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Deleuze and *the Face*²

Abstract

This article aims to analyze Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's "faciality", which is not handled in a Deleuzian sense. By saying that faces are "inhuman", Deleuze and Guattari speak in the name of the face. In *Le Visage Humain*, Antonin Artaud emphasizes the fact that nothing can be known about the face. The silence of the face gives rise to question the Deleuzian way of thinking. Writing on the face is taken as walking through the surface of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy. What comes out to the surface in the end is *the face* (in italics) that draws the non-Deleuzian line of flight.

When Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari designate a sense of philosophy, namely pop philosophy³, they equate thinking with a prolonged creativity.

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² "Deleuze and The Face" is a short and revised version of my main arguments on Deleuze's faciality. Comprehensive version of this article can be found in the subsection, "The Unmasked Metaphor", of my unpublished master thesis, "Pop Philosophy Versus The Face: Faciality in Dermocosmetic Advertisements". METU, December 2005.

³ Although Deleuze clearly stated in *Negotiations* that "[Anti-Oedipus] is not the Pop Philosophy or Pop Analysis we dreamed of" (see N, 7), we prefer to call Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy as "pop philosophy". The term does not only indicate his works with Guattari; but also the Deleuzian way of thinking in this article.

Philosophy becomes art. What is more, it is the “art of surfaces” (N 87)⁴. Since Deleuze and Guattari set philosophy into the surface, this article focuses on a certain surface -the face- and reveals the writing of the face on the surface with reference to Deleuzian saying, “make a map not a tracing” (ATP 12).

If “philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts” (WP 2), writing on pop philosophy could also involve creating concepts. As far as we are concerned, this point mostly disregarded by Deleuze readers. To write on Deleuze and Guattari means to trace what Deleuzian is in texts. However “in the act of writing there’s an attempt to make life something more than personal, to free life from what imprisons it (...) Creating isn’t communicating but resisting” (N 143). What striking is that in the act of writing on the face there is an attempt to resist pop philosophy’s faciality. *The face* (in italics) implies an alternative writing style as well.

The purpose of this study is to indicate how *the face* resists the Deleuzian way of thinking, namely becoming. *The face* “breaks into” pop philosophy and reverses Deleuze and Guattari’s sayings on faciality. Every meaning that comes from Deleuze and Guattari loses their concepts / words. *The face* creates surfaces with Deleuzian words. However, it is handled with faciality not in a Deleuzian sense.

On Methodology: *The Face that Walks on the “Inhuman Face”*

Two main characteristics of Pop Philosophy can be found in Deleuzian *Negotiations*. First of all such philosophy “requires nonphilosophical understanding just as much it requires philosophical understanding” (N 164). Deleuze and Guattari mostly indicate literature as a realm of nonphilosophical understanding. In this context, it is difficult to think *Minor Literature* without Kafka or there would be no *Logic of Sense* without Lewis Carroll’s *Alice*.

The second characteristics that define Deleuzian philosophy is the awareness of the fact that “philosophy has absolutely nothing to do with discussing things (...) all you should ever do is explore it, play around with the terms, add something, relate it to something else, never discuss it” (N 139). So does *the face*. These characteristics explain how *the face* breaks into Pop Philosophy as well. *The face* creates its nonphilosophical understanding

⁴ For the abbreviations used in the text to mark the cited works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari see works cited.

while giving references to literature. Using literature sounds like Deleuzian but what comes out the surface in the end will be not. In addition, *the face explores pop philosophy, play around with the terms, add something to pop philosophy and relate it to something else, never discuss it*. In short, Deleuzian methodology is used to become anti-Deleuzian. Writing on the face turns out walking on the surface to distmantle Deleuze's words on a face.

It is important to note that to write a methodology of the face in the act of walking does not mean to personify the face in this article. The silence of the face prevents knowledge of the face. Antonin Artaud discovers that "the human face / is an empty force, a / field of death" ("Le Visage Humain" 94). The weirdness of the human face is worthy of note since "for thousands and thousands of years indeed, / the human face has talked / and breathed / and one is under the impression still/ that it has not begun to/ say what it is and what it knows" (95). *Le Visage Humain* implies the fact that nothing can be known in the name of the face.

Pop Philosophy also follows Artaud's saying and firstly skins the physiognomy from the face, it does not mention physiognomy, though. There is a distinct opposition between physiognomy's discourse and Deleuze and Guattari's thoughts on the face. According to Chinese physiognomists, "person's personality can be read from the signs on his face" (Mar 7). Moreover, "everyone is built differently" (Whiteside 9). According to physiognomy, a face simply indicates an "individual". However, Deleuze and Guattari point out that "faces are not basically individual; they define zones of frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations" (ATP 168). To find out something inhuman in what we have already known as human deserves an explanation and faciality introduce the face not only as "inhuman" (ATP 171) but also as "the white wall/black hole system" (ATP 167). The crucial point is, we still face with Artaud's "empty force" ("Le Visage Humain" 94).

Faciality, a term that is used by Deleuze and Guattari, drops the mask of the human face since "[mask] is the face" (ATP 115). Nevertheless "the face is, what gives the signifier substance: it is what fuels interpretation, and it is what changes, changes traits, when interpretation reimparts signifier to its substance. Look, his expression changed. The signifier is always facialized" (ATP 115). Physiognomy or the knowledge of the face can be considered in terms of faciality. Whenever we try to read a face, not only the subject; but also the reader is "facialized".

Unlike faciality, *the face* does not state what the face is. The silence of the face provokes us to take a closer look to the face. As a result, the parts

of the face becomes noticeable. In each part of the face, unusual becoming is taking place. The nose draws its own “line of flight”. The eyes are in the preparation phase of an exile from the face. The white wall differs itself from the black hole in the name of the Mask/face. Becoming of *the face* is “becoming-individual”. The point is, *the face* answers to faciality with the nose, the eye and the white wall on the surface.

The Death of a Rhizome: The Three- Noses-Tree

The nose gives its flight a name: The three-noses-tree. That tree is composed of willing to be rooted noses. The nose which makes the face obey is Kovaliov’s nose (Gogol); the nose which becomes the tirade of the face is Cyrano’s nose (Rostand) and the nose which tortures the face is Pinocchio’s nose (Collodi). These roots can be familiar because of referring famous noses in literature but the combination which makes them the three-noses-tree is, in a word, unusual. The three-noses-tree implies the crucial opposition between “arborescent schema / the tree” and “rhizome”. Deleuze and Guattari once said “Many people have a tree growing in their heads” (ATP 15). What if the tree is growing not only in the heads but also *on the faces*?

Deleuze said at once “it is faces that choose their subjects” (ATP 180). The three-noses-tree implies a break because these noses are the ones who choose their subjects (faces). To put it differently, faces become noses’ subjects. The three-noses-tree does not only grows on our rooted reasoning on the face, but it also implies the process of dismantling the face. That approach on dismantling the face is not based on Deleuzian assertion that human beings “finally elude the organization of the face” (ATP 171) but, the nose itself eludes the organization of this surface.

In order to grasp the process of dismantling there is a need to dive in the *surface*. The nose is basically self-seeker and despotic by nature. In this case, there is a need to take a closer look to major Kovaliov’s nose who sees itself as “an independent individual” (Gogol 223).

Kovaliov the collegiate assessor woke up early next morning (...) stretched and asked for a little mirror that was standing on the table. He wanted to look at a pimple which had appeared on his nose the previous evening, but to his great astonishment there was a completely flat space where his nose should have been. Frightened, Kovaliov asked for some water and a towel to rub his eyes; there really was no nose (Gogol 219).

Kovaliov’s situation is more terrific than Gregor Samsa’s metamorphosis. To be(come) an insect probably will not need an explanation. On the other

hand, if we consider Kovaliov's loss: to be(come) a man without a nose definitely deserves a logical explanation. "How can I manage without such a conspicuous part of my person? (...) I can't possibly show myself now" (227). Kovaliov is right. The disappearance of the nose is unacceptable. It is also worth noting that the nose implies Kovaliov himself. In other words, the nose is what Kovaliov is: "my own nose; that is almost the same as about myself" (227).

Despite the fact that Gogol's story is such a unique absurdity, the nose's possession of Kovaliov cannot be called as absurd. Since we are unable to see a face in the case of Kovaliov, the nose has right to make "his" own way and be(come) "a civil councilor" (222). It is time to take physiognomy into consideration once again: "the nose (...) has special importance in face reading since it serves as a fulcrum in balancing the face" (Mar 57). Kovaliov's nose is rather impudent, therefore it is not ashamed of destroying such a face balance. As far as we are concerned the "individual" nose is the first one "who" is willing to "dismantle" the face. Kovaliov's nose is the pioneer of Deleuze and Guattari in this case.

Neither Deleuze nor Guattari grows the figure of the despot like a tree on the face. They speak of the face of "the despot-god" or "the priest [who] administers the face of the god" (ATP 115) in order to show "surveillance by the face, as Strindberg said" (ATP 115). Christ-face is crucial in this context:

If it is possible to assign the faciality machine a date- the year zero of Christ and the historical development of the White Man- it is because that is when the mixture ceased to be a splicing or an intertwining, becoming a total interpenetration in which each element suffuses the other like drops of red-black wine in white water (ATP 182).

There is a difference between Deleuze and Guattari's not so individual (because of his face) despot and this too much individual (because of the three-noses-tree) despot in terms of their publicity. Besides, there is also a connection between these despots: Deleuze and Guattari say, "the despot acts as a river, not as a fountainhead, which is still a point, a tree-point or root: he flows with the current rather than sitting under a tree" (ATP 19-20). The point is, the three-noses-tree also acts as a river. We speak of a nose which can run and also runaway like Kovaliov's nose does. It may whether "bleed" or "breathe" in the end. The result of this act definitely depends on how the nose acts.

It is better to consider Deleuzian "inhuman face" once again. What do we remember about that face? The face as a whole never changes,

in Humpty Dumpty's words, "it's always the same" (Carroll 255). On the other hand, what changes is the nose itself, that is why it is able to grow like a tree on the surface.

If Kovaliov's nose is the first root of the three-noses-tree, Cyrano's nose will be the second. But in terms of the nose's despotic nature, there is a slight difference between these two rooted noses. Although Kovaliov's nose leaves Kovaliov in order to be(come) an independent individual, Cyrano's nose does not even think of leaving his face.

The nose becomes Cyrano. In other words, contrary to Deleuzian "a dog with shoes", we speak of a "nose with shoes". Unlike Kovailov's nose, it resists to walk through the *surface*. Additionally, unlike Deleuze and Guattari's "the despot-god" who "makes himself one, or several faces" (ATP 115) Cyrano makes himself several noses. In the first place, we clearly see a "care-free" nose, Rostand does not say so, though. It seems, Cyrano probably does not care about its ugliness as long as he does not "see the shadow of [his] profile on the wall" (Rostand 41).

The second nose is the one that is grim. This also implies the real characteristic of Cyrano's nose. Cyrano is a joker contrary to his grim nose. It is better to emphasize the fact in rhyme: the public will not take notice of the big nose anymore, if there is a joker in the hall. In short, Cyrano tricks a play. That is how he hides his misery from the others⁵.

The third nose indicates, in Cyrano's words, "[his] poor big devil" which "inhales April." (41) This time, pity is the only thing that Cyrano feels about his nose. Do several noses indicate a kind of illusion? The answer is in one of Cyrano's lines: "With this protuberance! Oh I have no more illusions!" (41) To sum up, Cyrano's nose implies not only a break in the name of the despot; but also it implies a tree which "breathes", "hurts", "runs" as a "flow". Therefore, the three-noses-tree might cover the face as a mask especially in the case of Cyrano. There is no need to dismantle the face then. The nose indicates the absence of the face.

In terms of the three-noses-tree last but not least, we take Pinocchio's nose into consideration. As a matter of fact, whether Pinocchio will or not, his nose lead us to think on Deleuzian "coldness and cruelty". At this point, we should remember that Deleuze's "coldness and cruelty" is mainly an assertion of masochism, "the art of Sacher-Masoch" (M 33). Contrary to common beliefs, Deleuze considers that neither sadism nor masochism assumes a "mysterious link between pain and pleasure". He believes both of them take "pain" as "an *effect* only" (M 120-121).

⁵ See Cyrano's reply to Valvert in (Rostand 30-31).

Masochism is so a worthy of note in terms of not only Deleuzian “becoming-animal”; but also BwO^{6*}: “the masochist uses suffering as a way of constituting a body without organs and bringing forth a plane of consistency of desire” (ATP 155). Additionally, “something entirely different is going on: a becoming-animal essential to masochism. It is a question of forces” (ATP 155). As far as we are concerned, masochism is an alternative of “thought-in-becoming” (Massumi 100) since it stands as if the only way of showing “becoming-animal”. Above all, according to Deleuze, masochist does not “imitate a horse”; but he becomes a horse (ATP 155).

Thus, Deleuze seems to study on masochism in order to see whether BwO and “becoming-animal” work in practice or not. The body is the focal point in masochism. Deleuze starts with inscribing “the masochist body” (see ATP 150) in this context. Additionally, “the masochist is looking for a type of BwO that only pain can fill, or travel over due to the very conditions under which that BwO was constituted” (ATP 152).

Pinocchio’s nose is a torturer, in Sacher-Masoch’s words, a “hammer” (see M 271) on the surface/face. At this point, we should at once emphasize the fact that to take Pinocchio’s nose as a torturer does not mean that we want to make a comparison between Sacher-Masoch and Collodi. To put it differently, we do not go further to assert that the Blue Fairy is actually “Venus in Furs”⁷. Basically, we are interested in designating the difference between “becoming-animal” and becoming-individual. Thus, in order to reveal what becoming-individual is we make use of its opposition (“becoming-animal”).

The three-noses-tree, cuts “becoming-animal” out of the surface. The nose acts to affirm Artaud’s saying, “everything that acts is a cruelty” (“The Theater and Its Double” 85). According to Deleuze and Guattari, “cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence” (AO 145). On the other hand, we think violence is the priority in terms of the nose’s cruelty. That is, the nose’s act can be gory. Therefore, wooden nose’s cruelty is a little bit different from Deleuze’s or Artaud’s cruelty. When Pinocchio’s nose moves and grows, cruelty begins. At this point, we speak of something

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⁶ * BwO is the abbreviation for “Body Without Organs”. For further information see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, “November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?”, in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Brian Massumi. 4th ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, 149-166.

⁷ “Venus in Furs” is the novel of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. Complete Text can be found in Gilles Deleuze, *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty*. New York: Zone Books, 1991, 143-271.

figurative: *a nose with a whip*. Since the nose's whip strikes the face, pain is, in Deleuze's words, "only an effect". In brief, a nose with a whip is at once "very similar, and very different to" masochism like Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis which "seems at once very similar, and very different, to problems of history" (N 34). As far as we are concerned, "very similar, and very different" defines the connection –if there is a connection– between masochism and Pinocchio's nose.

Contrary to common thoughts, in order to become a real boy Pinocchio should obey the nose, not the Blue Fairy. If the marionette tells a lie, the nose "[grows] two inches longer" (73). Therefore, it is important to "follow the nose". In order to follow such a nose, we make use of *Commedia dell'Arte*. Because, this "theater form" firstly teaches us what to "follow your nose" means in mask. The fact is, the mask (face) in *Commedia dell'Arte* already knows the significance of the nose. Rudlin points out how the world is seen in mask: "if the eye-holes are correctly placed for the wearer, a kind of tunnel vision is set up (...) The world ceases to have dimension and the only means of finding your way around it is to 'follow your nose'" (40). Pinocchio's nose is like an independent, an individual "monument" which implies who the marionette obeys. Doubtless, it is difficult for Pinocchio to obey the rules or to "follow the nose".

Collodi also made use of *Commedia dell'Arte* in Pinocchio. Nevertheless, Pinocchio is the "wooden brother" (39) of Harlequin and Punchinello, who are one of the Masks⁸ in *Commedia dell'Arte*. Thus, it can be said that Pinocchio already knows what a long nose means, since "the longer the nose of the mask, the more stupid it is" (Rudlin 40).

More importantly, Pinocchio's wish "to become a real boy" sounds like an anti-Deleuzian, because Deleuze implies "becoming-animal" in order to reach "the line of flight". To take Deleuzian becoming differently, *Commedia dell'Arte* deserves to be noticed since it makes a direct connection between animals and faces. Each face/Mask of *Commedia dell'Arte* equates with certain animals. "Such animal mimicry is at the source of many, if not all, of the masks of the *commedia dell'arte*" (Collodi 39)⁹. Although Pinocchio is a marionette not a Mask, he is also involved in animal mimicry. On the contrary, Deleuze opposes imitation since he is fond of becoming.

Pinocchio firstly imitates human in order to become a human. At this point we should remember the Blue Fairy in order to reveal the monstrosity

⁸ "In *Commedia*, 'Mask' refers to character type and is inclusive of each individual mask", (Rudlin 35).

⁹ See also (Collodi 153) for the exception, namely *Scaramuccia*.

of Pinocchio's nose. Unlike Sacher-Masoch's "extreme form of contract" (M 93), there is an oral agreement between the image (the Blue Fairy) and the real (Pinocchio). However, the Blue Fairy's rules are similar to Wanda's rules: Collodi's Blue Fairy says: "you must obey me and do everything that I ask you to do" (108) and Sacher-Masoch's Wanda writes: "as the slave of Mrs. von Dunajew, he will (...) undertake to satisfy all the wishes of his mistress, to obey all her orders (...)" (M 220). Once again, *Pinocchio* is "very similar and very different to" masochism.

Pinocchio has to become a watch dog before he becomes a boy. In other words, Collodi follows a different way in terms of "becoming". When the marionette stole the farmer's grapes, he punished Pinocchio, "[the farmer] took a heavy collar covered with brass nails and strapped it around the marionette's neck. It was so tight he could not draw his head out, and a heavy chain held him fast to the wall" (85). Pinocchio can only rescue himself to act as a real dog. As a result, he barks in order to help the farmer to catch thief vessels. In other words, he "imitates" a dog. "Becoming-animal" is like a stepping-stone in order to becoming-individual in the case of Pinocchio. In the end we want to summarize the basic characteristics of the three-noses tree as follows:

Becoming-Individual: That is what the three-noses-tree is. This individuality cannot ascribe to the face. Since the face implies becoming-individual it is no longer considered in terms of Being. So to speak, becoming-individual cannot be taken as being-individual. In addition, the nose has its own individuality which differs itself from the surface. The "individual" nose opposes not only Deleuzian face; but also "becoming-animal". With this new form, becoming is no longer something Deleuzian.

Monstrosity of a nose is apart from the face's monstrosity. Since the face is distinctively "inhuman", the three-noses-tree becomes its "freak". Another way of saying this is that individual nose becomes monstrous on the "inhuman" surface.

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The three-noses-tree dismantle not only inhuman or human faces but also the noses which it refers to. It grows within differences which can be multiplied. It can be said that the three-noses-tree implies a state of continual contradiction. So to speak, the nose leaves the surface while it is staying where it is.

We assert that the three-noses-tree (not the "inhuman face") which indicates a monstrous becoming-individual, is a major obstacle to "becoming-animal". Giving becoming to the tree means to dismantle rhizome¹⁰

¹⁰ See the basic characteristics of a rhizome in (ATP 6-21).

as well. Deleuze said that “unlike trees or their roots the rhizome connects any point to any other point” (ATP 21). So does the three-noses-tree. Since “rhizome is made only of lines (...) the line of flight” (ATP 21) *the nose* takes each lines out of the surface. To take the rhizome out of its meaning in order to create a rhizomatic tree ends with the death of a rhizome.

The Imprisoned “Human” Eye: Dorian Gray

It is time to look through the eyes of Oscar Wilde’s Dorian Gray in order to designate how eyes are becoming-face and how the picture of Dorian Gray becomes Deleuzian simulacrum. At this point, we must emphasize the fact that when we say the eyes become the face of Dorian Gray, this saying does not imply Avril’s *Le Roman du Visage*, in which she equates face with the eyes (17). The eye does not define the face; since it attempts to separate itself from the face in Dorian Gray. The eye is no more a particular organ. If we make use of Deleuzian terminology, it can be said that the face becomes an obstacle since it does not refer to an “organ(ism)” as a whole any more. There is a need to reveal not a connection but a contradiction between the eyes and the face considering “inhuman face”. So to speak, unlike Avril’s point, the eyes are not the face.

Dorian’s eyes that become the face, do not imply Deleuze and Guattari’s face/eyes which corresponds to the white wall/black holes (see ATP 301) either. Deleuze and Guattari’s black holes neglect the “human” eye. They write on “black hole eye” instead of the eye. However, we speak of the “human eye” which stands in front of the black hole. Thus, Dorian Gray’s eyes do not seem Deleuzian. In the case of Gray, the picture is what Deleuzian is.

The eyes (Dorian Gray) also indicate a distinct opposition to Deleuze and Guattari’s “facialized body”. Lord Henry Wotton, who is a friend of the eye (Dorian Gray) and the painter (Basil), says, “real beauty, ends where an intellectual expression begins. Intellect is in itself a mode of exaggeration, and destroys the harmony of any face. The moment one sits down to think, one becomes all nose, or all forehead, or something horrid”(Wilde 378). Doubtless, Wotton’s saying is about how “intellectual expression” change one’s face. However, there is no need to be an intellect in order to become all nose, all forehead, and so on. Dorian Gray’s eyes can be given as an example on this issue. Although Gray does not “sit down to think”, he becomes all eye. Besides, his eyes/face cannot possibly indicate “the entire body” which is ‘facialized’” (ATP 175) as long as he is not an example of Deleuze and Guattari’s “facialized body”; but at most an eye-body.

The picture of Dorian Gray implies one of the unique examples of Deleuzian “simulacrum”. In a sense, Dorian Gray’s portrait correspond to Bacon’s “two simulacra of portraits” (FB 62) if we take Deleuzian connection between the simulacra and painting into consideration. The difference is, we speak of a simulacrum of a face in Dorian Gray while Deleuze is strictly speaking of the simulacra of the heads (portraits) with regard to Bacon (See FB 19-24). Thus, if we name the picture as an example of Deleuzian simulacrum, this saying will definitely be an opposition in the eyes of Dorian Gray.

Dorian Gray is succeeded in reversing Deleuzian faciality. The soul becomes something to look at, in a word, a picture. The question is, how is it possible to speak of a white wall without a “signifiante” which in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, clings to the soul? (cf. ATP 160) or can we speak of a signifiante without the soul? There will be nothing to be facialized when the hollow signifiante or soul places itself on a canvas. Therefore, we need to think differently from the eyes of Dorian Gray for the sake of Deleuzian simulacrum.

Dorian Gray is a multiplicity in terms of monstrosity. As long as the eye equates itself with the human soul, “human” eye becomes the monster of the inhuman face. Dorian’s young face is a monster because he is “unchanged”(454). The face on a canvas is a monster because he is “changed”. The picture is neither Dorian Gray nor the image of his beauty. It is worth noting that the picture abandons the eyes in order to “becoming-other”. This leads us to write that the picture is not a copy; but the simulacrum. At this point it is crucial to designate the difference between the copy and the simulacrum as follows:

The copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance. The catechism, so much inspired by Platonism, has familiarized us with this notion. God made man in his image and resemblance. Through sin, however, man lost the resemblance while maintaining the image. We have become simulacra. We have forsaken moral existence in order to enter into aesthetic existence (The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy in LS 257).

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If we take Deleuze’s distinction between the copy and the simulacrum into consideration, it can be said that Dorian Gray’s picture is a simulacrum because it is “an image without resemblance”. In particular, through Dorian Gray’s sin the picture lost the resemblance and become simulacrum. The picture has nothing to do with Dorian Gray’s soul. It gives the sins and the age which makes the young man “Dorian Gray” to Dorian Gray in the end.

Nonetheless, “the simulacrum is built (...) upon a difference. It internalizes a dissimilarity” (LS 258). Thus, there is a Deleuzian monstrosity in the picture of Dorian Gray.

Essentially, Deleuze says “by rising to the surface, the simulacrum makes the Same and the Similar, the model and the copy, fall under the power of the false (phantasm) (LS 263). The picture of Dorian Gray “become-mad”, not because it is sinful; but “there is in the simulacrum a becoming-mad, or a becoming unlimited (...) a becoming always other, a becoming subversive of the depths, able to evade the equal, the limit, the Same, or the Similar: always more and less at once, but never equal” (LS 258). In sum, the simulacrum implies becoming-mad and this becoming has nothing to do with Dorian Gray’s “tragic” end. The eyes become neurotic since they lose the soul. It can be said that there is only one way out for the eyes since they are not ready to leave the surface yet: to become something grotesque, *the eye with shoes*. Nonetheless, only in this way they are able to walk out of the face.

According to Rajchman, “[Deleuze] envisaged philosophy as a sort of detective story with concepts for characters, intervening to resolve local problems, then themselves changing as fresh questions emerge and new dramas take shape” (21). We keep Deleuzian method in mind and try to find “what happened” to the eye and the young monster and the simulacrum and the “inhuman face”. It is crucial to know the answer to it since we name the Picture of Dorian Gray not the face of the soul; but Deleuzian simulacrum. Overall, it is time to summarize what happened to Dorian Gray:

The “Human” Eyes Live On An “Inhuman Face”. There is a need to find a Deleuzian laughter in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Wilde says “humanity takes itself too seriously. It is the world’s original sin. If the caveman had known how to laugh, History would have been different” (399). Artaud also says the same thing: “You are quite unnecessary, young man!” (“From The Nerve Meter” 85) The eye also follows the humanity in this context. They not only imply our individuality (if we ever have one); but also seem to protect the soul. However, it is difficult to live on such an “inhuman face”. The worst thing is, the eyes lost the sense of humour and tried to find a safety place for the soul.

The Picture Chokes The Soul. The picture is “becoming-mad”. Therefore, it cares neither Dorian Gray (the eye) nor the wrinkled s(k)in. The picture of Dorian Gray or “the simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies *the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction*” (LS 262). In this way, the picture also differs itself from the painter Basil. As a matter of fact, neither the young monster nor Basil “can resist the vertigo of the simulacrum” (LS 262). They fall down unlike Bacon’s “fall”

(see FB 21) in the end. Besides, the more they try to see themselves in the picture, the simulacrum becomes “imperceptible” (LS 274). As far as we are concerned, Dorian Gray’s picture is what Carroll’s written “impenetrability” is supposed to mean orally. In terms of impenetrability, Humpty Dumpty says, “when I use a word (...) it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less (...) when I make a word do a lot of work like that” (Carroll 247). Additionally, Deleuze also competes with Carroll in order to add some other meanings to impenetrability (See LS 25). On the other hand, “becoming-imperceptible means many things” (ATP 279). Since each term is suitable to have many meanings, what we have done is to add something imperceptible to the “impenetrability”. Some “impenetrability” can also be added to whatever imperceptible is. As a result, the picture of Dorian Gray means many things and the picture (not the word) means what we choose it to mean. In this way, the picture implies impenetrability, imperceptibility and simulacrum.

Deep End of Dorian Gray. The eyes of Gray give us such an opportunity to point out the contradiction between the eyes and, Deleuze and Guattari’s “inhuman face”. Additionally, Wilde writes “it is the spectator (...) that art really mirrors” (376). It is also important to note that “The Masks [or the faces] live in the eye of the beholder” (Rudlin 42). In our opinion, this saying indicates what faciality is all on its own. The spectators might be easily take the picture as the picture of Dorian Gray. They have not been acquainted with the inhuman yet. In addition to that, the eyes are also not willing to face with this surface. Therefore, they need to give a specific meaning (soul) to the picture. In other words, the “human” eyes use symbols in order to arrange a place for the soul into the picture.

The first tragedy: the young monster/master dies. This also implies how the story ends in the eyes of the readers, beholders, and so on. The second tragedy: The eyes lose the soul and they are unable to become inhuman. Once upon a time they were deep and now they are living in exile on the surface. The third tragedy: To ask this question: Are we able to say that we understand what Deleuzian simulacrum or the picture of Dorian Gray really is?

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The Usual Beast: Pedrolino -The White Wall-

The last thing related to *the face* is “the monster” or “the beast” itself. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the fact that the face does not exactly constitute the wall of the signifier or the hole of subjectivity and “the face,

at least the concrete face, vaguely begins to take shape on the white wall. It vaguely begins to appear in the black hole” (ATP 168). Deleuze and Guattari speak of a noticeable togetherness of white wall and black holes in order to inscribe the face. That is why “there is no wall without black holes, and no black holes without a wall” (ATP 184). As a matter of fact, the wall and the holes make “inhuman face” in a word, typical; pop philosophy is able to add different combinations relevant to the wall/hole, such as “the wall could just as well be black, and the hole white” (ATP 169), though.

On the other hand, *the face* has a white wall, which is particularly named Pedrolino, is without its black holes. The usual beast is on the face. In addition, inhuman face does not go anywhere, even if we try to erase or dismantle it. At this point, what Deleuze and Guattari say on dismantling is also worthy of note:

Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity. Here the program, the slogan, of schizoanalysis is: Find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight (ATP 188).

Pedrolino appears on “the snowy white wall of the landscape-face” (ATP 173). At this point, we should answer who Pedrolino is. He is one of the Masks of *Commedia dell’Arte*. It is time to cut the Beast off from Pedrolino. Before *the face* creates a Deleuzian beast from Pedrolino, there is a need to write down the specific characteristics of this Mask with the help of Rudlin’s book. Nevertheless, it can be asked why *the face* indicates not someone else but Pedrolino.

First of all, Pedrolino is a white wall and his “white face, originally floured (Gian-Farina). He thus has a range of emotional expressions denied to other Masks” (Rudlin 134). Secondly, “although [he is] an animal-lover, he remains intensely human, a human animal, not a hybrid like the other Masks” (Rudlin 136). Thirdly, “stoicism in the face of misery, survived his oppression by pretending to be simple. Anaesthetised his sensivity by pretending to have no feelings. Gives vent to feelings only when alone. Totally honest” (Rudlin 136). Rudlin speaks of Pedrolino on the stage. However, the beast Pedrolino is actually on the face, which corresponds to being off the stage of *Commedia dell’Arte* in this article. In other words, there is not any link between Pedrolino on the stage and Pedrolino on the face. *The face* only borrows Pedrolino, not his “duties” in *Commedia dell’Arte*.

Undoubtedly, it is a “theater of cruelty” to place Pedrolino on a face, but this saying must not remind us of Artaud’s works on theater. Pedrolino

asks Deleuze and Guattari “what is wrong with me /the white wall /the flat face?” The question implies something more than his “stoic misery”. The fact is, nothing is as simple as the white wall. Although “the Stoics discovered surface effects” (LS 7), Pedrolino is far away from his own discovery. More importantly, he is not able to find his “rhizome” yet. The Beast implies a break: even the Stoics sometimes do not know what to do on the surface.

What if the monster separates itself from the surface? That is exactly what Pedrolino “the human beast” tries to do on a Deleuzian face. Is there any way to think of a “surface-monster” without a surface? It is crucial to see a contradiction on a white wall between the inhuman surface (Deleuzian “imperceptible” monster) and the “human” Beast (Pedrolino).

Objections might be made to our evaluations on a white wall, at least in terms of placing Pedrolino on the face. So to speak, there is not a white wall named Pedrolino in Deleuze and Guattari’s faciality. On the other hand, it seems problematic to inscribe the beast/monster as a human on an “inhuman” surface since Deleuze and Guattari do not separate monstrosity from the surface in terms of faciality. What is more, the face means “naturally inhuman, a monstrous hood” (ATP 190), “from the start” (ATP 171). In brief, how can Pedrolino help us in order to write on that faciality?

Deleuze and Guattari suggest “we must invent our lines of flight, if we are able, and the only way we can invent them is by effectively drawing them, in our lives” (ATP 202). However, it is the body which needs to escape, draws its line of flight in Deleuze and Guattari’s pop philosophy. In the case of Pedrolino, we assert that the face also draws its own line of flight which is totally different from the body’s expressive “line of flight”. This shows us something: Unlike the white wall/black hole system, Pedrolino -white wall walking or a bewildered Stoic- is becoming a face on the “inhuman face”.

When Pedrolino was on the stage, he did not only “look after the animals”, but also he had to deal with “hybrid Masks” (See Rudlin 136). What is more “he has a special affinity with dogs since he shares their abused, half-starved lives”(Rudlin 136). On the other hand, when a white wall is on the face, he firstly tries to get used to his new surroundings. It was not easy to live on the stage and nothing has changed in terms of difficulty when Pedrolino is on the face. The white wall/beast was “a loner, an observer of the follies of others”(Rudlin 136). It is also crucial to note that to change one’s place cannot change him totally. Pedrolino is still an observer when he is on the face. However, he is the observer of not the other masks; but the face’s follies on a white wall (a half of the face).

If Pedrolino is called as an observer of the “inhuman face” or a white wall on “the white wall”, to who he will inform about the “strangest happenings”?

The answer is rather predictable. He has to speak to Deleuze and Guattari. Nonetheless, the face is still inhuman, we change the features of “the white wall/black hole system”, though.

*Pedrolino: How can you want me to shut up? I do not get a moment's rest. The whole day long I have to run after the nose and the eyes. By the way, the nostrils want me to ask you when will the body “breathe with your belly” (ATP 151). I have no idea what they are talking about. Have you heard the news? The mouth is gone, and where were you? I must warn you this is not my fault. Maybe you should ask to Bacon. Nevertheless, he steals those mouths in order to scream. What have you said? What do you mean by parts of the face are not very important? Is not it a face we are talking about? What is the white wall/black hole system supposed to mean? When does the face become inhuman? It is inhuman from the beginning?! Don't make me mad.*¹¹

It is crucial to designate what the white wall's intention is when he faces with a Deleuzian face at this point. We call his response as “Blumfeld effect”. *Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor* is one of the short stories of Kafka. Deleuze and Guattari also make use of Blumfeld and his “two strange balls” when they write their faciality. “Two little ping-pong balls jumping around by themselves on the ‘wall’ constituted by the floor. They bounce everywhere and even try to hit him in the face (...) Blumfeld finally manages to lock them up in the black hole of a wardrobe” (ATP 169).

What should Pedrolino do? The truth is, there are several options whether to lock the parts of the face into black holes or to lock the black holes into the parts of the face or to turn the black holes into white as we suggest. It is crucial to note that black holes become Pedrolino's annoying balls. Considering Blumfeld's response, Pedrolino does the same thing but he imprisoned not the balls; but the holes. What do we see? On the one hand, Blumfeld “jumps out of it [wardrobe] with an enormous leap such as he has not made for years, slams the door and turns the key, the balls are imprisoned” (Kafka 63). On the other hand, Pedrolino jumps out of the inhuman surface, turns the key and the holes are imprisoned in white. In this way, he is able to live on an inhuman surface without black holes. The crucial point is, the face is still not dismantled when it loses its black holes. Besides, the face must stay where it is. Nonetheless, that is what faciality is. We have something which has a different “monstrous hood”: The white wall/hole.

¹¹ We freely adapt a part from Pedrolino's sample dialogue with II Dottore (another Mask in *Commedia Dell'Arte*). The words in italics are Pedrolino's own words in the dialogue. See the original dialogue in Rudlin 137-138.

Conclusion

This article asks questions to the inhuman face of faciality without giving answers in the name of the face. Nevertheless the face “has not begun to/ say what it is and what it knows” (Artaud “Le Visage Humain” 95) Although Deleuze and Guattari clearly stated that “writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come” (ATP 4-5), their writing about the inhuman face implies knowing what the face is.

The silence of the face gives rise to becomings, draws its own line of flight, separate itself from the surface and lose the Deleuzian vein, namely the inhuman face. With this thought-provoking silence, the face will become *the face* and the non-Deleuzian multiplicities on the surfaces. Since “multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities” (ATP 9), multiplicity of *the face* is defined by the outside of the Deleuzian outside.

Literature is taken as “a rhizome or multiplicity” (ATP 9) in the case of *the face* but not in a Deleuzian sense. What is more, *the face* reverses visibility of the face with using Deleuze’s references to Bacon and Artaud. Stephen Barber points out that “figures such as Francis Bacon and Edvard Munch, whose ultimate obsession, like Artaud’s, was to make an image of the body alive and screaming”(33). Deleuze also admires such screaming. “And the scream, Bacon’s scream is the operation through which the entire body escapes through the mouth” (FB 16). However, *the face* does not have a mouth. Munch’s scream or Bacon’s scream indicates nothing but the terrifying awareness of the fact that there is no way out to scream in this context.

The absence of the mouth also implies that there is no way out for a Deleuzian flight. Therefore, whenever you try to escape with a scream through the mouth, you will crash to the wall instead of escaping through the hole. Several faces or parts of the face with shoes imply a crack in/on the inhuman face. “If one asks (...) why the crack is desirable, it is perhaps because only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs” (LS 160). The point is, *the crack of the face* changes what one knows about the human face as well as pop philosophy’s “inhuman face”.

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