Abstract: This paper investigates political parties’ attitudes towards the past. It explores the ideological inspirations and patterns of behavior of the parties founded in Poland after 1989, which were more or less consciously “borrowed” from the political groups operating in the interwar and Communist periods respectively. The parties have been found to draw both upon democratic and authoritarian traditions. In addition to examining the ideological declarations and public utterances made by politicians, and proposals for systemic solutions, the paper also looks at political practice in the broad sense. The aim of this work is to determine how political traditions could help to shape the political identities of contemporary parties and to identify the historical references favored by political groups in post-1989 Poland. It portrays the political parties’ stances on tradition and shows how they are used in political rivalry.

Key words: political parties, tradition, political program

Introduction

Starting back in the 1980s, the collapse of the socialist system in Poland enforced newly created political parties to develop their ideological identities. During the early days of democratisation, party elites were seeking to earn a political space and to devise an optimal strategy for political action. Not looking back, some of the newly formed parties sought to emulate Western European groups, both in terms of their programmes and organisation. Others tried to draw upon political currents present in Poland before the communist takeover and founded their programs on a historically formed system of values.

This paper seeks to explore Polish parties’ attitude to the past. Such inquiry turns out to be even more interesting if we consider the fact that, unlike those countries of Western Europe that also underwent political transformation (e.g., Spain), Eastern Europe is typified by a relative scarcity of historic parties that have lastingly been ensconced on today’s political scene.

The article shows ideological inspirations and patterns of behaviour more or less consciously “borrowed” by parties founded in Poland after 1989 from political groups operating in the interwar and the Communist periods. The parties have been found to draw both upon democratic and authoritarian traditions.

To refine the research problem, the paper broadly discusses how political traditions could be helping to shape the political identity of contemporary parties and identifies historical references favoured by political groups in post-1989 Poland. It portrays political parties’ stance on tradition and shows how it is used in political rivalry.
This is too broad a topic for this article to provide a comprehensive discussion of all its nuances. Some preliminary premises are therefore necessary, not to narrow the focus so much as to precisely define the terminology.

Firstly, it is essential to briefly discuss the concept of a political programme. A definition saying that a programme is a set concretisation of ideology or doctrine and a rendering of it into the language of purposes of political action seems incomplete. More appropriate is perhaps a formal approach, whereby a programme is understood as an official document of a political party, which contains – next to the concretisation of political objectives – also elements of a doctrine, consciously evoked history or tradition, or even subjective views of its authors. Such an approach allows us to get away from discussing intentionally created images of particular parties, which actually show only a fragmentary image of a publicised doctrine, the exponent of which is a message addressed to the public (Sobolewski, 1976, p. 15; Blok, pp. 40–52).

In addition to ideological declarations that take the form of programmes, the paper also looks at political practice in the broad sense, mostly public utterances made by politicians for the media or during their meetings with voters. Those are often meant to explain and disseminate the programme among the potential party supporters.

In this paper, I use the concept of the political tradition in the sense suggested by Jerzy Szacki. He emphasised that the tradition is not this something that survived; it is not an image of bygone times, relationships or values. Instead, it is the past as seen through the eyes of the living; the past actively continued and transformed (Szacki, 1986, p. 149; Mannheim, 1986, Mannheim, 1953). Tradition draws a lot from history. It is, however, profoundly ahistorical, “because through it, the past is promoted to the rank of a timeless standard, a political, moral absolute” (Szacki, 1986, p. 267).

Tradition cannot be equated with heritage for the reason that heritage covers the whole historical experience of a community; all that was great in a nation, plus all that was mediocre. Tradition entails merely some threads drawn from the entire history\(^1\) by him or her who selects and decides of its valuation. Through the acceptance or rejection of a specific tradition, a group imposes a certain political or moral order on the past, thus appropriating it for a current political use. In the case of tradition, it is not history that teaches people what to do and what not to do. This is done by the past that is mythologised and processed to take the form of the tradition of a particular group, by which the past is disambiguated. Attitudes that receive the status of tradition are evaluated and assumed to be particularly worthy of acceptance (Szacki, 1986, p. 148, 270).

In order to determine the attitude of contemporary parties to the past, I shall first create models, the profile of which would include a basic picture of all potential relations, consuming at the same time all opportunistic twists and those caused by ad hoc circumstances. In this manner, exposed are only permanent relations, which display a real sense of a given party’s stance on tradition.\(^2\)

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1. The history is a whole of cultural products, which include all areas of life and more or less affect the contemporary behaviour of living generations.

2. For my research, I employed epistemological interpretationism, which does not seek explanation but understanding. The researcher focuses on the significance of the activities for social agents using rather qualitative data, and research results are presented as one of the possible interpretations of the relationship between analysed phenomena (Marsch, Stoker, 2006, pp. 26–29).
The first model could be referred to as symbolic and imitative. Political parties of this type emphasise the importance of the achievements and significance of parties to which they refer. However, literally reading the rules created by the “forefathers”, they do not creatively use historical heritage. It is emphasised in their ideological and political guiding principles that they are inheritors and continuators of historical parties; they use the same symbols, language and frequently organisational forms. The mobilisation of the electorate by reference to history is admittedly important here, yet does not play such a vital role as in the second model, referred to as a marketing model. In this case, references to tradition are primarily intended to evoke positive associations among potential supporters, to attract and mobilise potential voters. In this model, the attitude to the past is purely instrumental. To illustrate the essence of both models we can say that in the first model a reference to tradition is an end and in the other, a means of a party’s action.

The third model is a synthesis of the two variants. Present here is a conscious reference to historical groups in order to legitimise values or an ideology by evoking their historical origin. In this case, tradition helps import useful experiences regarding the functioning of the mechanisms of public governance and the formation of active citizenship. The political tradition is one of the main ways to use past cultural achievements for the establishment of a contemporary political order, but at the same time serves as a justification for one’s actions, thus becoming a tool in the political struggle.

Political parties after 1989

A large number of political parties and other organisations were founded in the early 1990s, although differences in ideology and programmes between them were often blurry. Groups were often formed following disagreements over the proper way of doing politics and a difference of opinion on current political issues. This resulted, on the one hand, in the absence of a clear ideological stance and on the other hand affected the cohesion of their programmes and organisation (Bojarowicz, 2007, p. 122). Within the framework of the emerging party system, this period saw the predominance of a division into post-communist parties (the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, Polish: Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej, SDRP and the Polish Peasant Party, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) and post-opposition parties, which constituted a broad spectrum in themselves: from right-wing national parties (Catholic Election Action, Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka) to left-wing parties (Labour Union, Unia Pracy) (Dzieciński, 2009, p. 190).

Characteristically, in the emerging party system in post-1989 Poland, there were very few historical groups, which either through their names or programme would draw upon parties established before the period of real socialism and which would find a permanent space on today’s political scene. Such parties were dubbed “sentimental” by political opposition, who seriously doubted such groups could be successful in new political conditions. Such indeed was the fate of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna), which emphasised its historical roots to distinguish itself from the social democ-

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3 111 electoral committees contested the 1991 election in Poland (Dudek, 1997, p. 171). A particular growth in the number of Polish political parties was observed between 1990 and 1994; few parties were formed after this time (Nalewajko, 1997, p. 90).
racy established after the transformation of the PZRP (the Polish United Workers’ Party, Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) into SDRP. Just as the Czech Social Democratic Party, the party somehow wished to continue the tradition of the party known under the same name in the period of the Second Polish Republic, hoping for good connotations among potential voters. The past was supposed to act as a good badge, strengthening the credibility of the party.

The same happened to Labour Party (Stronnictwo Pracy). Disbanded in July 1946, the party was reactivated under the name Christian Democratic Labour Party (Chrześciątko-Demokratyczne Stronnictwo Pracy) on 12 February 1989. Headed by Władysław Siła-Nowicki, the party’s intention was to continue the activity of its predecessor. The group saw its ideological roots in the interwar period, mainly in the traditions of the Polish Christian Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Chrześcijańskiej Demokracji). This period saw also an attempted revival of national groups, which brought up the tradition of the national movement rooted in the National League (Liga Narodowa), founded in 1893, and the National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczno-Narodowe).

All these parties constitute the margins of the current political life in Poland. The reasons behind this should probably be traced back to the too long a period of the existence of an undemocratic system in Poland. Because of an ideological and personal discontinuity, the parties were ‘erased’ from social awareness. A discontinuity also occurred in the evolution of a modern Polish political thought, a process which started in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The 1990s saw some failed attempts at restoring the continuity of thought (Ponczek, 2008, p. 60).

The politicians of the Third Polish Republic did not seek to reconstruct the ties with bygone times, with the tradition of the Second Polish Republic. Therefore, the resultant intellectual discontinuity did not stem from the mere fact that neither the National Party nor the Polish Socialist Party was legally formed, but mainly because the then politicians perceived the year 1989 as the inception of everything (Matyja, 2009, p. 270).

4 In the late 1980s, efforts were undertaken to reactivate the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS) Some activists, gathered around Edward Osóbka Morawski, appreciated the activities of the PPS between 1944 and 1948 and established the PPS-Revival (PPS-Odrodzenie). Other activists, headed by Jan Józef Lipski, drew merely upon the PPS tradition from the period of the Second Polish Republic and on 15 November 1987, founded the Polish Socialist Party in Warsaw. In 1990, active Polish Workers’ Parties (except PPS-Revival) were unified (Chwedoruk, 2010).


6 The example of Spain clearly demonstrates that despite the long period of authoritarian rule, historical parties occupied a permanent place on the political scene as a result of democratisation. Important for this process was the fact that the parties, mostly left-wing, continued their activities as illegal during the dictatorship, both at home and abroad (Sobolewska-Myśliślik, 2004, p. 17).

7 Rafał Matyja made a shrewd observation. He noticed that back in the 1970s, such terms as the National Democracy, PPS or Piłsudski resurfaced with considerable regularity. In contrast, with the advent of freedom, the Poles had no interest in the Second Polish Republic, and with its death gone were important elements of identity and political self-knowledge. Matyja also believes that: “We hardly ever recall its [the Second Polish Republic – S.P.] achievements, but for 11 November we do not recall its experience. Moreover, political traditions, these famous coffin that purportedly ruled, are dead forever” (Matyja, 2009, p. 257).
The absence of permanently rooted historical parties in the Polish party system makes Poland different from Western European countries, in which the renewal of the political parties after the Second World War (e.g., in Germany and Italy) consisted in the revival of the political forces operating there before the victory of anti-democratic forces. Socialist or communist parties returned to pre-war activity unchanged: this happened in the case of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Communist Party of Italy. Sometimes newly formed parties drew on the recently functioning groups with similar programmes. Post-war Christian Democratic parties that were established as new groups, yet to a lesser or greater extent continued the traditions of their pre-war predecessors, provide the best example. In Italy, the post-war Christian Democracy had traditional ties with the pre-war People’s Party, while the Christian Democratic Union of Germany to some extent drew on the tradition of the Centre Party (Sobolewska-Myślik, 2004, pp. 16–17).

**Historical references in the programmes and political practice of Law and Justice**

One party that regularly refers to tradition, mostly (but not only) that of Sanation (Sanacja), is Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS). PiS is a centre-right party founded on 29 May 2001 by the Kaczyński brothers, Lech and Jarosław, on a wave of popularity gained by Lech while serving as the Minister of Justice and Attorney General in the government led by the Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS). The party united people with different economic and ideological views: Christian Democrats, conservatives, nationalists and peasant movements (Paszkiewicz, 2004, pp. 112–113). PiS sought to conduct a thorough reconstruction of the political system and establish a “Fourth Polish Republic.” Not only did the postulates entail an exchange of elites, but also a transformation of the structure of the state.

This paper focuses on the analyses of political traditions that Law and Justice draw upon to define the identity of the Fourth Republic. A Piłsudskiite tradition was used by Law and Justice for ideological and propaganda purposes. Whether the tradition of the Sanacja governance was simply a tool invented by spin-doctors to attract and mobilise the PiS electorate or how deeply in fact PiS politicians identify themselves with the values underlying the fight for independence and the May Coup is hard to say. It is therefore essential that the PiS programme is critically analysed (IV Rzeczpospolita, 2005), especially because, unlike other political parties, PiS has shown a dogged determination to implement it.

Many journalists and commentators of public life believe that behind the Law and Justice electoral victory of 2005 was precisely the reference to the Piłsudskiite tradition. Besides, the Kaczyński brothers have actually never concealed their sympathy to Józef Piłsudski or to certain systemic and legislative solutions, the parallels of which can be

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8 For more information on the genesis of the party see (Kowalczyk, 2006, pp. 192–200).
9 For the party’s supporters, this was rather about the participation in the system of values embodied by Piłsudski, without the knowledge of their genealogy, a wider context or meaning. In addition, there are many politicians in PiS that lean to the right of Kaczyński. These include first and foremost the circles associated with Radio Maryja. Nevertheless, it is the chairman that shapes the political practice of his formation and decides also about its ideological character.
found in the Second Polish Republic after 1926. In addition, the PiS leaders try to use Piłsudski’s biography to construct their own political identities, promoting a similar vision of community, system solutions necessary for its better functioning or specific attitudes in international relations. Maintaining a suitable perspective of time and space, they adopted Piłsudski’s ideas, accommodating them to the interests, aspirations and patterns of the Fourth Republic.

References to the Second Republic are most evident in the systemic proposals. Jarosław Kaczyński has often been heard saying that ‘we need to refer to the great legislation work done after 1926. ‘[…] A great codification committee was founded then, and the president got the power to issue legislative degrees […] The right of Members of Parliament’s to table amendments to laws should, however, be seriously limited. Most of them have no idea what they vote. With this amount of legislation, even someone with the mind of a chess grandmaster is unable to embrace it all with his or her intellect. […] the legislative role of the President, acting in consultation with the government [should be – S.P.] increased […] We do not want to change the basic principle that the parliament adopts bills. It’s just that the law prepared by the President should be either accepted or rejected as a whole by the Parliament’ (Stan, 2007).

There are several points of mental similarity between PiS and the Sanation camp in Poland. Jarosław Kaczyński actually yearns to have a position in the political system somewhat similar to the one held by Marshall Piłsudski after 1926. Despite formally not occupying any “state” position, J. Kaczyński is the most important actor on the political scene. PiS has a similar attitude to the state, political opponents and internal hierarchy as the Piłsudskiite camp (Rękas, 2015/2016; Paruch, 2005; Chojnowski, 1986; Kulesza, 1986). For Both the Sanacja camp and the PiS leaders, the politics has not only ideological but also moral dimension. The Sanation camp developed a state ideology, which separated the state and nation and recognised the primacy of the former. Much like Jarosław Kaczyński, the Sanation assigned various functions to the state: it is firstly, a regulator of public life; secondly, an end and to measure of public action of individuals and social groups; thirdly, a guardian of moral norms; and fourthly, the executor of historical mission (Paruch, 1995, pp. 119–120; id., 2005, pp. 214–219).

Just as the Piłsudskiites, the leaders of Law and Justice put a heavy emphasis on the necessity to strengthen the state and turn it into a public life-shaping factor. The 2005 party programme and public utterances made by Jarosław Kaczyński confirm that the PiS politicians treat the state with special attention. During one interview, Kaczyński plainly stated that the most important element of the right-wing party is its attachment to the state. The state is a good that must be protected. This was expressed in the following words: “The state is necessary for our further development, it must be active, it must not simply play the role of a “night watchman”, it must protect the external security, take care of internal security – in the social and economic sphere” (Państwo, 2006, p. 19). Lech Kaczyński’s brother shared his views on the state. He stated openly that: “the Fourth Republic must be founded on the idea of the state as a common value that needs to be protected and strengthened” (Wywiad, 2006, p. 15).

10 In his public statements, Lech Kaczyński repeatedly emphasised that thanks to the May Coup of 1926, the Polish state achieved incomparably more efficiency than ever before (Janicki, Władyka, 2007, p. 60; Poparlhym, 2006, p. 14).
It should also be noted that putting an emphasis on the interdependence of individuals, the two formations acknowledged the principle of social solidarity, which provides for the interests of society as a whole, as the foundation of a social order. Born out of this principle, both in the case of the Sanation and Law and Justice, was a conviction that interventions into the economic sphere are necessary in order to take care of all societal strata. This resulted in the growth of statist politics (Sanecka, 2008, p. 317; Paruch, 2005, pp. 447–465).

There are, however, some marked differences between the two political groups. PiS does not seek to strengthen state power. It is its aim and even ideology to enhance power only when it is in their hands and to weaken the state once PiS becomes opposition. The difference is thus fundamental. PiS places a high value on the state only when it is fully controlled, otherwise it remains an asset of the opponent, and as such the target of authorised attacks (Rękas, 2015/2016).

At any rate, when Jarosław Kaczyński proclaimed the end of the Third Republic, there was barely a difference between him and the Marshal, who justified the May Coup by a necessity to oppose “a pervasive party particularism” and “forgetting about Poland for a penny and benefits” (Nowakowski, 2006).

Historical references are particularly evident in the project of the Fourth Republic, notably in the underlying origin myth. The idea of the Fourth Republic developed by the PiS politicians makes use of these moments of Polish history, which by situational analogy or ideological closeness, can be adapted to the created legend of the Fourth Republic. Quoted are Polish demands for the rebuilding of a powerful state and the restoration of Poland’s recognised position in the international arena. The Fourth Republic was to be reborn after the decades of the Polish People’s Republic (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL) and the moral decay of the Third Polish Republic, analogously to the Second Polish Republic, which was born after the period of annexation. In addition, Law and Justice adapts the tradition of the May Coup to its needs. As a patriot, Piłsudski opposed to ‘pseudo democratic governance of party particularism’, which arose once Poland regained independence. Piłsudski and his followers claimed that until 1926, Poland was the mainstay of chaos and confusion. 11 November 1918 was merely the first step towards building powerful Poland, a largely wasted one, considering the prevalent tolerance of non-productive “party favourism” (Kulesza, 1986, pp. 55–57; Paruch, 2005, pp. 275–294; Jażwiński, 2004). Likewise, according to the Kaczyński brothers, Poland regained independence in 1989, yet in the period of the Third Republic the state was appropriated by various elites, systems, etc. It was the therefore the Fourth Republic that gave rise to a new quality and restored the proper order of things (Jażwiński, 2004). The utterances by politicians from PiS leave no doubt that the main objective of Law and Justice is to repair the state through vetting, decommunisation, healing justice, streamlining administration and the establishment of institutions (such as the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau) that are intended to fight pathologies referred to as “pacts” (IV Rzeczpospolita, 2005, p. 7). All these constitute the so-called Law and Justice’s moral revolution, an

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11 The origin myth tells the story about “why it had to come to this,” it is therefore – in a sense – a reflection of successive phases/stages of development of the state and society. Furthermore, it outlines the reasons that prompted the creators to reach for the standard of order renewal (Jażwiński, 2004).
expected far-reaching change of social mood towards renewal, rediscovery of values, specifically those national, as well as a far-reaching change of lifestyle (Polityk).

Investigating the myth of the origins of the Fourth Republic, R. Jaźwiński discovers its significant element. He argues that “by giving itself over to the mission of constructing the Fourth Republic, PiS intended to capture and monopolise the authority of the founder of the new state. The authority of the creator of the moral renewal puts Law and Justice in the position held once by the Sanation” (Jaźwiński, 2004). There is an obvious analogy here with the Poland of Józef Piłsudski and the actions he undertook in 1926, intent on creating a powerful and efficient state. The analogy was further reinforced by the myth of the “Solidarity” (especially in its early 1980s form), from which PiS leaders are derived. At the ideological foundations of “Solidarity” lies the idea of independent, powerful and supportive Poland fighting against its enemies (then – the communist system, now – the post-communist pact) (Jaźwiński, 2004; Janicki, Władyka, 2007, pp. 82–88).

There are several references to the Sanation in the PiS concepts of foreign policy. According to the Kaczyński brothers, Marshal-style federalist politics towards the countries to the east of Poland shall let them rebuild Poland’ civilisatory and political position, first in Central and Eastern Europe, and ultimately in entire Europe. They strongly believe that due to its history and geopolitical situation, Poland is predestined to act as a bridge between Europe’s East and West. This is purported to be a natural continuation of the Jagiellonian idea, an oft-voiced claim by PiS leaders.12

It is also worth noting that Jarosław Kaczyński sought to build a party, which would synthesise a state, statist, solidarity thought with national Catholicism. In the period of the Second Polish Republic, such was the character of the Camp of National Unity (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego), founded upon the decomposition of the Sanacja movement (Kowalczyk, 2007, p 139; see Majchrowski, 1985).

To sum up, the similarities between the two formations are most striking in three areas. Firstly, each tried to emphasise the participation of its leaders and members in the historical process, i.e., the struggle for independence. Secondly, internal and international problems were strongly historically conditioned. Encouragement to take action was sought rather in the past than in the present. Historical inspirations typify both Law and Justice and the Piłsudskiite camp (Paruch, 2005, pp. 40–49).

It is important, however, that PiS did not allude only to the tradition of Sanacja. In his account of ideological sources and practical implications of the Fourth Republic, Andrzej Walicki notices that the Fourth Republic “is mentally founded upon a National Democratic idea of the supremacy of the national community over democratic, legally constituted community citizenship; this has a practical application – a concept (also National Democratic in origin) of national elites holding a right to determine who is a real Pole, who can and who should not be granted full citizenship” (Walicki, 2008, p. 28).

A historiosophical look at the Fourth Republic project leads to a seemingly paradoxical conclusion that its essence was the introduction of the system modelled not only on

12 A federalist concept developed by Piłsudski assumed that a young Polish state shall be joined by Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus. It was a sort of continuation of the so-called Promethean plan, which assumed that Russia should be weakened by the secession of its western lands. These were planned to form independent states. In the long term, Józef Piłsudski planned to establish the so-called Intermarum, i.e., a federation of states stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea (Paruch, 2005, pp. 689–702).
the publicly declared rule of the Sanation, but also the times of the Polish People’s Republic. Mirosław Gulczyński emphasises that the absolute negation of the latter voiced by the PiS politicians should not obscure the similarities and aspirations of the PiS leaders, who in fact wish to attain a position similar to that of a dominant party in the PRL, chieftain in style, with paternalistic and servile relations, its social basis, statism, centralisation of power and a negative attitude towards social organisations and professional associations autonomous from those in power13 (Gulczyński, 2009, p. 23).

The Law and Justice attitude to tradition fits with the third model proposed in the introduction. This political party declaratively draws upon the Piłsudskiite tradition, pursuing patterns for the functioning of the mechanisms of power and the formation of citizenship. But we also see a tendency in party leaders to instrumentalise tradition. Used as a justification of the leader’s political action, tradition is a tool in a battle to win electoral votes for the PiS spin-doctors.

**Conclusion**

The political changes that after 1989 swept through the countries of Central and Eastern Europe took different forms. Did tradition play any role in this process? In the case of today’s parties, the acceptance of tradition is accompanied by an affirming commitment to the past, often vague, sometimes unconscious or unspoken. In this case, tradition and its antiquity is synonymous with experience – the respect that we have for patterns of the past does not stem from the belief that they are old, but that they are “wise” and result from experience, since they are relevant for such a long time. In addition, a skilful combination of current political values and tradition endows them with peculiar dignity. This is possible in societies which highly values the past.

In case of political parties, the pursuit of points of reference in history and particular traditions serves to legitimise values or ideologies. This is achieved by showing their historical descent. In politics, a reference to tradition or source stands as a specific call for legitimacy, which often can be accomplished through “the inspirational power of specific past-derived patterns or a generally understood authority of the past” (Filipowicz, 1988, p. 46). Drawing upon the past, politicians justify their actions. Typically failing to specify the tradition, they assume that the whole thing is obvious or intuitive (Szacki, 1971, pp. 9–10).

More often than not, references to history made by political parties in Poland have a mere marketing or symbolic dimension. There are hardly any appeals to tradition or a conscious reference to the past system of values (whether that of Piłsudski or Dmowski) on the Polish political scene. The practice is unmistakeable only in the case of Law and Justice. For PiS, the Sanacja tradition works primarily as a carrier of ideological and visionary patriotism and the symbol of a battle for a powerful state. By making references to a particular tradition, party leaders praise its timeless value. In this case, tradition acts as a mediator between the present and eternity.

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13 There are also striking similarities in the rhetoric. A consistent propaganda success is similar to that mounted at the time of E. Gierek, who tried to convince Poles that Poland was the ninth power of the world (Janicki, Władyka, 2007, p. 198).
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Reminiscencje historyczne w programach partyjnych i wypowiedziach liderów polskich partii po 1989 roku na przykładzie Prawa i Sprawiedliwości

Streszczenie

Tekst ma na celu przeanalizowanie natury stosunku polskich partii do przeszłości. Pokazanie inspiracji ideologicznych, ale również wzorców zachowań, które można dostrzec w polskich partiach działających po 1989 roku, a które bardziej lub mniej świadomie zostały „zapożyczone” od ugrupowań funkcjonujących w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym i w okresie PRL-u. Są to nawiązania zarówno do tradycji demokratycznej, jak i autorytarnej. Przedmiotem analizy zostały nie tylko formalne deklaracje ideowe partii, wypowiedzi polityków, propozycje rozwiązań ustrojowych, ale również szeroko rozumiana praktyka polityczna. Tekst ma pomóc znaleźć odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jakim stopniu tradycja polityczna może być pomocna w kształtowaniu tożsamości politycznej współczesnych partii, do jakich elementów historii nawiązują najczęściej polskie ugrupowania po 1989 roku oraz scharakteryzować podejście partii do tradycji i sposobu jej wykorzystywania w rywalizacji politycznej.

Słowa kluczowe: partie polityczne, tradycja, program polityczny