves, and children - whereas the public consisted of citizens (effectively only men). However, unlike later theorists such as Habermas, Aristotle accepted that the public and private were inseparable and that there was considerable interplay between the two (Triadafilopoulos 1999). The public forum (held in the *agora*) was the interface where public and private met. Citizens of a polis shared the responsibility in debating issues of public importance (war, imports, exports and legislation) and "critically examining policies of the state" (Goçan 2008: 3). Aristotle argued for a form of deliberative democracy where political rhetoric was to be used to inform and persuade fellow citizens (Triadafilopoulos 1999). Aristotle argued that all citizens of a democracy should be formally allowed to have their voice heard equally. However he also conceded that in reality some citizens would

be better versed in the art of persuasion and rhetoric and thus would be seen to represent a certain programme (Triadafilopoulos 1999). Of course during this period of history, public citizenship was only afforded to certain free men and this has led to a questioning whether his writings are a suitable or acceptable basis for ideas of inclusive public spheres.

### **1.1.2. The Agonistic Public Sphere**

In Hannah Arendt's (1958) view this classic model of the public sphere that existed in ancient Greece (the polis) and Rome (the res publica), where the private was separate from the public, was characterised by its agonal nature. The deliberations within the public space were combative with the idea of winning an argument rather than coming to a compromise. It was a "competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (Arendt 1968: 78) and discursively, this was achieved by the mastering of the art of rhetoric (cf. Chapter 4) which was not about debate and agreement but about 'winning the argument' (Roberts-Miller 2002). Indeed, according to Roberts-Miller, for Arendt rhetoric was the ideal form of communication. Within the public sphere speech (or discourse) was valued just as highly as action on the battlefield. "Everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show through unique deeds or achievements that he was best of all" (Arendt 1958: 41) and as such, the values required of individual free men to participate were "a sense of honour, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and without the spirit of revenge" (Arendt 1972: 167).

Arendt's depiction of an agonistic public sphere however is troubling for a number of reasons. Firstly, as Benhabib (1990, 1993) and Roberts-Miller (2002) indicate, the same accusations of elitism and sexism that are levelled at Habermas (cf. below) can also be levelled at Arendt. Benhabib points out that Arendt's examples of agonistic debate within the public sphere come mainly from elitist cultures: for her, ideal deliberative citizen, read Habermas' 'world of letters'. With regards to sexism, and a preference for masculine traits, Benhabib (1993) notes the Arendt's work can be particularly troubling for the feminist movement to work with and yet, she points to the agonal and combative nature of the public sphere as a positive for feminist movements.

A further criticism of Arendt's public sphere is its combative nature. Roberts-Miller, characterises Arendt's agonism as 'polemical' where the public sphere is asymmetrical in that there is a speaker with an aim and a number of passive listeners. In polemical agonism "there is a sense in which one's main goal is not to persuade one's readers...it means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument" (2002: 596). For Roberts-Miller, Arendt does not describe how such discursive conflict should be kept useful or for the good of 'society' and does appear to be a hint of debating just for the sake of it – verbal language games rather than displays of physical prowess.

To round off this section it is worth pointing to another conception of the agonistic public sphere, that of Chantal Mouffe's (1999, 2009). Such a model seems to take into account those criticisms of Arendt and provide a model for more inclusive agonal public spaces where those from 'below' are also given a voice in a democracy. Like, Arendt, Mouffe sees society and politics as conflictual and that this is not necessarily a wholly negative thing. Rather, the role of democratic politics "is not to eliminate passions nor relegate them to a private sphere in order to render rational consensus possible, but to mobilise those passions" so that democracy can function (Mouffe 1999: 756). In a later interview, on the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent protests in Greece, she goes on to note that the role of democracy is "not to reach consensus but to manage dissensus" so that it does not lead to violence nor is it repressed in an authoritarian way. (2009). For her, an agonal public sphere where the legitimacy of the Other's demands are recognised, whilst at the same time it is accepted (and acceptable) that reconciliation is not always possible, is not just compatible with democratic societies, but a requirement of them. Thus, "far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence" (Mouffe 2009: 756).

### 1.1.3. The Habermasian Public Sphere

#### 1.1.3.1. The bourgeois public sphere

Although throughout his career Habermas has often returned to the subject of the public sphere, his most important intervention on the matter was *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989, first published in German in 1962). This meditation on the origins of the emerging public in Europe – primarily the UK, Germany and France – has been a bedrock for the theorisation and discussion on the public sphere in the sense that even those who has disagreed with his version of events or claims have used his work, and *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* specifically, as a basis for their own arguments (cf. Fraser (1997). This has become known as “the Habermas effect” (Matušík 2001: 237). The point here is not to discuss the relative merits of Habermas’ book as a work of historical or sociological value, rather, the main aim is to highlight his normative conception of the ideal (bourgeois) public sphere as I work towards a fuller understanding of the concept.

A critique of Habermas’ theory will be forthcoming in later sections of the chapter, but it is worth highlighting before we proceed to his theory and others’ that even the full title of his book points to some shortcomings of his proposals if they are to be treated as normative. The full title of the book is: *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Although he came to his conclusion from a different position than Aristotle, for Habermas, the public, and therefore the public sphere, consisted of the middle class, or what might be termed euphemistically today as ‘the professions’ – lawyers, doctors, writers, academics, bankers. Those who did not fall into this bracket of employment were excluded from the formation of the public sphere and this point proves problematic when analysing modern public spheres.

For Habermas, the public sphere was the interface at which the relationship between the state and private individuals was mediated (Crossley and Roberts 2004). Unlike in the Greek polis, for Habermas the private individual is free and needs to defend itself from the state (Calhoun 1992). Before the end of feudal regimes however there was no public (consisting of free private individuals) and so a public sphere was

not possible. Only the king or queen was public and everyone else was private, though often bonded, individual who could merely view the monarch's public pronouncements (Goçan 2008). Thus, in Habermas' eyes the emergence of the public sphere mirrors the end to absolute monarchies as well as the early development of a capitalist economy, in particular the mercantilist period in the eighteenth century and colonialism. According to Goode (2005), after the Reformation and the 'privatisation of religion', the crown's role had diminished to one focused more on the bureaucracy of the state. This was coupled with a gradual decline in reliance of the state on the monarch's own finances. Instead, money flowed into the public accounts from colonial ventures and from taxes. During the mercantilist period a private sphere emerged based on production and commerce, but this was not totally free of state control and many taxes went on funding military campaigns. This led to a call for greater accountability for the spending of public resources (Goode 2005) because "that zone of administrative contact" had become 'critical' "in the sense that it provoked the critical judgment of a public making use of its reason" (Habermas 1989: 24).

As Crossley and Roberts (2004) note, Habermas argued that during this time there was now a separation of the public (the state) from the private (work and family). However, there emerged a further split between home and work for the burgeoning bourgeoisie which also went some way to provide fertile ground and conditions from which the seed of the public sphere germinated. Within this private sphere of the home, the head of the household devoted themselves "to the project of self-cultivation" (Crossley and Roberts 2004: 3). Now that there was a clear delineation of public and private spheres, the issues that were seen as private became filtered out from the public debate (2004: 3). The nascent middle class now needed a space in which to 'be public' and this was provided by the growing numbers of coffee houses and salons that proliferated during the eighteenth century. To start with, these were places where literature and art could be discussed through the use of reason and carefully crafted argument and a literary public sphere evolved or "world of letters" (Habermas 1989: 51). However, as Goode (2005) points out, the high levels of illiteracy and poverty informally excluded rural and non-land owning urban populations from this sphere. Women too were, according to Habermas, excluded from participation in coffee houses and public salons, and thus, the public (literary) sphere was gendered. These places for debate evolved into centres for discussions that were more political, economic and social in nature but also

relied on the use of logical, well argued debate in order to reach consensus (Crossley and Roberts 2004: 3).

At the same time a further development allowed for wider dissemination of information: newspapers. As trade expanded geographically and financially, those involved required up-to-date news on economic matters such as taxes and prices. Later, though, these newspapers developed to include comment, opinion, literary reviews and news, which, meant that “critical reasoning made its way into the daily press’ (Habermas 1989: 25). This was critical because it brought into question the previously solid control over public opinion and power that had hitherto been maintained by the state and church (Goode 2005) and they were able to apply pressure on state institutions through public influence. Furthermore, politicians started to appeal to public opinion as transmitted in the newspapers and salons of the time.

This situation was the ‘ideal’ public sphere, “a situation in which the critical reasoning of the public constitutes an effective steering force in both society and polity” (Crossley and Roberts 2004: 4). Such a public sphere was also discursive in nature and was shaped in principle by the “values of egalitarian dialogue” (Goode 2005: 9). This discourse of rational critical reasoning was based on the concept of disregarding status altogether – thus, everyone who participated had equal stature and the debates were thus ‘free’ (Calhoun 2001). Although Habermas accepted that access to this public sphere was limited in practice to property-owning men, he nevertheless maintained that within the idea of free, critical argumentation and rational debate, as a way of arriving at consensus on issues of public interest, there was a “kernel of something emancipatory” (Benson 2009: 176).

### **1.1.3.2. The Decline of the bourgeois public sphere**

The remainder of *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989) is a Kaddish for the ideal public sphere, charting and explaining the decline of the concept as democracies were expanded as the franchise was given to more and more people and ceased to rely on property ownership and public opened up. During the nineteenth century, the public sphere grew thanks to not only advances in suffrage but also the growth of news-

papers. Crossley and Roberts (2004) identify four key factors that Habermas argued contributed to the decline of the bourgeois public sphere.

Firstly, a “refeudalisation of society” occurred (Calhoun 1992: 22). Habermas argues that the distinct separation between public and private has, since the eighteenth century, become very blurred at best. To borrow a turn of phrase from Claude Lefort, the decline of the bourgeois was due in part to the reduction of ‘the political’ to ‘politics’ (Edkins 1999: 1), i.e. the bureaucratisation of the relationship between the state and society from the eighteenth century onwards. On the one hand, the state has slowly but surely encroached upon the private by the growth of the welfare state. Issues of private concern – health, family and housing, have become public concerns governed and regulated by state bureaucracy. On the other hand, with the opening up of democracy to other groups, combined with the growth of capitalism, interest groups have become part of the public sphere and of the state (Crossley and Roberts 2004). This dual process has led to a change in the relationship between private individuals and the state from one of citizen to one of service user or client:

Individuals have become increasingly dependent upon the state, losing the independence that is central to the citizen role. And by the same route, political debate has increasingly lost its political edge by degenerating into utilitarian wrangling over the distribution of resources and private (domestic) interests. (Crossley and Roberts 2004: 5)

As such, public sphere of egalitarian critical reasoning on issues of public interest became replaced by interest groups of the state’s clients who called for “a greater slice of the public purse” (Crossley and Roberts 2004: 5). Thus, for Habermas:

Two tendencies dialectically related to each other indicated a breakdown of the public sphere. While it penetrated more spheres of society, it simultaneously lost its political function, namely: that of subjecting the affairs that it had made public to the control of a critical public. (Habermas 1989: 140)

This blurring of the public and private was, according to Habermas, further compounded by the emergence of professional politicians (organised along party lines) as the key participants and agenda-setters of discussion in the public sphere. Of course, what is promoted and advertised as free public debate is in fact highly strategic discussion in competition for political power (Crossley and Roberts 2004). Thus, the aim of

public sphere discussion is not to reach reasoned consensus, but rather the need to entice voters and remain popular.

Thirdly, the effects of professionalization, politicisation and sectarian nature of the public sphere are tied to a change in the meaning of ‘public opinion’ that occurred in the latter part of the twentieth century. Whereas in the bourgeois public sphere, public opinion was about critical reasoning, it now pertains more often than not to the results of surveys and polls (Crossley and Roberts 2004). Witness not just the market and social research business and the increase in focus groups by political parties and interest groups but also snap polls and phone votes held by newspapers. Their results, according to Habermas, are artificial as they ask questions of people which they would not normally consider (Crossley and Roberts 2004). Thus, those who carry the surveys out (or commission them – political parties and interest groups) can greatly influence the public sphere and the direction of debate. Indeed, the nature of the debate has also undergone a transformation: the public sphere is no longer about persuasive rational discourse but now it is about trying to manipulate and gain the support of the “loudest voice” (Crossley and Roberts 2004: 6).

The final factor in the decline of the public sphere is the changing role of the media. The media is central to the public sphere because they constitute the main channel of communication between politicians and the general public. Furthermore, because of this mediating role, they greatly influence both political behaviour and public behaviour. For example, The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) in the UK was in part introduced because of the public and media reaction to deaths of migrants at Dover and the Sangatte refugee camp in northern France. In modern states, full participatory democracy is no longer possible (if it ever was). Thus there has to be representative democracy and this is where the media plays an important part in the public sphere. For Habermas, the ideal public sphere is one where only serious issues of public interest are discussed (McKee 2005). However, thanks to a commercialization of the media, public communication has become enslaved to the “demands of big business” (Crossley and Roberts 2004: 6) and an ultra-competitive capitalist market place which has undergone the widespread process defined as tabloidization (McLachlan and Golding 2001). This is arguably even more so the case now given the proliferation of new channels on cable and satellite platforms as well as the ever-growing online presence of the media. As such owners and editors now search for the lowest common denominator in an attempt

to gain and maintain optimum levels of publicity and popularity for their outlet, there has been a ‘race to the bottom’: Where the early public sphere, as a domain of self-education and cultivation, tended to ‘level up’, the modern media, in its pursuit of the widest audience, is inclined to ‘level down.’ (Crossley and Roberts 2004: 6).

#### **1.1.4. A Critique of Habermas**

Habermas’ theorising of the public sphere has become a fundamental part of later discussions on the topic. It has opened up numerous lines of enquiry, not least on the role of the media in democratic societies (Benson 2009). This notwithstanding, there are a number of criticisms that can be levelled against Habermas’ public sphere which are vital in the context of this chapter as they pertain to the construction of, and access to, the public sphere. Chiefly amongst these is the argument that Habermas ignored other publics that were emerging at a roughly the same time or at least, he does not concede the importance of non-bourgeois citizens to the construction of a public sphere. For example, Baker (1992) argues that the working classes were starting to organise in the eighteenth century and contributed to a critical public (Goode 2006). Similarly, Ely (1991) and Fraser (1992) point towards the gendered nature of Habermasian public sphere which ignores the historical role of women. As such the bourgeois public sphere was exclusionary because it saw itself as *the* public and ignored other public. Furthermore, as well as ignoring other publics, Negt and Kluge (1988) argue that Habermas privileges discourse over praxis which further excluded proletarian access to the public sphere. Habermas prioritises namely rational discursive reasoning as the only form of engaging in politics and the only form of action that can contribute to the public sphere and thus ignores other actions which can contribute just as well. Goode (2005) points to making an independent film or starting a cooperative in competition to a large corporation, but this can also include graffiti or a work of art or a strike. These are all methods of discourse to be sure, but they cannot be included in Habermas’ concept of critical public reasoning. Geoff Ely (1992) asserts that these exclusions were merely incidental, but rather that the bourgeois public sphere was “a masculinist ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule” (Fraser, 1992: 523).

For a further, more structured critique of Habermas' public sphere it is worth turning now to Nancy Fraser's critique of *Habermas Rethinking the Public Sphere* (1992). Fraser highlights three shortcomings with a Habermasian imagining of the public sphere as laid out in the *Structural Transformation* (1989). Firstly, Fraser argues it is wrong to start from the assumption that access to the public sphere was open to all on an equal footing and that social equality and status could be "bracketed" (Fraser 1992: 524). In reality, participation in the public sphere was conditional on markers of style and decorum which both during the rise of the bourgeois public sphere and today still, are also markers of status inequality which "functioned informally to marginalise women and members of the plebeian classes and to prevent them from participating as peers" (Fraser 1992: 525). Such exclusion – informal, unencoded - has been termed structural violence by Johan Galtung (2005).<sup>6</sup> Following Cohen (1985), this is what I would term the 'symbolic tools of a community' (Bennett 2015 in press) or as Bourdieu (1986) would call it 'cultural capital'. This is further compounded in modern democracies that have witnessed mass migration by the need to have a good grasp of the native language in order to participate fully. This attempt to 'bracket' identities as if they did not exist actually ignores many inequalities and eliminates the possibility of "participatory parity" (Fraser 1992: 525). The bracketing of identities, also ignores the reality of the existence of myriad cultures within modern democracies and furthermore that these cultures are not valued equally (Fraser 1992).<sup>7</sup> According to Fraser, this means that marginalisation stemming from these inequalities is further compounded by the workings of the bourgeois public sphere in which the media - as the vessel for communication of the public interest - is privately owned and functions upon the logic of 'profit-over-all'. Marginalised, or in Fraser's words "subordinated" (Fraser 1992: 526), groups are thus often excluded from access to "the material means for equal participation" (Fraser 1992: 526). For example, recent research conducted by researchers on the MEDIVA project indicates that this is the case not just in terms of ownership of media outlets, but employment and representation within and by the media. (See Triandafyllidou et al., 2012; Bennett et al., 2012; McKay and Markova 2012; Preston, O'Boyle and Fehr 2012; and Triandafyllidou, Ulasiuk and Gemi 2012).

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<sup>6</sup> By unencoded I mean that it is not institutionalised via legislation and policy.

<sup>7</sup> Now more than ever there is considerable cultural diversity to be found in democratic states. This is partly down to increased immigration, especially into and between EU states but it is also down to the exchange of information that is now possible through improved communications technology.

The second major criticism of Habermas by Fraser is that the former envisages a singular public sphere as the ideal configuration for discussion of affairs of public interest. Fraser's argument is that in socially stratified society where there is only one formal (bourgeois) public sphere, members of subordinated groups are denied the institutionalised space where they can exchange communication of their interests and any action on their part would be guided by the principles of the dominant public sphere (Fraser 1992). As such they would be less likely to defend their own interests in the dominant public sphere. In reality, although a dominant (gendered and class-oriented) public sphere may exist in a democracy, there also exist parallel spaces of discourse or "subaltern counterpublics" (Fraser 1992: 527). For Goode here, the risk is that if minority voices are not heard, then interests cannot be forwarded and society remains unequal. He thus points to a link between "life chances and discourse chances" and calls for greater provision of resources for excluded groups for "participation in and access to the public sphere." (Goode 2005: 42). Fraser though calls for these counterpublics to be maintained rather than integrated and sees "emancipatory potential" by providing spaces where alternative discussions can take place under different rules (Fraser 1992: 528). This argument holds too for more egalitarian and multicultural societies where multiple public spheres are even more important.

The third criticism that can be levelled at a Habermasian public sphere is that discussion should only pertain to issues of the common good and not the private. Surely, Fraser argues, it is the responsibility and right of participants in the public sphere to decide what is and isn't of common interest and this will come out of "discursive contestation" between the parties (Fraser 1992: 531). Instead, the public sphere is a reflexive one in which not just communication occurs but also what is ripe for debate itself is discursively negotiated. Problem is that issues are often too narrowly and easily pigeonholed and are segregated into certain private and public groups (economic, domestic, industrial, race relations). Once segregated, they are now closed off to "open debate and contestation", which is normally to the advantage of dominant groups (Fraser 1992). Following Goode's (2005) reading of Fraser, I would call this situation a 'discursive deficit', in the sense that the boundaries of the discourse are too narrowly defined. Such a discursive deficit leads in turn to a form of democratic deficit. It damages the democratic potential of an (ideal) public sphere by disbaring some members of a society from full and active participation therein.

### **1.1.5. The post-national public sphere**

In her writings, Fraser goes further than merely critiquing Habermas and proposes her own formulation of the modern public sphere which requires further exploration here and is a site of increasing academic investigation, especially in the realm of transnational communication and global, or at least, supra-national governance systems. As Fraser and others (Ely 1991; Holoub 1992) have rightly indicated, there exists a number of public spheres within a given state and these are organised along, for example, class, cultural, interest and ethnic lines. With the onset of late-stage international capitalism, the coming of a digitalised society, and the clear society-influencing dynamics that mass migration brings the legitimacy and sovereignty of traditional nation-state has been questioned from inside and out, above and below, with this process, the state's critical conscience, the public sphere, has likewise been 'decentred'. As such opportunities and indeed necessities arise for a public sphere, or spheres, that move beyond the state level.

Keane (1995) has laid out a thesis that includes three tiers of possible public spheres: micro, meso and macro. The micro-level is a modern-day rendering of the Habermasian coffee-house and includes such spaces of discursive interaction as the discussion circle, church, clinic or possibly a local newspaper. The meso-level corresponds roughly to nation-states or proto-states such as Cataluña or Chechnya, but they can also be cross-border configurations such as a public sphere based on a language of two or more neighbouring states (Keane cites German language broadcasts in Austria). These meso-level public spheres, Keane argues, rely upon national media, including public service broadcasters. Finally, Keane points to what was a relatively novel concept at the time of his writing, namely a supra-national, or macro-level public sphere. This might be concomitant with a similar supra-national political body such as the EU but they are, he argues, more due to international and unbounded private media corporations and news agencies as well as the internet (Keane 1995). The European public sphere is one such example of a public sphere that is based on transnationalism and media production and reception (Triandafyllidou, Wodak and Krzyżanowski 2009: 1). Fraser (2007) would retort here that these multi-national, market-driven, media behemoths should by no means be expected to check supranational power structures (Fraser 2007). However, my reservation about Keane's thesis is that it is too oriented towards the power of the media. Obviously, the media is an important active agent within any public

sphere of whatever size, but Keane seems to underplay the media's role as a communicator/facilitator of the debate.

There are two further interrelated issues that the still-emerging (even un-ending) post-national public sphere faces: the first is a question of democratic legitimacy and the second is of political efficacy. As Fraser (2007) rightly notes Habermas' public sphere, and those conceptions of it following him both positively and critically, conceive of the public sphere as nationally bounded, emerging as it did from the Westphalian tradition (Fraser 2007: 8). The public interest was national public interest critically reasoned by equal citizen-members. Moreover, the traditional public sphere was a critical eye whose focus was directed at state (national government). In the twenty-first century we instead faced with a post-Westphalian reality in which public opinion and the common good are no longer territorially restricted and those taking part in the debate, indeed everyone who is affected by it, no longer "constitute(d) a demos or political citizenry." (Fraser 2007: 14).

How, Fraser asks, can with the decline in sovereignty nationally bounded public spheres be a politically effective critical force in changing and influencing the policies of a given state's government? (Fraser 2007). Economies are also no longer 'national' and so a nationally bounded public sphere cannot be expected to have much effective critical clout if the government they are purportedly keeping in check cannot necessarily steer its economy to the will of the people (Fraser 2007). Crucial to this thesis, is the fact that in many countries, the public "no longer coincides with a national citizenry" (Fraser 2007: 16). Firstly, geopolitically-bounded publics are increasingly becoming multicultural and multi-ethnic; there are now many non-citizens, non-nationals, diaspora groups who nevertheless have a stake in society. Secondly, the flip-side of this is that a national public now has members who are spread around the world. Likewise, although in most states there is one official (or at least dominant) language, most modern states are essentially (even if not officially) multilingual. Finally, the traditional public sphere necessitated a national vernacular literature which in part enabled 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) to emerge, whereas today, thanks to mass migration and globalisation, cultures have become hybridised and others globalised. There is, then, a disconnect between those affected (by a policy) and political membership (Fraser 2007). From here, Fraser asks two very pertinent questions as far as this paper is concerned:

If the interlocutors do not constitute a *demos*, how can their collective opinion be translated into binding laws and administrative policies? If, moreover, they are not fellow citizens, putatively equal in participation rights, status and voice, then how can the opinion they generate be considered legitimate? How, in sum, can the *critical* criteria of *efficacy* and *legitimacy* be meaningfully applied to transnational public opinion in a post-Westphalian world? (Fraser 2007: 16)

For Fraser, the partial answer is that public sphere participation should not be limited by political membership. What is obvious is that access to the public sphere is a major component of integration of migrants, is important for participation in the public sphere in the UK, and it is therefore apt to investigate how and why migrants are discursively excluded/integrated.

### **1.1.6. The multi-ethnic public sphere**

Whilst Fraser terms her public sphere as transnational, Charles Husband (1996, 1998) characterises his as multi-ethnic. Though different, in the sense that Fraser's gaze is fixed on the political and Husbands on the media, the two approaches obviously share a key similarity in that both conceive of a public sphere as a space where there are newcomers that wish to participate and indeed, should be afforded that right.

Husband argues that in many states around the world, the population is increasingly multi-ethnic.<sup>8</sup> These ethnic groups do not though co-exist in an equal way but rather “they operate within a hegemonic context in which culture and identity is contested” (Husband 1996: 207).<sup>9</sup> Minorities (ethnic, national or religious, are often denied access to or excluded from communication (1996) and this sets them at a disadvantage when it comes to participation in the modern public sphere where the media plays such an important role.

In order to counteract this, Husband calls for a democratisation of communication this includes two separate points. The first is, as mentioned above, the positioning of the media as central to the functioning of democracy and the public sphere and the importance of access to it. Secondly, Husband propounds the ‘right to communicate’ as important one for minority ethnic groups which is satisfied by a government not only

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<sup>8</sup> The UK is here a very good example, both to explain Husband's model of a public sphere and because of the subject of this thesis.

<sup>9</sup> This will be covered in more detail in Chapter 2.

not to “interfere arbitrarily with individuals’ communicative freedoms” but also actively ensures that migrant and minority groups have access to the resources and materials required (Husband 1998: 138).

As well as this right to communicate, there exists also a *right to be understood*. This relies on other members of a society trying to comprehend their fellow members through discursive interactions. These two rights are not just for national minorities and citizens but for migrants too. For a multi-ethnic public sphere to fully flourish, Husband argues that the media must reflect the diversity of the society and for this to succeed an active “minority ethnic media sector” must emerge and be actively supported (Husband 1996: 143). This satisfies the right to communicate. The right to be understood on the other hand necessitates diversity throughout the media which “promotes dialogue across ethnic boundaries” (Husband 1996: 143). Echoing previous critiques of Habermas, actors and their access to the public sphere are by no means equal and so, Husband calls for state intervention in the emergence and maintenance of a multi-ethnic public sphere (Husband 1998).

### **1.1.7. The public sphere - going forward**

As has been made clear above, there are a number of different images of the public sphere and the concept itself is open to several competing interpretations as the material and communicative reality changes.

Though an excellent starting point, Habermas’ public sphere is open to considerable critique, firstly on the grounds of its exclusionary, gendered and class-oriented nature, and secondly on the grounds that the traditional national model of the public sphere is arguably on the wane. Indeed, the argument that the UK finds itself in the post-national era where multiple public spheres exist at the micro, meso and macro level is an attractive one as it appears to mirror the socio-economic changes of recent years. And yet, it is hard to concede fully that the traditional nationally-bounded model of the public sphere will be consigned to history quite yet. This should by no means be taken as an endorsement of the current construction of the national public sphere in which there is a disconnect between the scope of the sphere and membership of it. Here, Fraser’s (2007 and above) intervention is highly relevant, as is Husband’s (cf. above), in

terms of how a national public sphere incorporates, integrates and/or excludes the previously often excluded 'others' such as migrants and ethnic minorities. As it stands, these groups are still not fully afforded either the 'right to communicate' or the 'right to be understood' within the public sphere. Migrants especially are formally, informally and discursively excluded from the public sphere. For Calhoun "the importance of the public sphere lies in its potential as a mode of societal integration" (Calhoun 1992: 6). For this potential to be realised, the public sphere must be opened up and made less rigid in its membership and this is where Mouffe's version of the agonistic public sphere, as opposed to Arendt's, is relevant in that it provides a theoretical model in which the views of the minority Other can be recognised as legitimate.

## **1.2. The Public Discourse**

Discursive and communicative acts within the public sphere are possible in larger societies because of the media. The media is not only a vessel for communication of public opinion, but it also acts as private individual with own demands driven by the market. However, the media is not the only site of public discourse. There are other spaces for discussion and other types of discourse that influence lives and society: political is also an important constituent part of communication within the public sphere and it is this form of discourse, alongside the media, that I turn to below. Whereas the categories of analysis of these discourses will be dealt with separately in the methodological chapter, here I will focus on an explanation of the types of discourse that constitute discursive public sphere and the processes they entail. I shall elucidate an explanation of each discourse whilst throughout the section I will also indicate the connections between them. Though independent in and of themselves to a large extent, especially with regards to the specific discourse genres contained within (and constitutive of) them, there is considerable interaction between the two types of discourse and the citizenry of a democracy. This constant interaction between the sites creates a network of connection and dialogical influence where those that are responsible for their production, reproduction, implementation and interpretation, are bonded in messy, often obfuscated, ways that are themselves frequently discursive in nature.

### 1.2.1. Media Discourse

As explained in the discussion of the public sphere above, the media is a significant channel of communication. In modern democracies it is the most efficient method for societal actors (politicians, commentators, CEOs, community leaders) to relay their message and it is through media consumption that members of a society collectively and individually interpret an already media-filtered re-reading of these messages. Indeed, in linguistic methodology, Wodak and Busch (2004) argue that media texts should be apprehended as dialogic in nature and that a text is not just the product of the writer but of a reading (and consequent interpretation) of the text by an audience (Wodak and Busch, 2004). Similarly, for Bernstein a media discourse is a “recontextualising principle for appropriating discourses and bringing them into a special relation with each other for the purposes of their dissemination and mass consumption” (1990: 183-184).

In extending an explanation of media discourse, Statham and Grey argue that the media is a “publically visible method of communication” (2005: 62) and thus it is a useful site to study, interpret and analyse the nature of public discourse. Similarly, because of its position and reach within the public sphere, analysis of media texts allows us to “gain insight into collective ideals and attitudes” (Str ath and Wodak 2009: 19). As a linguist, van Dijk (1985) moreover places media discourse within a cognitive model of discourse whereby over time recipients and readers of texts will develop cognitive models (primarily based on stereotypes) of actors and processes in society (cf. O’Halloran, 2009 for cultural reproduction of stereotypes in tabloid newspapers).

As such, given its potential power to communicate and influence, it is easy to see why the media is a “site for power and social struggle” (Wodak and Busch 2004: 106). Similarly, for van Dijk (1995), elite groups have privileged, controlled, access to many forms of talk and text and this is especially true for media discourses.<sup>10</sup> To elaborate: the media plays a crucial role in communicating messages and as such, those political and social actors (e.g. politicians and media owners) who possess or desire political influence utilise the media as a way to communicate their messages to their audiences. Furthermore, we can extend this axiom and, following van Dijk, say that if elite groups control the media, they are in a position to be very powerful, but if the elites

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<sup>10</sup> Van Dijk (1995) points to the fact that journalists will interview politicians, ask for their opinions, and position them as major actors in stories.

rely on the media in order to exercise power, then it is the media that has considerable power (van Dijk 1995).<sup>11</sup> The media's potentiality as an independent actor though is dependent on the degree of political authority in a given society. A functioning media is only truly possible within a public sphere that is governed by democratic ideals and processes. Each public sphere, be it national or supra-national, has its own political media traditions and so it logically follows that the character of the relationship between the media and politics in any given country will also be different (Stråth and Wodak 2009). The same can also be said for the relationship between the discourses that they (co)-create.

However, to limit this discussion of media discourse to the argument that the media are merely a tool for political elites would be a mistake that would also ignore the mediating and interpretive role that the media play in public discourse. An alternative, and attractive, proposition, which regards media discourse theory, postulates that the media – journalists, editors, owners - are independent actors within the discursive public sphere in their own right. For some theorists (Robinson 2001; Callaghan and Schnell 2001) the media, at least in certain instances, has considerable influence on public opinion but also on the political debate. One theory of media influence has been forwarded by Robinson (2001). Robinson accepts Hallin's (1994) premise that when there is political consensus, critical journalism is unlikely, and thus, the political discourse will in most cases pass relatively unmediated to the news consumers. However, if there is dissensus between the major parliamentary groups, there is more space for public debate and by supporting or promoting a certain line, the media can play a role in policy change. Thus, for Robinson, the level of policy certainty is important in determining the influence of media coverage (Robinson 2001: 533). In a similar vein, Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak note that “during crises, perceptions and definitions of political objects of reference (such as Europe or the nation state) are contested, negotiated, reformulated and reorganized” (2009: 5). Moreover, the discursive site for this contestation is often in the media.

Returning to Robinson's thesis, the support or criticism for a policy is achieved by framing events in a particular way and it is through the process of framing events

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<sup>11</sup> Of course, it is important here to note that the nominative ‘media’ is a shorthand metaphor for those who own and edit media outlets and those who set the agenda. More explicitly, the media should not be treated monolithically purely for the ease of fitting a certain narrative into a theory of media influence.

that journalists and media outlets become promoters of a particular policy option. Use of a certain frame (Entelman 1993) can influence public opinion by favouring certain interpretations and evaluations over others. The media recontextualise information and “construct social processes from privileged perspectives” (Chouliaraki 2000: 295). From this position within the public sphere, the media has the power to sway audiences towards the “preferred meanings whilst suppressing others” (Chouliaraki 2000: 295). It is possible to synthesise this view of media with that of Callaghan and Schnell’s (2001). Here, the authors argue that the media has a dual role: Media outlets will construct and produce frames of their own but they will also represent others’ frames as well. Moreover, the use and reuse of frames “cognitively serve to structure the public debate influence readers’ level of information, and attribute policy responsibility” (Callaghan and Schnell 2001: 187).<sup>12</sup> These two arguments, on the one hand the support for elite politicians, and on the other, the cognitive moves, fit well with a van Dijkian perspective of control of (and access to) public discourse.

Yet, this is not to say that media outlets are free from all ethical or economic constraints, but rather to argue that they are not always in hock with political actors. To be sure, the media is limited by formal constraints such as genre (Stråth and Wodak, 2009). For example, the media favours event-oriented reporting which lends itself to covering crime. Another common frame is that of entertainment (Preston and Metykova: 2009) such as the spectre of Prime Minister’s Questions in the UK parliamentary context which is often reported as pantomime battle. But the media is also constrained by its own (marketised) logic. Newspapers especially operate in ultra-competitive markets and so they are compelled to search out scoops so that the paper can set the agenda, thus “generating public consecration power for a certain media outlet” (Stråth and Wodak 2009: 28). If successful, this subsequently leads to enhanced sales and, from this, advertising revenues.

For media texts to have a sense of legitimacy or credibility though, they rely on the premise that the media merely provides the means for public discourse its role is to “reflect states of affairs disinterestedly and give the perceptions and arguments of the newsmakers” (Wodak and Busch 2004: 110). Recent empirical research, including interviews with journalists and other media professionals (Bennett et al. 2013) has found

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<sup>12</sup> For more on framing in regard to migrants and ethnic minorities, see Bennett et al. (2013), Richardson (2009) and Roggeband and Vliegthart (2007).

that the respondents prided themselves on their neutrality and hold it to be a major guiding force for their respective media outlet. However, Fairclough (1989) similarly to Wodak and Busch (2004) rejects this proposal and instead maintains that the media have a discursively mediating and constructing role to play as well. Likewise, Chouliaraki (2001: 294) argues that newspapers and TV broadcasters don't just relay information but constitute the information via "the process of communication". It is this very veil of neutrality, or at least objectivity, which lends the media such reverence and thus explains its position of influence within the discursive public sphere. As such, no study of public discourse as a whole would be complete without an analysis of media texts.

### **1.2.2. The Political Discourse**

The second category of public discourse that requires explanation for this thesis is that of political discourse. For Graber (1981, following Gastil 1992: 469), political discourse is "when political actors, in and out of government communicate about political matters for political purposes". This is slightly in contrast to Bitzer (1981) who argues that political rhetoric includes all citizens who deliberate and create messages about civic affairs. This appears too broad an explanation of political discourse and instead seems to share more in common with general conceptions of the discursive public sphere (cf. above) than it does with the workings of politics. Therefore, for the purposes of the investigation here, political discourse is taken to mean discourse which is 'done' by political actors (politicians, electoral candidates, civil servants, policy advisors). Furthermore, the crucial characteristic of this discourse is the fact that it is unmediated.

Social institutions (including political institutions) are constituted and symbolically represented by language and moreover, it is through language that our beliefs on what is wrong and right is signified and communicated (Chilton 2004). The institutional 'doing' of politics requires interaction and communication across different genre (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 2009): policy briefings, legislation, parliamentary debates, election manifestos and the State opening of Parliament. Thus, political discourse has a reifying role to play in the sense that not only does politics *require language*, but that political reality *is created* by political talk (Gastil 1992). As such, we can safely propose that all political behaviour is discursive and thus linguistic in nature (Chilton 2004).

Indeed, as Gastil (1992) argues politics and discourse are close bed-fellows: politics requires language structures and linguistic behaviour, and language involves structures of domination and legitimation.

In a similar nature to the influence and power of elites on the media discourse, politicians' roles in leading, directing and dominating the public debate on, for example, issues of immigration, are by no means marginal. Within his theory of white elite dominance, van Dijk (1989, 1997) argues that it is the politicians who are the decision makers and discursive agenda-setters and that the direct control of action is achieved via political discourses "(t)hat have directive pragmatic function (elocutionary force), such as commands threats, laws, regulations, instructions, and more indirectly by recommendations and advice. Speakers often have an institutional role, and their discourses are often backed by institutional power (van Dijk 1989: 27)".<sup>13</sup> Perhaps unsurprisingly, van Dijk's cognitive model is also as applicable and relevant to political discourses as it is to media discourses. Initially, recipients of political discourse are exposed to, and form their own, "mental models" (van Dijk 2000: 19) and subsequently, these models act as "interpretative schemes" (Gastil 1992: 474).

#### **1.2.2.1. Types of Political Discourse**

The importance of the context of a given discourse has been well argued by others (Wodak and Busch 2004; van Dijk 1984, 2008; Cap 2006; Duszak 1998 and Krzyżanowski 2010). Within the discursive political sphere, there are a number of different discourse genres. These include, as noted above, press briefings, policy documents, parliamentary debates, ministerial question time, political broadcasts and legislation. Within this thesis, my empirical analysis of political discourse will focus on two of these: Firstly, parliamentary debates (on immigration and citizenship legislation) and secondly, policy documents (specifically, election manifestos at local and general elections). It is worth then here, very briefly, explaining the nature of these two micro-discourse sites.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> My brackets.

<sup>14</sup> Specific categories of analysis of political discourse will be given in the methodological part of the thesis.

Parliament is a major site of ‘doing’ political discourse. It is where laws are debated and enacted and so it is also where we, as discourse analysts, are able to witness, analyse and interpret the implicit and explicit ideological positions of those that run the country and decide on its future. Parliament provides a specific context to a discourse which is dependent upon the workings of the institution and of democratic states in general. These include the functioning and role of both parliament and representatives (MPs), the electoral cycle, the relationship between MPs of different parties, the relationship between MPs and their constituencies and wider public and finally, relations between parliament, the government and state agencies (van Dijk 1997: 35). Parliamentary debates are also specific because they are “on record”, i.e. they are prepared prior to the moment of speech and, at least in terms of the major parties, carefully monitored for explicit language that could cause offence. The task for the discourse analyst then is to look for more indirect language. This is especially the case when parliamentary discussions turn to topics of immigration and ‘ethnic affairs’: talk is tightly controlled in order not to open one’s self up to criticisms of racism or xenophobia. Parliamentary debates then often bear witness to the embryonic stages of racist and/or exclusionary discourses and of legitimisations for discrimination against, *inter alia*, migrants. Moreover, via dissemination and recontextualisation in the media, these discourses reach wider society and shape public opinion on the subject.

The analysis of policy can also be a fruitful endeavour for investigating how law-makers construct and exclude others from the polity.<sup>15</sup> Within a theory of interpretive policy analysis, researchers look to investigate ‘how’ policy means, i.e. “how a policy accrues meaning; where meanings reside; how they are transmitted to and among various policy stakeholders; how they come to be shared or not shared; how they may be destroyed” (Yanow 1993: 41).<sup>16</sup> The meaning of a policy is communicated tacitly by use or non-use of symbolic objects, language and acts.<sup>17</sup> It is through policy, Yanow (1993: 41) argues, that publics “tell themselves who they are and what they value”. Although I agree with the basis of this premise, it misses the agency of the process. Thus, the alternative argument is that it is through policy that politicians tell publics who they

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<sup>15</sup> For other instances of policy analysis from a discourse perspective, see Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2011) and Muntigl, Weiss and Wodak (2000)

<sup>16</sup> I would also argue that this proposition also holds true for critical discourse analysis in general and not just policy analysis.

<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of symbolic objects, see Cohen (1985) and Bennett (forthcoming)

are and are not and what they should value and what they should choose not to value. Politics and policy are, after all, normative and future-oriented (Dunmire 2005).<sup>18</sup>

One of the major uses of policy (primarily foreign, but also domestic) is to secure the imagined, and often real, borders of a collective identity, more often than not the nation-state. It is a “boundary producing performance” that is realised through a series of exclusions in which others are marginalised (Campbell 1998: 23). The language of exclusion (cf. above) which is initiated in parliamentary debates and spread through mass media, also makes foreign policy possible (Campbell 1998).

The establishment of some policies surrounding immigration can be said to be a process of ‘*securitisation*’. This is when an issue is presented as being such a grave and imminent threat that it should be dealt with via extraordinary measures. According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), security legitimises special powers to deal with existential threats. Though their work is based on inter-state conflict, the theories of the Copenhagen school can also be transposed to domestic policy as well. Attempts at securitisation can be ad-hoc (such as international reactions to 9/11) but it can also be institutionalised over a longer period of time as is the case with immigration into the UK. A securitising move is an attempt to shift a policy area away from normal politics and such a move is only successful if the policy discourse is persuasive enough for audiences to accept the presentation of an issue as threatening enough. Thus, policies, much like media texts, are also dialogical speech acts (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). For these securitising speech acts to be successful they have to be persuasive and this persuasion results partly from questions of credibility and legitimacy (Chilton 2004). Those in power or in van Dijk’s terminology, the elite, thus hold a privileged position: they can construct the policy and disseminate it via the media. In turn, the securitising move is legitimised through support of it in the press and from there, the wider public.

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<sup>18</sup> For more on the normative nature of policies, see Chapter 3.

### **1.2.3. Interrelated Public Discourses: A model for how discourses flow in the public sphere**

In this final section I argue that the sites of discourse creation, mediation and reception are inherently interrelated in modern democracies. In order to achieve this I will first explain how sites and discourse are potentially linked and I will then introduce my own model for how public discourses relate to one another.

Although, media and political discourses are separate spaces, as explained in the previous sections an ideal demos is not possible, especially in large states that have democratically elected parliaments. Rather, political discourse is mediated and this is how democratic public sphere functions. The relationship though is not always two way, and the media may sometimes bring a particular issue to the attention of politicians – the so-called ‘CNN effect’ (Robinson 2001). This finding is further backed up by analysis of interviews with journalists around Europe (Gemi, Ulasiuk and Triandyfillidou 2012).

The link between media and political discourses are not just theoretical but also professional. Recently there has been a convergence between the two discourses and this might be down to the vocational overlap. Spin doctors are more and more involved in the managing of public images of political actors and professional political commentators (often former MPs) proliferate in the media to the extent that even active members of a political party have been marginalised by a few media-savvy elites at the top (Preston and Metykova 2009). More recently, in the case of the Western-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have seen the emergence of embedded reporters.<sup>19</sup>

But there is also a link between, on the one hand political and media discourses and on the other hand, public opinion. Simon and Jerritt (2007) have conducted empirical research into the relationship between these three sites: Firstly political discourse is reported by the media who are encouraged by politicians to adopt the similar frames and language as themselves. Secondly, these frames affect the public’s judgement.

As will become clear in the next chapter, discourses of exclusion are directed at a specific audience, often the (potential) electorate. Media and political discourses rely

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<sup>19</sup> Embedded reporting is when journalists are attached to military units in a conflict. Whilst this has happened historically, the term became used in the media in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom

upon for their legitimacy an acceptance by an ‘interpretive community’, those to whom the ‘symbolic artefacts’ mean something, but more than this, it is only through public discourse that this we, or interpretive community is constructed.<sup>20</sup> Figure 1.1 (below) indicates, very simply, my concept of how public discourses relate to one another.




Figure 1.1: A model for the functioning of public discourse

What is immediately obvious from figure 1.1 is that there are two discursive processes working alongside each other. The first is the ‘national discourse’, or what can be termed for these purposes a constant ‘meta-narrative discourse’. This is the on-going attempt to create a cohesive community identity by a group’s government (more often than not a national government, but the same can be said for sub-national groups or even specific political parties). The second process is the discourse surrounding a specific issue such as immigration, European integration, foreign policy or citizenship. Taken together, these individual discourse topics work to create the ‘meta-narrative discourse’. Each one reinforces the overall national narrative by legitimising and re-legitimising certain discourses and opening up possibilities for the integration of supplementary private and public realms to be included. These discourses are not easily disentangled and indeed there is a lot of interdiscursivity (Reisigl and Wodak 2000). As such, in the UK example, individual areas of policy discourse such as health care provision, social welfare provision, schooling, education, immigration, integration, citizenship, religion, terrorism and the economy all, in some way, uphold the larger overarching narrative.

<sup>20</sup> I have borrowed this term from Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998).

The next point to highlight in my model is that both discourses originate from the top, that is, from politicians. This does not mean to say that a topic will not be instigated from 'below' or from the media and it is quite frequent that policy discourses are reactive to the public/media. The policies and viewpoints of politicians and political actors are disseminated through a number of different possible genres such as speeches in Parliament, 'town hall' meetings, election hustings, policy leaks, press releases and official policy documents.

In the next stage, these pronouncements are recontextualised and reinterpreted by media outlets (individually and collectively). At one end of the scale of reactions, the media can accept the discourse and communicate it to the public, sometimes verbatim with the use of extensive quoting. At the other end of the scale, the discourse can be challenged or rejected. This rejection will be communicated 'up' to the politicians and 'down' to the general public. As mentioned above, despite protests to the contrary, media outlets are not objective and as such the way they recontextualise and frame political discourses are greatly influenced by their ownership, editorial stance and the competitive nature of media economy.

In the subsequent stage, the interpretive community then consumes the mediated discourse (textually, visually and/or audibly) and will either accept or reject it. To be sure, there is always dissent and multitude of viewpoints taken within the interpretative community, but the focus here is on what the dominant response is. It is timely here to remember Mouffe's agonistic public sphere where dissensus needs to be managed and accepted as legitimate as well as Fairclough's (1995) dialectical approach to discourses. Acceptance of the political discourse on a specific policy area leads to legitimisation of that discourse and the government's actions. For example in the UK successive governments' discourses on limiting immigration because of the multiple problems it causes has been 'accepted' by the electorate. But more than this though, acceptance of such a discourse also means the acceptance of a certain conceptualisation a community's identity – the meta-narrative. There are some instances where there is unmediated direct interaction between politicians and the electorate, for example, constituency surgeries and during election campaigns however, the vast majority of interaction is mediated by journalism.

It should be noted that this model relates to the traditional and currently dominant model of communication within the public sphere. The emergence of new, interac-

tive, platforms such as twitter and comments below the line on articles and blogs enables much easier direct communication between participants without the mediation of the media and thanks to this electorate are not just recipients of ‘information’.

### **1.3. Conclusion: A complex discursive public sphere**

To briefly recapitulate the basic premise of this chapter, firstly an exploration of differing conceptions of the public sphere was forwarded. This started with Aristotle’s initial separation of the public and the private and followed to an explanation of the agonistic public sphere (Arendt 1958 and more recently Mouffe 1999, 2009). Subsequently, Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere (1989) that evolved during the early capitalist period was introduced. This period saw the rise of scrutiny on government action (primarily in coffee houses, but increasingly via newspapers) and allowed the space for a ‘critical public’. This configuration of the public sphere was short-lived and with his work, Habermas also argues that it declined because of a blurring of the public and private including a professionalization and politicisation of the public sphere. A further crucial factor in the decline of the public sphere was the commercialisation and tabloidization of the media. Fraser though highlights three key shortcomings of Habermas’ theory: 1) the public sphere was not open to all but was conditioned by a number of factors, 2) there are multiple public spheres rather than one bourgeois-dominated one and, 3) the segregation between what is ripe for public debate and what is private is decided by the dominant group, the so-called ‘discursive deficit’. Finally, other conceptions of the public sphere were proposed including Fraser’s own model which attempts to correct Habermasian theory and Husband’s multicultural public sphere, which calls on the media to be more proactive in representing and including minorities.

The second half of the chapter looked at the two main discourses within the public sphere: media and political. The power and position within a modern public sphere is hopefully now clear: elite politicians rely on the media for dissemination of their messages and the media plays an important mediating role by interpreting these messages. With regards to political discourse, it was argued that all political behaviour is in one way or another discursive and that political discourse is means by which politicians tell the public who they are or are not. Two specific types of political discourse were briefly

explained: parliamentary and policy and finally, I attempted to explain the connectedness of public discourse.

Up to this point the arguments put forward have been theoretical and rather abstract in nature but they have nevertheless established a firm starting point for the remainder of the thesis. The subsequent chapter attempts to concretise this theory by highlighting how the specific (albeit intertextual) discursive issues of racism and immigration work within this frame.

## **Chapter 2: Discourse, Race and Migration**

Despite the purported attempts of politicians, world leaders and communities around the world to eradicate it, the spectre of racism and racialised thinking has had the uncanny ability, in both the lay-person and the more strictly Freudian sense, to maintain its social importance and influence. Regardless of attempts to eradicate it, race appears to be intransigent (Hook 2006: 17). Indeed, although we hear of a post-racial world and despite advances in human rights, racism of one form or another is on the increase throughout Europe. This rise has been concurrent with a rise in immigration into and within “EU-rope” (Garton-Ash 2000: 155). Indeed, for Solomos (2003) race has only ever been an issue in the UK since the arrival of large-scale migrant labour post-1945. As Delanty, Jones and Wodak (2008) posit, refugees and asylum seekers are the new others but it should be added that as well as being the targets of the new racism, migrant groups have long been present within European societies and so the discursively constructed, racialised, thinking behind these outward examples of racism are very much historically rooted.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the discursive nature of racism and the current antipathy to racialised ‘Others’ which is evident in the UK and is one of the focuses of this study. The specific ways by which racism or xenophobia are discursively realised will be approached in the methodological part of the thesis. What I am concerned with here is how racism is theorised and how this relates to its discursive construction. The chapter will start with an investigation in the concepts of race and racism as well other terms that are discursively and theoretically associated with them (such as xenophobia and ‘othering’). Following this, and following writers such as van Dijk (2005) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001), I will argue for a discursive explanation for the existence of racism in society. Moving on from this, chapter finishes by highlighting

Hook's (2006) work on 'pre-discursive racism' and the argument that racism, though discursively realised, is at least partly such a powerful ideology because of internal psychological reasons as it is for reasons of maintenance of power and control of access for a racially categorised majority against a similarly labelled minority, or minorities.

## **2.1. From Biology to culture**

Racism is as much an historical concept as it is social (Miles 2000). By this, we can take historical to mean firstly that there is a long history of racism and secondly that today's manifestations of racism themselves rely on national or ethno-national histories. It is racism's historical nature that will be look at below.

The concept of race, as (pseudo)biological way of differentiating people along primarily phenotypical grounds, became widespread in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Prior to this 'scientification' of the concept, it was largely used to explain aristocratic descent and membership of the nobility (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries however, race became linked to social-Darwinism whereby "folk taxonomies" (Triandafyllidou 2001: 6) were constructed and hierachialised in order to explain processes of history. Through this racist frame, history was interpreted as "a 'racial struggle' within which only the fittest 'races' would have the right to survive" (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 4). This form of racist discourse and thinking was used to justify imperial ventures, colonial expansion and slavery. Within a Marxist interpretation of racism, racial prejudice was used as a legitimation for the mistreatment of black Africans, and the racialised hierarchy of groups legitimised processes of labour exploitation (Miles 2000). Kamali (2008) argues that in present-day Europe, racism and discrimination possesses three distinct properties: otherism, racism and narcissism. The success of the European colonial programme required legitimation and justification and this was discursively achieved by constructing the colonial subject(s) as inferior along both pseudo-biological and ethno-cultural lines. According to Kamali (2008) this led, and continues to contribute to, a European narcissism that is based upon two tenets. Firstly this narcissism stems from a feeling of superiority that, if no longer biological is most certainly cultural and is has its origins in the belief of a universalism along European lines. Secondly, the narcissism is maintained discursively via the construction of a "purified" (Kamali 2008: 306) or re-written history that denies previous

racism and discrimination. Such an example of this narcissism and othering is Orientalism (Said 1995) in which, there is a “Western assumption that ‘our present is your future’” (Gabriel 1994, 25).

The concept of race was also closely tied to that of ‘nation’ (Anderson 1983) and of ‘volk’ (Gellner 1983). Through this, during the period of burgeoning nationalisms in the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie were bestowed with, or more precisely bestowed upon themselves, a racialised history and character which was typical of the nation and in opposition to the working class who lacked these qualities (Triandafyllidou 2001).<sup>21</sup> Similarly, Miles (1993) argues that this racialisation, as a precursor of justifying the marginalisation of peasants and the proletariat, was evident in the first stage development of the nation-state and only later was the strategy used against foreigners.

The normalisation and acceptance of a racialised hierarchy of peoples continued until the twentieth century where, because of the brutal excesses of Nazi Germany that led to the Shoah, combined with scientific work that disproved race theories, the concept of race was eventually delegitimised in politics. The mention of race became all but taboo in some countries such as Germany and France (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Indeed, the term racism has been so discredited that the use of it has become a significant rhetorical and political charge to level against a person or institution (Doane 2006).

However, despite its biological underpinnings being withdrawn, racism and racialised characteristics are still projected particularly onto migrant groups as racialised others. They therefore remain important in “common sense thought” (Miles 2000: 138) and are still very much a part of many people’s thinking on social-relations in present-day Europe. This has become even truer in the last twenty years since increasing levels of migration into the area. Furthermore, the concept of race has been difficult to shake off. The difference now is that a new racism exists based not on phenotypical difference but along what can broadly be defined as ethno-cultural lines. Certain cultural markers such as language, dress, traditions, food and beliefs have become socially signified. Via this racism there is a cultural chauvinism whereby ‘their’ culture is incompatible with ‘ours’ and those who ‘refuse’ to integrate are called-out as ‘intolerant’ (Delanty, Jones and Wodak 2008). Delanty, Jones and Wodak (2008: 4) are moved to stress that the discourse of racism has been ‘dereferralised’ in the sense that race is now removed

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<sup>21</sup> This mirrors the construction and rise of the bourgeois public sphere mentioned in Chapter 1 and the criticisms levelled at it that such a public sphere excluded the working classes.

from the racial subject and is now a “floating discourse” that encompasses many other differences.

## **2.2. Social constructions of race**

It is now widely accepted, at least in academia, that race, and thus racism, is a socially constructed phenomenon rather than one pertaining to biological differences. Rather than social relations being somatically determined so that race determines historical and social processes, the opposite is in fact true. Namely, that the concept of race is itself historically and socially contingent and constructed (Miles 2000). In the UK, this research came in cultural studies and specifically by the cultural studies group at Birmingham university, led by Stuart Hall and other important research on the subject has been published by Cox (1970), Miles (1993), and Omi and Winant (1986). As noted above though, this has not caused racial categories to cease to be used. The important thing to note about these constructed categories and the differences between them is that the actual existence of them and their scale, in terms of their continued use and power, is almost irrelevant. For Downing and Husband (2005: 5), these constructions do not need to be logical but merely “psychologically coherent”. What is important here rather, is that there is a “shared conviction” amongst a society as to the reality of these discursively constructed differences. This, to be sure, is a historically embedded process and as such other social and political phenomena that discursively link to race included nationalism and collective histories (Downing and Husband 2005, see also Reisigl and Wodak 2001 and Wodak et al. 2009).

Thus, it is right to ask, as Reisigl and Wodak (2001) do, whether there is a difference between old (somatic) and new (cultural) racism. In the old racism, groups were constructed as un-egalitarian due to biological inferiority. Juxtaposed to this is new racism, which is discursively constructed in texts ranging from school books to political pronouncements to media coverage, as a ‘differentialist’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) racism based on culture, lifestyles, habits and traditions and the threat which too much mixing will bring to the dominant society. Goldberg (1999) argues that race-based discourses no longer explicitly reference hierarchy. However I would contend that there is an implicit hierarchialisation at work in modern racisms as well. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) note, racism is based on a construction of groups based on the possession or non-

possession of certain traits (physical, cultural, linguistic, traditional) which are negatively evaluated. This is what has become to be known as ‘racialisation’ (Omi and Winant, 1986: 64), which is “the extension of racial meaning to previously racially unclassified relationships, social practices or groups”. Thus, any such separation of groups will inevitably lead to a taxonomy of the groups, however informal (and baseless).

Although, the discursive and rhetorical racism may have evolved over the course of the twentieth century from a focus on phenotypical to ‘cultural’ differences, the underlying practical function of racism has remained. Because they are socially constructed, it obviously follows logically that one must ask the question: Why is it constructed?<sup>22</sup> It stands to reason that there must be a ‘need’ or at least reason, for such a construction. Four interrelated functions that racial categorisations and racism serve can be proposed at this point:

- Firstly, race cannot be separated from questions of power and ideology,
- Secondly, and stemming from the first, racism, and the xeno-racism (Delanty, Jones and Wodak 2008) that characterises present day antipathy to migrants in Europe, is about the distribution of resources (which are discursively conveyed as being limited)
- Thirdly, by differentialising and hierarchialising groups via race, the dominant in-group is favoured and the collective identity is reinforced (this partly relates back to point 1)
- Fourthly, following Hook (2006) racism also serves to reinforce a person’s identity (the ego) at an individual level.

The first three of these will be dealt with briefly immediately below and I will return to the fourth point separately later in the chapter as this point is often over looked by discourse analysts in their interpretations of race.

I would argue that ‘race’, as a discursively constructed method of social categorisation and separation, is at base functional; that it serves a purpose for those in power. Furthermore, racism is an ideology and a “discriminatory social (including discursive) practice that could be backed by hegemonic social groups” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:

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<sup>22</sup> The subsequent questions of how racism is constructed and by whom will be answered in later chapters.

10).<sup>23</sup> Indeed, social issues are discursively framed as racial issues for political reasons by politicians and other members of society who have power (Doane 2006). For Memmi, (1992: 103) race is a “generalised and absolute evaluation of real or fictitious differences that is advantageous to the ‘accuser’ and detrimental to his or her ‘victim’”, whereas Goldberg (1999: 374) argues that race gives social relations the appearance of fixedness and “characterises assent relations in the language of descent”. Here, then, we see quite starkly the argument for the notion that racism is ‘done’ for a reason, that there is an advantage in acting in such a way, material or otherwise.

Guillaumin (1991: 164, following Reisigl and Wodak, 2001) has established four facets of racism, three of which can be defined as political: Racism is a political program, a legal structure (such as citizenship – which thus introduces immigration and the question of who is or is not a member of the society) and the “practical horizon” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 6) of the state, for example the desire for racial purity. The final part of racism is practical behaviour i.e. on a day to day basis on the street. Guillaumin’s conception of race is of one that originates from politicians and is thus about power. However, this ignores the question of consent and does not answer how the political programme filters down to the everyday behaviour or how this relates to, and relies upon, the “uncritical transmission” (Downing and Husband 2005: 5) by the media of the political discourse of the first three points.

To fill this gap, it is worth turning to Essed’s theory of ‘everyday racism’ (1991, 2002) in which the latter is “a process involving the continuous, often unconscious, exercise of power predicated in taking for granted the privileging of whiteness (Frankenberg: 1993), the universality of Western criteria of human progress, and the primacy of European (derived) cultures” (Essed 2002: 204). For Essed, the macro-structures, i.e. politics, link to micro events on a day-to-day basis. This perspective is echoed by Fairclough’s view that there is a “discursive dialectical relationship” between structure and event in all communicative acts (Richardson 2004: 4). The macro structure, i.e. the social and political context in which relations occur between individuals, and between and within groups, is shaped by power structures. This is what can be termed ‘institutional racism’ which, for Essed, is the argument that institutions embody certain cultural val-

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<sup>23</sup> I take the word ‘hegemonic’ here to mean the dominant social groups as well as ‘hegemonic’ in the Gramscian sense that it is not only about coercive power but also about mechanisms of control (discursive and otherwise) across social fields and practices.

ues and racism is “ideologically mediated via the practices of these institutions. This differs slightly from MacPherson’s (1999) definition which was given in UK government report that focused on police failings in the murder of a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, in London:

The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin", which "can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes, and behaviour, which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping, which disadvantages minority ethnic people. (Macpherson, 1999: para 6:34)

To place the blame at the metaphorical feet of institutions though fails to acknowledge sufficiently that institutions are run and led by people and so the agency of the elites in positions of power in maintaining or failing to bring racism to an end should not be left unquestioned. In Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001) terms, it is better to call this form of racism ‘institutionalised’ or ‘institutionally supported’.

Within a theory of everyday racism, racism is not a single act but a collection of acts that are experienced vicariously and directly, the impact of which are strengthened by each experience as well as by the memory of previous experiences. It is racism by ‘a thousand paper cuts’. For Essed (1991), there are three processes through which racism functions firstly there is a problematisation of other cultures and groups which leads to the second process of a marginalisation of minorities. Running concurrently with this there is a repression of these minorities via humiliation or violence. It is under these conditions that everyday racism as another process can flourish in which:

(1) socialized racist notions are integrated in meanings that make practices immediately definable and manageable, (2) practices with racist implications become in themselves familiar and repetitive and, (3) underlying racial and ethnic relations are actualized and reinforced through these routine or familiar practices in everyday situations. (Essed, 2002: 210)

The use of racial hierarchies allows the domination by a majority group and the subordination of a minority group or, groups. Domination, here, following van Dijk (2005), is the illegitimate use of power in which power is the preferential access to and control over social resources. Thus, the result of racist domination is social inequality whereby minorities have less access to and control over resources, which for political purposes, are discursively constructed as scarce. Racism, argues Lipman-Blumen (1994: 110) is

about the negotiation of resources in which a given group gains and attempts to preserve their “capacity to impose its will repeatedly upon another, despite any opposition, by its potential to contribute or withhold critical resources from the central task, as well as by offering or withholding rewards, or by threatening or invoking punishment”. This control of resources is visible in discourses of migration that have come to predominate in European debates. A major tenet of the xenophobia that abounds presently is of an economic bent and migrants are simultaneously, and counter-logically, constructed as taking jobs from the indigenous population and of being a burden on the state via benefits and access to health care and education.

The third and final point which needs touching upon here, is that racism is a means by which collective identity can be strengthened. Within a phenomenological theory of racism, xenophobia and racism play a role in securing collective identity in times of crisis. During or after periods of intense social upheaval and modernisation in which, for example, certain shared resources can no longer remain (such as a more comprehensive welfare state), “anomic tensions” arise and spread throughout society which in turn lead to a crisis of collective identity (Wimmer 1997: 27). Migration itself is a further process that could lead to such a condition. In a period of turmoil like this, a phenomenological theory propounds that societies regress to basic ‘self/other’ dichotomies based on historic myths and an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983) of nationhood. These basic forms of identity go some way in solving the crisis of identity by answering the question of what or who, ‘we’ are. By focusing attention on the ‘other’ it also “delivers an explanation of the malaises’ cause” (Wimmer 2002: 211). For Richard Sennett (following Delanty 2009) the ‘we’ is a defensive mechanism to protect a society against the ravages of modern capitalism.<sup>24</sup> More specifically to racial discrimination, Goldberg (1999: 374) sees race as a way of dealing with the “anonymity of mass social relations in modernity”. Although not necessarily based on race, another form of othering is vilification of the other, for example, Fabiszak’s (2007: 232) use of conceptual metaphor theory to analyse how enemies in a number of conflicts (Falklands, Libya, Afghanistan) were vilified (cf. also Fabiszak 2010a)

There are a number of troubling issues with this explanation of racism. Firstly, to conceive of racism as some kind of ‘natural’ reaction of hasocieties to threats to their

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<sup>24</sup> For a more thorough explanation of this topic, see Bennett (2015, forthcoming)

identity, pathologises racism. If it can be explained away as a purely psychological response to a ‘threat’, then there is very little that governments can do to change the situation and migration will always be a troubling issue that will never fully go away and can never be solved. Secondly, the blame for racism is fairly and squarely laid at the feet of the victims, i.e. minority groups and in particular migrants, and removes the agency of racism and racialisation, which in actuality lies with the dominant group in society. Thirdly this approach ignores the socially (and discursively) constructed nature of crises. As noted in Chapter 1, it is through policy, foreign and domestic, that the outer boundaries of a collective identity constructed through a marginalisation of others. It is the same case with political reactions to crises of modernity. Indeed, minorities and migrants thus appear as excellent subjects for othering because of their position and their limited access to social capital with which they might be able to react against the marginalisation (c.f Duszak 2002 for us/them dichotomies and examples of othering).

Despite these criticisms against such a phenomenological explanation of racism, there is though still, within psychology, a strong claim that the blurring of boundaries (national, topographic, mental models) and the Other’s transgression of these (constructed) boundaries is in some way traumatic on an individual and collective level. This point will be returned to and given more focused attention towards the end of the chapter in more depth when discussing pre-discursive racism.

### **2.3. Discursive Constructions of Race**

Racism is not just about possessing beliefs based on negative stereotypes of a racialised group. As noted above, racism also involves the power or ability to impose those beliefs as hegemonic and thus a basis for denial of rights (Richardson 2009). Indeed a minority group cannot become racialised without this power of the dominant group to impose a racialised identity. The actions of people with power and influence, combined with established rules and societal norms, function concurrently to produce and reproduce racism (Kamali 2008). This racism is produced and reproduced discursively through the model that was sketched out at the end of the previous chapter. In this model of discursive realisations and reifications, racist discourses reach a long way back into (constructed) histories and at the same time are normative, and so future oriented. Thus, to

be very clear, firstly racist discourses cannot and do not appear externally to a specific socio-historical context and secondly, racism is at least initially a 'top-down' process initiated by those with power and/or social capital.

Within discourse analysis - and in particular in critical discourse studies - there has been some discussion as to just how discursive racism is. Goldberg (1999) has argued that there is no racism without racialised discourse and that racism is a specific field of discourse which is made up of all racialised expressions including beliefs, acts and their consequences (Garcia 2001). The criticism of this position is that, following Garcia (2001), for it to hold weight, either the concept of discourse needs to be widened to extra-linguistic phenomena, or it reduces racism to the purely discursive. I am minded to side more with Goldberg and other discourse analysts.

The very basic tenet of a discursive theory of racism is that racist opinions are produced through discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). For Anthias (1995: 294) racism is "a discourse and practice whereby ethnic groups are inferiorised". However, Richardson (2004) makes an important intervention in this debate by stating that there is no need to separate discourse and practice. Indeed, discourse is practice. This is position taken by discourse analysts and defines discourse as "language in use" (Brown and Yule 1983: 1, following Richardson 2004: 3). Similarly, within discursive psychology, Le-couter and Augustinos (2001: 230) state that racism is an "interactional, language-based practice, whereas for Gilroy (1987), racism is an effect of discourse. For Fairclough (1995), there are three components to all communicative acts: social practice, discursive practice and the text itself, all three of which need analysing when taking a discursive line on racism (Richardson 2004).

Racism is discursive in two major, interrelated ways. Firstly it is through discourse that we learn discriminatory beliefs and negative stereotypes. Secondly, "discriminatory discourse is itself a form of racist practice" (van Dijk 2005: 10). Thus, it is a process similar to a serpent inescapably biting its own tail: racist ideologies are produced in discourse and reproduced and acted upon through discourse, the effects of which in turn reinforce our initial conceptions.

According to van Dijk (2005), racist discourse can appear in many functions and processes within a society and we get our filtered images of minorities primarily through discursive representations. This is due to the fact that on a day-to-day basis dominant group interaction with minorities is minimal and often limited to fleeting experiences within an economic or capitalist prism in which 'they' provide 'us' with

goods and services (airports, restaurants, security guards, cleaners, shop-owners). Indeed, when there is more extended interaction, the experience can be so different to expectations, precisely because it is in sharp conflict with previously-held negative representations. Positive experiences with a minority might be explained away as exceptions to the rule whereas a negative experience will automatically serve to reinforce what was already 'known' (Delanty, Jones and Wodak, 2008). People are hence discursively and, for van Dijk (2005) socio-cognitively, 'primed'.

Given this limited level of interaction, dominant-group views of minorities are necessarily mediated through varying discourse genres. The two main, forms of discourse pertaining to this thesis are media and politics, as noted in Chapter 1. As van Dijk (2005: 5-6) notes: "popular racism actually does not have a popular source but is instead produced and reproduced in elite (discourses of) racism". However, there are many other sites where racist or discriminatory discourse is visible, and thus suitable for analysis. These include school text books and children's' literature (van Dijk 2005), conversations with friends, training courses, academic work (and its funding streams), welfare institutions and health services. As with Essed, van Dijk argues that the power of racism endures because it is so ingrained into how members of a given society cognitively order the world around them. In 'everyday racism' (Essed 2002), the victims experience not one or two major racist events but many smaller events that build upon the previous. The case is a similar one for how members of society obtain and retain racist ideologies. We are almost bombarded by exclusionary discourse from childhood onwards, at school, on television, in newspapers, at the cinema, and in interaction with others at university, in the workplace and in the pub. These experience memories "shape our perception and comprehension of discursive practices and also imply stereotypes and prejudices, if such mental models become rigid." (Wodak and Busch 2004: 110). As such it is difficult to reject what has been learnt over a lifetime (van Dijk 2005). Moreover, these discourses are more readily accepted if they are "consistent with our own interests" (van Dijk 2005: 10), i.e. if parents want their child to go to a better school or if a patient is on a long waiting list for an operation.

It is here that the question of race and power again becomes clear: In the first place, racism is a "social system of domination" (van Dijk 2005: 1) based on discursively constructed differences. Within this system, the dominant group constructs minority groups as either possessing or lacking certain traits that have deemed to have symbolic capital. In the second, the leaders of the dominant group aim to uphold the

status quo with regards control over and access to resources, including power itself. In the third, access to the discursive public sphere is one of many forms of power abuse by elites. By limiting access to the (discursive) public sphere, and/or by wielding the power to set the agenda and thus limit the parameters of debate, exclusionary discourses are allowed to prevail without any serious challenge. Fourthly, public consent for these policies are sought and found by the construction of justificatory discourses in which those who are to be excluded are constructed as in some way threatening to the general public. These socio-cognitive acceptances of such constructions are, as noted above, dependent upon the initial stereotypes that exist within a diachronic context. The same argument can of course be made for other forms and processes of exclusion such as gender, class and nationality.

Along with these processes, which are constantly 'in motion' and 'being done', a major part of the discursive nature of racism is the denial of racism. For Essed (2002: 210) racial privilege is perpetuated "when those who claim superior judgement are insensitive to recognising everyday racial injustices, while claiming exclusive power to define reality as void of racism". By discursively constructing a society as "void of racism" (Essed 2001, 2010), the power of rebellion or even comment over 'everyday racism' is rendered less possible. Racism is denied in a number of ways. Firstly, as mentioned above, racism, qua biological differences, is now a taboo concept so that in modern western democracies it is constructed, through talk and text, as having been consigned to history, as something that happened but no longer does. In a similar way to which Fukuyama (1993) proclaimed the 'end of history' with reference to the fall of Communism, so now governments claim the end of racism. Similarly, in the USA, since the battle for civil rights, many white politicians have followed a philosophy of colour-blindness whereby race should no longer matter. Doane (2006) notes that the role of the colour-blind ideology, adopted by American politicians, is to defend white advantages. Alternatively, racism is a problem for other countries who want to be like us: i.e. racist football fans in countries in the former Yugoslavia, the governments of which are pushing for EU membership.<sup>25</sup>

If it is accepted as existing within a society, then it is discursively confined to a problem of the far-right and not representative of wider society. By constructing racism

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<sup>25</sup> Here we see a further discursive construction of the linear development of societies in which western-European (derived) states are always at the vanguard and whose culture is the one to be copied and followed.

in such a way it can be safely ‘quarantined’ and daily life can go on as normal.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, although institutional racism does undoubtedly exist, the focus on it ignores the (potential) agency of the wider public in continuing racism. These two discursive realisations allow people to continue to reject any blame for structural inequalities. Indeed, van Dijk (2005) argues that far-right political parties serve a purpose: such groups are described as the ‘real’ racists, thereby allowing discriminatory practices to continue unabated. They are also an easy target because the language used is much more explicitly racist than the implicit discriminatory language of mainstream politics (and media). Rather, now, as racism has moved from biological to ethno-cultural justification, so too has the language which is used to discriminate. Now discrimination against minorities is coded in less explicit discourse (Delanty, Jones and Wodak, 2008). Reeves (1983) talks of a discursive de-racialisation in which racial matters are spoken about by the use of symbolic signifiers rather than explicit racial language. This is what has been termed the rise of ‘dog-whistle politics’ (Goodin 2008) in which, certain words or phrases are used or symbolic topics are focused on which, despite not being explicitly racist, are easily cognitively linked to negative stereotypes of a minority group or groups. All of this works to create a paradoxical situation where racism is on the rise and yet there are only a few ‘racists’ (Delanty, Jones and Wodak 2008: 11).

The final way in which denial of racism is manifested is the reversal of racism. Those who claim to be discriminated against are labelled as racist against whites, over-sensitive, politically-correct or as playing the race-card, which, given the taboo nature of the word, automatically “neutralises minority claims of discrimination” (Doane 2006: 269).

#### **2.4. Psycho-discursive racism**

I need to return at this juncture to the fourth function of racism, namely that racist stereotypes serve to maintain individual identities. Firstly, it should be made clear that I am not arguing that racism is purely internal, or that humans are necessarily predisposed to it. By attributing racism to problems with cognition or evil people, it turns “a problem

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<sup>26</sup> Indeed, racism itself is medicalised and constructed as ‘disease’ such as a cancer that needs dealing with.

of social power into a problem of individual psychology” (Hook 2006: 209). Indeed to do so actually absolves society of any agency with regards to the constructions of racism. However, there is also a danger for (critical) discourse analysts to not give sufficient “internal psychological weight” (2006: 209) to racism, which is a social and political phenomenon. For Hook, the power of racism cannot be explained purely through discourse analysis and researchers need to look at the “psychic representations of race” (2006: 210) as well. This space is filled, he argues, by psychoanalytic theory.

Within this theory, desires, fantasies, anxieties and fears are important in explaining social power. These phenomena though are discursively produced (e.g. the construction of a threatening ‘other’) and historically specific (Hook 2006). Kristeva (1982) argues that the uptake of racism is motivated by the process of abjection. The abject is something contemptible and contact with it is traumatic to the extent that it should be rejected from the body. Kristeva’s (1982) point is that the ego is never fully autonomous and that abjections occurs when a person is unable to distinguish ‘me’ from ‘not me’, it is a “border anxiety” (Hook 2006: 217) that threatens distinction. Abjection though – the ridding of the body of unwanted others – is never a complete process. Indeed the ego cannot ever be fully autonomous because it relies on the abject for the security of its own identity. The other side of the wall is a constituent part of what is inside and the safe, secure, ego relies on what it abjects and cannot assimilate. For Derrida (Derrida and Dufoucmantelle, 2000), the foreigner puts into question, just by being, the *self* and is similarly brought into question by the *self*.

This abjection happens on an individual, but also collective level. On the individual level, the constitutive outside is the abject other, the thing we do not fully know. On the collective level, a community’s constitutive outside are those which do not belong to the community. Kristeva (1991: 96) goes one step further and argues that if social groupings, discursively constructed around power and legitimacy did not exist the “externality represented by the foreigner and most often experienced as unfavourable or at least problematical, would simply not exist”.

These pre-discursive reactions though are what political, discursive, attempts at securing power (via discrimination) rely on for their legitimation and enduring success. It is important to note though that the thing to be abjected need not be a racial(ised) one. For Hook (2006: 219), “there can, in short, be no abject other than that which is socially determined”. The object of abjection threatens the stability of the identity but it also provides it with the means to exclude which in turn provide the conditions of its contin-

ued existence (Hook 2006). This is done through discourse and the power to construct racist discourses, is important in the experiencing of the abject and the attempts of the ego to seek a secure collective or individual. Put succinctly, discursive and pre-discursive elements of racism are inseparable (Hook 2006).

## **2.5. Conclusion**

So far, I have investigated salient theories of racism and have indicated the important shift of justification for racism from biological reasons to ethno-cultural ones. It was argued that racism and racialisation serve practical purposes and from here, four functions of racism were explained: firstly that racism concerns power and ideology. Secondly that racism is often constructed as a battle over socially shared resources. Thirdly, racism secures collective (national) identities that have been called into question via modernity and globalisation. This point is accepted with the caveat that racism does not appear in a decontextualised vacuum but rather foreigners or outsiders are racialised through discourse that originate from those within the dominant group who hold power. Fourthly and finally, it was argued that there is an important psychological dimension to racism in which outsiders need to be abjected in order for the individual ego to maintain stability. As with point three, the object of abjection need not be a racialised other but frequently is because of certain socio-historical contexts.

The remainder of the chapter was dedicated to arguing for the discursive nature of racism. Following critical discourse analysts such as Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk, I contend that racism is ‘done’ through discourse in a variety of ways on a day-to-day basis, especially in the media and in politics. Furthermore, by limiting access to these discourse sites within the public sphere, minorities are further victims of racial exclusion. Finally, it was explained that discursive constructions of racism are produced and re-produced through a model of public discourse that was outlined in Chapter 1.

Within Europe today, and more specifically, in the UK, the object of abjectification, is often the migrant and this has been the case for at least the last 50 years since the Windrush years. Delanty, Jones and Wodak (2008) have termed the current racism in Europe as a xeno-racism which is racist in substance (the discursive construction of migrants) but xenophobic in form. ‘They’ are not a problem for ‘us’ because ‘they’ are

biologically inferior but because 'they' are taking resources from 'us' and their culture is different from ours.

### **Chapter 3: (En)acting integration**

It is only relatively recently that European countries have witnessed immigration on a large scale. Since the end of the Second World War, a number of processes have contributed to a considerable increase in non-nationals crossing the borders into Europe. These include the end of many French, Dutch and British colonial projects and the subsequent migration of subjects to the metropole and the need to rebuild cities and, running concurrently to these, an improvement in living standards and conditions in European countries which has become a strong pull factor for migrants. Additionally, there has been a shift in the motivations of migrants. Up until the 1960s and 1970s, migrants came to Europe for labour reasons and it was never envisaged or expected that in the long run they would settle in the country and thus were never seen as potential citizens or political actors (Martinello, 2006). They were there to produce but never reproduce. There has been a shift in migration patterns though in recent years from temporary labour, the archetypal Gastarbieter, to one of more permanent migration, motivated by push factors (environmental disasters and armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing) and pull factors (the chance of a better quality of life through greater economic, social and educational opportunities).

This change in both the levels of, and reasons for, immigration has brought many results but two stand out. Firstly, the permanence of migration has necessitated that states decide whether, and how, to integrate newcomers. Integration, Horner and Weber (2011: 139-159) note, is not just a moving across geographical borders but also “conceptual borders of identity, belonging and entitlement”. Similarly, Fortier posits that migration affects how individuals, communities and nations imagine themselves and their cohabitants spatially, temporally and corporeally (Fortier 2006). Secondly the ever-extended presence of migrants has called into question and disrupted previously

solid and accepted discursive expressions of purported national or cultural communities. As Favell notes, migration thus also invites questions to be asked regarding citizenship because it brings with it a need to “reconcile cultural pluralism with political membership” (Favell 1998: 22). Indeed, such issues question the European governments’ purported fidelity to ideals of justice, equality, liberalism and tolerance (Favell 1998).

In the concluding chapter of the theoretical contributions of this thesis, the aim is to explain the concomitant concepts of citizenship and integration which, going forward, will inform my empirical research and analysis. The overview provided in the chapter will lead to a working definition of the two concepts of integration and citizenship as well as a greater understanding of their inherent, yet implicit, discursive nature I will also point to how the concepts of integration and citizenship relate to each other and to other concepts such as racism and the public sphere which have been previously introduced.<sup>27</sup> Following these explanations, it will then be argued that integration is a performative, and therefore at least partly, discursive, process. Staying with this theatrical description, migrants are auditioning for permanent positions in British society. In order to be accepted, they need to be seen as authentic and similar to the existing members of the group. They need to perform certain identities that are gendered, racialised and class-based, the parameters of which are set by the country of residence.<sup>28</sup> Their stages, or sites, of discursively producing these performances are political, cultural, legal and social and are often ritualised and symbolic.

### **3.1. Citizenship**

#### **3.1.1. Formulations of Citizenship**

Citizenship has been, and continues to be, a difficult concept to pin down. Certainly it is more traditionally associated with the official legal status of membership of a given

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<sup>27</sup> Whilst it is true that the thesis focuses on migrant integration, this chapter will not look into theories of immigration *per se*, in the strict sense of why people cross borders. Relevant mention of migration to the UK, and to Brighton more specifically, will be made in the contextual chapters.

<sup>28</sup> As will become clear later in this chapter, ‘residence’ here should be taken to mean merely where a migrant currently resides rather than indicating legal status. Indeed throughout the thesis the terms ‘country of residence’ (COR) and country of origin (COO) will be used rather than other possible terms such as ‘host country’ and ‘sending country’.

(national) community. For Bauböck (2006b: 19), it is a binary “boundary concept” or as Brubaker (1992:31) writes, citizenship is an “international filing system, a mechanism for allocating persons to states”. The problem with filing systems though is that for them to work correctly there cannot be any ‘duplicates’. Consequently membership of one state often precludes legal membership of another. This produces a misalignment between formal citizenship and the reality of identities. An immigrant is able to switch identities even if they are ‘filed’ or claimed by one nation-state or another. Nation states “reify belonging into formal citizenship” (Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008: 10) and although senses of belonging are more than just formal membership, such a situation does, to a certain extent, preclude possibilities of multiple identities and ignores that identities are unbounded (Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008: 2). Citizenship is where migration and integration intersect with the law. However, even this ‘minimal’ or fundamental definition brings with it consequences for integration. A person’s legal status theoretically reflects a person’s position regarding the state and brings with it assumptions to allegiances and commitment to the (national) community (Da Lomba 2010). Citizenship as purely legal membership to a state, like integration, possesses a normative function in that it presents what is expected of the immigrants who wish to take nationality. The barriers and pre-requisites to citizenship that a state constructs indicate the level of willingness to allow certain migrants to enter and become part of the national community.

Indeed, within the specific EU context there is a need for a reappraisal of what constitutes citizenship. Firstly, following Reed-Danahay and Brettell (2008) the idea of a European citizenship that is valid regardless of EU country of residence has led to a questioning of relations between nationality and citizenship vs. residence. It also raises questions about the commensurate rights and duties, especially given the free movement of citizens of member states. These include, pension rights, voting, education and access to state welfare. Secondly, immigration into the EU disrupts the idea of a citizenship of residence because such an opportunity is only open to EU citizens (Perching 2006). Non-EU migrants are therefore limited to the margins of union citizenship and a hierarchy of migrants begins to emerge that privileges a passport from an EU state.

There are though other, more complex, taxonomies of citizenship that go beyond the merely legal question of which state a person belongs to. Up until quite recently, citizenship was about rights and duties: voting, taxes, military service etc. However, Marshall’s idea of social citizenship radically altered the citizenship debate (Marshall

1950). For the first time, citizenship was expanded to include state responsibilities to citizens. For Marshall, citizenship meant full membership of a community for the purpose of civil, political and social rights and duties (Morris 1994: 137). There is now a general acceptance that citizenship is more than just the legal membership of a state and that there is an active dimension to it which I would term integration. Following Reed-Danahay and Brettell (2008), these models include Kymlicka and Norman's (1994: 353) which distinguishes between "citizenship-as-legal-status and citizenship-as-desirable-activity". This model is useful because it highlights the normative aspect of non-formal citizenship and the assimilatory nature of integration. A further explanation is Stewart's (1995: 64) differentiation between "state citizenship", on the one hand, which is the formal legal status and "democratic citizenship", on the other, which refers to participation in a community. Similarly, Neveu (2000) distinguishes between horizontal relations (relations among citizens) and vertical relations (relations with the state and its institutions). Finally, for Balibar (1988: 724), there is a difference between citizenship in its "strict sense" (political rights) and in its "broad sense" meaning the "cultural initiative or effective presence in the public sphere (the capacity to be 'listened to' there)". This again requires us to reorient ourselves to arguments made about access and the activity of migrants in the public sphere and the importance of this to full integration, or as Reed-Danahay and Brettell (2008: 7) argue: "citizenship as civic engagement is a much more complex practice that involves individuals as agents in the public sphere". Though separate, formal and non-formal citizenship are obviously closely related. Reed-Danahay and Brettell (2008) propose that what they term social citizenship (participation within community), is a means to assert individual rights to citizenship via social practice rather via recourse to the law. Conversely, while accepting that citizenship is more than just legal status, Isin et al. (2008) argue that legal citizenship has major implications for accessing social citizenship rights.

As will be seen with the case of integration (below), unsurprisingly, there are arguments to say that migrants themselves have a certain level of agency when it comes to citizenship. Kraler (2006) posits that the motivation for naturalisation is separate for that of integration. Naturalisation is about making things easier with regards to the labour market or voting rights. Brettell (2006) terms this pragmatic citizenship. Elsewhere Bibler Coutin (1998 following Reed-Danahay and Brettell, 2008) calls this "additive citizenship" because migrants gain the advantages that citizenship brings, whilst maintaining a sense of belonging and affiliation with their culture of origin. As such we can talk

of ‘instrumental citizenship’ by which migrants become part of a legal-national entity because it is practical but do not have the motivation to integrate culturally and instead opt for separation.

### **3.1.2. A neo-liberal discourse of citizenship**

The models described above have considerable interpretative value when it comes to understanding citizenship in relation to integration. However, none of these models sufficiently question the meaning of citizenship, how it is discursively constructed by those with the power to set the agenda in the public sphere, and how this construction is received by the general public and migrants themselves. As Lepofsky and Fraser (2003: 127) argue: “citizenship is a powerful discursive mechanism that interpolates and articulates an identity for those claiming rights”. I would like here to forward a specific understanding of citizenship that is useful in realising both its discursively constructed nature and its assimilatory nature. Furthermore, such an understanding has serious implications for what migrants need to do in order to integrate.

In the last thirty years or so, since the rise of neo-liberal politics and Chicago school economics, the provision of social welfare has slowly receded in most states in Europe. Along with it there is now a greater emphasis on individual responsibility and success as opposed to reliance upon the state. Isin et al. (2008) add that there is now a shift in emphasis from social rights to social obligations. Thus, there is a dissonance between this and, for example, Marshall’s social citizenship, which although still relevant is now maybe less applicable than it was when it was written in 1950. In current neo-liberal discourses, there is a regression back towards the bourgeois public sphere and gradual retreat of government intervention in the ‘private’ oikos. The electorate, especially in the US and the UK are given freedom from the state and freedom to make their own choices through life, free of government intervention. Even the social welfare that remains is also discursively and practically represented through policy as a series of choices (choice of schools, choice of hospital, elected police commissioners etc.). Rhetorically these are constructed as positive improvements and greater freedom but this hides the reality that governments no longer care for all members ‘from the cradle to the grave’ and that there is change of ethics from one of social citizenship to one of individual self-government (Ong 2005). Citizenship now is about not needing government

aid. For Ong (2005: 698) due to a “neo-liberal technologisation of government, citizens’ well-being is now down to themselves and their own capacities to “confront globalised insecurities”. This language of choice and freedom follows from liberal capitalism and the privileging of the market place as the dominant site of action within a community. In a neo-liberal understanding of citizenship, being a good citizen means firstly to be a minimal burden on the state and secondly to be an active and successful participant in the economy (Ong 1996) in which entrepreneurship is a valuable commodity. Ong (2005) notes that in Asian countries, such as South Korea and Japan, citizens are told that they have a responsibility to self-improve and help the country grow. This is also evident in UK political discourse, especially since the start of the latest economic crisis. Through discursive processes, the ‘ideal citizen’ is given an identity of tax-payer, producer and consumer and conversely, to be welfare dependent implies that a person is not a full citizen. Ong (2005: 698) argues that those who cannot participate fully in the market are reduced to the level of second-class citizen and that those who “can’t climb the ladder or self govern” are marginalised as deviant or risky and threaten the new market-oriented norms. Such a theory is supported by empirical critically discursive analyses of how local communities are constructed in the media (Bennett 2015, in press). I would add though that it is not a question of ability to ‘climb the ladder’ but a question of (discursive) exclusion from the means to climb the ladder as well that leads to this positioning of certain parts of society as deficient. Because migrants, especially asylum seekers and refugees, find themselves generally in low-paid jobs and reliant upon state assistance, they are seen as less capable as self-dependent and economic success and indeed any success has to be justified in terms of “can-do attitudes” (Ong 1996: 739). This further is evident in current UK immigration policy which stipulates a minimum annual income before visas and permanent stays are accepted for family members (UK Border Agency 2012). Related to this, Ong (1996: 742) highlights the experiences of Cambodian migrants to the US who were socialised as refugees to expect only certain low-paid employment and periods of unemployment. They were constructed as “dependent minorities” and as such, were not full citizens. In the UK, this goes some way to explaining why asylum seekers are not accorded full citizenship status. Part of this is because they are not permanent residents but it is also partly down to the fact that they are legally precluded from paid-employment and are forced to rely on reduced state-benefits. From here it is relatively easy to see how and why they can be discursively represented as ‘scroungers’ who ‘skive off the state’.

Thus understood, citizenship has come to imply normatively, a social class, or at the very least, the level of economic activity. But there is also a racial and gendered side to this reworking of the concept in that it is a specifically white middle class that is normative (cf. Lepofsky and Fraser 2003; Balibar 2004; Ong 1996). Ong argues that qualities such as human capital, self sufficiency and consumer power are all associated with whiteness and it is these qualities that constitute a good citizen. This identity also privileges masculine characteristics and, racially, ideas of civilising. Discursively, attaining success does not preclude any cultural or racialised group, however, such success, and acceptance into a community relies upon the migrant subject ‘whitening’ (Ong 1996). Conversely, if success is whitened, then welfare dependency, at least in the US context according to Ong, is simultaneously blackened. Though this may not be wholly applicable to the UK, it is possible that there is a discursive hierarchialisation of migrants that might involve a racialisation too. Thus, within the empirical research in this thesis, one goal will be to ascertain whether certain migrants groups, because of economic success are ‘whitened’ and privileged above other groups who are less successful or who are excluded from attaining this success because of legal status. Whether, in Mulvey’s (2010: 446) terms, there are “scales of desirability”.

### **3.2. Integration**

For the purpose of this thesis, I have taken the decision to divide my investigation of integration into three sections. The first provides some theoretical background to the subsequent section on different explanations of practices of integration. By this, I mean which processes and which sites of action actually constitute the integration of migrants into a society and how these different models offer different normative theories of what is expected of newcomers. Following this, the third section will look at the discursive processes whereby integration is constructed within a mediated public sphere as sketched out in Chapter 1.

### 3.2.1. Theories of Integration

Within the literature on migration and its impact on societies in the new country of residence, there is very little explicit ‘integration theory’ that is named as such. That being said, there have been a number of political theories that have attempted to look at the impact of immigration and the changing ethnic make-up of societies.

Parekh (2008: 81) states that diversity is a “permanent feature of modern life” and although it is correct to state that depth and breadth of difference is greater in modern democracies around the world now than it ever has been, it is also worth remembering that this diversity – be it religious, cultural, ethnic, sexual, economic or linguistic – has existed to a greater or lesser extent for centuries. This notwithstanding, it is migration that highlights the tensions of modern life more than other diversities (Parekh 2008). Immigration into a state calls into question the functioning of the polity in what I can identify as five distinct, yet interrelated, spheres of activity. In each sphere, immigration asks certain questions that require both theoretical and practical responses.

1. In the *political* dimension, immigration challenges normative theories of democracy and citizenship and asks:
  - i. Who has a right to reside and be(come) a citizen?
  - ii. What is their relationship to the political institutions of the country of residence?
2. In the *economic* dimension, immigration introduces new practices and members to the labour market and asks:
  - i. Who has the right to work?
3. In the *social* dimension, immigration leads to increased interaction with newcomers at different sites of day-to-day life (neighbourhood, school, shops, workplace) and asks:
  - i. How are newcomers to be treated and interacted with?
  - ii. How are they expected to interact with the existing diverse population?
4. In the *cultural* dimension, immigration exposes existing populations to new artefacts, practices and values (Bauböck, 2008) and asks:
  - i. What are the existing dominant cultural values and practices of the society?

- ii. To what extent do non-dominant or new cultural practices and values challenge the dominant ones?
  - iii. What level of cultural difference is acceptable?
5. In *ethical/moral dimension*, immigration fundamentally questions a society's approach to the Other and asks:
- i. How does a society treat newcomers?
  - ii. What moral obligations does the existing population have?
  - iii. What moral obligations do newcomers have?

Immigration's impact on these five spheres and the eleven questions it subsequently asks, leads to three broader questions. Firstly, *what is the configuration of the bundle of rights that should be afforded minorities in general and immigrants in particular?* Secondly, *what should a diverse society look like?* Thirdly, *how are common goods to be distributed?* Finally, at the theoretical level, immigration and the growth of diversity in modern democracies challenges the dual concepts of universalism and liberalism that have been, and continue to be the guiding forces of the Western model of the nation state or, put more perspicaciously when applied to the circumstances of multiculturalism (Kelly 2002) "the main pillars of our political thought paradigm lose their solid cores" (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Zapata-Burrero 2006: 4). The final question immigration asks then, is: *What is the future of the Western liberal-democratic model which is based on universalism?* As such we are left with a heuristic set of fifteen questions to which any investigation of the impact of immigration on societies should direct itself to. Within political philosophy, four theoretical approaches to immigration appear relevant to this discussion and aim to partially answer these questions: multiculturalism, a politics of recognition, a politics of redistribution, and a theory of transnational membership.

### **3.2.1.1. Multiculturalism**

Multiculturalism first emerged as a theory and a policy concept in the 1970s in Canada and Australia. In Canada it was the acceptance of the rights of indigenous First Nation groups and linguistic minorities to some sort of political recognition whereas in Australia, it was the question of aboriginal groups' rights. Therefore multiculturalism was not

directly a response to immigration but to existing minorities within the state's borders.<sup>29</sup> Once a cultural diversity was accepted and recognised as existing, the task was to expound a theory of how countries should respond to this diversity and how to justify the acceptance. Therefore, at base, multiculturalism starts with the tenet that there are distinct cultural groupings (religious, national, ethnic, linguistic) within society and that certain minority groups have historically been discriminated against and thus it aimed to give a voice to the culturally oppressed (Joppke and Lukes 1999). According to Song (2010) multiculturalism can be justified in three ways. Firstly, along communitarian principles, theories of multiculturalism challenge the false universalism in the liberal tradition that the individual is not prior to society and that there are societal goods. Secondly, via liberal egalitarianism, some multicultural theories argue that culture is important for individuals. Thirdly, post-colonial arguments for multiculturalism argue that something is owed to native and minorities peoples because of past injustices and denial of rights.

Given the different possible justifications for multiculturalism, there are a number of different understandings of multiculturalism. For example, Joppke and Lukes (1999) differentiate between 'mosaic multiculturalism' and 'hodgepodge multiculturalism'. In the former, cultural groups can be seen as individual coloured mosaic tiles which remain distinct and yet, when viewed from afar, the tiles combine to give a multicoloured picture of the makeup of a state:

Mosaic multiculturalism is the negation of monoculture, that is, the nation as the locus of an individual's ultimate loyalties. Mosaic multiculturalism replicates at the sub-state level the Modiglianesque demarcation of modern societies into sharply bounded blocs, each couched in its own monochrome national (or cultural) colour. (Joppke and Lukes, 1999: 8)

Such an understanding is close to Kymlicka's (1995) idea of multiculturalism (below). The latter - 'hodgepodge' - sees multiculturalism as mixing, hybridity and mongrelisation where individual and group identities are blurred and always changing. Joppke and Lukes (1999: 9) maintain the advantage of this approach is that it accepts that a person's identity is formed of more than just one culture. The downside of this formulation

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<sup>29</sup> It is worth remembering that each nation state has its own 'history', experience and reasoning for multicultural policies. Those in Australia and Canada (existing minorities) differ from places such as the UK and the Netherlands (post-colonial, high post-war immigration), who in turn differ from the US (country of immigration, melting-pot).

though is that although probably closer to the truth ‘on the ground’, it provides no justification for how political claims are to be derived from it. Instead, the only avenue for political recognition of cultural difference is via membership to institutionally accepted cultural groupings.

A further, tripartite, typology of multiculturalisms is proposed by Bauböck (2008a). Firstly, in celebration multiculturalism, diversity is conceived of as a positive public good and is celebrated by focussing on a group’s cultural tools (language), traditions, ways of life, dress, artefacts and events. We could only half-jokingly term this approach ‘chicken-tikka multiculturalism’. Bauböck (2008a: 5) notes that the advantage to such an approach is its total rejection of assimilation as a model for migrant integration. However, on the downside, celebratory multiculturalism maybe overvalues cultural authenticity and “promotes stereotypical images of groups identified by their ethnic origins”. As such there is a risk of Orientalism and a fetishising of other cultures which in turn pigeonholes individuals into one way of living. In toleration multiculturalism, cultural goods are conceived of as potentially negative, or in conflict with dominant cultural values and practices and as such are tolerated to a greater or lesser extent. In this model, diverse groups in a society introduce a problem of “value conflict” (Bauböck 2008a: 7). Thirdly, recognition multiculturalism (cf. section 3.2.1.3, below) focuses on political claims of groups and investigates the imbalances of power and the manifold disadvantages that minorities face.

### **3.2.1.2. Criticisms of multiculturalism**

There are a number of substantial theoretical criticisms that can be levelled at multicultural models.<sup>30</sup> Firstly, because of its focus on the distinctness of cultural groups, multiculturalism reifies these socially constructed groups. Although it means that assimilation is rejected out of hand as a viable policy option, on the other hand it also makes membership and markers of these groups extremely salient. This is what Fraser (2000) calls the problem of reification. For Fraser (2000: 108), the focus on group identities means that the struggle for recognition of minority claims takes place not within plural-

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<sup>30</sup> Bauböck (2008) notes that the three approaches to multiculturalism that he defines are often lumped together in public critiques.

istic public spheres but rather cultural contexts that tend to “encourage separatism, intolerance and chauvinism, patriarchalism and authoritarianism”. More than this though, multiculturalism can be seen as merely an attempt to manage diversity through the old colonialist method of divide and rule. Indeed, in the clamour for more and more limited public funding by NGOs and RCOs<sup>31</sup> means that minority groups are often pitted against each other when applying for money. This in turn can lead to a greater focus of who is most in need and thus, this may reinforce negative self-identification of groups. The focus on identity politics can thus lead to a rejection of multiculturalism and minority claims and instead some may call for assimilation to majority norms (Fraser 2000).

Tied to this problem of reification is the fact that individuals consist of multiple identities and are members of many cultural ‘groups’ at the same time; this returns us to Joppke and Lukes’ ‘hodgepodge multiculturalism’. Multiculturalism, then, can homogenise minority groups (they are immigrants, they are Muslim, they are Polish). Such homogenisation though ignores the homosexual Muslim, the rich migrant and Pole who has taken British citizenship.

A further critique comes from Barry (2001), who argues that religious and cultural affiliations are choices and that members of these groups must bear the responsibility of membership and any consequences related to it. Barry’s (2001: 37) theory of justice contends that there is only a right to equality of opportunity not a right to equality of access to certain goods and services, or as he terms it, “outcomes”. According to Song (2010) for Barry, “when it comes to cultural and religious affiliations, they do not limit the range of opportunities one enjoys but rather the choices one can make within the set of opportunities available to all”.

Very briefly, further criticisms of multiculturalism include that it merely promotes toleration rather than acceptance or accommodation (Song 2010), that it privileges the group over the individual and that it focuses on culture rather than distribution of public goods and services (cf. Fraser 2000 and below).

Finally, at the level of public debate, there has been a rejection of multiculturalism in recent years and the focus of this has been one particular issue, namely the integration of Muslim immigrants (Bauböck 2008a, see also Triandafyllidou, Modood and Zapata-Burrero 2006). Bauböck (2008a: 8) notes that this has not, in general led to a return to ethnic concepts of identity, but rather to an “illiberal reinterpretation of civic

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<sup>31</sup> Refugee community organisations.

identity”. This has two important consequences for this thesis. Firstly, it re-orientates us to the importance of the subject matter of the second chapter – that is, new discursive configurations of racism that focus on culture rather than race. Secondly, it points to the relevance of investigating the theory, practice and discursive constructions of citizenship (both ‘as-legal status’ and ‘as-desirable-activity’) when looking at theories of integration.

### **3.2.1.3. Politics of recognition**

The following theoretical ideas on managing diversity and immigration all, I would argue, stem from and agree with the basic tenets of multiculturalism – that is that firstly an individual’s membership of a certain (cultural/ethnic) group often leads, directly or indirectly, to a denial of their rights or some form of discrimination and secondly, any new theory needs to address this whilst also acknowledging the criticisms of multiculturalism above.

Theories of a politics of recognition look into the political claims of minorities (such as migrants) and the rights they should claim. Recognition can be boiled down to an “affirmation of cultural diversity” (Bauböck 2008a: 8) as a source of individual self-respect and calls for a collective sense of equality among all citizens. Three separate formulations of a politics of recognition are valuable here. Firstly, Kymlicka’s multicultural citizenship (1995) in which he foregrounds the cultural context of an individual’s choices. For Kymlicka (1995: 83), stable identities (based on unmediated access to their culture) are necessary for individuals to be able to in turn access a “range of meaningful options”. More than this though, a person’s self-respect is inextricably linked to the respect that is given to their culture (Song 2010). The situation demands an equal recognition of all cultures so that individuals can then participate in society on an equal setting. In policy terms this informs language rights and the right to some form of political autonomy. Joppke and Lukes (1999) however point out that a major failing of Kymlicka’s (1995) theory is its minimal rendition of what cultures should be included. Coming from the Canadian context, Kymlicka (1995: 80) is focussed on larger groupings of established “societal cultures” which “tend to be national cultures”, i.e. first nations and larger ethno-linguistic groups such as Quebec. Because of this, smaller cultures which

“lack the basic institutional completeness” (Joppke and Lukes 1995: 9) are excluded from claiming such rights. These include migrant groups, women and sexual minorities.

The second form of a politics of recognition is Charles Taylor’s (1992, 1994). As is the case with Kymlicka, from Taylor’s perspective, recognition is about equal status. Where they differ though is that for Taylor (1994: 30) it also involves an individual’s claim to, and right to, authenticity or the powerful moral ideal of being true to one’s self. In the modern world, Taylor argues, there is not the need for recognition but rather there exists the conditions in which attempts to be recognised can fail. This failure to be recognised (or the refusal by others to recognise) as an equal participant in an ongoing dialogue of identity construction, can distort and oppress an individual’s identity to the extent that a negative image of the self become internalised (Taylor 1994, 30-35). In van Dijkian discursive terms (cf. Chapter 4), this means that minorities begin to see themselves through the same mental models and discursive practices as those misrecognising them. Taylor turns universalism on its head and argues that human potential is universal and thus there is a universal right to be accorded with equal respect so that they can realise this potential (Taylor 1994: 41). This struggle for recognition of a person’s culture must be reciprocal if it is to be successful. To do this people need to start with a presumption of the equal value of different cultures and accept their worth rather than a priori reject cultures as deficient or less worthy (Taylor 1994: 42). Thus this goes further than mere toleration or even celebration and requires an interaction and learning about other cultures. This is not to say that there will not be differences of opinion or that there will not be some cultural practices and values that cause dissensus or, as Taylor (1994: 73) writes, “what the presumption requires of us is not peremptory and inauthentic judgements of equal value, but a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions” of cultures.

A third formulation of a politics of recognition comes from Parekh (2000, 2008) who argues for a form of intercultural dialogue on a public level over a society’s shared values and what might or not need to be changed. Parekh (2008: 261) argues that within every society there is a set of “operative public values” which arise from shared lives lived on three levels: constitutional, legal and civic. Very similarly to Taylor, Parekh argues that minority ways of life deserve prior equal recognition and need to be investigated and interacted with before they can be understood. Also, like Taylor, this dialogue must be reciprocal in that it should look at both the contested values of minority cultures but also the ‘operative public values’ of the majority group. Both Taylor’s and Parekh’s

dialogical models note that the conversation is never finite or final and that there will be dissensus. In contrast, Owen and Tully (2007) claim that a reciprocal acceptance of the value of cultures within this dialogue may in time lead to participants feeling a wider attachment to the polity so that even if a group loses out in one particular struggle, it makes sense to continue the dialogue because of the freedom to challenge the operative public values and future possibility of changing them. Such a model, they argue, is also less likely to lead to violence and here the parallels with Mouffe's agonistic public sphere are starkly apparent.

Moving away from the politics of recognition, it is worth now introducing the critique and alternative offered by Fraser (2000, cf. Fraser and Honneth 2003). Fraser argues that multiculturalism displaces claims of redistribution, i.e. there is an economic dimension to inequality that is often backgrounded by some theories of cultural diversity (Owen and Tully 2007: 266). Fraser also follows the line that such theories reify cultural groupings. Fraser (2000: 116) offers the alternative of recognition as a question of social status and calls for a recognition of individual members along the line of a politics of cultural recognition but she also goes one step further and argues that the recognition is also about equal participation in the economy and that "maldistribution" as well as misrecognition can "constitute an impediment to parity". Thus, for Fraser, social justice includes recognition as well as redistribution and so the practical implications for this is not just the need for anti-discrimination laws but also policies that help to establish minority groups on an equal footing.

Bauböck's theory of transnational citizenship (1994, 2003) provides a useful addition to what has come before, not least because it focuses on the impact that patterns of immigration have on the societies they enter as well as the ones they leave. Indeed, Bauböck argues that by entering states in large numbers migrants force changes in institutions of states as well as the conceptions of membership. This change also happens because of the transnational political practices of migrants (2003), that is: traditional configurations of membership and citizenship fail to reflect the reality of the impact of migrants not just on the country of residence but also on the country of origin. Bauböck agitates for a theory of justice based on a concept of equal membership for all citizens including migrants who have a moral right to live there (2008b: 213). He argues that cultural recognition is a moral obligation rather than a legal right, but goes on to note that this recognition has to be supported through political institutions and the legal system. Therefore migrants in societies that have witnessed multicultural transformations

(2008b) have cultural rights. These include traditional, liberal, individual rights such as equality, liberty and protection from discrimination which the state should act to provide and defend, but it also includes a specific right to public resources for cultural reproduction

To sum up this section, there are a number of political theories that deal either directly or indirectly with the integration of migrants. Though none are perfect and one hundred percent watertight, some are more attractive than others. The dialogical nature of a politics of recognition is important when we think of an ideal public sphere where minorities are not only represented within political and social institutions but also, following Husband, where they have equal access to means of communication. Likewise Fraser's refocusing of the debate towards redistribution is timely. Finally, Bauböck call to recognise the transnational nature of modern migrants and the concomitant call for a realisation for this at a policy and societal level is also important.

### **3.2.2. Practices of integration**

As the previous section explained, theories that tackle integration and diversity within modern democracies are normative and it therefore stands to reason that a state's integration policies – and the integration model they adopt in tackling the phenomena of migration - are also normative. This is borne out at a linguistic level in the frequent usage of modal construction in policies such as *should*, *ought to*, *are expected to*, and *have to* (cf. Chapter 7, below). Such documents and models indicate to those who it is aimed at (the electorate, the media and of course migrants) what is expected of them and what processes are involved in integration. It also, explicitly or otherwise, indicates the type of member of society, or citizen, that new migrants are expected to become. Integration policies and the processes of bestowing citizenship can be seen “technologies of corrective citizenship” where integration and immigration meet (Fortier 2006: 320).

There are a number of different conceptions of what constitutes integration in practice. In starting out it is worth extrapolating some applicable meaning from Berry's typology of acculturation methods (Doná and Berry 1999). Berry's work investigated attitudes of migrant groups to life in Canada. Migrants were asked two questions 1) Is it considered to be of value to maintain cultural identity and characteristics? and 2) is it considered to be of value to maintain relationships with other groups? Depending on

answers, respondents can be categorised as favouring one of four acculturation methods: 1) Integration, 2) Assimilation, 3) Separation, and 4) Marginalisation (Fig. 3.1, below). For example, those who favoured assimilation would answer ‘no’ to the first question and ‘yes’ to the second, i.e. they are happy to give up their own culture and characteristics and adopt those of their COR.




Figure 3.1: Berry’s model of acculturation methods (Adapted from Doná and Berry, 1999: 58)

Though designed to analyse and categorise migrant groups’ attitudes to their country of residence (COR), this model can be turned on its head and be used as a normative starting point to policies addressing issues of migration, i.e. governmental and societal consensus on how migrants should be received and included or excluded. The US model might be thought of as being more explicitly assimilationist, whereas marginalisation might be characterised by states who advocate both a loosening of ties with the country of origin (COO) and dissuade integration with citizens of the COR. Realistically, within a modern European framework of rights and globalised labour, most state’s policies have to address rising levels of cultural pluralism and most would fall somewhere between the integration vs. assimilation spectrum. Berry’s acculturation model only accounts for culture. However, in reality policies for each of the four options, though possibly based on cultural categories, are also realised socially, economically and politically. This means that at a discursive level integration is explicitly separated from assimilation, which, in UK society holds negative connotations. As will become clear though, the two concepts are implicitly closer bed-fellows than might be first expected.

For Alaminos and Santacreu (2009) there are a number of parallels between acculturation and integration. However, the most salient difference is that, whilst acculturation pays attention to how migrants adapt to a new environment, integration also

includes the effects of society on migrants and the effects of migrants on society. The process then is at least discursively constructed as two-way rather than the acculturation which focuses on the role of the migrant or in Berry's terminology, they possess agency for "strategic action" (Berry 2003). Alaminos and Santacreu argue that although acculturation does not necessarily lead to assimilation, measures and indicators of acculturation tend to be assimilation (2009: 99). The same can be said for certain quantitative indicators of integration such as language learning. This notwithstanding, going forward, it is important to clarify how 'integration' should be understood. Integration, defines any policy that deals with how migrants are to become part of their new society. Under this definition, an integration policy can be of an assimilatory or separatist nature.

I move now to the exploration of what constitutes integration. The first major matter to note is that integration consists of more than merely the extent to which migrants maintain or jettison their culture. Schoorl (2005) identifies four strands to migrant integration: structural integration, social integration, cultural integration and identification. Structural integration involves equal access to basic resources such as education, health, employment, the political system and schooling. Social integration is the amount of contact and interaction between migrants and the local population. Cultural integration is to what extent norms and values are shared. Finally, identification concerns both the extent to which migrants identify with the society they now find themselves in and how far society accepts or rejects their presence. What should be remembered is that the integration process works at different speeds and is different for individual migrants and groups of migrants. For example, a migrant might be structurally highly integrated but culturally, less so. Likewise, levels of identification may be deeper for some than for others (Alaminos and Santacreu 2009).

Following Schoorl and Berry, Alaminos and Santacreu (2009) denote two dimensions of integration, social and cultural. For the authors, social integration concerns social networks, coexistence with the local population. This type of integration hinges on language competences. Cultural integration on the other hand refers to the "preference for the culture of origin or the culture of destination" (Alaminos and Santacreu 2009: 103). This second space of integration clearly references Berry's acculturation methods. Though useful for an investigation of migrant attitudes towards the COR and levels of social integration, this model does not attend to issues of structural integration

such as employment and education which can help to facilitate further social and cultural integration.

A more comprehensive model of what constitutes integration is that proposed by Ager and Strang (2004, 2008, and 2010) (See fig 3.2, below).




Figure 3.2: Ager and Strang’s *Indicators of Integration Framework* (2004)

Their model came after research for a UK Home Office report *Indicators of Integration* (2004). Within this normative model, there are ten substantial indicators of integration which are organised into four key domains: 1) Means and Matters: the assessment of access to employment, housing, education and health, 2) Social connections: interaction within communities, with other communities and with structures of government, 3) ‘Facilitators’: structural barriers to these connections such as language, culture and 4) Foundations: assumptions and practices regarding citizenship and legal rights and finally.

The authors found that employment, housing, education and health were all major factors in refugees’ understanding of integration. Furthermore, these markers of integration are not just a result of integration but also part of the process and a means to the end. To be sure, access and activity within these four domains lead to greater integration. The second level of markers “stress the importance of relationships to the understanding of the integration process” (Ager and Strang 2004: 2). Social bridges are those connections to other communities, including the existing population and other migrant groups. Social bonds encompass co-ethnic, co-religious or co-national groups. Meanwhile, social links include interaction with institutions including local and national government. Together these three social connection indicators speak to the “importance of relationships between people, as key to both the definition and achievement of inte-

gration” (2004: 3). Ager and Strang note that the two facilitating factors are those in which the government can decide to take action on or not in order to facilitate (or constrain) integration. The authors note that these areas are ‘two-way’ in that they do not merely refer to migrants’ knowledge of UK language and culture but also an understanding of newcomers’ ways of life by non-migrants. This argument is echoed by Alaminos and Santacreu (2009) when they write that integration is not just about a migrant’s adaptation to their new society but also the structural effects on the society and how accepting a society is of new entrants. Finally, the authors conceive of citizenship and rights as the foundation to integration. Their research found that “perceptions of rights and entitlements” influenced migrant and non-migrant positions towards integration (2004: 4). Moreover, they found that in a well-integrated community, migrants would have the same level of rights as non-migrants (Ager and Strang, 2008).

With reference to later chapters, it is Ager and Strang’s framework of integration that I will use as a basis for my empirical interviews with migrants. This is for three reasons: Firstly, the model comes out of a UK context and is thus directly applicable to my study. Secondly, the framework is based on an extensive literature review of integration from government, academia and NGOs. Thirdly, this research was backed up by qualitative research interviews with refugees in two areas of the UK (Croydon in London and Pollockshaws in Glasgow) and these interviews subsequently influenced the framework (Ager and Strang, 2004). Thus, their framework appears to be the most comprehensive and the most relevant study of integration in the UK. It also lends itself to the design of questions for the interviews and from there to the study of how the ten sites of integration are discursively constructed and how they interact and overlap.

Within the debate over integration it should not be forgotten that migrants, though often at a disadvantage in terms of relative social, economic and cultural capital, do have a level of influence over the process of integration. As Bauböck (2006: 10) argues, they are not just objects of the process of integration but active agents too within the “political opportunity structure” who “pursue their interests collectively and individually”. The decisions that migrants make and their attitudes to their new environment are critical to the level and depth to which they will integrate and indeed, want to integrate. Through interviews with inter-EU migrants, Alaminos and Santacreu (2009) found that the time spent in the new country as well as the long-term intentions of migrants affect how much they will integrate and feel comfortable. Those with intentions

to return home were less likely to integrate more deeply than those who intended to remain in that country permanently. As such, belonging is important to understanding reasons for integration or non-integration.

### **3.2.3. Discursive constructions of integration**

We now have a normative framework for integration with which to proceed. However, integration is discursively constructed rather differently in everyday policy and interaction. Whilst more will be said on this subject in the following chapters, I would like now to draw upon the discursive constructions of the public sphere and of race as outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 and look at how the discourse of integration relies upon these discourses and how the issue of integration becomes topicalised by political elites.

Mulvey (2010) usefully recognises that the creation of policy impacts on how it is received. More explicitly, he argues that there is a mutually symbiotic relationship between hostile policy and public that is hostile to immigration in general and specifically to asylum seekers whereby government policy and action legitimises hostility and also creates a further policy momentum. For this to be the case, two processes need to work together which are both enacted in the public sphere. Firstly the securitisation of integration of migrants as an issue, and secondly a dual discursive move in which migrant culture is problematised as a barrier to integration and the ‘native’ culture is simultaneously raised upon a pedestal.

On the first point, integration, and immigration, as salient public issues do not occur in a vacuum. For Fortier and Lewis (2006: 309), migration is not simply a fact but it is also a process that is mobilised for a reason in order “to produce desires and anxieties”. Following a similar vein of thought, Munck (2004: 3) recognises that “a crisis only becomes one when it is narrated as such”. Within issues of integration of asylum seekers, Bloch (2005) has identified a securitisation and de-politicisation of their presence in the UK. She argues that the government constructs asylum seekers as danger to society which necessitates policies of repression, intervention and restriction. Such activities are all methods reserved normally for crises but for dealing with asylum seekers, these policies have become normalised. Thus, the question of how to manage asylum seekers is removed from the public sphere of debate and reduces it to merely a function of the state.

On the second point, this is where discursive constructions of racism, which were described thoroughly in Chapter 2, come to the forefront. Discursively, within policy and professional research, integration is constructed as a two-way process (Ager and Strang 2008), but this serves to mask the assimilatory nature of the policies. Within a discourse of integration, migrants or foreigners are constructed as the problem (Horner and Weber 2011) and the inside it presumes to be unproblematic (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998). Consequently the responsibility for a failure to integrate is placed with newcomers. For example, by arguing that Muslims do not or, refuse to, integrate fails to look more closely at reasons and ways in which British society excludes Muslims (Kundnani 2007). As such, the policy solution, be it language classes, citizenship classes, or social cohesion, frames the policy problem (MacPherson 2010) and policies will be assimilatory in nature. With this as a starting point, while migrant policies might be heralded as integratory, they will consistently be assimilatory in nature because they a priori favour the existing community.

Many migration policies see refugees and other migrants as deficient and backwards and in need of changing or even civilising (MacPherson 2010; Blommaert and Verschueren 1998). There is a cultural imperialism at work that favours western civilisation (Bauböck 2000). Indeed, Horner and Weber (2011) argue that the discourse of integration is inherently colonial. There are two types of migrants: on the one hand, good ones that need protecting and deserve to be civilised and on the other hand, bad ones who need treating harshly and who are so different from 'us' that they will never fully integrate. Those migrants that are good will have minimal differences whereas bad ones will be constructed as being radically different. This is discursively realised both by a racialisation of group differences (as explained in chapter 2) and by hiding such racist practices rhetorically behind Western ideas of tolerance (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998) or the deracialised language of social cohesion (Isin et al. 2008).

#### **3.2.4. Integration as an empty signifier**

Like many concepts, integration is an empty or floating signifier. It is a concept that absorbs rather emits meaning (OED 2013). The word itself has zero symbolic value, but it absorbs meanings and symbolism from its users (Mehlman 1972) I argue though that its very ambiguity is arguably also its allure as a semantic choice for policy formation,

political pronouncements and media commentary on ‘how you solve a problem like migration’.

Favell (1998) argues that the specific national public philosophy of a country that allows for social agreement on how to manage or approach a given issue is founded on a set of consensual ideas and linguistic terms. Such terms provide a framework and justification for policies. For Stråth (2011: 395), the value of the concept of integration is its very ambiguity which allows the “goals of holistic unification” to be realised. To be sure, the employment of the term in discourses of immigration in a number of countries, is at saturation levels, despite it not being clearly defined (Macpherson 2010: 550)

If our gaze is turned towards modern multicultural Britain, then rhetorical instruments such as ‘integration’ fulfil this role as empty signifier within discourses surrounding immigration. It is sold by political actors to the public and the media as a middle-ground between, on the one hand, assimilation which has been delegitimised since the Holocaust and on the other, multiculturalism, which has ‘failed’ (Bennett 2015, in press).<sup>32</sup> However, if asked, the public, let alone policy makers, would be certain to expound numerous different definitions. In the UK, racial categories which have been part of race relations, immigration and integration policy since the mid-1960s, have to some extent dominated the discourses on these topics. As well as curtailing policy options, such dedicated use and reliance upon the terms, also reifies the (discursively constructed) racial categories and furthermore, promotes their maintenance as a means to win the battle for social recognition and state resources.

### **3.3. Performing Integration**

For a migrant to become a fully accepted member of society (citizenship-as-desirable-activity), they must first become ‘like’ other citizens, or at least, be seen to act like them in public. Acceptance within a given society is only possible via performative acts. Lepofsky and Fraser (2003) contend that the meaning of citizenship has always been about both status and performance but that there has been a recent shift to the latter. Now, the authors argue, legal status is only guaranteed after performative acts. Likewise, Kostakopoulou (2003) notes that the obligation to prove sufficient integration is deeply em-

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<sup>32</sup> See for example speeches by David Cameron (2011).

bedded in symbolic practices. Barbero (2009) goes one step further when he says that “citizenship exists only in so far as it is enacted”. For Roxworthy (2008:13), in America there exists a myth that citizenship will be bestowed “based simply upon the performance of a codified repertoire of speech acts and embodied acts, ranging from the recitation of the Oath of Citizenship to public participation in patriotic pageantry and even enlistment in the armed services”. It is a myth because citizenship is more complicated than just these symbolic performances and ignores the fact that citizenship has been denied to people previously.

Though symbolic moments such as citizenship ceremonies are important, integration also includes ‘smaller’ performances of the required identity. Rather than everyday racism then, we can talk of ‘everyday performances of integration’. Potential migrants are expected to be better citizens than most of the settled population. For example, taking part in certain demonstrations can damage asylum applications and if migrants undertake fifty hours of voluntary community service, their citizenship application can be fast-tracked by a year.<sup>33</sup> If we take the neo-liberal understanding of citizenship as applicable to the British context, and I firmly contend that it does, then it is unsurprising that there is also a dimension of economic self-reliance to applications for naturalisation.<sup>34</sup>

Migrants thus have to sometimes be ‘more British than the Brits’ and there might be repercussions. This brings to mind a sketch from *Goodness Gracious Me*, a BBC comedy show that starred British Indian actors. In one sketch, two couples of obvious Indian heritage but with British citizenship aim to prove to the other that they are more British than them:

W1: Well, well, well. If it isn't Dinesh and Sushee Kapoor

W2: Well, well. It isn't. It's Dennis and Charlotte Cooper

M1: Of course. Well what are you two doing here? This for members of the Church of EngLAND only.

W2: Of course. We are members of the Church of EngLAND

M2: We are English after all... British Broadcasting Corporation (2000)

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<sup>33</sup> The alternative view of this is that, if one doesn't undertake voluntary work, the application will be delayed by a year.

<sup>34</sup> The discursive constructions of neo-liberal citizenship and integration into a community, in the context of local media, has been investigated by Bennett (2015, in press) and more in depth investigation will be provided in the analytical chapters.

Though a funny sketch, it does point to a more serious matter: That there is a racialised element to performances of integration. Roxworthy (2008: 14) forwards the argument that part of the performance of citizenship is the “performativity of the gaze that racializes the other”. It is the way migrants are looked at, conceived of and discursively constructed that forces their performativity. Thus, if migrants are discursively constructed as culturally or economically deficient, then it logically follows that they will be expected to change the situation and become more like the dominant in-group by performing a similar identity. Again, this points to the assimilatory nature of integration.

These performative actions that migrants must enact go further than merely theories of ‘communities of practice’ (Wenger 1998) or ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1990) because an imbalance of power and control of the public sphere, and thus control over discursive constructions of integration. Rather, it harks back to Butler’s performativity and the conditions within which a person constructs their identity. Practices are not invented by the self (Davies 2006) but instead, “we are outside ourselves, constituted in cultural norms that precede and exceed us” (Butler 2004: 45). According to Butler, power, and here we can speak of discursive power, not only forms the subject but also establishes the conditions of its continued existence (2004: 50). With regards citizenship specifically, Ong (1996: 737) argues that citizenship is a process of subjectification a “self-making and being made by power relations that produce consent through schemes of surveillance, discourse, control and administration”.

### **3.4. Citizenship and Integration**

As argued above, citizenship is an important part of integration and indeed for some scholars it is almost synonymous with it. At the very least these appear to be ‘sister concepts’. That is, they are closely discursively and conceptually linked. It should be noted though that the markers of integration are not objective facts but are constructed by the existing community. The conditions of integration (language requirements, cultural assimilation) are set “by the inside” (Horner and Weber 2011: 146). This means that the idea of ‘successful integration’ could at times be a misnomer as there is no clear finishing line as to where migration will be seen as authentic (Horner and Weber 2011) or even complete.

Likewise there is considerable debate about the role that formal citizenship, that is to say citizenship-as-legal-status, plays in integration. In past, UK governmental policy, rights and citizenship have been held up to be at the foundation of the integration process and that the sense of certainty and purpose that citizenship brings aids integration (Home Office 2005). A secure legal status allows applicants greater welfare, employment and education opportunities, all of which, as noted above, are the foundation stones of integration. Yet, at the same time, the government has removed the right of Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) for those granted refugee status. Instead new refugees are given Limited Leave to Remain (LLR) and subject to 5-year reviews of their status. This reduces the chance of permanence and a settled future, which is important in the motivation to integrate. This is further compounded by the need for language proficiency and passing a citizenship test. Combined, these measures appear to point to a different understanding of the place of citizenship comes in integration. This seems to mirror Da Lomba's (2010) proposal that citizenship or permanent residency is a reward for successful integration. For Da Lomba, integration is a process not a destination and, moreover, one that starts from day one. Yet, within policy, this is not accepted or endorsed by the British government despite their discursive attempts to construct it alternatively. It is quite clear then that there is a contradiction between the discursive rhetoric of citizenship and policies of integration.

### **3.5. Conclusion: Ideological performances**

In this chapter, I have attempted to explore different models of integration and different meanings of citizenship as well highlighting their inherently discursive nature. Firstly the attempt was to provide explanations for the importance of citizenship to theories of integration.

In the second section, a number of political theories, relevant to integration of migrants were explained. Firstly multiculturalism was investigated and critiqued. This was followed by three alternative theories of managing cultural diversity: a politics of recognition, a politics of redistribution and a concept of transnational membership.

After this theoretical section, the practice of integration was looked at in detail. Ager and Strang's ten-point indicator of integration was introduced and it is this model that will be used as a basis for the empirical analysis of focus groups. Later, it was ar-

gued that though rhetorically constructed as a two-way process, integration in policy reality and in less explicit discourse is actually constructed as something akin to Berry's assimilation. This model can be termed 'assimilation as integration'.

Finally, it was argued that integration is a discursive and performative act and one that is governed by dominant discourses on integration, nationhood, race and citizenship. Furthermore this performance is based on racialised and economised assessments of suitability for membership.

Conceptions of nationhood and citizenship determine a specific understanding of integration and the social spaces available to refugees regarding belonging within a society (Ager and Strang 2010). Following a description of different constructions of citizenship, a neo-liberal model was forwarded and it is this one that is most useful in understanding the integration of in-coming non-nationals into current UK society.

What should be clear is that citizenship is a complex term. Most usefully for this work, it is important to remember Kymlicka and Norman's differentiation between citizenship-as-legal-status and citizenship-as-desirable-activity. The former is, as argued above, an important part of integration. Some view it is a goal of integration, others as a means to integration. I err on the side of means because I would argue that citizenship is more expansive than just legal status. Symbolic performances such as citizenship ceremonies do form a part of integration, but they are by no means the be-all and end-all. 'Thin' citizenship (legal status) is actually much easier to acquire than 'thick citizenship' (cultural and social integration). Thus, it is citizenship-as-desirable-activity which is even more relevant to assimilation-as-integration, because this indicates what type of person a migrant must become (or act like) in order to be accepted within society. A Neo-liberal conception of a citizen means that a normative policy of integration will inevitably involve the need to act in ways that fit ideas of self-sufficiency and economic activity.

This chapter hopefully complements the preceding two chapters by emphasising the importance of discourse when analysing processes of migrant inclusion and exclusion from not just the public sphere but societies as a whole. In the next part of the thesis, I will introduce the discipline of (critical) discourse analysis and explain the categories of analysis that will be used to analyse the empirical research.

## **Chapter 4: (Critical) Discourse Analysis**

The field of Discourse Analysis (DA) is a relatively new one within the wider academic discipline of linguistics (Duszak and Fairclough 2008). Though now a separate field in itself, it owes a lot to those linguists, anthropologists, social scientists and psychologists whose work, collectively, unbeknownst to them, would lead to the current position of discourse analysis where. Indeed, it is possible to talk of a linguistic turn in the social sciences and humanities during the latter part of the twentieth century, although it must be made clear that this does not stem purely from linguistic ventures but from philosophy too. Whatever the reasons, the positioning of discourse and language closer to the centre of social scientific investigations has both allowed for, and been sparked by, the emergence of discourse studies.

Within this, the subfield of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) or Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) is a specific approach to the analysis of talk and text which, at its very basest form, argues that language is a form of social practice and as such cannot be understood without looking at power. It has itself become an established discipline within the last twenty-five years although the roots and influencing factors of CDA can be traced as far back as ancient Greece and as broadly as philosophy and artificial intelligence.

In this chapter, both the fields of Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis will be introduced. In 4.1 I will explain what DA is and how ‘discourse’ and ‘text’ actually should be understood. In section 4.2 I elaborate on the historical roots of DA (ancient, structural and ethno-methodological and its emergence as an academic field of study). I also look at current DA work in 4.2.4. Section 4.3 is given over to a presentation of critical approaches to discourse analysis. In section 4.3.1 the aims, objectives and key concepts of CDA are introduced. In 4.3.2 I look at the (history of) key

approaches to CDA. This is followed in 4.3.3 by the categories of analysis to be used in the analytical chapters. 4.3.4 provides a comprehensive explanation of the Discourse Historical Approach. Section 4.3.5 indicates alternative approaches to critical approaches to DA and 4.3.6 points to some of the criticisms levelled at CDA and following Chilton (2007) I argue that these need to be dealt with rather than merely be swept under the carpet. Finally, I summarise the chapter in 4.4.

#### **4.1. Discourse Analysis**

At its base, Discourse Analysis is the academic study of language as a form of social interaction. As such DA is cross-disciplinary and, as Johnstone (2002) notes, DA researchers may situate their work within linguistic departments or other departments in the humanities and social sciences, similarly, their research questions may be linguistic or socio-cultural. Beyond this, it can be stated that Discourse Analysis is generally the analysis of language above the level of the sentence which sets this broad field of study apart from previous approaches to linguistics and language systems. DA is concerned with larger ‘chunks’ of language and how these create and communicate meaning. It is important though to point out that sentences, whether spoken or written, consist of syntactically arranged grammatical and lexical items and so for analyses of discourses to be conducted rigorously, the construction of sentences also needs to be investigated. This is what can be termed an analysis of micro-linguistic structures. As Fairclough (1995a) rightly notes, the form and texture of a text - the phonological, syntactical, lexical, and clause levels - need to be taken into account otherwise, we are in danger of being left with merely content analysis (cf. Duszak and Fairclough 2008).

As a further nuance to the definition, it can also be added that because DA looks at language as a form of social interaction, the context within which a discursive event takes place should also be taken into account when analysing a discourse. The extent to which context is important open to considerable debate. It can mean the direct context of the discursive event – for example the purpose of the discourse participants and how it is communicated – or it can pertain to wider contexts such as gender, social class, time and place in history. For those who work with discourse from a critical perspective, a major contextual factor is power relations and how this affects the production and reception of texts and discourses. It is not though merely the case that discursive events

are influenced by the context in which they occur, but also that these very same discursive events impact upon the context in which they occur. This is what Fairclough and Wodak (1997) refer to as the socially constituted and constitutive nature of discourse and sets DA apart from, on the one hand, conversation analysis which agitates for an analysis of only what is said and directly analysable, and on the other hand, syntax and other systemic linguistic approaches which deal with the 'ideal' speaker/recipient and non-naturally occurring language. Such a view of language directly relies on the Foucauldian approach that discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault 1972: 50). Johnstone (2002) offers an extremely clear and user-friendly heuristic for DA and the analysis of the context in which discursive events are situated. The list below indicates the different contextual levels that should be thought about and used as possible reference points when 'doing' DA (Johnstone 2002: 10):

- Discourse is shaped by the world, and discourse shapes the world.
- Discourse is shaped by language, and discourse shapes language.
- Discourse is shaped by participants, and discourse shapes participants.
- Discourse is shaped by prior discourse, and discourse shapes the possibilities for future discourse.
- Discourse is shaped by its medium, and discourse shapes the possibilities of its medium.
- Discourse is shaped by purpose, and discourse shapes possible purposes.

Together, the levels point to the importance of studying wider socio-political contexts and questions of power relations (people/purpose) as well as the diachronic and synchronic nature of discourses.

#### **4.1.1. Defining 'discourse'**

To begin with DA was primarily concerned with spoken language and the discipline does have its roots in the analysis of the spoken rather than written word (e.g. conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, tagmemics and rhetoric). Indeed, there has been, and

continues to be, disagreement between whether discourse analysis can or should include the analysis of texts. David Crystal (1987: 116) argues that discourse analysis is the study of “naturally occurring spoken language” and this is placed in contrast to text analysis. However, Crystal goes on to note that this distinction is often not clear. Within the field of text linguistics (DeBeaugrande and Dressler 1981) there is a distinction between discourse which is spoken and text which is written, whereas, Schiffrin (1992) notes that in the English-speaking world there is more of a tendency to include both the written and the spoken in discourse.

There are a number of different definitions for what a discourse is and quite often the same author may use the concept to mean different things. Indeed one major criticism which is often levelled at (critical) discourse analysts is that there is no systematized conceptual toolkit and so understandings of ‘discourse’ and ‘text’ differ from author to author. Mills (2004: 6) points out that in Foucault’s work there are three different meanings for ‘discourse’: Firstly, in its broadest terms it can mean all utterances and statements that have an effect on the real world. Such an approach is echoed by MacDonell (1986: 4) who argues that “whatever signifies or has meaning can be considered part of a discourse. Secondly, discourse can mean “a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements” (Foucault 1972: 80). I would contend though that this understanding is more relevant as description of the ‘order of discourse’ or ‘genre’ within which a discursive event is produced as it deals with rules and structures of a discourse. The third and final of Foucault’s use of ‘discourse’ is that which, with a few minor adjustments, I would argue seems to be the most adhered to by discourse practitioners, namely that a discourse is group of statements that “belong to a single discursive formation” and which taken together have some level of coherence (Smart 2002: 32).<sup>35</sup> Foucault talks of the ‘positivity’ of a discourse which, according to Smart:

Characterizes the unity of a group of statements above and beyond books, texts, authors, through time, and independently of the proximity of epistemological validity, scientificity or truth. It reveals that within a discourse, reference is being made to the same thing within the same conceptual field, at the same level. (2002: 32)

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<sup>35</sup> This reading of Foucault’s use of the word ‘discourse’ does not tally with that of Mills who argues that it is the second point that resonates most with discourse analysts. I counter this and propose that it is the third conceptualisation that appears to be most popular, especially with practitioners of Critical Discourse Analysis

Such a definition perhaps unsurprisingly, is similar to that of Reisigl and Wodak's (2001: 66) who define discourse as "a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves with and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as texts that belong to specific semiotic types i.e. Genres". This definition seems to point to the thematic nature of Foucault's third use of discourse but also includes the importance of the second (genre) to a discourse. In a similar vein, for Fairclough (1995: 14) "a discourse is a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective". This intervention also points obliquely to the ideological nature of discourses, and the subjectivity involved in all discursive events regardless of protests of objectivity. The quote also points to another source of thinking of discourse, Bakhtin (1981: 293), who argued that a discourse is a way of using words which presumes authority and distinct perspective. Going forward, given that a discourse-historical approach to the data will be taken in later chapters, for the sake of conceptual and methodological clarity, it is prudent to follow Reisigl and Wodak's (2001) definition of a discourse given above.

#### **4.1.2. What is a text?**

Mills (2004) highlights the fact that a discourse is often defined negatively, that is, by what it is not, and it is quite often juxtaposed to the concept of a text, possibly because texts are slightly easier to define through the use of positivist criteria such as DeBeaugrande and Dressler's (1981) seven criteria of a textuality (see section 4.2.2). Within some approaches to the critical analysis of discourse such as the Discourse Historical Approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) and Teun Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach (2008), discourse is described as a form of knowledge and memory, whereas texts are concrete "oral utterances or written documents" (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 13). However, Fairclough (1995) argues that although texts should be primarily linguistic, there are increasing instances of non-linguistic texts or at least texts which combine both linguistic and non-linguistic qualities. As such, Weiss and Wodak's conception could be

charged with the criticism that it is both out of date and that fails to acknowledge work on semiotics and linguistics by authors such as Kress, van Leeuwen and Hodge<sup>36</sup>

Finally, it should be made clear where a text ends and where a discourse begins. Is an interview one text or a collection of separate texts? One e-mail or many? One debate or a series? Can a text have more than one speaker/author? Each researcher must decide for themselves what understanding best suits their research but it would appear that the most important point is that the researcher should ensure that their initial definition is adhered to throughout the analysis in order to guard against conceptual 'slippage' which could impinge upon the methodological rigour, and thus the quality of the work. Lemke forwards a useful separation of the two which I will attempt to follow in thesis:

When I speak about discourse in general, I will usually mean the social activity of making meanings with language and other symbolic systems...On each occasion when the particular meaning characteristic of these discourses is being made, a text is produced...When we want to focus on the specifics of an event or occasion, we speak of the text; when we want to look at patterns, commonality, relationships that embrace different texts and occasions, we can speak of discourses. (1995: 7)

With regards to this thesis, each newspaper article or document will be counted as one text and each interview will be counted as one text (although obviously authored by multiple participants).

#### **4.2. Discourse Analysis as a field of linguistic study**

As mentioned in the introductory remarks, discourse analysis has a family tree that stretches out and back through linguistics and other social, cultural, philosophical and political genealogical branches. These can be divided very crudely and broadly into those originating from the North American tradition and those from Continental Europe (primarily France and Germany) and it should be noted that different authors focus upon different influences. Kaplan and Grabe (2002) for example focus primarily on American influences, whereas van Dijk (1985, 1997) and DeBeaugrande (1997) highlight the importance of European influences. Moreover, because discourse analysis beginnings were

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<sup>36</sup> It should be noted that later publications by Wodak (Wodak and Meyer 2009) do note the importance of Computer Mediated Communication and the rise of Computer Mediated Discourse analysis.

as interdisciplinary as the field is now, the history of the subject is necessarily ‘messy’. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight and development within DA, it could be argued that if its development had to be given a leitmotif, it would surely be intertextuality, characterised as it is by borrowings, interpretations and reinterpretations of different linguistic and non-linguistic fields. In her book *Tekst, dyskurs, komunikacja międzykulturowa* (1998) Duszak divides the sources of DA into three: classic, structural and ethnomethodological and I will follow a similar delineation here.

#### **4.2.1. Ancient influences**

Two ancient ancestors of DA are instantly traceable: hermeneutics and classic rhetoric. Essentially a hermeneutic model of text interpretation implies that the meaning of one part of the text can only be understood in the context of the whole and, conversely, the whole can only be understood from looking at its constituent parts (Meyer 2001). The main concept employed is the hermeneutic circle (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2009) which sees the researcher move between parts and the whole of the text but because the context (and thus the position of the interpreter) is ever-changing, there is constantly the possibility of further interpretations of texts. Thus, history is important to the understanding and meaning of language use and because we can never fully grasp the meaning of text (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2009: 5.8), the hermeneutic circle can never be fully closed or completed. This obviously has implications for the critical analysis of discourses (see. 4.3).

Classical rhetoric dates back to Ancient Greece and in particular Aristotle’s *Treatise on Rhetoric* from the third century BC. Rhetoric was the quality of being able to inform and persuade and convince an audience. Within rhetoric it was believed that certain structures and modes of speech and text could be used in order to influence an audience. This included linguistic structures, such as metaphor, comparisons, irony, hyperbole and euphemisms, as well as topics of argumentation and certain lexical choices, for example emotive words (van Dijk 2007). Subsequently, a rhetorician was someone who could identify what rhetorical tool to use in each situation in order to convince the other party (Rapp 2010). Moreover, Aristotle maintained that these rhetoric tools could be used for good or bad purposes (Rapp 2010). Above all, Aristotle saw

rhetoric as the art of persuasion based on skilful language use. The decision over the type of persuasion employed depended on the audience and the content of the speech (Duszak 1998: 22). Thus language was tailored to the social context in which it was to be received. Though initially used as almost a teaching rubric for those wanting to learn how to speak well publically, the concepts and approach to language as a form of persuasion later became tools of analysis of (primarily political) discourse and as such is also an important base for critical approaches to discourse.<sup>37</sup>

The study of rhetoric lost popularity for centuries but was resuscitated in the mid twentieth century when research refocused their attentions on persuasion again. These included Toulmin's (1958) model of practical argument. More recently, in their seminal work *The New Rhetoric*, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 83) argue that topoi are "headings under which arguments can be classified" (cf. 4.3.3 below for an in-depth explanation of topoi). According to Duszak (1998: 23), the legacy of ancient rhetoric in present day DA is the idea of the ability to use language for particular aims. It also impacted on stylistics, pragmatics and critical linguistics.

#### **4.2.2. Structuralist roots**

The study of rhetoric for a long while was the core focus for linguistics and philologists and it was only at the start of the nineteenth century that historical linguistics and comparative linguistics came to supersede it. Later, at the start of the twentieth century, the emergence of structural linguistics came to be added to this small list of linguistic studies (van Dijk 1985a). Under initial structural approaches to language, certain facets of languages were divided up and then studied separately, i.e. phonology and morphology.

Duszak (1998) argues that the influence of structuralism on the evolution of text linguistics was significant and came from a variety of different sources. Van Dijk (1985a 2007) traces the formal beginnings of discourse analysis back to French structuralists and semioticians from anthropology and literary theory. Those schools had appropriated concepts of linguistic structuralism from Saussure's work at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially his *Course in General Linguistics* (1916). They also took their influences

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<sup>37</sup> A more detailed explanation of topoi will be attempted when the Discourse Historical Approach (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001) is introduced.

from the Prague school of structuralism which itself came originally from philological traditions, specifically Weil (1887) who compared the word order of ancient languages and proposed that they were influenced by both grammar rules and psychological factors (Duszak 1998). Russian formalism was also an initial influential field in particular Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale* ([1928] 1968) which included a structural analysis of a discourse. For example, Levi-Strauss's (1973) work on the structural relations of cultures was influenced both by Propp and structural linguistics. Van Dijk (1985a) highlights the publication of *Communications 4* in 1964. The volume was edited by Barthes and included a critical analysis of Propp, semiotic analysis, film analysis, rhetorical analysis and linguistic and semantic analysis of literature (van Dijk 1985a). This was followed by *Communications 8* in 1968 which focuses on a structural analysis of narratives and though the authors worked in different academic fields, they all held the common ground of analysing discourse and being influenced by semiotics (van Dijk 1985a: 2-3)

This initial dominance of sub-sentence level approaches to languages, be they structural or syntactic, remained until the 1960s where a number of events, studies and situations, both within linguistics and external to it, combined to change the way that language was studied. During this period, work was undertaken on the creation of text grammar which were supposed to supplement the previous work on sentence-level grammar and were thus known as hyper-syntax (Palek 1968), macro-syntax (Gulich 1970) or text-syntax (Dressler 1970). Also, following Duszak (1998), a breakthrough role was also played by Harweg (1968) who produced the first large scale work on the organisation of text.

It should be noted that such changes did not emerge in a cultural, social and political vacuum (van Dijk 2007). Rather, these changes occurred alongside, some might even argue, within, a specific social context that included student movements in, for example France, the civil rights movement in the US and elsewhere and the emergence of the feminist movement(s). It is important to remember, as Van Dijk (2007) notes, that to infer a tautological connection between the context and the linguistic output from this would be wrong, especially given that "it was only with such later developments as critical discourse studies that these two different forms of dissent (linguistic theory and social movement) merged." (van Dijk 2007: xxiii, my brackets). That notwithstanding, within other academic fields, new approaches were emerging that rejected "traditional orientations in literature, linguistics, sociology and psychology" (2007: xxiii) and might

have at least set the broader context for what emerged within linguistics. Indeed, elsewhere, van Dijk (1985a) notes that the limitations of generative-transformational linguistics greatly influenced the development of discourse analysis in the 1970s.

In reaction to structuralist approaches, Chomsky's generative approach came to dominate linguistic study and further disconnected language from context. In terms of analytical orientation, linguistics ceased to be about interaction and relationships between participants in communicative events or, as DeBeaugrande (1997) argues, by breaking down linguistics into (sometimes single) syllable sounds, language was simultaneously disconnected from discourse. To this can be added a commensurate disconnection from context and all that this comprises: intention, gender, time, place and power relations. DeBeaugrande (1997) argues that the focus on grammar and the search for rules within structuralist and generative approaches was unrealistic, and even exclusionary. DeBeaugrande (1997: 39) terms syntax as "homework linguistics" because it often works with invented data and relies for interpretation on the intuition of a native speaker. He then juxtaposes this term with "fieldwork linguistics" which would include present-day discourse analysis as well as its precursors such as language ethnography, tagmemics and socio-linguistics. Such work appreciates and includes in analysis the contexts within which a communicative event occurs. DeBeaugrande also argues that by the late 1960s there was a realisation that language could not be wholly reduced to invented sentences and rules. The result is that the study of linguistics can be seen as almost turned on its head. Whereas previous accounts pointed towards sub-sentence level rules as the precursor to communication, discourse analysis took the approach that "the text is the father to the sentence" (Enkvist 1997: 199) and that text strategies, and the contexts in which and from which they are deployed, come before syntactic formation (Enkvist 1997). Coulthard (1985) traces this shift as far back as Firth's (1935) work which argued that conversation should be studied in order to understand language and how it functions. In 1951 Firth added to this initial claim by stating that language is fundamentally "a way of behaving and making others behave" and as such, researchers should investigate "the verbal process in its context of situation" (Firth 1957: 31). A year later, Harris's (1952) article in *Language* was titled *Discourse Analysis* and introduced a method for analysis of communication, although he was concerned with the level of the morpheme. Coulthard (1985: 3) also highlights Mitchell's (1957) article *The language of buying and selling in Cyrenaica* which was the first analysis that looked at semantics and concentrated on the order of conversations, including the types

of phrases and clauses used. Similarly, by the late 1960s, within generative semantics, Ross (1972), MacCawley (1976) and George Lakoff (1971) all proposed that grammar could not be described in isolation and Robin Lakoff (1972: 907) added to this anti-generativist literature that “in order to predict correctly the applicability of many rules, one must be able to refer to assumptions about the social context of an utterance, as well as to other implicit assumptions made by the participants in a discourse”. To these discoveries and proposals, should be added Labov’s (1972) work on conversation and the importance of shared knowledge for interpretation. Taken together this broad burgeoning canon of linguistic investigation at above the sentence level, and the emergence of context as a major factor can be seen as an, if not coherent or systematic, then at least persistent, response to other linguistics subfields that had dominated the broader field since the end of the nineteenth century. For DeBeaugrande, this offered a “programmatic counter current to disconnection of language” (1997: 3).

During the 1970s and early 1980s in Europe, work had started within linguistics against Chomsky’s transformational-generative syntax to account for the grammatical structure of texts, not just sentences. Phenomena such as pronoun use, cohesion, coherence, pre-supposition and anaphora. Two important works here include van Dijk’s *Some aspect of Text Grammars* (1972) and Dressler’s *Einführung in die Textlinguistik* (1972). This focus was later developed independently into text linguistics (DeBeaugrande and Dressler 1981) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday and Hasan 1976) and indirectly led to van Dijk’s own work on CDA. Because of their importance as bases of CDA, it is worth explaining in more detail these two theories.

Text linguistics was devised and forwarded by DeBeaugrande and Dressler (1981) as a way of interpreting and analysing the communicative nature of written texts. DeBeaugrande (1997) notes that text linguistics shares some of the same concerns as classical studies of rhetoric including the transition between ideas and expressions, the influence and effect of texts on recipients and texts as “vehicles of purposeful interaction” (DeBeaugrande and Dressler 1981: 2.4). The question that text linguistics asks is: “how are discoverable structures built through operations of decision and selection, and what are the implications of those operations for communicative interaction? (1981: 2.5) For a text to be accepted as a communicative event, it must adhere to seven conditions of textuality: Cohesion (the connectedness of sentences and clauses), coherence (the meaning and understandability of concepts and relations within texts), intentionality (the attitude of the text producer as well as the intention or purpose of the communi-

cative event), acceptability (the text must be recognised as a text by the recipients), informativity (the quantity and quality of information in a text), situationality (the speech situation plays an important role in the production of a text) and intertextuality. There are two parts to intertextuality. Firstly, it indicates that utilisation of a text is connected to the knowledge of another text or texts that have previously occurred or are currently occurring (DeBeaugrande and Dressler 1981: 1.21). Secondly, intertextuality also means the formal criteria that links texts within discernible genres, i.e. narrative, argumentative, descriptive or instructive (Titscher et al. 2000: 23).

If one of the seven criteria is not satisfied then a text is not communicative and therefore is not a text. As Titscher et al. (2000: 28) note though, DeBeaugrande and Dressler stress that it is not possible to objectively predict whether a text will meet the seven criteria in advance, that is, prior to reading and “any utterance could ultimately be judged to be a text in a particular context”.

Both DeBeaugrande and Dressler (1981), as well as others following them (for example Titscher et al. 2000) tend to divide the seven criteria into text-internal (cohesion and coherence) and text-external (intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality). Titscher et al. (2000) go one step further and point out that text linguistics is concerned primarily with the text-internal whereas discourse analysis focuses on the text-external criteria and the first coherence and cohesion are the constitutive parts of a text. However, the dichotomy is not as simple. Coherence for example relies upon a vast amount of background knowledge and therefore, I would see it distinctly text *external*. Though part of the text itself, to gain an understanding of the meaning, the reader relies upon prior knowledge. As such it would maybe be more helpful to picture the seven criteria as running along a continuum of internality and externality.

Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1978, 1985, 1994; Martin 1992) is a theory of language production and use based on the idea that all texts and utterances are functional and so, contra DeBeaugrande and Dressler, there can be no non-texts in that everything in a text is meaningful (Titscher et al. 2000). Halliday’s functional systemic model of grammar was influenced in part by the Prague school and was focussed on the social functions of language and he saw language as mainly consisting of social semiotic code (Duszak 1998: 26). Hallidayan functional linguistics regards language as a societal phenomenon (Halliday 1994) and investigates the relationship between systems of grammar and the social or personal needs that language serves every human (Halli-

day 1970: 142). Because of its focus on language use in society, it is particularly applicable to CDA (Fairclough 1995). Language is also seen as systemic because each grammatical or lexical choice is a set of options. SFL starts as a social context or as Mattiessen and Halliday write:

We use language to interact with one another, to construct and maintain our interpersonal relations and the social order that lies behind them; and in doing so we interpret and represent the world for one another and for ourselves. Language is a natural part of the process of living; it is also used to 'store' the experience built up in the course of that process, both personal and collective. It is (among other things) a tool for representing knowledge or, to look at this in terms of language itself, for constructing meaning. (Mattiessen and Halliday 1997: iii)

Halliday's SFL was a comprehensive analysis of language the reasons for use and it can be divided into four criteria: Context, semantics, lexico-grammar and phonology-graphology. Within the criteria of semantics, Halliday (1978) argues that there are three types of metafunctions of language that are interconnected: Ideational, interpersonal and textual. The ideational function of language is means through which an environment is understood; the interpersonal function of language pertains to (inter)acting with others in this environment; the textual meta-function which makes a text coherent. These three meta-functions are closely aligned with CDA's main tenets and indeed Fairclough draws widely from Halliday's SFL for his approach to discourse analysis and it is also the basis of van Leeuwen's social-actors analysis approach (1996).

#### **4.2.3. Ethno-methodological roots**

The third historical source of DA comes from research into spoken language within linguistic anthropology and an increasing interest in the ethnography of languages and communication. This looked at research into the ethnography of speech and researched the usage of language in different social and cultural situations.

Influential in the evolution of this study was the edited volume *Language in Culture and Society* (Hymes, 1964) and included works by Sapir, Levi-Strauss and Firth as well as proto-sociolinguistics such as Brown and Gumperz (van Dijk 1985a). The publication also included Pike's theory of tegmemics. Pike looked at "larger chunks" of language encountered in human interactions (DeBeaugrande and Dressler 1981: 2.15) and

argued that language was a specific field of human behaviour (Kaplan and Grabe 2002). Communication was, according to Pike, socially situated and utterances could not be separated from the speaker, audience or the “varied worlds they may construct and inhabit through the use of language” (Edwards 2009: 1).

From the early 1970s to the mid 1980s, socio-linguistics began to take hold as a formal academic discipline in part as a reaction to Chomsky’s generative grammar. This critique held that, contra Chomsky, there were no ideal speakers of language nor were there “homogenous speech communities” (van Dijk 1985a: 5). Instead, socio-linguistics explored how naturally occurring language varied depending on social, regional and economic contexts and statuses (DeBeaugrande 1997). Primary examples of this type of approach come from Labov (1972) who looked at the social influences on stylistic variations, Gumperz and Hyme’s (1972) study of ‘verbal jousting’ and Tripp’s (1972) study of patterns of interaction (van Dijk 2007) .

Conversation Analysis (CA), which originated in sociology, is a further important influence on the development of DA. Garfinkel’s (1974) study proposed the usefulness of the investigation of conversational data in order to be able to understand participants’ “common-sense methodology” when communicating (DeBeaugrande 1997: 52). Garfinkel’s breakthrough works of the 1960s were then also taken on by Cicourel (1973) and Sacks, Schlegoff and Jefferson (1974). CA also takes influence from symbolic interaction which proposes that actors are shaped by their interactions (Goffman, 1959). Though CA came about as a development in ethnomethodology, in contrast to that field, conversation analysts argue that there is no requirement for researchers to interview and get to know the participants of a conversation because the data for analysis can be gleaned purely from the conversation itself. Indeed, CA practitioners go so far as to argue that interaction with participants is misleading and upsets the empirical study because discourse participants generally do not have a conscious understanding of how they interact and to question them on this would affect the reliability of the data. Instead CA proposes an analysis that does not require knowledge of “shared biography or culture” (Rawls 2005: 149) and focuses on the hyper-localised context of the conversation. As Rawls argues though, CA does not ignore the macro context, but rather, that the macro starts with and is enacted within the micro structure. This fits well with the socially constitutive and constituted nature of discourse. CA, though, does differ from DA in another way. CA takes the position, contrary to DA and CDA, that there is very little ambiguity in language (Rawls 2005). Thus, whereas, CA focuses on what is said,

DA and to a much greater extent CDA, is equally concerned with what is not said and why it is not said.

Within linguistic philosophy and pragmatics too, there was work being done on the pragmatics of speech acts and communicative co-influence that would influence the study of spoken, and later written, discourse (Duszak 1998). Searle (1969) devised his speech-act theory which held that texts were “negotiated communicative achievements of the participants” (Kaplan and Grabe 2002: 194). Also, Grice (1975) proposed his conversation maxims (of quantity, quality, relation and manner) as a way of explaining and predicting implicatures speech interaction (Davies 2013). Austin’s (1955) work on the performative utterances and illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. All three of these authors indicated that (spoken) sentences were forms of social interaction and that there was a meaning or pragmatic function behind each utterance, i.e. that there was some sort of illocutionary power which was dependent upon “speaker intentions, beliefs, or evaluations, or relations between speaker and hearer” (van Dijk 1985a: 5). For Duszak, the influence of pragmatics for later research on text and discourse was very important. The late 1970s and early 1980s was characterised by a re-evaluation of “ways of perception” and “interpretation of rules” which regulate the creation and social functioning of texts (Duszak 1998: 27). They laid the ground for new thinking on the strong connections between language, thought and action and that language should be treated as a form of social activity which allowed for the creation of reality outside language.

Very briefly, two more, fields of study should be mentioned when talking of the genesis of DA in general and especially the work in CDA of van Dijk. Firstly, studies into the psychology of text processing by Kintsch (1974) and van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) looked at how discourse was produced, understood and memorised and that there was a cognitive basis for comprehension of a discourse (van Dijk 2007) this work in itself was based on a rediscovery of Bartlett’s (1932) work on remembering. Secondly, research within the emerging field of Artificial Intelligence pointed to the necessity of vast amounts of world knowledge and knowledge activation strategies for processing a discourse (van Dijk 1985a; DeBeaugrande 1997). Later, Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Billig (1987) introduced theories on how psychological concepts such as memory are enacted in discourse (van Dijk, 2007).<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Krzyżanowski (2010) includes a useful summary of this history

Taken together, the developments of this complemented each other well in sense that, to the American tradition on spoken interaction was added the mainly continental European work on written discourse. Although obviously varied in their approach, Van Dijk (2007: xxii) notes that there were some key methodological similarities in the subjects and researchers who, maybe unknowingly were creating a new field. These include:

- An interest in naturally occurring language
- An interest in the study of language as interaction
- A move above the sentence level
- A focus on the social, cultural and cognitive role of language

From this point, DA began to establish itself as a stand-alone field which was applied inter-disciplinarily to a number of different academic sites of study. Both directly and indirectly the emergence of DA can be said to have influenced the ‘linguistic turn’ that came about in subjects such as law, history, politics, media studies, literature and social psychology.<sup>39</sup>

#### **4.2.4. Contemporary Discourse Analysis**

Perhaps unsurprisingly, DA has not remained static and new perspectives and approaches have evolved due to both technology and a widening of the scope of possible research subjects. Three here are worth mentioning: Corpus approaches to DA, mediated discourse analysis and computer mediated discourse analysis.

Corpus linguistics should be considered a tool for analysis of discourse rather than separate methodological approach. By looking at concordances of certain words and phrases within authentic data, the discourse prosody (Stubbs 2001) of lexical items can be ascertained not just within one article but with reference to corpora that include millions of words. Such semantic preferences can show the type of social issues that a lexical item is connected to and the attitudes associated with it (Mautner 2009). Furthermore, following Partington:

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<sup>39</sup> Of equal importance to the linguistic turn was the work done within the post-structuralist tradition on the philosophy of language such as Derrida, Kristeva and later Mouff and LeClau

At the simplest level, corpus technology helps find other examples of a phenomenon one has already noted. At the other extreme, it reveals patterns of use previously unthought of. In between, it can reinforce, refute or revise a researcher's intuition and show them why and how much their suspicions were grounded. (2003: 12)

Corpus approaches have been used to look at work on the elderly (Mautner 2007), metaphor in business media (Koller 2006), war metaphors in the media (Fabiszak and Kaszubski 2005), immigration in European media (Bayley and Williams 2012) and UK media (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Baker et. al. 2008) and media representations of Islam (Baker 2006). Mautner (2009: 124-125) argues that corpus linguistics has a contributory role and as a quantitative "ancillary method" is "flexible and if handled appropriately, will enrich but not prejudice the rest of the research design or interpretation of the results". Furthermore, following Baker et al. (2008: 6): "It could be argued that CL methods offer the researcher a reasonably high degree of objectivity; that is, they enable the researcher to approach the texts (or text surface) (relatively) free from any preconceived or existing notions regarding their linguistic or semantic/pragmatic content.". By focusing on frequency of occurrences and their collocations, within large amounts of data it reduces the chances of the work being accused of researcher bias, a common criticism laid at the feet of CDA. The benefits of synthesising CDA with corpus linguistics include downsampling which allows for larger amounts of texts to be analysed than would normally be the case in CDA work. Furthermore, DeBeaugrande (1997: 42) argued that by using large corpora of real data, corpus analysis supports discourse analysis' attempts for linguistics to "return to authentic data". However, because it is a machine reading of a large corpus of text based on one or more keywords, the wider discursive and semiotic context can get lost. Thus, in order to ameliorate this decontextualisation, after quantitative analysis is carried out, finer-grained qualitative interpretation is required to complete the analysis (Wodak and Meyer 2009)

Mediated discourse analysis (Scollon 2004; Scollon and Scollon 2004, Norris and Jones 2005) is slightly different - socio semiotic - approach to discourse in that it takes discourse to be one of a number of activities within society rather than, as DA and CDA practitioners do, to take social action to be of secondary importance (Norris and Jones, 2005). MDA was originally proposed by Scollon (1997) and the focus on the mediated action is influenced by Wertsch's (1993) "sociocultural approach to mind" (Norris and Scollon 2005: 5) who in turn was influenced by Vygotsky (1978).

MDA is closely related to CDA in that it sees social problems as stemming from and linked to texts. The difference between the two is that whilst CDA looks at discourses, MDA practitioners study social action and sees discourse as one of many mediators of action. They will study social action and formulate how discourse influences this. A mediated analysis of discourse will take into account all “mediational means or cultural tools such as language, gesture, material objects and institutions” (Scollon 2001: 7) form a person’s habitus or ‘nexus of practice’. Mediated discourse analysis sees all social actors are mediated by cultural tools, of which discourse is the most salient one and, at base, similarly to CDA looks for the connections between social issues and how they impact upon talk and text (Meyer 2001). According to Norris and Jones (2005: 4) MDA “provides a way of understanding how all of the objects and all of the language and all of the actions taken with these various mediational means intersect at a *nexus* of multiple social practices and the trajectories of multiple histories and storylines that reproduce social identities and social groups”. Another difference between that MDA and CDA is that mediated discourse analysis is more than just an acceptance of the need to view discourses in context. Rather:

We suggest that the relationship between discourse and action is dynamic and contingent, located at a nexus of social practices, social identities and social goals. This relationship is manifested in the tension between the kinds of actions that discourse and other cultural tools make possible and the ways people purposefully mix these tools in response to their immediate circumstances. (Norris and Jones 2005: 9)

Thus, MDA practitioners aim to ask and answer two questions: Firstly what is the action that is being taken here and, secondly, only ‘What is the role of discourse in those actions (Scollon 2001).

Finally, Computer Mediated Discourse Analysis (CMDA) has arisen directly because of technological advances in how people now communicate which did not exist up until the turn of the twenty-first Century. CMDA is the study of computer mediated communication (CMC) which is interaction between people using computer networks. CMDA uses the same analytical tools and methodologies as traditional DA, the difference being the method of communication. As such text analysis, CA, sociolinguistics and CDA can all be used to analyse CMC. CMDA takes a peculiar approach that links multimodality, semiotics and a CA-like take on interaction. CMDA was pioneered by Herring (1996) who notes three primary features of CMC which, together, differentiate

it from other forms of discourse interaction. Firstly, it is mainly text based (which allowed, for the first time, practitioners of written DA, to study interaction).<sup>40</sup> Secondly participants interact with one-another without the usual non-verbal cues afforded a person in normal conversation such as awareness of the other's sex, gender, age, race. Interaction is thus anonymised if the participant(s) so wish. Finally, CMC allows for the founding of communities (Herring 1996). Initial approaches to CMC (see Androutsopoulos 2006) argued that it was characterised by a specific way of speaking or 'web-slang'. Later work though rejected this proposal and instead proposed that the type of language used varied from genre to genre and even within genre depending on the purpose of the communication (Herring 2001). Furthermore, CMC was initially seen to be a lesser form of communication, but again, extensive research and the ubiquity of online communication has shown that CMC is merely different to off-line communication and as it has developed, CMC has compensated for the extra-linguistic cues that are missing such as emoticons (Herring 2001). For DA practitioners, a key interest with CMC is the creation of online communities and, within this, how online identities are created, performed and mediated. More recently, this also includes how offline and online identities connect (cf. Kennedy 2006).

### **4.3. Critical Discourse Analysis**

#### **4.3.1. Aims, Objectives and key terms**

DA is often defined by its descriptive nature. Johnstone (2002) points out that much of DA is oriented around the more general argument about research that the role of researchers is to describe the world around them and nothing more. This relies on two presumptions about academic ventures: firstly that there is one way to describe phenomena and secondly that the role of the scholar is primarily to describe and only secondarily apply the results to problems. More than this though, within this broader debate applied research is often seen to have a lesser status than theoretical or descriptive with

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<sup>40</sup> With the advances in technology and the advent of web 2.0 there is a lot more need to combine CMC with semiotic analysis in order to understand how text and non-textual factors work together

practical relevance of academic work only coming about as a by-product (van Dijk 1985a). It is this difference that fundamentally separates DA from CDA.

Unlike DA, CDA is problem-oriented and aims to change or at the very least challenge the social status quo. The problems which CDA practitioners gravitate to are varied but they all concern social inequalities in some shape or form and the belief of critical discourse analysts is that these social inequalities are established and maintained through both the use of certain language and of the control over the means of discourse production and distribution. Language choice is believed to be ideological in the sense that discourse is not objective and so there is a function to the language people use. The role of the CDA researcher is to identify these choices as well as their effects, and the motivation behind them. The aim is therefore to critique dominant discourses and reveal the contradictions and non-expressions (Jäger 2001). Similarly, Weiss and Wodak (2003: 45) state that the aim of CDA is “to demystify discourses by deciphering ideologies”. Although this working of CDA is agreeable in the main I would prefer to swap the clauses that the authors use in order to foreground the linguistic rigorousness at the core of ‘good’ critical analyses of discourse. Thus reworked, it would read: the aim of CDA is to *decipher ideologies* by *demystifying discourses*. Given this stance on social issues, it is clear that the study of discourses from a critical perspective is an (overtly) political, or ideological venture to the extent that there is an explicit independence between research aims and a researcher’s political commitment.<sup>41</sup> By demystifying discourses and bringing hidden ideologies to the fore, the socio-political aim of CDA is to systematise awareness of such a state of affairs as a precursor to empowerment of individuals or communities that continue to be discriminated against. The practical application of findings can then be used to inform policy, be disseminated via workshops for professionals and media and policy guidelines, or even to inform changes in school text books (Wodak 2001).<sup>42</sup>

For critical discourse analysts the three concepts of power, ideology and knowledge are all interlinked and cannot be separated from one another. A simple explanation of the relationship would be that power is in part enacted via discourse or, to put it an-

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<sup>41</sup> The criticism of CDA as ‘politicised’ and counter arguments to these claims are explained in section 4.5

<sup>42</sup> Within the MEDIVA project (cf. Bennett et al. 2013; Gemi et al. 2012) a number of workshops were given to journalists on good practice for the representation of third country nationals in the European media. Within the EMEDIATE project media and policy guidelines were produced (cf. Triandafyllidou et al. 2007)

other way, via the control and dissemination of knowledge. Secondly, knowledge is not objective but is ideological in that, as mentioned above, an ideology presents a certain perspective on the world. Thirdly, completing the circle, for this ideology to be dominant, power must be wielded.

The concept of power in the case of critical discourse analysis stems directly from Foucault's work. Foucault argued that power was not an institution or structure but rather a "complex strategical situation (Smart 2002: 81). It was also not the commodity of a given class or group but rather power circulated and was present throughout society and functioned "in the form of a chain" (2002: 72) in that power was transmitted by and through those who were powerless as well. Power came not just from the state, but also in the economy, through sexuality, knowledge and within the private sphere of the family. According to Foucault, to understand power, researchers needed to identify and analyse the exercise of power, where it was applied and its effects in order to understand the processes of how people also became the effects of power. It was only after the functioning of power was uncovered that it was possible to see how and why power was economically or politically useful (2002: 72-73).

Following Smart (2002: 72), Foucault also argued that the establishment of power was "closely linked to the production and dissemination of discourse". For Fairclough (1995: 2) though, Foucault's analysis of power neglected the existence of power asymmetries between participants of a "discourse event" and of asymmetries in the ability and means to influence how texts are "produced, distributed and consumed" in certain contexts. Fairclough takes a dialectic approach to discourse and power based on Marxist theory combined with Gramsci's work on hegemony which in turn relates back to Foucault's concept of power and resistance, in the sense that although power is normally in the hands of one class and is used over another, that relationship is never complete or total and there exists an "unstable equilibrium" (Fairclough 1995: 76). According to Fairclough (1995: 76), hegemony is domination by consent and is "leadership as well as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of society". Under hegemony, power is exercised by gaining consent throughout society through the control over the production and creativity of discursive practices. Such control comes via "the production of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge - methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research and apparatuses of control" (Smart 2002: 73). Within this paradigm, power is the ability to control and sustain particular ideological discursive

practices. Furthermore, a given discourse becomes and remains dominant due to “institutional funding, government patronage and public support” (Mills 2004: 17). This public support is important because most discourse events occur at a local level. Thus, for hegemonic power to function, this local level needs to give its consent.

Such hegemonic discourses are, like all language, ideological and via discourse certain ideologies are created and circulated (Foucault 1972). Indeed, following Fairclough (1995), there is no arbitrariness in signs. From a basis in SFL, critical discourse analysts argue that language is a system of options, i.e. that everything that is said or not said is done so for a reason and quite often this reason is power. Alternatively, as Johnstone (2002: 45) argues “linguistic choices are strategic, in the sense that every utterance has an epistemological agenda, a way of seeing the world that is favoured via that choice and not others” and it is through these choices about lexical choice, genre, style, and grammar that ways of thinking “can be manipulated”. By taking a critical approach to ideology, a researcher accepts that ideology (produced via discourse) is a method “through which social relations of power are reproduced” (Fairclough 1995: 17) and role of the researcher is to show people are deluded about the society they live in (Wodak 2001). It should be remembered that just because a discursive event is denoted as ideological, it does not ipso facto mean that it is false, but merely, following Fairclough (1995: 10) “it contributes to the reproduction of relations of power”. For van Dijk (1998: 8) ideologies are the basis of “the social representations shared by members of a group”. They are systems of ideas that are influenced by complex relationships between cognition, society and discourse (1998: 5). For him, ideas are psychological but also social, cultural and political and so their “social representations and their function for social cognition” (van Dijk 1998: 6) also need to be investigated:

Language use, text, talk and communication (together subsumed here under the overall term of ‘discourse’) are needed and used by group members to learn, acquire, change, confirm, articulate, as well as to persuasively convey ideologies to other ingroup members, to inculcate them in novices, defend them against (or conceal them from) outgroup members or to propagate them among those who are (as yet) the infidels. In sum, if we want to know what ideologies actually look like, how they work, and how they are created, changed and reproduced, we need to look closely at their *discursive manifestations*. (van Dijk 1998: 6)

With regards to knowledge, Foucault (1979) proposed that ‘truth’ was produced via society (discursively) and involved the inclusion of some forms of knowledge and the exclusion of others (Mills 2004) therefore it is ideological. For sake of clarity then, it

would be better to call Foucault's 'truth' something like 'common knowledge'. As van Dijk (2003) notes, knowledge is representational – it is something believed by someone about something. Knowledge is defined by the social consensus surrounding it. It is shared through interaction, without which it would merely be personal belief (van Dijk 2003). Social acceptance and consent for a particular knowledge validates its production and reproduction circularly. This knowledge then informs people's interpretation of a discourse and given the social situatedness of discourse, people derive their knowledge from the discourses that surround them (Jäger 2001).

Thus, because of its importance to discourse processing and interpretation, knowledge is a power resource or what Bourdieu (1991) called symbolic capital. One might crudely state that those who control the books, control the thoughts. A critical approach to knowledge and power then investigates which groups have access to knowledge, which groups set the criteria for the definition and legitimation of knowledge and which groups are involved in knowledge distribution and the limitation of knowledge in society. This is why, following Fairclough (1995: 18), discourses need to be analysed within an unequal social system "which is capitalist and dominated but not reducible to relations of class" in order to understand "underlying mechanisms of social attitudes and discrimination practices" (van Dijk 1985b: 6).

#### **4.3.1.1. The big 'C': The 'Critical' in Critical Discourse Analysis**

It is due primarily to the focus on inequalities and the (mis)use of power that the 'critical' is derived from in CDA and yet this 'critical' is often misinterpreted, possibly because of its multiple meanings. Wodak (2001) has highlighted four facets of the 'critical', all of which have some sort of relevance and application to the study of language as social practice:

- Having distance to the data
- Situating the data within the social context it emerges in
- An explicit political stance
- Self reflection

Much of CDA's thinking on the critical comes from the work of the Frankfurt school, and in particular Habermas and, prior to him, Horkheimer who was himself influenced by Marxist theory on class.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, Forchtner (2011: 9) claims that the Discourse Historical Approach is grounded more in Habermas' work than that of other members of the Frankfurt school.

For Horkheimer (following Wodak 2001a: 9), the role of academia was to develop a class consciousness and that "the tasks of critical theory were to assist in 'remembering' a past that was in danger of being forgotten, to struggle for emancipation, to clarify the reasons for such a struggle and to define the nature of critical thinking itself". Further influence comes from Horkheimer and Adorno's (1977) work on the dialectic of enlightenment in which they argue that domination is part of civilising rationality (Forchtner 2011: 4). Additionally, Adorno's (1973) 'negative dialectics', contends that "to identify something, is necessarily a violent act as it reduces an object to only one or a few of its ontological characteristics" (Forchtner 2001: 5). Habermas (1977: 259), on the other hand saw language as method of domination and social control that serves "to legitimise relations of organised power" and that these methods are employed used for reasons of self-interest by those in power. The critical has now come to mean that human interconnections may be "distorted out of vision" (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 14) primarily through language. CDA also takes influence from Habermas' (1972) concept of the ideal speech situation based on: publicness, absence of coercion, sincerity on the part of the participants, and inclusivity/the same rights for all participants. Habermas saw these as a "blueprint for meaningful interaction" (Forchtner 2011: 7).

Moreover, as Billig (2003) correctly writes, CDA is not merely discourse analysis with a certain political agenda. Nor is it the case that the optimal outcome (a radical change in formations of social relations) is some sort of addendum to academic work. Instead the whole *raison d'être* of CDA is the critique of social relations. For the relevance of CDA, this idea builds on a broader perspective of the 'critical' which includes Horkheimer's and Habermas' contributions. Following Wodak (2001a) there is a connection between social and political engagement on the one hand, and an acceptance of the constructed nature of society on the other, and that this combined with Fairclough's view that the interconnectedness of social phenomena might be "distorted out of vision"

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<sup>43</sup> Forchtner (2011) provides an excellent analysis of the influence of the Frankfurt School on CDA and the Discourse Historical Approach

(Wodak 2001a: 2) This feeds back into the primary goals of CDA and the belief that is necessary in order “to make visible the interconnectedness of things” (Fairclough 1995: 36). The Discourse Historical Approach specifically calls for “emancipation, self-determination and social recognition . . . [which] is motivated by the perhaps utopian conviction that unsatisfactory social conditions can, and therefore must, be subject to methodological transformation towards fewer social dysfunctional and unjustifiable inequalities” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 34). In order to do this, Wodak (2001a) argues that within critical theory there are three interrelated aspects of social critique that must be attended to: the ‘immanent critique’, the ‘socio-diagnostic critique’ and the ‘prognostic critique.’<sup>44 45</sup>

#### **4.3.1.2. Language and context**

In its very basest form CDA is the study of discourse in its social context. Texts, as forms of interaction, are seen as discursive practices and these discursive practices are also social practices (Fairclough 1995). Actions reproduce structures and these structures are producers of action (Fairclough 1995). Succinctly put, “discourse makes people as well as people make discourse” (Fairclough 1995: 39) or at least the parameters in which discourse is produced. This idea echoes Halliday’s (1978: 2) view that “by their everyday acts of meaning, people act out the social structure affirming their own statuses and roles and establishing and transmitting the shared systems of value and of knowledge”. Elsewhere, Weiss and Wodak (2003: 10) state that “symbolic practices do not take place within social systems. Instead they reproduce the latter simply by taking place; the systems reproduced in this way then retroact on the conditions of action” and thus “text production equals system reproduction”. Jäger (2001: 45) goes even further and argues that “everything that is human consciousness is constituted discursively” and this echoes van Leeuwen’s (1993: 13, following Wodak 2001a: 9) call that CDA “is, or should be, concerned with...discourse as the instrument of power and control as well as with discourse as the instrument of the social construction of reality”. Finally for (van

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<sup>44</sup> See subsection 4.3.3 for a more detailed explanation of the three critiques and how they relate specifically to DHA.

<sup>45</sup> See Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 32 following Benhabib 1992: 77-110) for a detailed analysis of the three critiques.

Dijk 2003: 96) “in discourse production and comprehension, it is not the text which is first produced, but rather the model of the social situation which we have called ‘context’”.<sup>46</sup>

Fairclough (1995) has argued that DA ignores social context. However, given the work in previous sections about DA and its precursors, Fairclough’s concept of social context requires elaboration. Both DA and CDA deal with social context and the study of language as a form of social practice but where they crucially differ, as mentioned above, is that CDA takes as its point of departure and interest in the inequalities of social structures and contexts, i.e. it is concerned with power. This is in contrast to DA which has a focus on more local contexts (goal of speaker, gender, age, social class). As with DA, CDA practitioners also ascribe to the view that discourses are socially constitutive and constituted. However, even these factors though are themselves socially situated and discursively constructed and they are ideological in the sense that they are not value-neutral. As van Dijk (and Kintsch 1983) have proposed, context is not a social situation but rather a subjective mental model. Seen in this way, age, gender, time and space are not stand-alone, unquestionable contexts, but are results of how participants (discursively) interpret and construct them. This points us towards to the inherent social-situatedness of texts and the mistakes of analysing them without taking into account as much context as possible.

In order to realise its goals and to take into account the importance of social context critical analyses of discourse should be three dimensional (Fairclough 1995). Firstly, analyses should include an analysis of the selected texts. Secondly, discourse practices should be investigated. This includes studying processes of how texts and discourses are produced, disseminated, controlled and consumed. Thirdly, the discursive events themselves should be analysed with reference to their state as constitutive of and constituted instances of socio-cultural practice.

Finally, it is worth noting that critical approaches to language have their roots in hermeneutic interpretation of texts and this genealogy of thought is not always made clear by CDA practitioners (Meyer 2001). It could be argued that critical discourse analysis is a form of ‘critical hermeneutics’ (Kinsella 2006) in the sense that interpretations of texts occur within a “tangle of oppressions” (Rich 2001, following Kinsella, 2006: 3.1). Similarly, Wodak (2011b) has argued that (critical) discourse studies in the

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<sup>46</sup> Hence, ethnographical approaches to CDA should be encouraged.

humanities and social sciences requires (critical) hermeneutics which is closely linked to important CDA/DHA concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity (cf. 4.3.1.3 below). Thus, hermeneutic approaches should be critical in the sense of questioning who is absent from conversations and why and in order to allow such invisible, marginalised groups to become interpreters within the circle.

#### **4.3.1.3. Interdisciplinarity**

The relationship between language and society, via cognition (cf. Wodak 2006a), is extremely complex and complicated and thus a complete analysis calls for the integration of different - grand, middle range and discourse - theories. Indeed, it would almost be ludicrous to believe that a reasonable explanation of a system of domination and hegemony could be reached by utilising one theory. Critical discourse necessitates an integrative, problem oriented attitude to interdisciplinarity in which certain approaches and theories are combined in order to arrive at “meaningful, adequate and transparent” (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 19) explanations of texts. This is in contrast to other interdisciplinary approaches such as the additive interdisciplinarity (the attaching of one field to another such as socio-linguistics) or eclectic ad hoc models in which everything useful is used (Weiss and Wodak 2003). Following Knapp and Landweer (1995), Weiss and Wodak (2003: 18) write that there are five motivations for taking an interdisciplinary approach:

- Because of their complex nature, certain problems require expertise from multiple domains.
- Individual field and institutionalised disciplines require reassessment because they no longer meet the requirements.
- Conventions on theory and data collection are obstacles to “constructing new knowledge”.
- The more complex social relations become, the more cooperative research projects need to be.
- Critical thinking and practice indicate new constructions and applications of knowledge.

Secondly, following, Kroh and Küppers (1989), Titscher et al. (2000) explain the relationship between an (interdisciplinary) approach to research and the method of data collection. Firstly, a researcher should start with hypothesis or assumptions which are then operationalised by deciding on empirical methods of data collection. The data is then collected, analysed and finally interpreted. This interpretation of the data becomes information when it is systematised and compared with other analyses. At this point, the researcher may return to the start and note whether the information supports the hypothesis or whether it needs to be amended. This process is circular and might occur multiple times within a research project so that there is a movement between theory and method before conclusions can be arrived at. Within this model of research, Grounded Theory (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990) can be very useful way of tending to data collection in CDA especially larger quantities of texts (Titscher et al. 2000: 75-76). Grounded Theory does not look for incontrovertible truths but rather, focuses on “explanation and the generation of hypotheses” that show repeatedly “their suitability for a scientific decoding of reality”. Grounded Theory proposes that data collection does not have to be completed before analysis. Instead, initial analyses of data are potential indicators of concepts, codes and categories which then inform further data collection. Through this process, which fits well with hermeneutic approaches to text analysis, new questions arise that might only be answered through collecting new data or through a re-examination of existing data (Titscher et al. 2000).

Finally, because it foregoes logical positivism and because of its interdisciplinary nature, critical approaches to discourse, like most qualitative research in the social sciences, require criteria to assess the quality of its findings. If not the ‘truth’, then what? Wodak and Meyer (2009) note that there has been very little acceptance of this within CDA, which in turn leaves it open to criticisms. However, the authors do point to elements within CDA which may help to fill this gap. Within Jäger’s (2001) discourse dispositional analysis there is a focus on representativeness, reliability and validity of results based on a completeness of the research (i.e. the research is complete when there are no new findings). Secondly, from the socio-cognitive approach particularly, and from other approaches too, another way of validating findings is through the accessibility of them, especially to those under investigation (i.e. those who hold power within society) and to the groups that are marginalised. Finally, Wodak and Meyer (2003) reference the Dis-

course Historical Approach and the use of triangulation. They argue that analysing all levels of context can help to minimise the risk bias within research findings.

#### **4.3.2. Key approaches to CDA**

In this section of the chapter I will lay out clearly the history of Critical Discourse Analysis and the main approaches which have influenced and can be utilised when taking a Discourse Historical approach to analysis of texts: the socio-cognitive approach, the dialectical-relational approach and the Duisburg school.

CDA has its roots in discourse analysis and shares many of the same ancestors though where the two differ is the integration of the ‘critical’ side of the analysis which stems from the Frankfurt school and from Foucault as well as from Marxist dialectical theory. Indeed critical discourse analysis employs multiple theories in order to explain discursive phenomena. These include: grand theories; middle range, or meso, theories; discourse theories; and linguistic analyses. Following Foucault (Smart 2004), no general theories need be employed but rather each instance or discourse should be analysed separately so that for CDA practitioners the question is not ‘is a grand theory necessary?’ but ‘what tools are required for this problem or context?’. To approach analysis in such way is to accept that the world is ‘messy’ and uneasily pigeonholed and goes against the push of logical positivism and quantitative analysis that social sciences constantly have to get battle with. The use of different conceptual tools from different perspectives is, then, necessitated by the fact that the object of the research has different dimensions and therefore the synthesis of theories can be seen to be “conceptually pragmatic” (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 7).

Though CDA is rooted in social theory, linguistics is very much at the core of ‘doing CDA’ and analysis relies on linguistic categories (Wodak and Meyer 2009). CDA draws its influence primarily from text linguistics and from SFL but also classic rhetoric, pragmatics and applied linguistics and different researchers rely on different grammatical approaches as well as the differing concepts of ‘discourse’, ‘the critical’, ‘ideology’ and ‘power’. Furthermore, because of its varied approaches, it is worth taking note of Weiss and Wodak’s call that any criticism of CDA should refer to specific authors rather than the field of study as whole (Weiss and Wodak 2003).

As a standalone field of study, CDA is barely twenty years old.<sup>47</sup> Its direct predecessor is Critical Linguistics which emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the East Anglian school under the guidance of Gunther Kress (1989) and Roger Fowler (1991, see also Fowler et al. 1979). Kress was initially influenced by Hallidayan work on the meta functions of language. Kress's assumptions were: language is a social phenomenon, institutional and social groups have specific meanings and values which are expressed in language, texts are the unit of language in communication, readers are not passive and finally that there are similarities between institutional languages (Wodak 2006b: 6). His work has developed into a focus on social semiotics where language is one of many systems of meaning making and his aim is to "connect the specificities of semiotic forms, in any medium, with the specificities of social organizations and social histories" (Kress 1993: 176). Similarly, Fowler (1991) incorporated both Halliday's systemic functional grammar and elements of Chomskyan grammar to "indicate linguistic structures of power in texts" (Wodak 2006b: 6). Finally, Fowler and Kress (1979) argued that there was a strong link between linguistic structure and social structure and that "discourse cannot exist without social meaning" (Wodak 2006b: 5).

Unsurprisingly, CDA and CL have similar aims and approaches (Krzyżanowski 2010). Fowler and Kress (1979) elucidate three principles of Critical Linguistics that can be seen to have a number of similarities with the key guiding principles of CDA: Firstly, CL is different from conventional linguistics in the sense that it does not look at language structures. "Texts are not sources of data" but rather "independent subjects for critical interpretation" (1979: 195). Secondly, CL is concerned with the "critical nature of linguistic interpretation" (1979: 196), that is, trying to expose how language usage is context dependent. This context includes who the actors are, their aims and, importantly, their access to power. Thirdly, "practice is the target" (1979: 195), i.e. results and methodologies should be made available to other researchers in other fields. Furthermore, this principle also extends to results being disseminated outside of academia with the intention of affecting change on certain discursive practices, for example discourse of discrimination such as racism.

In more recent years, many working within CL have shifted the focus of their work to social semiotics and an analysis of other 'signs' such as visual media and van Leeuwen's actors analysis (c.f. 4.3.3 below) can be utilised to analyse both texts and

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<sup>47</sup> See Krzyżanowski 2010 and Wodak 2001a for the historical developments of CDA and critical linguistics.

visual material in order to identify semiotic practices and how they are linked to specific forms of control (Wodak 2006b: 8).

Wodak points to a symposium in 1991 in Amsterdam where she, Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen met to discuss and share views and approaches, as the start of the network of CDA and CL researchers and although these approaches and methodologies differed, there was commonality in programme (Wodak 2001). Initially, Fairclough placed critical approaches to DA alongside other linguistic fields such as critical linguistics, critical language awareness and critical language studies. Later, in 1992, he placed it in critical language studies and it was only in 1995 that CDA (with capital initials) appeared along with the use of ‘the’ in the subtitle: *the critical study of language*. Since then, it has rapidly become an established field of linguistics via journals (*Discourse & Society*, *Critical Discourse Studies*, *the Journal of Language and Politics*, and *Discourse and Communication*), books and book series (Discourse Approaches to Politics Society and Culture) conferences (Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines – CADAAD) and academic courses across the world (Wodak and Meyer 2009).

In the paragraphs below I will very briefly introduce van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach, Fairclough’s dialectical-relational approach and the Duisburg school’s approach to analysis as these are the key approaches that inform the DHA (cf. Reisigl and Wodak 2001). However, it should be noted that there are other many approaches to critical discourse analysis.

The socio-cognitive approach to discourse has been forwarded most famously by Teun van Dijk (1984). Prior to this approach, the belief was that language was defined by context (Wodak and Meyer 2009). The socio-cognitive approach though adds an intermediary level to the thesis and argues that the relationship between language and context is mediated by cognitive processes (Wodak and Meyer 2009). Van Dijk (2009: 66) argues that the socio-cognitive context within which a text is created and received is actually a “subjective mental representation” that is created over time through personal knowledge and societal knowledge which are both activated when interpreting a text. Further to this, our memories “shape our perception and comprehension of discursive practices and also imply stereotypes and prejudices, if such mental models become rigid” (Wodak and Busch 2004: 110) and are part of the reason why people act in discriminatory way (Van Dijk 2000). These mental models include:

- Semantic mental models: representations of personally experienced or observed events
- Pragmatic Context models: subjective representations of properties of a discursive or communicative event which guide discourse processing and modify a discourse so that it is suitable to a given situation
- Knowledge: beliefs shared within society and legitimised because there is a consensus within society
- Ideology: shared belief systems (socialism etc)
- Attitudes: socially shared normative beliefs certain issues
- Cognitive processes

The socio-cognitive approach is particularly applicable to the study of media and political discourse. Firstly, the media is the main sources of people's knowledge of event and secondly the media mediates the messages of those who possess power in society – politicians, professionals and academics. This is also called 'elite discourse' (van Dijk 1993). In terms of actual tools for linguistic analysis, van Dijk works with a conceptual tool known as the ideological square which focuses on a 'positive Self-presentation' on the one side, and a simultaneous 'negative Other-presentation' on the other (Richardson 2004: 55).

Next, Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach (1995) is, like the DHA, problem oriented. In using such an approach a researcher will first identify a situation of social conflict and will then look for representations and markers of this conflict within language use. After this initial stage the dominant styles and genres (or orders of discourse) should be identified and analysed in order to ascertain the relative difference or diversity of them. The approach also calls for an analysis of the social (and historical) context, an analysis of interdiscursivity and a linguistic analysis including agents, time, tense, modality and syntax. Finally, Fairclough follows Foucauldian understanding that power is never absolute or complete and that there is always resistance to power. Thus, traces of resistance against the hegemony of certain styles, genres and discourses should be identified and highlighted as a way of challenging that hegemony (Wodak and Meyer 2009)

The Duisburg School is the final influence on DHA relevant here. Again influenced by Foucault, Jäger argues that discourses are linked through a "collective symbol-

ism” (Jäger 2001: 35) known as *topoi* which are “cultural stereotypes...handed down and used collectively” within a society (Drews et al. 1985: 265, following Jäger 2001: 35). The Duisburg school also followed Foucault’s work on the archaeology of knowledge in accepting that discourses were historical and therefore, there is also a need to look at how discourses emerged historically and how they change over time. Thus, discourses are not just socially situated, but that this social context is also an historical one (Jäger 2001).

### 4.3.3. Categories of analysis

DHA practitioners often take a three-dimensional approach to the job of analysing data. First the specific content or *topics* of a discourse are identified. The next stage is to determine which *discursive strategies* are used. Finally, “the linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens)” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44) are analysed. Krzyżanowski (2010: 81) uses these same three-dimensions but groups them into a two-stage analysis. The first stage, or “entry-level examination” is a thematic analysis where discourse topics are established and the second stage, or in-depth analysis, looks at argumentation (*topoi*) and other linguistic features.

In presenting DHA, Reisigl and Wodak (2001), present the role of analysis to answer five questions:

- How are persons named and referred to linguistically?
- What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?
- By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimise the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of others?
- From what perspective or point of view are these namings, attributions and arguments expressed?
- Are the respective discriminating utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified or are they mitigated?

To operationalise these questions, five types of discursive strategies are of interest and should be focussed on and will be used in the analytical chapters. Together the five

strategies can be implemented in creating positive self-representations and negative other-representations that are the bedrock of discriminatory and exclusionary discursive practices such as immigration control or integration policies.

*Referential and nominational strategies* are used to construct social actors (individuals, groups or institutions). They can be used to identify actors negatively purely through naming them, i.e. *nigger* or *kike*, and need no supplementary attributions. A number of the strategies indicated by Reisigl and Wodak are based on van Leeuwen's social-actors analysis (1996), which itself has foundations in Hallidayan SFL. Working within social semiotics (cf. Hodge and Kress 1988, Halliday 1978, Van Leeuwen 2005), van Leeuwen's Social Actors Analysis (1996: 32) is a taxonomy, or "sociosemantic inventory" for identifying the way that actors and actions are constructed in discourse. Van Leeuwen follows Halliday's view of the function of language and that language is a system of pragmatic options (van Leeuwen 1996: 36). Using this framework, representations of actors and processes are identified through the use of sociological categories. Their qualities, agency, role allocation and actions are indicated through for example, pronouns, actors' attributes, verbs and adjectives as well as via time, space and modality (van Leeuwen 1996). The options within van Leeuwen's representation of social actor's system include twenty-two strategies including: backgrounding and foregrounding, activation and passivisation, abstraction, nomination, inclusion and exclusion, aggregation, collectivisation and physical identification. Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 48-52) highlight a number of different strategies including:

- Somatisation (somatonyms)
  - Racialisations – *blacks, whites, slit-eyes*
  - Mental deficiency – *idiot*
  - Sexual orientation – *queer*
- Spatialisation (toponyms) – *Germany, England, Africa, London, the outside* and anthroponyms such as: *resident, inhabitant, community members*.<sup>48</sup>
- Actionalisation (actionyms). Van Leeuwen (1996: 54) calls this functionalisation, i.e. when actors are referred to in terms of an activity either through suffixes - *asy-*

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<sup>48</sup> Van Leeuwen (1996: 59) categorises somatisation and spatialisation as forms of objectivation which is when social actors "are represented by means of reference to a place or thing closely associated either with their person or with the activity they are represented as being engaged in".

*lum seekers criminals, workers, applicant* – or nouns formed from other nouns – *pi-anist*

- Explicit dissimilation (xenonyms) – *alien, others*
- De-spatialisation (de-toponymic athronyms) – *Englishman, southerner, Pole,*
- collectivisation (deictics and collectives) – *we, us, they, them, nation, the people, the community,*
- Culturalisation (ethnonyms, religionyms, linguonyms) – *Slavs, Muslims, English-speakers*
- Economisation (Econonyms) – *worker, the rich, the unemployed, guest worker, Communist*
- Politicisation (politonyms) – *the rich, upper class, Tories, right-wing extremists, government, voters, citizens, bogus refugees*
- Social Problematisation (crimonyms, pathologonyms) – *detainees, psycho*
- Relationalisation (relationyms) – *enemies, opponents, neighbour, friend.*<sup>49</sup>

Following Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 50), it should be remembered that these referential and nominational labels are based on synecdochisation which is “a specific feature, trait or characteristic is selectively pushed to the fore as a ‘part for the whole’, as a representative depicter”. As Reisigl and Wodak argue:

Because of the descriptive quality of such referential categorisations, linguistic identification is already related to strategic predication and thus very often involves evaluation. This is especially the case with exclusionary discourses or those that aim to separate the inside from the outside, i.e. the discourse of integration. Thus, once a social actor is constructed, *predicational strategies* are used to imbibe “evaluative attributions. (2001: 45)

Van Leeuwen (1996: 59) argues that in newspaper articles the outgroup (‘they’) tend to be categorised more than the ingroup (‘we’). Reisigl and Wodak also (2001: 45) note that referential strategies are specific types of predicational strategies because “referential identification very often already involves a denotatively as well as connotatively more or less deprecatory or appreciative labelling of the social actors”. This allows actors to be separated along binary, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, categorisations, or what van Leeu-

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<sup>49</sup>See Van Leeuwen (1996: 66) for a full systems network of the representation of social actors in discourse. See also Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 48-52) for a detailed presentation of referential strategies that they use and employ in the DHA.

wen (1996: 58) calls appraisalment. These are often representations of *inter alia*: difference, similarity, collectivity, unity, (social) cohesion and (social) exclusion. As well as this, metaphors are used to imbibe actors as possessing, or lacking, or being required to possess, certain qualities. These include:<sup>50</sup>

- Metaphors of spatio-dynamics – *fast, fast-moving, mobile, slow*. E.g. *He's a bit slow, that's why he never went to college*.
- Metaphors of tactility – *hard, soft*. E.g. *He's pretty hard, I wouldn't want to meet him in a dark ally*.
- Metaphors of audibility – *loud, quiet, ring, listen*. E.g. *UKIP's stance on immigration rings true with a lot of voters*.
- Metaphors of smell – *stinking*. E.g. *Jews are all stinking rich*
- Metaphors of material quality – *heavy, light, solid*. E.g. *Since the crisis, business has been solid*.

These metaphors are then ordered symbolically and evaluatively into a hierarchy or inside/outside construction. Others metaphors that are common in discourse of exclusion and inclusion are metaphors of:

- Natural disasters/weather – *storm tsunami, avalanche*. E.g. *The comedian's routine led to a tsunami of complaints from the public*.
- Water- *flow, flood, stream, tide*. E.g. *Britain is becoming flooded by migrants*.
- Fire – *sparks, flames*. E.g. *Large-scale migration from Central Europe has sparked protest in some neighbourhoods*.
- Thermostatics – *bubbling, heated*. E.g. *Tensions are at risk of bubbling over and becoming violent*.
- Plants/soil – *uprooted*. E.g. *The war has left many people uprooted from their homes*.
- Body – *heart, soul*. E.g. *Democracy is at the heart of British values*.
- Disease – *cancer, infection*. E.g. *Corruption and graft are cancers that must be eradicated*.

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<sup>50</sup> Examples are taken from Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 58-59).

- War – *invasions, attack*. E.g. *Every summer Lincolnshire is invaded by hordes of East Europeans looking for work in the fruit fields.*
- Container – *overcrowded, full-up*. E.g. *Britain is simply full. It cannot take in any more asylum seekers.*

Thirdly, *argumentation strategies* – topoi or argumentation schemes – should be analysed. Topoi serve to link discourses to one another and to give a text its coherence in that they function “by creating connections between utterances and areas of experience, bridging contradictions, generating plausibilities and acceptances” (Wodak 2001: 35). According to Krzyżanowski (2010: 85) topoi are viewed as “certain headings of arguments which, in a way, summarise the argument while also providing it with a necessary ‘skeleton’ which is fleshed over by respective discourse contents”. Within their work on New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 84) argue that topoi are used to persuade the listener and can be seen as “an indispensable arsenal on which a person wishing to persuade another will have to draw, whether he likes it or not”. Furthermore, topoi can be both universal or context and content dependent (cf. Kienpointner 1992, following Krzyżanowski 2010).<sup>51</sup> An alternative understanding of topoi comes from van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (1992: 96) pragma-dialectical approach which posits that topoi are “a more or less conventionalised way of representing the relation between what is stated in the argument and what is stated in the standpoint”. Topoi, then are “‘signals’ or ‘indications’ (or summaries) letting the interlocutors (including readers/audiences) know the aim of the argument” (Krzyżanowski 2010, 84). However, following Krzyżanowski (2010: 84), it is worth mentioning that within the discursive public sphere classic rules of rhetoric are ignored for strategic reasons and therefore “arguments may be expressed implicitly”. Thus, the aim of any analysis of topoi should be the links between topics and topoi, as well as how these topoi are linguistically rendered. There are a number of topoi that are common to discourses of exclusion and inclusion. These include:

- Topos of danger or threat – if there is a danger then something must be done to stop it, or alternatively, if a decision or action is dangerous, it should not be performed

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<sup>51</sup> See Krzyżanowski (2010: 83-87) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 69-80) for in-depth descriptions of argumentation strategies and topoi.

- Topos of burden - if a community or country is burdened by something/someone, then action must be taken to reduce the impact.
- Topos of cost/finances – if something costs too much, it should not be done.
- Topos of numbers – “if the numbers prove a specific topos, a specific action should be performed/not be carried out” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:79)
- Topos of authority – X is correct because A says it is correct
- Topos of history – because history has shown something to be wrong, it should not be allowed to happen again
- Topos of culture – because the culture of a given group has certain qualities, problems may arise
- Topos of law - if an action is not permitted by law, it should not be carried out.
- Topos of abuse –if a right is abused, then the right should be changed or people should be stopped from abusing it.

In order to show how topoi are employed in naturally existing texts, the following text, from the Daily Mail will be briefly analysed:

**IMMIGRATION IS HURTING US, SAY SIX OUT OF TEN BRITISH VOTERS:  
FEARS OVER IMPACT ON JOBS AND PUBLIC SERVICES**

Sixty per cent of the public believe immigration has damaged Britain, a major poll revealed last night.

The study, commissioned by former Tory treasurer Lord Ashcroft, **reveals widespread concern about the scale of immigration and its impact on jobs and public services...**

**...More than three-quarters of people (77 per cent) said they supported a ‘drastic’ reduction in immigration, saying it would make it easier for British people to find jobs and reduce the pressure on public services.** (Daily Mail 2013)

The first thing to recognise is that in naturally occurring discourse, several topoi may be employed and combined in one clause, sentence or paragraph. In the first paragraph, four topoi can be seen: Topos of danger, i.e. *immigration is hurting us*, the topos of numbers *six out of ten*, the topos of burden *fears over impact on jobs and public services*, and the topos of authority *British public* under which can be included *argumentum ad populum*, which is an argument based on an appeal “to the prejudiced emotions, opinions and convictions of a specific social group or to the vox populi instead of rele-

vant arguments” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 72). In subsequent paragraphs, the topoi of authority, numbers and burden are repeatedly combined, e.g. paragraph 5: *Many of the 20,000 people polled also reported direct experience of losing out to immigrants in the competition for a job or public services such as housing.* Elsewhere, in paragraph 3 there is a further example of the topos of authority but here through *argumentum ad vericundiam*, which is an appeal to a person in authority who is competent, superior or unimpeachable (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 72): The study, commissioned by former Tory treasurer Lord Ashcroft. Finally, in the last paragraph of the excerpt the topoi of numbers and burden are also employed: *More than three-quarters of people (77 per cent) said they supported a ‘drastic’ reduction in immigration, saying it would make it easier for British people to find jobs and reduce the pressure on public services.*

Elsewhere, van Leeuwen (2007) identifies legitimation as another form of argumentation strategy used to legitimise or de-legitimise a speaker, action or event. Van Leeuwen (2007: 92) highlights four categories of legitimation techniques:

- Authorisation – “reference to the authority, tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is invested”
- Moral Evaluation – reference to value systems
- Rationalisation – reference to “the goals and uses of institutionalized social action, and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity
- Mythopoesis – reference to narratives, the outcomes of which prove or justify that certain actions were legitimate

Although not used in my analysis, it is worth noting here Cap’s (2006, 2008, 2010a, 2010b) work which takes a slightly different approach to legitimation. By using an interdisciplinary approach that includes CDA and pragmatics, Cap has created and refined a proximization model to investigate how political actors legitimise actions that were subsequently proven to be based on false premises and assumptions. Following Chilton (2004), Cap (2010a: 57) argues that “people ‘position’ other entities in their ‘world’ by placing them in relation to themselves” along three axes: spatial, temporal and axiological. In much of his work he employs the model to analyse speeches of politicians, especially George Bush before and after the invasion of Iraq.

Returning briefly now to the categories of analysis, a fourth strategy to take into account is *perspectivisation, framing* or *discourse representation* through which the speaker(s) or author(s) indicate their involvement in a discourse. This is done via reporting, describing, narrating or quoting events or utterances (Wodak 2001b: 73). Finally *intensification and mitigation strategies* modify and qualify the strength of a proposition by altering the “illocutionary force” or perlocutionary effect of a text or utterance (Wodak 2001b: 73). This is linguistically realised through use of modal verbs, adverbs and adjectives.

Within the analysis conducted in chapters 7-9 all of the five categories of analysis will be considered but specific attention will be paid to the construction of social actors and how they are identified as either being included or excluded from certain groups (nation, city, community)/ Thus, throughout the analysis, the focus will be nomination and predication strategies as well as argumentation strategies (topoi and legitimation) and I refer to instances of *perspectivisation/framing* and *mitigation/intensification* only where necessary.

#### **4.3.4. The Discourse Historical Approach**

For the analysis of the empirical data (government policy, media texts and focus groups) the Discourse Historical Approach will be used. DHA was first forwarded by Wodak (2001b) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009; see also Wodak et al. 1999) and has since been used and moved forward by many others, primarily Krzyżanowski (2010, see also Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber 2007; Wodak and Weiss 2004).

According to Wodak (2001b: 65), DHA adheres to CDA’s use of critical theory and in her explanation of DHA she foregrounds the three dimensions of critique: Text or discourse immanent critique aims to uncover “inconsistencies, (self-) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures”. Secondly, in applying an unmasking, or socio-diagnostic, critique the aim is to demystify exposure of the- manifest or latent - possibly persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices” (2001b: 65). The critique thus goes beyond the textual and makes use of other knowledge of wider socio-political, economic and historical contexts. This also necessitates the inclusion of wider social theories and requires an inter-

disciplinary approach. Finally prognostic critique aims contributes to the transformation and improvement of communication. This may come in the form of, for example, policy briefings or guidelines for language use. DHA is therefore said to be problem-oriented (2001b: 69).

As with many CDA approaches, DHA takes discourse to be both as “socially constituted and constitutive” and as “a cluster of context dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action” (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 89). Discourses are made up of multiple texts that belong to specific semiotic types (Wodak 2001b: 66). Discourses and texts cannot be understood without reference to the other: “Whereas patterns and communalities or argumentation or themes are embedded in discourses, texts comprise a representation of discourse in a particular context and situation” (Krzyzanowski 2010: 76). Put another way, in a reworking of Johnstone’s (2002) heuristic for DA (cf. 4.1 above), we can claim that discourses are constituted by and constitutive of texts and texts are constituted by and constitutive of discourses.

The idea of discourse as social action as it is understood in DHA is similar to the idea of ‘fields of action’ (Bourdieu 1977; Girth 1996). Thus, discourses are not hermetically sealed but rather “are open and hybrid” (Wodak 2001b: 66). The distinction between different fields of action is a distinction based on the functional aims of a discursive practice. Fig 4.1 is an example provided by Wodak (2001b) and also used by Krzyzanowski (2010) to illustrate how fields of action link to text genres and discourses.




Figure 4.1: The Relationships between fields of action, genres and discourses in the field of politics (Wodak 2001: 68)

The figure shows the different types of text genre potentially found within each sub-field of action within a wider field of politics and how, taken together, these texts produce discourse topics. According to Wodak:

A 'discourse' about a specific topic can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through another one. Discourses and discourse topics 'spread' to different fields and discourses. They cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other or are in some other way socio-functionally linked with each other. (2001b: 67)

Another way in which texts and discourses are linked is through intertextuality and interdiscursivity (Fig 4.2). *Intertextuality* is the relationship between texts that come before or after a given text (cf. De Beaugrande and Dressler 1980). This may come in the form of direct or indirect reference to another text or by the use of the same narrative, argumentative, descriptive or instructive structures. *Intertextuality* on the other hand is the idea that discourses are connected both synchronically and diachronically (Krzyżanowski 2010: 77). Key to these two processes is *recontextualisation* (Bernstein 1990) whereby texts and discourses “move between spatially and temporally different contexts and are subject to transformations whose nature depends upon relationships and differences between such contexts” (Wodak and Fairclough 2010: 22). Recontextualisation is frequently the result of a ‘mixing’ of new recontextualised elements and older ones such as particular words, phrases, arguments or topoi (Wodak 2011b: 630)

Within DHA identifying intertextual and interdiscursive connections are seen as an important component of investigating the constructions of discriminatory discourses and it is these links that necessitate the ‘historical’ element of analysis in order to ascertain the sources of discourses.




Figure 4.2: Interdiscursive and intertextual relationships between discourses, discourse topics, genres and texts (Wodak 2001: 69).

As with other critically discursive approaches, another important element of DHA is the consideration of context. For Wodak (1996: 18), “it is not enough to analyse texts – one also needs to consider how texts are interpreted and received and what social effects texts have”. Within DHA four levels of context should be taken into account (Wodak 2000: 67):

- Language and text internal co-text.
- Intertextual and interdiscursive connections between utterances, texts, genres and discourses.
- Extralinguistic variables and “institutional frames of a specific `context of situation””.
- Wider socio-political and historical contexts in which discourses occur and are related to.

The first level is descriptive and focuses on linguistic analysis of texts and utterances based on categories of analysis (see Fig 4.3 below). The other three pertain to theories of context: level 2 is about theories of discourse; level 3 requires middle-range, or meso-, theories; and level 4 involves ‘grand theories’.




Figure 4.3: Levels of theories and linguistic analysis (Wodak 2001: 69)

To operationalise this understanding of context, the DHA employs a triangulatory approach to analysis of empirical data. Triangulation is used in the social sciences and especially in qualitative research, whereby “a variety or combination of research methods” (Rothbauer 2008: 893) are used in order to better understand and interpret the empirical data that is being studied. Indeed, for Cohen and Manion (2000: 254), it is “a powerful way of demonstrating concurrent validity”. Triangulation should, at least in theory, help researchers to “identify, explore, and understand different dimensions of the units of study, thereby strengthening their findings and enriching their interpretations” (Rothbauer 2008: 893). Cicourel (1974: 124) was one of the first proponents of triangulation and advocated a radical approach of “indefinite triangulation” which supposed that every reading of a text would result in a new interpretation. According to Denzin (1978: 301-310) there are four basic types of triangulation that researchers can incorporate into their work:

- Data triangulation – synchronic and diachronic analysis of the issue at hand.
- Investigator triangulation – when more than one researcher interprets the data.
- Theory triangulation – employing more than one theoretical approach when analysing data.
- Methodological triangulation – using more than one type of data i.e. combining ethnographies with interviews.

The last of the four types of triangulation is the one most commonly employed. One major strength of taking a triangulatory approach to analysis is that “where the different perspectives agree with one another, the interpretation is considered more credible” (Altrichter et al. 1993: 113). Triangulation, therefore, can add a robustness to analysis in the social sciences generally and, more specifically can be employed in the critical analysis of discourses in order to give weight to any findings. It is for this reason that serves a key role in the discourse historical approach to analysing discourses.

<b>DHA’s triangulatory approach to context (Reisigl and Wodak 2000)</b>	<b>Types of triangulation (Denzin 1978)</b>
Level 4: Broader socio-political and historical contexts	Data triangulation
Level 3: Extra-linguistic variables accounted for by use of middle-range theories	Theory triangulation
Level 2: intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between texts, genres and discourses.	Methodological triangulation
Level: Text-internal co-text	-

Figure 4.4: Parallels between the DHA and Denzin’s approach to triangulation

As well as the three parallels outlined in Fig. 4.4 above, Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 86) also argue that in order to produce as complete a picture as possible, a full DHA analysis would necessitate a number of researchers, given the multi-faceted approach and the amount of data and there have recently been a number of large scale (critical) linguistic investigations where, a number of researchers have cooperated. These include MEDIVA (Bennett et al. 2013, RASIM (Baker et al. 2008), and DYLAN (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2007; Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2011; Krzyżanowski and Forchtner 2012). This would then account for Denzin’s ‘investigator triangulation’.

In this sub-section, it has been shown how and why the DHA is the approach best suited to the empirical data to be analysed. Rather than drawing any further conclusion, as a way of summarising DHA, it is worth referring directly to what Wodak (2001b: 67-70) stresses are the key points of the discourse-historical CDA. These also reflect the principles of Critical Linguistics (cf. section 4.3.2 above).

- The approach is interdisciplinary.
- Interdisciplinarity is located on several levels: in theory, in the work itself, in teams, and in practice.
- The approach is problem oriented, not focused on specific linguistic items.

- The theory as well as the methodology is eclectic; that is theories and methods are integrated which are helpful in understanding and explaining the object under investigation.
- The study always incorporates fieldwork and ethnography to explore the object under investigation (study from the inside) as a precondition for any further analysis and theorizing
- The approach is abductive: a constant movement back and forth between theory and empirical data is necessary.
- Multiple genres and multiple public spaces are studied, and intertextual and inter-discursive relationships are investigated. Recontextualization is the most important process in connecting these genres as well as topics and arguments (topoi).
- The historical context is always analysed and integrated into the interpretation of discourses and texts.
- The categories and tools for the analysis are defined according to all these steps and procedures as well as to the specific problem under investigation.
- Grand theories serve as a foundation (see above). In the specific analysis, middle range theories serve the analytical aims better.
- Practice is the target. The results should be made available to experts in different fields and, as a second step, be applied with the goal of changing certain discursive and social practices.

#### **4.3.5. Critical Approaches to Discourse Studies outside CDA/CDS**

Although CDA is the most established critical approach to the study of language and discourse interaction, it is by no means the only one and there are other critical approaches to the study of discourse which should be elaborated on briefly in order to give as complete a picture as possible of the discipline.

The main approach to be touched on here the interest in social issues found within the paradigm of linguistic anthropology (LA). According to Blommaert et al. (2001) there are three main contrasting differences between CDA and LA. The first is that LA works ethnographically with face-to-face interaction and analysis whereas, according to the authors, CDA deals mainly with mass-communicated texts. Secondly,

CDA investigates “false consciousness and ideology-as-mystification” (Blommaert et al. 2001: 5) in contrast to LA in “the connection between language and social structure is not made a priori; rather, it is sought in the practical interplay between concrete actions and group- or society-level forces and patterns” (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 459). Thirdly, while CDA focuses on discourses of the powerful which lead to inequality, LA is more concerned with de-stigmatising the language of who are oppressed. Within LA studies have looked at language ideology (Silverstein 1996), the role of authority and hierarchy in genres (Gal and Woolard 1995) and inequalities of language minorities in a globalising world (Heller 1999). Other LA approaches to critical discourse include Slembrouck (2005) and Heller (2001) who use ethnographic research to investigate how local processes are linked to wider issues of social inequality.

Contrary to Blommaert et al. though, I see more similarities than differences between the two approaches and it is possible to counter Blommaert et al.’s assertions of the wide differences between LA and CDA. For example, Wodak and Meyer (2009) have noted that CDA, and the Discourse Historical Approach in particular, lends itself to ethnographical forms of data collection and can be used to study conversation.<sup>52</sup> It is also worth pointing out that Gal and Woolard’s (1995) work on genre, has similarities with Fairclough’s work on orders of discourse (1995).

Although LA approaches developed separately to CDA, because of their common ancestry they cannot be separated entirely from it in that all of these disciplines approach critical language analysis with roughly the same set of tools (pragmatics, SFL, cognitive-psychology, ethnography). The key purported methodological difference (a predilection for textual vs. conversational analysis) is more than anything a result of their separate genealogies in the US and Europe. Furthermore, to a certain extent the outcomes, that is to say a critique of social, economic and cultural inequalities via exposition of patterns of specific language use, are also similar.

Therefore, the need for some of these authors to separate themselves is, perhaps controversially, a minor case of the ‘narcissism of minor differences’. In other words, whether it is termed CDA or not, their work is a critical analysis of language and discourse. Indeed, some of their work can be open to the same criticisms of that levelled at

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<sup>52</sup> For ethnomethodological studies see Wodak 2009, Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber 2007, volume 8:4 (2011) of *Critical Discourse Studies - Critical discourse analysis and the ethnography of language policy*, 2011, Krzyżanowski 2011 and the output of the DYLAN project on discourse within EU institutions cf. Grin 2011).

CDA (such as political bias) this is especially the case with Blommaert and Versheueren (1999). This again may point to the problem of the formalisation of CDA and the boundaries that this necessarily creates which is addressed in section 4.3.5 below.

One problem which Blommaert et al (2001) do rightly highlight is that there is little dialogue between LA and CDA and this is perhaps evidenced by histories of DA and CDA written by (European) CDA practitioners (van Dijk 1985a, 2007; DeBeaugrande 2007, Reisigl and Wodak 2001) in which the critical side of LA is not touched upon at all, possibly in an attempt to highlight the success of CDA. This lack of apparent dialogue seems to be missed opportunity because it is clear from this section that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and rather, theoretically, seem to complement each other well one working from ‘top-down’ perspective of the issue, and the second from a ‘bottom-up’. For example, the critical approaches to discourse stemming from pragmatics and Halliday’s SFL are equally applicable to spoken as they are written discourse. Similarly some of the methodological approaches of ‘non-CDA critical discourse analysis’ may help to improve CDA and plug the gaps which leave it open to regular, if well rebuffed, criticism.

#### **4.3.6. Criticisms of CDA**

Throughout this chapter I have hinted and pointed to criticisms that are levelled against critical approaches to discourse analysis and I would like to expand on them here. I will point to three criticisms: firstly that CDA is overtly political, secondly that it ignores certain approaches, thirdly that methodology is unclear or unsound and finally that CDA is at risk of ceasing to be critical. The first three can, I think, be refuted relatively easily but the fourth criticism or observation is more troubling.

A common criticism of CDA is that it is not objective enough. Widdowson (1995) argues that it is too ideologically motivated, in that it looks for problems first, its aim to change the status quo societal inequalities, and therefore is not real analysis. Stemming from this initial selection of problems, the second failing of CDA, he argues is that data is then selected or ‘cherry picked’ which will back up initial hypotheses and interpretations of social issues (Widdowson 1995). Schegloff (1997: 180) has simultaneously defended Conversation analysis and criticised CDA by stating that CA takes an empirical approach to data that focuses on the “understandings of participants” rather

than wider assertions that may be the result of critical analyses. Schlegloff's main issue with CDA is that of context. As a conversation analyst, he believes that only the local construction of interaction is relevant and only what is explicitly mentioned (via speech) should be analysed. Including anything else in the analysis, would mean that CDA is merely ideological inferencing and thus methodologically unsound (Meyer 2001). In turn, Billig (1999: 543) has defended CDA from Schegloff's criticism by arguing that CA itself has an ideological position and "habitually deploys a rhetoric that conveys a contestable view of social order".<sup>53</sup>

There is also a general criticism within mainstream academia that critical approaches are politically biased. In response to this, though, Billig (2003) writes that non-critical approaches to language are also ideological themselves because they have the choice to take a critical or non-critical approach. He writes that this precludes social critique. Furthermore, by favouring non-critical approaches and holding them up as in some way more valid than critical ones, social critique is denied or at the very least not promoted and this contributes to the maintenance of existing power relations. Similarly, DeBeaugrande (1997: 45) argues that "language guardians" in academia who say that critical discourse analysis is not improving an understanding of language, is actually just legitimizing their own power within the field as well as power within society. The reality is that all sciences and academic fields are in some way ideological. The difference is that CDA is explicit about its political position rather than attempting to hide behind fig leaves of 'truth' and objectivity.

Previously, Chilton (2007) has also criticised CDA for only selectively incorporating other disciplines within linguistics. For Chilton, CDA's failure to deal with generative syntax or cognitive linguistics means that it has not advanced our understanding of language faculty. This though is an outdated criticism given the cognitive research within critical discourse by, for example Hart's (2008) work on CDA and conceptual metaphor theory, Koller's (2005) on social cognition in business media discourse and Fabiszak's (2010c) on vilification of enemy 'others'. Likewise, Chilton's criticism ignores the cognitive and psychological bases for van Dijk's work on understanding and text comprehension (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) and the socio-cognitive approach (1984).<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> See also Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000).

<sup>54</sup> See Wodak (2006a) for an in-depth investigation on cognitive approaches in CDA.

Chilton also argues that although CDA researchers have helped to indicate category formation and the power of stereotypes, racism still exists (Chilton 2003). Chilton points to Sperber's work (2000) on theory of the mind as a way of explaining why there is an uptake in certain discourse by people. Again, he seems to be criticising CDA for the wrong reasons. The reason of why people are, for example, racist is not a primary concern of CDA which rather concentrates on the how. Also, the functioning of society is not purely based on language faculty and the social context has an impact on language use. If CDA were to look solely at cognitive or psychological motives behind language use, it would cease to be CDA.

CDA is sometimes further condemned for its interdisciplinarity (Chilton 2003). As mentioned previously in this chapter, an interdisciplinary approach is required because of the complex nature of social issues under analysis. More than this though, Billig (2003: 40) retorts that CDA is necessarily interdisciplinary because it cannot or will not accept "the rigid structure of the approaches which it criticises". A further methodological issue, as forwarded by Widdowson (2004), is that within CDA there is often a very unclear demarcation between text and discourse. However, as argued at the beginning of the chapter, and throughout, there are different approaches to discourse and text within DA and CDA. CDA should not be regarded as monolithic theory but varied range of approaches who happen to share a programmatic coherence and as such, when criticising the usage of certain terms, the critique should be explicitly directed to individual researchers rather than CDA in general.

The final criticism of CDA is that it has ceased to be critical, or is at risk of being so because it has become so successful. CDA is now an established academic discipline and as such is situated largely within mainstream academia. It has 'branded' itself via books, grants, conferences, publishes via journals for which expensive subscriptions must be paid and has used market discourse to do so (Billig 2003). Billig points to the importance of the capitalisation of 'CDA' as part of this branding. For Billig, the emergence of CDA has to be looked at in the context of this marketisation: It has become successful and this involves "capturing resources and markets occupied by the main discourse" that it often critiques (2003: 41). Given this situation, practitioners need to be aware of their own language and need to step outside of their work. CDA needs to be reflective and self-critical, something that critiques of the discipline help to foster (Wodak and Meyer 2009). In response to this, Fairclough and Chouliaraki (1999) explain that the establishment of CDA does not mean that it is part of mainstream academia but

merely that its terms and approaches are being used in the social sciences. One way to step back from this risk of the un-critical CDA, is to revert back to the use of pronouns and lower case letters: ‘the critical analysis of discourse’. Such a move allows the analysts to maintain their critical approach without risking it becoming part of the establishment.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

This chapter was an attempt to map the field of Discourse Analysis and more importantly for this thesis to fully explain the motivation, concepts, and approaches within the critical study of discourse. I first defined DA and explained the American and European sides of its family tree. In later sections, I described the aims and objectives of CDA/CDS and explained certain key facets of the approach including context, the hermeneutic nature of CDA, ‘the critical’, ideology, power and knowledge. I then pointed to major approaches to critically analysing discourse and some methodological issues of research and data collection. After this I explained, in depth, my categories of analysis and the Discourse Historical Approach. In later sections I looked at critical approaches to discourses outside CDA tried to refute a number of criticisms commonly directed to CDA/CDS.

It is clear from this chapter in which sphere of linguistics this thesis is situated, in as well as how the empirical analysis will be approached. CDA is still a relatively new way of tackling discourse, and it does receive ample criticism. However, it seems to be the best approach to understanding how migrant integration is discursively constructed in the UK public sphere. Furthermore, by uncovering how this discourse is produced, and disseminating that work as widely as possible, the status quo of unequal social relations will hopefully be challenged.

## **Chapter 5: Immigration and integration in post-war UK: Historical and socio-political contexts**

During New Labour's time in power, under both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, the UK witnessed significant demographic changes with regards to both immigration and ethnic diversity. In those 13 years from 1997 to 2010, the UK saw sharp rises not just in the numbers of people coming to the UK and ethnic diversity (stemming not just from immigration but also population rises in minority ethnic groups) but also in those becoming naturalised British subjects. Demographics alone do not tell the whole picture though and within the period there were also a number of trigger events and processes - at micro (local), meso (national) and macro (supranational) levels - which also influenced the tone of the debate surrounding integration. Combined together, these changes led to, and in many cases resulted from, shifts in government policy and social attitudes on the subject. As such, a complete understanding of the wider context discursive construction of integration within the UK public sphere requires a broad, if compact, exploration of the relevant socio-political landscape during the New Labour years, and indeed prior to that, in order to comprehend the historical roots of the discourse.

On the one hand, then this chapter moves the thesis from the abstract to the concrete. From theory to practice. From the page to the street. From discourse to action. But on the other hand, as argued in the methodological chapter before, discourse is a form of action and the two cannot be separated. When we speak of policy or mediatised reports that influenced government decisions we are talking about the discursively constitutive and constituted nature of society. With this very much as the predominant, overarching, theoretical approach to the thesis in mind, although running as it were 'in the background' the chapter looks to set the scene for the three analytical chapters. As well as providing a more national level analysis, the chapter will thoroughly consider the local

context for two reasons: firstly because of the way that integration policy and practice is operationalised at a diffuse, local level. That is the responsibility for integration of incoming non-nationals lies at the local authority level, despite a top-down approach to policy formation. Secondly an understanding of demographic and socio-political changes in Brighton and Hove will allow for a more informed reading of the analysis of parts of the second analytical chapter (Newspaper articles, including the Brighton Argus) and the third analytical chapter which looks at the results of focus groups with those who have come to Brighton and settled. The first section (5.1) looks at the demographic changes and trends that have occurred since the end of World War Two at a national and local level. The chapter moves on in 5.2 to a brief summary of immigration and integration policies and an explanation of the two as increasingly politicised, and mediatised, issues. Finally, 5.3 will consider some wider meso and macro processes in which the discursive construction of integration in the public sphere is embedded.

### **5.1. A history of immigration and integration**

Painting a reliable, faithful picture of integration, from a statistical perspective at least, is a difficult venture; some might even be tempted to label it a fool's errand. Castles et al. (2002: ii) argue that there is "a serious lack of data and other factual knowledge about integration and how to measure it". That this is the case is down to, I would argue, four key factors. The first is that, historically, border control has been separated from internal ethnic diversity (Favell 2001: 201). This is due to the fact that unlike other EU countries, post-war immigration policy in the UK is based not on control of aliens but on the question of nationality and defining who is or who is not a British citizen (Cerna and Wietholz 2001: 196). Secondly this has in turn led to the institutional and policy separation of immigration from internal race relations. Cerna and Wietholz (2001: 234) argue that terminologically the two are separate but, as will be argued in the analytical chapters, discursively they are very much connected. Thirdly there are also differing policies and institutional responsibilities for different categories of migrants (refugees, asylum seekers, EU, students, economic migrants). Fourthly, and linked to this, it is unclear where integration sits within the institutional framework in the sense of national strategies for immigration (of some categories but not others) and cohesion, but the responsibility for application of these policies are at a very local level and are under-

taken by local authorities and by the “shadow state” of NGOs and RCOs (Cerna and Wietholz 2001: 232). This is in line with the government discourse that integration occurs at a local level. Thus there is a national strategy for refugee integration that is integrated locally, but there is no similar national strategy for the integration of economic migrants from either inside or outside the EU and local authorities are expected to manage inward migration and local cohesion. The picture has also been further complicated by Scottish devolution: Border control is a reserved power that remains with the UK government in Westminster, but integration is a devolved power which leads to differing policies on integration. Collectively these institutional factors make explaining integration problematic. The conceptual (and latter institutional) separation of immigration and ethnicity has led, albeit indirectly, to an issue of definition, i.e. what constitutes integration and who is required to integrate (this has been explained in greater detail in Chapter 3). Following from this, the institutional and policy separation means that official data collection (nationally and locally) is haphazard. There are no specific official indicators of integration and instead, measurements of social inclusion (such as access of services) and quality of life indicators become a “proxy for integration” measurement (Somerville 2007: 171-175). According to Somerville the only target that can be assessed is that of community cohesion which the Home Office claimed was likely met in 2006. The issue with this is that the statistics are based on ethnicity not nationality and so migrants are not visible in the statistics as migrants. Thus, while community cohesion overall may have been met, they have probably not been met for migrants. Furthermore, as Somerville points out, Asylum seekers do not fit into social inclusion indicators (consumption, production and political and social engagement). On top of this there are of course literally countless undocumented migrants in the UK, both from the EU and TCNs, who do not exist in official statistics based on census results, service use and national insurance registration.

In order, then, to understand the wider context of integration we need to reunite it with immigration. That is, to comprehend the discourse of integration we need to look at the history of immigration and governmental responses to it. In the subsections below I will outline the history of immigration into the UK at a national (5.1.1) and local level (5.1.2)

### 5.1.1. The national picture: UK Immigration and integration trends

Since the Second World War Britain has seen a rise in its overall population of approximately 30% from just over 50 million in 1951 to 64 million in 2011. Along with other socio-demographic factors such as an ageing population and better health care, just over 5million of this rise can be accounted for by an increase in the foreign born population. The foreign born population itself has increased by approximately 3.5x from 2.1 million (4.2% of the total population) to 7.5 million which accounts for 13% of the overall population. Within that period there were two major phases of immigration and these major rises can be seen in the statistics (cf. Table 5.1 and Fig 5.1 below). The first is the rise in the foreign born population in the 1960s, which coincides with the first big phase of immigration from the West Indies and other ‘new colonies’. The second, and more pronounced, is the spike in the foreign born population in the first decade of the twenty first century, which was also Labour’s time in government and the ten years surveyed in this thesis.

Year	Population of the United Kingdom	Percentage increase in total population over previous decade	Foreign Born Population	Percentage increase in foreign born population over previous decade	Foreign Born population as a percentage of total population
1951	50,200,000		2,118,600		4.2
1961	52,700,000	5.0	2,573,500	21.5	4.9
1971	55,900,000	6.1	3,190,300	24.5	5.8
1981	56,400,000	0.9	3,429,100	7.5	6.2
1991	57,400,000	1.8	3,835,400	11.8	6.7
2001	59,100,000	3.0	4,896,600	27.7	8.3
2011	64,100,000	8.5	7,505,000	53.3	13

Table 5.1: Total population and foreign born population of the United Kingdom 1951-2011 (after ONS 2012a; Rendall and Salt 2005)

That decade saw an increase in the foreign born population to 7.5million which now accounts for 13% of the population. This period witnessed large numbers of immigration from the EU after accession of 8 states in 2004 and a further two in 2007.




Figure 5.1: Total population and foreign born population of the United Kingdom 1951-201 (ONS: 2012a, Rendall and Salt: 2005)

1951		1961		1971		1981	
Ireland	492	Ireland	683	Ireland	676	Ireland	580
Poland	152	India	157	India	313	India	383
India	111	Germany	121	Jamaica	171	Pakistan	182
Germany	96	Poland	120	Germany	148	Germany	170
Russia	76	Jamaica	100	Pakistan	136	Jamaica	164
USA	59	USA	94	Poland	104	USA	106
Canada	46	Italy	81	Italy	103	Kenya	100
Italy	33	Russia	53	USA	100	Italy	93
Australia	31	Canada	49	Cyprus	72	Poland	88
France	30	Cyprus	42	Kenya	58	Cyprus	83
1991		2001		2011			
Ireland	570	Ireland	473	India	694		
India	400	India	456	Poland	579		
Pakistan	225	Pakistan	308	Pakistan	482		
Germany	202	Germany	244	Ireland	407		
Jamaica	142	Bangladesh	153	Germany	274		
USA	131	Jamaica	146	Bangladesh	212		
Kenya	111	USA	144	Nigeria	191		
Bangladesh	104	South Africa	132	South Africa	191		
Italy	87	Kenya	127	USA	177		
Cyprus	77	Italy	102	Jamaica	160		

Table 5.2: Top ten countries of birth (000s) (after ONS 2012a)

As well as the total foreign born population rising considerably, the diversity within this group has also risen. 50% of the foreign born population now comes from EU countries (ONS 2013a). In 1951 the top ten non-UK countries of birth accounted for 60% of the total foreign born population (ONS 2013b) but in 2011 this had fallen to just 45%. As table 5.2 (above) indicates there are a number of stable foreign born populations such as Germany, the USA, India, Jamaica and Ireland. As of the 1980s Pakistan and Kenya also feature and in the 1990s Bangladesh appears and remains in the top ten. The presence of Polish-born residents in the 1950s was because of large numbers of migrants arriving during the Second World War. Over time, this population declined slowly until 2011. In the period between censuses covering accession to the EU (2001-2011) the Polish population rose from 58,000 to 579,000, a ten-fold increase.

The foreign born population statistics can be useful because they indicate those people coming to the UK who may have needs concerning integration. However, they by no means show the whole picture because they do not take into account nationality. Therefore they include British citizens born abroad as well as people who have settled in the UK and become naturalised citizens. Thus to draw more complete opinions, immigration, which is obviously very much connected to the foreign born population figures, also needs to be looked at.

The immigration statistics below (table 5.3) clearly show that the long term trend has been an upwards one. In the fifteen years to 1992, migration nearly doubled to 315,000 but this was offset by 238,000 people leaving. However, the real boom came in the late 1990s and rose sharply again in 2004. For last decade, immigration has been over half a million per year. Over the period, emigration rates have also risen but they are now long since outnumbered by immigration and thus, in the period 2000 to 2010, the UK saw net migration of between 179,000 and 268,000 although there was a considerable drop off in 2008 and 2009 which coincided with the global financial crisis.

Throughout the period of New Labour's time in office (1997-2010), and even the decade preceding it, asylum was major political issue (see section 5.2.2 below for more detail). However, although it was portrayed as a major source of migration into the UK, the statistics (Table 5.4, below) indicate that for much of Labour's time in power asylum applications were actually proportionally low.

Year	Immigration	Emigration	Net migration	Year	Immigration	Emigration	Net migration
1977	162,000	208,000	- 46,000	1995	312,000	236,000	76,000
1978	187,000	192,000	- 5,000	1996	318,000	264,000	55,000
1979	195,000	189,000	6,000	1997	327,000	279,000	48,000
1980	173,000	228,000	- 55,000	1998	391,000	251,000	140,000
1981	153,000	232,000	- 59,000	1999	454,000	291,000	163,000
1982	201,000	257,000	- 56,000	2000	479,000	321,000	158,000
1983	202,000	184,000	17,000	2001	481,000	309,000	179,000
1984	201,000	164,000	37,000	2002	516,000	363,000	172,000
1985	232,000	174,000	58,000	2003	511,000	363,000	185,000
1986	250,000	213,000	37,000	2004	589,000	344,000	268,000
1987	211,000	209,000	2,000	2005	567,000	361,000	267,000
1988	216,000	237,000	- 21,000	2006	596,000	398,000	265,000
1989	250,000	205,000	44,000	2007	574,000	341,000	273,000
1990	267,000	231,000	36,000	2008	590,000	427,000	229,000
1991	329,000	285,000	44,000	2009	567,000	368,000	229,000
1992	268,000	281,000	- 13,000	2010	591,000	339,000	256,000
1993	266,000	266,000	0	2011	566,000	351,000	205,000
1994	315,000	238,000	77,000	2012	498,000	321,000	177,000

Table 5.3: Immigration and Emigration 1977-2012 (after ONS 2014a)<sup>55</sup>

Year	Asylum Applications	Year	Asylum Applications
1992	24,605	2003	49,407
1993	22,370	2004	33,960
1994	32,830	2005	25,712
1995	43,965	2006	23,608
1996	29,640	2007	23,431
1997	32,500	2008	25,932
1998	46,015	2009	24,487
1999	71,160	2010	17,916
2000	80,315	2011	19,865
2001	71,027	2012	21,843
2002	84,132		

Table 5.4: Asylum applications 1992-2012 (after Blinder 2014)

Applications remained low until 1998, then spiked sharply to a peak of just over 84,000 in 2002, after which applications initially fell steeply and then continued to fall. Given the trend, then it would appear that there must have been other reasons for the government's policy and discursive focus on asylum.

<sup>55</sup> An immigrant is defined as someone staying in the country for 12 months or more. The statistics include: EU and non-EU citizens, asylum seekers, refugees and long-term foreign students.

The final statistic that may be of some use for integration purposes is the number of citizenship applications. If, as the government argues in the discourse, citizenship is the final stage in formal integration in to UK life – after having passed language and knowledge of the UK tests – then a higher rate of citizenship applications granted may point to more people wanting to integrate. As can be seen from fig 5.2 (below) successful applications more than quadrupled in the 15 years from 1995 to 2010. The five year average (2006-2010) was 169,373. With the introduction of Life in the UK and ESOL requirements, as well as increased fees in 2004, there might have been an expectation of fall in applications. Research conducted by Binder (2013: 4-8) suggests that this has not been the case but that the new requirements place added pressure on applicants from poorer, less educated and non-English speaking countries and so may deterred applications from these places. Blinder found that refusals for citizenship have actually fallen in the period 2005-2012 (from 9.3% to 3.5%). 37% of those applications were refused on grounds of “good character” – essentially if an applicant has a criminal record. Overall, Binder argues that the increased acceptance rate and reduced refusal rate are both down to new application checking services.

There are three caveats to the basic hypothesis above that, given the rise long-term immigration over the last thirty years, a concomitant proportional rise in citizenship applications would be expected. Firstly, there is of course a long time-lag between immigration and completing the naturalisation process. Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that a large proportion of the increase in immigration comes from EU states, citizens of which are afforded a large number of rights (work, access to services/benefits) and so a majority of these may choose to live or even settle permanently in the UK without feeling the recourse to apply for British citizenship. This is evidenced by the fact that the largest groups of newly naturalised citizens in 2012 were previously foreign nationals of India, Pakistan, Nigeria and South Africa and not EU states such as Poland, Ireland and Germany (Blinder 2013: 4).

Thirdly, and connected to this, applications for citizenship may be motivated by factors other than a sense of belonging or attachment and can sometimes be instrumental such as the advantages afforded by possession of a British passport (visas, consular protection).




Figure 5.2: Successful citizenship applications, 1962-2012 (after Blinder 2013)<sup>56</sup>




Figure 5.3: Immigration and asylum 1992-2012 (after Binder 2014; ONS 2014b)

By way of a brief comparison Fig 5.3 (above) indicates trends in overall immigration, asylum applications and grants of citizenship over the last twenty years. The first trend of note is that whilst total immigration and asylum applications rose for the first ten years (1992-2002), after this time immigration continued to rise (especially

<sup>56</sup> Qualifications for citizenship include residence (53% of applications in 2012), marriage (20%) and minors (24%) (Binder 2013: 4)

after A8 accession in 2004) whereas asylum applications fell and remain historically low. Despite this, asylum criteria were regularly legislated on for during the 2000's. The second trend is the continued rise in citizenship despite the most recent fall in overall immigration to the UK.

### **5.1.2. The local picture: Immigration and integration in Brighton and Hove**

Whilst the national picture is vital in understanding governmental policy, it is also important to understand the local migration and integration context of Brighton and Hove as the geographical focus of the focus groups and the site of data collection for local print media.

Brighton is a diverse city and its official online profile foregrounds this openness and diversity (Visit Brighton 2014). Anecdotal evidence indicates that the heart of the city's attraction for residents and newcomers alike is its tolerance and this was borne out in the focus groups' responses (see Chapter 9). Petridis (2010) writes that "there's definitely a sense that Brighton is a city in which it would take an almost superhuman effort to be misfit: it seems capable of assimilating anybody...No one group has the upper hand". This tolerance and openness is indicated by, and stems in part from, the large LGBTQ population in the city. However, this openness has not translated into a strong sense of belonging to a neighbourhood community. In research carried out by the city council, just 58% of respondents felt that they belonged to their immediate neighbourhood whilst three quarters replied that they could call for help from a friend or neighbour. Nationally, these figures were 66% and 90%. Thus, while there is openness and widespread acceptance of difference in the city, there is much less of a sense of community.

The city's ethnic minority population has risen considerably since 2001. In that year, black and minority ethnic (BME) groups accounted for 5.7% of the population. This was lower than average for small cities and much lower than the average for England as a whole (9.1%) (Oxford Consultants 2007: 15, Brighton and Hove City Council 2002). In 2011 this population had risen to 19.5% (53,351 people). Overall, this is in line with the English average of 20.2% (Brighton and Hove City Council 2012: 4). As such the non-white British population in Brighton rose more quickly than it did nationally. As can be expected, the ethnicity of those populations also changed. In 2001 Indi-

ans made up the largest BME proportion, followed by Black Africans, Chinese and Bangladeshi (Oxford Consultants 2007: 16). By 2011 the largest ethnic group was Other White which was 7.1% of the total population and 36.6% of the BME population (Brighton and Hove 2012: 4). 6.4% (17,416) of residents were born in EU and of this, 5,609 were born A8 or A10 accession states. According to Oxford consultants (2007: 64) “the growing diversity of the city presents a number of key social cohesion and inclusion challenges...one of the biggest issues relates to language barriers”. To this end Sussex Interpreting Services (SIS) provided nearly 11,000 interpretations for 2,500 separate users in 47 languages in 2012/13 (BMECP 2013: 19).

The migration profile in Brighton and Hove is primarily made up of migrant workers (from the EU and outside) and also from a large student population. The city has two large universities and is a centre for ESOL schools. In 2010 there were an estimated 35,000 English language students (Brighton and Hove City Council 2011: 7) and overall about one third of all students in the city were from an ethnic minority background. According to Brighton and Hove City Council, estimating the city’s migrant and refugee population is difficult. There are between 4,000 and 5,000 members of Sudanese communities (both Coptic Christian and Muslim) who arrived in the 1990s and became citizens (Brighton and Hove City Council 2011: 7) The groups each have their own community organisations as does the large Chinese community and the Polish community, which also has two Polish cultural centres and schools. With regards to asylum seekers, in 2007, 12 people were being housed by the Borders and Immigration Agency. There were a further 50 receiving subsistence only assistance from the agency, 22 unaccompanied children and 29 unaccompanied care leavers aged 18-21 (Oxford Consultants 2007: 49). In 2011 there were none that were placed by the national government but there were a small number that were either unaccompanied or being housed by other service such as the NHS Community Mental Health Team or the Young Asylum Team. Many of the adult asylum seekers were from Iran, and their applications were based on either their religion or sexuality. Though there is no organised Iranian community group, members to meet regularly at the Black and Ethnic Minority Community Partnership centre, primarily to get assistance with their applications and other support. Furthermore, Brighton and Hove has an active third sector with many NGOs and RCOs so while ethnic communities and non-British born individuals, including asylum seekers and migrants, may not be part of an organised community, there is still support on offer.

Finally, because of their presence in the field work for this thesis, it is worth focussing briefly on the small Ethiopian community and the uniqueness of their arrival. In October 2006, 79 refugees were resettled in Brighton and Hove. A majority of them (56) came from the Oromo ethnic group, 10 were Amhara and 13 were unrecorded. They came to the UK under the Gateway Protection Programme, which was introduced in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002). The programme was set up to facilitate acceptance of Britain's quota of UN refugees. The quota was set at 500 per annum on top of and separate from regular applications through the asylum system and stipulated that between 50-100 refugees would be resettled within one local authority (Collyer and de Guerre 2007: 16-17). The refugees had previously lived in the Kakuma refugee camp outside Nairobi in Kenya and selections were made on the basis of referrals from the UNHCR after an interview with UK officials and medical exam. Prior to departure they undertook an orientation programme based on life in the UK and the specificity of the area, for example the large LGBTQ population in the city. They were given Indefinite Leave to Remain on arrival and many have now taken British citizenship after completing the period of residency. Unlike asylum seekers, the Ethiopians were given resettlement support from local authorities including three full-time case workers for the first year (Collyer and de Guerre 2007: 39). They were also provided with ESOL lessons and informal support from NGO's such as the Time Bank refugee mentoring scheme administered by another local NGO, MACS (Money Advice and Community Support). Over the first year, the case workers tried to reduce dependency but this was difficult because of understandings of norms and systems. There was also an issue of managing expectations, specifically with regards to housing and employment. As of late 2007, the Ethiopian refugees had had limited success in gaining employment. Of the forty aged 18 to 37, only two had found jobs. However, as time went by, many more of them found work and all of the focus group respondents were working, albeit in low paid unskilled jobs. There were also other issues such as divorces, which in turn caused further housing issues, and depression caused by family situations, and a general inability to settle and acclimatise. This led to at least one suicide within the group.

This section has attempted to provide an overview of recent and historical trends in immigration and integration at both a national and local level. Within the UK and in Brighton there has been an increase in inward migration and a similar rise in the foreign-born population. As well as this, the diversity of non-British residents has also in-

creased. In line with, but not necessarily directly related to this, successful citizenship applications have risen but one statistic that has bucked this upward trend is the fall in asylum applications. In the following section the political and policy framework surrounding integration will be explained in order to contextualise these rather bare figures and trends.

## **5.2. Immigration and integration as political and politicised issues**

Up until Blair came to power in 1997 it is arguable that there existed a path dependency with regards to immigration and race relations for the best part of fifty years. According to Favell (2001: 201) in the post war era race relations and the control of immigration were “reasonable medium-term solutions” to diversity in the UK. There was a definite consensus on the two subjects that led to a depoliticisation of the topic of immigration that took it away from “the centre of political debate”. Indeed, there is one overriding leitmotif in successive governments’ approaches to immigration and integration and that is control, and with it an obsession with numbers. According to Favell (2001: 202), there remains today a “pathological focus of British border control in extremis. It is this control that is, of course, the external frame and guarantee of all that is positive and progressive about internal British race relations and multiculturalism”. Immigration control was linked to race relations and reductions were, and still are, rhetorically justified on helping race relations and integration (Cerna and Wietholz 2011: 219). Thus the policies have historically been paternalistic in the sense that immigration controls are constructed as being ‘for the good of’ minorities and that their well being is dependent upon fewer people entering. The logic and discourse of control also implies that racism comes from too much diversity and follows the line of argument that if there is less immigration there will be less racism. Elsewhere, Kundnani (2002) has criticised the victim blaming that occurred after the troubles in northern cities in 2001 whereby ethnic segregation in Oldham and Burnley were seen as causes, rather than the results, of racism. The focus on control, as well as consistent warnings of ‘swamping’ and a loss of British identity follow the discourse found in the 1990s in France based on a ‘seuil de tolerance’. Furthermore, as Favell argues, such an approach to immigration control, based on race/ethnicity, ignores how this very control is experienced by minorities already in the UK. i.e. the control of family reunions, treatment of similar groups and the

discourse of security lead to suspicion which in turn leads to a breakdown in understanding of the idea of multiculturalism (Favell 2001: 203). In 5.2.1 below it will be shown how immigration policy and the politics of immigration have evolved over the last century and in 5.2.2 the period of Labour's time in government will be explored in more detail.

### **5.2.1. The Twentieth Century: Shadows and forewarnings**

Up until the late nineteenth century there were no restrictions on immigration and on the contrary there was a need for labour repopulation as many had left to forge new lives throughout the Empire. In the first years of the twentieth century though, this changed when there were economic problems and high unemployment. In 1905 the government introduced the Aliens act, which was aimed at reducing the numbers of steerage class passengers on immigration ships, i.e. those who would have trouble supporting themselves financially (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 52). At the time this was seen as targeting certain groups - Poles and Russians - but it also indicates the roots of other immigration policies under Blair's Labour that prioritise self sufficiency and welcome high earners. Thus, the elitism of immigration policy has remained. In the 1910s and 1920s numbers of Jewish asylum seekers were limited in an attempt to appease rising anti-Semitism in the UK and the government only allowed Jews whom the pre-existing Jewish community agreed to help. These restrictions were only relaxed in 1938 for political reasons as way of trying to separate the UK from Germany. According to Schuster and Solomos (1999), the post-war treatment of Jews (grants of asylum) fed the myth of British decency and liberal traditions and in many immigration and integration policy documents produced under New Labour were often supported discursively by a topos of tradition and British values of helping those in need. This 'sanitises' and erases from public memory Britain's history of anti-Semitism and other forms of racism (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 56).

Immigration policy in the immediate post-war period was influenced by four factors: the cold war, the break-up of the Empire, the development of the welfare state and labour shortages (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 57). Asylum was allowed, and even encouraged from an ideological perspective, from Soviet bloc countries and immigration was also encouraged from new colonies, especially West Africa, India and the Car-

ibbean to fill gaps in the labour market in construction, transport and the burgeoning welfare state. This was enabled by the 1948 British Nationality Act which gave British citizenship to every member of the Commonwealth. Publically there was resistance from the trade unions that immigration was putting pressure on wages and by the end of the 1950s there was political pressure to reduce immigration. Politically this left the Labour party in a difficult position, one that they have still yet to fully get a grip on. On the one hand it was the traditional party of the working classes but on the other hand, Labour was the party that championed race equality and progressive politics.

The major turning points on race relations and immigration came in the 1960s. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act restricted the immigration of commonwealth passport holders, except UK passport holders. Commonwealth migrants were now allowed entry if they had been awarded an employment voucher and these were given to skilled migrants (just as Labour immigration policy 1997-2010 prioritised skilled labour). Although the act led to a reduction in immigration it did not, in the public's eyes do enough. Many opponents of the bill lost their parliamentary seats at the 1964 and in 1967 (National Archives 2014). In 1966, Roy Jenkins 1967: 267), the then Home Secretary laid out what he saw as the ideal integration of migrants "not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance". In 1967, Asians from Kenya and Uganda, who had retained their British citizenship after independence, arrived in the UK fleeing discrimination in their own countries. This led in part to Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of blood' speech where he warned of the dangers of unfettered immigration and it also led to a tightening of immigration controls. The 1968 Commonwealth immigration act marked a split in legislation as it began to define immigration along racial lines in that it extended the 1962 act to all citizens who did not have a parent or grandparent who was born in the UK or was a UK citizen. This racial basis of immigration policy was further enhanced by the 1971 Immigration Act which made all labour immigration temporary but which exempted 'Patrials' i.e. those with close ties to the UK such as white South Africans, Australians and New Zealanders (National Archives 2014). Asylum though was still allowed, especially in the 1970s and again on ideological grounds such as Chileans fleeing the Allende government and Vietnamese boat people (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 59). The 1971 act also gave the Home Secretary rule making powers over immigration regulations and since then regular changes have been made and further restrictions con-

tinue to be introduced surreptitiously, often without even a press release (Somerville 2007: 29).

Thatcher's time in government was marked by further immigration control and such controls were seen as electorally useful. Whilst in opposition, Thatcher had frequently used immigration "to mobilize a fear of 'being swamped by people of a different culture'" and a threat to social and cultural unity (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 59). Again here it is very clear how immigration is discursively linked with internal community cohesion. Indeed, Saggar (2001) argues that generally there was a belief among both the Conservative and Labour that there existed a 'race card', the idea that in the UK there is an anti-immigrant and anti-ethnic minority undercurrent in public that when mobilised influences mass electoral behaviour. This in part arguably led to the public support for further restrictions on immigration and seven immigration acts were passed between 1980 and 1988. During the 80s the internal dimensions of diversity and the politics of race were also changing. The 1980s started with 'race riots' in the summer of 1981 and in turn to the Scarman Report (1981) which raised concerns about community relations and how minorities felt part of the UK, rather than merely race relations. The report also mentioned institutional racism, something that had still to be addressed by the time of the Lawrence Inquiry in 1997 and the subsequent Macpherson Report (1999). Similarly, as the demographics of the UK changed to include larger numbers of Asians, so too was there a shift away from race relations to multiculturalism and diversity. As such the discourse became one of cultural difference, especially Islam, something that also has parallels with New Labour's time in power. According to Favell (2001: 216), the divergence in political interests of black and Asian populations led to an opening up of questions personal subjectivities and what it meant to be British.

Throughout the 1990s the discourse of multiculturalism also provided space for the rise in distinct Muslim interests that were separate from those of more successful Hindu Asians (Favell 2001: 217) although the responses of some Muslims to the publication of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* caused Islam in the UK to lose some of the good will it had previously been awarded (Favell 2001: 225). With regards to immigration, amidst the back drop of the recession of the early 1990s and the end of the cold war, as well as more open borders in Europe, the Conservative government under John Major, as well as the right wing press, heavily promoted a discourse of Britain being under siege, with a special focus on 'bogus' asylum seekers and illegal migrants exploiting the immigration system. Although it is true that asylum rose in the 1990s, when

compared to the number of people granted asylum in Germany, Switzerland or Sweden, especially from the former Yugoslavia, the numbers are much smaller and yet it was discursively constructed as an “uncontrollable influx” and as a moral panic (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 63). This has led Joppke (1999: 129) to write that British asylum policy makes “maximal fuss over minimal numbers”.

### **5.2.2. Labour governments 1997-2010**

As will become clear in Chapter 7, Labour policies towards immigration and integration possess somewhat of a synchronically split personality. Discursively, the case was made for economic immigration to elite audiences (in speeches to businesses and in policy documents), but on the other hand there was an outward more restrictive rhetoric of control of immigration that was aimed at the voters as a reaction to the mediatisation and politicisation of immigration as an issue (Goodhart 2013: 217). This discourse is also followed in the policy whereby the benefits of (managed) economic migration were offset by further more restrictive controls on asylum and other forms of entry. But there was also a second, diachronic, split in the discourse that pertains more to integration. There is very clearly a schism between the initial multicultural approach of 1997-2001 and of the more assimilatory understanding of integration that abounded afterwards. This of course can be put down to certain trigger events in particular 9/11, the riots in northern cities and the 7/7 bombings which led to discussions within the public sphere about Britishness and the failures of multiculturalism. In the subsection below, I will look briefly at the ever increasing politicisation of immigration and integration in the UK under New Labour.

Crime and immigration have traditionally been seen as an electoral weak spots for Labour and they have been seen as soft touches. In contrast, and in an attempt to shift public opinion on Labour’s weaknesses on these issues, in the run up to the 1997 election, Blair agreed with the Conservatives that race relations would be improved with tighter immigration control (Spencer 2007: 341) and he also agreed that there was an issue with ‘bogus asylum seekers’ (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 68). Despite this, neither party dedicated much space to either issue in their respective manifestos and there appeared to be no policy goals on immigration. This initial reticence by Labour to have a policy position different from the Conservatives (Saggar 2001: 208) was partly due to

their fear of losing the white working class vote as they had done when being seen as the party of ethnic minorities in the 1960s and 70s. In fact, it could be argued, that much of Labour's immigration policy was of a reactive nature. For example, in response to asylum numbers rising dramatically in 1999, the government passed the Immigration and Asylum Act. It was during this period that the issue of asylum became particularly mediatised and politicised. The media concentration on Sangatte became symbolic of the government's inability to control immigration (Spencer 2007: 342) and there was also public pressure from towns in Kent and Sussex that had to deal with the 'unfair burden' of asylum seekers. With the Immigration and Nationality Act 1999 the government also established the National Asylum Support Service. Under this, asylum seekers were dispersed to other regions of the UK, often to areas of high levels of social deprivation, in order to share the burden. There was little local government participation or control and asylum seekers were sent despite little preparation of services or consultation with local populations. This became an issue in Brighton in 2001 (cf. 5.2.3 below). The act also barred asylum seekers from working and thus forced them into reliance on benefits. This also played into media and public arguments that the asylum seekers were benefit scroungers.

Immigration thus started to become an election issue in 2001 and Labour were aware that they had to appear tough on immigration and that if they ignored public worries over asylum (whipped up by the media) they would pay an electoral penalty (Saggar 2001: 197). The discourse changed from immigration control to managed migration in an attempt to differentiate between desirable migrants that had instrumental value to the national economy and undesirable migrants that needed further control and restriction. Race relations and integration also become politicised issues. William Hague the then leader of the Conservative party made a speech that warned about immigration leading to Britain becoming a foreign land and other MPs refused to sign a public pledge initiated by the Commission for Racial Equality not use racist language in election campaigns. The rise of far right politics was evident in some areas for example the BNP polled 11% of the vote in Oldham. This was a precursor of things to come in the summer of 2001 when there were riots in Oldham, Bradford, Leeds and Burnley that were conceived of as racial in nature and were between mainly Muslim British Asians and white British youths. In response the government set up the Commission on Community Cohesion which published the Cantle Report (2001) stating that many communities were living parallel lives. This, combined with the attack on the World Trade Cen-

tre in New York and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, led to change in policy. In a post 9/11 world, the government's policies became less liberal and there was more public and political support for stronger actions on immigration (Wring 2005: 65).

The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 also introduced a number of changes that affected integration including the 'Life in the UK' test before citizenship could be applied for. In the media, the focus was still on asylum seekers and large numbers of migrants in general. The Conservatives hired the Australian political strategist Lynton Crosby who then pushed immigration as a major issue in the run up to the 2005 election. Harrison argues that Labour responded in kind to this and were equally strong on immigration (Harrison 2005: 102). The Labour party complained of 'dog whistle' politics but as Wring writes, the 'dog whistle' also came from inside the Home Office when David Blunkett spoke of public fears of being swamped (Wring 2005: 65). Thus, the anti-immigration discourse also came from within government and was then picked up on by the media. Immigration was a much more salient issue for both TV media and the press in 2005 than it had been in 2001 (Harrison 2005: 102, Scammell and Harrop 2005: 131). Furthermore, the press' position was generally much closer to the Conservatives than it was to Labour, especially the right wing tabloids. This pressure from papers such as the Daily Mail, along with the increasing agenda setting role the media led to the government, and in particular successive Home Secretaries "courting favourable headlines" (Allen 2011: 18). According to Kavanagh and Butler (2005: 185) immigration and asylum were initially core issues for conservative voters and many voters saw the failure to deal with immigration as symptomatic of wider government failings on public services and benefits. This was backed up by its prevalence in the media and yet as election time came closer, immigration became a turn off for voters and the Conservatives were came to be seen as a one issue party (Seldon and Snowdon 2005: 78).

After the 2005 election victory, the strong discourse on immigration did not abate and according to Spencer (2007) the government did very little to combat the pervading public view that asylum was a threat to the country rather than a case of helping those in need. According to Fiona McTaggart, the race relations minister between 2002-2005, the government "created a belief that claiming asylum was an abusive act, against the community" (Spencer 2007: 349). Elsewhere, Barbara Roache, the immigration minister in 1999 said that even by then there was little interest in promoting a positive integrationist message (Spencer 2007: 349) about asylum seekers. There were though specific measures aimed at refugee integration (such as Integration Matters in 2005).

Economic migration was though constructed as a necessity. The media reaction to the large numbers of EU migration after 2004 became an issue for Labour. On the one hand, economists and business were all too eager to take advantage of the new potential workforce, but politically and electorally, it was unpopular. The Conservatives claimed that Labour should have predicted the larger numbers and this in turn led to quota restrictions on workers from Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.

The year 2007 also saw a major shift in the discourses on immigration and integration after the London bombings, although even before then, the discursive and policy connections between immigration, terrorism and security had been visible as early as the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Somerville points out that in the ten years of Blair's premiership "discrete portions" of individual anti-terror legislation were devoted to asylum and immigration and vice versa (Somerville 2007: 41). Under Gordon Brown, this continued and in the wake of 7/7 bombings he established the Commission on Integration and Cohesion which published its findings in 2007, *Our shared Future* (2007), and later the Goldsmith Report (2008) on citizenship which raised issues of Britishness. From this period on, integration was closely linked to ethnic diversity and in particular Muslims.

As Allen (2011: 20) argues, immigration was becoming a harder issue for Labour to deal with. It was at risk of becoming a race issue after the London bombings but it did become an economic one when it was announced in 2007 that half the jobs created since 1997 had gone to foreign workers. In response Brown announced plans for "British jobs for British workers" (BBC 2007) in a speech to the GMB trade union and further controls on TCNs, such as a points based system of entry, were introduced. Despite this, immigration was not a major factor in the 2010 election issue and never rose above 5% of the leaders' themes in their speeches, well behind the economy, domestic policies, political reform and defence (Allen et al. 2011: 187). It was similarly a less important issue for the press and TV and even the 'Bigotgate' scandal was of minimal electoral influence on the day of the election (Deacon and Wring 2011: 294-296)

Overall during Blair's time in government and the three years of Brown's leadership following it, the political focus was on two types of migration: asylum and economic migrants. However, as Spencer (2007) notes, the government's positive message on the benefits (and necessity) of economic migration was 'drowned out' by their increasingly strong rhetoric on asylum and illegal immigration which became securitised. Six major acts of parliament on immigration were passed between 1997 and 2007 and

the constant changes put added pressure on the Immigration and Nationality Directorate which in turn led to a lack of public confidence in the system and thence to more reactive policies. Often policy and legislation were obvious reactive responses to Conservative policy and public opinion such as *Controlling Our Borders* (2005).

Where integration policy was created it came in the form of social cohesion and race equality legislation (in the first Parliament and following the 2001 riots) but it was directed at second and third generation migrants rather than newcomers. Moreover, institutional responsibility for integration was not part of the community cohesion team in the Home Office and it was only in 2006 that migrants were included in social cohesion strategies at a local level (Spencer 2007: 356). In 2005 there was a recognition that refugees required help and this led to the *Full and Equal Citizens* white paper in 2005. The government though saw a clear difference between responsibilities to refugees under international law and other migrants for who “if it does not work out, they know where to catch the bus home” (Spencer 2007: 356). This of course was a short-sighted policy as it failed to accept that integration was also about existing communities and not enough was done to consider the impact of immigration on local communities until it was ‘too late’ and it had become a mediatised public issue. It also left local councils in a “policy vacuum” (Spencer 2007: 359). It also underestimated the sheer volume of EU migration in certain areas. Thus, as with immigration policy during the same period, integration also became to be seen through the lens of control of numbers and the policies remained reactive to events and in particular how these were articulated in the press. Over this time as well, the discursive veil of multicultural integration slipped and in its place came a much more assimilatory approach to integration based on British values and the importance of citizenship. Moreover, these policies were explicitly and implicitly directed at Muslims rather than other groups and so the policy stipulations for the integration of newcomers were also present in that of social cohesion.

### **5.2.3. The local politics of immigration in Brighton and Hove**

Though on a national level, immigration and integration were salient political issues for much of Labour’s time in power, locally, they have arguably been less controversial political topics in Brighton and Hove. This may be down to the fact that immigration policy is made at a national level and the local authority has little say in the matter.

Much of the local political action is about lobbying of local MPs to try and influence governmental policy. However, there are four key areas that do need attention. Firstly, following the trend of wider national debate and the politicisation of asylum, there was similar public and political outcry over the potential use of a local hotel as dispersal accommodation for asylum seekers in 2001. The plan was initially accepted by the Home Office but after a local residents' campaign against the move, that centred on the lack of public consultation and concerns over the extra burden on services, and which had tacit support from the Brighton and Hove Argus, the Home Office reversed its decision. The second issue is that of the recent rise in numbers of EU citizens (especially A8) moving to the city. In this case the threat to employment for 'natives' of Brighton was highlighted although, there is little evidence of this and instead Brighton relies on foreign migrants to work in the tourism industry, especially in the summer months. There was also a publically voiced concern that these migrants were getting preferential treatment in accessing services, especially social housing which is extremely limited in the city, to the extent that those requiring emergency and temporary accommodation are often initially housed in neighbouring local authorities such as West Sussex or East Sussex. Thirdly, as mentioned in section 5.1.2 above, there is a large number of foreign language students. Whilst this is a boom for the local economy, their large numbers place added pressure on housing in the private sector and also the transient nature of this population may be one of the contributing factors to the low sense of belonging to a local community. Finally, since 2008, the English Defence League (EDL) has regularly held its *March for England* in Brighton. Rather than as a response to increasing Muslim populations from South Asia, as for example in Birmingham, the EDL instead has decided to march in Brighton as it is seen a liberal city with a strong anti-fascist radical community (Channel 4 2014).

In this section the history of immigration and integration as politicised issues have been discussed. As it should clear, there are a number of historical roots to the policies under Labour but it is equally obvious that between 1997 to 2010 there were also substantial shifts in how the two issues became politicised. Asylum especially, and later EU expansion, became major media issues and these led to policy reactions aimed at quelling the public disquiet. Furthermore, there was a distinct shift away from multiculturalism towards assimilation in the government's approach to integration and, as will be shown in Chapter 7, these approaches spread to other spheres of policy such security, crime and citizenship.

### 5.3. Consideration of wider contexts

I would like here to situate the national and local landscape of integration and immigration within the wider context of other processes at the national and international level. On the national level three processes are worthy of attention: demographic changes, political devolution and the rise of neo-liberal politics.

It is clear through an analysis of the statistics that the UK is becoming a more ethnically diverse country (see 5.1 above), but other demographic processes continue to influence policy on immigration. Firstly the UK's population is ageing. This has a number of consequences. Firstly, it puts added and extended pressure on certain services, such as healthcare. Secondly more money is required through national insurance contributions to pay pensions for a longer period and to more people. Thirdly, the demographic shift means that there are less people of working age (despite increases in retirement ages) who are making those contributions. One way to ameliorate the situation is to increase immigration into the UK in order to boost the working population. In 2013 the Office for Budget Responsibility (2013: 153) claimed that the UK would require seven million more working age migrants over the next fifty years in order to offset the ageing population and pay for the shortfall. As such, the government is somewhat hamstrung. On the one hand, there is a fiscal requirement for immigration in order to deal with the national debt and rising national insurance costs, but on the other hand, the current public sphere discourse is decidedly against increasing immigration. This would seem to partly explain the approach to immigration under New Labour of allowing economic migration whilst maintaining a rhetorical hard line and policy perspective on certain forms of immigration especially asylum seekers and 'benefit tourism'.

The devolution which occurred under New Labour (national parliaments in Scotland, Wales and Ulster, elected mayors in major cities, and the London Assembly), and which looks set to continue in the future, not only changed the way that politics was done around the UK but it also changed the way that the UK was perceived. There have always been strong regional identification in the UK – Cornwall, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Liverpool, south/north London – but recently national rather than British identification has become more pronounced. This is evidenced in the recent referendum on Scottish independence and the increase in Welsh speakers. There has also been an increase in English nationalism, especially on the far right, which has seen the decline in electoral significance of the BNP but a rise in (mediatised) popularity of the EDL which is anti-

Muslim and often holds demonstrations in the diverse areas such as Burnley or Birmingham. Recent research has shown that those who self-identify as ‘white-British’ seem to prioritise national identity over British identity, whereas ethnic minorities - especially British Pakistanis - are more inclined to prioritise British identity over national ones (Nandi and Platt 2013: 3). This has far reaching consequences for integration. Firstly, it implies that national identities may be exclusionary whereas Britishness is more inclusionary and provides space for ethnic-minorities. The second is that the relative lack of importance of British identity for white British people may imply a disenchantment with the Labour government’s messages of multiculturalism and ‘cool Britannia’. Indeed, Gordon Brown attempted to introduce a specific British day and foreground Britishness (cf. Chapter 7) as a way to try and construct a more robust British identity. Such a level of identification with Britain by ethnic minorities also appears to challenge the pervading view in public discourse that multiculturalism has failed and that there is an issue of lack of integration, especially of Muslims.

Finally, New Labour’s immigration and integration policies need to be understood as part of a wider movement towards neo-liberalism that prioritises self sufficiency, frowns on state reliance and cements the primacy of the market place. As explained in chapter 3, immigration and integration policy arguably seems to be based on a neoliberal understanding of citizenship. This concept extends not just to incoming non-nationals but to the British population more generally through policy approaches and public discourses on welfare. In the media, as in politics, there is a broader vilification of those who do not contribute to ‘greater good’. Thus, those who are excluded from contributing, for example asylum seekers, or those who rely on welfare, such as the long-term disabled or unemployed are seen of as problem populations. It is therefore no surprise that immigration is legislated on in such a way and in actual fact it would be more surprising if it were not dealt with through a neoliberal prism.

Though I hesitate to use the world globalisation as a catch all explanation for every change to our post-modern world, there are undoubtedly many more supra-national factors that impact on intra-national events and processes than fifty or even twenty five years ago. Thus, two further macro level factors should be considering as influencing the policy context of integration and immigration: the UK’s membership of the European Institutions and the global context of a post 9/11 world.

Immigration in the UK is closely discursively linked with the UK’s membership of the EU (which allows the free movement of people) and other European institutions

such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Britain's membership of the EU has affected immigration and integration approaches in a number of ways. Firstly, with the expansion of EU from 2004 onwards, freedom of movement was granted for many millions of people from former communist states. This has changed the profile and the dynamic of immigration into the UK. Firstly, as mentioned in 5.1 Poland is now the second-highest country of immigration in the UK after India. Whilst many of these have stayed and settled many others have returned to Poland and other countries after a brief period or continue to come for short periods of time to take offers of seasonal employment. The shift to increased EU immigration has a potential impact on integration because such migrants have equal access to a number of benefits and services. There is thus much less reason to take up British citizenship. Furthermore, with the shift to less extended periods of stay in the country, informal settlement and integration is less likely to occur.

Lastly, as pointed out above in section 5.2, there was a definite shift in approaches to integration and immigration policy in the wake of 9/11. But the global influence is wider than this, as it also includes the West's military responses to 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the growing discursive securitisation of Islamic terrorism as a real threat to public safety in Europe and the US. These (mediatised) discourses impact on the public sphere 'back home' in that they influence how certain social groups are perceived – including incoming non-nationals from the middle east and British Muslims. As will be shown in Chapter 7, there are considerable overlaps in discourse and policy on terrorism, security, migration and community cohesion.

#### **5.4. Conclusions**

As indicated in 5.1, immigration rose throughout the second half of the twentieth century and continues to rise today. Two major boom periods can be seen. The first in the rise of commonwealth immigration after World War Two and the second between 1997 and 2012 which saw about 4m net migration, much of this post 2004 and EU enlargement.

As Somerville argues (2007: 51), political responses to the need for integration were initially aimed at first generation migrants and by 1997 the focus had moved to ethnic minorities. Taking this to be a fair representation, the Labour government's re-

sponses have been a combination of the two. This breaks with the previous, path dependent, consensus on immigration and integration that separated the two issues. However, just as Britain's immigration and integration policies have historically been based on race or ethnicity, the Labour's were similarly unable to separate one from the other and move the public discourse away from an essentially racist one of numbers and the paternalistic argument that less immigration will enhance community relations.

On immigration, Labour's time in office was defined by increasing control for some migrants (and ethnic minorities) and liberalisation in other areas. The government's head was turned two both ways. On the one hand, businesses and demographic shifts meant that migrant labour was required but on the other, the government both reacted to and helped to reinforce a public sense of Britain under siege just as previous governments had done. This helped to create a hierarchy of migrants where some are more desirable than others and yet on the public discursive level, such nuances were either not communicated well enough or were ignored entirely by the media. On integration, the shift was from multiculturalism to neo-assimilationist integration which again targeted certain migrant groups and existing ethnic minority communities, especially Muslims. These twin currents of control and integration were both justified by a continued rhetoric of (the myth of) Britain's liberal tradition on immigration. But as, Schuster and Solomos (1999: 67) argue, this myth is not challenged by migrants taking advantage but rather by the restrictions themselves.

The inclusion of this chapter has been vital not only in setting the context of the thesis but it also justifies, as is necessitated by, the methodological approach taken as well. Firstly the chapter has shown that the Labour governments of 1997-2010 were increasingly reactive and restrictive in policy towards integration and immigration and thus it is important to track the discursive changes in policy. Secondly immigration and integration became increasingly mediatised policy areas. According to Somerville, such policy now considers and anticipates how the media will respond and policies are "designed with the media in mind". Thus, this clearly indicates the importance of the media in any analysis of public sphere discourse. Thirdly, the chapter has shown that there is a specific local dimension to immigration processes and political and social reactions to them. This combined with fact that integration happens at a local level, justifies specific field work to ascertain how integration is experienced. Fourthly, immigration and integration do not occur in a domestic vacuum. Section 5.3 highlighted the need to look at much wider social political contexts and how they influence migration flows, influence

policy and how they are discursively used to justify policy. Finally, the chapter has hopefully convincingly outlined the significance of the historical context of current discourses. Thus, Labour's time in office should be analysed as another stage along a continuum both in terms of immigration and policy responses to it.

## **Chapter 6: Description of empirical investigation and data collection methods**

This chapter marks the beginning of the analytical part of this work but before moving to the analysis of integration discourse though, it is necessary to explain how the texts that will be analysed were collected and why they were chosen. In this brief chapter I will introduce the material gathered for the in-depth linguistic analysis using the DHA. Immediately below I revisit and expand on the concept of triangulation that was initially introduced when explaining a discourse historical approach to analysis of language (Chapter 4). This is followed by successive sections on the three types of data collected and analysed for this thesis; policy discourse, media discourse and transcripts from focus groups. Finally I address some of the limitations of the data and the collection process.

### **6.1. Triangulation**

In order to get as complete a picture as possible of the discourse of integration that circulated, and continues to circulate, in the public sphere in the UK, it is necessary to implement a triangulation more than one class of data. To rationalise this process, we must return briefly to the model of how a discourse flows through the public sphere which was introduced in Chapter 1. I argued that there are three major sites of the (discursive) public sphere. Initially there is political discourse (governmental, opposition, policy discourse). This is then received by the media and recontextualised and then consumed by what, following Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), I term the ‘interpretative com-

munity'. Discourses (both issue-specific and 'meta-discourses') flow within and between these sites. Taken together, the research questions (cf. Introduction) and my model of the discursive public sphere (cf. Chapter 1) provide a very clear rationale for analysing three sets of data: Governmental policy, newspaper articles and interviews with migrants themselves (see chart below):




Figure 6.1: Triangulation of data

A strong argument for the inclusion of the first two data sets was laid out in Chapter 1. As Bauböck (2006) notes, analyses of policy that explain the shift and new orientation in integration policies are lacking in general and although a lot of work has been carried out within critical discourse on exclusion and national identity in governmental and media discourses, there has been little or no focus on how non-nationals are included or integrated.

The first type of data is political texts of a number of genres. Genre has been defined as “a class of communicative events, the members of which share some set of communicative purposes... In addition to purpose, exemplars of a genre exhibit various patterns of similarity in terms of structure, style, content and intended audience” (Swales 1990: 58) and within CDA as “the conventionalized, more or less schematically fixed use of language associated with a particular activity, as ‘a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity’” (Fairclough 1995: 14). There is, then, a functional aspect to genre. Within CDA, the importance of the genre that a text belongs to has been well established, in particular the decision to use one particular genre as method of communicating a message over another. As Wodak (2001b: 11) argues “(p)ower is signalled not only by grammatical forms within a text, but also by a person's control of a social occasion by means of the genre of a text.

It is often exactly within the genres associated with given social occasions that power is exercised or challenged”. A good example of this is a White Paper, which is strictly controlled genre aimed at a certain audience with a specific aim in mind. That is, they are “political texts...primarily designed to make a persuasive case” (Fairclough 2001: 132). As well as this they could be considered uni-directional and rarely offer chances of dialogue with, for example, voters and importantly for this work, those who are the targets of a particular policy: Migrants. Even when a ‘right of reply’ is possible, or even requested, in Green Papers (consultation documents), the parameters for communication are strictly controlled by those in power (short time limits for responses, limitations on who can respond, limited methods of response).

The second tranche of data for analysis comes from articles in national and local newspapers. Newspapers outlets and other media are key components in the discursive public sphere. They play a vital intermediary role, (re)communicating and mediating policy discourse for their audiences. Although the shifts in methods of news consumption, primarily because of communication technology, have led to a decline in print media landscape, newspapers are still influential in the framing of national and local issues. In deciding to include a discursive analysis of newspaper articles, the aim was to ascertain, how governmental policy discourse on integration was reported on and to what extent it was recontextualised.

Thirdly, apropos my decision to include interviews with migrants, as argued above, the discourse on integration is framed and dominated by actors within the public sphere who have the power and access to means of (media) production. Policies are informed by reactions to public opinion, responses to consultation documents from stakeholders, think tanks and government advisors. Those who are most affected by integration policies and policies in related areas (immigration, community cohesion and citizenship) are migrants themselves and yet they are the ones most excluded from the decision making process. In part this is because of their lack of power. Therefore, in pointing to the understudied nature of integration in the social sciences, Bauböck (2006: 31) argues that qualitative studies on migrants’ self interpretation of citizenship and integration practices are lacking within the literature and that focus groups are well suited to interrogating this. By including this type of data, I am also following Altrichter et al.’s (1993: 113) approach to triangulation in that I aim to break the “hierarchy of credibility” that is afforded the political elite and the media within the public sphere. As

well being an analysis of discursive content it is also an attempt to give a voice to the voiceless. Such an approach follows the work done by Krzyżanowski (2008, 2010) and Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2008) on using focus groups as method of investigating ‘voices of migrants’ (Krzyżanowski 2008: 163). As well as the reasons specific to this thesis, focus groups also afford a number of other benefits for researchers. For example, because of the multiple participants, a major strength of focus groups is the communicative dynamics of the group. This allows researchers to firstly investigate collective and individual opinions and secondly to “test whether those beliefs and opinions are well grounded and stable, or whether they are prone to change in the situation of interaction with others” (Krzyżanowski 2008, 163).

## **6.2. Description of the empirical material**

In employing a triangulatory and interdisciplinary approach to my analysis, I decided to collect three types of material: Government policy, newspaper articles and the results of focus groups. In this section of the chapter I will explain in detail the processes involved in the collection of these three types of material.

### **6.2.1. Governmental Policy Documents**

The material for the analysis of government policy comes from documents that all fall into the field of action of “law making and political procedure” (Wodak 2001a:68). Within this field of action, the documents represent a number of genres including green papers (consultation documents), white papers (government policy documents), strategy documents, government commissioned reports and government responses to Parliamentary committees (see Table 6.1, below). It must be stated though that within the policy material for analysis, quite often there were many genres at play within one document. Taking the example of White Papers these frequently start with Prime ministerial or Ministerial forewords which are “and often include signatures and a photo of the author” (Fairclough, 2001). After this White Papers may also include other genres such as

executive summaries, ‘commentary boxes’, focus group results, best practice examples or short narratives from people.

<b>Genre</b>	<b>Freq.</b>
Policy Documents (White Paper)	7
Government Commissioned Report	5
Guidance for Local Authorities	5
Consultation Document (Green Paper)	5
Parliamentary Report	2
Select Committee Report	1
Government Response to Report	1
Government Report	1
Total	27

Table 6.1: Frequency by genre of UK Government documents

After an initial survey of government policy it became clear that although integration policy most frequently formed part of immigration policies, there were also a number of other, connected, policy areas that pertained to integration, either directly or indirectly, these included community cohesion, English language teaching provision, citizenship and, later, terrorism. Given the breadth of the topic, it is unsurprising that the documents were released by a number of different government departments and agencies including, inter alia, The Home Office, UK Borders Agency (UKBA), Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the Local Government Association (LGA) and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS). Such a broad range of departments therefore points to the complexity of integration in policy as well as a level of (inter)discursivity.

In total, twenty-seven documents were selected for analysis.<sup>57</sup> The first was published in November 2000 and the last in July 2009. As can be seen in table 6.2 (below), the relevant polices were very evenly spread across the period of analysis apart from a very large spike in 2008 when eight documents were published.

<b>Year</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Freq.</b>	1	2	2	1	3	3	2	2	8	3	27

Table 6.2: Frequency by year of UK government documents

All of the documents were collected electronically via archived versions official government websites ([www.nationalarchives.gov.uk](http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk)) and the online publications library of

<sup>57</sup> See Appendix A for a full list of documents

the Centre for social Relations at Coventry University ([www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk](http://www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk)). The documents were downloaded, saved in PDF format and then hard copies were produced for ease of analysis.

### 6.2.2. Newspaper Articles

In order to get as representative a sample of UK newspaper discourse as possible, it was decided that articles would be taken from five daily newspapers. Three variables were considered then choosing the sources. Firstly, the type of newspaper was taken into account, that is, two were quality broadsheets and two were tabloid (one ‘mid-market’ and one ‘red-top’). Secondly, the newspapers were all chosen with regard to their general socio-political editorial viewpoint, that is, two can said to be traditionally on the left of the political spectrum and two on the right. In today’s world though the left/right dichotomy is an idealised concept and in reality newspapers often fluctuate along the political spectrum in order to garner attention and support from readers and political groups alike. Articles were included from the daily newspapers and their Sunday sister papers (*Guardian/Observer*, *Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph*, *Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday* and *Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror*). In addition to these four national newspapers, in order to capture the local nature of integration, a local newspaper was included - the *Brighton Argus* (hereafter, the *Argus*)

	Editorial position	
	Liberal	Conservative
Broadsheet	Guardian	Daily Telegraph
Tabloid	Daily Mirror	Daily Mail

Table 6.3: Breakdown of national newspapers

If all articles had been included during the extended length of the period of analysis (2000-2010), it would have led to an unmanageable corpus size for this thesis. Instead, seven-day ‘snap-shot’ periods were chosen. Furthermore, rather than choosing arbitrary dates, the data collection periods were chosen so that they coincided with elections (the collection period included the day of the election and the six days preceding it). For the four national newspapers three periods were chosen corresponding to the three general

elections during the period of analysis (2001, 2005 and 2010). For the *Argus*, the short sample period produced a low number of results and therefore the sample period was extended to one month. The same election dates were also used for collecting articles from the *Argus* but additional sample periods were included that correlated with local elections (2003 and 2007).

The articles were retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis online newspaper archive and were searched for using ten relevant keywords: *integrate*, *integration*, *migration*, *immigration*, *migrant(s)*, *immigrant(s)*, *asylum seeker(s)*, *refugee(s)*, *sex-traffick(ing)* and *community cohesion*. Plurals were searched for using Boolean search characters ('\*', '?'). The results were downloaded as MSWord documents and saved for further analysis.

The initial keyword search produced 732 articles after which the corpus was downsized according to a number of variables including: articles not relating to the UK such as refugee situations in Afghanistan (2001), Darfur (2005) and Bosnia (2005) and immigration in Israel (2005) and the US (2010); lifestyle, arts and sports articles; obituaries and false positives – such as the migration of birds or corporate integration.

Year	Sample Period	Election Type	Newspaper	Sample after initial keyword search	Sample after downsizing
2001	1 June – 7 June	General	<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	58	20
			<i>Guardian</i>	72	25
			<i>Daily Mirror</i>	22	16
			<i>Daily Mail</i>	29	16
			<i>Brighton Argus</i>	5	5
			<b>Total</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>82</b>
2003	1 April – 1 May	Local	<i>Brighton Argus</i>	17	12
			<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>
2005	29 April – 5 May	General	<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	69	38
			<i>Guardian</i>	79	50
			<i>Daily Mirror</i>	22	17
			<i>Daily Mail</i>	35	29
			<i>Brighton Argus</i>	10	7
			<b>Total</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>141</b>
2007	3 April – 3 May	Local	<i>Brighton Argus</i>	11	10
			<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>
2010	30 April – 6 May	General	<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	99	66
			<i>Guardian</i>	108	57
			<i>Daily Mirror</i>	45	39
			<i>Daily Mail</i>	42	29
			<i>Brighton Argus</i>	9	8
			<b>Total</b>	<b>303</b>	<b>199</b>
			<b>Total Sample Size</b>	<b>732</b>	<b>444</b>

Table 6.4: Newspaper corpus details

The decision was taken to include op-ed articles and editorials but not readers' letters, although the inclusion of these is also clearly subjective editorial decisions. After downsizing, the final corpus amounted to 444 articles (see table 6.4 above).

### **6.2.3. Focus Groups**

Following Wodak and Meyer (2009), a theoretical approach data collection was taken to decide the exact configuration of the focus groups. After conducting a literature review into integration and immigration in the UK and after close analysis of government policies, it was evident that migrants who come to the UK were often categorised in terms of their legal status and their method of entry into the country and furthermore that integration and migration policies differed according to the type of migrant. The first distinction was between migrants EEA member states and those from outside (third country nationals). Within this second group, a further distinction could be made. Firstly there were those migrants who had applied for, and been given, asylum. That is, they first travelled to the UK and then submitted their claim for asylum. The second category of third-country migrant was that of migrants who had been granted refugee status prior to arriving in the UK after applying in-country. This group partly consisted of refugees that the British government agreed to resettle, after referral from the UNHCR as part of the UN's refugee quota programme. In the UK, this system is known as the Gateway Protection Programme.

Following this research, it was decided that the focus groups would need to be carried out with more than one group of migrants and that the core variable would be their migration path. Further variables that informed the decision on participants were that of country of origin of presence in Brighton (as the geographical location of the research) and of date of entry (since 2000). To this, end the final configurations for the focus groups can be seen in table 6.5 (below) which also gives other details. The numbers of participants in FG1 and FG2 are relatively low for focus groups. It was immensely difficult to reach informants from such communities and with such legal status.

Focus Group	Code	Migration Path	Country of Origin	Number of Participants	Participant Code used in Analysis	Length of recording
1	FG1	TCN – Gateway	Oromo (Ethiopia) <sup>58</sup>	5	OR#	01:33:27
2	FG2	TCN – Asylum	Iran	4	IN#	01:33:29
3	FG3	EEA	Poland, Hungary <sup>59</sup>	6	PL#/HU#	01:28:52

Table 6.5: Focus group details

Refugees and asylum seekers are often reluctant to discuss their situation publically because of a general distrust of authority (possibly stemming from previous experiences of authoritarian regimes) and also because such groups are often asked for their opinions (by NGOs or local governments) but never see the outcome of research or any material changes in their lives. This is why dissemination of results back to those that participated in the focus groups is a vital post-publication goal of this thesis.

### 6.2.3.1. Topics and question prompts for the focus groups

Although the focus groups were semi-structured, certain topics and question prompts were used in the interviews as a way of directing the discussion and stimulating debate on those topics which were related to integration. The topics were based on a modified version of Agar and Strang's Indicators of Integration Framework (2004, see also Chapter 3, above). This decision was taken for three reasons. Firstly, the model comes out of a UK context and is thus directly applicable to my study. Secondly, the framework is based on an extensive literature review of integration from government, academia and NGOs. Thirdly, this research was backed up by qualitative research interviews with refugees in two areas of the UK (Croydon in London and Pollockshaws in Glasgow) and these interviews subsequently influenced the framework (Agar and Strang 2004). Their framework therefore appears to be the most comprehensive and the most relevant study of integration in the UK. It also lends itself to the design of questions for the interviews and from there to the study of how the ten sites of integration are discursively constructed and how they interact and overlap. Further input came from the literature

<sup>58</sup> The participants from Ethiopia identified themselves as Oromo, their nation or ethnic group, rather than Ethiopian, which they felt neither recognised nor represented them fully.

<sup>59</sup> One participant in FG3 was from Hungary and therefore fitted into the EEA variable.

review on integration and citizenship and the detailed analysis of government policy. This starting point was operationalised by reference to examples of good practice from CDA researchers concerned with investigating migration and exclusion. The ideas for prompts and questions are heavily based on Krzyżanowski (2008, cf. also Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2008: 207-210). A full list of the topics and question prompts used in the three focus groups are given in Appendix C but it worth mentioning here that the key topics were: Feeling welcome, housing and local area, accessing services and support, employment, social links, language, citizenship and perceptions of the UK.

### **6.2.3.2. Collection of the material from Focus Groups**

In March 2013 I undertook a self-funded field work trip to Brighton in order to make contact with migrant groups and organise the interviews. I used previous contacts acquired from my own voluntary work as a refugee mentor and also had meetings with a number of community NGOs that worked with different types of migrants. These included Refugee Radio, the Money Advice Centre (MACs) and the Black, Minority and Ethnic Community Partnership (BMCP). I returned to Brighton in July 2013 on three week field trip during which all three of the interviews were carried out. This trip was partially funded by a Type-A bursary from the European Society for the Study of English. The field trip also afforded me the opportunity to visit the library at Sussex University where I was able to utilise their permanent and online collections. All of the interviews took place in Meeting room 3 at Community Base, a hub for local NGOs in central Brighton. The room was hired for three hours each time and the costs were covered by the ESSE bursary.

For the recordings, two Zoom H2 Handy Recorders were used. The decision was taken to use two so that if one failed, the recordings would be backed up. The interviews were recorded on 4MB SD cards and the data was then transferred after recording to a laptop and backed-up to a cloud drive.

At all the interviews a second researcher was present. Their main role was to observe what occurred during the interviews: this included drawing a map of where every participant sat and paying specific attention to how participants interacted and when, for

example, they became more animated than normal. After each interview, both researchers discussed their experiences. By employing the help of a second researcher, it allowed the primary researcher to concentrate on moderating the discussion. They also assisted in preparing the room and welcoming participants.

After a brief welcome, participants were given a folded piece of A4 paper. They were asked to first write their names on the front and on the reverse, there was space to give personal details. These included age, country of origin, nationality, length of time in the UK, length of time in Brighton, occupation and education level.<sup>60</sup> Although names were used throughout the discussion, during the transcription process, the participants' names were replaced with a code consisting of two letters (denoting country of origin – and thus also focus group) and one number (denoting in what position they first spoke). For example the first person to speak in FG1 was coded as OR1 and the fifth person to speak in FG3 was coded PL5 (see table 6.5, above, for more details).

Upon returning from the research trip, the recordings were then transcribed using the 'half interpretive working transcription system', or HIAT (Ehlich and Redder 1994, Krzyżanowski 2008). This method can be employed for researchers focussing on the "textual material" (Krzyżanowski 2008: 170) as opposed to, for example, conversation analysis practitioners, whose focus is on the structure of interaction.

#### **6.2.4. Description of focus Groups**

##### **6.2.4.1. Focus Group 1: Oromo**

All of the participants of the FG1 had had similar experiences prior to coming to the UK. All of the 79 Oromo refugees who came to Brighton via the Gateway resettlement programme had been living in Kenya as refugees, a vast majority, lived in Kakuma refugee camp but others had settled in Nairobi for between seven and sixteen years. All but one had arrived in 2007 and OR4 had come via the Gateway programme in 2010. None of them had met each other before meeting on pre-departure workshops in Kenya

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<sup>60</sup> Full details of each participant are given in Appendix D.

but since arriving in Brighton they had become friends and met often either at their mosque, at monthly community meetings or in each others' homes. Four of the five lived in Brighton and Hove. Two of them lived centrally (OR2 and OR5) and the other two in outer lying areas of Woodingdean, to the north-east (OR4) and Portslade (OR3), to the west. OR1 was the eldest son of OR2 and had lived in Brighton with his father upon arrival in 2007 until 2011 when he moved to Bournemouth to attend university. All of those living in Brighton worked part time three worked as cleaners/domestic assistants and one as a hospital housekeeper. OR1 was working in Bournemouth as a social worker. OR3 and OR4 had arrived in the UK with their families, OR2 had arrived with his son (OR1) and daughter but later remarried and now lives with his new wife and two children. Of those living in Brighton, all of them lived in social housing. Some had been living in temporary accommodation for up to seven years and had only recently moved into permanent council accommodation. With regards to education, three (OR2, OR3, OR4) had secondary level education, OR1 had recently completed his degree in Social Work and had previously taken his A-levels and OR5 did not respond. In terms of ESL (English as a second language) skills, OR1 was fluent, OR2 was intermediate OR3 and OR5 were pre-intermediate, and OR4 had only a basic level of English. All of them had taken ESL classes which had been provided for free to start with but once they started working they either stopped classes because of time constraints or in some cases were unable to afford lessons. OR3 was still taking lessons provided free of charge because he worked under a certain number of hours per week. Indeed, access to ESL courses was a salient topic for many participants during the interview.

In terms of interaction within the group, because all of the participants all knew each other, responses to the facilitator were often of a collaborative nature which participants building on what had been said before. These periods were characterised by comparisons of personal experiences rather than a collective creation of a narrative of shared experiences. Towards the end of the focus group, the participants became quite tired. Though it is to be expected in such intense periods of communication, the situation for this group was influenced by the fact that it took place during Ramadan and therefore the participants were in the middle of their daily fast and had not eaten or drunk anything for over twelve hours.

In general, the issues which the group spent most talking about were housing, employment and access to ESL classes (which directly related to their experiences of

work). In addition, the issue of British citizenship, or to be more exact, having a British passport, was also a topic of great importance to them. Of those that had arrived in 2007, all of them had become British citizens within the last year and had therefore taken the Life in the UK test and taken part in local citizenship ceremonies, either in Brighton or Eastbourne.

Individually, OR1 was the most vocal, probably because of his comfort in using English. He was often the mouthpiece for the rest of group either directly or indirectly after translating the facilitator's questions or participants' comments, this was evident in the frequent use of the plural pronoun 'we'. Given his level of English he was also able to summarise comments or provide a wider perspective on what other participants said. He was also comfortable making jokes with and about other participants which assisted in creating a relaxed atmosphere for the interview. Despite good English skills, OR2 was less vocal than expected but when he did contribute, similarly to OR1, he was able to offer some form of meta-analysis of other participants' responses. The most salient issue for him appeared to be housing as he continued to live in unsuitable temporary accommodation. OR3 was often the most animated participant and his comments were frequently accompanied by hand gestures. He became particularly active when talking about his local area and access to ESL training. He was also comfortable relaying stories about both his time in Kenya and his time in Brighton and often gave examples (both real and hypothetical) of his experiences via narratives. OR4 was the least talkative, primarily due to his very low level of English. His interventions were rarely longer than one sentence and when he did want to comment more extensively, he relied on OR1 to translate. OR5 joined the group about thirty minutes into the interview and it took a while for him to become comfortable speaking.

#### **6.2.4.2. Focus Group 2: Iranian**

As with FG1, FG2 participants were political refugees although rather than entering via the Gateway programme, they had each applied for asylum individually. In contrast to those in FG1 then, participants in FG2 had had varied experiences prior to entering the UK and since their arrival. IN1 had claimed political asylum in 1980 after the Iranian revolution. Her family had a summer house in the UK and she was staying there at the

time. After the revolution, they were unable to return to Iran and had been given permanent refugee status and finally British citizenship. After settling in Brighton, she had initially worked as a voluntary teaching assistant and then later set up the Black, Minority and Ethnic Community Partnership (BMECP). She was very active in the Baha'i community in Brighton and also assisted other Iranian asylum seekers in a voluntary capacity once a week. IN3 had arrived in the UK fourteen years ago and claimed political asylum he had been through the asylum process and had become a British citizen. IN2 was IN3's wife and had entered the UK via the Family Reunification process in 2003 since then she had taken British citizenship. To start with, they lived in London, where IN2 studied accounting at university, and had then moved to Brighton in order to get onto the property ladder. They had previously opened a cafe but had been forced to close the cafe in 2011 because it was unprofitable. IN3 worked as a decorator and IN2 often assisted him whilst looking for full-time work. IN4 was IN2's mother. She had applied for asylum individually and initially was accommodated in an asylum processing centre in Hull and had since moved in with IN2 and IN3 in Brighton. At the time of the interview she was still awaiting a decision on her asylum claim. IN1 had an upper-intermediate level of English, and although she made a lot of mistakes she was very comfortable using the language. IN2 had advanced English, IN3 intermediate and IN4, no English at all. This obviously meant that she was unable to participate fully in the focus group.

Due to the fact that the general level on English was higher in FG2, the participants' comments were often longer and more thorough and as a result there was more textual material produced that could be analysed. A direct effect of the higher English level in FG2 was that there was less need for the moderator to intervene by asking supplementary questions or to direct the topic to another participant. In comparison to this, FG1 was characterised by too much intervention from the moderator. Throughout FG2, the most talkative participant was IN1 and she often used narratives of her experiences to answer questions. She was often reticent to criticise or mention local institutions or indeed any of her experiences and sometimes hid behind 'not wanting to go into politics' to maybe deflect her answers from criticism. This might indicate a level of discomfort that the FG was being recorded. She became quite emotional when talking about not being able to return to Iran and was quite animated on the subject of her local community and neighbours. IN2 was also active during the FG and helped to give a very

good calming, measured atmosphere to interview until she had to leave thirty minutes before the end to attend a doctor's appointment. IN3 seemed to focus on the cost of living and the differences between living in the UK and other countries that he had experiences of.

#### **6.2.4.3. Focus Group 3: Polish and Hungarian**

FG3 consisted of EEA citizens from A8 states; five from Poland and one from Hungary. They had all arrived in the UK post-A8 accession and had decided to settle in the area for different reasons. None had applied for British citizenship and none had seriously considered it. One of the participants (HU1) was a graduate, four were post-graduates and one was a doctor (PL6).

HU1 had come to Brighton in 2006 to study at university and had since decided to stay, working in a number of different jobs. She had moved away from Brighton to Crawley (30kms away) to live with her British boyfriend. PL2 had also been in the UK for seven years. She worked as a nursery teacher in a school for Polish children and lived with her British fiancé along with her brother (PL4). PL3 had only arrived in Brighton for two months and was currently looking for work. She was staying with PL2 whilst looking for a place to live in a flat-share. PL4 had initially lived in London for a very short time but soon relocated to Brighton and had lived in the UK for eight years in total. PL5 had been in the UK for five years but had first lived in Kent for two years before moving to Brighton. Like PL2, she also worked as a nursery teacher in a school for Polish children (although a different one) and as a waitress. She lived with her Polish boyfriend and they were planning to move back to Poland in the autumn. PL6 had moved to the UK in 2005 to undertake a PhD in Birmingham and had moved to Brighton in 2010 to take up a post as a research fellow at Sussex University.

All of the participants had high levels of English and this obviously led to much more complex answers and the ability to analyse, or at least verbalise their viewpoints on certain topics, at a more macro level. Also, despite most people having never met before, the level of interaction was high. Communication was multidirectional rather than led by the moderator and there was a lot of co-constructive 'work' within the group. Furthermore, the participants in the main appeared quite confident and were comfortable questioning and disagreeing with other participants' comments. Although

collectively the group framed Brighton positively, in contrast to FG1 and FG2 they did not mention many positive experiences with local residents or neighbours. In FG3 their main connections were with colleagues from work and their own circle of friends. The group became particularly animated about housing and health and complained about how difficult the bureaucracy was surrounding these two subjects.

### **6.3. Conclusions and limitations of data and collection methods**

This chapter has attempted to explain the types of data collected and analysed for the thesis as well as expounded in depth the methods of collection. The chapter started out by explaining the importance of triangulation to my work and as a key part of multidisciplinary approaches to CDA such as the Discourse Historical Approach. After this, the genres and methods of data collection were explained in detail, with special attention being paid to the focus groups, their participants and interaction within them. The data collected for this thesis amounts to a comprehensive survey of the state of integration discourse in the British public sphere. It has been carefully chosen and through a triangulation of the data, its findings should be more robust than other analyses that include one genre or site of discourse.

This notwithstanding, no individual work on such a complex and broad-ranging topic could ever be termed complete and there are of course limitations to the data and to how it was collected. The original project was to include more data but as the collection process went on it became clear that the empirical research plan would have to be revised. Other genres of political discourse such as parliamentary speeches and election manifestos (general and local) were to be analysed. However, the former was rejected because of space considerations and latter because of the limited amount of relevant data held in them when compared to policy documents. Similarly, with the newspaper discourse, initial attempts at longer sampling periods (six weeks, four weeks and two weeks) produced unworkable numbers of articles of over 500 articles per newspaper, per collection period before downsizing (4000 articles in total). Furthermore, because of the period of collection was immediately prior to elections, the corpus is inherently biased towards issues of a more political nature and this is why lexical items linked to politics are so prevalent in the corpus (cf. Chapter 8). Thus, results may have been quite different if a different sample period had been chosen, for example, prior to National

Refugee Week (third week in June). Though a massive amount of data would have been more comprehensive and would have counteracted the arguably more arbitrary short collection period chosen, such a corpus would also have required large-scale corpus linguistic analysis and possible multiple researchers when the time came for fine-grained qualitative analysis.

Upon reflection and analysis, along with conversations with other researchers, one area in which the data could have potentially been improved and expanded was the number of focus groups and the type of participant. In the first plan of the thesis, focus groups were also to be conducted with migration professionals from Brighton and Hove council and from NGOs working with migrants in the city. Unfortunately, due to time and cost constraints during the research trips, it was not possible to organise and carry out further interviews. It would also have been very useful to record the perspectives of longer-term residents of the city who had been born and brought up in the UK. This would have given the opportunity to compare responses from migrants and original residents of Brighton. Such research has been carried out in academia by Kirkwood (2012) and Leudar et al. (2008) and within the scope of policy research by the Institute for Public Policy Research and its 'Everyday Integration' project (2013). Furthermore, Brighton is quite a unique city in the UK. It is a seaside resort and a primarily tertiary economy based on the leisure industry, especially during the summer. It has an open, liberal, atmosphere in places, thanks in part to the large LGBT population and though its levels of longer-term international migration roughly average for a city of its size, it does have a large number of international students who attend language schools as well as a vibrant student population. All of the participants in the focus groups commented that they felt Brighton was welcoming a number of them said that their experiences of integration might have been very different had they lived in different towns and cities. Member of FG1 pointed to the experiences of their compatriots in Coventry, IN3 in FG2 spoke about Manchester and PL5 said that Brighton was much more open and welcoming than Margate in Kent where she first lived.

Finally, there is the question of researcher bias and the subjectivity of the data. By inviting these participants to discuss their points of view in focus groups that were based on migration history, they were automatically labelled (explicitly and implicitly) as migrants that had entered the UK, rather than as residents who experienced the immigration of other people into where they lived. As such, they were ipso facto located on the outside of the self/other dichotomy despite the fact that many of them were Brit-

ish citizens a majority had been settled here for an extended period of time. That is, though some saw themselves as British and others not, for the purposes of the research they were all treated in a generalised way as though they were foreign. This then brings into question what it means to be a migrant and when does a migrant cease to be a migrant and become a member of the general population. Though interesting and vital areas of research, such questions are not in scope of my analysis.

## **Chapter 7: Analysis of Government Policy Texts**

This chapter is the first of three analytical chapters and is an investigation into UK government policy pertaining to integration over a period of ten years (2000-2010). What follows is a detailed analysis of official government discourse. In many ways, the period is marked by a number of dynamic changes in the discursive construction of integration, but in others, there is evidence of the presence of repeated themes and strategies.

As was apparent in the methodological and contextual chapters up to this juncture, although integration is at the heart of this investigation, there are a number of concepts and therefore policy areas in which, firstly, integration is found and, secondly, which themselves impact upon integration. In terms of policy, most closely tied to integration is ‘community cohesion’ and as will be shown there is considerable overlap between these two policy sites. Within this analysis, I will also look at ‘community’ as a distinct, yet related, concept. Unsurprisingly, migration is also directly related to integration. It is the process which precedes integration and the impact that it brings is also used by the government as a justification for integration policies. Finally, citizenship policies also relate to these above mentioned areas in terms of being an end point of migration and integration.

The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 7.1 addresses the conceptual history of integration and community cohesion and sets out how these two terms overlap and connect in policy discourse. Section 7.2 is taken up by an investigation of ‘community’ as a dominant, yet polysemous concept deployed in the policy language. I argue that the way ‘community’ is defined has serious implications for both what ‘integration’ means and how it is realised in policy. In section 7.3, the largest portion of the chapter, attention shifts to integration, including how it has been framed as an issue over

time, what integration includes, who is involved in integration and who has the power in this process. Section 7.4 returns to the idea of performative integration (cf. Chapter 1) and argues that the discursive construction of integration points to a neo-liberal understanding of citizenship which, in turn shapes and moulds integration policy and discourse. Finally, section 7.5 introduces integration's sister contexts. The interdiscursivity of integration policy is highlighted as well as the concrete policy linkages and what this means for how 'integration' is understood.

### **7.1. Defining Integration and Community Cohesion: A history of two-concepts**

One distinct finding apparent throughout the policy texts is the closeness of definitions of integration and community cohesion. Though often outlined as separate areas of policy they often become entangled and overlap to the extent that later in the period only one, combined, definition is proposed. How these two concepts are understood has obvious implications for how integration is 'done' and how the discourse is received by different target audiences. This section looks solely at definitions evident in the policy discourse, a more in-depth explanation and analysis of intertextuality and interdiscursivity between integration and its sister concepts is forwarded in 7.4.

A governmental definition of integration is not present in the material until 2005. Integration was spoken of in integration policy documents such as *Full and Equal Citizens* (2000), but no definition was explicitly forwarded, there is not even a clear view of what an integrated community looks like. Therefore, what integration entails has to be implicitly inferred from section headings, i.e. accommodation, education, employment, access to healthcare, and community development. In contrast much of the early literature reviewed concentrates on community cohesion. This can be explained by the events at the time, especially the government's responses to the riots in the north of England. As such, later government policy on integration has its discursive roots in dealing with a domestic situation of settled groups of migrants from South Asia (primarily Pakistani) that had been of UK society for a number of generations. A second issue to this history of integration discourse is that, because it comes from the government's responses to riots discursively constructed in the media and in politics as being between different ethnic groups, integration policy's precursor is race relations policy.

The first official definition of community cohesion appeared in the Independent review team's report on community cohesion (more commonly referred to as the *Cantle Report*). The report proposes five domains of community cohesion based on academic work by Forest and Kearns (2000):

- (1) Common values and a civic culture: Common aims and objectives. Common moral principles and codes of behaviour. Support for political institutions and participation in politics

Social order and social control: Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order. Absence of incivility. Effective informal social control. Tolerance; respect for differences; inter-group co-operation.

Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities: Harmonious economic and social development and common standards. Redistribution of public finances and of opportunities. Equal access to services and welfare benefits. Ready acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist others.

Social Networks and Social Capital: High degree of social interaction within communities and families. Civic engagement and associational activity. Easy resolution of collective action problems.

Place Attachment and Identity: Strong attachment to place. Inter-twining of personal and place identity. (*Cantle Report* 2001: 13)

The inter-ministerial report on community cohesion, published in the same month did not give an explicit definition, but instead proposed that:

- (2) Community cohesion requires that there is a shared sense of belonging based on common goals and core social values, respect for difference (ethnic, cultural and religious), and acceptance of the reciprocal rights and obligations of community members working together for the common good (*Building Cohesive Communities* 2001: 18)

There are also similarities, via intertextuality, between the two definitions above and that provided in the *Guidance on Community Cohesion* (2002) for local authorities:

(3) A cohesive community is one where:

There is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities

The diversity of people's different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued

Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and

Strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods

(*Guidance on Community Cohesion* 2002: 6)

The same definition also appears, word for word, in *Community Cohesion: An Action Guide* (2004). As is clear, there is considerable overlap and intertextuality evident. All three of the excerpts deploy *common* as an adjectival modifier, often in explaining a normative future. In (1) it is repeated, as a rhetorical tool three times in the first sentence: *common aims and objectives...common values...common moral principles*. In (2) it is used in *common good* and *common goals* which echo its first use in (1) and in (3) where we see *common vision*. Secondly, in (2) and (3) the phrase *sense of belonging* is used and this tallies, at least in terms of concept with the more complex *Inter-twining of personal and place identity* in (1). *Difference* is also present in all three excerpts. In (1) and (2), *respect* is the theme of the sentence as in: *respect for difference* but in (3) it is intensified, firstly by the use of the indicative declarative clause *diversity of people's background...is appreciated* and secondly by the adverbial construction: *positively valued*. Finally, respect is constructed as an action by using verbs.

The first explicit definition of integration appears in *Integration Matters* in 2005:

(4) By 'integration', we mean the process that takes place when refugees are empowered to achieve their full potential as members of British society, to contribute to the community, and to become fully able to exercise the rights and responsibilities that they share with other residents (*Integration Matters* 2005: 5)

Clearly, 'integration' as understood in this document is different from 'community cohesion'. The main difference is that integration pertains to newcomers, indeed here, a specific group of migrants; refugees. In fact there are no similarities to this and the previous definitions of community cohesion. On the same page in the document though, there is mention of cohesive communities as a connected result of integration. The real, explicit, discursive shift and conceptual linkage when defining integration and community cohesion appears after 2007. The government set up the Commission for Integration and Cohesion, in part as a response to the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005. The commission authors initially state that they see integration and cohesion as separate and go on to explain the differences, the main one being that, while community cohesion is relevant to all, integration is about how new residents and existing residents interact:

- (5) We do not believe integration and cohesion are the same thing as some argue. Cohesion is principally the process that must happen in all communities to ensure different groups of people get on well together; while integration is principally the process that ensures new residents and existing residents adapt to one another...(T)he two processes go on side by side, and ...they interact with one another as local communities experience change and develop a shared future together (*Our Shared Future* 2007: 9)

However, on the following page they then forward a combined definition for integration and cohesion:

- (6) An integrated and cohesive community is one where:
- There is a clearly defined and widely shared sense of the contribution of different individuals and different communities to a future vision for a neighbourhood, city, region or country
  - There is a strong sense of an individual's rights and responsibilities when living in a particular place – people know what everyone expects of them, and what they can expect in turn
  - Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities, access to services and treatment

There is a strong sense of trust in institutions locally to act fairly in arbitrating between different interests and for their role and justifications to be subject to public scrutiny

There is a strong recognition of the contribution of both those who have newly arrived and those who already have deep attachments to a particular place, with a focus on what they have in common

There are strong and positive relationships between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and other institutions within neighbourhoods (*Our Shared Future* 2007: 10)

Though an independent commission, there are a lot of intertextual features in this definition that refer back to previous integration and community cohesion definitions (1-4). For example, there is the recursive epithet of a 'shared sense' which could also be seen as the presence of a topos of shared values. Secondly there is mention of 'similar life opportunities' both in the *Guidance on Community Cohesion* (2002) and *Our Shared Future* (2007) Similarly, the final point in (6) is comparable to the final point in the definition of community cohesion in *Guidance on Community Cohesion* (2002). With regards integration, the definition includes reference to rights and responsibilities which is also present in the definition in *Integration Matters* (2005).

Though investigated in greater detail in 7.4, it is also worth highlighting the interdiscursivity of this document here. Of primary interest is the discursive link between integration and community cohesion. Just as importantly though is the fact that the report was commissioned by the government in reaction to a terrorist event and so at least from a governmental position, terrorism becomes linked to integration (immigration) and community cohesion (race relations). Furthermore, by referencing rights and responsibilities, we can see a link to the language of citizenship.<sup>61</sup> Such conceptual connections imply that difference, and in particular newcomers, are viewed as problematic. This begins to point to the complexity of integration policy and the picture will emerge gradually throughout the chapter.

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<sup>61</sup> The conceptual linkage is further visible in the report from the House of Commons on *Community Cohesion and Migration* (2008). The title indicates how a Parliamentary select committee links two policy areas that had been kept separate (in terms of definitions) for eight previous years.

The government's response to the *Our Shared Future* accepted that there was a need for a new definition of community cohesion. However, the commission's definition is recontextualised so that integration is foregrounded:

- (7) Community Cohesion is what must happen in all communities to enable different groups of people to get on well together. A key contributor to community cohesion is integration which is what must happen to enable new residents and existing residents to adjust to one another (*The Government's Response to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion* 2008: 10)

The government's definitions of community cohesion and integration are almost identical to that forwarded in *Our Shared Future*, but whilst the commission's definition constructs the two as occurring together, *go on side by side*, the government's definition introduces a causality, using a fixed phrase that includes the attributive premodifier *key* and the noun *contributer* to construct integration. This implies that integration is prerequisite for cohesion. The definition appears again, in the *Guidance on Building a Local Sense of Belonging* (2009: 9).

Finally, in a green paper on migration policy from 2009, community cohesion becomes again linked to integration and to citizenship:

- (8) The new system of earned citizenship recognises the important role citizenship can play in community cohesion and places a renewed focus on integration (*Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship* 2009: 8)

It is thus possible to sketch a chain of discursive causality starting with entry and ending in community cohesion:

Immigration → Integration → Citizenship → Community Cohesion

Figure 7.1: Chain of discursive causality from immigration to community cohesion

This theme of interdiscursivity is common throughout the policy discourse. What has hopefully been shown in this section is that the conceptual history of integration and community cohesion is wrought with changes and interlinkages. In the following sec-

tion, the concept of community, mentioned throughout these definitions, will be considered in greater detail.

## 7.2. The polysemy of Community as concept

A key factor in integration policy discourse is the consistent reference to ‘community’. There is not, though, one understanding of ‘community’ and it is used in its singular or plural forms often in conjunction with pronouns or nouns in order to narrow down or widen, potential meanings, that is, ‘community’ can be inclusive or exclusive. For these reasons, we can talk of a polysemy of community that can serve to blur and obfuscate which group of people is being talked about. The usages can also point to how the British government conceives of these groups in relation to integration, immigration and community cohesion.

### 7.2.1. Locating the community

Often ‘community’ is used in the singular form with the definite article and with different prepositions:

- (9) Citizenship education should be fundamentally reviewed...This could include new approaches to volunteering and everyday activity **in the community** (*End of Parallel Lives?* 2004: 14)
- (10) However, there are virtues in being proud of the place where you live and **the community** that you share (*Citizenship Our Common Bond* 2008: 93)
- (11) We would like them [citizenship ceremonies] to be seen as a two-way commitment with **the local community** pledging to support new citizens and with new citizens being clearer about their commitment **to the community** (*End of Parallel Lives?* 2004: 13)<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> My brackets.

- (12) If migrants do not intend to stay in the local area there is less incentive for them to **get involved in the community**, understand local norms, and to learn English (*Report on Community Cohesion and Migration* 2008: 42)

In (9) the use of the preposition *in* constructs community as having a spatial dimension and similarly, in (10), although there is no preposition, *the community* here likely also pertains to a local geographical area because of the reference to location in the previous clause. In (11) though, *to the community* is an elliptical referral to earlier *the local community* and so points to community being understood as a group of people as the target of the mental activity of *commitment*. However, in (12), the meaning is less clear. Although *in* again implies its spatial nature, community here potentially works as synonym for *community life* and is therefore about relationships with people. This sense is also possible because of the desired actions of migrants that follow, both of which are interpersonal rather than spatial.

When drilling down into one specific document, *Building Cohesive Communities* (2001) this polysemy becomes even starker. A town or city may be discursively constructed as having, or consisting of, a number of communities and alternatively reference is also made to a single community:

- (13) The damage done to local businesses, and to the image of, and relations **between those communities** will not be made good (*Building Cohesive communities* 2001: 10)
- (14) directing increased early education and childcare funding to the most disadvantaged areas, where new Neighbourhood Nurseries will be **at the heart of the community** and make particular contribution to closing the childcare gap (*Building Cohesive Communities* 2001: 24)

Because readers would already be aware that the disturbances occurred at a local level rather than between two separate towns, the preposition *between* automatically introduces a relational element to the clause that refers to intra-area phenomena. Thus, the conclusion to be reached is that there can be, or are, many communities in one local

area. However, in the subsequent excerpt (14), there is again evidence of community understood singly and possibly geographically. Here, mapping of the centre of the community, a heart is used metaphorically which logically then constructs the community as (single) body.

### 7.2.2. Being inside and outside the community

Elsewhere in the document, e.g. (15) and (16) below, the use of the quantifying adjectives *all* and *each and every* serves to create the community as at once singular and multiple: Single in the sense that there is one community but multiple in the sense that one community may consist of a number of sub-groups.

(15) The police must have the confidence of **all sections of the community** (*Building Cohesive Communities* 2001: 32)

(16) A transparent prioritisation process undertaken on a fair and rational basis, with the needs of **each and every section of the community** properly taken into account, will reduce the potential for generating bitterness and conflict (*Building Cohesive Communities* 2001: 22)

(17) Our report sets out the action that has already been taken, including...the steps taken to appoint facilitators to foster dialogue **within and between fractured communities**. (*Building Cohesive Communities* 2001: 3)

In excerpt (17) the use of the preposition *within* in conjunction with the prepositional *between* leads readers to think that a local community can consist of not just sub-groups but actually other communities. In this sentence the first preposition locates the issue and the second preposition supplies the relational information. Finally, an even greater level of ambiguity appears with the introduction of singular understandings of potential sub-groups:

- (18) ...every single aspect of the NRU's work is responsive to the needs of the **black and ethnic minority community** (Building Cohesive Communities 2001: 31)

By referring here to a singular ethnic community, it is unclear whether the target is a sub-group within a community or whether it refers to a wider community that includes all black and ethnic minorities in the whole of the UK. If it is the latter, then this raises the critical issue of directing policy measures that were a response to riots in only a few locations to all non-white residents of Britain.

As is clear from the six excerpts above, in this single text, the use of the word *community* is far from regularised and thus a confusing image of what constitutes a community appears. But such confusion is not relegated to one governmental report and is clear across the material. Depending on its usage and predicational lexical choices, *community* can become semantically inclusive or exclusive. Often different sub-groups are discursively constructed as somehow separate from the wider community

- (19) When thinking about the impact of asylum seekers and refugees on community cohesion, you will need to think about the needs not only of the **asylum seeker, refugee and migrant communities but also those of the settled community** (*Community Cohesion Action Guide* 2004: 78)

- (20) Steps must be taken to maximise the potential for new and positive relationships **between refugees and members of the settled population** (Integration Matters 2005: 23)

- (21) Many of the barriers, however, that are faced by newly recognised refugees may also pose problems for **long-established refugee communities** (Integration Matters 2005: 68)

In excerpt (19), from a community cohesion policy document, three different groups of migrants are enumerated before mention of a *settled* community. By constructing these groups as separate, via the use of listing and the adverbial *also*, the implication is that migrants cannot be considered to be part of the settled population despite the fact that this could conceivably include long-term settled groups that had arrived from the 1950s

onwards. A similar construction is evident in (20), which is from refugee integration policy. Here refugees are juxtaposed to settled populations, the result likewise being that refugees are discursively constructed as not existing inside. Thus, refugees can never be considered to be settled. This is also apparent later on in the same document (21). In this sentence, refugee communities are modified by the use of the adjectival phrase *long-established* which marks people that have often lived for generations in the UK as still separate despite the fact that many of these people, included a majority of second and third generation populations would be British citizens and not refugees. From here, it can be taken that the type of migrant, and indeed, whether a person is marked as a migrant at all, impacts upon whether they are included or not in a community. To label a British citizen as a refugee serves to separate them from the national community and so despite having been here for generations or taking British citizenship, they are the targets of community cohesion and integration policy. As such, the term *refugee* in these excerpts appears to have a broader semantic meaning than just legal status, and may include ethnicity or language proficiency.

Evidence from the policy texts also suggests that throughout the period Muslims, a religious rather than legal or ethnic group, are also discursively defined and separated from the national or local community.

- (22) **The local community, including Muslim groups**, should be actively engaged in the partnership (*Prevent* 2008: 8)
- (23) **Communities** which are sometimes poorly equipped to challenge and resist violent extremism (*Prevent* 2008: 5)
- (24) **All political and community leaders share responsibility**, working with the local and national media, for tackling the myths and misrepresentation of facts that can damage cohesion. **Religious extremists** who wrongly argue for support for acts of terrorism **in the name of Islam present the same threat to British Muslim communities as they do to others**, compounded by the fact that they propagate false perceptions about the **values and beliefs of Islam** (*Strength in Diversity* 2004: 11)

In (22) the particularising conjunctive adverb *including* highlights Muslims as somehow singled out for special attention as actors in the sentence and deontic modal auxiliary of recommendation *should* introduces a normative aspect that possibly implies that it is not currently occurring. The next two excerpts (23) and (24) are both examples of how there is often a gradual redefinition of which community is being spoken about. In (23) *communities* is left relatively vague but its full understanding comes via cohesion surrounding it in the text, often a number of pages before. Thus ‘communities’ is redefined via prior mention of training for Imams (*Prevent* 2008: 2-6) and via subsequent mention of Al Qaida. Likewise in (24) the definition of *community leaders* becomes clear only after considering the immediate co-text. Here, the actors are foregrounded as the declarative theme of the sentence and is modified by the predeterminer *all*. However, in subsequent sentences it becomes apparent that the actors are Muslim community leaders

### 7.2.3. The nation as a wider community

Another way in which the community is defined is by the use of deictic expressions of location (*here*), and person (*we*, *our*, *they*). Often this refers to a national rather than local community and is most prevalent in immigration policies rather than community cohesion documents especially ministerial forewords and executive summaries

(25) **Our** proposals for the future of the immigration system set out an approach which ensures that **we** manage and control immigration in a way that is to the benefit not just for **our economy**, but for **our society, our citizens**, and **our way of life** (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 5)

(26) The strategy shows:  
who **we** admit and why; and  
who **we** allow to stay permanently in the UK and why.  
**we** enforce the rules rigorously to admit only those who meet the criteria and prevent those who do not from getting **here**; and  
**we** ensure people leave when they are no longer entitled to be **here** (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 9)

- (27) Although **as a nation we** can see the benefits of immigration, some people are concerned about its impacts in their local area (*Our Shared Future* 2007: 9)

The polysemous *we* and *our* that are deployed sometimes clearly refers to the government but at other junctures, what constitutes this deictic centre is unclear.<sup>63</sup> In (25) the first *our* refers to the government and, through sentence cohesion, so does the first *we*. However, what follows can be understood, depending on who the target reader is, as being an inclusive national ‘our’. The governmental ‘we’ is also present in excerpt (26) but this is tempered by the locational deictic *here* which refers to the UK in general rather than Whitehall and the actual title of the publication *controlling our borders* which as with excerpt (25) can be read as the inclusive national ‘we’. Finally, in (27), the construction *as a nation we* defines the community along proto-ethnic or legal rather than geographical grounds. Those that fall outside of this understanding of nation – refugees and other non-nationals - are excluded from the community.

The section above has shown how ‘community’ is variously constructed in political discourse to the extent that there is a polysemy of community. This investigation into what community means is important for building up an understanding of integration in the UK because, depending on its definition, non-nationals may be included or excluded a priori from the community. Firstly, by locating them as outside, integration becomes a process that must involve moving from the outside to the inside. Secondly, the marking and labelling of long term non-national residents as migrants or refugees, constructs this process of integration as one that does not end once legal and symbolic entry into the community is afforded them via refugee status or citizenship. Integration then is more than citizenship-as-legal status.

### 7.3. The evolution of integration discourse

We now have an idea, albeit vague, of where migrants integrate into and so in this section I will look at how integration has been defined over the period, and how changes

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<sup>63</sup> In itself, *government* can be a metonym for wider state administrative institutions

over time in the discursive construction of what integration is, when it occurs, who is responsible and what it includes.

### 7.3.1. Topoi: How integration is framed over time as a problem

Throughout the ten years, one constant theme was the deployment of the topos of tension as a way of framing immigration and subsequently as a justification for integration policies.

- (28) Migration brings huge benefits: increased skills, enhanced levels of economic activity, cultural diversity and global links. **But it can also raise tensions** unless properly understood and well managed (*Secure Borders* 2002: 9)
- (29) We recognise that inward migration **does create tensions** and that these do not necessarily revolve around race (*End of Parallel Lives* 2004: 15)
- (30) The vision and strategic objectives agreed should be directed towards achieving the following outcomes...**a reduction in racial and inter-religious tension and conflict** (*Guidance on Community Cohesion* 2002: 14)

A second common frame of integration is the topos of burden:

- (31) The Government's policy of dispersing asylum seekers is designed to ensure that **the burden on services** is shared across the country, and **not borne overwhelmingly** in London and the South East (*Secure Borders* 2002: 15)
- (32) It is understandable that people migrate to seek a better life for themselves and their families. But this can leave settled populations, including many in the UK, concerned about **the impact on public services and on their way of life** (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 11-12)

- (33) The message to people refused asylum is clear: they must go home and the **UK taxpayer will not support** them if they do not (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 20)

In all three excerpts there is reference to the impact caused by immigration. In (31) the metaphor of weight is introduced through *burden* and *borne* and in (33) the metaphor is also visible in *support*. Another common theme is that the object of the burden is public funding. In the first two, this referred to as *services* and *public services* but in (33) *UK taxpayer* is used as a metonym (*pars pro toto*) where one member represents the whole group and through this idea of one-as-many and many-as-one, a sense of unity is also present. Asylum seekers are negatively juxtaposed to, and excluded from, this group and even potential membership is barred both in discourse and in policy measures.<sup>64</sup> This also points to the neo-liberal drift across government policy that promotes self sufficiency and denounces reliance on the state. Indeed, when immigration is positively framed, it is primarily at a functional level through topos of financial benefit:

- (34) This five year plan...will ensure Britain continues to benefit from people from abroad **who work hard and add to our prosperity**...Our country's history and success would be very different without the **enterprise and energy** of people who, over centuries, have come to settle here. **We would be poorer** in every way without them. This is as true today as in the past. The movement of people and labour into the UK remains vital to **our economy and our prosperity** (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 5)

Within this short excerpt, four of the five sentences include mention of the economic benefit of immigration and is a rhetorical tool that adds emphasis and cohesion to the argument. Furthermore, it should also be noted that this appears in the Prime Ministerial foreword.

By framing incoming non-nationals as a burden on shared resources and as causing tensions they are not only positioned as a problem that requires a solution but also as a priori responsible for these tensions. Issues of pre-existing communities' attitudes

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<sup>64</sup> Asylum seekers are not entitled to undertake paid work and as such are often forced to be reliant on public funds.

or political decisions that might lead to lower public spending and fewer services are rarely, if ever problematised. Instead, the overall presupposition that implicitly arises from all of these excerpts above is that if there was not immigration, there would not be tension and there would be enough resources for everyone. Two practical consequences of this presupposition arise. Firstly, constructed in this way, immigration policy becomes reduced to a numbers game about limiting the numbers of people entering the country. This can be seen by successive governments' targets to reduce migration and the political and public outcry when these targets are not met. Secondly, in terms of measures contained in integration policy, either the responsibility for improving the situation falls on the shoulders of those who cause the problem or, at the very least, it is non-nationals who should be the targets of the policy and this calls into question the discursive construction of integration as a two-way process.

### 7.3.2. Integration as a normative phenomenon

Government policies are normative and the British governmental discourse on integration is no different. Throughout policies on immigration, refugee integration, citizenship and community cohesion, a picture is built up of what integration should be. The construction of integration as a multidirectional process, via the attributive adjective *two way* is a further constant in the material and this provides continuity to integration policy over the ten years:

- (35) It is a '**two-way street**' requiring commitment and action from the host community, asylum seekers and **long-term migrants alike** (*Secure Borders* 2002: 5)
- (36) Integration in Britain is **not about assimilation** into a single homogenous culture, **it is a two way process** with responsibilities on both new arrivals and established communities (*Strength in Diversity* 2004: 4)
- (37) **Integration is a two-way process** by which both new and existing residents adjust to one another and understand the rights and responsibilities that come

with living in the UK (*Government's Response to the Committee on Cohesion and Migration* 2008: 13)

- (38) **Multiculturalism is a two-way street – they must accept us and change too** (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 14)

As explained in Chapter 2, assimilation is a uni-directional process and has negative connotations, especially in Europe after World War Two. As such, it is unsurprising that policies directed at cultural, national or ethnic difference are discursively constructed as less authoritarian. For example, in excerpt (36) the definition of two-way process comes after a conjunctive clause that contrasts it with a negative definition of what integration does not include, that is, assimilation.<sup>65</sup> In *The Path to Citizenship*, a green paper (38), this argument is reinforced by the inclusion of a response from a focus group participant. It is interesting to note the conceptual overlap where although the policy document is about immigration and naturalisation, the focus group respondent speaks of multiculturalism, which is a much wider category of difference. The strong deontic modal *must* along with the adverb *too* gives the speaker's words a normative dimension but also implies that 'we' (the silent other of 'they') already accept and change.

However, although it is constructed as a two-way process, the types of behavioural processes involved in integration differ between what is expected of the settled community and what is expected of certain incoming non-nationals. On the one hand, the settled community's responsibilities are often to change their mental processes whereas those entering the UK are expected to complete more active, physical actions.

- (39) The CIC report identified the following gaps...For settled communities:...**Lack of understanding of other cultures** (*Review of Migrant Integration Policy* 2008: 9)

- (40) Refugee integration directly contributes to building more cohesive communities by ensuring that refugees receive the necessary support to **become full and active members** of local communities and that local communities **understand**

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<sup>65</sup> In (35) it is also again worth noting that long-term migrants are constructed as a separate group, outside of the host-community.

**and appreciate** the diversity of the contributions that refugees can bring to the local area (*Integration Matters* 2005: 49)

- (41) Earned citizenship aims to improve community cohesion, through increased migrant involvement in the community by way of **active citizenship, and increased public awareness** of the contribution migrants make to the UK (*Earning the Right to Stay* 2009: 17)
- (42) **There is a deal for citizenship.** This is a country of liberty and tolerance, opportunity and diversity – and these values are reinforced by the expectation that **all who live here should learn our language, play by the rules, obey the law and contribute to the community** (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 5)

In the first three excerpts above, these cognitive processes are evident – *understand* and *appreciate*. Moreover, in (40) and (41) these mental processes are compared to the physical actions expected of migrants. This is marked in (40) as normative claim too by the verb *become* which implies that refugees are currently not full and active members. In the final excerpt (42), from the ministerial foreword to a green paper on citizenship, the required processes are enumerated in the imperative mood which is also marked as normative by the modal *should*. The presupposition arising from this is that if these activities are not carried out, then citizenship will not be forthcoming. The point I want to make here is not that physical actions are any harder to achieve than mental processes but that physical actions are more easily measured and are more visible and so leads again to a more performative concept of integration where what is important is performing certain symbolic acts that define an *integrated migrant*.

The normative elements of integration policy are visible throughout the data via the use of modal verbs of obligation.

- (43) Those who want to settle **will have to** show they bring long term benefits to our country (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 22)

- (44) **Newcomers to the UK must earn their right to citizenship** by proving their commitment to the community and the country (*Earning the Right to Stay* 2009: 11)

This frequent use of this strong deontic modality intensifies the onus of integration on incoming populations and mirrors policy considerations that change over time. For example, in *Full and Equal Citizens* (2000) the idea of orientation courses is proposed that would be voluntarily attended but these became compulsory for naturalisation in 2005 and for settlement in 2007 under and became known as the *Life in the United Kingdom* test. Likewise, in the Government commissioned report *The New and the Old* which looked into life in the UK, the authors wrote that “there can be no compulsion” to take British citizenship (2003: 10). Two years later, in *Controlling Our Borders* (2005: 22), this had changed to: “The Government will strongly encourage those who have permanent status to make a commitment to the UK by accepting the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship” and in *Path to Citizenship* (2008) and *Earning the Right to Stay* (2009) there is pressure on long-term non-nationals to become citizens.

More generally, over time the definition of the values that new residents are supposed to possess evolves and as a starting point it is discursively presumed that when they arrive, incoming non-nationals do not have these values.

- (45) Community cohesion requires that there is a shared sense of belonging based on **common goals and core social values** (*Building Cohesive Communities* 2001: 18)

- (46) It [a successful integrated society] must be underpinned by a **sense of people belonging to Britain and to each other**, underpinned by **common human rights and shared values** (*Strength in Diversity* 2004: 1, brackets added)

In the earlier publications, there is reference to values that are modified by the adjective *common* and *common and shared* (see 45 and 46 above) and these are constructed as being the bases of a sense of belonging. In the first excerpt this belonging is to an unspecified community but in the second, the community is replaced with the more expansive, but simultaneously more exclusive *Britain*. Both earlier, but primarily later, these

same values are redefined as *British*. Thus it is not just a certain set of values that lead to a sense of belonging but ‘British values’.

- (47) **To be British** is to respect those overarching specific institutions, **values, beliefs and traditions** that bind us all (*The New and the Old* 2000: 11)
- (48) With the exception of the **values of respect for others and the rule of law, including tolerance and mutual obligations between citizens, which we consider are essential elements of Britishness**, differences in values and customs need to be resolved through negotiation (*Improving Opportunity* 2005: 42)
- (49) There is a simple ambition behind our proposed reform of the immigration system: **to place the values of the British people** at the heart of the journey newcomers take towards citizenship (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 14)

By labelling these positive characteristics with the adjective *British*, the presupposition is that nationals from other countries do not have such values. For example, in excerpt (47) being British is linked to jointly held values but by a process of deduction to not be British means to not share these values. This is despite the fact that the values enumerated in (48) are applicable to most liberal democracies around the world. In (49) the construction is different again and the result is similarly exclusionary. Here, values are possessed by *British people* and it is because these newcomers don’t share the same values that they need to be a central part of new immigration and citizenship policy. This construction of values also presupposes that all British people show respect for others and the rule of law etc., which is not necessarily the case.

The discursive constructions of such values occur despite recommendations from the *Commission on Integration and Cohesion* to not use the term ‘British values’:

not because our national society has no values to which it is committed but, rather, because many of our broadly held values are common to people in other countries and calling them ‘British values’ feeds a ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality where we imply that ‘we British’ have values which others simply don’t share (*Our Shared Future* 2007: 65).

These values though are extended to include other characteristics and the list becomes more prescriptive and assimilatory:

- (50) We believe we need to work harder to strengthen the things – **the values, the habits, the qualities** – that we have in common, and thereby strengthen our communities (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 12)
- (51) Joining in with **the British way of life** (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 7)
- (52) There is room to celebrate multiple and different identities, **but none of these identities should take precedence over the core democratic values that define what it means to be British** (*Governance of the UK* 2007: 57)

In (50) there is reference to not just values but also other abstract nouns concepts as *habits* and *qualities* which could be read as metonyms for ‘culture’ or, the ‘British way of life’ (51). The normative assimilatory nature of integration policy is also observable in (52) where British identity is firstly constructed as consisting of *core democratic values* and then placed at the top of a hierarchy so that other (non-British) identities are of less importance.

Moreover, as well as becoming more assimilatory and less two-way, government discourse also becomes more proscriptive in that incoming non-national are expected to do more things in order to acquire British citizenship:

- (53) We **now require much more** from those who wish to be citizens - they **must** pass a residence test; be intending to make the UK their home; be of good character; and pass an English language requirement and (from later this year) a test of knowledge of life in the UK. (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 22)
- (54) Second, we are making a series of changes to set out more clearly the **expectations on newcomers: to work, pay taxes and support themselves without recourse to public funds; to learn English, and to obey the law**. Citizenship or permanent residence will no longer follow automatically from staying in Britain

for a number of years, instead **it must be earned** (*Managing the Impacts of Migration* 2008: 6)

In the first, there is the verb *require* which is stronger and more normative than other potential lexical choices such as *expect*. The verb is also intensified by the modal verb *must* and the list of requirements, which includes mental processes and physical actions, is qualified by the strong modal of obligation which is also present in the final clause of (54) in relation to *earned* citizenship. It is worth noting the intertextuality of the expectations in the excerpt which were also present in two other government documents of that year – *Path to Citizenship* (2008, cf. excerpt 42) and the *Government's response to the House of Commons report on Community Cohesion and Migration* (2008: 4). The differences in the two lists of requirements or expectations for newcomers also points to the shift in the discursive construction of integration from one that is concerned with race relations and community cohesion (50) to increasingly performative one (53) to one of integration that later is based on neo-liberal ideals (54).

### 7.3.3. The Sisyphean nature of integration

Even if incoming-non nationals do carry out these processes it won't always guarantee that they will become integrated. Part of the reason for this is how integration is constructed as process. In the first half of the literature, action that makes up integration, especially citizenship, is described simply as a process, but later metaphors of movement are employed:

(55) We want to make **the journey to citizenship** clearer, simpler and easier for the public and migrants to understand (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 5)

(56) This document seeks views on how these principles can be strengthened and built upon by... supporting those who are **on the path to citizenship** to integrate into their new communities (*Earning the Right to Stay* 2009: 6)

In (55) the metaphor *journey* is used to describe the process of acquiring citizenship and here, citizenship is the end-goal, denoted by the directional preposition *to* and in (56) there is intertextual reference to a previous policy document in the continued use of *path*. Using the metaphor of a road in conjunction with the definite article implies two things: Firstly that there is only one route to citizenship. This in turn leads us to integration as a limited, closely controlled process and doesn't allow for difference or deviation from that path. Secondly, these metaphorical constructions also carry on the use of journey as metaphor for a migrant's life in general, so that even once they arrive at their new country of residence, the story is not yet over. Indeed, discursively integration is often constructed as an unending process.

There is some contention and disclarity in the material as to whether there is an end point to integration.

- (57) We have emphasised the importance of **successfully integrating new arrivals** to Britain through a two way process with responsibilities on both the migrant and the community that welcomes them (*Strength in Diversity* 2004: 18)
- (58) To incentivise migrants to make the commitment to becoming British citizens and **fully integrate into society**, probationary citizens would be able to apply for citizenship after a minimum period of 1 year (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 26)
- (59) Once citizenship is obtained a **person ceases to be a migrant and can become fully integrated** into our society (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 23)
- (60) The Government believes that in order to ensure that there is a common bond between **all types of citizen in the UK, whether born in the country or naturalised...** (*Governance of the UK* 2007: 57)
- (61) **Long-established refugee communities...**have a role to play (*Full and Equal Citizens* 2000: 12)

The proscriptive nature of integration is pointed to by the frequent predication of it as *successful* or *full* (57 and 58) which also indicates that there is an end point and it is a

completable task. However, less explicitly, there are indications that reaching this point is anything but straightforward. For example, in (59) integration is again a finite process that is only possible after citizenship. However this implies that a migrant who does not take citizenship cannot fully integrate and raises questions with regards the assimilatory nature of post-immigration life in that integration here is equated with becoming British (and all this entails). This in turn problematises how non-citizens are dealt with in the UK as it precludes non-citizens from ‘fully’ integrating. Other examples though bring into question whether even citizenship leads to full integration. In (60) citizens are differentiated, through an additional clause, between those that are born in the UK and those that take citizenship later and this marks new citizens as discursively separate from those born here. Similarly, (61) potentially labels British citizens (either via naturalisation or birth) as refugees and thus prohibits them from shaking off the tag of an outsider that still needs to integrate. Constructing integration as an unending process and incoming non-nationals as outsiders means that integration becomes an impossible task with the goalposts being moved constantly and the parameters for what constitutes ‘successful’ integration being discursively constructed and negotiated within the public sphere by those with power.

#### 7.3.4. The linguistic agency of integration

Having already looked at the type of processes that incomers are expected to undertake, another way to investigate integration is to look at the linguistic agency, or transitivity, behind it. Three patterns of transitivity were evident, each of which represents the process as being brought about from the outside or inside. The first is that migrants were sometimes constructed as the object, that is, they were integrated by an outside agent.

- (62) We will apply the New Asylum Model to ensure that asylum cases are resolved quickly, with those who do not qualify removed promptly and **genuine refugees integrated** (*Fair, Effective, Trusted, Transparent* 2006: 9)
- (63) Overseen by this new national body, our assessment is that what needs to be done locally **to integrate new migrants** can be summarised in three fairly

straightforward steps: providing access to information on services,... working with partners to find creative ways to provide “cultural briefing” on the norms and expectations particular to local areas, and providing tailored support for learning English (*Our Shared Future* 2007: 69)

- (64) The Commission for Integration and Cohesion’s (CIC) report *Our Shared Future* recommended that **all levels of government should do more to welcome and integrate new migrants**, and to enable new residents and existing residents to adjust to one another (*Review of Migrant Integration Policy* 2008: 1)

In both of the first highlighted extracts the specific agent is deleted from the clause. There is thus no attribution of responsibility and yet by creating the ‘migrant’ as the object of the process rather than the agent, they are given a passive role which they are unable to influence. Although there is agent deletion in (62) through ellipsis, the agent of this integration can be guessed at as ‘we’ and a consideration of the wider co-text would reveal that this ‘we’ refers to the government. It is worth noting too the semantically loaded attributive adjective ‘genuine’ used in conjunction with the modifying noun *refugees*. The presupposition from this is that there is also a (potential) group of un-genuine, or bogus, refugees. In contrast to these two, excerpt (64) is an example of where the agents are present, here laid out in a normative claim that it is not just central government but also regional and local that have responsibility to integrate migrants. Whether the agent is explicit or not though, by constructing the newcomer as a passive grammatical patient, would then lead to a ‘top-down’ interpretation of integration in which the process is controlled.

The second example of transitivity is the rendering of migrants as the agents of their own integration.

- (65) For those settling in Britain, the Government has a clear expectation that **they will integrate into our society** and economy because all the evidence indicates that this benefits them and the country as a whole (*Improving Opportunity* 2005: 45)

- (66) But even with this investment, there are still too many long-term residents committed to making a contribution to Britain who cannot engage with other people in their neighbourhoods – let alone play an active role in their communities – simply because their lack of English prevents it. This is having a negative impact on their life chances and limiting **their ability to integrate** (*Focusing ESOL on Community Cohesion* 2008: 3)

In (65) the agency and the responsibility of the newcomer is enhanced by *into* that directs the process towards the deictic centre *our society*. If integration is two-way, as the government claims, then it should be a collaborative process, but here integration is unidirectional. Moreover, the preposition *into* constructs *our society* as a container which the migrant has to enter from the outside. This being the case, *integrate* here is instead a synonym for assimilate. In (66), there is reference to certain people's ability to integrate. Ability is a quality and therefore, not possessing this quality is a deficiency which needs addressing. By constructing non-English speakers as in some way deficient it again lays the responsibility to change at their feet. The attribution of agency to newcomers can be read as a positive step, if compared to the previous option. However, an alternative interpretation is that the wide use of this sentence construction fits in well with the diffusion of neo-liberal ideas and language into all areas of government policy that prioritises self-sufficiency and minimises state intervention/reliance.

A third construction of transitivity is a process with an additional agent:

- (67) For those who wish to make the UK their home and earn the privileges of settlement under the new system, the Government has a responsibility **to support them in integrating fully and enabling them to contribute** to their new communities (*Earning the Right to Stay* 2009: 21)
- (68) **Facilitating integration** will require you to introduce newly arrived communities to the way that systems work (*Community Cohesion Action Guide* 2004: 79)
- (69) This [the TimeBank Time Together programme] is a mentoring scheme for refugees and it has enormous benefits in terms **of helping refugees to integrate** (*Citizenship: Our Common Bond* 2008: 116, brackets added).

In these constructions there is an additional level of agency, via the verbs help, facilitate, support and enable, in the process of integration whereby the government is the key agent that facilitates a secondary process. Moreover there is a presupposition of a causal relationship in that, if the government did not support migrants to integrate, they would not be able to integrate. As with the second form of transitivity, there can be two views of how such an agentive construction can be interpreted. On the one hand this can point to the government as a benign facilitator of integration that both understands its responsibilities and treats newcomers as capable albeit with assistance. On the other hand though, the construction can veil the power of the state in controlling how integration is done and how it is understood. This then fits in with the increasingly performative nature of integration (cf. 7.4 below) and how the state sets the expectations of integration.

### **7.3.5. Section Summary**

This core section of the chapter has tried to unpack what integration means. It was shown how migration is framed and how this frame necessitates integration. Following this, the normative nature of integration discourse was discussed in detail and this was followed by an explanation of how it is constructed as an unending process. Finally, the linguistic agency of integration and how this affects the construction of integration was outlined. One final question remains unanswered though that needs addressing is the issue of who integrates and who the policy provisions are directed at. Throughout the policy material reference is often made to ‘migrants’ which is an encompassing term which can refer to asylum seekers, refugees, TCNs, students and EEA nationals. However, in reality integration policy is almost completely directed at non-EEA migrants and in the early part of the material, especially asylum seekers and refugees. EU nationals are also invisible in citizenship and community cohesion policy too, despite the fact that they make up approximately 30% of the total foreign-born population and the numbers have increased substantially since 2004. Firstly this means that residents who “play an important role in local communities” (*Our Shared Future* 2007: 62) are not included within policy although they may face similar issues (language, social exclusion). It is

not even clear whether they are expected to integrate. Secondly, by linking such values as belonging, national identity and citizenship together, more generally it ignores the reality of the modern UK where there are 4.5million non-nationals that live and work in the country and this goes back to a more general failure of liberal democracies to theorise non-nationals; if a person is not included as a citizen they are excluded from participation. This was not an issue in the city states of ancient Greece and was not even applicable to the United Kingdom up until the middle of the twentieth century. Nowadays though, with increased flows of migrants of all kinds, temporary and permanent, from different areas, concepts such as citizenship (as-legal-status) break down. Finally, by focusing on non-EEA nationals, and more recently specific groups such as Muslims, integration becomes framed as the need to deal with ‘cultural’ differences whereby ‘their’ culture is incompatible with ‘ours’. As such, the discursive construction of integration cannot be separated from wider them/us binary oppositions that dominate immigration discourse.

#### **7.4. Integration as performance**

The discursive construction of integration as, at base, an issue of cultural difference, obviously shapes integration policy into a form of cultural assimilation and over time, greater and greater emphasis on outward public performances of this assimilation as a prerequisite to ‘successful integration’. It is to this that I now turn.

##### **7.4.1. A neo-liberal construction of integration**

As outlined in Chapter 3, a key component of integration is citizenship-as-desirable-activity in that acceptance into the national community is only possible through being seen to be performing certain acts that are discursively constructed as in some way symbolic and salient to the community and nowadays legal status is only guaranteed after performative acts (Lepofsky and Fraser 2003). Integration policy is normative and this was evident throughout the period of analysis (2000-2010), but as we move through

the decade, a more performative understanding of integration gradually emerges that is based on neo-liberal assumptions.

As already noted in 7.3, how the agency of integration is linguistically rendered can give some insight into the neo-liberal ideology at the heart of government policy and it was further argued that the twin topoi of immigrants as a burden and immigration as offering purely financial benefit. It is also visible in more frequent usage of financial and economic terms such as “*Earning the Right to Stay*” (2009, 1) or “the long term *business of integration* begins when an asylum seeker is recognised as a refugee” (Integration Matters 2005: 62) and the policy provisions which favour higher earning migrants such as investors and entrepreneurs (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 16).

- (70) Permanent migrants **must be as economically active as possible; put as little burden on the state as possible**; and be as socially integrated as possible (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 21)
- (71) Those who have permanent status have the same rights as citizens, **but have to be able to demonstrate**, before they are granted that status, that **they can support themselves and their families** (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 23)
- (72) Once people are here, we are making a series of changes to set out more clearly the expectations on newcomers; **to work, pay taxes and support themselves without recourse to public funds**. (*Managing the Impacts of Migration* 2008: 10)
- (73) The second clear principal that emerged from our groups’ discussions was the **importance of working and paying tax...in essence, working and paying tax were seen as essential precursors to acquiring citizenship** (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 15)

All of these excerpts foreground the qualities of self-sufficiency in multiple ways. In (71 and 72), this is constructed through the reflexive verb *support* (+ *themselves*). Each of these is qualified: In (72), this is via reference to not just the applicant but their family too and in (71), mention is made of not relying on state funds. The topoi of burden is

also deployed in (70), which is intensified by the strong deontic modal *must*, to not rely state funds. The physical action of *working* (70, 71 and 73) and *paying taxes* (72 and 73) are also used prevalently when the expectations of incoming non-nationals are enumerated and their constant presence reinforces their position as actions that have a symbolic quality for existing members of the (national) community.

#### 7.4.2. Discursive expectations of performative integration

It is not though merely economic activity and self-reliance that is required of new migrants but a whole raft of different processes and characteristics that are expected. Amongst these are the need to learn English, which is increasingly problematised (cf. excerpt 66), and the necessity to pass the *Life in the United Kingdom* test for those taking British citizenship. Within the governmental discourse of integration, two other areas of policy indicate the performative nature of integration: voluntary work and obeying the law.

(74) The benefits of volunteering are large, it can help develop social skills and self esteem, to help asylum seekers and refugees feel at home in unfamiliar communities but **also to demonstrate to the ‘local’ communities the benefits that new arrivals can bring** (*Community Cohesion Action Guide* 2004: 79)

(75) People seeking British citizenship **will able to qualify more quickly if they demonstrate their commitment to the UK by playing an active part in their community**. We propose that migrants should be **able to demonstrate ‘active citizenship’** through a wide variety of activities, but that all of these activities should have one thing in common: that they benefit the local community (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 7)

The construction of citizenship as a series of desirable actions first emerges in the material in *Strength in Diversity* in 2004. In this document, the first reference is made to active citizenship via “participation, volunteering and civic action” as a way to foster community cohesion and an “integrated society” (*Strength in Diversity* 2004: 6). To

begin with, active citizenship was promoted as an ideal activity for all members of society and especially young people, but later the expectation became more oriented towards incoming populations. The performativity of integration is made clear in the two excerpts above through the use of the physical verb *demonstrate* which denotes a relational process and is directed to the beneficiary (recipient). In essence, it is a theatrical audition with an actor (migrant), a script (voluntary action), a stage (local area), and an audience (current residents of the area). Carrying on this analogy, the actor will be rewarded with a role only if they prove their worth. The importance of active citizenship is later enhanced by the policy proposition that undertaking a set amount of voluntary work would speed up the process of acquiring citizenship by up to twelve months. However, though framed as encouragement, it could alternatively be seen as punitive, i.e. that the process would be slowed down by up to twelve months if voluntary work was not undertaken.

As well as being expected to actively do ‘good’ things, both newcomers and pre-existing members of the community are also expected to not do ‘bad’ things.

- (76) The importance of our work has been underlined by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September and the consequent rise in racial incidents and community tensions. **The Muslim community has condemned the terrorist attacks and the Prime Minister and other senior Ministers have stressed their support for the Muslim community and condemned racist activity** (*Building Cohesive Communities* 2001: 3)
- (77) It is important to keep families together but you have to be responsible for them. **If they can’t control their kids they should have their status revoked as family** (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 16)
- (78) We are also considering the possibility of deducting points or applying penalties for not integrating into the British way of life, for criminal or anti-social behaviour, or in circumstances where **an active disregard for UK values is demonstrated** (*Earning the Right to Stay* 2008: 16)

In (76) there is a causal or at least temporal chain, through the strategy of syntactic parallelism, in which the government only supports Muslim communities after they have publicly condemned terrorist attacks. The presupposition, then, is that if the Muslim communities had not condemned 9/11 they would not have been supported by the government. This imposes upon migrant communities a certain way they are expected to act. Likewise with regards to citizenship applicants, the stand alone quote from a focus group participant in (77) implies an expectation that they should be able to control their families and that there should be some form of penalty for not doing so – the denial of the right to a family. This would appear to go further than the actions and penalties for pre-existing citizens. Finally, as well as having to obey the law (excerpt 78, see also 42 and 54) prospective citizens are further expected to adhere to ‘UK values’. How this might look like in practice was revealed in a radio interview with a government minister who said that taking part in certain legal activities such as demonstrations might jeopardise citizenship applications (Guardian 2009). Again the performative nature of adherence to values is visible with the verb *demonstrate*.

In this section, I have shown the neo-liberal tendencies in integration discourse in governmental policy and how integrations is constructed as a performative act. It should be noted, that I am not claiming that paying taxes, condemning terrorism and obeying the law are bad activities. On the contrary these appear to be sensible and necessary requirements for the functioning of a country. Rather, what I have tried to show is that in integration discourse, firstly newcomers do not currently carry out these actions or possess the required character traits. They are thus constructed as deficient and in need of ‘civilising’ through an integration policy which is rhetorically wrapped-up and presented as a two-way process but which in actual fact, is assimilatory. Secondly, more is expected of migrants than of existing citizens. Perhaps the best example of this is the discursive performativity of the citizenship ceremony. In these ceremonies the new citizens are rewarded for their symbolic performances as good proto-citizens and have to swear an oath of allegiance in front of their families, members of the local community and public officials (as representatives of the government). According to the *Life in the UK Advisory Group* (2003), the oath is “explicit for new citizens and implicit for us all” (*Life in the UK* 2003: 30). Here, then is proof within the political material that the performing good citizenship is expected more of migrants than of citizens.

## 7.5. Interdiscursive and intertextual links between integration and other policy areas

In this final section, I will show that integration doesn't just appear in integration literature but in other policies too. I will explain that integration is an issue that overlaps discursively and policy wise with many other areas of government activity and I will illustrate what happens to its meaning in other documents and discursive policy areas.

Integration is discursively connected to many different phenomena and that each of these are regularly also linked with one another within the literature. Table 7.1 (below) shows the interdiscursivity of 'integration' as well as a number of other processes, policy areas, effects and people that are conceptually linked to integration.

		Processes				Policy		Effects				People					
		<i>Integration</i>	<i>Citizenship</i>	<i>Community Cohesion</i>	<i>Immigration</i>	<i>Race Relations</i>	<i>ESOL</i>	<i>Economy</i>	<i>Pressure on State Funds</i>	<i>Terrorism</i>	<i>Crime</i>	<i>Migrants</i>	<i>EEA Migrants</i>	<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Asylum Seekers</i>	<i>Ethnic Minorities</i>	<i>Muslims</i>
Processes	<i>Integration</i>		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	<i>Citizenship</i>	○		○	○	○	○			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	<i>Community Cohesion</i>	○	○		○	○	○			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	<i>Immigration</i>	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Policy	<i>Race Relations</i>	○	○	○	○				○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
	<i>ESOL</i>	○	○	○	○			○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Effects	<i>Economy</i>	○		○	○			○			○	○	○	○			
	<i>Pressure on state funds</i>	○			○						○	○	○	○			
	<i>Terrorism</i>	○	○	○	○	○				○	○			○			○
	<i>Crime</i>	○		○	○	○		○			○			○			
People	<i>Migrants</i>	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○
	<i>EEA Migrants</i>	○	○	○	○		○	○	○		○						
	<i>Refugees</i>	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		○			○	○	○	
	<i>Asylum Seekers</i>	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		○				
	<i>Ethnic Minorities</i>	○	○	○	○	○					○		○	○			○
	<i>Muslims</i>	○	○	○	○	○	○		○		○		○	○	○	○	
<b>Total Linkages (15)</b>		15	13	14	15	11	11	8	7	9	9	15	8	12	14	10	10

Table 7.1: Interdiscursive and policy connections in UK government policy (2000-2010)

As has already been shown in Section 7.1, community cohesion, one of integration's closer sister concepts, is already discursively linked with migration and integration:

- (79) A key contributor to **community cohesion is integration** which is what must happen to enable **new residents** and existing residents to adjust to one another (*The Government's Response to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion* 2008: 10)

By connecting community cohesion to integration, migration also becomes linked with settled communities. But it is also connected to many other themes:

- (80) Strength in Diversity: **Towards a Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy** (*Strength in Diversity* 2004: 1)

- (81) The rise in **international terrorism, new patterns of migration and the effects of globalisation**, can all contribute to people's sense of insecurity and fear, which is often most profoundly felt in areas suffering deprivation or where change occurs over a short period of time (*Strength in Diversity* 2004: 10)

- (82) What more should be done to embed race equality in the delivery of public services? **For Black and minority ethnic people to have confidence and trust in public services, those services must have workforces that reflect the population they serve** and this is particularly important for services that are responsible for enforcing the law or exercising some other form of control over individuals. **This is obviously true for the immigration service, police and other criminal justice agencies**, but also a key factor and local authorities, for example housing departments (*Strength in Diversity* 2004: 15)

- (83) I believe we need to give more attention to what binds us together if we are to achieve **the economic and social progress that benefits** (*Improving Opportunity* 2005: 5)

- (84) This strategy...sets out the actions the Government is taking and will take to help drive the process of integration forward. It has been written in the light of the duty on the Government, and on all public bodies, to work for the promotion of good race relations, which was introduced by **the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000**. Indeed, it seeks to provide a major contribution to the fulfilment of that duty. **The principles of this strategy are also consistent with the principles of community cohesion. Ensuring the integration of refugees will be an integral part of building more cohesive communities in many areas** (*Integration Matters* 2005: 13)

To give an example of these connections, we can look at *Strength in Diversity*, a community cohesion policy document from 2004 (excerpts 80-82). The twin policy areas of community cohesion and race relations are closely linked together in the first excerpt (80) in the title of the document not just by their proximity in the sentence but also by being combined into one singular strategy as opposed to the use of the plural. In the subsequent extract, through syntactic cohesion, migration and terrorism are jointly constructed as causes for *insecurity and fear* and in (82), race equality is first, quite naturally, linked to black and ethnic minorities but also, minorities are then conceptually linked to immigration and crime as *obvious* public services that they will have contact with. No mention is made of the other public services that are frequently used by minorities, for example schools, health centres, libraries etc. This complicated network is added to by (83), an excerpt from another community cohesion and race equality strategy from only one year later (*Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society* 2005), community cohesion as necessary for *economic and social* progress and finally, in *Integration Matters* (84), a refugee integration white paper, integration is linked to race relations, completing the circle neatly, to community cohesion.

Another interesting interdiscursive nexus point is ESOL:

- (85) Darra Singh's recent report "Our Shared Future" on integration and cohesion published in June 2007 showed that the ability to communicate effectively is the most important issue facing **integration and cohesion for both settled and new communities in Britain...** Our ESOL policy is a success... **But even with this investment, there are still too many long-term residents committed** to mak-

ing a contribution to Britain who cannot engage with other people in their neighbourhoods – let alone play an active role in their communities – simply because their lack of English prevents it. **This is having a negative impact on their life chances and limiting their ability to integrate.** (*Focusing ESOL on Community Cohesion* 2008: 3)




Figure 7.2: Cover of Focusing ESOL on Community Cohesion (2008)

Throughout the material, the ability to speak English is highlighted as a major barrier, or prerequisite, for integration and is regularly discursively linked to asylum seekers, refugees, TCNs and EEA migrants. As was shown in 7.1, integration came to be redefined and closely aligned to community cohesion, to the extent that after 2007 the government offered just one definition to explain the two issues which had hitherto been separate. Such a linking, via ESOL, is also present in the excerpt above. Firstly, the lack of English skills is constructed as a barrier for both new migrants and settled communities, which may include *long-term residents* that may have taken British citizenship before the ESOL requirements were introduced. It is constructed as having an impact on the ability to integrate despite the fact that integration policy, in theory at least, pertains to new migrants. So, a policy stipulation that is originally constructed as relevant to

migrants, becomes applied to long-term residents and social cohesion. Visually, the images contained in the document hints at what types of people need help with ESOL, for example the two black women in Image 7.1 (elsewhere in the document, there are images of women in headscarves and men and women who are visibly non-white). Similarly, within the document it is made clear that the policy is aimed at long-term migrants rather than short-term ones from EEA countries (despite an acceptance that this too is an issue). Finally, reference is made to “the engagement of faith communities, online provision and volunteering linked to citizenship” (Focusing ESOL on Community Cohesion 2008: 5) as important contributions to the ESOL and community cohesion strategy and thus, the network of ESOL is extended not just to migrants but, at least potentially, to British citizens.

Citizenship is a further concept that is often linked to integration and other phenomena:

- (86) We will develop our **citizenship and nationality policy** to create a supportive, **safe and cohesive community** (*Secure Borders* 2002: 20)
  
- (87) The new system of **earned citizenship** recognises the important role citizenship can play in **community cohesion and places a renewed focus on integration**. While the privileges of citizenship must now be earned, for those prepared to commit to the UK and make it their home on a permanent basis, the Government has a duty to support them in integrating into their new communities. (*Earning the Right to Stay* 2009: 8)

From 2002 onwards citizenship and integration become linked discursively and in terms of policy through the introduction of citizenship ceremonies. In (86) we also see it linked to cohesive communities and to community safety and such interdiscursivity extends right through, up to the later years with two integration documents the Path to Citizenship (2008) and Earning the Right to Stay (2009). As can be seen here (87), citizenship is placed as important to community cohesion and constructs integration as a tool or process, of which citizenship is a part of, that will lead to cohesive communities. However, like ESOL, citizenship is not just rendered in the discourse as an issue for incoming non-nationals.

- (88) Working particularly with **the Muslim community** to help strengthen religious understanding among young people **and in particular support an understanding of citizenship in an Islamic context**. This may include work in partnership with Islamic institutions such as mosque schools (*Prevent Strategy* 2008: 18)

In the excerpt above (88) from the *Prevent Strategy* (2008), a guide for local authorities on combating extremism and terrorism, citizenship teaching is extended, away from merely compulsory citizenship classes in schools and towards Muslim-focussed citizenship teaching. This presupposes that Muslims require greater instruction in what citizenship means and thus constructs them as somehow deficient.

Such a network of interdiscursive linkages obviously has a distinct impact upon how integration is understood because it broadens what and who is included in any wider discussion of it. These connections don't just occur through connecting different discourse topics together but also through policy provisions. Indeed the discursive connections and blurring between integration and other concepts facilitates, and is facilitated by, a frequent overlap of policy measures. For example, citizenship classes which were initially for migrants and were then introduced as a compulsory subject in schools becomes a method to deter terrorism (*Prevent* 2008: 2). Similarly, over time ESOL becomes a major provision for immigration, integration, citizenship, community cohesion and anti-terrorism.

The situation also not helped by conceptual slippage when referring to different migrants whereby there is no clear distinction between different groups of migrants.

- (89) This ease of movement has broken down traditional boundaries. Yet the historic causes of homelessness, hunger or fear – conflict, war and persecution – have not disappeared. **That is why economic migration and the seeking of asylum** are as prevalent today as they have been at times of historic trauma (*Secure Borders* 2002: 2)

- (90) It will enable us to attract those migrants that our economy needs and provide a safe haven to **genuine refugees**...This section sets out who can enter the UK. It demonstrates the economic benefits they bring and reaffirms our commitment to

our international obligations to **refugees who need our protection** (*Controlling Our Borders* 2005: 8-9)

- (91) The key feature of the proposed system is that it aims to increase community cohesion by ensuring **all migrants** ‘earn’ the right to citizenship and asks migrants to demonstrate their commitment to the UK by playing an active part in the community (*Path to Citizenship* 2008: 12)

In (89) economic migration and asylum seeking are linked via syntactic proximity and also as results of the same processes and in (90) *refugee* is used to explain the temporal position of an asylum seeker in the application process. People who need protection are asylum seekers but only become refugees when this fact has been accepted by the border agencies. Furthermore, by constructing refugees with the attributive adjective *genuine*, the presupposition is that there also exists a group of ‘bogus’ refugees. Finally, in (91) the policy document refers migrants collectively as *all migrants* despite the fact that it pertains only to those from outside the EEA. The conceptual blurring is also present not just when incoming non-nationals are the targets of policy but of when referring to those who are already *part of the community*.

- (92) (B)oth **white and ethnic minority** young men were involved. Most were local to the area. The ethnic minority young men involved were largely of **Pakistani and Bangladeshi** origin (*Building Cohesive Communities* 2001: 8)

To begin with, in the excerpt above participants in the disturbances are described through their ethnicity, but in the same passage this changes to one of national origin and by using nationality origin they are marked as non-British and from the outside, despite having British passports and being born in the UK. This gives succour to the argument made in Chapter 5 that the UK’s immigration and integration policies are at base race-relations policies that problematise racial, or now cultural, differences furthermore, those that are culturally different to the inside are discursively constructed as deficient and as such, any integration policy will err on the side of assimilation towards desired modes of being and action.

## 7.6. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have investigated how integration is discursively constructed by the UK government. To do this, I have expanded my research to concepts that are inextricably linked to integration discursively and in terms of policy provision. Firstly the history of how 'integration' has been presented in policy was outlined. As time went by, integration became consistently more closely linked to community cohesion, the result being that integration was connected to race relations and settled residents rather than just incoming non-nationals. After this, it was forwarded that a clear understanding of integration was made less possible because of the differing meanings, or polysemy, of 'community'. Section 7.3 focussed on the discursive construction of integration and in analysing the long-term history of the political discourse, it is clear that immigration is framed as problematic and therefore requires both immigration and integration policies to be highly normative and that the onus of integration was on incoming populations rather than all members of the community. Thus, normative integration policy takes on an assimilatory character, despite it being constructed rhetorically as two-way. It was also noted that integration policies and discourse are further hamstrung by Britain's membership of the EEA and the issues that this brings concerning citizenship how to include such migrants in the community. Subsequently in 7.4, it was argued that this assimilatory integration is also a discursive performance in which certain newcomers must prove that they have sufficiently become like the inside before they are accepted into the community. Finally, 7.5 claimed that the interdiscursive nature of integration policies leads to is a blurring of the concept of integration and its sister concepts. They are hazy spheres of terms that become nebulous entities. The borders between concepts, and by extension policies, that should be kept separate, and in places are discursively constructed as such, instead become blurred and overlap, which in turn, confuses what integration is, crucially, who is expected to integrate. This makes a switching between topics and actors possible and also works to allow attribution of blame and responsibility to different groups and the problem is further complicated by high levels of conceptual slippage between different types of migrants and between migrants and British ethnic minorities.

This investigation of policy texts has shown how the phenomenon integration is discursively constitutive and constituted within policy. However, these government dis-

courses are just one portion of the wider discursive construction of integration in the public sphere. In the following chapter it will be shown how government literature is negotiated, interpreted and passed on to the general public via the media.

## Chapter 8: Analysis of media texts

In the previous chapter the political discourse, that is governmental policy documents and other parliamentary publications, was analysed. In this chapter the focus shifts to representations of integration, which is a key component of the movement of the discourse of integration through the public sphere. As was argued in Chapter 1, the media interprets and reproduces, or recontextualises, political discourse which is then consumed by the wider public through an increasing number of mediums including, inter alia, television, traditional print media and their online versions, online only news outlets, and social media. In this thesis, I concentrate only on traditional print media articles, although a vast majority of them were also published online concurrently. To briefly recapitulate, the data comes from four national newspapers (*Guardian*, *Telegraph*, *Daily Mail*, *Mirror*) and one local (*Brighton Argus*).<sup>66</sup>

The aim of this chapter is to try to ascertain if and how the discourse of integration circling at the political level is transferred to the media. The chapter will therefore to some extent follow thematic focus of the previous one in that it will look at similar topics of linguistic action. This should not though lead to the expectation that the media discourse was an exact replica of the political. Indeed, ‘integration’ was not salient as a term or topic of media articles in the period of analysis. This doesn’t mean to say that discursive constructions of integration are not visible but rather that it is written about more obliquely and is understood in terms of other concepts.

The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 8.1 will introduce a brief corpus analysis of the data. This initial method was employed in order to down-size the corpus but also to check for collocation and frequency patterns in the data. The remainder of

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<sup>66</sup> For a detailed explanation of data collection, see Chapter 6.

the chapter will introduce a qualitative analysis based on a critical-discursive reading of functional grammar. Section 8.2 investigates how the data points to a number of different possible understandings of how migrant integration is understood 8.3 looks firstly at how ‘community’ is discursively constructed and secondly, how migrants are marked as outside of the community. In 8.4 I highlight the values and characteristics that new migrants are expected to, at least outwardly, express and finally (8.5) I speak briefly about some frequent linguistic strategies employed across the material which serve to maintain a certain ideological stance on the issue of integration: conceptual slippage, intertextuality and the selective use of quotations.

### **8.1. A corpus analysis of media discourse**

In this section I will introduce a corpus analysis of the articles. As explained in Chapter 6, quantitative corpus analysis can benefit qualitative CDA in two main ways, firstly as method of downsizing large corpora which then allows for a further fine-grained qualitative analysis using traditional CDA tools based on functional grammar, and secondly as a second level of analysis that can make qualitative analyses more robust. In this thesis I am employing a corpus approach for both of these reasons. Although the corpus was not massive, it was still too large to conduct a solely qualitative analysis. Thus, a corpus approach was used to downsize the sample and from that point relevant articles were selected for further analysis. As will be shown though, the corpus analysis also threw up a number of interesting results that point to how integration is interdiscursively linked to other concepts in media discourse. It is also worth reiterating here that the articles were already pre-selected on the basis of a keyword search and as such, their frequency and prevalence in this corpus analysis should not indicate their respective prevalence in a corpus consisting of all news articles from the same period. Further sampling and corpus work would be needed in order to investigate this fully.

### 8.1.1. Word Frequency

The first stage of analysis was to analyse the word frequency in the corpus. In total, the national newspaper data amounted to 213,430 words and this produced 15,663 different words.<sup>67</sup> Table 8.1 (below) indicates the twenty most frequent words. As can be expected of any media corpus, the most prevalent words were pronouns (*he, I, that*), conjunctions (*and*) and prepositions (*on, of, to*). The exceptions to this are ‘s’ - which could either denote the possessive or a shortening of *is* in speech – and the verb to be, which appears in its present (*is*) and past (*was*) forms. The other result of note in table 8.1 is the visibility of the masculine pronoun ‘he’ and the possessive pronoun ‘his’. Both of these could be explained by the combined prominence of male politicians and periods of data collection being immediately prior to general elections.

Rank	Word	Freq.
1	the	12295
2	to	5872
3	of	5170
4	a	4952
5	and	4468
6	in	3835
7	that	2623
8	is	2404
9	s	2244
10	he	2084
11	for	2081
12	it	1974
13	on	1840
14	I	1656
15	was	1546
16	as	1465
17	be	1277
18	his	1252
19	but	1251
20	with	1250

Table 8.1: Overall word frequency

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<sup>67</sup> The local newspaper data from the Brighton Argus was too small to warrant corpus analysis and was only analysed qualitatively.

Rank	Word	Freq.
22	Labour	1143
41	Brown	622
49	people	577
50	party	564
56	election	481
67	Blair	433
69	Cameron	423
72	Tory	365
73	Tories	361
75	government	352
76	vote	350
77	campaign	346
78	time	340
88	immigration	297
90	years	293
91	London	290
92	Britain	288
97	country	272
99	voters	269
101	Clegg	266

Table 8.2: Noun frequency

Table 8.2 (above) provides details of the twenty most frequent nouns that appear in the corpus. The list is dominated by what could be loosely classed as ‘political’ words. This classification can then be broken down in smaller component groups. Firstly, there are political actors, both individual politicians (*Brown, Blair, Cameron, Clegg*) and parliamentary groupings (‘Labour’, ‘Tory’, ‘Tories’). ‘People’ and ‘voters’ could arguably also be included in this group of actors but they could also be categorised as part of a second group of nouns pertaining to political processes and institutions, here primarily elections, along with *vote, election, government, party* and *campaign*.<sup>68</sup> The prevalence of these lexical items is not surprising given the period of date collection immediately prior to general and local elections. ‘Country’ may similarly fall into the first group, depending on the context it is used in. For example, in *the country will go to the polls next week*, *country* is a metonym for ‘voters’, but in *Blair has travelled around the country*, it is simply a marker of geography and could be classed in a separate group

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<sup>68</sup> ‘Party’ may also be taken to be a second part of the noun phrase for parliamentary groups, i.e. ‘the Labour party’.

with, for example, *London* and *Britain* when used as geographical places rather than metonymically, i.e. London as ‘government’ and Britain as ‘nation-state’. There is, though, one word that stands out as separate from the others on this list, *immigration*. This word could be classed by itself as a process or possibly an issue. Its prevalence in the corpora is maybe to be expected given the original keyword search in selecting the articles and the period of collection, but it is still interesting in that it is the first of the keywords that appear and it is also the most frequent ‘policy’ word in the corpus. By way of comparison, *economy* was ranked in 192<sup>nd</sup> place.

Table 8.3 (below) presents a comparison of the frequency of certain keywords. This list includes original keywords used to select the articles and supplementary keywords that were introduced after the analysis of the political discourse.<sup>69</sup>

<b>Word</b>	<b>Freq.</b>
Immigration	297
British	280
Immigrant*	108
Communit*	83
Asylum Seeker*	63
Refugee*	61
Migrant*	40
Migration	23
Muslim*	20
Citizenship	20
Britishness	17
Integration*	16
Identity	10
Multicultural	6
Integrate*	6
Multi-cultural	2
Multi-culturalism	2
Community cohesion	2
Moslem*	1
Sex-trafficking	0

Table 8.3: Keyword frequency

Within the corpus, words relating to immigration predominated. These included – *immigration*, *immigrant(s)*, *refugee(s)*, *asylum seeker(s)*, *migrant(s)* and *migration*. Again,

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<sup>69</sup> The ranking position of words is not given because the list includes plurals, denoted by ‘\*’ the character used in Antconc when searching for words with multiple endings. E.g.: *migrat\** would find *migration*, *migrate* and *migrates*.

their presence in the list is not unexpected due to the process of data collection. However, what is critical in terms of the overall study is their relative frequency when compared to integration's other sister concepts such as *multicultural(ism)*, *citizenship* and *community*. This appears to point to an initial understanding of integration in the media as one that is an issue of inward movement of non-nationals. It also indicates that integration is not a salient term in media discourse. As such, a hypothesis that can be forwarded that if integration of non-nationals is to be found within this corpus, it will be discursively constructed in other ways to that in the political discourse, in which 'integration' was a clearly, albeit polysemously, defined and used.

### 8.1.2. Concordance

Using Antconc (Anthony, 2013) concordance software the next stage of analysis was to look at the immediate co-text of the keywords (integration and its sister concepts) in order to ascertain how and where they were deployed.

1	Treaty of Nice is not about enlargement but about integration. We would sign up to the chapters on e
2	Been there, done that. "My generation, we're all integrated, musically, culturally. We all went to
3	Community we affirm the values of federalism and integration and work for unity based on these prin
4	de" of European states to press ahead with deeper integration. M Fabius gave warning that failure to
5	ies in Europe." They add: "That European defence integration offers the only rational approach to o
6	russels to reject the idea that the ratchet of EU integration can never be reversed at all," said Mr
7	that he would make the case for greater European integration. The Labour Party will not worry too m
8	ent, both spoke out in favour of greater European integration this week. Francis Maude, the shadow f
9	ople in this country about the future of European integration, but this does not make them part of a
10	t greater scepticism about the merits of European integration. Mr Ahern was sufficiently alarmed by
11	liberal positions on immigration and on European integration that many Labour ministers might share
12	ought. "But there is too much emphasis on further integration: the EU needs to become flexible not m
13	it will provoke a crisis in EU plans for greater integration and eastwards expansion. Since no othe
14	at it is important for different racial groups in integrate. The Conservative leader did not use the
15	veto the Nice Treaty because it contains too many integrationist measures. Although he did not menti
16	undertake a further bold stroke that helps to re-integrate Northern Ireland into the British mainst
17	n here already do. It is a huge step towards real integration and it means the Tories are no longer
18	n England we're a little more modern in the sense integration is no big news for us, know what I mea
19	orms and to work towards the twin goals of social integration and ethnic harmony." Trouble also fla
20	ighest level, there wouldn't be such a failure to integrate. But one point which cricket hasn't pro
21	rainforest with indigenous tribes, the key is to integrate your skills and empathise with people fr
22	erms," the authors say. "That is progressively to integrate the UK effort with . . . our Nato allies

Figure 8.1: Concordance snapshot for *integrat\**

Overall there were only 22 occurrences of *integration* or similar words in the corpus. As is evident in Fig. 8.1 (integration) is most frequently understood in terms of European integration. Even when there is no direct collocate, Europe, or European institutions, are still visible in the concordance lines. Where integration does not refer to Europe, there

are a couple of instances which are overtly about integration of different people (see lines 2, 14 and 19 in Image 8.1, above). As such, this leads us to a hypothesis that if integration is spoken about in the media discourse, it will be done so through the use of other concepts.

*Community* or *communities* appeared 83 times in the corpus and 43 times it collocated with an adjective as a preceding lexeme. Of these, 23 of them referred to ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, difference, or legal-status (see Fig. 8.2 and Table 8.4, below).

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30 knowledge' of Rhoda Sulaimon's status. The former Communities Secretary personally signed a letter t
31 nd unlimited immigration poses a problem for good community relations, for our national security, fo
32 s to the contribution made by Britain's immigrant communities. "We are all as British as each other.
33 sh Sea meant it has always had a strong immigrant community. My own family was no exception. My pare
34 more successful country because of the immigrant communities that have settled here". He hammered h
35 iberately defying the rules of the "international community" and the rulings of "international law".
36 "something must be done", when the international community felt Washington's urge to sort out probl
37 ime Mr Brown was inspecting some yellow-jacketed 'community payback' workers (we once spoke of chain
38 take precedence over the priorities of the local community. Police have to fulfil a certain amount
39 'It is very sad, but we have to protect the local community,' said Labour councillor Riaz Ahmed. Re
40 hesion... and caused a tide of resentment in many communities across Britain.' -- SCHOOL PLACES CHIL
41 rically, the majority part of the ethnic minority community have supported Labour," Mr Vara acknowle
42 ty. He sought to promote candidates from minority communities. He shifted rhetoric away from attacks
43 rmining the true loyalties of members of minority communities by asking which side they cheer when t
44 ory of helping the under-privileged in the Muslim community and had not profited from his operation.
45 all share the emphasis that members of the Muslim community place on enterprise, on hard work, on ed

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Figure 8.2: Concordance snapshot for *communit*\*

Left collocate	Freq.
Asian	8
Immigrant	3
Different, minority, Muslim	2
Arab, black, Polish, Hindu and Sikh, Somali, mixed and vibrant	1

Table 8.4: Left collocates with *communit*\*

This appears to point to an understanding of communities as being based on ethnic-national characteristics and has obvious implications for the construction of integration in that if a community is constructed as ethnic, it is difficult to move between or into that community. There are though some other collocations which might point to a more geographical understanding of community: there were some mentions of a *local community*, as well as constructions of *in the community*, although these too may, on closer inspection, pertain to a population rather than geographical understanding.

With regards to the other people and processes of migration, a pattern emerged that focused on two things: illegality and numbers. *Immigration* was present 297 times in the

corpus and often collocated on the left with adjectives used to describe numbers such as *mass, net, large-scale, uncontrolled* or *widespread*. On the right, it often collocated with institutions and actors including *policy, minister, officers* and *service*. When it comes to immigrants, the picture is similar in the sense that many instances were related to numbers but another phenomenon was the fact that of the 108 occurrences of *immigrant* or *immigrants*, 41 of them (38%) collocated on the left with *illegal*. This is a very high statistical frequency and led to constructions such as:

(93) amnesty for **600,000 illegal immigrants**” (*Mail* April 30 2010)

(94) How Uncle Azad, the master forger, gave **thousands of illegal immigrants** a passport to Britain (*Mail* May 1 2010)

As a way of comparison, lexical items pertaining to numbers or the quantity of immigrants, collocated in 14 instances (15%) and *illegal* plus a number (or lexical item relating to numbers) was present 6 times (5.5%). Again this has serious implications for how immigrants may be construed by consumers of newspaper articles on the issue and from here, how what such consumers expect immigration legislation and integration measures to include.

The focus on numbers was also present in the concordance lines for *refugee\** and *migrant\** for example:

(95) But the pending arrival of around **4,000 more refugees** in the next few months is likely to increase tensions (*Mail* June 5 2001)

(96) **Numbers at the refugee** centre near Calais have fallen by **two thirds** (*Telegraph* June 4 2001)

(97) With each beneficiary bringing in one family member or spouse, this could mean **a total of up to 2.2 million migrants** being granted legal rights to stay (*Mail on Sunday* May 2 2010)

- (98) During heated exchanges, Mr Woolas repeatedly refused to say whether **the two million increase in the migrant population** under Labour had been a deliberate policy or an 'accident' (*Mail* 30 April 2010)

Taken together, this reliance on the use of topoi of numbers (and illegality) leads migration and integration to be purely a question of ensuring that a putative tipping point of too much immigration is not reached and the focus is on reducing migration in whatever guise:

- (99) But aren't targets and command and control exactly what the Conservative Party is proposing for immigration: **to put an arbitrary cap on the number of people who would be allowed in**, despite the fact that British business is saying that the market and not government should decide how many foreigners they take on? **“No, that's not a target, it's a limit”** (Sunday Telegraph, 1 May, 2005)
- (100) Demanding a yes or no answer, he challenged Cameron to admit that his **planned cap on immigration** would have no impact on migrants from the European Union (*Guardian*, 30 April 2010)

From this perspective, we can forward a presupposition that if immigration was positive for the country, it would not need to be controlled, limited or capped. Therefore, this frames any immigration as (potentially) negative and, stemming from this migrants need to be dealt with via integration strategies so that those who do come, do not disrupt the country unnecessarily. It is also worth noting that in (99) even if the collocates in question appear in a grammatically or semantically negative context *arbitrary cap*, it still strengthens the negative connotation of migration with threatening numbers, a phenomenon described in Lakoff (2004).

When migrants were spoken of away from issues of numbers and legality, they often collocated with words relating to the economy, i.e. work and skills.

- (101) However, the number of asylum seekers is at its lowest level since 1992, and net immigration is falling rapidly. **Our Points Based System ensures that no unskilled migrants can come here from outside Europe and that skilled jobs**

**have to be advertised for four weeks in Job Centre Plus before an employer can fill it with migrant labour.** We expel a migrant every eight minutes either because of criminal activity or because they are here illegally (*Mirror* 3 May 2010)

- (102) “I’m very disturbed about the government’s language towards asylum seekers - **they seem to be saying we want economic migrants to prop up the holes in our workforce.** And I really dislike the feeling that Tony Blair really thinks businessmen are wonderful, whereas those of us who are slogging our guts out in the NHS are profligate”. - Claire Rayner, agony aunt (*Guardian* 6 June 2001)<sup>70</sup>

This would appear to have parallels with the governmental discourse on the ‘functional’ benefit that migration brings being the main positive aspect of incoming non-nationals.

Finally, in this section it is worth mentioning the corpus analysis results on *race* and *racism*. When *race* was the head of a noun phrase it was used not its meaning as an ethno-biological construct, but in the sense of competition, i.e. *two-horse race* or *election race*. However, in its use as a modifier the hits were more often relevant to the study at hand.

Hit	KWIC
24	sy canter into Downing Street has turned into the <b>race of</b> his life, saddlebags flying. In this pell-
25	What goes through the minds of this mysterious <b>race of</b> people who draw up campaign schedules? In
26	. You can't go picking on people because of their <b>race or</b> religion or because they're a refugee." In
27	hs could cost lives. 'People could get killed. In <b>race politics</b> , lives are on the line and this is t
28	d kow-towing to political correctness has done to <b>race relations</b> . All sensible people condemn the a
29	police officer. The effect on Oldham's strained <b>race relations</b> has been huge. Where Asian communit
30	se if they had the opportunity." I ask Alan about <b>race relations</b> in Britain today, and he reminds me
31	ualify for special favours under human rights and <b>race relations</b> law, meaning the fears of those who
32	he most tolerant country in Europe, with the best <b>race relations</b> of any developed nation, can easily
33	tting Hill during the race riots. I remember what <b>race relations</b> were like then. Labour acted to ens
34	up." He paused, then said: "The first half of the <b>race requires</b> outer strength; the second half inne
35	hat they have devel oped provoked Britain's worst <b>race riot</b> since the Eighties. A main body of activ
36	00. June 3, 2001 Far Right plot to provoke <b>race riots</b> : Extremists OBSERVER SPECIAL INVESTIGAT
37	, 2001 Page Page Far Right plot to provoke <b>race riots</b> : Extremists OBSERVER SPECIAL INVESTIGAT
38	me: "I was brought up in Notting Hill during the <b>race riots</b> . I remember what race relations were li
39	-RIGHT extremists are plotting to trigger massive <b>race riots</b> in Oldham and Bradford this summer. Th
40	off for Old Trafford last Friday. There had been <b>race riots</b> in Oldham, a few miles up the road, lar
41	, but police sources believe it is exploiting the <b>race riots</b> triggered by the NF and Combat 18. 'It

Figure 8.3: Concordance snapshot for *race*

<sup>70</sup> Original quotation marks from the articles have been retained in order to indicate where direct quotation was used by articles authors.

Immediately obvious in Fig 8.3 are the collocations *race relations* and *race riot*. *Race riots* refer to the riots in northern English towns in 2001 between the white population and British Asians. One hypothesis to take from this is that if the incidents were constructed in the media discourse as ‘race riots’, then these incidents may also be constructed as being caused by bad race relations and thus, possibly would point to matters of integration, or a lack thereof. *Race relations* on the other hand may here be some synonym or, at least, sister concept, to integration, primarily because previous legislation dealing with immigration and integration came in the guise of race relations laws. Therefore, instances of both of these collocations should be investigated in more qualitative detail. When *racist* was searched for this, also indicated a number of instances of the phrase *not racist* or *isn't racist*, especially in 2005 and this might be a sign of intertextuality of policy discourse, specifically a famous Conservative Party poster campaign which ran a simple tagline of “It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration”. This linguistic strategy of “I’m not a racist, but...” has been discussed by Augustinos and Every (2010)

In this section, I have introduced the brief corpus analysis that was undertaken on the media discourse. Firstly word frequency was analysed and then an explanation of some concordance searches were forwarded. Despite the relatively small size of the corpus, a number of clear patterns of word usage and collocation have emerged, including: the absence of ‘integration’ being used to explain how incoming non-nationals are expected to adapt to life in the UK, a racial, or ethnic, understanding of community, a focus on numbers when reporting about immigrants and immigration, a reporting of immigration as *illegal* and the presence of *race relations* in the corpus. In the remainder of the chapter (sections 8.2 to 8.5), I turn to a more qualitative analysis of these patterns of discourse and consider the wider textual context in which they occur, in order to widen my understanding of reporting strategies. I will also investigate in a more detailed fashion those parts of the corpus which do not form part of a clear pattern but which, nonetheless, may give some indication as to how integration is discursively constructed within the media discourse.

## 8.2. Integration by any other name

As was explained in the preceding section, integration was all but absent in the corpus, appearing only 22 times and frequently in relation to EU, rather than migrant, integration. A good starting point for this section then is to ascertain how integration is discursively rendered when it is referring to immigrants.

- (103) England cricket captain Nasser Hussain was right to urge young blacks and Asians to support the England team...Perhaps if more talented players from the ethnic minorities, like Hussain himself, were encouraged to play the game at the highest level, **there wouldn't be such a failure to integrate** (*Mail* 2 June 2001)
- (104) He (William Hague) also came close to contradicting Lady Thatcher and Lord Tebbit, who have recently criticised multi-culturalism on the grounds that **it is important for different racial groups to integrate** (*Telegraph* 2 June 2001, brackets added)
- (105) ... “In England we're **a little more modern** (than the in USA) in the sense **integration is no big news for us**, know what I mean? Been there, done that...**My generation, we're all integrated, musically, culturally**. We all went to the same schools, we all got the same education, we all had the same leaders”. (*Mirror* 3 May 2010, brackets added)

Excerpt (103) is from an opinion piece on the then England cricket captain's comments about non-white fans supporting the national team. Here, the author uses the second, or unreal, conditional to present a normative argument in which integration is a positive, but one that currently does not happen. Furthermore the responsibility for integration is placed on the shoulders of ethnic minorities via transitive agency in that the failure to integrate is the fault of their non-action, rather than socio-economic conditions, public attitudes or (lack of) government assistance: there is a *failure to integrate* rather than 'a failure to integrate them' or 'a failure to be integrated'. In (104) too there is a normative element to the statement, here constructed by the predicate adjective *important*, but what is maybe more interesting is how integration is understood here. By comparing it

positively to multiculturalism, integration thus becomes something that doesn't include space for plurality of cultures and if the wider socio-historical context of the excerpt is considered, that is the reference to Thatcher and Tebbit, it is relatively safe to claim that their understanding of integration would be assimilatory, or at least neo-assimilatory. Finally in (105), an excerpt from an interview with the actor Idris Elba, integration is both defined temporally and in terms of what integration includes. In the initial paragraph, comparing England (not the UK) to the US, the English situation is constructed with a qualified predicate as *a little more modern*, wherein modern should be understood as a positive quality. In the second paragraph, what type of integration occurs in the UK is described: cultural, musical, educational and political. From these three short excerpts we have almost a microcosm of the elite discourse on integration. Firstly, that integration is a positive phenomenon, it is also normative and it is problematic when it does not occur, but there is also maybe a level of dissonance between what actually constitutes integration.

As I outlined in the introduction above, despite its lack of frequency in the corpus, this is not to say that integration is not often spoken about but that when it is, it is done so with reference to, and usage of, other concepts.

(106) Nasser Hussain, who joined the players before the game and then left to await the birth of his first child, has reopened a lively debate with his views about **the assimilation of Asian people within British society**, and how disappointing it was that more of them did not follow England at cricket. (*Telegraph* 4 June 2001)

(107) London is full of residents who can't speak English, or can't speak it properly. We read of schools where lessons are conducted in Urdu or Hindi, and as we walk about the city, we pass regions where English is almost unknown: Turkish, Cypriot, Portuguese, Nigerian . . . This is part of the fascination of a capital city, and nobody would question that part of the excitement of London is its rich racial and cultural diversity. Equally, though, no one could doubt that the young man who had that confused conversation with me about newspapers the other morning is at a quite colossal disadvantage compared with other young men and

women of an identical racial and cultural background **whose parents have decided to become linguistically assimilated.** (*Daily Mail* 3 June 2001a)

In the two excerpts above, there is a mention of assimilation, an alternative to integration. As with excerpt (103), in (106) the article recontextualises the words of Nasser Hussain. In his original comments, Hussain said “I cannot understand why those [British Asians] born here, or who come here at a very young age, cannot support England (brackets added)”, but in (106) this is reported as him giving his views on assimilation. This is then a reading of Hussain’s words through the prism of Tebbit’s ‘cricket test’ whereby the national team one supports represents the extent to which a non-white Briton is integrated. Those assimilating are also constructed initially by the modifier *Asians*, where in reality many would be children or grandchildren of Asian migrants and thus, feel more British. Indeed, this is even alluded to later in the article. Also, such people are marked as already on the inside via the preposition *within* rather than entering from outside. In (15), it is language rather than cricketing and national loyalties that come to define assimilation. Duszak (2002: 1) argues that in the creation of in/out groups, “*they* (Others) are those who *cannot* speak *our* language”. In the excerpt, knowledge of English is framed as a normative marker of, and as a necessity for, integration. Furthermore, the agency of integration is constructed as being with the migrant through the use of the verb of mental process *decide*. Though there is of course some truth in this agency when learning a language, this does not tell the whole truth given that there is also the question of accessing English language courses. Thus, in some cases, such as respondents from one of the focus groups (cf. Chapter 9), the desire to learn the language is very real, but other difficulties such as work, benefits and lack of free time are obstacles.<sup>71</sup>

Another way in which we can see integration being spoken of in the media is through allusion to mixing and multiculturalism.

(108) Immigrants have changed the landscape of Britain but they have also become a crucial part of our country. **Bristol, Liverpool and Nottingham may be multi-racial cities but they are still distinctly British** (*Mirror* 5 May 2010)

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<sup>71</sup> Working over 18hrs a week removes eligibility to access free ESOL classes. Conversely, working under 18hrs allows free ESOL classes but leads to reliance on benefits.

- (109) Political parties tell themselves nowadays that they must “look like Britain”.... Forgive me if I nodded off and missed the odd exception, but by my tally, **this audience did not look like Britain, but like a BBC marketing man's idea of Britain...It had a very high representation of visible ethnic minorities** - perhaps 25 per cent, compared with the true national figure of 10 per cent. (*Telegraph* 30 April 2005)
- (110) Within months of taking power, Labour flung open the doors to widespread immigration in a **politically willed act of social engineering**. Tony Blair’s advisers admit this was to ‘rub the Right’s nose in diversity’, simultaneously **making the country multicultural, by force majeure**, and cynically importing hundreds of thousands of Labour voters. (*Mail on Sunday* 2 May 2010)

In excerpt (108), an op-ed article by the comedian Eddie Izzard, British cities are constructed with the predicative adjective *multi-racial* but are then linked through the contrastive conjunction *but* and the temporal adverb *still* to a second, presumably positive, quality (*British*) that is not mutually exclusive to the first. In contrast to this, the subsequent two extracts forward a less positive opinion of multiculturalism. (109) seems to provide an alternative view to the previous one of the UK as multi-racial. In this excerpt a BBC audience with a high number of ethnic minorities is described as not looking *like Britain*. The presupposition underlying this statement is that Britain is not ethnically diverse. Finally, in (110) immigration is constructed with the predicate *politically willed* and with the noun phrase *social engineering*, both of which have negative semantic load. It also explains multiculturalism as being forced on the UK from above and the causal presupposition is that had Labour not allowed immigration, the UK would not be multicultural. As such, immigration and multiculturalism that stems from it are represented as negative phenomena.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, official policy on how to deal with non-nationals settling in the UK was defined in terms of race relations which became a major part of successive governments’ social policy. In the thirty-five years between 1965 and 2000, four separate Race Relations acts were passed and although there was no further Race Relations legislation after 2000, there can be a time lag in use of concepts, as well as

resistance to changing the use of commonly understood terms. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that race and race relations is a further topos through which integration is written about in the media discourse from 2000 to 2010.<sup>72</sup>

- (111) I ask Alan about **race relations in Britain today**, and he reminds me: “**I was brought up in Notting Hill during the race riots. I remember what race relations were like then.** Labour acted to ensure discrimination, intolerance and hatred were unacceptable under the rule of law.” (*Mirror* May 3 2010)
- (112) Ashok Patel, who also attends the temple, said: “**Some of our people are immigrants. The poster draws attention to the issue of racism** and we don't want this problem on our doorstep. **It provokes racial tension.**” (*Argus* 24 April 2005)
- (113) **The white working class** learned once again that they were the only group the politically correct elite found it acceptable to denigrate. **Meanwhile, immigrants** wondered why Brown waited until he was in the supposed privacy of his official car to describe her as a “bigot” (*Observer* 2 May 2010)
- (114) As a former home secretary, Mr Blunkett is concerned that Michael Howard's tough campaign on immigration will cost Labour votes. “**In white working-class communities**, it's had a resonance,” he says. “It's about fear of difference, fear of resources being used.” (*Telegraph* 5 May 2005)
- (115) WILLIAM Hague showed his commitment to “One Nation” Conservatism yesterday by saying **whites, blacks and Asians “are all as British as each other”** (*Sunday Telegraph* 2 May 2001)

In (111) and (112) mention is made of race relations in a way that can be construed as marker of lack of integration. In (111) *race relations*, a legal-political term, is used twice but alongside the collocation *race riots* so that the quoted speaker, Alan Johnson

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<sup>72</sup> See also above, 8.1.2, on corpus analysis of race

the then Home Secretary, describes race relations in south London *then* (when he was growing up) as consisting of race riots. In another local context (112), this time Brighton, the quoted speaker is responding to the presence of the Conservative Party election poster that read “It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration”, outside a mosque. Given this wider context, it is possible to see his words as a recontextualisation, or at least rejection, of the poster’s definition of racism, here using the collocation *racial tension* in the present tense and thus the unqualified verb *to be*. Elsewhere, in (113) and (114), the race is combined with social class in order to categorise a certain group. In both cases, it is *white working-class*. In (113) this racial-economic group is juxtaposed and separated from immigrants. So that the presupposition is that immigrants are not white working class. This could imply either that there are working class immigrants that are not white or that there are white immigrants who are not working class or there is a possible third option that this hints at an understanding of immigrants as both a separate economic and racial category. It implies that racial difference is greater than socio-economic similarity and that such constructions preclude unified action on the part of the working class, who instead of fighting for improved working conditions will fight against a group with whom they have shared interests. In (114) the same phrase is used not as an adjective-noun collocation but as an adjectival predicate for *communities*. This fits with the finding in the corpus analysis of community as being frequently constructed ethnically or racially (see 8.1.2, above). Finally, in (115) there is the implication of race, here ethnic groups, but in a positive, inclusive context that would appear to imply integration of some sort. By using the comparative *all as British as each other* *this* points to a level of equality of different groups. It is also inclusive in that it groups a number of different ethnic categories into a larger, broader one, ‘British’.

Integration though is not just about being part of a national community but, as argued throughout this work, it is also done at a local level and this can be viewed in the articles in the corpus too, although to lesser extent than in the political discourse (see Chapter 7) and in the narratives of those that have come to the UK and settled (see Chapter 9).

(116) Yet it is painfully clear that the poorest voters in the poorer neighbourhoods, those the Brown budgets have tried most to help, are least likely to vote today -

or to vote Tory or UKIP on the **simmering local issue of asylum seekers**, mentioned by several voters (Guardian, 6 June, 2001)

(117) He added: 'I understand the worries people have about immigration, I understand the concerns about what is happening to **people's neighbourhoods** and I understand the fears that people have' (Mail, 30 April, 2010)

(118) "I am interested in what is necessary to deal with the challenges facing Britain today, and I think that uncontrolled and unlimited immigration poses a problem for **good community relations**, for our national security, for our public services." (Sunday Telegraph, 1 May, 2005)

In (116) immigration into the UK, is localised. Asylum seekers, a key focus of government immigration policy (but as mentioned in Chapter 7 not of formal integration policy until they are granted refugee status) are constructed as a local issue but this is also intensified by a cooking metaphor *simmering* to imply that if not attended to, the issue could boil over. As such, asylum, as a local issue, needs to be managed. In (117) the quoted speaker, Gordon Brown, speaks about people's concerns, fears and worries about immigration in *people's neighbourhoods*. What is clear is that these neighbourhoods and people, that is the speaker's audience, are unlikely to include immigrants. Finally, in excerpt (118), the speaker Michael Howard, employs the phrase *community relations*. The polysemy of community (see Chapter 7 and 8.3.1 below) leaves comprehension of this phrase vague. On the one hand, this could be taken to mean a specific geographical community but it could alternatively pertain to ethnic communities and so could also be a synonym for race relations.

In this section I have tried to investigate how integration and a number of its sister concepts, were discursively constructed and employed. First the agency of integration was highlighted and this dovetails with the transitive agency of integration evident in policy discourse. After this, assimilation, multiculturalism and race were all showed to be important concepts that could be seen in some way to be either alternatives to, or at least very closely linked to, integration. Finally, the local community was proposed as an important site of discursive work on the integration of non-nationals and ethnic minorities.

### 8.3. Constructions of community

In the following section, the theme of locality and community is carried on and will be interrogated more closely. In 8.3.1 I will look at how communities are discursively constructed and in 8.3.2 the issue of migrants being marked as outside these communities (of whatever type – geographical, national or ethnic) will be examined.

#### 8.3.1. What is a community?

When the political discourse was analysed in Chapter 7, ‘community’ emerged as a particularly salient concept and site for understanding integration and this pattern continues in the media discourse. A large number of instances of community were collocated with ethnic or racial terms.

- (119) Nowadays, its **other communities who face the kind of discrimination the Irish faced - black and Asian people, Poles and other immigrants**. (Mirror, 5 May, 2010)
- (120) Abdullah Azad, to give him his full name, was known not just in his own city but across **the Asian community** as the first stop for people with immigration problems. (Mail, 30 April, 2010)
- (121) But a party spokesman brushed the concerns of **Jewish community** leaders aside, suggesting it was a case of political correctness gone mad. (Argus, 21 April, 2010)

Above are just three examples of the different ethno-national configurations of community. In excerpt (119) there is a mixture of ethnic (*black and Asian*) with national (*Irish and Poles*) as well as a more vague group of *other immigrants*. The adjective *other* then retroactively marks the previous groups as also consisting of immigrants, which seemingly precludes the possibility of these people being British, despite the possibility of them taking British citizenship. In (120) there is reference to *the Asian community*. This

constructs it as an ethnic community but the definite article suggests that there is only one Asian community in the UK, or at least one that extends beyond the borders of Manchester. Finally, a religious-ethnic community *Jewish* is spoken of in (121) but in a localised context, alluding to the existence of other Jewish communities around the country. Elsewhere there was mention of *Muslim, Arab, Somali, Hindu and Sikh* and *ethnic minority* communities.

As well as ethnicity there were also other instances of community constructed according to its members rather than geography.

(122) The attack at a Bognor bus stop is being investigated by Sussex Police's major crime branch with inquiries focusing on the town's **migrant community**...Police are working with the Arun **Expanded Communities** Team to gather information among the **migrant worker community** in the area. (*Argus* 3 May 2010)

(123) But the frustration of Labour's attempts to abolish section 28, which was blocked in the House of Lords, has upset the **gay community**. (*Argus* 6 June 2001)

In both examples, there is reference to specific communities. In (122), there are no less than three separate renderings of community, although it would be fair to claim that in each case the membership would be the same. *Migrant community* implies that there is a stable, cohesive group, but this is later predicated as *migrant worker community*. In the mean time though, there is reference to *Expanded Communities*, an official bureaucratic term that can be seen as a synonym for 'migrant' but, because of the plural *communities*, it also recognises that there are multiple migrant communities in the borough. (123) on the other hand is an example of another member-based community, *the gay* and like (120), above, speaks about single group within the UK.

There are though several instances of a geographical understanding of communities.

(124) ...he has been happy with the performance of outgoing MP David Lepper, who took action for the residents and worked for this **suburban community**, who are often **ignored in Brighton where the focus tends to be on the centre of the town** (*Argus* 3 May 2010b)

(125) She (Alison Fenney, Head of the British Refugee Council)<sup>73</sup> said: "We are concerned this decision has been made partly because **the local community** was not consulted at the earliest possible opportunity" (*Argus* 9 April 2003)

(126) We don't want trouble in **our communities**, and we don't want to see **our neighbourhoods** torn apart by hatred and division (*Mirror* 5 May 2010)

In (124) there is the construction *this suburban community* referring to Coldean, a residential on the outskirts of Brighton. This creates the community not on the basis of its members, but on its geographical location in opposition to Brighton. Similarly, in excerpt (125) there is reference to *the local community*. In (126) the issue is not so clear. In the second clause communities, here constructed as 'our neighbourhoods' is obviously a geographical term, but the initial 'our communities' is slightly vaguer. Through the immediate sentence co-text, it may seem to be analogous to the subsequent 'neighbourhoods'. However, if the wider context of the entire article is considered (about diversity through the UK), then this could lead to a different understanding based on ethnicity.

Indeed, as it was in the political discourse, community is also a polysemous term in newspaper articles and often it is unclear which community is being referred to.

(127) Where Asian communities border some of the town's sprawling and overwhelmingly white council estates, local people patrol and keep watch throughout the night. In one area, where an alleyway leads from the white estate of Fitton Hill into an Asian street, **the council plans to erect a metal gate to separate the communities**. Griffin's hopes for segregation are coming true. 'It is very sad, but **we have to protect the local community**,' said Labour councillor Riaz Ahmed. (*Observer* 3 June 2001)

(128) It is hoped the people will pass on what they have learned to others **in their community**. Course co-ordinator Fatin Wana said: "**It was a two-way thing**."

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<sup>73</sup> Brackets added

**We wanted to tell them about their rights, but we also wanted them to think about their responsibilities and what they planned to offer the community."**

(*Mirror* 5 June 2001)

(129) "The tone of the debate is racist and so is this poster because it's creating demonization **of certain sections of the community**". (*Argus* 24 April, 2005)

Excerpt (127) is from a report on disturbances between *Asian* and *white* residents in Oldham, just after the riots in summer 2001. To start with *communities* are plural and understood as consisting of separate ethnic groups. However, the *local community* is then mentioned. This constructs community as singular and possibly geographical, but it more likely refers to a localised community of one ethnic group although which group is left uncertain. There is similar confusion in (128). In the first sentence, *community* is possessed or inhabited by the subjects, here asylum seekers taking a *Citizenship course*. Thus *community* could mean an asylum seekers community or reference to each individual's ethnic group. Later on in the excerpt though there is reference to *the community* which seems to refer to a wider, singular, community (of people, of a locality or even of a country). It is also interesting to note, the presence of the phrase *two-way*, which was a prominent part of government discourse on integration throughout the period. Lastly, in (129) the speaker constructs Brighton as singular community but one that consists of 'different sections'.

In this section, through a semantic analysis of contextual meaning, I have explained how 'community' was discursively constructed in the media discourse. There are a number of obvious parallels between these and those that found in the political discourse and this reinforces the idea that community is a vague concept that can be understood in many ways and is employed in many different contexts. In the next section, I will attempt to show how migrants are excluded from, or included in, these communities.

### 8.3.2. Exclusion and inclusion of migrants

As outlined above, membership criteria play a key defining role in media reporting of communities. In this section, I will go one stage further and argue that the ways in which incoming non-nationals are discursively constructed as either inhabiting the inside or being excluded can point to wider representations of who is integrated, who still needs to integrate/needs integrating and who will forever be marked as outsiders, and therefore unable to integrate.

By way of a first set of examples, it is worth looking at how the national community, that is Brits, can at times exclude certain categories of people.<sup>74</sup>

(130) Readers, I was there when Labour leader met **the pride of Lancastrian womanhood. In Mrs Duffy, 66, you never met finer example of the English pensioner** en route to the shops for a loaf of bread. (*Mail* 29 April 2010)

(131) Ministers are simply in denial about why **the British people** are so angry about their failures of immigration policy” – Damian Green (*Mail* 5 May 2010)

(132) It [New Labour] has ...encouraged **unprecedented mass immigration** – thereby placing intolerable strain on our public services and **striking at our very identity as a nation** (Mail, 5 May, 2010b, brackets added)

Excerpt (130) is from an op-ed article in the Mail on the so-called ‘Bigotgate’ issue (see Chapter 5 for more details). Here, Mrs Duffy is used as an epitome that represents all that is good about *English pensioners*. It is interesting that the attributive adjective *English*, rather than ‘British’ is employed. This might be a question of comparison with the Scottishness of the other protagonist, Gordon Brown. Alternatively, it could be a more exclusionary tactic, whereby her English identity is, for some other reason, foregrounded, for example the fact she raised the issues of immigration. Recent research by the Economic and Social Research Council (Nandi and Platt, 2013) indicates that most ethnic minorities in the UK feel more British than English, even more so than

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<sup>74</sup> The specific values of British nationals, and how this is used to exclude non-nationals, will be dealt with in section 8.4, below

white respondents, who were instead more likely to identify with each constituent nation of the UK. Furthermore, Englishness is sometimes seen as a more exclusionary identity, whereas 'British' is seen as more inclusive (Commission for Racial Equality, 2005). As such, *English* in this excerpt may also be a container for other possibly exclusionary characteristics such as 'white'. (131) is a direct quote from the then shadow immigration minister, Damian Green. In this excerpt there is use of the definite article which denotes that the speaker is talking about all British people as a cohesive collective group with one point of view, rather than using a qualifier such as 'many' or 'some', or omitting it entirely, which would then pertain to British people in general. As with the first example, what actually constitutes *the British people* and it therefore stands as an empty container that recipients of the discourse, the interpretative community, can fill with whatever values they wish. Depending on an inclusive or exclusionary definition, migrants who have recently taken British citizenship, Brits whose parents or grandparents came to the UK or other groups of people who were broadly pro-immigration, may not fit neatly into this category of 'the British people'.

Finally, in (132) there appears to be similarly exclusionary understanding, or obvious short sightedness, of who are potential members of the British nation. Mass immigration is constructed as threat to national identity. This results in two presuppositions; firstly 'immigrants' challenge rather than enhance the nation and secondly, as a result, immigrants are not members of the nation. This is further reinforced by the possessive plural pronoun *our* which constructs the speaker as representing the whole nation. As with the previous excerpt, where this leaves new British citizens, in terms of being included in this *nation* or not, is left ambiguous. Indeed, the very ambiguity highlighted in these three examples is what makes integration for non-nationals and ethnic minorities harder. This discursive haziness surrounding certain categories is a useful rhetorical method for circumventing claims of racism or discrimination whilst simultaneously being able to speak to a certain part of the interpretive community.

There are other examples of inclusion and exclusion of specific groups of non-nationals throughout the media discourse, especially in the Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday.

- (133) The **poorer immigrant families, now in their second or third generation**, arrived in England when we were all suffering from huge and possibly justified doses of post-colonial guilt. (*Mail on Sunday* 3 June 2001a)
- (134) **Last week, its [Glasgow's] citizens** were condemned by Cardinal Thomas Winning, leader of Scotland's Roman Catholics, **for their 'shameful' treatment of asylum seekers** (*Mail* 5 June 2001, brackets added)
- (135) **The asylum seekers who fly home...** on holiday. **Hundreds of refugees pop back** to the countries they fled in terror and it's perfectly legal. (*Mail on Sunday* 3 June 2001b)
- (136) **GIPSIES'** human rights are more important than the concerns of **local residents**, according to new planning rules. (*Mail* 6 May 2010)

In (133) there is again evidence of British citizens being discursively constructed as being outside the nation, by being marked with the modifier *immigrant*. Thus, people who presumably have a British passport are still not seen as belonging fully to the British nation. In (134) and (135) the focus turns to asylum seekers. In (134) residents of the same city are discursively separated. Through syntactic parallelism, asylum seekers are juxtaposed to Glasgow's *citizens*. This construction though presupposes that asylum seekers are not, and cannot be, citizens. The crucial factor here is how citizen is to be understood. If it is the narrow understanding of official membership, then, asylum seekers are correctly marked as non-citizens. However, an alternative would be a broader use of *citizen* as a synonym for resident. If this is the case, then asylum seekers should be considered a 'cityzen' (Milani, forthcoming) as much as any other resident, temporary or permanent. In (135), one obvious issue is the conceptual muddling between *asylum seekers* and *refugees* which makes it harder for the reader to ascertain exactly who, in terms of legal status, the article is referring to. More relevant is that asylum seekers become temporary visitors to the UK. This is done not only through the presence of verb of movement *fly* and the directional phrasal verb *pop back* but also, importantly for this point, that the destination is *home* and thus, if home is 'there', it cannot also simultaneously be 'here', i.e. Britain. This is not to say that asylum seekers, refugees or other

long-term migrants don't conceive of their country of origin as home, but rather that through dominant discourses in the media, this choice of construction is chosen for them and they are not given the space to communicate their own views.<sup>75</sup> Excerpt (136) provides evidence that it is not just different groups of non-nationals that are constructed on the outside of the dominant majority, but other minority groups also. In a very similar structure to that in (134), here Gypsies are separate from local residents. This comparison relies on a highly normative, and exclusionary, understanding of who a local resident is and what characteristics they possess, for example, local residents should not live on temporary caravan sites.

The inclusion and exclusion from local and national communities also occurs with reference to ethnicity.

(137) The British National party would offer **non-white British people** £50,000 to leave "overcrowded" Britain and return to the land of their ancestors (*Guardian* 30 April 2010)

(138) Yet the problem remains as bad as ever. A BBC report last week found that **Asian activists are targeting British Pakistanis** who have relocated in their thousands to the Pakistan district of Maipur (*Mail* 4 May 2010)

In (137) certain British citizens are marked as different and are kept at a distance from the majority by using the racial attributive adjective *non-white*, whilst in (46), about alleged vote rigging in some constituencies, Labour activists, presumably British, are labelled *Asian* and their targets are also constructed as a British subgroup. This though is maybe a rather cynical and exclusionary reading of the discourse and could alternatively be a sign that there is discursive space, and an understanding in the media, for hybrid identities. That is, that a person can be a member of multiple nation, ethnic, religious or cultural groups at the same time and need not be discursively 'reduced' or pigeonholed in to one category.

In all of these examples, subjects have been discursively constructed as being on the outside of the nation or local community. By being placed on the outside, they are

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<sup>75</sup> This lack of agency in media discourses is discussed in more detail in section 8.5 (below).

then forced into a position whereby they are expected to integrate on the assumption that, if they were constructed as belonging to the inside, the process of integration would have already been completed. Although this was the dominant pattern throughout the period of data collection, and across the media sample, there was evidence, predominantly in the Guardian, of how migrants and ethnic minorities are constructed as belonging to the British nation.

(139) Why the cricket test fails: A week ago **British Asians** rioted on the streets of Oldham. So what would happen when Pakistan's cricketers took on England a few miles down the road? And what can a cricket match tell us about race and identity anyway?...There had been race riots...**largely involving youths of Pakistani descent**...Some of the "Asians" spoke to **one another in a mixture of Urdu and English. Others spoke in broad Yorkshire accents** (*Guardian* 4 June 2001)

(140) An Iranian civil rights activist who is due to be deported from the UK today could face the death penalty and fears being murdered by her family in an "honour killing" if she is sent back to Iran, according to her **British partner**....**Her partner, Mohsen Zadshir, from Barnet, a member of the Iranian opposition who gained political asylum in 1999**, said that if deported, her life is "finished". (*Guardian* 5 May 2010)

Excerpt (139) provides a good example of both inclusion and separation in one article. To start with, there is the potentially exclusive predication *British Asians* and this is followed by a secondary construction where the focus is drawn to their ancestry of *Pakistani descent*, rather than current nationality. In the final sentence though, *Asians* is placed in scare quotes as way of indicating non-acceptance of, or at least a calling into question of, the legitimacy of the term. It is also worth noting the relative foregrounding of difference via language (and accent), a major issue in government policy on integration. Finally, in (140) a person who gained asylum in the UK a decade previously is clearly discursively rendered as being on the inside. This is achieved in two ways. Firstly by predicating the subject as simply *British*, without any mention of other markers of alternative national identity. Secondly, through the preposition *from* followed the

proper noun *Barnet*, his home is constructed as being in London, rather than Iran. Both of these strategies together have the effect of implying a level of integration.

There are other examples of inclusion of non-nationals and ethnic minorities, often through the use of the collective, rather than exclusive, 'we'.

(141) **White, black, Asian, we're all British**, says Hague.... **He told an audience in Bradford...**"Whatever **our religious beliefs or our ethnic background** I believe passionately that the United Kingdom belongs **to all of us.**" (*Telegraph* 2 June 2001)

(142) **BRITAIN has always been a melting pot of different types of people.** It's one of the things that **makes us what we are as a nation.** (*Mirror* 5 May 2010)

Excerpt (141) provides an example of recontextualisation. The original quote from William Hague, referring to an *us*, is given in the final sentence but this is reinterpreted strongly in the article headline as *we're all British*. Though this is an inclusive understanding of Britain, it still appears not to leave space for migrants that have not taken citizenship. It is also worth pointing out the audience of the speech from which the quote is taken from, a meeting of British people who either migrated from the Indian sub-continent or whose ancestors did. In (142) diversity is framed as being a fundamental part of Britain using the adverb of time *always* along with the present perfect.

More generally, there are attempts in other places at representing a rhetorical valuing of diversity and ethnic difference.

(143) Earlier in Bradford Mr Hague told a meeting of British Asians: "**I believe in one nation. The fact that the United Kingdom is made up of different communities with a variety of different cultures and traditions greatly enriches our national life.**" (*Guardian* 2 June 2001)

(144) "**DIVERSITY is what makes this country great.** I was brought up in a multicultural city – Leeds – and it was a thoroughly vibrant mix. People from different backgrounds have brought many things to this country." (*Mirror* 5 May 2010)

(145) **Gordon Brown's instincts in Rochdale last week did not betray him. In Scotland, they echoed many of ours - a love of diversity** and a preferential option for those fleeing persecution. (*Observer* 2 May 2010)

Oftentimes this is constructed using direct quotes of political figures, as in (143). The reference to *one nation* is a recontextualisation of previous, centrist Conservative party policy from Disraeli's time as leader, employed for a speech on multiculturalism in the UK to the same group of people as in (141).<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, this singular nation is comprised of different communities based on ethnicity or cultural difference, rather than geography. The quote is further made inclusive by the use of *our*, presumably in reference to the audience of the speech, in order to denote a successful integration. Diversity is also the theme of (144) and here it is constructed as a strong positive - *what makes this country great* - on the national but also at local level by the addition of the qualifying adverb *thoroughly* (an intensifying strategy) to the construction *vibrant mix*. There is also explicit mention of the benefits of immigration. Finally, in (145) it is not Britain, but Scotland that the author constructs as open to diversity and this is also reinforced by the caption for the accompanying picture: "Scotland is a proudly multicultural nation" (*Observer* 2 May 2010).<sup>77</sup>

In this section I have attempted to indicate how community is understood and discursively constructed in the media discourse. There are a number of parallels with the language of the articles and that of the political texts over the same period, especially in terms of the polysemy of community. However, in general the media texts displayed a tendency, across all newspapers, to conceptualise communities along ethnic or racial lines, whereas there was more ambiguity in the policy and greater frequency of geographical communities. A secondary pattern of the discursive marking of non-white Brits as different, and therefore requiring integration, was also present in the articles and although this was dominant, there were also examples of how migrants and ethnic minorities were included in communities. Finally, and again in parallel with the policy discourse, there was a rhetorical construction of diversity as a positive quality of Brit-

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<sup>76</sup> To further contextualise the excerpt, the speech was made partly in response to claims that Hague was ignoring the non-white electorate.

<sup>77</sup> No picture was available via the Lexis portal and the online version of the article at [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk) published the article without the picture.

ain. In the following section I will try to draw out some examples of other positive traits of Britain and British people and point to how this might construct what migrants are expected to do and how they are expected to act in order to integrate into the national, and local, community.

#### **8.4. The ‘perfect’ (British) citizen**

In the political discourse chapter it was argued that policies relating to integration were of a distinctly normative nature. Although there was relatively less mention of this in the newspaper corpus, there are still wide range of instances where what integration includes is touched upon. In this section, I will initially highlight those values which are discursively constructed as specifically British and following this, I will introduce a few brief examples of how these are then transferred and reconstructed to portray individual migrants positively (that is integrated) or negatively (as having failed to integrate).

##### **8.4.1. British values**

Within the policy discourse, certain values became to be delineated and then later redefined as ‘British’ values (cf. Kielar 2010) and the relevance for integration of the framing of such as values in this way was dealt with in substantial detail in Chapter 7. Similar strategies were also evident in the media discourse and one of the main ways in which this was done was to construct Britain as a tolerant nation.

(146) The closest the Chancellor comes to defining “Brownism” is through **his views on “Britishness”**. For him, it is all about **“a passion for liberty, anchored in a sense of duty, and an intrinsic commitment to tolerance and fair play”** (*Telegraph* 30 May 2005)

(147) **“To me, Britishness is the fact we are an island – and we are tolerant people.”** (*Mirror* 5 May 2010)

(148) But this is not just a matter for Quakers; it is about the common decency of us all. **Our shared values call for those seeking asylum to be treated as human beings**, not statistics (*Guardian* 1 May 2010)

In (146) the author uses a quote from Gordon Brown in order to define what Brown conceives as Britishness and the quote includes a number of characteristics that were also present in integration policy such as tolerance and liberty. (147), a quote from the mixed-race singer Corinne Bailey Rae on why she is supporting an ant-racist movement, exposes a similar positive framing of *tolerant*, this time of British people but this is also juxtaposed to the idea of Britain as an island nation and the implication is that just because it is an island, it does not mean that the people should be insular. There is some ambiguity too in the use of *fact* and it is not clear whether the tolerance is also a fact or whether it is a separate claim. Again, in excerpt (148) *us all* (presumably the whole country) is imbued with certain values. Although not elaborated upon, if an asylum seeker is to be treated as a human being, we can hazard a guess that these may include tolerance, understanding and respect for human rights. Another finding of note is the presence of *our shared values* which may be a possibly unconscious, recontextualisation of policy discourse which often mentioned our ‘shared’ and ‘common’ values.

Another facet of Britishness that is foregrounded in the media discourse is that of democracy.

(149) **But, like so many other British traditions, the credibility of our democracy** has been badly weakened during the last 13 years of Labour rule. (*Mail* 4 May 2010)

(150) This is particularly true among **inner-city wards dominated by Asian clan leaders who effectively control the local franchise and even set up 'voting factories' to process ballot papers. Almost all the worst instances of fraud since 2000 have arisen in places with large concentrations of Asian voters**, such as Blackburn, Oldham and Tower Hamlets. **In the Birmingham local elections of 2004, six Muslim men stole thousands of ballot papers and marked them for Labour candidates.** (*Mail* 4 May 2010)

Excerpts (149) and (150) are from the same article on election fraud. In the first, democracy is constructed as British tradition, rather than a value and moreover one that has been lost due to the Labour government. In the second, the focus is on the election fraud and what is made obvious throughout the excerpt is that the perpetrators were non-white. Indeed, they are constructed not as British or even British Asians, but as simply *Asians, Asian (voters, clan-leaders) and Muslims*. The implication, and the overall image of British people of Asian descent that is discursively projected in this passage is that, in contradistinction to ‘British’ people, Asians do not have a tradition of democracy and nor do they value it. From here, the secondary presupposition is that in order to integrate fully into British society, they would need to first accept and value democracy. As with community, this relies on the normative (Westernised) understanding of democracy as based on elections and through parliamentary representation.

The final group of examples of ‘British’ values can be placed under the banner of ‘right-wing’ values.

(151) **It would be easy to caricature Mr Vara as being "more British than the British". His stance on such issues as race, crime, law and order, immigration and asylum, places him on the Right wing of the Conservative Party** but his views have been long held (*Telegraph* 3 May 2005b)

(152) **However, he clearly holds a strong attachment to British values.** He is a family man whose sincere beliefs suffuse his policies, including his genuinely radical plans for a shake-up of schools. His idea of turning them into parent-driven independents could be the salvation of our rotten, unfair system. Crucially, Mr Cameron says that he will do something about the problem of immigration (*Mail on Sunday* 2 May 2010)

(153) **Assets are the spur of a sense of belonging, of citizenship,** of ambition and a lifetime's financial planning (*Guardian* 3 May 2010)

Excerpt (151) initially constructs Mr Vara, a Ugandan Asian who took British citizenship, as integrated (*more British than the British*) and this maybe points to a performative understanding of integration as outlined in previous chapters. In the following sen-

tence, the issues (and political) stance that this implies are subsequently listed. The presupposition in this excerpt is that to be British is to be tough on race, immigration and asylum. In a very similar vein, and also much like Gordon Brown in (146), in (152) David Cameron is presented as having an attachment to *British values* and this is intensified by the adjective *strong*. These values are again left unexplained, but there is mention of the political issues that need changing and these include, after only education, immigration, which is nominatively constructed as a *problem*. Again, a possible presupposition is that to be British is to want to deal with the immigration. The final excerpt (153) is an exception to much of the discourse presented above in that it is not to do with immigration or integration, but in fact was thrown up by the corpus analysis. It provides a neat example of the neo-liberal nature of citizenship that was so evident in the latter part of the policy discourse sample in that it links citizenship to financial savings. This neo-liberal citizenship is more evident in the media discourse when individual migrants are the focus of articles, as will be shown in the sub-section below.

#### 8.4.2. 'Good' and 'bad' migrants

As mentioned in Chapter 7 (cf. Bennett, 2014a and 2014b) the creep of neo-liberal discourse into many parts of the political discourse, including integration policy, has been widespread and there is clear evidence that such language is prevalent in the media too in articles on the same topic. Neo-liberal ideas such as self-sufficiency and not relying on the state, as well as financial and non-financial contribution to the greater public good are all foregrounded as positive characteristic. As with the policy discourse, migrants are expected to possess, or at least acquire them and thus, the presence of these characteristics in a non-national becomes a marker of integration and simultaneously, their absence points to a lack of integration.

(154) 'Rhoda lives in two-bedroom terrace house in Salford and has been struggling recently to meet her 6500-a-month rent. **She says she isn't on any benefits but is supported by friends and relatives.**' (*Mail on Sunday* 2 May 2010)

(155) She [a local voter] added: “I came to this country as an immigrant in 1961 and all the time I have been here **I’ve never taken anything off the state.** If the candidates came to the door I would say that immigration is a big problem in this country – **and I’m saying that as an immigrant myself.**” (*Argus* 14 April 2010, brackets added)

In both of the passages above, there is reference to neo-liberal values in the positive framing of migrants. In (154), an article about a non-national working illegally for an MP, the quoted speaker, is clear to point out that Rhoda is not claiming any state benefits. Similarly, in (155) a local voter who represents herself as an immigrant also describes herself as never having to rely on state aid. Both of these examples show the complex mental models that are at work in public discourse on immigration where migrants of all type and legal status are discursively constructed as relying on the state for assistance and not working, so that they are a burden on society. This is especially true in (155) in the use of the phrasal verb *take off* which can have a meaning similar to steal or nick. Thus, benefits are conflated with theft of public goods. The presupposition in (154) is that, if Rhoda did receive benefits she would have less of a legitimate claim for assistance with her problem and in (155) it is that if the speaker had ever *taken anything off the state* the legitimacy of her political views would be less acceptable. These excerpts then are, in a way, pre-emptive responses to such claims and show that non-nationals are required to do/not do certain activities. The speakers then, rather than challenging the dominant discourse, actually accept and internalise the public sentiment that migrants are all on benefits to the extent that instead they try to distance themselves from other migrants, by positively framing their actions.

It is not just financial matters that represent a well integrated migrant, but other, more culturally symbolic actions too, as exemplified in the following articles.

(156) Although born in Madras he [Nasser Hussain, England cricket captain] has grown up in this country, **was educated here, has played his sport here, pays his taxes here, is married to a Lancashire lass,** and would feel affronted if anybody considered him other than British. (*Telegraph* 4 June, 2001 brackets added)

(157) He's [author's husband] a hospital doctor and **like any 'good' immigrant** -- by which I mean **one who has come here legally and abided by every rule and requirement demanded of them** -- nothing incenses him more than those of **his compatriots he comes across who come here to play the system**. They **rapidly patch into networks and swap notes about how to get housing, maximise their benefits and get their relatives into the country too**. (*Mail* 5 May 2005, brackets added)

Excerpt (156), again on the subject of English cricket, from the article entitled '*English game all the better for 'Anglicised' players*', Nasser Hussain is positively represented as an example of an integrated migrant. Reference is made to education, profession and the fact that he pays taxes. These characteristics are further strengthened by the rhetorical repetition of the deictic *here*, in reference to England. There is also further marking of his level of integration through mention of his wife as a *lass* a regional colloquialism for woman. In the next example (157), the writer's husband is represented as a migrant, along with the strong attributive adjective, '*good*' in scare quotes. The details of what a good migrant does is then enumerated including legal entry, being lawful and doing everything that is asked. This seems very close to a performative concept of integration where the migrant must do what they are told in order to be accepted. The positive qualities that the author's partner possesses are subsequently juxtaposed to what other migrants do when they arrive. This includes accessing as many benefits as possible. There is also, as with all functional grammar, an element of lexical choice. The writer uses *patch into networks* which has connotations with illegality and organised crime whereas other options may have included use 'informal community support structures' or 'ask for the assistance of friends and relatives' both of which would have framed the same activity in a more positive light. As with (154) and (155), instead though, the author chose to rely on dominant discourses surrounding immigration. Finally, the presence of *his compatriots* implies that although the author distinguishes between her 'good' migrant and other ones, all migrants for her belong to one larger category.

The discursive construction of good and bad migrants was also very evident at a local level in the *Argus*. Indeed, the *Argus* had more examples where individual non-nationals were the focus of attention, be it positive or negative.

(158) **'Perfect citizen'** faces being kicked out

The Home Office faced mounting anger last night over plans to deport a **"model immigrant"**.

Mohammed Samad, 23, faces being sent back to the civil war-torn island of Sri Lanka after immigration officials detained him without warning on Tuesday morning.

The move has sparked fierce criticism from human rights experts, MPs and Mr Samad's supporters who have described him as a **"perfect British citizen"**.

**Mr Samad, of Hurstpierpoint**, fled Sri Lanka after being badly beaten by Tamil Tiger rebels in 1999 and **has raised his baby boy Oscar with wife Sarah, 21, and held down a long-term job as a groundsman at Hurstpierpoint College.**

**He has paid his taxes in full and become a hugely popular member of the community and a key player for Henfield Cricket Club. But he has failed to gain asylum status.**

Mid Sussex district councillor Christopher Maidment said: "It is absolutely outrageous and goes against every single human rights law ever created."

"How the Home Office can send this man, who **has worked hard to support his family and pay his taxes since arriving here**, back to Sri Lanka is beyond comprehension.

**"If there was a mould of the model immigrant it would be made out of Mohammed Samad."** (*Argus* 11 April 2007)

(159) The Iraqi asylum seeker **had no driving license or insurance and had previously been banned from driving for having no insurance. Aziz was working illegally, living of benefits** and had been jailed for 12 months for trying to enter Britain by deception in 2005 (*Argus* 21 April 2010)

Excerpt (158) is an extended example taken from an article about an asylum seeker who was detained and was awaiting deportation. Throughout the article, the subject is carefully and continually activated as performing given activities and possessing qualities

and thus is an example of a well integrated non-national. In the headline Mr Samad is described with the strongly positive “*perfect citizen*”, and thus a member of the community. The article uses direct quotes in headline from a person in authority, in this case a local councillor. This is then reinforced by a subsequent description as a *model migrant* which has echoes of the ‘good migrant’ in (157). This not only builds up to a point where there is now a normative understanding of the concepts of ‘citizen’ and ‘migrant’ but also that Mr Samad is both of these things at the same time. The subject is later constructed as inside the community via *of Hurstpierpoint* and in the following paragraphs there are multiple mentions of Mr Samad being a member of certain categories, including husband, father, worker and, along the lines of previous examples, tax payer. He is also described as *hugely popular*. Again, the presupposition that can be deduced from listing these qualities is that non-payment of taxes, and being single, would somehow reduce his popularity, exclude him from membership of the community and damage his claim to remain in the UK. His ‘integration’ is also highlighted by mention of his membership of the local cricket team which is a significant symbolic marker of English identity. As a neat rejoinder to this ‘integrated’ migrant, (159) is an example of how non-nationals are constructed in media discourse as not being part of the community and of not integrating. Firstly, the subject’s nationality and legal status is created as the sentence theme and is thus foregrounded as relevant to the story. This is in direct comparison to (158) where first mention of Mr Samad’s asylum status doesn’t appear until the fifth paragraph. Mr Aziz’s criminality is then explained in detail but, and more interestingly for my argument on a neo-liberal construction of citizenship, he is constructed as not just ‘receiving’ but *living off* benefits. Two points are worth indicating here. Firstly that his status as benefit claimant is not relevant to his actions, that is, killing a motorcyclist, and secondly, as an asylum seeker, Mr Aziz is not allowed to work legally (apart from voluntary work) and is therefore forced to be reliant upon benefits.

In this hopefully lucid section I have provided a number of examples which, together, suggest that there is a normative understanding of integration in the media discourse, in terms of what qualities non-nationals are expected to possess or at least acquire and that these qualities revolve around a neo-liberal conceptualisation of citizenship and social life in the UK.

## 8.5. Examples of journalistic bad practice

I would like here to briefly note some instances within the media texts where common mistakes and reporting conventions that impact upon how incoming non-nationals are discursively constructed.

Firstly, a large proportion of the media coverage analysed for this chapter focused on the negative aspects of immigration such as migrants being a strain on services (a topos of burden) and the framing of immigration through illegality (a topos of crime). Instances of negative reporting are nothing new, indeed most news is about negative issues of one type or another. However, this is disproportionately the case in articles on immigration and integration and this reflects van Dijk's (1991) work on positive in-groups and negative out-group construction. Furthermore, this negative reporting goes hand in hand with other examples of bad media practice which, together impact on how (incoming) non-nationals are discursively constructed in the wider public sphere. The media corpus though does mirror other research (cf. Bennett et al. 2013) that local media is, on the whole, more positive in its reporting of migrants, especially in larger cities such as London.

Secondly, as with the policy discourse, another major issue with the media discourse is that of false terminology and conceptual slippage

(160) He [William Hague] told *The Mail on Sunday* that a new 'Removals Agency' would round up the **bogus refugees** and deport them. (*Mail on Sunday* 3 June 2001b, brackets added)

(161) People from Pakistan and Tamils from Sri Lanka are among the biggest groups of **asylum immigrants** taking return flights to countries where they'd told UK officials they faced imprisonment, persecution or death. (*Mail on Sunday* 3 June, 2001a)

(162) **Refugees learn their way**

**ASYLUM-seekers** have been attending courses in citizenship to help them settle in. (*Mirror* 5 June 2001)

Excerpt (160) is an example of incorrect terminology usage. The term *bogus refugee* not only casts doubt on the genuine nature of the person but it is also an oxymoron; if a person is a refugee, their case for asylum has been accepted by the government and have been found to be in 'genuine' need. The other two examples show instances of conceptual slippage where terminology for different migrant groups is used in conjunction with one another, *asylum immigrants* in (161), or synonymously as in (162) where *refugee* appears to also mean *asylum seeker*. Indeed the reporting in (162) is so unclear throughout the article that it is impossible to discern which group of migrants it pertains to. The findings on false terminology and conceptual slippage are also not new but rather back up extensive previous research. For example, Buchanan, Grillo, and Threadgold (2004) have argued that the media, especially tabloids, are regularly guilty of failing to fully differentiate between different categories of migrants such as asylum seekers, refugees and so-called economic migrants. Although, there is much less incorrect terminology used nowadays in reporting, the practice of conceptual slippage continues despite professional codes and charters of terminology use developed by broadcasters and trade unions in the UK. The arguments made in Chapter 7 on the impact of such language bare repeating briefly here, namely that this conceptual blurring makes it harder for the interpretive community to clearly understand which type of migrant, or indeed, British citizen sometimes, is being described. There is then a lumping together of all migrants so that all migrants become problematic.

Taking a diachronic perspective of the sample, there were very few visible patterns of change of use in terminology or of how given terms were understood. This was touched upon in 8.2 and it may indicate an inclination on behalf of editors and journalists to continue to use terminology that is widely understood and recognised by their audiences. Research by Bennett et al. (2013) has shown that the term Third Country National, which is a legal term used in politics is very rarely used in media reports and instead the media prefers to use refugee, asylum seeker or immigrant.

Finally, there were very few examples of articles in which migrants, especially asylum seekers and refugees, were quoted directly or even used as sources. Instead there was an over reliance on official sources and especially politicians. Indeed, a lot of the instances of discourse on integration and immigration were to be found within direct embedded quotes from politicians. This then points to a closeness between policy discourse and media discourse and also to the regular direct intertextuality and lack of re-

contextualisation of policy discourse *within* media discourse. This might partly be explained because of the period of data collection so close to elections when immigration is a salient political issue but it also correlates with other research.<sup>78</sup> This notwithstanding, such practices have obvious implications for the discourse of integration in the public sphere. On the one hand, this means that dominant political voices and discourse are not sufficiently reinterpreted and so the normative understanding of integration, as envisioned in government documents, becomes the key director of public discourse on the issue. On the other hand, the prevalence of elite voices in media discourse occurs to the detriment of migrant voices who remain passive in terms of agency in the media and therefore have less of a chance to influence the public sphere. This is why, according to Husband (1998), there should be more state support and funding for ethnic minority activity in the media.

## **8.6. Conclusion**

In Chapter 8 I have laid out and explained in depth the findings from an analysis of the media texts on integration. In section 8.1 I introduced the results of a primarily quantitative analysis of the corpus. The results indicated polysemous understandings of both ‘integration’ and other sister concepts, especially ‘community’ which was often constructed along ethnic lines. The frequency of the collocation ‘illegal immigrant’ was also noted as a key finding. In the remainder of the chapter I took a more qualitative Discourse Historical approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, Krzyżanowski 2010), based on functional grammar (Halliday 1985) to investigate newspaper articles in further detail. In 8.2 I looked at how integration was discursively constructed and in 8.3 I firstly investigated how community was differently conceived of and then how non-nationals and ethnic minorities were included or excluded from such communities, both local and national. In 8.4 I gave a number of examples of how certain values such as democracy and self-sufficiency were constructed as British and then attempted to show how these values and characteristics were represented as markers of integration. Finally, in 8.5 I highlighted three examples of journalistic bad practice which impact upon the discursive

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<sup>78</sup> See, Gemi et al. (2013) and Bennett et al. (2013) for research on journalists’ justifications for under usage of migrant sources.

sive construction of integration.

Overall, the relatively small sample of media discourse analysed here presented a number of parallels with the policy discourse. Returning to my model of discourse in the public sphere, this finding appears to indicate a low level of reinterpretation of official governmental discourse on integration. There are comparable understandings of community and integration and there are definitely similarities in the normative nature of integration, based on neo-liberal ideals. As such, Chapter 8 provides further force to van Dijk's (1995) view of elite discourses and other critically discursive work (Fairclough, 1998, Chouliaraki, 2001) on the mediating and constructing role of newspapers. Dominant discourse, that initiate in policy circles and parliament are then passed on the interpretive community via media outlets. However, at very few junctures along the way do non-elites get their chance to give their side of the story in order to inform and influence the public discourse. In the following chapter I will analyse the results of focus groups with people living in the UK who have, or still are migrants of one form or another in an attempt to discern whether, and if so, to what extent, they fit into this discursive construction of migrants and integration and more importantly, whether they take up and internalise the wider public discourse.

## **Chapter 9: Analysis of Focus Groups with incoming non-nationals**

The final analytical part of this work shifts the critically analytical gaze from the ‘top-down’ to the ‘bottom-up’ and turns though to what, in some ways, should be considered the most crucial aspect of the data, that is, the words, thoughts, feelings and experiences of migrants themselves. This is the case for two separate reasons. From a methodological point of view, and in terms of the structure of this work, the overarching aim has been to track the flow of discourse through the public sphere and this obviously includes how top-down discourses are understood and internalised by the relevant social actors (incoming non-nationals) and also how discursive social practices (for example of citizenship and integration policy) effect both their day-to-day lives and their experiences of (non)integration. Secondly, this chapter also speaks to, and tries to redress the balance of, the almost total silence of migrant voices found within political and media sites of public discourse on integration.

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the results of three focus groups carried out in Brighton in the summer of 2013.<sup>79</sup> The aim is to answer as fully as possible the final two research questions posed in the introduction:

- RQ3: How is integration discursively constructed by incoming non-nationals themselves?
- RQ4. How do these discursive constructions actually affect the integration of incoming non-nationals?

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<sup>79</sup> See Chapter 6 for details of data collection as well as Appendix D for details of focus group participants and coding.

In order to approach this task in the best possible manner, I rely on and broadly follow the two-level approach to analysing focus groups as forwarded by Krzyżanowski (2008, 2010) whereby first the key discourse topics of a focus group are presented and then an in-depth analysis focussing on different elements of discourse such as those proposed by Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2007) that in turn are adapted from the Discourse Historical approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2001).

In the first section I will present, with examples, the primary and secondary discourse topics that were present in each focus group and how the two types of topics connect. Discourse topics are the “important or “summarizing” ideas and are “expressed by several sentences of discourse...by larger segments of the discourse or by the discourse as a whole” (van Dijk 1984: 56, as quoted in Krzyżanowski 2008: 170). Primary discourse topics are those presented to the focus group participants by the facilitator and secondary discourse topics are those introduced, mentioned and developed by the participants themselves, independently of the facilitator. The final stage of mapping the connections between primary and secondary topics is important because it shows the thematic and therefore conceptual links made by the participants. This may in turn indicate in what parts of their day-to-day experiences of integration, non-nationals living in Brighton find particularly problematic or salient for them.

The remaining sections of the chapter are given over to an in-depth analysis of other discursive features (Krzyżanowski 2010: 180). Section 9.2 looks more closely at the discourses produced on some of the key topics that are oriented towards ‘practical’ issues such as language, sites of integration (work, accommodation, education and accessing public services), the specificity of the locale (Brighton) and perceptions of the public sphere discourse on integration. Section 9.3 moves towards an analysis of how participants constructed their (dis)attachments, (un)belongings and (non)membership of their new environments (Krzyżanowski 2010, cf. Jones and Krzyżanowski 2004, 2007 for earlier versions), that is, whether their ‘feelings’ of being integrated are present discursively. It should be noted that I will not be following, Krzyżanowski’s methodology in its entirety. For the purpose of this chapter I make no real distinctions between attachments and belongings but I do recognise the differences between these two and membership as a form of belonging also, rather than categorising results based on the type of belonging, I approach the data coherently through mention of the specific dis-

course topics. 9.3.1 looks at cultural (dis)attachments as an important topic where the extent of integration and immigration can be perceived. Following in from this 9.3.2 investigates the participants' perceptions of membership (symbolic-official and social) and 9.3.3 looks at how participants discursively produce, deny and negotiate multiple belongings. 9.4 is given over to an analysis of the recipients' perceptions of the wider public sphere discourse on integration and immigration. Finally, 9.5 will give some concluding remarks.

## 9.1. Discourse Topics

### 9.1.1. Primary and Secondary Discourse Topics

Primary discourse topics are those introduced by the facilitator throughout the course of a focus group. They are thematic areas that the researcher introduces in order to direct the conversation. Unlike more formal structured interviews though, these are 'loose' topics rather than strict questions. As explained in Chapter 6, these discourse topics were based on Indicators of Integration Framework (2004, cf. Chapter 3).

Code	Topic
PT-I	Perceptions of place of residence
PT-II	Housing, local area and safety
PT-III	Accessing services/benefits
PT-IV	Education
PT-V	Employment
PT-VI	Social contact
PT-VII	Language
PT-VIII	Citizenship
PT-IX	Perceptions of the public sphere
PT-X	Integration and community

Table 9.1: List of Primary Discourse Topics

The topics were introduced in the focus groups to participants through direct questions and prompts. Sometimes primary discourse topic prompts were not used because the topic came up organically and at other times prompts were not used in the order indi-

cated above. A full list of the topics and question prompts used are given in Appendix C.

Following Krzyżanowski’s (2008) methodology the next step of the analysis was to identify secondary discourse topics which were introduced by focus group participants. These topics included many, but not all of the primary discourse topics but were coded as secondary when introduced by participants rather than the facilitator. Table 9.2 below presents a list of secondary discourse topics and in which focus group they were developed.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>FG1</b>	<b>FG2</b>	<b>FG3</b>
ST-1	Freedom	X	X	
ST-2	Safety	X	X	X
ST-3	Life before moving to Brighton	X	X	X
ST-4	Housing	X		X
ST-5	Accessing services/benefits	X	X	X
ST-6	Language	X	X	X
ST-7	Education	X	X	X
ST-8	Cost of living	X	X	X
ST-9	Own ethnic or national community	X	X	X
ST-10	Social contact	X	X	X
ST-11	Racial harassment/discrimination/xenophobia	X	X	X
ST-12	Specificity of Brighton	X	X	X
ST-13	Employment	X	X	X
ST-14	Financial crisis	X		
ST-15	Ethnic minorities and religion		X	X
ST-16	Citizenship		X	
ST-17	Entry process		X	
ST-18	Perceptions of public sphere		X	X
ST-19	Equal rights/democracy		X	X

Table 9.2: List of secondary discourse topics

As the table suggests, there were a number of issues that were salient for the participants but which were not identified as a potential topic by the researcher. Interestingly there was a relatively high level of similarity between the focus groups in terms of which secondary discourse topics were introduced. Eleven of the nineteen topics were brought up by all three groups and a further five were introduced in two of the groups. Indeed, just three topics (the financial crisis, citizenship and the entry process) were introduced as secondary topics. At first sight, this may seem to suggest that, in terms of discourse topics at least, a number of the same issues were important for focus group participants regardless of their immigration experiences (Gateway, asylum system and A8), which was proposed as a potential variable. However, looking merely at secondary

discourse topics does not tell the whole story. This table only indicates which topics were introduced and not how they were spoken about. As will become clear in the in-depth discourse analysis below and subsequent discussion experiences of integration and feelings of belonging to the local and national community, the experiences of the three different groups of respondents differed greatly.

The second finding to point out is that a number of those new discourse topics introduced are oriented towards personal experiences that, collectively, could be gathered under a wider umbrella group of those pertaining to ‘community’ in the widest, and polysemous, sense of the word. These include freedom, safety, one’s own ethnic community, racism, social contact and the specificity of Brighton. This appears to indicate that integration was an individualised experience consisting of events and processes which in the main entailed contact, or lack thereof, with others and which occurred at a very localised level. Such a finding is in line with a lot of the government rhetoric on integration which points to integration as occurring at a local level and is the justification for a lot of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of state intervention on integration being devolved to the city or county council level. On the other hand, the finding also jars with the government discourse on integration pertaining to citizenship and immigration which has a more levelling effect that ignores such local specificities.

### **9.1.2. Mapping thematic links**

The third and final stage of the analysis of discourse topics is to identify and map the discursive links between primary and secondary topics (Table 9.3 below. See also Appendix E for similar tables and charts for individual focus groups). Reading the table vertically, one can see which secondary discourse topics were introduced during discussion of each primary discourse topic. The figures ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ in the table refer to which focus group the secondary topic was introduced in. So if ‘13’ is present, it means that that secondary discourse topic was developed in discussions of that specific primary topic in focus groups 1 and 3. Similarly, read horizontally, the table shows during discussions of which primary discourse each secondary discourse was introduced. The

frequency on the far right of the table shows how many times each secondary discourse topic was introduced during the course of all three focus groups.<sup>80</sup>

Secondary Discourse Topic	Primary Discourse Topics										Freq.
	PT-I	PT-II	PT-III	PT-IV	PT-V	PT-VI	PT-VII	PT-VIII	PT-IX	PT-X	
ST-1	12							2			2
ST-2	1	2							3		3
ST-3	123						23	1		2	4
ST-4	13								3		2
ST-5	12				1		2	12		2	5
ST-6	1			123	13			1		123	5
ST-7	1					3	13		2	3	5
ST-8	123	2			1		1	3			5
ST-9		13	3	1		123	3		3	3	6
ST-10	23	123		3	123		3			23	6
ST-11		12			1				23		3
ST-12	23	1			3			12		3	5
ST-13	123						123		23	3	4
ST-14									1		1
ST-15	23					2	3			2	4
ST-16	2										1
ST-17	2										1
ST-18								3		2	2
ST-19								3			1
<b>Freq</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>	

Table 9.3: Links between primary and secondary discourse topics for all focus groups

(163)

IN2: **Yeah first I moved to London from my country and then I (.) I was living over there for four years (.) and after four years we moved to Brighton**<sup>81</sup>

SB: Okay<sup>82</sup>

IN2: Because we had planned to buy a house (.) and then it wasn't really possible (0.5) in London **it was so expensive**

ST-8 was also mentioned frequently when talking about PT-I, such as in excerpt (163) above, as was employment. PT-X fostered a high number of different secondary discourse topics although these were often only present in one focus group. PTs-VII, VIII,

<sup>80</sup> Tables for each separate focus group can be found in Appendix E

<sup>81</sup> IN2 denotes the second speaker in FG2 (Iranian). See Table 6.5 in Chapter 6 for a full explanation of coding.

<sup>82</sup> SB denotes facilitator.

and to a lesser extent IX also saw numerous secondary discourse topics. For PT-VII (language) unsurprisingly the secondary topics were about interaction (social contact, own ethnic/national community) but also about spaces where this interaction might take place such as ST-5 (accessing services) and ST-13 (employment). Similarly, language as a secondary topic was brought up by all three focus groups when discussing PT-IV (Education) and PT-X (Integration into the community). The secondary topics about the formalities of living in the UK including citizenship (ST-16) and Entry process (ST-17) were not brought up in discussions of language which may point to either a rejection or lack of knowledge of government discourse on the importance of language to immigration policies and later integration. However, the presence of language as a salient secondary topic throughout shows that respondents see language as important. Overall there was a very strong correlation between employment and language. As a secondary topic (ST-13) employment was used by all three groups in PT-VII (Language) as when employment was a primary discourse topic (PT-V), language was introduced as secondary topics by FG1 and FG3. For the EU respondents this was primarily an issue of English being an initial barrier to finding work when they or their colleagues first arrived. This issue though was overcome later though relatively easily either by improving their language skills through social contact or by searching for jobs that required less knowledge of English. For those from Ethiopia though, English language was seen as a key skill in improving their employment but one that, because of changes in government policy, they were unable to access. This can be interpreted as them being caught in a ‘Catch-22’ situation whereby if they worked full-time (over 18 hours a week), they were not eligible for free English language classes and yet were not earning enough to pay for the classes.<sup>83</sup> If they decided to work fewer hours they would be able to access free language classes but then would not earn enough to live.

Looking at table 9.3 horizontally, it is possible to see that some secondary topics were used extensively across primary discourse topics, often in more than one focus group. Statistically, the most prevalent were ST-9 (own ethnic or national community) and ST-10 (social contact). That these two topics were the more common seems to add fuel to suggestion above around the salience of ‘community’ and indicates that the interpersonal nature of integration was very important for the respondents. This is further

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<sup>83</sup> It should be made clear that they did not reference to the Joseph Heller’s book but that this is my personal interpretation of their words.

backed up by the relative frequency of ST-6 (language) and (ST12) the specificity of Brighton. Other secondary topics were rarely introduced such as ST-1 (freedom). However, this does not tell the whole story. While freedom was not, maybe, a cross-cutting issue such as language or social contact were, it was an extremely salient point for some respondents, especially in FG1 (Oromo) and to a lesser extent FG2 (Iranian). This was marked by the emotive language used:

(164)

OR2: Cause here is (.) very (1) er (.) **we live in freedom**

SB: Okay

OR2: We don't have **any security problems** (.) **worries**

SB: So you feel safe?

OR2: Yeah (.) safe (1) in refugee life (.) the (.) we have **many** problems (.) financial problems (.) security problems (1) now here in (0.5) the UK we are living just **normally. Peacefully**

That ST-1 was introduced by the two non-EU focus groups possibly implies that motivations, or at the very least ex post factum justifications, for emigrating to the UK differ from those contained in the narratives from Polish and Hungarian residents of Brighton.

Finally in this section, it is worth looking at how some of the primary topics “triggered the development” (Krzyżanowski 1998, 175) of secondary issues. The charts below are two examples (PT-VI and PT-I) of which secondary topics occurred and how. Often, the use of one secondary topic would lead to further supplementary issues being discussed. A thick unbroken arrow denotes that the discursive interconnection was present in all three focus groups, a dashed arrow indicates that it was present in two, and a dotted arrow indicates that the interconnection occurred in just on focus group (Charts for each individual focus group can be found in Appendix E)


Primary Discourse Topic		Secondary Discourse Topics
		
PT-VI		ST-9
		ST-13
		ST-15

Figure 9.1: Thematic links of primary discourse topic 6 (PT-VI)

Fig 9.1 (above) is an example of a primary topic (PT-VI, social contact) that did produce or necessitate many secondary topics. ST-13 (employment) and ST-15 (ethnic mi-

norities and religion) were both used once each but ST-9 (own ethnic or national community) was mentioned in all three focus groups. This relates back to Agar and Strang's (2004) social bonds as a key part of integration.




Figure 9.2: Thematic links of primary discourse topic 1 (PT-I)

Fig 9.2 (above) on the other hand shows the more complex thematic links that were developed after the topic of perceptions of the participants' place of residence was introduced. There were strong interconnections between PT-I and ST-3 (life before moving to Brighton), ST-8 (cost of living) and ST-13 (employment). This would suggest that respondents saw employment as a crucial part of settling in to their new environments, especially as, in one group, there was a further interconnection between employment and social contact. There were also relatively strong interconnections in more than one focus group with freedom (ST-1), housing (ST-4), language (ST-6), social contact (ST-10), the specificity of Brighton (ST-12) and ethnic minorities and religion (ST-15). Most interesting of these thematic links is perhaps that between PT-1 and the specificity of Brighton as there was a subsequent relatively strong thematic interconnection with the topic of ethnic minorities and religions, albeit, in one instance via the topic of freedom. This interconnection speaks of an opinion of Brighton as a unique in part at least because of its ethnic and multinational make up. This diversity may make it easier to

settle rather than stand out as in some visible or linguistic way as ‘different’ in smaller towns or towns and cities with less diversity.

(165)

PL4: yeah you are right that basically Brighton **we have so many mixed erm race races and basically international place so but for me it’s not only British people who create this environment** so also like yeah different nationalities

For example, in excerpt (165) the Polish respondent makes the point that Brighton is a welcoming place because of the international nature of the city as well as ‘native’ British people. Two things should be noted here. Firstly, her use of the phrase *British people* is vague and it is not clear whether the respondent means white British or not. Secondly, the participant uses the collective pronoun ‘we’ to talk about Brighton, thus positioning herself as a member of a putative Brighton community.

In this the first part of this section the primary and secondary discourse topics were introduced. It was noted that many secondary topics were used in multiple focus groups and this points to a certain ‘stability’ and homogeneity purely in terms of the issues that are salient for all those interviewed. In the second part of the second section the thematic interconnections between primary and secondary discourse topics were comprehensively mapped and analysed. In summary, they point to three key findings. Firstly, that integration is a locally experienced phenomenon based primarily on contact (or the absence of it) with others. Secondly and linked to this, language is a key part of the integration process in both the personal and professional spheres. Finally, because integration is such a locally lived experience the unique nature of Brighton as an open, diverse and socially liberal city appears to be a major factor that influences integration and indeed appears to make the transition for some a lot easier than it would be in other cities in the UK.

## 9.2. ‘Doing Integration’: Patterns and links in discourse

Following on from a mapping of the discourse topics, in the next two sections a fine-grained, critically discursive, analysis of the focus groups will be presented. This section is given over to what I have termed ‘doing integration’ and looks at some of the

discursive work done by focus group participants on what might be called the ‘practical’ elements of integration, that is how they understand and relay their experiences of integration. The section is divided into three sub-sections: Language (9.2.1), sites of integration (9.2.2) and the specificity of Brighton (9.2.3).

### 9.2.1. Language

As mentioned in the previous section, language was repeatedly mentioned in the focus groups when discussing integration and appeared to be an issue that affected integration in number of areas of life. For those who had come from Ethiopia via Kenya, the lack of English language skills was seen as an obstacle to understanding how life functioned in the UK and also being able to access services.

(166)

OR1: Because like eighty percent of **our community** they don’t (.) **well they speak English but it’s not perfect**

SB: Sure

OR1: and that’s **another barrier** into you know **adapting to the systems** and things like that

SB: So you so the (.)so er the English was one of the biggest problems for you

OR1: It was I think yes I would say

OR2: [Mhmhm (0.5) **If you don’t know it good how can you explain your problems?**

Firstly there is mention of *community* along with the possessive pronoun *our* which in this excerpt denoted the Oromo community in Brighton but at other times to a wider community of Oromo throughout the UK. When speaking about language skills, there is a positive framing of language skills of the community members, but this is then mitigated by the contrastive conjunctive clause *but it’s not perfect*. The possible presupposition here is that if they could speak English perfectly, they would have fewer problems with integration in terms of accessing services. This presupposition is in fact forwarded later in the conversation by OR2 via a rhetorical question using the first conditional construction. This is in response to OR1 who explains language deficiency through the metaphor of a *barrier* (a metaphorical wall can block access). OR1 also provides insight

into how he understands what integration entails. The use of the word *adapting* implies that it is a responsibility of the incoming person to change to fit the current landscape. Furthermore, throughout the duration of the focus group there was recurring reference to *the system* or *systems*. In some cases it appeared to mean government and official bureaucracy and at other times alternatively it seemed to imply ‘the way this country works’. In this excerpt OR1’s ‘system’ is firstly plural but also ambiguous whereas, OR2’s response points to an understanding of system as accessing public services.

In the same focus group there was also discussion on how the lack of English affected employment and in particular finding better jobs.

(167)

OR3: Because of I’m working because of I’m working I’m working **I’m not getting job centre allowance (.) if you are not getting job centre allowance you cannot get English class or lessons (.) we like to learn English (1)** just now we have a problem you know to learn English to learn even if you learning everything to get you know er (.) **driving license to get working (.) delivery everything (0.5) taxi**

SB: Better job yeah

OR3: **Better job changing our life (.) because of if you are not learning how can I get a better job? (.) How can I get a good job how can get a good skill? (.)** I cannot learning cause of that yeah

In this excerpt, OR3 explains his predicament. He links the discourse topics of work with language but also education. For him, better knowledge of English would not just directly allow him to find better work but also lack of English is a barrier to him accessing other education opportunities (*getting a good skill*) that would indirectly improve his job opportunities. The importance of language and employment as a gateway to integration is underscored by the claim that *better job changing our life*.<sup>84</sup> As mentioned section 9.1.2 above, some Oromo participants could be seen as feeling of being in a classic Catch-22 situation caused by the government decision to restrict access to free English classes. This was also mentioned in FG2 by IN3, but as a problem that happened to other people rather than the participant himself. Acknowledgement of this situation shows that some of the respondents were aware of government policy concerning integration, but it is highly likely that it is in a large part down to personal experi-

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<sup>84</sup> I interpret this as an attempt to use a modal construction (possibly would/will) by OR3 who had very limited English.

ence. This is then an example of the impact of ‘discourse in action’ on the lived experiences of incoming non-nations. Furthermore, the use of different pronouns throughout (*I, we, you*) seems to point to a nuanced understanding of the issue. *I* is used to explain the issue as a personalised experience, here a barrier getting a better job via learning other skills. The use of *we* though frames this as a problem experienced by other members of the Oromo community in Brighton. By using *you* in the zero conditional construction the issue is not only depersonalised but also presented as a general factual rule and ‘you’ is also further used in a first conditional rhetorical question.

The participants in FG1 wanted to learn English in order to integrate more fully but felt as though they could not because of their circumstances. However, the following excerpt from FG3 shows that learning the language, and by extension, integrating, is also a question of choice:

(168)

PL6: Yeah well I think there is actually Polish people who form communities as well ‘cause my friend from Colchester he knows a woman who’s been living here for twenty years (.) **and her English possibly consists of thirty words or something (.) and she works with English people so (.) but she’s got you know Polish telly Polish husband Polish friends it’s just all Polish and then she just goes to work (.)** like fair enough **she doesn’t really have to speak to people** because she only serves them food in canteens so they just point at or I guess can learn

Here, PL6 describes a person who has not integrated into wider British society but rather relies on, or has chosen to rely on, TV from back home and any extended social contact is conducted with fellow Poles. The element of choice is highlighted twice. Firstly through the giving of information about her language abilities *thirty words or something*, followed by an additive clause *and she works with English people*. The implication is that because she works with English people, her English should be better either because of greater exposure to English or because of a responsibility to learn the language in order to communicate with colleagues and clients. This is followed up with the second example: the negative modal of obligation or *necessity she doesn’t really have to*. As explained in detail in Chapter 7, English is a requirement for those migrating to England from outside the EU but for EU citizens there is no such ‘stick approach’ and so learning the language is down to personal choice. With the case above, although when she entered the UK twenty years ago Poland was not an EU member, there were

no language requirements for entry and so her decision to not learn the language was at least in part down to personal choice.

In the two excerpts from FG1 above the respondents saw language as a barrier to concrete issues of employment and access to services but in FG3 language was (also) seen as something that could inhibit an understanding of, and integration into the more abstract concept of ‘culture’.

(169)

HU1: Think it's very important (.) **It's the most important I think to be able to communicate and to (0.5) not just in terms of understanding what people say but everything about the culture (0.5) or to belong** although I didn't I already studied English for (1) about eight years before I came here so I never had big problems with the I never really (.) I mean obviously trying to understand British accent when you move is really hard but when you get used to it then you learn how to speak yeah it's it's easier and **I never had problems I not I never experienced that part of it** (1) how you get along without knowing the language

Here the respondent from Hungary argues that knowing English is more than a question of *understanding* other people but that a good knowledge allows one to get a better grasp of British culture and *to belong*. Here, then, is a very clear example of the importance that some participants placed on language as a key element of integration; that without it, it is much harder to ‘belong’ in the country and this appears to back up both academic research and, crucially, government discourse on the subject. HU1 subsequently distances herself from this potential situation by positively framing her own previous education as the reason for her not having *big* problems stemming from lack of English language ability. This is later intensified by an adverb of frequency, *never*. The presupposition from this distancing technique is that she feels like she belongs in the UK and understands the culture.

One problem that HU1 does mention is the British accent and this is something that others in FG3 also brought up.

(170)

PL4: Like yeah we (.) especially like if we have maybe some private schools where they have like (.) er erm native native teachers native speakers and so it might help you get used to to the accent but **at the beginning its quite hard especially that especially here in Brighton people don't**

**speak proper English** (.) they they cut words off and they they shorten everything and **they if they want (.) me to not understand it's easy to make**

PL5 ((laughs))

SB: Do you think people try sometimes

PL4: Yeah yeah when I was working in the clubs they they were kind of joking this way yeah

SB: Okay so you found they were being deliberately (0.) using different language

PL4: Yeah they had they had good fun I think yeah

SB: **Okay were doing it just for fun or?**

PL4: **Yeah kind of to annoy**

In the excerpt above the speaker constructs himself as the deictic centre both temporally and geographically. By using *at the beginning* PL4 places the problem in the past and could imply that the issue has been overcome, however he also uses the present tense *it's* which indicates that the problem is still occurring and the continued use of the present tense later would suggest this to be the case. Additionally, or possibly alternatively, it may be a distancing technique that frames it as a general problem that would be experienced by everyone.<sup>85</sup> He then relates his experiences of this happening and through this 'small story' (Georgakopolou 2007, Bamberg and Georgakopolou, 2008). He reveals how people at work deliberately used language that he would find difficult to understand for fun and to annoy him and is an example of how new migrants can be excluded from local communities and 'communities of practice' (Wenger 1998) through language. Furthermore, interestingly, PL4 seemingly attempts to deflect any potential problems arising from not understanding the English spoken in Brighton away from himself and instead places the blame on people not speaking English correctly and this mirrors what HU1 said in excerpt (169). Although PL4 experienced these problems with integrating at work due to communication, this does not stop him from constructing himself at the deictic centre and moreover that that centre is Brighton: *here in Brighton*. Positioning one's self in such a way should be taken as a discursive sign of belonging.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Interpretation of this passage is problematised by English language proficiency. Different tense usage may be a substitute for not knowing how to use present perfect.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Chapter 5 of Krzyżanowski 2010 and Krzyżanowski (2008) for other examples of the importance of language for integration.

### 9.2.2. Sites of integration

As well as language, a more abstract barrier, there are other more concrete sites and areas of life where integration is done and experienced. Accommodation, another of Ager and Strang's key building blocks of integration, was mentioned frequently by participants of FG1, for them their main problem was accessing public housing.

(171)

OR2: Every six or one year we move from place to place (.) **That was difficult for us er (.) but later (2) we understand we get (.) to the system (.) we understand er the situation it is completely (.) different from what we had now (.) before**

SB: So it was shock yeah?

OR1: Yeah

SB: Because the system's totally different

OR1: Yeah very different

OR2: Yeah but later on still still some (.) **still some of us somehow we understand (.) some we still we have problems especially in the accommodation**

SB: Okay

OR2: Still we are moving from place to place er every two years or one year (.) when we move we lose erm stuff (.) we buy

OR2: It's difficult

OR1: **So you can't even create (.) your place (.)** you can't you can't call it **is my home** and you you know just look after it because you never know when you are going to move out

In excerpt (171) above, OR2 recounts how despite now understanding *the system*, accommodation remains a problem for many in the Oromo community *we still have problems*. There is also reference to life before coming to the UK when he constructs how things work in Brighton as different from *what we had...before*. This is intensified via the adverb of intensity *completely*. Towards the end of the excerpt, OR1's claim of the possessive pronouns *your place* and *my home* indicate the effect of uncertain accommodation on settling down and feeling as though one belongs. It is a barrier to further attachment. Although place and home can be understood as concrete entities made out of bricks and mortar, they should I think, be interpreted here as more abstract concepts of a place where one feels settled or safe. The presupposition stemming from all of this is that having a place to call home is vital for feeling a sense of belonging

It became apparent though that it was not just a question of having settled accommodation that was problematic but also the location.

(172)

OR2: So it is er for us er (.) good very (.) very (.) er best to meet each other before get our problems **we talk each other our problem (.) we can help we can help we can help each other** yes (1) you know some of er **one of our er community member he er died in Brighton and Hove (0.5) he hung himself**

SB: Okay

OR2: **Cause he felt stressed**

OR1: **Very stressed**

OR2: Because he don't know the

SB: Depressed

OR1: Very depressed yeah

OR2: [depressed yeah

SB: Why?

OR2: **[every time he got er bills**

OR1: **It's just the system you can't you can't you can't cope with the system it's too much for him and on top of that he can't speak (.) doesn't speak English**

OR2: [the system (.) it's difficult

OR2: **[He lived far from us**

SB: Okay

OR1: So (1) yeah there are a lot of problems

OR2: **He lived from he lived far from us** he can't get someone to help (1) to help him what the letter is says er (1) so (.) **living closer for us it is (.) very important I think.**

In the excerpt above a story is co-constructed by OR1 and OR2 (son and father) about an acquaintance, *one of our community*, who committed suicide. The importance of social contact with other Oromo is deemed to be very important as a form of support in dealing with the difficulties faced in integrating. Again, there is reference to *the system* and it is constructed as overwhelming. It appears relevant to point out that rather than saying 'he couldn't cope' OR1 instead uses *you can't cope* which constructs the problem as one faced by him and other people. The dangers and risks of not knowing English are further topicalised by the participants but OR2 is very clear to point out that he lived far away from other Oromo and that living close to others from the same ethnic group was important.<sup>87</sup> The implicit presupposition is that if he had lived closer to other

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<sup>87</sup> Temporary accommodation where the Gateway refugees lived to begin with was provided by Brighton and Hove City Council. Initially they did not have free choice as to where they could live. Under the 1996

Oromo, he may not have committed suicide. Accommodation becomes, then, a matter of life and death.

Education was another area of life where discursive hints at integration came up in conversation.

(173)

OR1: Yeah and that that makes it<sup>88</sup> **hard for (.) to get a job** and er (.) and you know **link into the rest of the communities** and the things like that

In this excerpt OR1 echoes the claim of OR3 in excerpt 5 that education/skills is a barrier to getting gainful employment but also goes on explain how a lack of education can also preclude people from the Oromo community from establishing bonds with others in the city (or what Krzyzanowski 2010: 175) would term a form of “functional attachment”. The use of the word *link* implies not just one-off contact but sustained connections and it is also interesting that OR1 speaks of multiple *communities* which might point to understanding of the concept of community based on ethnicity/nationality rather than geography.

In contrast, for participants of FG3 their experiences of education in the UK allowed them to create attachments to other people.

(174)

PL2: Well I think it was interesting you know just (.) I think **it helped with language a bit a** but with like this course was like **getting more into Brighton community** as well because you you meet much more

(175)

HU1: I think (1) obviously it's very hard to find jobs and I'm not sure if its (.) that necessary to have a degree but in terms of the knowledge I er received and the opportunities I got to what I studied and the researches I've done I really enjoyed all of it (.) the teaching **and I never felt (.) as an outsider in a course where there were forty of us and there were two people who weren't English and they always treated me in exactly the same way as anyone else would be treated**

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Housing Act, if a person rejects temporary legislation (“a reasonable offer of accommodation”) the council can fully discharge its duty (s.193) to house the applicant. However, later when applying for permanent council accommodation via the Homemove scheme, applicants can bid on homes throughout the Brighton and Hove area.

<sup>88</sup> *it* is an anaphoric reference to a previous claim by the speaker that most of the Oromo community didn't have education

Unlike OR1, in the first excerpt above PL2's idea of community is understood geographically. Moreover, a consideration of the wider context (the course was a free ESOL course for foreigners) it also indicates that this community is multinational one, albeit one that uses English to communicate. She constructs the community as an entity which one can enter (*into*) but also the presence of the comparative adjective *more* shows that the speaker feels that she was already part of the community prior to this experience. In excerpt (175), HU1's use of strong adjectives of frequency *never* and *always* intensify her claims that she felt included and treated equally at university. The presupposition behind the never feeling as an *outsider* is that during her time at studying, she felt like an insider, which would be an indication of feeling a sense of belonging. There is also a strong sense of idealisation of her experiences.

Unsurprisingly, the workplace is also a site of integration and of non-integration, as evidenced below in excerpt (176).

(176)

SB: (incomp 0.5) communication (.) and do you have communication with English people at work or?

OR4: **I'm not have communication (.) only teacher and my manager**

SB: Okay just teacher and manager

OR4: Er not talking with people outside with English. Hi (.) Neighbour another person

SB: Okay just hello. (.) so do you do you find it difficult in in Woodingdean?

OR4: Yes **Woodingdean and Brighton are little bit different**. In Woodingdean talking to people (1) yeah Hi how are you good morning just that (.) it's better but in **Brighton I not talking (.) Hello hi**

SB: Okay (.) **just hello hi**

OR4: **Two years (.) hi**

In this co-constructed piece (OR4 had elementary English) it becomes evident that the participant has severely limited contact with people other than from the Oromo community *only teacher and my manager* and then goes on to negatively compare his place of work in Brighton with where he lives: *in Woodingdean...it's better*. He also mentions the ongoing temporal nature of this experience *two years*.

### 9.2.3. The uniqueness of Brighton

In 9.1 it was shown that the specificity of Brighton was a stable secondary discourse topic that was introduced in response to a statistically high number of primary discourse topics and it would therefore appear right to interrogate this topic in more critically discursive depth.

(177)

IN2: Er (.) I think (.) Brighton is seems to (.) **I just not saying from myself because I heard it from other people who coming here** for a shorter stay or (.) student that **Brighton is slightly different (0.5) because I don't know it's a multicultural its (.) people with lots of different ideas then its more welcome and you feel more home** when you come here...

(178)

IN2: And the other things (.) as my friend [nods towards IN1] explained there are **lots of minority that (0.5) you (.) you feel home when you between them** (.) also they (.) the people for example in college in GP in hospital they used to that they deal with other people other than just English people and now (.) they are more friendly with them (.) **erm I feel more comfortable with my GP here rather than London (0.5) I think the behaviour of the nurse doctor (.) school teacher or college everywhere is slightly (.) because I feel people are more relaxed here in this city rather than big city**

In the two excerpts above, IN2 foregrounds her view that Brighton's multiculturalism and overall diversity is a positive thing. In excerpt (178), she prefaces her claims with an *argumentum ad populum*. This distances her comments and has the effect of positioning what she says not (just) as personal opinion but as a more widely accepted or experienced fact and this potentially gives more weight to her words. In both examples, using the generic 'you', she explains that the multicultural nature of the city allows her (presumably as someone from a minority ethnic group in the UK) to feel *home*. This is an interesting construction. 'To feel at home' means feeling settled, or where one belongs or where one is accepted, whereas 'to feel home' additionally implies a return to a state or place. To construct Brighton in such a way would seem to suggest that the participant feels a strong sense of belonging to the city.<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, in both excerpts she positively compares Brighton to other cities; in the first she compares to where her par-

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<sup>89</sup> However, one must be cautious in interpreting such interviews and this could simply be a grammatical mistake made by a non-native speaker of English.

ents, currently awaiting a decision on their application for asylum, live (later divulged as Hull a smaller and less diverse city in the north east of England) and in the second she refers to London where she lived prior to moving to Brighton. This might be termed ‘the Goldilocks principle’:<sup>90</sup> for IN2 Hull is not diverse enough, London is not relaxed enough but Brighton is ‘just right’.

In a similar vein, in excerpt (179) below, IN3 also negatively frames other cities *some problems* in order to present Brighton in a positive light and also points to the number of foreigners.

(179)

IN3: Er (.) especially in Brighton no because **in another city I saw is some problems** but in Brighton is (.) I think so many foreigner coming and they spend the money (.) in a result people is **warmer than another city** (.) I **think because foreigner student come here and spend money help run business is people friendly with the foreigner**

Where his line of argument differs though is that he claims that it is the spending power of these foreigners that in some way pleases the residents of Brighton to the extent that they become *warmer* towards non-residents. Two things seem interesting here. Firstly that the presupposition of this claim is that if foreigners didn’t spend money and help keep businesses going through their spending, then Brighton would be a worse place to live for foreigners. Secondly, his mention of *foreigners* and *students* points to a view of non-nationals as, at best, temporary residents of Brighton or tourists rather than potential citizens. It may also show a neo-liberal understanding of what responsibilities a new migrant has.

A further topos used by recipients to discursively construct their opinions of Brighton was that of freedom.

(180)

IN1: **Actually I love it (.) Brighton because everybody freedom**

SB: Okay

IN1: And also I’m telling my **children you are freedom here but you keep all of the good things from your country** (.) adding some freedom here as well **but not too much freedom**

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<sup>90</sup> The Goldilocks principle states that something must fall within certain narrow margins for it to be accepted and is derived from the fairy tale ‘Goldilocks and the three bears’

(181)

PL4: Yeah rather Brighton is very **specific atmosphere** and people rather don't (.) don't expressing at least (.) what they think they think buy they don't express it like (.) too much about like if they think you are a weird person they don't say it they just look and that's it

PL5: ((laughs))

PL4: Or they just pass by and er (.) **so because you have many people like gay community er or people doing yoga on the beach or everybody's running its really doesn't matter if you are twenty years old or seventy years old or more just everybody does what they wants and doing**

PL5: Yeah and especially clothes (.) **like in Poland if you see somebody with I like I don't know (.) very like strange clothes it's like ooh (.) and here you can wear what you want**

In excerpt (180), IN1 uses a strong verb of emotion to display her feelings about Brighton *I love it*. Despite this love of the city though, the rest of the excerpt gives hints to her latent sense of belonging. She positions her family's country as not at their deictic centre (*here*) and it is clear that Britain is not her country but rather Iran. For her, the freedom afforded to her children by living in Brighton is of an additive nature, a 'top-up' on top of all the *good things* from back home. However there is also a wariness of this freedom *not too much freedom*.

In Excerpt 20, PL5 describes Brighton as a *specific atmosphere*. This is likely a calque from the Polish *specyficzna atmosfera*, which understood in its positive sense, could be better translated as 'unique atmosphere'. He then goes on to enumerate the diversity of the city with examples of people's actions and further points to a sense of freedom *just everybody does what they wants*. PL5 then interacts with his examples, and then positively compares Brighton to her country of origin, Poland which for her is less open.

In this section language, education, accommodation, work and the uniqueness of Brighton were all shown to be important sites where the discursive construction of integration was visible in the focus groups. Language especially was seen as major factor in directly facilitating integration via social contact and also indirectly because of how it aided other processes such as improving one's job. Experiences in such practical and concrete, that is, geographical, spaces of integration then have an impact on more abstract/cognitive processes of integration and it is to these that we now turn.

### **9.3. ‘Feeling integrated’: (Dis)attachments, (non-)belongings and (multiple) memberships**

Though obviously a vital component, ‘doing integration’ is but one facet of adjusting to living in a country; integration is also about feeling a sense of attachment or belonging to the new country of residence and by deduction, discursive instances of not belonging or feeling attached may in some instances be a sign that a person is having trouble integrating more fully or does not want to integrate further. In this section, comprised of three subsections, I will firstly analyse what focus group participants said about the importance of culture. I will then move to further discursive constructions of belonging and of official/symbolic membership of national and local communities and in the third section instances of where participants displayed multiple belongings will be introduced and commented on.

#### **9.3.1. “Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?” Contradicting and confirming the Cricket test<sup>91</sup>**

One hypothesis surrounding integration and belonging is that the value that a person attaches to one’s country of origin and the culture through discourse might throw up some indication of how integrated they feel. If we follow Tebbit’s cricket test theory, quoted in the subtitle above, then continued attachment to ‘where you came from’ is a barrier to integration (as assimilation). This is not a theory that I subscribe to and as forwarded throughout this work, integration is not a unidirectional process. Indeed, in 9.3.3 I will indicate that for many of the focus group participants there was discursive evidence that multiple belongings were possible. This notwithstanding though, reference to non-British culture and to life in their country of origin was a consistently salient secondary discourse topic and thus deserves deeper analysis.

A number of discussions highlighted the importance of maintaining cultural ties and traditions. In the excerpt below, two participants of FG1 along with the facilitator

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<sup>91</sup> This quote is part of Tebbit’s ‘Cricket test’ (see previous chapters and also Howe, 2006)

co-construct an explanation for why they feel it is important for Oromo members in Brighton to come together regularly.

(182)

OR2: Yeah it is **very important** because (.) er **in our country this I'd say a tradition people (.) they meet** (0.5) especially ceremony, we have a ceremony before a ceremony people they have a community they contribute money they buy everything for the event

SB: Okay (.) so everyone comes together

OR2: They comes together (.) so this is like **like culture or our tradition** (0.5) erm people meet in the evening after work they er in big man area home they're chatting they're discussing about (.) life or everything

...

OR2: Because we **we live in (.) many people live in the same area** then they come to the big the oldest person's home (.) they play they chat about life everything this is like (0.5) our culture as I said

OR1: **So we are following the roots of the culture**

OR2: The roots yeah (.) then we like to make community (.) er this is for us is very important

SB: So it gives you some type of er (.) connection to to your

OR1: Cultural yeah or cultural. **And we're teaching our children as well**

OR2: Children children

SB: Yeah okay and that's important as well yes?

OR1: [yeah so

Very important (.) the language because **in this country they can (.) easily forget the culture because in er school they spend with you know erm (.) English they speak English language and there likely to forget the language** so

OR2 uses the intensifying adjective *very* to predicate the importance of meeting and proceeds to explain that this is because of tradition. To start with it is constructed as *a tradition* but later it becomes *our tradition* which works to personalise and thus enhance the significance of such meetings. The use of the word *roots* further creates an understanding of meeting in this as a fundamental and foundational to being Oromo. Later, OR1 adds a supplementary, temporal justification for meeting regularly as way of carrying on the tradition, i.e. so that such symbolic rituals and the language can be passed down to children. In this example OR2's attachment to the tradition is also evidenced in the choice of tense *we live in* which implies an ongoing state, but he then stops and instead says *many people live in the same area*. The first seems to place his attachment more in Ethiopia (cognitively, or maybe temporally, he feels he is 'still' in Ethiopia)

whereas the second seems to point to a realisation that he no longer lives that way and so he distances himself and then rearticulates the story from an external perspective.

A similar explanation for the importance of maintaining cultural ties was given by PL2 in FG3 but in reference to the establishment of Polish schools in Brighton, one of which she worked at.

(183)

PL2: It's **actually keeping this identity somehow** like meeting together and the the group I joined they just seem to be the people who some of the people were the people who just came here like a while ago well I suppose the school was founded a while ago but it (.) and I don't (.) think well some of them are come (.) they come (.) **some children come from mixed families like I would say I met two children who had a Polish mum and mum died a while ago so they got only English dad and then (.) so they basically speak mostly English because dad doesn't really speak Polish but then they still want to keep the Polish identity together with the Dad** and just (.) they want to

SB: So there's obviously a need for something like that or else there wouldn't be two schools

PL2: [yeah there's a need for something to go and to just to go to school to I don't know to **learn some a little bit about history the geography or just know know little bit about Polish customs** and

Here there is initial reference to the need to keep one's identity via contact with other Polish people and as the explanation goes on to give details what this identity includes: language, history, geography and customs. Here through a small story about some of her students, language is rendered as an especially important part of identity.

Contact with others of the same language group was also brought up in FG2.

(184)

IN2: Yeah I think yeah it's nice to have friends from different community because for example when you talk with your friend (.) English friend (.) you talk about certain things like the weather like the price like politics like these things (.) **but when you talk with your friend Iranian people you can you can talk about very details that you you just you both knows that er important for just you** maybe it's not important issue something to talk about for English

Here, IN2 firstly appears to positively frame her contact (albeit through the generic 'you') with English people, but it later transpires that this is in fact a mitigation that,

through the *but* conjunction, shifts the focus to the even greater positives of speaking to Iranian friends.

By means of a contrast though, other participants said that they did not actively look to establish contact with fellow nationals.

(185)

PL6: I must admit **I wasn't very interested in what Polish people were doing here**

PL2: I just **I don't really look for Polish people as friends** I just (.) happen to meet people and **just happen to be if they're Polish then that's fine but most of them actually aren't** so it's just er

To start with, using the adjective of cognition *interested*, PL6 constructs herself as, in some way, actively shunning other Poles in the UK. PL2 then builds on this ambivalence, by stating that she too doesn't actively search for fellow nationals, through the verb of action *look*.

Another way that might point to the complexity of the integration process, as one that involves a negotiation of the country of origin and country of residence, is presence of comparisons of life in the UK with life prior to that, be that in the country of origin or a third country. For the Oromo respondents in FG1 comparison to previous places of residence came as a secondary discourse topic introduced when talking about employment.

(186)

OR3: You know you know Kenya and English (.) England is not the same (.) Why? Kenya **Kenya you are free** if you need just now you are starting on the way of a job I can start in the job (.) this job **you don't need health and safety** you don't need er

OR1: **Policies and procedures no**

OR3: Policy and procedure you don't need anything you **don't need tax**

OR2: **Straight**

OR3: You don't need anything you **need a certificate**

SB: Okay

OR3: For example just now if you are getting if er I'm a doctor I'm coming from Kenya (.) a doctor I cannot doctor in England I must learn in England here in UK after getting my er (.) result good result after that I be doctor (1) just now in Kenya even if you are I am working in a butchery I'm working in a butchery I'm selling er (.) everything **I'm er even I go for every I'm working more than thirty forty hours three jobs because of that I'm changing my you know my life (.) here you can't**

The fact that three of the five participants in the discussion are present in this excerpt indicates the significance of the issue. In comparison to excerpt (164) where the UK was positively constructed as providing them with freedom, here, the quality of freedom is bestowed instead on living in Kenya where they lived previously; and this despite the daily hardships and dangers of living there such as threats from the Kenyan police and crime. In the following exchanges, official nouns of bureaucracy and local government, are enumerated, but also for them these are methods of control that inhibit their freedom of earn and work. That they use such terminology may come from either an internalisation of the public discourse but more likely they are words used frequently in the workplace: OR1 had just finished studying for a BA in Social Work and so would be expected to use such a construction as *policies and procedures* and OR3 refers to the hours he was allowed to work in Kenya and says that *here you can't* and this seems to point to a basic knowledge of the EU working time directive Worth pointing also is OR2's comment, *straight*, which serves to construct work metaphorically as a journey and thus such bureaucracy as obstructions to a smooth, direct, process of earning money.

The juxtaposition of country of origin and the UK was also frequently present in the context of social contact with neighbours.

(187)

IN2: Er yeah (.) because is in **my country it's totally different** we know our neighbour very well **like the relative the family** but here (.) er they just maybe **stop to stay hello if they are a little very friendly** otherwise they just (0.5) shake the hand ((laughs))

(188)

IN3: But **it's warm place** but it depend English people I told you is (.) my neighbour (.) for example ten English people (.) **I can't see is warm together or every week contact together (.) no nothing but in Iran you know I think is Iran is ten neighbour or twenty neighbour understand everything** (.) and contact to more than English

(189)

HU1: And the (.) I agree that like **in Hungary where where my parents live we do know our neighbours much better or we would visit each other** (.) not necessarily be close friends but maybe know a bit more about them (.) but I guess in Brighton if you have if you live near the centre people coming and going students coming and going it's not like (.) **If I guess it's different if you live in a residential or if you know**

**somebody has a family and lived there for twenty years they might know their neighbours much better (.) but I don't know 'cause I never did**

In Excerpt (187), the possessive construction *my country* highlights the continued attachment to Iran of IN2 and by deduction, it implies that as yet she doesn't completely see herself as belonging to a wider British community, this is subsequently reinforced by the present tense constructions *it's totally different* and *we know our neighbours* despite her living in the UK for over ten years which may imply that her time in the UK is of a temporary nature and there is a desire to return to Iran if the possibility arises. The closeness of social relations in Iran is enhanced by its description as almost familial and this followed by a comparison to the negative reality in the UK. This is an opinion shared by her compatriot IN3 in excerpt 27 who uses a metaphor of temperature *warm* to compare social contact between neighbours. As well as relative coldness and distance of English people, in excerpt 28 HU1 explains the lack of social contact as also possibly down to the length of time and location one lives in an area. Like IN2 though, she also discursively exhibits a continued but conflicted sense of belonging to where she grew up, *where my parents live*, which places her as separate from this locality in Hungary. This is followed by the present tense *we know do our neighbours* which places her alongside her parents in Hungary but she then uses the past tense to describe previous experiences that separates her temporally from her contact with neighbours. She then goes on to explain Brighton, albeit at a distance via the generic 'you', and appears to justify why this doesn't happen in city but then finally personalising this process through *but I don't know 'cause I never did*. For the respondents in the above three excerpts, belonging to a geographical community maybe means something different in the UK than it does in their respective countries of residence. Contact with immediate neighbours would seem to foster a sense of belonging to a hyper-local community but in the UK this does not seem possible and as such positive social contact has to be sought from other places. This maybe widens the geographical scale of the community to a city-wide level that then encompasses other social contact which is fruitful and provides a feeling of belonging to a community.

Throughout this small section, it has been shown that despite living in the UK for extended periods of time, the participants have consistently displayed continuing attachments to their previous lives and their own distinct cultural experiences. At the

discursive level cultural differences and references to countries of origin were secondary topics used when responding to numerous different primary discourse topics. At the linguistic level such attachments were visible primarily through tense and comparative constructions.

### 9.3.2. Feeling part of something: Belonging and Membership

Continuing the theme of attachments and belonging, which would appear to be a key discursive marker of whether a person feels integrated, this subsection looks firstly at how participants of the focus group described their experiences of feeling welcome in the UK and feeling part of a community and later analyses examples of symbolic belongings, that is, citizenship and British nationality.

#### 9.3.2.1. Welcome and community

For those in FG1 their move to the UK was discursively constructed as a major life-changing event or critical juncture. The geographical movement was also a narrative way-point that split their life experiences into before and after.

(190)

OR3: Because of er (.) we are happy to come (.) To get to (.) to come to the UK and (.) you know **that day (.) First day (.)**Is that we are happy

SB: OK (.) so you're happy

OR3: To be

OR1: Laugh

OR2: Yeah ((laughs)) We are happy

SB: Yeah

OR2: **Cause here** is (.) very (1) er (.) **we live in freedom**

SB: Okay

OR2: We don't have any security problems (.) Worries

...

OR3: Because of that we are (.) because of that I'm say I (.) **we are born that day we don't have these problems** of all

OR1: So **it is a new hour** yeah

SB: So it's new new hour right (.) new hour

OR1: [New hour

OR3: New hour ((laughs))

SB: So do (.) Is that (.) **interestingly so is that how you saw it? It's Like a**

**new life** here?  
 OR1: No no no  
 SB: Like from previous  
 OR1: **That's just his definition** ((laughs))  
 SB: Ok fine ((laughs))  
 SB: So for you it was like a new er er a new  
 OR1: **New beginning** yeah  
 SB: New beginning

(191)

OR1: Basically they were the one to help us to settle down and er **you know start the life**

In the two excerpts above, the very day they arrive becomes a zero-hour for them. The conceptual and experiential link between happiness and freedom is firstly co-constructed but the more telling discursive work comes after this, where OR3 uses a strong metaphor to liken their move to the UK, and the freedom from problems that it brings, as being born. OR1 calls this is a *new hour* and *new beginning* but at the same time separates himself from OR3's stronger evocation of birth, *that's just his definition*, followed by laughing. However, later on in the focus group (excerpt 30) he seems to implicitly and unknowingly agree with OR3 by saying that their local government key-workers helped them *start the life*.

For IN2, the first days and months seemed to be much less of major life event, but like the Oromo respondents, it seemed to be generally positive.

(192)

IN2: Yeah because it **was a family reunion** for me I didn't maybe have the process maybe like some people here they have at the moment if they apply for a refugee (0.5) **it was quite welcoming it was (.) really (.) like a holiday** when you're going (0.5) nothing is strange just a **very straight forward process** yeah (.) it was it was okay for me as well

In almost diametrical opposition to the Oromo recipients, she constructs her arrival as *like a holiday* and so therefore would presumably have been lot less of a traumatic event without upheaval, exemplified by the intensified *very straight forward* (cf. Fabiszak 2010b).

Moving to examples of longer-term belonging rather than initial feelings of feeling welcome, the following two excerpts exemplify a frequently mitigated negotiation of belonging in Brighton.

(193)

SB: so moving on to that then do do you feel part of the local community in Brighton?

PL2: Well I **suppose I do in a way** because I'm I mean (.) I **work mostly with British people and I my boyfriend my fiancé comes from Brighton** as well you I just meet his family quite a bit or just some (.) and (.) I suppose especially work because I'm working in the nursery with children I just people from different sort of backgrounds environments and (.) erm sometimes you've got some sort of festival so you know like **I I think like (.)yeah yes actually**

(194)

HU1: **I'm not sure maybe** I did when I was at university because that was a (.) a community in itself and erm (.) then afterwards I think (.) **definitely did feel part of it living here but (.) no I wouldn't say hundred percent yeah**

In excerpt 32, PL2 start out rather wary: *I suppose I do in a way*. She then proceeds to list the different phenomena that have led her to feel part of the community: work, social contact and love. This process of enumerating her attachments seems to have effect of concretising her perceptions to the extent that in the end she concludes that *yes actually* she does feel part of the community. In the second example (194), HU1 very similarly seems initially uncertain of her position: *I'm not sure maybe*. She later intensifies her belonging with the adverb *definitely* but immediately mitigates this with the negative quantifying construction *not 100% percent*.

### 9.3.2.2. Symbolic membership

As well as abstract attachment and feelings of belonging to communities, citizenship was an important area of discussion in the focus groups and was both a primary and secondary discourse topic.

For one respondent, IN3, a sense of belonging to a wider national community actually came before official membership.

(195)

SB: Mhmhm and did you feel any different the day after? Did you did you feel like a British citizen?

IN3: Mhmhm (.) **I came here my feel was British citizen**

When asked whether he felt different after his citizenship ceremony, IN3 replies that had felt like a British citizen since he had arrived in the UK.

For participants in the Oromo focus group though, it was official membership that facilitated a sense of belonging and a stronger sense of membership. Being given citizenship after their time as refugees was clearly a very symbolic event for them.

(196)

OR1: He said **if we get citizenship er we feel (.) everybody's like you (0.5) happy face** and things like that

...

OR5: **We are now with the English people** for (.) [Oromo 6]

OR1: [Oromo 3]

OR5: [Oromo 12]

OR1: Yeah (.) he said er (.) I mean we are very happy to (.) **I mean we are full citizens now** and we just want to you know (.) er live (.) among the community happily and er yeah

Relaying OR5's words<sup>92</sup>, OR1 uses the first conditional and uses the facilitator as the prototypical citizen, *like you happy face*, to explain the positive effects of taking citizenship. Of interest is the fact that at the time of the recording, OR5 still had refugee status and yet, he uses the present tense and the time marker *now* to express his feeling of membership of the English nation.<sup>93</sup> Furthermore OR1's construction of himself and his Oromo colleagues as *full citizens* speaks possibly to the benefits of citizenship but could also conceivably imply that, like IN3 above, they already felt like partial citizens prior to actually gaining nationality.

The Oromo focus group also indicated two of the more instrumental benefits of British citizenship. In the excerpt below, it was a ability to travel, specifically so that they would be able to visit Ethiopia.

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<sup>92</sup> OR5 had very limited English skills and relied upon OR1 to translate. Thus, from a methodological perspective it is not possible to ascertain whether this passage is a direct translation, an interpretation or a co-construction. The long period of OR5 using the Oromo language, followed by a relatively short speech by OR1, would imply that, at best, this is a paraphrasing of OR5's words. This contextual detail should be taken into account when analysing this passage.

<sup>93</sup> English should be here taken as a synonym for British, because a person has British rather than an English citizenship

(197)

- OR2: Er now **we can go to err home**  
OR1: Home yeah  
OR2: country  
OR1: Ethiopia  
OR2: But before citizen  
OR1: You can't go  
OR2: You can't go  
SB: So you were saying now you're you're no longer  
OR4: (incomp)  
OR5: **We are now not refugees (0.5) we are British**  
OR1: **Full full British**  
SB: **And that's important for you?**  
OR1: **Yeah!**  
OR2: **Yeah!**  
OR5: **Yeah!**  
SB: Why?  
OR1: **Confidence** isn't it (.) confidence yeah  
OR5: Confidence isn't it yes  
SB: Right confidence (.) how do you mean confidence?  
OR1: You can (.) wouldn't (.) in terms of (0.5) papers or identity you wouldn't have any problem (0.5) you know you are just like you (.) **I am just like you you know I've got a passport like you so (0.5) they wouldn't be wouldn't be any problem**  
SB: Okay okay  
OR1: So that gives you a bit of confidence to yeah  
SB: Confidence (0.5) stability  
OR1: stability and yeah  
OR3: You know I live in Kenya sixteen years (.) after that if I'm coming from Kakuma refugee camp with any just like this paper **sometime police seeing this paper and they make it just like this ((mimes tearing up paper)) after that he take money from me (0.5) I not Kenyan (0.5) Just now I am British if I got there just now I'm free I am British because of you know he can't make me you know take easy**  
SB: Yeah  
OR3: **Just like you are** (1) (incomp 0.5)  
OR4: [Oromo 1]  
OR5: **Anyway now we are (0.5) some people (0.5) are British talking about the weather**

So much discursive work on integration and migration is on display in the example above. As with excerpt (196), the facilitator is used as a comparative locus point to their experiences *like you* and also OR3 links Britishness to freedom as previous examples have also shown. Here though it is a freedom to travel and this was also spoken of in two other separate instances. Elsewhere, despite now being *full full* citizens OR2 con-

structs Ethiopia as *home*. Later on, the comparison between being a refugee and being British may show an understanding of being British as purely a legal/bureaucratic category rather than a sense of belonging. However, at the end of excerpt OR5 references what he sees as a common British trait *talking about the weather* and this constructed as some form of communicative event that symbolises real membership of the national community.

As well as the freedom to travel, citizenship is discursively constructed as providing instrumental benefits.

(198)

OR1: **And the first time when we open a bank and you know all those things (.) erm we had ID not even a travel document and the many people doesn't know that**

OR3: Paper

OR1: They say what is this?

OR5: [what's this?

OR1: What is it? You know (.) and **now if you show them a passport (.) easily yeah so that boosts the confidence** isn't it

SB: Okay

OR2: Because those people you know don't know refugees (incomp 0.5) we had a letter (incomp 0.25) they don't know

OR1: They don't know what it is

OR2: What is it?

OR1: So we had to show them the letter the Home Office had written

OR5: [letter

SB: Okay so did you find the problem (.) that was er a big problem?

OR1: Yeah to **CONVINCE them to convince them** 'cause they don't know what it is

In the excerpt above the participants explain the difficulties of starting their lives in the UK with only refugee status and then compare it temporally, *now* with the ease that citizenship affords them and the *confidence* it gives them. The theme of previous difficulties is then returned to by OR1

For the respondents in FG3, the situation was slightly different, firstly in the sense that unlike the other two groups none of them had taken citizenship and were therefore still 'immigrants' and secondly that because they were EU citizens, they were not at a great disadvantage, in purely legal terms, by being British citizens. Possibly because of their position as European citizens, overall there was a general ambivalence

to the idea of taking British citizenship. This notwithstanding, the potential benefits that they brought up were sometimes similar to the real benefits expressed by other groups.

(199)

PL5: I yeah I actually my boyfriend was thinking about this because **it could help us to travel around the world like Australia er America like united states**

PL6: Well to be honest I was thinking about and I think I'll do it eventually but not (.) basically when I have some spare cash because now at the moment (.) but I would **mostly need it for work really because sometimes you you get grants that you have to be apply it you're just a British citizen so because of the credit crunch and everything so obviously the pools of money are shrinking** so the more you can apply for the more variety then the more chances there is you're going to get

(200)

PL6: **Or maybe vote against Conservatives as well**

In excerpts (199) and (200) three separate instrumental or functional reasons are given. In (199), PL5 echoes the Oromo participants in citing travel as one thing that would be facilitated by taking citizenship. The difference being though that for PL5 it was for leisure purposes whereas for the Oromo members it was about the more crucial possibility of visiting family *back home*. This is followed by PL6 who indicates British citizenship would allow her to access more research funding and then later, in excerpt (200), she adds the ability to take part in elections as a reason for taking citizenship. This might belie a desire to become part of a wider national community but more likely indicates that she wants she considers herself a member of the interpretive community within the UK and her concomitant desire to influence public policy.

Finally, in excerpt 40 below, HU1 gives her reasons for not taking citizenship.

(201)

HU1: **It's really expensive!** ((laughs))

SB: It's really expensive

PL5: Yeah it's like one thousand fifteen hundred

SB: Is it?

HU1: Its nine hundred pounds just to apply and if you fail the exam you don't get it back

...

HU1: **And I never really understood why and I think she just really wanted to have something to you know prove that she lives here or**

whatever and erm but **I never really (.) thought it would make any difference in my life** like the **benefits** I can get or the **health service** I can get or the **schools** I can go to **because of being in the EU having the same (.) not the same rights obviously but almost (.) so never felt the need** to do it

The first reason given is the financial one, *it's really expensive*, and the presupposition is that her decision to take citizenship would be based on some type of cost-benefit analysis whereby it (currently) is not 'worth' her taking it in comparison to the minimal extra benefits it would afford her (cf. Galasińska 2010). Towards the end, she introduces a small story about her Hungarian friend who is currently studying for the 'Life in the UK' test. Using a strong adverb of frequency along with verbs of cognition, she then repeatedly constructs her justifications for not following suit in juxtaposition to this story, *I never really understood why, I never...thought it would make any difference*, and *never felt the need to do it*. She also enumerates the area of life in which she feels she has *almost* equal rights as an EU citizen, benefits, health and education.

### 9.3.3. Multiple Memberships

In the previous subsections discursive displays of (non)belonging and a deeper or more official membership (the the reasons for not taking up this option) have been analysed. During the course of the analysis, the need of non-nationals and new citizens to negotiate their often conflicted memberships and belongings was visible, pointing to the fact migration, and later integration, are not simple smooth processes. Below are some further examples of how some focus group participants negotiate their multiple identities in their lived experiences of integration.

The reasons for living in the UK mentioned by the participants differed greatly between those who were refugees or had gone through the asylum system and those who were European citizens.

(202)

PL2: And I suppose I I lived away from my family home for a while before I came to UK so it wasn't such a big difference for me but **I I actually came to see my brother at first and I decided to stay for a year and then I just stayed a bit longer ((laughs))** yeah I felt really welcome

(203)

HU1: **I came here because I my friend lived here** and I visited him before and I liked really like Brighton and then (.) **got stuck in here** ((laughs)) after that (.) visit

In the two excerpts above, both PL2 and HU1 explain that their reasons for initially coming to the UK were visiting friends or family and the implication is that there was no intention to stay. For PL2, her decision to stay came gradually but HU1 constructs her staying in the UK as almost out of her control; the adjective *stuck* would seem to imply that there were increasing numbers of attachments and reasons to stay, as if she had become glued to the country.

In stark contrast, the following four excerpts tell the story of IN1 and her struggles with multiple membership. (204) and (205) are examples of an understanding of being ‘stuck’ in country because of the inability to return to the country of residence.

(204)

IN1: No (.) because I had a ticket to **return back (.) home (.)** one month (.) I’m afraid here (.) **our airport** destroyed by Iraq in the beginning (.) **we couldn’t go back home** and Iraq started to bomb with Iran and non-stop and then **I lost everything from my country** I live here (.) about I think thirty four years

(205)

IN1: Of course people they have to respect them they are human they had a problem of course. **If I haven’t any problem from my country I never stay here I’m going back home (.) because a lot of persecution happened for Baha’is (.) I lost everything from my country I stay here (.)** those people is refugees here I’m sure the rest of them they have a house they had everything (.) and I’m afraid different reason they lost everything either for war or religion or whatever they came here or get different country we have to respect them

Twice in excerpt (204) IN1 uses directional constructions, *go back home* and *return back home* which places home as away from the deictic centre. The presence of possessives, not just of the country to denote membership, but also of shared national goods and services *our airport*, is also evident throughout and denotes a strong sense of membership with Iran, especially in opposition to Iraq. These constructions continue to be used in the subsequent excerpt, i.e. *my country* and *going back home*. Her implicit desire to return is reinforced and made explicit by her use of the second, unreal, condi-

tional in the subsequent excerpt to explain that if the conditions (namely religious freedom) were suitable she would return to Iran.

IN1's continued strong attachment to Iran is evidently traumatic for her, despite her expressed feeling of belonging in the UK.

(206)

IN1: Of course in the beginning whatever person **even the language not barrier even you have enough money whatever it's not easy (.) in the beginning especial (.) miss the country and their friends and home and everything and you have to establish again in the beginning (.) it's not easy**

SB: Mhmhm

IN1: And also even **I am thirty four years I live in England and I love England I love everybody but still one part of my heart my body missing (.) and its natural (.) for everybody not only for me for every human being** er ((cries))

To begin with, she distances herself from the troubles of initial integration by using the third person *whatever person* to preface the emotional challenges a refugee might face *miss their country and their friends* and argues that even language and money would not help this. By employing the generic *you*, she still maintains a distance but in comparison to the third person, she also moves towards including herself in the story. After the facilitator's minimal response though, her narrative shifts to the personal. Using a strong emotional verb she mitigates her feelings by professing her attachment to England, *I love England*. This is followed by two intense bodily metaphors which render Iran as part of her body and part of her heart and indicate her strong attachment to, and dislocation from, her country of origin.

Furthermore, she and her family's multiple membership prove not just problematic on the cognitive level but also on the practical one.

(207)

IN1: Yes (.) I'm not going to details but even my son they have a British passport (.) **he grown up here seven years old until now**

SB: Yeah

IN1: He had a **problem with going** to

SB: Going to **Haifa**

IN1: Because its **written is the mum's you know**

Here she explains the difficulties faced by her son, who has a British passport and Iranian name, when he went to Israel to visit the Baha'i temple in Haifa. These parts of his identity work together to both enable and problematise his trip. His British passport allows him to travel to Israel on a religious journey which, as an Iranian, would be almost impossible. However, his mother's surname in the passport is evidence of his irreducible foreignness that cannot be bracketed.

If IN1's is a transnational identity, albeit one that is distressing and has been forced upon her, then the long passage below from FG3 maybe points to an integration that for a number of reasons (EU citizenship and freedom of movement) allows for a less traumatic space for transnational identities and which therefore change the experience of integration.

(208)

PL5: I think nowadays its completely change like immigration has completely changed compare with like twenty years ago so the situation is completely different so (.) **living here for me is like anywhere actually so it's not like emigration** (.) from Poland it's to Brighton like two hours only its (.) if **I if I lived in I don't know in Brazil for example it could be** (.) **you could say its emigration**

SB: Okay that's interesting so don't see yourself as a migrant really or

PL5: Erm (.) not really it's like (.) of course there are a lot of things but **it's not like a very big deal**

SB: Okay (.) is that something

HU1: No I don't think **about am I a migrant or immigrant because (1) I started to think it's been such a long time** and then (.) not I don't you know **I never want to lose my Hungarian identity or forget all those words and (.) which I do sometimes obviously** but it's been such time (.) seven years and **I was nineteen when I moved here so I've grown up to be an adult basically in this country and** (.) well now I'm thinking **I'm always going to be Hungarian** so it's it's a bit of both what you said about this is so close **I talk to my mum three times a week on the phone you know like it's really easy to communicate somehow or see relatives or friends but it's still (2) it's always gonna be there with my surname or you know my passport or anything like that I'm still Hungarian**

SB: Mhmhm

HU1: I do (.) **I would say I'm an immigrant (.) but very well puzzled in**

SB: ((laughs)) PL2? Would you see yourself as as an immigrant or just someone living in Brighton or what?

PL2: Yeah well I **I never actually thought about calling myself an immigrant but obviously if someone would ask me just I am you know I moved between two different countries so I am**

SB: Sure

- PL2: But erm (1) yeah **I think I'm quite well settled** in as well because being a few years ((laughs)) since I came to this country and then oh (.) well I think some probably not because I grew up in Poland mostly I was just erm I spent there most of my life really so I **I don't think I would ever lose anything from Polish identity even and (.) I think even with my accent or (.) like I don't like it will always be something left out (.) like everyone can say like oh you're just not from here you're just from somewhere else you know (.)** so I think but but yeah **I do I do feel here like I'm well settled so** (1) I just like I don't really find it like you said about calling to I mean it's such an easy contact to Poland and I got like special phone calls so I pay like two or three pounds per month and then I can just speak for for hours basically (.) so it's all makes it easy you know in terms of money and in terms of erm (.) how often you can do (.) so it's just I keep in touch not only with my family but I've got quite a few friends in Poland so I (.) I erm and **I feel like I basically live like in a different town somewhere in Poland**
- SB: Okay
- PL2: So I don't find it's just so really just so far
- PL5: Yeah for me it's easier contact with my family also to travel to Poland than it would be soon (.) **because I spend maybe two three four hours to to get to Poland it will be like thirteen hours if I was in Poland**

Unlike IN1, who saw her life in the UK as an enforced dislocation, some in FG3 didn't not even consider themselves as having emigrated. For PL5, the relatively short distance between Poland and the UK is defined as *not like emigration* and then the example of living in Brazil is given as a comparison. HU1 also points to frequent telephone contact as important for feeling connected to her country of origin. Right at the end of the excerpt, PL5 combines familial contact and travel to positively frame the proximity of the UK to Poland. PL2 on the other hand references her ability to maintain close contact with friends and family in Poland as a reason for feeling as though she doesn't live in a foreign country but instead in a *different town somewhere in Poland*. Such a construction of closeness allows PL2 to not think of herself as an immigrant despite obviously understanding the dictionary definition of the word: *I moved between two different countries so I am*. Likewise, using an embedded rhetorical question, HU1 at first replies that she has not considered what she feels *I don't think about am I a migrant or immigrant* but later after more explanation of her predicament and how she deals with it, she arrives at a self-definition as an immigrant *but very well puzzled in*. The use of the participle *puzzled* is a telling metaphor that indicates that she feels as though she fits in within the UK and we can take this as evidence of a sense of being integrated and yet maintaining a level of difference from the 'native' community. This sense of integration

is possible despite the importance of her Hungarian identity and membership to the Hungarian nation, presented with the adverb of frequency *it will always be there with my surname or you know my passport*. PL2 also displays her multiple attachments in remarkably similar discursive ways. She states that she is *settled* but then lists salient parts of her Polish identity such as her accent. After this, there is an acceptance that by maintaining this identity she will be marked as outside of the UK national community and presumably this would deny her the opportunity to be accepted as British. These traces of being foreign though have not stopped her from integrating.

Such discursive work by these participants can be read in a number of ways. Firstly, although logically they are aware of living in another country, for the first two participants, being in the UK is like travelling internally and this hints at a sense of an EU-wide understanding of citizenship or belonging rather than one defined along national borders. There is not the need, the desire, nor the risk of ties being severed. Secondly, it may point to the importance of diasporic connections and electronic communications as facilitating phenomena that assist leaving one's country of residence and integrating elsewhere. A third alternative reading of it though is that by refusing to construct themselves as emigrants or immigrants, they are denying their realities and this might be a mechanism to cope psychologically with the upheavals of immigration.

In this section I have widened my analysis of the bottom-up discourse taken from focus groups to include a thorough explanation of how the participants discursively constructed their feelings of integration and (non-)belonging in the UK. It was first argued that the presence of references to cultural differences and a foregrounding of life in, and contact with, family and friends in the country of origin possibly pointed to incomplete integration, understood as assimilation, and as such, these respondents would have failed Norman Tebbit's famed 'cricket test'. After this, an analysis of in what ways and to what extent, the participants felt as though they belonged. This included considerations of initial welcome, feeling part of a community and the importance of symbolic and official membership. This points to an instability of belongings (Krzyżanowski 2010). Elsewhere, Fabiszak (2010c: 278) speaks of national identity as a "continuum of categories with fuzzy borders" of national identity that allow for. Finally, discursive examples of the difficulties in negotiating multiple belongings to both the country of origin and the country of residence were presented and analysed.

## 9.4. Perspectives on the public sphere

In this final section of the analysis of focus groups, I look at how the participants understood wider public sphere discursive constructions of immigration and integration. This in some ways is the most important part of the in-depth qualitative analysis as it will hopefully indicate to what extent targets of government policy (incoming non-nationals) have received and internalised the discourse from above. Below, an initial subsection on knowledge of the public discourse on integration and immigration will be followed by a slightly larger subsection that concentrates on how focus group participants understand the concept of integration and how this differs from those found in the government discourse which is then passed on to the interpretive community by the media.

### 9.4.1. Knowledge of public discourse

Within all of the groups there was a clear pattern of awareness of current wider public and government discourse on immigration. A lot of this was focused on their understandings of the links between immigration and the economy, especially extended EU migration.

(209)

OR1: I think (0.5) generally speaking **this country erm (1) had enough of asylum seekers and refugees** all that (.) they want to **they want to to control it as far as possible** erm (.) but again you know **everything that happens (0.5) most of them it is the refugees or asylum seekers who are targeted isn't it** (0.5) if something wrong happens erm you know it's just refugees or **like even the crisis (.) financial crisis it is the refugees who will be blamed or the (.) the the European Union and you say you're from Poland and all those from (.) it is them who cause the (.) financial crisis** and things like that so

In the excerpt there is no discernible differentiation between the government, the media and public attitudes, instead the active agent is constructed as *this country* and through plural pronominals. They suggest that the speaker maybe sees no difference between the participants in the public sphere discourse and rather sees a homogeneity of opinions on the subject. There is an obvious belief that there is a strong negative opinion, *had enough*, towards certain third country nationals but also towards A8 EU migrants and

that this has been exacerbated by the financial crisis. It is not just a question of blame though but the use of the verb *targeted* implies that the speaker believes that these groups are being singled out. Also of note is the fact that OR1 discursively distances himself from being a member of this group through the use of the *refugees* rather than “we refugees” or “us”, which would have been other potential alternatives.

Elsewhere there was evidence that participants were specifically cognisant of the media discourse.

(210)

IN3: **I think its er I saw in the TV or on radio its government worried about immigration** people here as well because there’s so many country its difficulty **for money they came here for job (.) and here is don’t find a job and government worried about it so many people come they come immigration in here (.) I think it’s problem**

(211)

HU1: **I read like sometimes recently because of Romanian Bulgarian joining** I come across and I know it’s becoming something **they are concerned** about um a lot of arguments as you said that you hear from this (.) but **personally I’ve never experienced any er negativity towards me being a foreigner**

In (210) there is an observable understanding of the diffusion of discourse on integration and immigration: *I saw in the TV....government worried about immigration*. This subsequently followed by an explanation of the reasons the government gives for why it is an issue. He ends though on an ambiguous note, *I think it’s problem*, this is not clear whether this is his personal position on the issue or whether it is immigration which is the problem for the government. In excerpt (211), HU1, similarly indicates a personal experience of the media discourse, but as with OR1 at the start of this subsection, she also uses the unclear *they* and it is not certain whether this pertains to the government, the media or the public. However, the later inclusion of the information that she has *personally never experienced any...negativity* implies that she is speaking of wider public attitudes, given that most people will not have had direct experiences of politicians or journalists.

In the third focus group there was also a belief of negative framing in the media and how this was then received and interpreted by the public.

(212)

PL2: and I think it just comes with the times as well because obviously of the **recession or just like when the times are a bit harder in well in some like TV programmes I just heard like some people say oh these Polish people come here and take all the work from us** ((laughs)) you know

(213)

PL2: **sometimes there is something happening on the news** (0.5) let's say some **Polish person did something** in London or ((laughs)) in Scotland or somewhere else and then **this friend of mine says have you heard? it was a Polish person** (.) and I just think well (.) it could be anyone ((laughs))

In excerpt (212), PL2 indicates an understanding of how economic factors might during some periods influence public attitudes, *when the times are a bit harder*, and also how this leads to a scapegoating in the media of certain migrants. In another example of discourse in action, excerpt (213) carries on this line of argument but then moves, via hypothetical direct reported speech, to how this is then received and then internalised by the discourse recipients.

However, it appears that this public discourse is not just present in the media but across other sites.

(214)

PL2: **sometimes there is something happening on the news** (0.5) let's say some **Polish person did something** in London or ((laughs)) in Scotland or somewhere else and then **this friend of mine says have you heard? it was a Polish person** (.) and I just think well (.) it could be anyone ((laughs))

(215)

IN3: Yes is government worried about I my **I was in the English class one lesson** was on this question

SB: Oh really?

IN3: **Yes the government and the parliament** so many meeting and worried about two thousand fourteen is **so many people Romanian is get free come here is no any job** which **can he can support** the which way can afford it it is difficult

In (215) IN3 recalls an instance where a lesson in his ESOL class was based around an article on Romanian immigration and government attitudes to it. That a media article is used in teaching English is not surprising, but it is the specific context of lesson, ESOL

for migrants, that it very interesting. Here, the targets and scapegoats of the government discourse, are brought face to face with a media interpretation of the discourse and are expected to learn English through a discussion of it.

Elsewhere, in FG3, that despite the negative media coverage, public attitudes were more ambivalent.

(216)

HU1: **you can't say they they don't like us here but you can't say that they want us here either**

PL6: That's the thing that's what I would say **they just can't decide (.) either its good or its bad but shall we just stay in the middle and just not really discuss this** and then just see who they just sort of they don't really want to touch the ball they just try to **sort of juggle it** and keep it in the air so it's quite funny

HU1's use of the pronouns *us* and *them* serves to differentiate between A8 migrants and British people and by placing herself in the "us" camp, she constructs herself as a migrant and separate from British society, despite feeling integrated. PL6 deploys similar language *they*, and through the use of the metaphor *juggle* describes her understanding of the public debate on immigration as ambivalent.

In FG3, this awareness of the discourse also led to the production of participant's responses and justifications to what they saw as the public discourse.

(217)

PL2: Yeah everyone can apply its just I suppose that it the thing that migr some **Polish people you know that maybe not so (0.5) um fussy about which job they would take** it you know and **they can always stay or go so you know they like can accept different conditions** maybe

PL6: But that's the thing at least at the beginning how I see it that when **Polish people came here they just got a job and they were happy with the fact that they got a job whereas British people say well to be honest I can't be bothered cleaning the streets I'll just prefer to stay at home (.) that's my view I don't know if that's actually true or am I just generalising about it might that's how I see it that they just can't be bothered (.)** because they'll get more or less the same amount of support if they sit at home and watch Sellyoaks sorry Hollyoaks or whatever that those you know

In the co-construction in (217), at first PL2 argues that Polish people are *not so fussy* about employment. The presupposition is that British workers are fussy as to the type of

work they are willing to do. PL6 appears to agree with PL2 but also constructs British people as lazy through the negative verb/adjective combination *can't be bothered*. She then mitigates her position by allusion to uncertainty, *I don't know it that's actually true*, and by clarifying her words as personal opinion. Finally, attempts to express the other side of the argument, via hypothetical direct reported speech that represents the public discourse on immigration.

Despite such criticism of the British people, there also seems to be an awareness, and at times a sympathy, for British attitudes though.

(218)

PL2: Yeah but mean in terms of like **with some people coming and getting our jobs they're taking our jobs I think it's a little bit true as well**

(219)

IN1: **This is natural!** My opinion its natural because (0.5) England is one island and **really everybody's come here they haven't the space** when the people they come they need **the housing they need you know the benefits** they need everything

(220)

HU1: It doesn't (1) I don't think I care that much I know it sounds harsh but I think I've been here for (0.5) seven **I owe a lot of money for the government** for my university **I'm really part of it you know I pay my taxes so obviously I don't have (.) passport but if they let me have what I have by now then and I live here and I don't really (.) I don't get offended (.)** like I don't think I mean I had benefits **I had housing benefit or when I needed it and money from the government which erm helped but I never tried to erm (.) what's the word (.) like abuse it (1)** because I think (.) for example I applied for benefits when I needed it and **when I didn't have any other source to get money and then when I had a job I closed my benefits and I think that's what they are for** and er I well I completely understand 'cause (1) some other people's views because I met Hungarian people who the first question was when they moved here and they met me or we met through somebody else (.) so how do you apply for benefits or what do you need to get erm tax refund or this and that **so I can understand where it comes from (.) all the complaints and the problems maybe**

In (218), PL2, seems to go back on her previous opinions and describes the argument that migrants take jobs that British people as *fair*, albeit with the adverb of frequency *little bit* which mitigates her position. In the next excerpt, IN1 constructs British attitudes by using the adjective *natural* and therefore something which is in accordance

with the human condition or an expected reaction to the situation. It also, serves to absolve the British people of the charge that they are holding incorrect opinions and so justifies their position. Finally, towards the end of (220), HU1 seems to take on and accept (*I completely understand*) the neo-liberal arguments against immigration regarding being self-sufficient and not relying on benefits. However she also distances herself from being one of those migrants who she thinks comes to live in the UK and want to access state support. This is done by introducing a story about other Hungarian acquaintances and also before this, she justifies her own position of living in the UK by again, referring to what can be called neo-liberal traits: *I owe a lot of money for the government* and *I pay my taxes*. This is further enhanced by placing herself actively inside the economic system: *I'm really part of it*. This use of the neo-liberal topoi indicates not just an understanding of the public discourse on immigration and integration, but also an internalising of it as well of other salient public discourse topics in the UK such as the economy and role of the state in private lives.

#### 9.4.2. Conceptualisation of integration

Because one of the aims of the focus groups was to ascertain whether incoming non-nationals were aware of discourses of integration, as well as sister concepts such as immigration and citizenship, their attitudes were directly asked for in primary discourse topics. As will be shown below, some respondents exhibited examples of understandings of integration that were similar to the government conceptions whereas others seemed to implicitly reject the ideas found in political discourse.

For a number of the participants, especially those in FG1, integration was synonymous with diversity.

(221)

OR1: Erm (1) **integration is mixing with other communities** isn't it... I think it is erm (0.5) important because it's about **diversity knowing you know about (.) different cultures and living with different communities** and er (.) and I think that's important for (.) to live

(222)

OR2: It is good (1) **knowing different people er (.) you get er (.) different experience er again (.)** you you you know every man every human be-

ing is the same you understand (.) so you feel er (0.5) you feel er (.) **for me I feel happy if I meet different people with different understanding different culture**

OR1 describes integration with the active verb of activity *mixing* with other communities, which seems to tally with a multicultural understanding of living in modern Britain, but he also adds a verb of mental process *knowing* which is also used by OR2 in excerpt (222). Both of them also construct their idea of integration as a positive phenomenon. OR1 does this by describing gaining knowledge of cultural diversity as *important* to living, whereas OR2 makes it a more personal opinion: *I feel happy*.

In contrast to this, the participants in FG2 understood integration as a respect for human rights.

(223)

IN1: Of course people they have to **respect** that **they are human** they had a problem of course.

(224)

IN3: **My mind is all is human (.) I accept for example European rule is no any borders (.) I pass the Netherlands I pass Belgium I pass the France no any borders (.) is all human (.)**

IN1 places part of the burden of integration on the pre-existing population with the strong modal verb of obligation, *have to*, to argue that those coming as asylum seekers should be respected. This respect is then justified using *argumentum ad misericordiam*, *they are human...they had a problem*, IN3 also sees integration as, at least in part, consisting of an acceptance that everyone is human and the presupposition behind is that therefore everyone should be treated equally. He also cites the right of free movement in the EU to justify immigration. These perceptions of integration are more about immigration and justifications for people being allowed to come to the UK and settle (victims/EU membership). As such it could be tentatively said that in the two cases above, their conception of integration comes directly from their own direct personal experiences as asylum seekers, especially IN1 who undertook a lot of voluntary work with young Iranian asylum seekers and refugees.

Whereas FG1 saw, integration as mixing and FG2 saw it as the right to equal treatment, respondents in FG3 appeared to consider integration as a process of adaptation.

(225)

HU1: **Learning (.) about the people who you are surrounded not necessarily just British people** but I mean if you talk about Brighton (.) I've lived with so many foreign people and so many (.) I had many English friends and (.) and [sighs] how can I say it (.) it's just to get **to know the way of life within and not stick to the this is how I learnt it at home (.) just to be open** towards that there are other ways even just cooking or you know jokes or anything (.) of course what you said about **the language is very important and erm (.) that's difficult to grasp**

(226)

PL6: Well to start off with I would say to **you have to know the language** that you're going into secondly unfortunately it **also depends on the person because if you are a person who's outgoing and you like meeting people then in my opinion you're going to integrate more (.) whereas if you're keeping yourself to yourself then it's not going to work because that's what the integration in my opinion means**

(227)

PL3: I think we should erm (.) **try to adapt to the new environment** just a little bit

HU1 initially constructs integration at a local level as about getting to know *the people who you are surrounded* and she makes it clear that this means not just British people but other non-nationals also living in the UK. This is very similar to the multicultural understanding of integration visible in excerpts (221) and (222). She then goes on to elaborate on this adding a second facet to integration that is a need to be open and she geographically and temporally compares this openness to *back home*. This would seem to suggest that her view of integration is one in which the incoming non-national should adapt, but it falls short of claiming that integration is about cultural levelling or assimilation is much closer to the American 'melting pot' idea. This is an opinion also held by PL2 who points out the dangers of not having this openness with a first conditional construction: *if you're keeping yourself to yourself then it's not going to work*. Furthermore, PL2 and HU1 both yet again highlight the importance of language as major facilitating factor in integration. The view of the need of non-nationals to be open and willing to change to 'fit' their new country of residence whilst at the same time not assimilating is additionally proposed by PL3, who used the word *adapt* but also mitigates this modal of suggestion with the idiomatic noun-adverb *just a little bit*.

In excerpt 228 (below), PL5 points to the need for British people to adapt to the new realities as well in some way.

(228)

PL5: 'cause **British people are I think are used to to I don't know to see a lot of people like from different countries so (.) they think they don't have choice (.) just accept it**

Rather than constructing this as a suggestion or obligation through modal verbs, she paints a picture of British people as not being able to change the reality of immigration and so forced to accept non-nationals coming to live in the UK: *they don't have a choice*.

As well as mentioning what integration consisted of, there were also sometimes hints at when integration occurred.

(229)

OR1: **We feel like integrating more (.) than than when we came because (.) the more we live the more we (.) you know we know about the country system communities and things like that**

OR2: [Oromo 1]

OR1: Yeah so I would say that integration is (.) is increasing

SB: Increasing and ongoing

OR1: Ongoing yeah?

OR1: Do you think (.) you can ever finish integrating? Or?

OR3: **We're starting just now**

SB: You're starting just now yeah?

OR1: Yeah

OR4: [Oromo 4]

OR1: Yeah he said **before we don't we don't speak English and er (.) all you know there was a lot to catch up (.) so it is now (.) kind of we are starting so there's a lot (.) to do even (0.5) let alone let alone stopping it ((laughs))**

For the Oromo respondents above, they co-construct integration (understood as cultural mixing) as something which they want to continue to do and which are only able to do now that they understand the language and the *system*. In fact, rather than feeling as though they have integrated sufficiently, they are only just *starting now*. Such a view of integration seems to reject and question the official government discourse that, firstly, full integration can only start once someone has been granted refugee status and sec-

ondly, the symbolic gaining of British citizenship is the end of the process of integration. Instead, their concept of integration is long-term ongoing process that can only start in earnest now that they have the symbolic (citizenship) and practical (language) markers of integration. Similarly, it is worth referring back to excerpt in which IR3 states that he felt a citizen the moment he came to the UK.

As well as integration, the focus group participants were also asked about how they understood the idea of citizenship and 'good' citizenship.

(230)

PL2: **Just always go with the law of the place where you're living** you know just erm (1) I suppose be (.) it's just depends on the person but just be a good person basically (.) just behave properly to others you know just not to not to do any harm to any one or damage anything around (.) you know just (.) no but a bit more than that I would just say like **being good citizen is just like (.) maybe getting bit more into the community trying to (.) maybe use some of your knowledge or experience just to add something to it if you can erm (.) maybe create something with the other people within the community**

Here PL2 seems to construct citizenship initially along legal grounds, but as well as this, she her opinion dovetails with the government discourse on active citizenship and being an active member of the community *add something*. Here then, rather than being negative processes that damage the community, citizenship, and by extension integration and immigration, are ideally positive additive elements. Again, this construction might be based on her own position as a citizen who works with children at a school and also volunteers.

There were though also instances where responses differed, and challenged the government discourse on citizenship.

(231)

PL2: Yeah I'd just say thinking about being good British citizen it just means like ok **be the good citizen first of all you know of any country**

(232)

PL6: Well I wouldn't be a **good citizen of any country 'cause I'm just against the system** because the system is always it's not really even in England it's not really pro it's pro whoever is in the government and then the rest of the people either they will fit in with it or they'll won't fit in with or they'll sort of (.) **I could be a citizen within a community for example**

Excerpt (231) implicitly rejects the government discourse of the existence of specific values that are constructed as British (cf. Chapters 7 and 8). Instead, her idea of a good citizen follows that proposed by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (*Our Shared Future* 2007), that is that these values are universal and not limited to British people: *be the good citizen...of any country*. Elsewhere, PL6 (232) rejects top-down conceptions of citizenship based on national borders and then later create her ideal citizenship to be at local *community* level. This would seem to both accept and reject the government discourse. On the one hand it rejects the idea of homogenising top-down citizenship but on the other hand it supports and gives weight to the government policy that integration and citizenship is ‘done’ at a local level.

In this section the focus group participants’ understandings of the wider public sphere discourse on integration have been robustly analysed. It was first shown that they manifested an awareness not just of the government discourse but also of how the media reported on this and relayed the message to public audiences. There were instances where some of the recipients, and their British acquaintances had internalised public discourses and this appears to give weight to the model of discourse movement in the public sphere presented in Chapter 1, above. That being said, there were also examples where the government discourse was rejected or challenged. In the subsequent subsection, the focus groups’ work on integration was put forward and it was argued that integration was understood in a number of different ways including diversity, human rights and the need to adapt and as with the public discourses on immigration and integration, there were further examples of where governmental policy was implicitly challenged.

## **9.5. Conclusion**

In this final analytical chapter a full critically discursive analysis of three focus groups comprised of non-nationals and those who have recently acquired British citizenship but who had migrated to the UK. In Section 9.1 the primary and secondary discourse topics were introduced and the links between them were mapped, of specific importance were language and social contact both with those from their own ethnic/linguistic group and with the wider community. In section 9.2 the respondents discursive renderings of the

more practical sides of integration were analysed and this included a focus on language as a direct and indirect facilitator of integration, it further considered other sites of integration such as educational institutions and the workplace and the uniqueness of Brighton was also investigated as a salient part of integration into the local community, understood both in terms of geography and the diversity of the population. In section 9.3 the participants' perspectives on, attachments to, and (official) membership of, the UK were interrogated, as were instances of discourse where multiple belongings were evident. Finally, section 9.4 was given over to an analysis of respondents' understandings of the wider discourses on integration and immigration circling in the public sphere and to their personal, co-constructed, discursive constructions of what the concept of integration included.

Throughout this chapter it has been shown that there is a massive difference between doing integration, feeling integrated and being integrated. That is why discursive analysis of integration from a bottom-up perspective is so crucial to fully understand. From the excerpts in 9.4 it is clear that integration is understood in a number of different ways. Collectively (diversity plus adaptation), these seem to be similar to government rhetoric on what integration includes, especially if we include the spaces where integration is 'done' (work, school, social contact etc.). However, taking the all of the analysis in the chapter into account, what is also clear is that official membership was not majorly salient component of integration. Being a 'good' citizen is done at a local level, and for the EU participants especially, a sense of feeling integrated and the rights and responsibilities of living in the UK are not dependent on being an official member of the national community. Thus the chapter as whole suggests that integration is done, and felt at a very local, personal level. For example, if we take integration to mean social contact with 'native' British people and smooth insertion into local life, then of the three focus groups, the Oromo participants would be the least integrated and yet they were the most effusive and positive about symbolic membership of the national community. Conversely, those who would be seen as integrated through their actions, experiences and social contacts, especially those from A8 countries, often displayed the least amount of attachment to the national community. But even here though, understanding integration is very complex. Although they did not feel to be members of the national community, discursively there was a strong sense of belonging to a local community, understood in geographical terms and this attachment was further evidenced by their actions the most clear example of this was IN1 who had lived in the UK for longest of

all respondents and participated in numerous local activities and yet through a close reading of her participation in the focus group, it is clear that she has a much closer attachment to Iran than the UK.

Such findings seem to clash with current conceptions of integration that rhetorically are seen as occurring at a local level and yet, which after a more fine grained analysis of the public discourse indicate, that what this integration should look like actually comes from the top-down. This would appear to suggest that integration models and frameworks and qualitative or quantitative scales of integration fail to tell the whole story of integration and there is an obvious disconnect between, on the one hand, the political and media discourse, and on the other, how incoming non-nationals, experience immigration and integration. This does not seem to have been sufficiently recognised by government departments and as such the experiences and views of those who experience integration do not seem to influence or inform policy.

Linked to this, although the increased usage of focus group and public consultations by Labour (1997-2010), and now the Conservative-Lib-Dem coalition, can be seen as a positive change towards more openness in government and a way in which stakeholders can have their say on policy, is also undoubtedly a useful PR tool for governments to include such voices in policy documents to show that they are 'listening' to the interpretive community of electors. This is borne out in the presence of focus group extracts within official publications and their discursive role in giving public legitimacy to the document. However the voices presented in policy are those of the 'host' community and not of the 'targets' of the policy. The absence of such voices reinforces the position of non-nationals in UK as passive agents (socially and often discursively too) and precludes them from influencing the very policies that affect them. This then suggests that the real audience of integration policy and immigration policy is not incoming non-nationals but the voters.

I would like that this juncture to flag up two caveats to the analysis contained above. The first has been explained in the methodological chapter but it bears repeating here. That is, that the sometimes limited language skills of the respondents can make it difficult to sufficiently interpret their discourse. At times it is unclear what tense is being used and whether this is intentional or not. As a researcher, one cannot second guess the evidence and try to speculate what was meant. Instead one can only analyse what is present, and in the spirit of functional grammar, also what is omitted. Secondly, there is the danger of extrapolation of extrapolation of results. The analysis is only a limited one

totalling just three focus groups and fifteen participants. Thus my findings by no means represent how all migrants feel and because of this would be wrong to deduce too much in terms of wider patterns of experiences and how they are discursively constructed. This is also the case because not only is each migration an individual lived experience but each telling of the story will differ in some way. With this in mind, this does mean that such discourse analysis is of no use, indeed it is hoped that the work above has elucidated certain tentative patterns of experience and language use. Such patterns then need to be tested against and compared alongside, other existing (critically) discursive research on the subjects of immigration, integration, belonging and community in order to draw more substantial conclusions.

## Conclusion

The aim of this section is to in some way conclude the analysis and relate the findings to the rest of the thesis. In the first section I will briefly summarise the findings of the analysis of political texts, media texts and focus group recordings. I will then discuss the analysis in light of my theoretical claims on the discursive nature of the public sphere, racism and integration. After doing this, I will firstly return to the original research questions to see whether they have been answered fully and then afterwards I will test whether my starting hypotheses were confirmed or falsified. This will in turn allow for an elaboration on the aptness of CDA as the correct approach to investigation. Finally, I argue for the salience of the social problems, outlined in the introduction, as crucial issues that demand linguistic investigation and, following the problem-oriented, progressive, nature of CDA, the socio-prognostic implications of the thesis will be advanced.

Summarising the findings, In Chapter 7 I analysed how integration is discursively constructed in political texts. Firstly the chapter looked at how integration and community were constructed in the political discourse, how this changed over time and how the concepts of integration and community cohesion were related. The next section identified the polysemy of ‘community’ as a concept. This was done with reference to geographical location and in-group and out-group constructions, based on racionyms and nationyms, e.g. how incoming non-nationals were constructed as outside the majority community. Section 7.3 exposed how the discourse of integration evolved over time. It was shown that certain topoi (topos of financial burden, topos of crime, topos of cultural difference) were frequently and continually used to frame integration as a problem. 7.3.2 showed that integration was discursively constructed as a normative phenomenon,


that is, as something that was a desired end-goal for incoming non-nationals. An analysis of the political texts revealed that integration included adherence to certain values which were constructed as 'British'. Following on from this, in section 7.4 it was shown how integration was constructed as a neo-liberal performance. Finally, 7.5 showed the interdiscursivity and intertextuality inherent in the discursive construction of integration. The section indicated that other discourses and policy areas that were linked to integration included ESOL, community cohesion, religion and the economy.

Chapter 8 provided a comprehensive analysis of a sample of media texts totalling 444 articles. 8.1 presented the results of a corpus analysis of the texts. After word frequency (8.1.1) was shown, in 8.1.2 an analysis of concordance lines was forwarded. Firstly, it was found that *community* often collocated with racionyms, religionyms and nationyms. Secondly, *immigration* frequently collocated with numbers or lexical items pertaining to numbers. When incoming non-nationals were mentioned, it was found that they often collocated with words related to criminality or work. After this, the remainder of the chapter was devoted to a qualitative analysis of the media texts. It was found that integration as a concept was all but absent in the newspaper articles sampled, but when it was present, it was regarded as a normative phenomenon that was required because of cultural or racial difference. *Assimilation* was an alternative to integration and the two were sometimes conflated with one-another, that is, that integration was understood as assimilation. In 8.3 the question of how 'community' as a concept was discursively constructed was answered. The analysis indicated that, as with political texts, 'community' was often understood along ethnic or national lines. 8.3.2 drew attention to how incoming non-nationals were included or excluded from the inside, be it a local or national understanding of community. Separation from the inside was achieved through reference to ethnicity, race and religion. In the subsequent section (8.4) it was shown how this exclusion was also discursively constructed through reference to certain values and how incoming non-nationals were discursively rendered as inside or outside based on the presence or absence of these values. In 8.5 it was also found that the journalistic bad practice of conceptual slippage of different migrant types contributed to the exclusion of incoming non-nationals.

Chapter 9 presented the results of a comprehensive analysis of three focus groups carried out with different groups of incoming non-nationals. In section 9.1, firstly primary and secondary discourse topics were presented and then the thematic

links between discourse topics were analysed. It was found that the primary topic of perceptions of place of residence sparked the introduction of the most secondary topics. The analysis of discourse topics highlighted strong correlations between employment and language, and overall, these two topics were some of the most important for participants. Other secondary topics that were frequently introduced included the participants' ethnic or national community and social contact. Section 9.2 gave an in-depth analysis of some of the more salient discourse topics. This included how language was seen as barrier to integration, the importance of the workplace or place of education as sites of 'doing' integration, and how the unique atmosphere of Brighton as an open, multicultural city was a facilitator of integration. In 9.3 the participants' discursive work on attachments, belongings and membership was analysed. It was shown that participants felt that multiple belongings and memberships were possible and in some cases highly desirable, that is, feeling that 'home' was both in the country of origin and country of residence. For some participants, especially refugees in FG1, it was felt that the formal integration stage of acquiring British citizenship was important to more informal markers of integration such as employment. In contrast, formal membership was not seen as either desirable or necessary for EU migrants. Evidence was found of transnational identities, that is, multiple belongings and membership, albeit that some participants' experiences were distressing and for others it had the potential to be less traumatic. It was forwarded that part of the reason for this finding was the different migration experiences of participants.

How, then, do the findings relate to the theoretical claims laid out in Chapters 1-3? Firstly, the analysis seems to back-up the premise that the public sphere is inherently discursive in its nature and that the media play an important part in this. At this juncture it is worth reintroducing the model of the functioning of public discourse (below) and how this was tested by the analysis. The model of how discourse flows through the public sphere stands up to, and seems to be well tested by, the analysis. There was conclusive evidence that the integration discourse originated in the political sphere and was then recontextualised by the media before being passed on. The media had the opportunity to critique and challenge this discourse, but the analysis shows that this opportunity was not taken. Thus, there was both implicit and explicit support for the discursive construction of integration along neo-liberal, assimilatory lines and this support in turn legitimised that policy.



A model for the Functioning of Public Discourse

As was pointed out in Chapter 5, the issue of immigration was mediated to such an extent that politicians felt there was very little room to manoeuvre and to some extent it was the media that set the tone of the debate. The analytical chapters do not seem to confirm this claim though. Furthermore by accepting the political discourse, the media also appears to support the wider meta-narrative of the primacy of the British nation. Within the focus group responses there was evidence of the trickle down of the elite discourse and there was a clear pattern of awareness of negative frames of representation of immigration and incoming non-nationals. One respondent appeared to neatly sum up the public sphere: *I saw in the TV or on radio...government worried about immigration* (IN3, FG2). There was also a high level understanding of the wider public discourse on immigration and its links to economic discourses, especially in reference to migration from A8 states. Although focus group participants appeared to challenge the discourse of integration, there was some limited evidence of the internalisation of other related discourses such as on the economy and neo-liberal citizenship (cf. below).

Further to this, politicians rely on the media to disseminate their messages and the media also plays a key mediating role by interpreting these messages and passing them on to the interpretive community. Within this, the analysis especially speaks to the dominance of elite discourses and the role that both power and agency play in the dominance of certain discourses over others. The analysis of media texts showed there was an over reliance on official sources and politicians and at times there was a direct intertextuality. Through direct quotations or reported speech between what was said by poli-

ticians in speeches or documents and what was printed in articles. The voices of migrants were rare and if their perspective on an issue was included it was often through the medium of an official or NGO speaking ‘for them’. Migrants were therefore in some way denied a voice. Similarly, despite incoming non-nationals being the targets of integration policy their views were not included in official documents. Interestingly though, focus groups of residents were used in order to legitimise, via *argumentum ad populum*, a policy position. Thus, within the analysis there is little evidence of a multi-ethnic public sphere as envisaged by Husband (1998). Rather the discourse is dominated by political and media elites. This finding would seem to be in line with the theoretical argument that, because of this dominance and power to control the discourse, there is a discursive deficit within the public sphere. Firstly, as Blommaert and Verschuere (2001: 140) note, in the integration debate the parameters of a discourse are narrowly defined and dominated by those in power. Secondly, for multiple reasons, incoming non-nationals (and ethnic minorities) are denied access to the public sphere and are thus also denied the opportunity to challenge the dominant frames of a discourse.

As mentioned above, the agency in the discursive construction of integration lies with the elites. The reverse side of the coin is that migrants do not have agency. Instead, the stranger is used as discursive resource (Wodak 2014), i.e. as a scapegoat for social issues. By extension too, ethnic minorities are also the targets of integration discourse and policy and they too cannot challenge this because of their exclusion from the public sphere. The use of the economic benefit of migrants as a positive topos within the material analysed is almost a metaphor for this stranger-as-resource model: In reducing potential residents to merely their relative contribution or cost to the wider taxpaying UK public, they are dehumanised as a commodity (this of course, fits well with the wider spread of neo-liberal discourse). “(B)agging up foreigners and weighing them by their economic usefulness” (Williams 2014) is no less discriminatory than denying entry because of supposed cultural differences.

The denial of agency damages the democratic and fully representative potential of the public sphere because some members of a society (non-nationals and socially excluded ethnic minorities) are disbarred from full and active participation. Furthermore, because the integration debate is conducted almost exclusively by (elite) members of the majority, the real problems of integration are to be found in the sites where

this discourse is visible and this justifies rigorous investigations into how such actors conceive of integration, assimilation and diversity.

What was left untested by the analysis and my model was how much the interpretive community's discourse feeds back to media and the politicians. At the moment the model ignores the flow of discourse 'up'. This would include traditional forms like letters to the editor but also modern technology such as open news websites where comments can be written and twitter which allows direct access to media outlets. Arguably another key test of the acceptance or rejection of a discourse is elections. However, it is difficult to discern the reasons for people voting for one party and not another and, as the contextual chapter showed, although immigration was important, there were other topics which took precedence in opinion polls. One way in which the model could have been tested would have been to have held focus groups with non-migrants and people who were born in the UK. This was part of the original plan but funding and timing did not allow it. Though the level of discourse flow back down the line is of a much lower degree than the other, way, it should be acknowledged as a constitutive part of the discursive public sphere. To rectify this, in the model, I would add additional connections running from the interpretive community to the media.

Moving on the discursive construction of integration, in the analysis it was highlighted that 'integration' as a term was an empty semantic container and as such the contents of the concept were diachronically and synchronically fluid. It therefore fulfilled its role as a consensus concept whereby usage of term could be agreed on by anyone participating in the debate, but the semantic contents differed from person to person and policy to policy. At a governmental level, it evolved during the ten years of analysis into one that was very much supportive of multiculturalism to one that advocated assimilation. As Hughes (2007: 956) writes, "if a policy of assimilation aims to force minority groups to change practices in order to become more like members of the majority group, how is a policy of integration supposed to be distinguished from it?". And herein lies the nub of the issue: In practice an assimilatory policy is not supposed to be distinguished from an integration policy. It is integration and the rhetoric of a two-way process that is used as a camouflage for assimilatory policy and discourse which both exclude their targets from participation in the formulation of the policy and expects them to perform Britishness. Moreover, it is a performance that is not explicitly expected of the white British population.

The polysemy of integration was also indicated by reactions in the focus groups and again it both challenged and supported the elite discourse. The respondents noted that not becoming a part of a community was a negative thing and that to be a good citizen of any country meant giving something to the community. However, if there was a pattern in their perceptions of integration then it was that it was much more of a two-way process than that contained within policy and in newspapers. Also, integration was understood differently and this may have been down to personal experiences, for example IN3, who fled religious persecution, saw integration as based on human rights and equality, while those who had been refugees in Kenya saw it as freedom. This speaks to the individuality of migration and integration experiences and the difficulty of trying to find narratives for migrants.

At the level of policy discourse, and to a lesser extent also found in the media, a key sister concept was ‘community’ and how this is discursively rendered and understood appears to impact on integration. Integration policy was, as to be expected, about how to deal with incoming non-nationals and it became clear that on some level it meant insertion into a community. Thus, how a community was defined, and more crucially, where incoming non-nationals were placed in relation to it, that is, whether they were included or excluded, can point to the level of integration. Sometimes ‘community’ was constructed as spatial or geographical such as *in the community* or *local community*. However, even a single town or area could consist of multiple communities or one community consisting of subgroups. As well as this, it was clear that certain types of migrants (refugees and asylum seekers) were more likely to be constructed as separate from the wider community. This labelling as an outsider continued even when referring to long-term citizens of the UK, such as “long established refugee communities” (Integration Matters 2005: 68). To label a British citizen as a refugee separates them from the national community and so despite having been here for generations or taking British citizenship and their construction as such implies that they still need to integrate more. In other documents, such discursive exclusion from the community was also possible when ‘community’ was understood along ethno-national or religious lines, i.e. *muslim community* or *the local community, including Muslim groups*. In the media corpus, there was a similar polysemous understanding of community but there was a greater tendency for ‘community’ to pertain to distinct ethnic groups which seems to reinforce the ‘separate but equal’ notion of multiculturalism but at the same time, by

constructing people and communities along ethnic lines, it also serves to separate and also deny attachment to multiple groups. More than this though, by extending the discourse to ethnic or religious minorities and also conceptualising them as separate or even outside the main national or local community, it also expands the scope of those people who require integrating. In a challenge to the elite discourse though, respondents from focus groups appeared to feel very much part of a local, geographically specific, community and indeed one that was generally open and accepting of their own ethnic differences. Moreover this did not seem to depend on official membership of the national community via citizenship as this position was taken up by EU migrants, refugees and those who had taken British citizenship after being refugees.

A surprising further discovery was the salience of the locality as either a positive or negative factor in integration. All of the focus groups mentioned the uniqueness of Brighton as an open and tolerant city and that this made moving to and settling in the UK easier. Integration, then, is a locally experienced phenomenon. Both this and the individual understandings of integration above, question the validity of overarching top-down policies. The government literature also noted that integration occurred on a local level and yet in terms of policy responsibilities and funding, local authorities were hamstrung. Instead, the elite national-level discourse is assimilatory and treats all local communities, and migrants, as the same.

Although the investigation was into the discourse of integration, another finding was that, the analysis revealed a high level of interdiscursivity and pointed to a network of different concepts, and therefore policy areas, to which integration was discursively linked. The discourse of integration also encompassed documents on citizenship, ESOL provisions, terrorism, the economy, religion, crime, immigration and community cohesion. For example, over the period of analysis ESOL became a major provision for immigration, integration, citizenship, community cohesion and anti-terrorism. The stable salience of the discourse topics of work, education and ESOL in and across the field work tallies with key elements of integration policy discourse over the period. The most important topic, especially for those who had arrived from Ethiopia, via Kenya, was language and it was constructed as a crucial part of the integration process which allowed greater access to jobs, education and making social connections. In the policy texts and several newspaper articles language was also seen as vital facilitator in integration. However, in the focus groups there was criticism of government policy too

when they mentioned that because they could not access free language classes, they were unable to progress. This points to the Janus-like nature of the discourse: On the one hand there is a lot of space given over the importance of language not just in integration papers but also in community cohesion and terrorism policy as well as stand-alone documents. On the other hand, over time access is reduced to ESOL classes. This is an example of where there is a dissonance between the policy rhetoric and the provisions therein. Intertextually, there were a number of links between community cohesion policy documents and integration documents, which again blurs the line between incoming non-nationals and pre-existing British citizens and the expectations of them. If both groups are discursively constructed as requiring 'civilising' then how are they to be identified as separate?

Such a network of interdiscursive and intertextual connections obviously has a real impact upon how integration is understood. It broadens what and who is included in any wider discussion of it. It also serves to confuse what integration is and also who is expected to integrate. By extending the discourse and the policy provisions, a network of policy areas and separate but related discourses is created that encompasses non-migrants, i.e. British Muslims and other minorities, part of the existing population is problematised. Because they are discursively constructed as in need of being subjected to the same requirements as incoming non-nationals, they too become marked as outsiders. Thus, minorities also need to learn so-called 'British' values. This also implies that the only answer to the problem is homogeneity which in turn becomes an implicit bed-rock of integration discourse.

It could be argued that the high level of interdiscursivity and intertextuality is in a large part due to the very nature of the social issue (in-coming non-nationals migrating to the UK) and the way in which responsibilities are shared and divided between governmental departments. However, this fails to accept the point that social action is discursively constituted. Thus, not only do the very ways that the responsibility for integration is split amongst policy areas and the concepts that it is discursively connected to tell us a lot about what, at an elite discourse level, integration entails, but also these practices themselves are the products and consequences of the discourse that they serve to maintain. The way that a social issue is discursively constructed will impact upon how it is dealt with at a policy level. Indeed, when it comes to integration, it would be impossible to understand the concept without also critically 'reading around' it.

The analysis also seems to have proven the validity of the claims about the racism of the integration discourse and the discursive nature of racism (cf. Chapter 2). Following van Dijk (2000) racism is both an effect of discriminatory discourse and a source of it. The discursive construction of immigration was another related area that appeared to affect both the discourse and practice of integration. By this I mean that the a priori negative framing of migration and migrants by the UK government and press necessitated a specific understanding of integration. In the policy documents, two key negative topoi were present: The first was that certain migrants, especially asylum seekers, were a financial burden on UK taxpayers and the second was that immigration caused tension. In some policy the tension arose from the burden and the extra strain on shared resources and in other documents it was to do with inter-ethnic or cultural differences. In contrast to this, the media discourse employed two alternative topoi. There was firstly a tendency to focus on the numbers of migrants entering UK and often the purported illegality of entry. This was especially evident in the earlier articles during the period when asylum was a salient political and media issue. Secondly, there was also a lot of reference to individual migrants as criminals and transgressors. When immigration was positively framed in the elite discourse, it was very often through the topoi of financial benefit. In the policy documents, this related to the jobs done by migrants and the additive value they gave to the national economy. Similarly, when migrants were written about in the press, away from numbers and illegality, they seemed to mirror the political discourse in that they often collocated with words concerned with employment and skill. Within the focus groups, respondents frequently challenged the construction of them as part of the negative out-group

Connected to this is the issue of conceptual slippage within policy and the media that fails to discern the differences between different types of migrants. Within policy there were incidents where refugees and asylum seekers were confused, for example *genuine refugees* and in other documents there was a lumping together of all migrants being required to earn citizenship despite the reality that EU migrants have the right to live in the UK long-term without the need to take British nationality. This was also visible in the media where there was mention of *bogus refugees* and often *refugee* and *asylum seeker* were used as direct synonyms for each other. This continues to occur despite professional codes and charters of terminology use developed by broadcasters and trade unions in the UK. Furthermore as with the discourse of integration and community co-

hesion, the conceptual blurring is also present not just when incoming non-nationals are the targets of policy but also when referring to those who are already part of the community, i.e. by describing British citizens in relation to their ethnicity. This was also evident in the media articles, especially in reference to Muslim populations.

By constructing migrants as deficient (culturally and economically), integration policies become corrective technologies (Fortier 2006: 320) in order to make incoming non-nationals, and by extension of the discourse, ethnic minorities too, act in a desired manner. It also relies on more traditional racist discourses and points to the narcissism of western democracies (Kamali 2008). Firstly this narcissism stems from a feeling of cultural superiority as evidence by continued reference to 'British values' of democracy and the rule of law etc. Secondly, the narcissism is maintained discursively via the construction of a "purified" (Kamali, 2008: 306) or re-written history that denies previous racism and discrimination. This is also present in the political literature analysed in which reference was made to British traditions of providing safe havens for refugees and those facing discrimination in the past. Furthermore, by focussing on numbers and a putative threshold of tolerance, the media discourse implicitly forwarded an understanding of Britishness along ethnic lines. The presupposition underlying this argument is that too much difference would upset the balance of the national community. This was also supported by the more explicit use of ethno-national nominational strategies, i.e. British Asians.

It was also evidenced that integration is a normative and performative phenomenon. Constructing immigration and incoming non-nationals as problematic - criminal, culturally different to the extent it causes tension and burdensome on UK taxpayers - in turn forward frames integration policy as highly normative and as having to address these deficiencies. The xeno-racism that characterises present day discourse of immigration was also present in the discourse of integration whereby it is constructed as an issue of access to (limited) shared resources. In turn, this necessitates a neo-liberal working of integration that forces migrants to be self sufficient if they are to be 'fully' integrated.

By this point it should be clear that the discourse of integration is highly normative and is aimed at changing the way incoming non-nationals act. This is based in part at least on the performativity of the gaze which racialises the other (Roxworthy 2008) and shifts the onus on to them. Thus, integration is moved away from the rhetoric of the 'two-way' process to a neo-assimilatory one. To paraphrase Kymlicka and Norman

(1994), there is integration-as-desired activity and integration-as-legal status and within the discourse the two are very much connected. In policy discourse, the gaining of citizenship is reliant upon the successful performance of actions. Some of these are official such as citizenship ceremonies which marks a non-national's formal entry into the British nation. Others though are more day-to-day, albeit no less symbolic. As mentioned above, these include voluntary work to fast-track citizenship applications, but also neo-liberal ideals such as not receiving benefits and being self-sufficient. On top of these are even more assimilatory discourses on adherence to 'British values'. Such language was very much present in the media analysis but in the focus groups too there was a tacit acceptance of the performativity of integration. Especially for those who had come from outside the EU, the symbolism of British citizenship was important and they also appeared to agree with the political discourse by seeing Britain as free and open. On the whole though, official membership was not seen as a necessary component of integration.

Thus, although at an explicit rhetorical level, the discursive construction of integration becomes a corrective ideology that is assimilatory in nature and the aim of integration policy should be to make incoming non-nationals more like those on the inside. This of course also rests on traditional discourses of racism and the primacy of Western liberal democracies and the cultures they help to create. In the policy and media discourses, both incoming non-nationals and existing British citizens marked as outsiders by reference to religion, ethnicity or prior nationality or prior legal status were discursively constructed as in some way deficient, i.e. by not having and needing to adopt 'British values' or by not being tolerant and thus need to undergo a civilising process in order to become like the inside. The analysis indicated that over time integration policy became more and more narrowly defined as adherence to neo-liberal ideals of being a 'good' citizen. In the discourse and in the policy stipulations, this also became more performative with the introduction of ESOL and financial requirements for citizenship, restriction of benefits, the Life in the UK test and, after 2007, the promotion of voluntary work and threats against those who did not obey the law. In the media, this was further added to by constructing British values as right-wing values such as being against immigration and not being a burden on the state. Interestingly the neo-liberal element of integration was also brought up by one of the A8 focus group participants who related being a taxpayer to how she should be treated. However, in other ways the

interviewees challenged the elite discursive construction of a good British citizen and argued that to be a good British citizen was to be a good citizen of any country. On the other hand, it seemed to concur with the policy discourse that at some level, being a good citizen implied being an active member of the community. Additionally, by constructing these and other values (democracy, rule of law, equality) as ‘British’ it implies that incomers don’t have that tradition and therefore need to internalise them before they can be accepted into UK society. This argument also relies on the presumption that the society that they are entering into is homogenous in its thoughts and values.

I would now like to return to the salience of CDA as the best approach to answer my research questions. To do this, I will also naturally refer to the initial hypotheses and the critical ontological, epistemological and methodological approach that was taken in this thesis. Below are the research questions originally outlined in the introduction.

RQ1. How was integration discursively constructed in government policy between 2000 and 2010?

SQ1: Which ‘fields’ (Bourdieu 1993), i.e. concepts, policy areas and events, was integration discursively connected to?

RQ2. How was integration discursively constructed by the media over the same period?

SQ2. To what extent was the political discourse recontextualised over the same period?

RQ3. How is integration discursively constructed by incoming non-nationals themselves?

SQ3. To what extent is there a dissonance between these constructions and the public sphere discourse of integration?

RQ4. How do these discursive constructions actually affect the integration of incoming non-nationals?

SQ4. Are all types of migrant affected equally?

The research set out to answer four main questions each with one sub-question. In light of the analysis, all of the questions were answered in full. It was clearly shown that integration was discursively constructed in government policy as neo-assimilatory (RQ1) and that it was linked discursively to a number of other concepts and policy areas in-

cluding, inter alia, community cohesion, terrorism, citizenship, immigration, the economy and ESOL (SQ1). As explained above, this blurred the lines of integration and expanded some the discourse to British nationals from ethnic minorities. In light of this, it was argued that British integration policy at its very core, is based on racialising discourses.

Over the same period, the media discourse often mirrored that of policy. If anything, ‘communities’ and ‘integration’ were even more likely to be constructed along ethno-national lines and, linked to this, some non-white British nationals were similarly marked as being on the outside, and therefore having to integrate. Further taking on the neo-assimilatory government-level discourse, integration meant adhering to ‘British values’ (RQ1). Another feature of the media articles was the high level of direct recontextualisation of the political discourse (SQ2), often through the use of official quotes. This resulted in an un-mediated message on integration being passed on to the interpretive community of readers and voters and thus the dominant discourses on integration were sustained and tacitly supported.

The field work with group interviews of incoming non-nations and people who had recently acquired citizenship presented differing constructions of integration. Indeed, to a great extent ‘integration’ as an understood concept was not present in their discussions. However, it became clear that integration is ‘done’ and experienced at an individual level (RQ3). Thus, the discourse surrounding integration came out in small stories and discussions of everyday experiences. The salience of ESOL, work and education pointed to a similarity between government policy and experiences of integration. However, a lot what respondents said challenged the elite level discourse (SQ3). The questions of how the discursive constructions at the elite level actually affect the integration of incoming non-nationals and whether all types of migrant are affected equally will be answered in below.

As well as answering the research questions, the thesis has also verified the hypotheses. I will mention H2-6 here, and return to H1 below. Firstly, the public sphere is indeed discursive in nature and this is dominated by elites in politics and the media. The absence of migrants’ voices in the media and in policy discourse, and the reliance on official sources in articles proves that non-elites, especially ethnic minorities incoming non-nationals are excluded from the public sphere. Secondly, the discourse of integration changed over time and there was a very visible shift to neo-assimilation after the London bombings, and even before that it was affected by the riots in northern towns in

2001. Thus, integration policy is related to community cohesion and British ethnic minorities. In contrast to the government-level discourse though, there was little discernible difference in media reporting over the ten years, but this may be more down to the relatively small size sampled and analysed. Thirdly, the discourse of integration relies upon intertextuality and is also interdiscursive. Fourthly, and related to H2, power plays a major role in the maintenance of a certain ideal of integration that is hidden behind the rhetoric of an equal two-way process. Finally, there are a number of contradictions between the top-down normative discourse of integration and the bottom-up lived experiences of integration by non-nationals. This indicates a dissonance between policy and how integration is 'done' on the ground.

From a linguistic perspective, the research and analysis provides a cogent argument for the importance of a critical methodological approach to the study of discourse and supports CDA's claim of language as a form of social action that cannot be decoupled from questions of power and hegemony. It is only through an inter-disciplinary critical analysis of public discourse that the "underlying mechanisms of social attitudes and discrimination practices" (van Dijk 1985b: 6) can be revealed. The research has also shown that language choice is based on ideological grounds, and with regards to integration, this ideology is neo-liberalism combined with an ethno-national understanding of nation and citizenship. It has also revealed the contradictions between the rhetoric of two-way integration and the underlying neo-assimilatory language visible in discourse. On top of this, the importance of historical socio-political contexts in analysing discourses has been highlighted. Symbolic practices surrounding the performance of good citizenship don't just take place within an objective social system but also reproduce the system which is the context of the discourse production. Thus, "text production equals system reproduction" (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 10). Likewise, it should be remembered that the symbolism of a practice is also justified by wider discourses of the nation, terrorism and access to shared social goods and that incoming non-nationals and ethnic minorities are excluded from the discussion on which practices are fetishised as symbolic and which are not. As such, the research has shown CDA to be a critical hermeneutic approach as it has questioned who is absent from conversations and why this is the case.

Finally, the thesis has proven the usefulness and applicability of the Discourse Historical Approach to analysis of language. A triangulatory approach to analysis has allowed for a consideration of different levels of context: text-internal cohesion and

coherence, interdiscursivity and intertextuality, extra linguistic sociological variables, and crucially, the historical and broader socio-political contexts that constitute and are constitutive of such discriminatory discourses. The three dimensions of a discourse historical approach to the subject allowed for the identification of discourse topics, discursive strategies and the micro-linguistic means which the discourse of integration consisted of. Furthermore, the analysis has shown how functional grammar should be employed in any rigorous analysis of discourses. Finally, the effectiveness of DHA as a method of analysing the diachronic changes and continuities has proved to be invaluable. Without this, it would have been impossible to track the history of the concept of integration and to link to 'older', pre-existing, discourses and to show that the discourse of integration is one of a complex network of discriminatory discourses circling with the British public sphere.

Returning now to RQ4 and H1, it appears evident from the work in this thesis that the discourse of integration affects social action. That is, it negatively affects how integration is experienced by incoming non-nationals. This occurs in various ways and at various sites. Briefly, to recapitulate, discourses of immigration are based on racist assumptions in which the foreigner is constructed as multiply different. Moreover, these difference become symbolic and are negatively compared to the culture and values of the inside. For example, wearing the burkha becomes a "wilful rejection" (Blommaert and Verschueren (2001: 93) of accepted norms of society. Similarly, not contributing through work and taxes and not being self-sufficient is also discursively constructed, through policy and the media, as a transgression of the social and cultural norms of the UK. As such, they are not just different but deficient. This deficient-difference is constructed as threatening the cohesion of communities in a number of ways (too much difference, competition for resources, criminality, lack of understanding) and thus harmonious communities are those that have few differences and in which everyone contributes. Such a move relies on a concurrent discursive construction of the community as homogenous and this in turn leads to a neo-assimilatory integration discourse based on the "deculturalisation" (Blommaert and Verschueren 2001: 99) of incoming non-nationals to make them act 'like us'. Through conceptual slippage and interdiscursivity within media discourses and policy, this need to integrate is also required by ethnic minorities. Of course, the focus of policy on the need of incoming non-nationals means that individual and institutional racism, and enduring racist discourses, are not problem-

atised. Indeed, the integration discourse purposefully, but unsuccessfully, tries to conceal these.

Not all migrants are affected equally by such discourses though. In practice, integration policies are directed only at certain TCNs such as refugees and those who want to settle in the UK and take up British citizenship. Asylum seekers are not included in policy because it is presumed that integration can only begin after the granting of refugee status. EU migrants are also not formal targets of integration policy and are exempt from the need to assimilate in the sense that they have the right to reside in the UK and therefore there is no 'stick' but only a 'carrot' which is down to personal choice. Although legal status provides a clear delineation of who is affected, in reality the discursive construction of integration also affects pre-existing ethnic minority citizens in the UK as they too are othered as radically different and sharing the same deficiencies as new migrants. Furthermore, social, economic and legal factors also combine to impact upon the agency of those affected and this was evident in the focus group responses. A hierarchy of migrants is thus possible to construct that starts with asylum seekers and ends with white migrants from Western Europe or other desirable countries such as the US. Thus viewed, migrants and ethnic minorities, are marked as requiring integration even after settling into communities and becoming both active members and active (economic) contributors and this affects the cohesion of communities as, on the one side, they are subjected to a discriminatory gaze and on the other, they in turn are liable to view existing members (and institutions) as discriminatory.

The discursive construction of integration undoubtedly has the potential to seriously inhibit integration and how it is experienced. It would be wrong though to overestimate the extent of its influence and to blithely argue this would be to fall into the trap of the discourse and reject the individual agency of migrants. There is a choice for some about whether or not to integrate. As the focus group work showed, EU migrants maybe seem to view integration differently than TCNs and this might be down to the fact they chose to come to the UK and it was not forced upon them as was the case with those from Ethiopia or Iran. There is no legal requirement for EU citizens to learn English and unless they want to vote or have the benefit of a British passport they do not need to subject themselves to the neo-assimilation of formal integration as citizenship. Similarly, the decision to integrate may be instrumental as it was for refugees from Ethiopia who wanted to return 'home'. The system can be played on itself for personal gain and formal integration may not necessarily mean wider active membership of a community.

Furthermore, despite such a flawed discourse and national level policy, ‘successful’ integration can occur. Indeed, integration is an individually experienced phenomenon that happens on a local level and in a large part, the sense of inclusion in a community depends upon what happens at this level. The research shows that formal membership is not necessarily a salient component of integration and at its core, for many of those incoming non-nationals included in the field work, a sense of belonging came from their attitudes to Brighton and the space that it gave them, as well as the people they met and contacts they made. Integration seems to happen despite, rather than because of, integration policy.

This would appear to call for a reconfiguration of integration discourse and policy. Firstly, integration policy should be devolved down to a local rather than national level. This would require subsequent funding to be redirected to local authorities and to community organisations that aim to bring different individuals and groups together. The more localised that integration policy is, the more attuned it will be to the nuances of individuals’ needs as well as the needs of those pre-existing communities. One-to-one mentoring schemes are an excellent way for local individuals to learn about each other. Dissemination of the findings of this thesis to local authorities and NGOs would also be beneficial.

A second requirement if integration discourse is to change is for the inclusion of non-elites into the public sphere. Even the most dominant discourses are dialectical and there are many competing alternative discourses that should be heard. As argued, the current discourse does not sufficiently include those it affects (incoming non-nationals, new citizens and ethnic minorities) and they are effectively denied agency. Thus, following Husband (1998), there needs to be a multiethnic public sphere that gives space and funding for non-majority populations to influence the discourse. This includes representation in the media (as quoted sources and as journalists and editors). The Europe-wide *media4us* campaign and *Refugee Radio* in Brighton are two such examples. Also, given the working of the public sphere, there must also be representation in politics at the highest level. A good first step would be to run focus groups with recent migrants and new citizens as well as pre-existing long-term populations when designing integration policy. Similarly, research such as that contained in this work needs to be disseminated, via policy briefs or other avenues, to politicians and government agencies.

Thirdly, integration policies do not account for the reality of belongings and attachments. This research, as well as other work has shown that migrants have multiple

ties. Kirkwood (2012) calls these transdiasporal identities and Bhatia (2002: 57) speaks of the diasporic self as “a constant moving back and forth between incompatible cultural positions”. As was clear from the focus group material, it is possible to feel part of a community in Brighton and yet speak of Ethiopia or Poland as home. The two identities need not be mutually exclusive and yet, a highly normative, neo-assimilatory integration policy, denies this reality. The irony of the policy of multiculturalism is that it doesn’t allow for multiple identities and belongings (Blommaert and Verschuere 2001), if communities are still constructed as bonded and along ethnic lines in government policy and are re-presented in the media, then there is no way in which newcomers can enter them and instead they are “imprison[ed]...within their own narrow allegiances” (Maa-louf 2001: 22) by the performative policy gaze. Increased levels of migration into Europe, and the cultural pluralism that it brings, challenges traditional ethno-national nation-states. For many reasons, the consensual multicultural model that existed in the UK has begun to falter and some argue it is on life-support. It has been challenged from the inside by anti-immigration discourse but also from new realities of multiple identities. Following Cole (2000), this in part stems from the failure of liberal democracies to sufficiently conceptualise and account for the Other. There is an a priori assumption within Western thought that presumes that everyone is a member of the group: It is not that there is an inside and an outside that is ignored or excluded, it *is that there is not even an outside*. As Dillon (1999: 128) recognises, the stranger, by its very nature is outside the normal modes of questioning: it is almost literally off the scale of comprehension. The result is that those who are in practice not members are excluded from political thought because there are no obligations to those outside (because there is no outside). Long-term settlement of non-nationals obviously challenges this and EU citizenship in particular raises serious questions as to the plausibility of such an approach in the modern world. There therefore needs to be a change in policy away from narrow conceptions of community and states ethnic lines. Bauböck’s (2008b: 213) theory of transnational citizenship is one such alternative. It accepts that large-scale migration changes the conception of membership and calls for of equal membership for all citizens including migrants who have a moral right to live in a given country of residence. Furthermore, cultural recognition of incoming non-nationals is a moral obligation rather than a legal right for this recognition to occur, it has to be supported through political institutions and the legal system.

More than just new policy though, an alternative discourse of integration has to be found. By demystifying the discourse of integration and identifying concealed ideologies the aim of this thesis has been to make readers aware such a state of affairs as a precursor to the empowerment of individuals or communities that continue to be discriminated against. The divisive language of multiculturalism has not worked but its successor, a neo-assimilatory integration that relies on a neo-liberal vernacular is not the way forward. There needs to be an attempt to recognise incoming non-nationals as more than just net contributors or beneficiaries to the national economy (Bennett 2014). Baumann (2000: 101) speaks of “devouring” or “vomiting” as two approaches to immigration. On the one hand, devouring means digesting and assimilating and on the other, vomiting is the control of national borders and attempt to stop immigration. Between 2000 and 2010, successive Labour governments employed both policies in its dealing with immigration and integration. It seems apt therefore to borrow a term from the first days of New Labour and call for a ‘third way’ to approach the discourse of integration that accepts migrant realities and offers them agency they deserve as equal members of British society.

## Streszczenie

W niniejszej rozprawie doktorskiej zastosowano krytyczno-analityczne podejście do analizy dyskursu tworzącego wizerunek integracji migrantów w brytyjskiej sferze publicznej. Za punkt wyjścia objąłem założenie, że do zrozumienia problemów społecznych niezbędne jest znalezienie odpowiedzi na pytanie w jaki sposób omawiane są one przez społeczeństwa. Niniejsza rozprawa przyjmuje analityczne podejście do dyskursu, zakładające, że język jest formą interakcji społecznej, a zatem do wyjaśnienia konkretnych zjawisk społecznych kluczowa jest analiza zarówno makro- jak i mikrokontekstu, w którym zachodzi dyskurs. Przyjmując pogląd Fairclough i Wodak (1997) uznaję, że dyskursy tworzą rzeczywistość społeczną i są przez nią tworzone. Podejście to opiera się na Foucaultowskiej definicji dyskursów jako „praktyk systematycznie tworzących obiekty, które opisują” (Foucault 1972: 50), co oznacza, że dane zdarzenie dyskursywne nie tylko zachodzi pod wpływem kontekstu, ale również samo na ów kontekst wpływa.

W rozprawie argumentuję, że konstrukcja dyskursu o integracji w sferze publicznej Zjednoczonego Królestwa uległa zmianom w latach 2000-2010. Perspektywa wielokulturowa oraz afirmacja kulturowego pluralizmu ustąpiły miejsca ideom neo-asymilacji, popartym przez coraz szerzej akceptowany dyskurs neoliberalizmu. W tym celu analizuję trzy rodzaje dyskursu: teksty o charakterze politycznym, teksty publicystyczne oraz nagrania grup fokusowych złożonych z osób, które przybyły do Wielkiej Brytanii zza granicy w celu osiedlenia się.

Rozprawa usytuowana jest w kontekście teorii krytycznej. Z punktu widzenia językoznawstwa należy ona do dziedziny Krytycznej Analizy Dyskursu (Critical Discourse Analysis – CDA) (patrz: Fairclough 1995; Fairclough i Wodak 1997), natomiast z punktu widzenia nauk społecznych osadzona jest w ramach Szkoły

frankfurckiej. W związku z powyższym, jednym z głównych czynników omówionych w przedstawionej przeze mnie analizie dyskursu integracji są stosunki sił, jak również ich wpływ na tworzenie i odbiór tekstów oraz dyskursów.

W analizie zebranych materiałów wykorzystałem tzw. podejście dyskursywno-historyczne w ramach krytycznej analizy dyskursu (Discourse-Historical Approach - DHA) (patrz: Reisigl i Wodak 2001; Krzyżanowski 2010), która opiera się na halidayowskiej lingwistyce funkcjonalnej. DHA okazała się znakomitym narzędziem analizy rasizmu oraz nacjonalizmu; jest to również metoda szczególnie użyteczna w jakościowej analizie językoznawczej z elementami wywiadu jaką zastosowano w niniejszej rozprawie. Dzięki wielowymiarowemu podejściu do kontekstu, DHA rozgrywa się nie tylko na mikro-poziomie wypowiedzi czy tekstu, ale również pozwala wziąć pod uwagę szeroko stosowane praktyki społeczne.

We wstępie do niniejszej rozprawy przedstawiam ogólny zarys problematyki. Następnie omawiam hipotezy oraz pytania badawcze, które stanowią ramy przeprowadzonej analizy. Zakreślam również szkic przyjętych przeze mnie założeń ontologicznych i epistemologicznych. Rozdziały 1-3 przedstawiają argumenty za dyskursywnym charakterem sfery publicznej oraz wykazują dyskursywne konstrukcje zagadnień rasizmu, imigracji i integracji. W Rozdziale 4 omawiam historię badań nad dyskursem oraz podejścia CDA, a następnie przedstawiam zarys kategorii, które wykorzystane zostały w analizie. Rozdział 5 zawiera opis historycznego i socjopolitycznego kontekstu integracji w Zjednoczonym Królestwie. Rozdział 6 dotyczy metodologii uzyskania danych empirycznych. Rozdziały 7-8 zawierają szczegółową analizę tekstów o charakterze politycznym i publicystycznym, natomiast Rozdział 9 opisuje w jaki sposób te „odgórnie narzucone”, elitystyczne dyskursy odbierane są na poziomie grup fokusowych złożonych z osób, które przybyły do Wielkiej Brytanii zza granicy w celu osiedlenia się, oraz czy i w jaki sposób dyskursy te są przez nich kwestionowane i internalizowane. Na zakończenie podsumowuję przeprowadzoną analizę oraz porównuję uzyskane przeze mnie wyniki z hipotezą badawczą oraz postawionymi pytaniami, rozważając jednocześnie potencjalne praktyczne zastosowania przeprowadzonego badania.

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## Appendices

### Appendix A: List of Policies and Reports Analysed

<i>Year</i>	<i>Month</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Department</i>	<i>Type of Document</i>
2000	Nov	Full and Equal Citizens: A strategy for the integration of Refugees into the UK	Home Office	Strategy Document
2001	Dec	Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team	Home Office	Government commissioned report
2001	Dec	Building Cohesive Communities: A Report by the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion	Home Office	Government Report
2002	Feb	Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain	Home Office	Strategy Document
2002	Dec	Guidance on Community Cohesion	Local Government Association	Guidance for Local Authorities
2003	Sep	The New and the Old: 'The Report of the Life in the UK' Advisory Group	Home Office	Government commissioned report
2004	Jun	Strength in Diversity: Towards a Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy	Home Office	Consultation Document
2004	Jul	The End of Parallel Lives? The Report of the Community Cohesion Panel	Independent advisory group to the Government	Government commissioned Report
2004	Jan	Community Cohesion: An Action Guide	Local Government Association	Guidance for Local Authorities
2005	Jan	Improving opportunity, strengthening society: the government's strategy to increase race equality and community cohesion	Home Office	Strategy Document
2005	Feb	Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration work for Britain	Home Office	Strategy Document
2005	Mar	Integration Matters: A National Strategy for Refugee Integration	Home Office	Strategy Document
2006	Jul	Fair, Effective, Transparent and Trusted: Rebuilding Confidence in our Immigration System	Home Office	Strategy Document
2006	Oct	Strong and Prosperous Communities	Home Office	Strategy Document
2007	Jun	Our Shared Future	Commission on Integration	Government Commissioned Report

			and Cohesion	
2007	Jul	The Governance of Britain	Cabinet Office	Consultation Document
2008	Jan	Focusing English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) on Community Cohesion	Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills	Consultation Document
2008	Feb	The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System	Home Office	Consultation Document
2008	Mar	Citizenship: Our Common Bond	Citizenship Review Team	Government commissioned report
2008	May	The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners – Stopping people becoming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists	HM Government	Guidance for Local Authorities
2008	Jun	Review of Migrant Integration Policy in the UK	Department for Communities and Local Government	Policy Review report
2008	Jun	Managing the Impacts of Migration: A cross-governmental approach	Department for Communities and Local Government	Policy Review report
2008	Jun	Communities and Local Government Committee Report on Community and Migration	House of Commons	Select Committee Report
2008	Nov	Government Response to Communities and Local Government Committee Report on Community and Migration	Cabinet Office	Government response paper
2009	Jan	Guidance on Meaningful Interaction: How encouraging positive relationships between people can help build community cohesion	Department for Communities and Local Government	Guidance for Local Authorities
2009	Jan	Guidance on Building a Local Sense of Belonging	Department for Communities and Local Government	Guidance for Local Authorities
2009	Jul	Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship	UK Borders Agency (Home Office)	Consultation Document

## Appendix B: List of articles used as examples in the analysis

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Date</i>
Brighton and Hove Argus	2001	Pink vote counts, says lobby group	6 Jun
	2003	Mixed feelings at asylum decision	9 Apr
	2005	Tory poster angers religious congregation	24 Apr
	2007	'Perfect citizen' faces being kicked out	11 Apr
	2010	Do parties still need to canvass?	14 Apr
		Home Secretary will consider case of Hove killer driver	21 Apr
		Anger after Brighton candidate compares trains to concentration camps	24 Apr
		Big question: How will Brighton Pavilion vote on the 6th	3 May
		Three arrested over alleged Bognor gang rape	3 May
Daily Mail	2001	A terrible price to pay for apathy	2 Jun
		The asylum seekers who fly home...on holiday	3 Jun
		The racist, aged six; boy is youngest offender as gang attacks asylum seekers	5 Jun
	2005	The Sandra Parsons column	5 May
	2010	She was magnificent, she was eloquent. And she spoke, I suspect, for millions	29 Apr
		Beleaguered Gordon Brown's not of this age, says Johnson	30 Apr
		Cameron turns his fire on Clegg	30 Apr
		How Uncle Azad, the master forger, gave thousands of illegal immigrants a passport to Britain	1 May
		A farce that shames our democracy	4 May
		The EU migrant lie	5 May
		Vote decisively to stop Britain walking blindly into disaster	5 May
Gipsies can ignore the green belt laws		6 May	
Mail on Sunday	2001	Bound by a common tongue	3 Jun
		Hague pins hope on last-gasp ploy	3 Jun
	2010	Beards knew about illegal immigrant 7 weeks ago	2 May
		Who can you trust to clear up this mess?	2 May
Daily Mirror	2001	Refugees learn their way	5 Jun
	2010	Comment: Coleen Nolan	3 May
		I'd rather impress Mum and Auntie than earn millions as a Hollywood star! Says Idris Elba	3 May
		Not over ..we can win; Johnson's rallying cry	3 May
		Comment: Eddie Izzard	5 May
		Why we support; Hope Not Hate	5 May
Daily Telegraph	2001	White, Black, Asian, We're all British, says Hague	2 Jun
		English game all the better for 'Anglicised' players. Cricket commentary	3 Jun
		Refugee alert as France leaves ports unguarded	4 Jun
	2005	For any reason you mention, Blair should go. Except Iraq	30 Apr
		No need to glower now. Brown's time has come	30 Apr
		Ugandan Asian Briton tipped for the top	3 May
		Cabinet seat awaits Blunkett at the end of 'Comeback Tour'	5 May
	Sunday Telegraph	2005	This country is fundamentally going in the wrong direction
Guardian	2001	'Values' plea signals Tory poll switch	2 Jun
		Inside story: Why the Cricket Test fails	4 Jun
		Election 2001: Doubtful voters stick to Labour agenda in Kent marginals	6 Jun
		Yes, but...: What a few high-profile Labour voters would say	6 Jun
	2010	BNP: £50,000 for non-Whites to leave Britain	30 Apr
		David Cameron Wins third leg	30 Apr
		Face to faith: Quakers oppose detention of migrants' children, and so should a new Government, says Michael Bartlett	1 May

		Baby bonds distil the optimism of richer times - They must stay	3 May
		Iranian asylum seeker fears 'honour killing'	5 May
Observer	2001	Far Right plot to provoke race riots	3 Jun
	2010	Gordon Brown can proudly hold his head high	2 May
		I won't desert the party that cares for the downtrodden	2 May
		Jitters strike Cameron as he nears the finishing line	2 May

## Appendix C: Discussion topics and question prompts used for Focus Groups

### *Topic 1: General Issues*

1. How long have you lived in the UK?
  - a. Is this the first place in the UK you lived?
2. Do you feel welcome living in the UK?
3. Do you feel welcome here in Brighton
  - a. Did you feel welcomed when you arrived?
  - b. Do you feel part of the local community?
  - c. Do you think it would be different in other cities?
4. What are some bits about living in Brighton that you
  - a. like
  - b. dislike?

### *Topic 2: Housing and local area (safety)*

1. What part of Brighton do you live in?
  - a. Do you like the area?
  - b. How about your neighbours? Who are they, where do they work?
  - c. Is there a sense of local community?
  - d. Do you feel you and your family are safe and welcome in the area?
2. What type of home do you have?
  - a. Is that privately rented or provided by council?
  - b. Did you have any problems getting accommodation?

### *Topic 3: Accessing services/support*

1. Are you in contact with the doctors or nurses
  - a. Family members, friends
  - b. What have been your/their experiences?
2. Have you or your children had any contact with education institutions like schools or universities, or language lessons?
  - a. Family members, friends
  - b. What have been your/their experiences?
  - c. Have your/their experiences given you positive or negative examples of contact with British people or other people living in Brighton?
3. When you arrived, did you get any support with adapting to your new place? Social services?
  - a. Where was it from (who)
  - b. How long?
  - c. Do you feel it was useful
  - d. Do think you would have benefited from support?
    - i. What areas?

### *Topic 4: Employment*

1. Where do you work?
  - a. Are there other non-British workers at your job?
  - b. Have your/their experiences given you positive or negative examples of contact with British people or other people living in Brighton?
2. Do any of you do any voluntary work?

*Topic 5: social links and free time*

1. Are most of your friends British, Polish/Iranian/Oromo
2. How much contact do you have with people of the Polish/Iranian/Oromo...community
  - a. Where do you meet? Church, cafe, park,
  - b. How often
  - c. Activities
  - d. Why do you meet? How does it help? – why is this important
3. How much contact do you have with people of other backgrounds? British, or other non-british groups.
  - a. Where do you meet? Church, cafe, park,
  - b. How often
  - c. Activities

*Topic 6: Language and Citizenship*

1. Have any of you taken British Citizenship?
  - a. Why?
  - b. What were your experiences?
  - c. How was the ceremony?
  - d. If not, are you thinking of doing so?
    - i. Why/why not
  - e. What do you think being a good citizen or member of the community means?
  - f. What does a bad citizen mean?
2. Did you know English before you arrived?
  - a. Did you take lessons?
  - b. Was this self funded or were the classes provided
  - c. Do you think that learning English is important?
    - i. Has it helped you?
    - ii. How?
  - d. Do you think it is part of being a good citizen

*Topic 7: Perceptions and knowledge of UK political situation*

1. I want to return to the beginning of our talk, we spoke about living in the UK and if you feel welcome here
  - a. What was the hardest thing when you arrived?
  - b. Are there any things you have problems with now?
2. How welcoming in general do you think Britain is to newcomers.
  - a. Have you had any memorable positive or negative experiences?
  - b. Have you ever experienced any racism or discrimination because of your nationality/race.
  - c. Do you think your experiences of integration are normal or do you think different groups from different countries have different experiences
  - d. Do you think British people want migrants and refugees to integrate?
    - i. What do you think it depends on?
3. And how about politicians?
  - a. Do you know anything about policies on immigration and integration?
4. How do you get your news? Do you read newspapers or watch the news?
  - a. Which ones? Local/national/free?
  - b. Do you think they represent your community positively or negatively?

- i. How about newcomers to the UK in general

*Topic 8: Final summary questions*

1. What do you associate with integration
2. So we talked about a lot of things today – where you live and work, education, social services, the local community, language etc. Do you think that integration means anything else?
3. Do you think the idea of integration has a positive or negative meaning
4. So how would you call successful integration?

## Appendix D: Focus Group participants

### Focus Group 1 (FG1): Oromo - Gateway Protection Programme

Participant	Age	Sex	Country of Origin	Citizenship	Number of Years in UK	Number of Years in Brighton	Education	Occupation
OR1	23	M	Ethiopia	British	6	6	University	Student/ support worker
OR2	48	M	Ethiopia	British	6	6	Secondary School	Hospital House-keeper
OR3	43	M	Ethiopia	British	6	6	Secondary School (14)	Domestic Assistant
OR4	49	M	Ethiopia	Ethiopian	3	3	Secondary School	Cleaner
OR5		M	Ethiopia	British	7	7		Cleaner

### Focus Group 2 (FG2): Iranian - Asylum system

Participant	Age	Sex	Country of Origin	Citizenship	Number of Years in UK	Number of Years in Brighton	Education	Occupation
IN1	62	F	Iran	British	33	33	Secondary School	Teacher/ volunteer
IN2	39	F	Iran	British	10	6	University	Self-employed
IN3	53	M	Iran	British	14	6	University	Self-employed
IN4	62	F	Iran	Iranian	10 months	6 months	School	House wife


### Focus Group 3 (FG3): Polish and Hungarian - EU/A8

<i>Participant</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Country of Origin</i>	<i>Citizenship</i>	<i>Number of Years in UK</i>	<i>Number of Years in Brighton</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Occupation</i>
HU1	25	F	Hungary	Hungarian	7	6	Graduate	Operations assistant/ sales assistant
PL2	37	F	Poland	Polish	7	7	Post-graduate	Nursery practitioner/maths tutor
PL3	35	F	Poland	Polish	2 months	2 months	Post-graduate	Unemployed/ economist
PL4	32	M	Poland	Polish	8	8	Post-graduate	Massage therapist
PL5	34	F	Poland	Polish	5	3	Post-graduate	Waitress/ teacher
PL6	32	F	Poland	Polish	8	3	Doctorate	Research fellow

**Appendix E: Thematic links of primary discourse topics and Links between primary and secondary discourse topics for all focus groups**

**Focus Group 1**

*Thematic interconnections of Primary Discourse Topics*



	→	ST-5
	→	ST-6
	→	ST-12

PT-IX	→	ST-14
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
PT-X	→	ST-6
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
*Thematic interconnections of Secondary Discourse Topics*

Secondary Discourse Topic	Primary Discourse Topics									
	PT-I	PT-II	PT-III	PT-IV	PT-V	PT-VI	PT-VII	PT-VIII	PT-IX	PT-X
ST-1	X									
ST-2	X									
ST-3	X							X		
ST-4	X									
ST-5	X			X	X			X		
ST-6	X		X	X	X			X		X
ST-7	X						X			
ST-8	X			X			X			
ST-9		X	X			X				
ST-10		X			X					
ST-11		X		X						
ST-12		X						X		
ST-13	X						X			
ST-14									X	
ST-15										
ST-16										
ST-17										
ST-18										
ST-19										

## Focus Group 2

*Thematic interconnections of Primary Discourse Topics*






**Thematic interconnections of Secondary Discourse Topics**

Secondary Discourse Topic	Primary Discourse Topics									
	PT-I	PT-II	PT-III	PT-IV	PT-V	PT-VI	PT-VII	PT-VIII	PT-IX	PT-X
ST-1	X							X		
ST-2		X								
ST-3	X						X			X
ST-4										
ST-5	X						X	X		X
ST-6				X						X
ST-7									X	
ST-8	X	X								
ST-9						X				
ST-10	X	X			X					X
ST-11		X							X	
ST-12	X							X		
ST-13	X						X		X	
ST-14										
ST-15	X					X		X		X
ST-16	X									
ST-17	X							X		
ST-18										X
ST-19										

### Focus Group 3

*Thematic interconnections of Primary Discourse Topics*




PT-X	→	ST-6
	→	ST-7
	→	ST-13
	→	ST-10
	→	ST-12
	→	ST-9





*Thematic interconnections of Secondary Discourse Topics*

Secondary Discourse Topic	Primary Discourse Topics									
	PT-I	PT-II	PT-III	PT-IV	PT-V	PT-VI	PT-VII	PT-VIII	PT-IX	PT-X
ST-1										
ST-2									X	
ST-3	X						X			
ST-4	X									
ST-5									X	
ST-6				X	X					X
ST-7						X	X			X
ST-8	X							X		
ST-9		X	X			X	X		X	X
ST-10	X	X		X	X		X			X
ST-11									X	
ST-12	X				X					X
ST-13	X						X		X	X
ST-14										
ST-15	X					X	X			
ST-16										
ST-17										
ST-18								X		
ST-19								X		

## All groups combined

*Thematic interconnections of Primary Discourse Topics*





*Thematic interconnections of Secondary Discourse Topics*

Secondary Discourse Topic	Primary Discourse Topics										
	PT-I	PT-II	PT-III	PT-IV	PT-V	PT-VI	PT-VII	PT-VIII	PT-IX	PT-X	Freq.
ST-1	12							2			2
ST-2	1	2							3		3
ST-3	123						23	1		2	4
ST-4	13								3		2
ST-5	12				1		2	12		2	5
ST-6	1			123	13			1		123	5
ST-7	1					3	13		2	3	5
ST-8	123	2			1		1	3			5
ST-9		13	3	1		123	3		3	3	6
ST-10	23	123		3	123		3			23	6
ST-11		12			1				23		3
ST-12	23	1			3			12		3	5
ST-13	123						123		23	3	4
ST-14									1		1
ST-15	23					2	3			2	4
ST-16	2										1
ST-17	2										1
ST-18								3		2	2
ST-19								3			1
Freq	14	6	3	3	6	3	8	8	7	10	