Conclusions:

It should be claimed that the assessment of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project depends on the assessment of Russia’s intentions because it was Russia which forced this project. If the assessment is negative it will be difficult not to analyze realization of the project in the context of making a dominant position of Russia in Europe. Of course, this domination can have economic character but also political. Poland rates this project in a negative way because of technical possibility of including Poland and the Baltic countries (also Belorussia, Ukraine) to gas delivery. Moreover, this technical possibility can become a great device of political influence not only on East-Central Europe countries but West Europe as well. The examples from previous years are quite certain – e.g. energy conflict of Russia with Belorussia and Ukraine.

It seems that the lack of trust is caused by the strong connection of Gazprom with Russia what makes, that these two entities cannot be analyzed separately. Certain solution would be signing by Russia Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), but at present it can be treated as “a science fiction movie script” rather than a real action. The question is: Does the fact of signing Energy Charter Treaty by Russia decrease Russian income? Probably in some way yes, especially in the case of introducing the institution of independent market regulator, TPA regulations and unbundling. However, the treaty alone will not protect instrumental treatment of energy sector. A good example of this is France, Germany and Italy.

It should be mentioned that it is difficult to separate the policy from the economy and charging Gazprom of practicing policy is only a way of good argumentation of protecting national businesses of Poland and other countries in international policy. It cannot be hidden how important is political influence on energy sector in France. Moreover, French nuclear sector and others get enormous political support. Another examples can be given, but it is enough to say that energy sector is everywhere treated as a priority, and because of its meaning for the country’s safety it is on a high level of interlacing of policy with economy.
From the national Russia’s point of view it should not be surprising that Gazprom was used to conduct the foreign policy. The willingness of strengthening international position by Russia is a natural country’s tendency. Pretending that other countries are not like this can be recognized for hypocrisy. Another question to answer is the issue of using devices for this purpose and if they are accepted or not. A good example of such ambivalence is a sentence said by W. Putin – If someone comes to us with an investment we call it globalization, but if we come to invest it is called expansion.

From Poland’s business point of view it should be said that the construction of Nord Stream will strengthen Russia’s position in the EU. It concerns not only political influences but also Russia’s participation in European companies. This results from specific policy of exchanging assets which is led by Gazprom. This means that European energy companies are allowed to take part in energy projects (e.g. in Russia) but only to make the cooperation closer.

Besides Russia will get technical possibility to conduct so called loop which will make it easier to omit a few countries from East-Central Europe in gas delivery. These are not Russian policy followers. In the case of two countries (Belorussia, Ukraine) Russia tries to keep its income. Potential possibility of creating gas loop causes the lack of trust in real intentions of North gas pipeline investment.

It should be mentioned that the environmental dangers connected with the gas pipeline construction are not bigger than similar investments of this type. But the economic issue of this enterprise seems to be debating. A significant element is a fact of transit diversification of gas to EU what in consequence improves safety of delivery to Germany.

Poland has not taken use of the possibility to join the Nord Stream system and this would make a protection in case of Russia’s energy conflict with such countries like Belorussia and Ukraine. It is made by particular inner political situation in Poland and previous priorities of foreign policy. The change in inner situation, in Ukraine for example, proves the short-sightedness of authorities and the lack of long term thinking. Of course, it should be noticed that there will be bigger gas dependence in case of Poland’s connection to the North gas pipeline. Similarly, Russia becomes a dominant direction of gas delivery to Poland. Another disadvantage of not taking part in the Baltic project is the lack of control possibilities for the investment range. During the Nord Stream construction Poland has no devices to check if there is only a gas pipeline put on the seabed or maybe fiber-optic cable as
well. Additionally, this project omits Polish economic waters. Solution, in this case, made by Polish authorities would be understandable, if the diversification of supplies was real rather than postulated.

The only action, in direction of the real diversification of supplies, were agreements made by the government of J. Buzek’s (AWS) in supplies of gas of the Norwegian, no matter how dubious the issue of the cost-effectiveness and numbers of possible supplies of gas were from this direction. This agreement was broken off by the government of L. Miller (SLD). It is necessary to add, that the agreement with Norwegians, in contrast with gas agreements with Russia, provided for the possibility of the reexportation what facilitated the brush-off of possible surpluses of the raw material.

As part of strengthening the Polish energy security a necessity of the expansion of gas connections in German direction would be other issue. However, in this case Polish authorities are not demonstrating any special interest. That seems strange, taking into consideration small agents which would be necessary to allocate for this purpose. Poland would gain the possibility of gas supplies from the German direction in case of blocking gas supplies even from Ukraine. The fear of Polish authorities can result from financial connections of German business entities with Russian. According to opponents of this conception real diversification would not have been made because gas flowing from Germany would be still Russian gas. Opponents of this solution notice that there are two gas pipelines (NEL and Opal) which actually enable to exclude Poland or Ukraine from the transit of Russian gas (of course, in the wider range, the project of North and South gas pipeline is posing a threat to the energy security in the region).

The last conclusion, concerning the fact of carrying the Baltic project out, is a statement that Poland does not have good cooperation mechanisms with states of the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Baltic countries. Moreover, Poland is weak in using already existing mechanisms, even if conventions within the scope of the environmental protection in the basin of the Baltic Sea. It can result from lack of qualified staff which would conduct the deeper cooperation with these states, or it simply results from indolence of the institution of the state which are responsible for such a cooperation.