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## **On the political dimension of political science – a few words about political dimension as the final judgment and reasoning**

**Summary:** The subject of the text is the issue of the “political”, which is defined as **the nature and level of the final judgment and ultimate reasoning**. The issues of this kind of the “political” has been attempted to distinguish in political sciences. The text focuses on: (1) the scientist as an agent for the final judgment and reasoning, (2) the subject of study of political science, (3) “theoretical strategies” in the science of politics.

The latter problem has been discussed mainly on the example of Polish political science. Discussed were among others: (1) “the dilemma of scale”, (2) limited operational capacity (methodological and theoretical), (3) aesthetic imagery of political life, (4) structural ignorance in the field of ontology, epistemology and methodology.

### **Introduction**

The political dimension together with politics and authority is a major category in political science. The fundamental nature of this politological category does not make it clear and definite. The main problem of the term ‘political dimension’ or ‘the political’ is related to its abuse, which is reflected in the use of the word ‘political’ as an adjective, which is to describe everything that has anything to do with politics; often the adjective ‘political’ is a synonym for the word ‘ideological’ – the latter case is related to the rhetoric used by politicians in public debate basically as a means to discredit the ideas or projects of the adversary. Often the concept of ‘political’ is to look for the proper object of study in political science – in this case the fact that the proper object of study for political science is authority and even politics is negated.<sup>1</sup> These scenes remind an expedition in search of the Holy Grail, without the happy ending though. These views are at least risky, as they essentially try to determine the area of politics or to indicate to one answer to the question of the subject of political science, and thus also indicate what is to be the political. These views can give rise to a fetishistic and dogmatic cult of ‘scientific calves’, which, in turn, may adversely affect the development of theories in area of the science of politics – of course, only if such views would become the dominant paradigm. L. Fleck wrote: “According to me, only such theory has a value which creates new fields of research, new possibilities of thought, and not the one that closes the way

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. R. Skarżyński, *Podstawowy dylemat politologii: Dyscyplina nauki czy potoczna wiedza o społeczeństwie? O tradycji uniwersytetu i demarkacji wiedzy*, Ed. Temida 2, Białystok 2012.

for future research.”<sup>2</sup> Thus, the reduction of politics to individual factors or determinants of human or community behaviour may cause more harm than good. However, the consolidation of the foundations of the kingdom of the paradigm (i.e. knowledge of ‘the normal’) could be a possibility to give rise to further refining the analysis and research within their own framework.<sup>3</sup>

*So what is described by of the article, the title of which is directly relevant to the issue of the political?* ‘The political’ in this case will be referred to as **the nature of final judgment and ultimate reasoning**. At the same time it should be emphasized that this is not an attempt to melt of another ‘golden calf’; in the text we are not going to wear the garments of Aaron the High Priest, so that no to unnecessarily sin with idolatry.<sup>4</sup> *What then the ‘nature of the final judgment’ would mean?* The answer is the assumption that in the reasoning of choices and decisions we have to rely on the final selection, which can take many forms. It is enough to point out that a person in the society must constantly be in favour for or against something. In fact, this way of acting and thinking is based on bipolar divisions: between right and wrong (ethics), beauty and ugliness (aesthetics), etc. In the case of ‘the political’ and politics there are often references to the division based on the acceptance or its lack, on the division between us and them and on the distinction between the enemy and friend.<sup>5</sup>

It should be noted that in addition to the normal division, which has its own utility in the efficiency of human activities, there is **a level of ultimate reasoning**. At this point, we can refer to basic categories of political science such as equality, justice, freedom and democracy. One might ask, for example, the following question: *Why is it believed that democracy is, if not the best, then the most acceptable political regime?* There could be different replies... For example, an answer may be that it is a fair system... However, there can be more questions asked, such as: *Why must justice be a determinant of the ‘acceptable’ political regime? Why is justice a positive argument? Why should justice mean for example equality?* And so on. **With emerging subsequent an-**

<sup>2</sup> L. Fleck, *O obserwacji naukowej i postrzeganiu w ogóle*, “Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1935, No. 38, p. 58–76 (electronic version).

<sup>3</sup> One should also pay attention to the instrumental assignation of the feature of heterogeneity of political sciences, in order to free oneself from a wider theoretical and methodological reflection within this sub-discipline of the social sciences. This intentional instrumentalism is based on an erroneous assumption that the heterogeneity of sciences on politics is closely related to political sciences, and for “unexplained reasons” the problem does not apply to other sub-disciplines within the “family” of the social sciences. However, the homogeneity of political sciences is related to the entrenchment within the “kingdoms” of paradigm, should not only be associated with the risk for development, because without internal strengthening of the paradigm it is difficult to talk about its development [the thesis on the development of paradigm, see. T. S. Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*]. There are no opportunities for the development of methodological and theoretical structure of certain disciplines and sub-disciplines without building their unity, coherence, explanatory value and “mythical” completeness (thesis for the construction of the theory, M. Karwat, *Czym jest teoria w politologii? Rodzaje teorii w nauce o polityce*, [http://wnpid.amu.edu.pl/attachments/787\\_Prof.%20Karwat%20-%20referat.pdf](http://wnpid.amu.edu.pl/attachments/787_Prof.%20Karwat%20-%20referat.pdf), 4.04.2013).

<sup>4</sup> *Exodus* 10, 24.

<sup>5</sup> Resorting to the division us/them and the enemy/friend owing to the reception of thought by C. Schmitt. See: C. Schmitt, *Teologia polityczna i inne pisma*, Znak, Kraków 2000; Ch. Mouffe, *Polityczność*, KP, Warszawa 2008.

**swers there can be further questions presented, which will have to lead to the level of the ultimate reasoning.**

The question of **the nature and level of the ultimate reasoning** can be considered on two levels – (1) ontological naturalism and anti-naturalism (plausibility or discursiveness of reality),<sup>6</sup> (2) judgment. In the first case, one should consider the nature of the real existence of divisions and their rights. If one assumes a critical position in this field, one would need to opt for discursiveness or interpretability of reality – in our case, the ‘political’ reality. The judgment on the possibility of determining could be related to the awareness constructing social reality, thus, by definition, the awareness of the lack of objectivity. On the other hand, beliefs that there may be biased social structures (narratives); however, the existing structures do not change the fact of a real existence of social phenomena. Following the view based on the assumptions of discursiveness and constructivism of social world, it should be concluded that there is no such a thing as an objective view of social reality, there is no neutrality in social science, there is no non-normative interpretation, i.e., non-aligned, at least ethically or aesthetically. Of course, this position can be considered as scientific relativism; however, this may be the position concerning the awareness of the limitations to the cognition of the social world. In this case, such awareness would be an acknowledgement of the existence of what might be called the existence of the power of judgment – the choice of what is true and what false, what is good and what is evil, what is beauty and what is ugliness, etc.

**Scientist as a subject deciding on the final judgment and ultimate reasoning**

Assuming that the researcher is an entity deciding on **the final judgment and ultimate reasoning** causes that in the article there is **the mythical uninvolved research attitude negated**. Taking into account the development of the humanities and social sciences this will not be a position particularly new, but relevant to the considerations undertaken in the text. It is obvious that the mythical neutrality of the scientist was absorbed in the social sciences along with the standard of research in the natural sciences. Their deliberations conducted in this area among others M. Weber, A. Schütz, who sought to identify a separated area of social activity of the scientist (M. Weber: scientist vs. politician; A. Schütz: scientific constructs vs. common-sense constructs).<sup>7</sup>

*Where to look for doubt in the plausibility of reality and where to look for the discursiveness of the knowledge about it?* At this point one can go back to the Sophists and Socrates. In the first case we should refer to the views of Protagoras and Gorgias, who sought to teach critical thinking, which, in turn, was associated with a violation of established discourses of values, religion, socio-political institutions and so on of that world.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See: D. Marsh, P. Furlong, *Skóra, a nie sweter: ontologia i epistemologia w politologii*, in: *Teorie i metody w naukach politycznych*, eds. D. Marsh, G. Stoker, UJ, Kraków 2006, p. 17–40.

<sup>7</sup> M. Weber, *Polityka jako zawód i powołanie*, NOW, Warszawa 1989, p. 1–60; A. Schütz, *O wielości światów*, NOMOS, Kraków 2008.

<sup>8</sup> G. Reale, *Historia filozofii starożytnej*, Vol. 1, KUL, Lublin 1994, p. 247–270.

To Sophists can be attributed the awareness of the importance of discourse in the social authority structures.<sup>9</sup> The problem of the relation between knowledge, discourse and authority was widely analysed by M. Foucault as part of his “archeology of knowledge”.<sup>10</sup> In the case of Sophists the assumption that the measure of all things is the man was of great importance (homo-mensura principle). In the case of Protagoras, it meant that one cannot specify any absolute criterion which would allow for example to distinguish truth from falsehood. All criteria are relative, as they are expressed by the “individual man” – it is the man that is the measure of judgment.<sup>11</sup> However, for Protagoras the irrefutable knowledge or absolute knowledge is not the most important, but the knowledge which is relatively more practical. This practicality is a kind of pragmatism and utilitarianism, which related to the realm of science can cause instrumentalism of scientific knowledge. It is also an indication of the issue of the **nature and level of the ultimate reasoning** – it will obviously be the man who will make the judgment by his measure.

However, Socrates is associated with the sentence: *I know I do know almost nothing – or nothing at all!* (I know I know nothing), which K. R. Popper reduced to the postulate of modesty and assumption of human fallibility. The man (scientist, politician, etc.) should be aware of his unquestioned ignorance, which was opposed to the platonian authority of knowledge.<sup>12</sup> Although this sentence provokes skeptical thinking, it goes beyond the speculative inquiry of Sophists. The philosopher should move away from speculation on non-cognitive things, he should also be aware that knowledge is not unlimited. Socrates’s postulate of modesty would go against hypercriticism of Gorgias, who was ready to answer any question he was asked.<sup>13</sup> Deceptive though is the knowledge of poets, artisans, all those who by their profession think they are also in other respects the wisest.<sup>14</sup> Thus, following the example of Socrates it can be said (over-interpreting his thought for our purposes) that the possibility to know socio-political reality has its limits. However, theories which explain everything are risky, just as risky are the views of theorists who dressed their theories in the only recognized form of a “golden calf”.

L. Fleck, as previously mentioned A. Schütz, juxtaposed the world of scientific knowledge to the world of everyday knowledge (knowledge and perception of the layman).<sup>15</sup> However, these divisions should rather be seen as ideal types, which would facilitate the exploration of epistemological issues. L. Fleck draws attention to the development of research and cognitive skills of scientists. Development of these skills is a “style of thought”, which codifies and limits the subject of research. Inevitably, this position shows the impact of science on the perception of the subject of study of, which, in the case of political science, may be important at least in relation to the

<sup>9</sup> A. Citkowska-Kimla, *Władza i wiedza. Postmodernizm, Michel Foucault i sofistyka*, in: *Pytania współczesnej filozofii polityki*, ed. D. Pietrzyk-Reeves, UJ, Kraków 2007, p. 227–236.

<sup>10</sup> M. Foucault, *Archeologia wiedzy*, PIW, Warszawa 1977.

<sup>11</sup> G. Reale, op. cit., p. 247–251.

<sup>12</sup> K. R. Popper, *W poszukiwaniu lepszego świata*, KiW, Warszawa 1997, p. 47–61.

<sup>13</sup> Platon, *Gorgiasz*, PWN, Warszawa 1958.

<sup>14</sup> Platon, *Obrona Sokratesa*, ZS, Warszawa 2007.

<sup>15</sup> L. Fleck, *O obserwacji naukowej i postrzeganiu w ogóle...*, op. cit., p. 58–76.

epistemological and/or ontological or theoretical position. L. Fleck also adds: “So we have two related problems: 1) the need for a certain standard education and training the observer, without which there can be no observation an object, and 2) the impossibility of a complete reconciliation of different observers, even educated ones, as to the scope of the subject.”<sup>16</sup> Thus, L. Fleck is aware of what the sophists pointed out, that is of the fact that the man is the measure of judgment of all things – it is the man who decides about the **ultimate reasoning**.

M. Foucault was convinced that there is no science free from influence, what is more, knowledge is instrumental. Hence, we can say that the objectivity of scientific knowledge is limited; moreover, it will be characterized by a kind of pragmatism. This pragmatism, is the realization of specific objectives, which were set by for example the authority. In the case of the concept of social control of M. Foucault, knowledge becomes an essential element for the effective use of techniques of control over the forces of the human body. By this, the authorities may be invisible, can shape the knowledge and produce discourses. The very humanities would be nothing more than a consequence of a number of procedures and mechanisms of power.<sup>17</sup>

P. Bourdieu was interested in the social practices and their dynamics – important were the attempts to identify the logic of everyday activities. The dynamic aspect of social theory was expressed by relationality of social reality. As the social position of individuals, by disposition, affects the positions occupied by them, the same the social position of a scientist is associated with the same kind of relationship. Thus, on one hand, it is important to indicate the social conditions of the production of knowledge. On the other hand, it becomes necessary that researchers have a critical look at their own research activity. This self-reflection is to limit the projection of the investigator’s position on his/her perception of the subject of the study. Therefore, it should be considered that such a factor as social status can affect the form of his teachings. It can also affect the researcher’s adoption of specific strategies within the “field of the university.” The result will be the researcher’s participation in the reproduction of the order (using symbolic violence) within their own community – the kind of capital to be used here is an open question (recognition or institutional privileges).<sup>18</sup>

### The problem of the subjects of research in political science

The problem of the subject of research in political science is often associated with the desire to display its autonomy in a number of disciplines. It is often associated with the adoption of a radical definition of science, the existence of which can be discussed if

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<sup>16</sup> Quoted from: *ibidem* (5<sup>th</sup> page of the article in the electronic version).

<sup>17</sup> M. Foucault, *Archeologia...*, op. cit.; M. Foucault, *Słowa i rzeczy. Archeologia nauk humanistycznych*, Ed. słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdańsk 2005; M. Foucault, *Nadzorować i karać. Narodziny więzienia*, Aletheia, Warszawa 1998; G. Deleuze, *Foucault*, DSzWE TWP, Wrocław 2004, p. 77–120.

<sup>18</sup> P. Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1988; P. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, Columbia University Press, New York 1993; P. Bourdieu, *Rozum praktyczny. O teorii działania*, Ed. UJ, Kraków 2009.

one can identify its proper subject of study and research methods.<sup>19</sup> It is not difficult to realize that such determinants of “scientificity” cause that a multitude of political scientists embarks on a search for the Holy Grail; however, the search ends the same way as the life of Don Quixote ended – with a mournful face, but not necessarily with the awareness of delusion. Often, on this occasion there are arguments evoked that other social scientists (e.g., lawyers, social scientists) know what they are studying, or that they have the proper object of study. It is difficult to consider this position to be correct, since it is difficult to provide a definition of the law<sup>20</sup> or society, just as it is difficult to identify what is the political, politics or power. Often definitions will have constructing character – that is, they will be constructing the meaning for specific “things” (in our case, for example, the political, politics or power/authority). However, this does not alter in any way the problem of involvement of artists/scientists who will arrogate a special status of their definitions – that means a claim concerning their universal validity. This position is often reinforced by the desire to indicate strictly the “field of politics” or “essence of politics”.<sup>21</sup> This results in definitions which are reduced in the content of definiens or are of a form character.

In the case of political science will deal even with the views which deny the fact that the proper subject of political science is the politics itself – for example, it has to be the political.<sup>22</sup> This is supported by the fact that politics is the subject of research in other disciplines and sub-disciplines within the social sciences and/or humanities. This argument is “lame” because such an assumption can be adopted also for law (as not just lawyers deal with law) or sociology (because not only sociologists deal with society). *Should in such a situation lawyers take care of something that could be described as “legal”, while sociologists something that is “social”?* It can be assumed that this position is an attempt to re-evaluate what was found in political science, but the level of reasoning is too weak (even “lame”) to break the conceptual tradition of those sciences. Sticking firmly to “politics”, moreover, indicating that this and not any other interpretation of the political is the only acceptable one, is nothing more than bigotry of “golden calf”, transformation of the Knight with a Dismal Face into the Knight of Lions.<sup>23</sup> The more that political sciences are widely traced back to the humanities and social sciences, drawing on the wealth of achievements of considerations on politics and the political, even anthropology, sociology, philosophy of politics, theology, etc.

The openness of political sciences in the methodological and theoretical aspect is their advantage, but for purists it is the problem of its identity concerning the object of knowledge and explanation. It is also not true that the “hybridization” of political science is the result of the dynamics of socio-economic changes and changes in the very

<sup>19</sup> Cf. R. Rosicki, W. Szewczak, *O przedmiocie badań politologii. Czy możliwa jest ogólna teoria polityki?*, “Studia Polityczne” 2012, No. 29, p. 37–62.

<sup>20</sup> The problem of legal definitions in the legal system would be here a separate issue.

<sup>21</sup> See: Z. Blok, *O polityczności, polityce i politologii*, WNPiD UAM, Poznań 2009, p. 31–86; R. Skarzyński, *Podstawowy...*, op. cit.

<sup>22</sup> R. Skarzyński, *Podstawowy...*, op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> The concepts of “Knight with a Dismal Faces” and “Knight of Lions” taken from the novel by Miguel de Cervantes. See: M. de Cervantes y Saavedra, *Przemysłny szlachcic Don Kichote z Manczy*, Vol. 1 i Vol. 2, PIW, Warszawa 1986.

science in the twenty-first century – according to A. Wolff-Powęska.<sup>24</sup> It is rather the result of adoption and replication of the “hybridical code”, which was acquired with all the complexes of the forming social sciences at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. An example of this can be the “mythical” Great Theories in the social sciences, methodological and theoretical models of natural sciences, models and momentum of complex philosophical systems.<sup>25</sup> It should be noted that in this case the term “hybridization” would be synonymous with the term “interdisciplinarity” – in many cases this interdisciplinarity in political sciences is the result of a lack of willingness to engage in theoretical development of these sciences, it is also a “pseudo-intellectual shield” legitimising converts who approach political sciences from other disciplines (a phenomenon familiar to Polish political sciences).<sup>26</sup>

On this occasion, attention should be paid to the issue risen by J. Woleński, who pointed out the difference between the object of knowledge and the object of explanation in the sciences of politics. In the first case we would be dealing with the objectives of isolating a discipline, while in the second case with theoretical assumptions, which in turn serve as a tool for explanation.<sup>27</sup> Although both cases concern different problems they are often lumped together, which causes the blandness of the discourse on the level of the subject of political sciences and logical structure as well as function of the theory of political science. Woleński’s division does not address the issues of apriorism and aposteriorism – that means it does not solve the problem of knowledge, which will be the starting point in both types of cognition. **The problem of experience and knowledge (as a product of reason), is *de facto* the question of the final judgment and ultimate reasoning.** On one hand it will be a problem of actually existing cognitive processes and explaining social reality (ontological naturalism), on the other hand it is a problem of functioning in the constructed social reality assuming no objectivity or its reduced level (ontological anti-naturalism).

The problem of ontology in political sciences is closely connected with epistemology – the possibility of examining political reality with tools which are used for this examination.<sup>28</sup> In the case of ontological naturalism it should be assumed that the world (political reality) exist objectively; however, in the case of ontological anti-naturalism it should be assumed that we are dealing with the interpretation of reality (an open question is whether there will be a political reality existing independently of the existing interpretation or will it merely be an interpretation).

The adoption of positivist assumptions concerning the political reality leads us into philosophical issues concerning the nature of the man. If we negate the sphere of culture and social consciousness, and ideological elements are brought to the level of phenotype as the effect of Darwinian laws, we will not be anything different from androids

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<sup>24</sup> A. Wolff-Powęska, *Politologia – nauka w drodze*, “Przegląd Politologiczny” 2012, No. 3, p. 7–16.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. C. W. Mills, *Wyobrażenia socjologiczne*, PWN, Warszawa 2008, p. 78–109.

<sup>26</sup> R. Rosicki, W. Szewczak, op. cit., p. 37–62; R. Skarzyński, *Podstawowy...*, op. cit.

<sup>27</sup> J. Woleński, *Spór o status metodologiczny nauki o polityce*, in: *Metodologiczne i teoretyczne problemy nauk politycznych*, ed. K. Opatek, Warszawa 1975, p. 32–57.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. D. Marsh, P. Furlong, op. cit., p. 17–40.

presented by P. K. Dick in the novel *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*<sup>29</sup> In this case, the “politics” is nothing but an electronic sheep dreamed by the “brains” of biological machines. Ideology would become only the implementation of artificial resentments which would prove to human animal his humanity.

### The problem of “theoretical strategies” in political sciences

In addition to the previously mentioned “hybridical code”, inscribed in the social sciences, and thus in political sciences, we deal with natural constraints of the development of scale of theory. In the first place a big constraint became the Great Theories, which quickly became a rampant “kingdom” of concepts and definitions, often reproduced without a critical approach.<sup>30</sup> This issue was addressed, among others, by R. K. Merton and C. W. Mills.<sup>31</sup> The problem of scale in the theory of political sciences can be reduced to at least two different issues, namely (1) the problem of complex/grand theories and minor theories (middle-range theories) and (2) the problem of determinants and factors reflecting the level of reasoning and characteristics of social and political life (in the process of construction of the theory). In both cases, political sciences (even the whole family of social science) cannot solve the problem of taking the place on both types of scale. While in the first case, the idea of the Great Theories was replaced by more accessible and less demanding medium-range theories, though in the second case, political sciences face the dilemma of detailness of reasoning of processes, regularities and political events. An example is the theory of rational choice in the political sciences, which will stop at the most at the level of an efficient analysis of group factors (social) or, for example, model limited strategies in the theory of games – it is due to the fact that in order to understand the factors influencing the choices of individuals we should go down to the level of psychological and biological (psychology, physiology, genetics, etc.). Political scientists with their limited scope of knowledge in these areas will only be dabblers who fill the images of socio-political reality with miserable copies or photocopies.

It can therefore be noted that the problem of political sciences is limited operational capability (methodological and theoretical) on the above mentioned scale. This means that the tools available to representatives of these sciences are not sufficient for exploring smaller and smaller determinants and factors. Inevitably, representatives of political sciences must justify the position they took to resolve this dilemma, which directly leads us to the problem of the **level of final judgment and reasoning in relation to the theoretical strategy**.

<sup>29</sup> P. K. Dick, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, Ballantine Books, New York 1996.

<sup>30</sup> In terms of uncritical implementing theories and paradigms in the study of international relations, in among others: R. Skarżyński, *Od statusu uczonego do funkcji ideokopiarki. Jak uniwersyteccy profesorowie dają się przekształcać w środek polityczny i rujnują dyscyplinę, powielając zachodnie wizje rzeczywistości międzynarodowej*, in: *Wokół stosunków międzynarodowych*, eds. W. Micha, J. Nowak, UMCS, Lublin 2012, p. 19–82.

<sup>31</sup> See: R. K. Merton, *Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna*, PWN, Warszawa 2002; C. W. Mills, *Wyobrażenia socjologiczne*, PWN, Warszawa 2008.

Operational capacity in the social sciences can be substantially enhanced by qualitative and quantitative methods, which is associated among others with the development of information technology, etc.<sup>32</sup> In other cases, we often only meet the development of metaphors, which in the case of political sciences is expressed in the analysis of phenomena of politics as for example the theatre, war, paranoia, etc. Of course, this claim is by no means a voice against the importance and the role of metaphors in general, which stems from the inability to construct a larger narrative in social sciences without the use of any metaphor. However, we should distinguish between a metaphor as a tool, and simulation of the research process by constructing a colourful imagery to describe the well-known problems in the socio-political life. At this point, a political scientist becomes a more or less efficient dauber; however, the determinant of science – as opposed to art – is not the aesthetics but the possibility of verification.<sup>33</sup> The transition of a scientist from the level determining what is true and what is false to the level determining what is beautiful or ugly (in fact this what aesthetic imagery comes down to) should be judged negatively; however, in the both cases we would have to deal with the **problem of final judgment and reasoning**.

The problem in the Polish political science (at this time) is sticking fiercely to anti-naturalism, in particular methodological anti-naturalism.<sup>34</sup> It is made into a religion which is to build an identity of this discipline. Idiographic approaches dominate the nomothetic ones, which is expressed by a weak position of the “applied political science”, and by this means, by a weak position of political science in the social sciences.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> The development of information technology facilitated the collection of data, which in turn permanently affects the research strategies. The starting point for the analysis of the data was the reflection on what we want to achieve in the context of the collected data. Now one can collect data and then look for any correlation – of course the effect does not necessarily have to be positive for the research, which is due to the fact that not every correlation is causal, however, each causation is a correlation. The development of information technology and instant messaging has led to an increase in the potential of qualitative and quantitative methods on a previously unattainable scale. An example may be the very social networking sites like Facebook, which has made the data a key element of the business model. See V. Mayer-Schönberger, K. Cukier, *Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think*, Houghton Mifflin Harcour, New York 2013.

<sup>33</sup> Aspect of comparison between science and art, among others in: L. Nowak, *O ukrytej jedności nauk społecznych i nauk przyrodniczych*, <http://strebski.dyktatura.info/wp-content/texts/philosophy/Nowak02.pdf>, 6.11.2012.

<sup>34</sup> The concepts of naturalism and anti-naturalism in the context of a dispute over the subject and methods of research in the natural sciences and the humanities (philosophy of science). See: A. Pałubicka, *Naturalizm i antynaturalizm*, in: *Filozofia i nauka: zarys encyklopedyczny*, ed. Z. Cackowski, Ed. PAN, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Warszawa 1987, s. 403 and further; A. Schütz, op. cit.

<sup>35</sup> Often the weaker position of Polish political science in the family of social sciences is explained by the “ideological” involvement in the previous political system (i.e. before 1989.). However, Marxism itself as a paradigm of research in the social sciences in the PRL did not exempt from the reflection on ontological, epistemological and methodological issues. Often we deal with the possibility of relying on the “youth” in political science. This kind of reasoning should also be assessed skeptically, because this “youth” does not exempt from the reflection on the issues of ontology, epistemology and methodology – the more that political sciences inherited the core of these considerations after the whole family of social sciences and humanities. Lack of its efficient use suited the numerous political science converts who came from other scientific communities. In this regard, we dealt with structural-

At the same time, this process reduces operational capabilities for the efficient exploration of the subject of cognition and the subject to prove in the science of politics. The result of this is little variety of adopted strategies to build political science theories or little practice in their real use at all (not counting the declarative aspect).

It can be assumed that the monoculture in theoretical strategies and/or the use of theory in the study only in the declarative aspect is a result of poor political science degree program in this field (for I, II and III level). Structural ignorance of the problem reproduces theoretical ignorance in practice within the scientific community of political scientists. Hence it can be concluded that the spirit of “humanities”, “idiography” and “description” are the only screens which serve the scientific ignorance. At this place we should speak highly of the postulate of R. Skarżyński as far as drawing from other areas of knowledge is concerned (e.g. natural science).<sup>36</sup> We should add to this postulate strengthening the position of qualitative and quantitative methods, which would more foster inductive strategies in building a theory of political science. This postulate does not solve the problem of the “political” aspect of theory; however, it strengthens the diversity of different levels of political science knowledge verification.

### Summary

The subject of the text is the issue of the “political”, which is defined as **the nature and level of final judgment and ultimate reasoning**. The issues of this kind of the “political” has been attempted to indicate in political sciences, resulting in the assumption that in this context we deal with the “political” of political sciences. Final decisions and reasonings were attempted to be pointed out in the following:

- 1) the scientist as the subject making the selection (reference was made among others to the Sophists, Socrates, L. Fleck, M. Foucault, P. Bourdieu);
- 2) the subject of research in political sciences (reference was made among others to the problems of the object of cognition and explanation, the political, interdisciplinarity);
- 3) the theoretical strategy in political science (discussed were among others the issues of: “the dilemma of scale” in the strategies of building a theory, reasoning factors and the characteristics of the social and political life, selected dilemmas of Polish Political Science).

Using the adopted assumptions of the “political” it may be indicated that of a “political” nature is the very research process at its very beginning – that means, starting with the very researcher. In the first place it should be recognised that the researcher is only human, and therefore he/she benefits from all the baggage of social life, that means, it must be concluded that it is impossible for the scientist to get rid of the socially con-

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ly reproduced ignorance, which was transformed into an “ideology” in the form of nice sounding euphemism – “interdisciplinarity”. This instrumental approach to interdisciplinarity has become the justification and driving force behind the decisions of Polish political science.

<sup>36</sup> R. Skarżyński, *Mobilizacja polityczna. Współpraca i rywalizacja człowieka współczesnego w wielkiej przestrzeni i długim czasie*, Ed. Elipsa, Warszawa 2011.

structed knowledge, in which he/she is embedded. This is reflected in the final level of judgment and reasoning, at least in ethical and aesthetic aspects. This is essential for the analysis and strategy of the research into political life.

The problem of reality or interpretativeness (choice between these two assumptions) of the reality of the social world concerns fundamental issues of theorizing in political sciences (issues of ontology, epistemology and methodology). Political scientists (like other social scientists) ask or should ask questions about reality, or interpretability of such processes and political events. Without any reflection on the subject, political scientists will not have a real opportunity to develop principles of the discipline and theoretical assumptions, which, in turn, serve as a tool for explaining.

The text also addresses the issues of “theoretical strategies” in political sciences – there were mainly outlined the problems of Polish political science. One of the main problems of political science is its limited operational capability (methodological and theoretical), which in a nutshell can be specified as the “dilemma of scale.” The dilemma of scale should be associated with the need to take a place in different structures: (1) comprehensive/grand theories and minor theories (middle-range theories), (2) the determinants or factors reflecting the level of reasoning and the characteristics of social and political life (under constructing the theory). Inability to move at different levels of the scale can lead to the development of aesthetic metaphors describing political life. The problem that seems to be important on the basis of theorising, is the situation in which the metaphorical efforts start to be the essence of the science narration. We face the problem when the efficiency of the research process is replaced with the efficiency of the narrative style or vividness of imagery. As an aberration should be regarded the situation when in the research process the scientist focuses only on the construction of a set of metaphors the sole purpose of which is to “rewrite” the knowledge or problems generally known or studied, so as to achieve the effect of “freshness” or even controversial effect. Whether we have to deal with a researcher determining what is true and what is false, or a scientist who is satisfied with defining what is beautiful or ugly (aesthetic imagery of political life), the problem of final judgment and ultimate reasoning will remain.

In the case of Polish political science, its representatives often try to explain the theoretical shortcomings: (1) by ideological commitment of the discipline in the PRL, (2) by the “youth” of the discipline, (3) by its interdisciplinary character. These three reasons should be approached with criticism. They should rather be considered as an attempt to legitimise the structural ignorance in the area of ontology, epistemology and methodology of political sciences.

### **Komentarz nr 1 [Sebastian Paczos]**

Autor w swoim tekście zwrócił uwagę na istotną rzecz, a mianowicie, że nie do końca właściwie jest używane, wręcz nadużywane, przez naukowców pojęcie „polityczności”. Stosują je niejednokrotnie jako przymiotnika przy opisie politologicznym, wprowadzając tym samym zamieszanie pojęciowe. Ponadto przestrzega Autor przed dogmatycznym podejściem do pojęcia polityczności, które przynosi wiele szkód naukom politycznym,

zwłaszcza teorii polityki. Niemniej stara się Autor prowokacyjnie przedstawić nam koncepcję aspirującą do miana owych ujęć dogmatycznych. Ma nią być „natura ostatecznego rozstrzygnięcia i uzasadnienia” – zapewniając jednak czytelnika, że nie jest to kolejna próba „wytopienia złotego cielca” ani „odnalezienia świętego Grała”.

W dużym skrócie, według Autora polityczność to konieczność wybierania. Ja bym dodał, że egzystencja polityczna człowieka to również wartościowanie, które jest nieodłączną częścią wyboru. I tutaj Autor składa ukłon klasykowi koncepcji polityczności, jakim jest Carl Schmitt. Z drugiej, natura ostatecznego uzasadnienia to odwołanie się do liberalizujących koncepcji polityczności. Autor stawia pytania, jakie zadaje się zadawać sobie każdy bezradny liberał w obliczu konfrontowania swoich założeń z rzeczywistym światem.

Autor stoi na stanowisku, że fikcją jest uzyskanie prawdy obiektywnej ze względu na fakt dyskursywności i konstruktywizmu świata społecznego, a osobą rozstrzygającą – co jest prawdą a co fałszem – jest osoba naukowca, rozwiewając tym samym złudzenia o postawie naturalności światopoglądowej badacza. Lecz badacz nie ma w dokonywaniu wyborów wolnej ręki. Zawsze na straży jego wyborów powinien stać krytycyzm i uzmysłowienie sobie własnej niewiedzy. Za przestrożę niech posłużą koncepcje M. Foucault i P. Bourdieu, które pokazują jak łatwo wiedza może stać się instrumentem władzy. W innych dziedzinach nauki, na „straży” prawdy stoi czasami również warsztat badawczy, natomiast w coraz mniejszym stopniu presja środowiska przed pisaniem głupot.

Autor dostrzega ułomność dogmatycznych ujęć polityczność w naukach politycznych, podkreślając błędność założenia, że właśnie taka a nie inna interpretacja polityczności jest jedyną dopuszczalną. Prowadzi to do fanatyzmu „złotego cielca”, przekształcając „Rycerza Smętnego Oblicza w Rycerza Lwów”. Dostrzega natomiast Autor szansę rozwoju dla nauk politycznych w ich otwartości na metody stosowane w innych dziedzinach nauk, przestrzegając zarazem przed powierzchownym ich traktowaniem i brakiem realnych narzędzi przedstawicieli nauk politycznych w badaniu rzeczywistości.

Wskazanie tych bolączek nauk politycznych powinno stworzyć oczy teoretykom polityki. I zmotywować ich do dołożenia starań w zbudowaniu nowego innowacyjnego paradygmatu nauk politycznych, odpowiadającemu dzisiejszym czasom.