

Beyond Borders

External Relations of the European Union

Edited by
Jarosław Jańczak

Faculty of Political Science and Journalism
Adam Mickiewicz University
Poznań 2008



Reviewer:

Prof. dr hab. Jerzy Babiak

© Copyright by Faculty of Political Science and Journalism Press,
Adam Mickiewicz University,
89 Umultowska Street, 61-614 Poznań, Poland, tel. (061) 829 65 08

ISBN 978-83-60677-51-3

Skład komputerowy – „MRS”

60-408 Poznań, ul. P. Złotowa 23, tel. 061 843 09 39

Druk i oprawa – ESUS Studio, 61-558 Poznań, ul. Wierzbicice 35, tel. 061 835 35 36

Contents

Introduction	5
MANUELA RIEDEL	
The EU's External Democratisation Efforts in the Context of EU Accession – Promotion of Minority Protection as an Example	7
MONICA BAJAN	
Charming the Dark Waters: Romania's Path into an Enlarged Europe.	23
JOANNA CIEŚLIŃSKA	
The Eastern Dimension as an Element of the European Neighbourhood Policy. From <i>Wider Europe</i> to <i>European Neighbourhood Policy Plus</i>	35
MAGDALENA MUSIAŁ-KARG	
Eastern Dimension – the Role of Poland	47
JAROSŁAW JAŃCZAK	
Why Go beyond EU Borders? Historical and Structural Reasons for the EU Eastern Edge States' External Initiatives	59
PRZEMYSŁAW OSIEWICZ	
The European Union and Its Attitude towards Turkish Cypriots after 2004: Continuity or Change?	67
TOMASZ BRAŃKA	
Overseas Countries and Territories' Status in the European Community	79
PAWEŁ FRANKOWSKI	
New and Old Europe in the U.S. Foreign Policy	93
ADAM JASKULSKI	
The European Security Strategy and National Security Strategy of United States of America: Common Aims or Two Different Views on International Security	99
IRMA SŁOMCZYŃSKA	
French Security and Defence Policy in Context of Contemporary Euroatlantic Relations	111
PIOTR TOSIEK	
The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon – Still a Hybrid Legal and Political System	127
About the Authors	141

Why Go beyond EU Borders? Historical and Structural Reasons for the EU Eastern Edge States' External Initiatives

Introduction

With the enlargement in 1995 and 2004, the European Union (EU) obtained a new Northern flank:¹ a long and problematic border with the Soviet Union successor states. As existing EU member states, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania shared borders accordingly with Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and Moldova. Those eight countries, located at the Eastern edge of the “Western Civilization,” formed the space usually referred as Central Eastern Europe (CEE). European presence of the newcomers has resulted immediately in different initiatives crossing the new Eastern border of Europe and addressing the new, non-EU neighbors. The Northern Dimension initiative was proposed by Finland briefly after its accession; it was then formulated at European level, smoothly and widely accepted and finally implemented in the form of two Action Plans.² Similarly, Poland and Lithuania initiated the debate on the Eastern Dimension;³ despite the fact that it was rather unsuccessful in its suggested form, it led to European involvement in the East and Eastern Partnership initiative.⁴

Analyses of EU spatial customization⁵ efforts usually concentrate on interest distribution and geopolitical conditions. Special important is often attached to the current situation in the soft security field (illegal immigration, international crime, environmental threats, etc.) and Europeanization (promotion of European norms and values eastwards). This approach, however, seems to be narrow in its nature as it does not include historical and structural elements which contribute to the process.⁶ Both need to be considered as a part of the framework for current developments.

¹ J. Jańczak, *Northern Dimension of the European Union*, in: J. Jańczak, T. Szymczyński (eds.), *The Experiences of the 1995 Enlargement of the European Union*, Logos Verlag, Berlin 2003, p. 108.

² C. Browning, *The Construction of Europea in the Northern Dimension*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper, No. 39, Copenhagen 2001.

³ J. Cichocki, M. Cicocki, P. Kowal, *Poland and the EU's "Eastern Dimension"*, in: P. Kowal (ed.), *The EU's "Eastern Dimension" – An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland's Policy*, Warszawa 2002.

⁴ P. Runner, *Poland and Sweden to pitch "Eastern Partnership" idea*, EUobserver, 22.05.2008.

⁵ Customization is defined by Hanna Ojanen as a situation, where “each member state tries to make the best out of membership, emphasizing some features over others so that the Union would resemble the country itself. Customizing can sometimes be linked to furthering national interests, or using the union for one's particular purpose.” See: H. Ojanen, *How to Customize Your Union: Finland and the "Northern Dimension of the EU"*, Northern Dimensions, Yearbook 1999, pp. 13–14.

⁶ Poland's contemporary Eastern involvement may also be seen as a continuation of the interwar *Promethean movement*. Its aim was to support independence efforts of the Soviet Union nations and

The aim of this paper is to show how historical experience and mental structures of the EU Eastern border states have been influencing their current strategies in attracting the EU's attention towards Northern and Eastern neighboring areas. Historical heritage and cultural patterns will then be linked to ideas oriented towards achieving internal and external aims, in other words, security and Europeanization. This investigation will also claim that *periphery complex* and *front mentality* are two factors which strongly determine the activity of the EU border members. They result in a specific perception of the Eastern EU neighbors that is based on the *chaos and mess* stereotypes and thus a consequent feeling of superiority over them among *the Eastern edge members*. Both *chaos* and superiority determine the role that the latter want to play: defenders of Europe and teachers of Europeaness.

I. What is *Central Eastern Europe*? – At the Eastern edge of the Western world

External initiatives of the Eastern members lead to the problem of finding a territorial definition for the *Eastern edge of Western civilisation*. Investigation into the concept of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) is therefore necessary.

As the result of the problems ensued through the unambiguous classification of some states and territories as Western or Eastern, the area between them was in time defined as a separate being – Central or Central Eastern Europe. This point of view was shared, among others, by Oskar Halecki, who saw it as a zone “separating the Holy Roman Empire or Teutonic and Romanic nations from Eurasian Russia, that means those Eastern Slavs, who in certain periods of their history were place outside the European community.”⁷ The former leader of the UK Conservative Party, Michael Howard, stressed the importance of a distinction between Central and Eastern Europe. The former were “territories that used to belong to the circle of Western Christianity” and then became a subject of Russian dependence, whereby the latter are related to the Orthodox culture. He saw, on the other hand, a role for Western states in the mission of reintegrating Central European nations to the cultural and economic community of Western Europe.⁸ Helmut Juros stresses the semantic meaning of the analyzed expression, as the term “Central Western Europe” does not exist as a category. It is derived, in his opinion, from a nineteenth century distinction between Western Europe as a synonym for civilization and Eastern Europe as a space that is to be civilized.⁹

States that were formed after World War I created a new geopolitical situation in Europe. Consequently, they were referred to as a *Sanitary Cordon*¹⁰ or simply a buffer

their exile governments. This publication deliberately excludes this policy from the analyses conducted as it focuses predominantly on geopolitical and strategic motives. See: R. Woytak, *The Promethean Movement in Interwar Poland*, “East European Quarterly” 1984, Vol. XVIII, No. 3.

⁷ O. Halecki, *Historia Europy – jej granice i podziały*, Lublin 2000, p. 117.

⁸ S. P. Huntington, *Zderzenie...*, p. 233.

⁹ H. Juros, *Europa – quo vadis?*, “Przegląd Zachodni” 2003, No. 2, p. 22.

¹⁰ R. Pullat, *Stosunki Polsko-Fińskie w okresie międzywojennym*, Warszawa 1998, p. 45.

zone between the Soviet Union and Germany. The Finnish Minister of foreign affairs, Rudolf Holsti, was an architect of this policy.¹¹

Furthermore, Norman Davies pays attention to the fact that new states which appeared after World War I as part of Central Eastern Europe formed a group of so-called *successor-states*, spreading from Finland to Yugoslavia. In 1945, the Cold War division of the continent into West and East eliminated CEE, a move which was questioned by intellectuals led by Milan Kundera, who were quick to point out the uniqueness of the regions.¹² Together with the collapse of Communism, a new paradigm of European continent division appeared and won many followers in academic circles, being considered as one of the concepts explaining the new world order. Samuel Huntington suggests a multiple construction reflecting the eight great civilizations. Three of them exist in Europe: Western, Orthodox and Muslim. The first two are diversified by subsequently Roman and Byzantine roots, different religions, political systems, different influences of the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, etc.¹³

At the beginning of the 1990s, Reimo Pullat saw a renaissance of the *Sanitary Cordon* concept under the conditions of the collapse of Communism, reintegration of Central Europe with the rest of the continent and¹⁴ lack of stability in post-Soviet space.

II. Are we true Europeans? *Periphery complex* as an identity factor

Having described how Central-Eastern Europe is defined – and in order to understand the reasons for external activities of the *Eastern edge states* –, it is necessary to analyze how the location is reflected in the identity of Central Europe. It is based on the contested Europeaness expressed in the *periphery complex*.

Dariusz Aleksandrowicz notes that the cultural tradition of the *edge states* is defined by their peripheral location.¹⁵ According to Barbara Goryńska-Bittner, “inhabitants of the central part of the continent stress very strongly that they are Europeans.” Simultaneously, they have to resist locating them in “Western culture’s ‘worseness’ stereotypes and own periferality complexes.”¹⁶ This Western-oriented tendency is expressed by Central Europeans in countless books and articles ensuring themselves and the surrounding world with their belonging to Europe. Norman Davies claims that Poles, for example, are more “pro-Western in their opinions than most of the Western states in-

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 49.

¹² N. Davies, *Europa. Rozprawa historyka z historią*, Kraków 1998, p. 38; O. Halecki, *Historia...*, pp. 131–132.

¹³ S. P. Huntington, *Zderzenie cywilizacji*, Warszawa 1997, p. 50.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 8.

¹⁵ He also states semantic paradox related to the idea of *central peripheries*. In his opinion *Central European Periphery* differ from *proper European Periphery*. The latter is located on the European Atlantic coast and consists of Portugal, Ireland, Iceland and Norway. *Central European Periphery* do not have an unequivocal border separating it from the other territories what makes them *open*. See: D. Aleksandrowicz, *Cultural paradigms and post-communist transformation in Poland*, F.I.T. Discussion Paper No. 6/99, p. 1.

¹⁶ B. Goryńska-Bittner, *Być Środkowoeuropejczykiem – między uniwersalizmem a potrzebą zakorzenienia*, “Przegląd Politologiczny” 2002, No. 2, p. 108.

habitants.”¹⁷ The same diagnosis could be applied to Hungarians, Czechs, Lithuanians, etc, but at the same time it presents a very strong *periphery complex*.

One of the variations of this self-conscious attitude of belonging to Europe is the *return to Europe* idea, one of the most important elements of public discourse in the aftermath of Communism in the region.¹⁸ This was, on the other hand, accompanied by the awareness of the fact that the region is contributing much less to European heritage than has derived from it. The described approach resulted again in *periphery complex*. For example, Poles “abuse their location and are spiritually not able to escape it. They want to be Europeans and suffer when someone does not consider them as European.”¹⁹ This forced separation from Western Europe after the end of World War II resulted in a strengthening of *periphery complex*, a fact that was also caused by the economic and political backwardness of the region. On the other hand, their heritage of a struggle for freedom and democracy, as well as a vivid Western Christianity made being European credible but also mythological.

Periphery complex and the need to be “European” are expressed in foreign policy strategies, especially within the EU. There are at least two forms of them: visible presence and constructive contribution.

Visible presence leads to the proposal of solutions, ideas and policies but also vetoing, aggressive bargaining, etc. The aim is to be visible and important for the EU, that is to confirm being within the structures and possessing an important as well as decisive voice that has to be taken into consideration by the other European players. One such example is the Lithuanian and Polish veto to the Partnership Agreement with Russia or the active pro-Orange-Ukraine lobbying.

Constructive contribution is expressed among others by a *best pupil in the class* syndrome. It is based on active and eager operating within Western structures, it excels and surpasses the expected level, as well as it contributing to the Community’s policies. This desire to be part of Europe forces additional efforts and a never-ending demonstration that membership is legitimate, unproblematic and beneficial for Europe.²⁰ Finland seems to be the best example here.

III. Why are we needed? *Front mentality* as legitimizer of belonging to Europe

Dariusz Aleksandrowicz claim that the image of Central Europe as a part of the continent that is detached from the east and the west derives from the fact that its borders

¹⁷ N. Davies, *Serce Europy. Krótka historia Polski*, London 1995, p. 304.

¹⁸ Z. Mach, *Heritage, Dream, and Anxiety: The European Identity of Poles*, in: Z. Mach, D. Niedźwiedzi (eds.), *European Enlargement and Identity*, Kraków 1997, p. 35; E. Lesiewicz, *W drodze do integracji – rzecz o rządzie Tadeusza Mazowieckiego*, “Przegląd Politologiczny” 2002, No. 1, p. 33.

¹⁹ W. Łazuga, T. Schramm, *Polacy między wschodem a zachodem*, in: A. Czubiński (ed.), *Problem granic i obszaru odrodzonego państwa polskiego 1918–1990*, Poznań 1992, p. 225.

²⁰ Zobacz: H. Nyyssönen, *Cheaper Eggs, Security or Other Experiences? – EU in the Finnish Politics in the 1990s*, in: J. Jańczak, T. Szymczyński (eds.), *The Experiences of 1995 Enlargement. Sweden, Finland and Austria in the European Union*, pp. 19–20.

are not clearly set and consequently its clear identity is missing.²¹ But a part of this identity, making the region a piece of Western Europe was the *Christianity bulwark* concept, representing *front mentality*. The Eastern borders of the *edge states* were also the borders of Western civilisation. Since the 14th century, clergy, nobility (and later intelligentsia) developed the self-image of defenders of the Christian faith and, later, Western civilization and Europe defenders against barbarians and pagans exerting pressure from the east²² (such as Tatars, Turks, Russians, Ukrainians, etc.) Adam Mickiewicz described it in the following way: “Christian Poland became a natural defense line of the Western civilization, created from Christianity against idolatrous and Mahometan barbarianism. This was her proper calling and her services to the humankind; that was what our forefathers felt. As long as they defended the world, Poland grew and flourished; because nations only then grow up and have the right to live if they serve the whole humankind by supporting or defending some great thought or great feeling.”²³ Similarly Hungarians saw their destiny, defending Europe against the Ottoman Empire and sacrificing their statehood for the goodness of Europe.

In the 20th century, Poles considered themselves as defenders of Europe against the Bolsheviks (for example during the invasion of 1920).²⁴ Similarly in the 1920s and 1930s, Finland was pictured as the *last bastion of Christianity*. Her border with the Soviet Union was presented as a symbol of cultural differences between both states. It became a “sanctified border between good and evil.” This fortress image was used both internally and externally to present Finland as a “defender of Western values such as democracy and Christianity against Russian barbarianism and chaos.”²⁵ This self perception of a Western civilization bridgehead was expressed by Uno Kalias who wrote:

“Like a chasm runs the border
In front, Asia, the East
In back, Europe, the West
Like a sentry, I stand guard”²⁶

Following this traditional Finnish approach, the fight between East and West determined the course of Finland’s history. This created in the 1930s and 1940s the interpretation by Jalmari Jaakkola of the past becoming a paradigm and basis for further analysis conducted by local historians.²⁷ As a the result, as Roberta Matson remarks, the

²¹ D. Aleksandrowicz, *Cultural paradigms and...*, p. 1.

²² Z. Mach, *Heritage, Dream, and Anxiety...*, p. 35.

²³ A. Mickiewicz, *O duchu narodowym*, in: *Dziela*, Vol. VI, part. 2, Warszawa 1955, pp. 72–73. Following: M. Tomczak, *Refleksje o patriotyzmie polskim w przeddzień wstapienia do Unii Europejskiej*, “Przegląd Zachodni” 2003, No. 1, p. 166.

²⁴ This approach was denied by the Soviet historians. Giennadij Matwiejew considered the Polish-Bolshevik war as a continuation of World War I related to the border’s demarkation. See: I. Lewandowski, P. Wroński, *Druga strona cudu*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 14–15.08.2003.

²⁵ S. Kare, *The Karelian Question as a Mirror to the Changing Finnishness: An Inquiry into the National Identity of EU Finland*, in: H. Rytvuori-Apunen (ed.), *Russian-European Interfaces in the Northern Dimension of the EU*, Tampere 2000, pp. 316–317.

²⁶ E. Solsten, S. Meditz (ed.), *Finland. A country Study*, p. 38.

²⁷ J. Korpela, “The Russian Threat Against Finland” in *the Western Sources Before the Peace of Noteborg (1323)*, “Scandinavian Journal of History” 1997, Vol. 22, No. 3, p. 161.

struggle against the Soviet Union during World War II was presented as the biblical fight of David and Goliath.²⁸

This mission was related to the defenders role and led to difficult compromises with Western enemies. Before regaining independence at the end of World War I, Polish conservatives supported alliance with Austria-Hungary, whereby left-wing parties supported a cooperation with Germany; both factions were united against Russia.²⁹ Finnish *Jäger* units were trained in Germany and German troops played an important role in the civil war between 1917 and 1918.³⁰ The Hessian prince Friedrich Karl was offered the Finnish crown. The Fins also expected German help in solving the territorial conflict with Russia in the Eastern Karelia and Petsamo regions.³¹ During the interwar period, Poland was very hesitant towards proposed alliances with the Soviet Union.³² During World War II, Finland, attacked by her Eastern neighbors, collaborated with Nazi Germany. Support for the latter was strong in the Baltic States, Slovakia and Hungary.

In practice, *front mentality* resulted in two sets of beliefs in the region. First, the role as Europe's defender legitimized the presence of *the edge states* within Western Europe and additionally makes them important, or even crucial, pillars of Europe's order. Second, both Europe and *edge states* can survive and effectively develop, so long as the roles are maintained.

IV. Do they know it? Western European selfconcentration

Both *periphery complex* and *front mentality*, that locate *Eastern edge states* in Western Europe, are rather unknown to the wider circles in that part of the continent. Usually, Central Europe used to be omitted from history books, public debates, alliances, etc. Seen as underdeveloped, wild and uninteresting, it had to fight for respect and recognition as an inseparable part of European civilization. These unreciprocated feelings were very often put to the test. Signed treaties and alliances between Western and Central European states were several times broken due to different reasons. The lack of an alternative led to *edge states* remaining attached to the myths of the unity of Western culture. Poland – despite existing assistance commitments – was left alone in 1939 and then again in 1945. Czechoslovakia in 1937, 1939, 1948. Finland did not receive any help during the first winter of World War II (1939–1940).

This negative experience with partner states in Western Europe was overcome with the European Integration process and appearance of a supranational decision center

²⁸ R. Matson, *Finlandisation: A Retrospective*, in: T. M. Ruddy (ed.), *Charting an Independent Course. Finland's Place in the Cold War and in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Claremont 1998, p. 197.

²⁹ A. Czubiński, *Historyczne uwarunkowania rozwoju stosunków pomiędzy Polską a Niemcami i Rosją*, in: *Polska między Niemcami a Rosją*, Poznań 1999, p. 15.

³⁰ N. Davies, *Europa. Rozprawa historyka z historią*, Kraków 1998, p. 973.

³¹ S. Hentilä, *Od uzyskania niepodległości do zakończenia wojny kontynuacyjnej*, in: O. Jussila, S. Hentilä, J. Nevakivi (eds.), *Historia polityczna Finlandii 1809–1999*, Kraków 2001, pp. 136–138.

³² J. Kalisch, *Linia 26 stycznia 1934 r. – pozory i rzeczywistość imperialistycznej polityki Niemiec wobec Polski*, in: *Niemcy w polityce międzynarodowej 1919–1939*, Tom III: S. Sierpowski (ed.), *W dobie Monachium*, Poznań 1992, p. 178.

– Brussels. It goes without saying that national interests also intersect, but what is also very vivid is the European perspective and European voice. Both *periphery complex* and *front mentality* were to be factors in the filtration of strategies and coercing *edge members* to implement old patterns under new circumstances as well as persuading old members and the EU with them.

V. How is heritage transformed within EU customization? Between bridging and protecting

The necessity of this confirmation of belonging to Europe (as determined by *periphery complex*), together with the role that *edge states* saw for themselves as Europe's defenders, resulted in external initiatives that were formulated as European policies and addressed to Eastern neighbors. On the one hand, they followed historical patterns, on the other they were enriched and modified by the changing international situation.

New member states still wanted to be the first of all Europe's defenders, a desire that was based on previous assumptions of *chaos and mess* in the East, post-Soviet territories as well as the powerlessness of the rest of Europe in the face of these new territories. *The edge states* were to protect old member states against all the unwanted phenomena, especially organized crime, illegal immigration, drug smuggling, environmental threats, etc. Preparations towards Schengen enlargement created a great possibility for them to play this role³³ and to be good and reliable Europeans.³⁴ On the other hand, this situation was welcomed by some of the *destination states*, e.g. Germany, that wanted to have an additional barrier instead of problematic neighbors.

The second, modified strategy is based on being *teachers of Europe* in the east. Here the starting point was the feeling of superiority over Eastern neighbors and the mission of "civilizing" them in the fields of democracy consolidation, values promotion, implementation of economic reforms, etc. This was, on the other hand, also a transposition of the previously dominating West-Central cleavage and confirmation of oneself belonging to the West: *edge states* were to be no longer the Eastern (poorer, worse, etc.) outskirts of Western Europe. In fact, the opposite was true: as member states with full rights, they were entitled to behave as part of Western civilisation, among others by being teachers for those who were left outside. Here, the logics of external policies were based on the Europeanization process – "a process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics became part of national politics and policy-making."³⁵ According to François Bafail and Timm Beichelt,

³³ J. Jańczak, *Ruch osobowy w polsko-niemieckim mieście podzielonym – zmiany reżimu kontroli granicznych po 1 maja 2004 roku i ich wpływ na przepuszczalność granicy*, in: M. Adamowicz, A. Siedlecka (ed.), *Rozwój transgranicznej współpracy edukacyjnej w regionie Biała Podlaska–Brześć*, Tom II, Wydawnictwo PWSZ w Białej Podlaskiej, Biała Podlaska 2007, pp. 28–37.

³⁴ A. Schwell, *Zaufanie jest dobre, kontrola jest lepsza. Europa wschodnia jako strefa buforowa Unii Europejskiej*, in: J. Jańczak, M. Musiał-Karg (eds.), *Pogranicze polsko-niemieckie pro roku 2004. Nowa jakość sąsiedztwa?*, Toruń 2008, pp. 153–166.

³⁵ R. Ladrech, *The Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France*, "European Journal of Common Market Studies", No. 1, pp. 69–88.

it“(...) affects all functional instances of the policy cycle. Not only the actors and institutions conform the EU level through social learning but also society and its individuals and their norms and values.”³⁶ Teaching European norms and values was to Europeanize neighbors, and in this way also make protection against them easier.

Conclusion

As presented in the paper Northern and Eastern enlargement in 1995 and 2004 respectively created a long border with post-Soviet space for the EU. Almost immediately, the new member states created initiatives that addressed the neighboring areas and intended to draw the EU's attention towards the Northern and Eastern surroundings of an expanded Europe. Those attempts were formulated in the shape of Northern and then Eastern Dimensions of the European Union.³⁷ To widen the perspective of the analyses of these initiatives, specific historical and structural heritage of *edge states* has to be taken into consideration. Historically, being at the Eastern edge of Western civilization resulted in a *periphery complex*. External initiatives are seen from this perspective as a tool to confirm Europeaness through their visible presence and constructive contribution. At the forefront of the initiatives' aims, it also promoted the status of newcomers from *almost European* to *true Europeans* in that they became *teachers of Europe*. The second historical consequence of their location was a *front mentality* thereby justifying their role as defender. As a form of legitimization, this remain unchanged, gaining only much wider recognition from the Western side and new territorial forms.

³⁶ F. Bafoil, T. Beichelt, *Dimensions of Europeanization*, in: F Bafoil, T. Beichelta (eds.), *Européanisation. D'Ouest en Est*, Paris 2007, p. 8.

³⁷ C. Browning, P. Joenniemi, *The European Union's Two Dimensions: The Eastern and the Northern*, "Security Dialogue" 2003, Vol. 34, No. 4.