

Robert Bielecki

# FINNISH CASE GRAMMAR

From the Syntactic  
and Semantic Perspectives

Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM

# **FINNISH CASE GRAMMAR**



UNIwersytet IM. ADAMA MICKIEWICZA W POZNANIU

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**Robert Bielecki**

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## **FROM THE SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC PERSPECTIVES**



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The present work comprises a study of the category of case in Finnish. It begins with an overview of the history of investigation, from antiquity up to modern times, shedding light on the general complexity of the category and successive attempts to develop systemic approaches to it. The book's main content consists of an analysis of the Finnish case system, with its 16 desinential cases classified into five subsystems on the ground of an explicitly formulated case theory. The detailed discussion concentrates on the solution of the most intricate problems of the syntax and semantics of Finnish cases, such as the characteristic merger of the category of subject and direct object (nominative, accusative and partitive) and the combinability of quantitative meanings with other (especially aspectual and individuative) meanings. The analysis results in the assignment to each Finnish case of a bundle of appropriate morphological, syntactic and semantic properties, relatively independent from the context, characteristic only of the given case, in such a way that it is systemically opposed to the other cases within the same case system.

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# SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED

<b>ABL</b>	ablative
<b>ABESS</b>	abessive
<b>ABS</b>	absolutive
<b>ACC</b>	accusative
<b>ACT</b>	active
<b>ADESS</b>	adessive
<b>AG</b>	agent
<b>ALLAT</b>	allative
<b>APPROX</b>	approximative
<b>C</b>	case-conditional sentence
<b>COM</b>	comitative
<b>DAT</b>	dative
<b>DU</b>	dual
<b>DUR</b>	durative
<b>ELAT</b>	elative
<b>ERG</b>	ergative
<b>ESS</b>	essive
<b>FAST</b>	fastened
<b>Fin</b>	Finnish
<b>GEN</b>	genitive
<b>ILLAT</b>	illative
<b>IMP</b>	imperative
<b>IMPERS</b>	impersonal
<b>IND</b>	indicative
<b>INDIV</b>	individual
<b>INESS</b>	inessive
<b>INF</b>	infinitive
<b>INSTR</b>	instrumental

<b>INSTRUC</b>	instructive
<b>INT</b>	interior
<b>INTER</b>	interrogative
<b>LOC</b>	locative
<b>MASC</b>	masculine (gender)
<b>MEDPASS</b>	mediopassive
<b>NEUT</b>	neutral (gender)
<b>NOM</b>	nominative
<b>PART</b>	partitive
<b>PARTIC</b>	participle
<b>PASS</b>	passive
<b>PAT</b>	patient
<b>PL</b>	plural
<b>POSS</b>	possessor
<b>PRAET</b>	preterite
<b>PROLAT</b>	prolative
<b>PUNCT</b>	punctual
<b>RESULT</b>	resultative
<b>SG</b>	singular
<b>STAT</b>	stative
<b>TRANS</b>	translative
<b>V</b>	vocal
<b>VOC</b>	vocative
<b>A : B :: C : D</b>	proportionality
<b>1</b>	first person
<b>2</b>	second person
<b>3</b>	third person
<b>↵</b>	the arrow-head indicates the unmarked member of the opposition
<b>=</b>	homophonic
<b>≠</b>	heterophonic
<b>[PATIENT]</b>	the meaning ‘patient’
<b>{aspect}</b>	the dimension of aspect
<b>[Näin]</b>	context
<b>†</b>	historic reconstruction
<b>*</b>	incorrect
<b>↔</b>	alternation on the syntagmatic plane of the language
<b>∅</b>	morphological zero
<b>/</b>	border between morphs
<b>-n</b>	ending

**-tta-** interfix  
→ process of (transformation, reinterpretation, adscription)  
> historical reinterpretation  
// *caesura*  
• sentential stress  
**KIRJA** abstract morpheme-form

↔ if and only if  
∈ belongs to  
∉ does not belong to  
^ and  
∨ or  
¬ negation  
∃ existential quantifier



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Any errors and inconsistencies are my own responsibility.



# INTRODUCTION

Issues of case have run incessantly through linguistics from its dawn up to modern times, in relation to both the relatively thoroughly investigated Indo-European languages, and less studied families such as Finno-Ugric, which includes the Finnish language. This constant interest in case results from its significant role in lingual communication; case encodes a complex of relations binding the objects of reality, be it extra- or intralingual. I would not hesitate to assert that case is omnipresent. Every sentence in any human language, lingually manifesting a human thought, refers to certain objects and relations between them.

The immensity and diversity of works devoted to case may give the impression that all or at least enough has been said; that any further investigation will be confined to fruitless hair-splitting. Nevertheless, the linguistic literature on the subject may cause a more demanding reader to conclude that, in general, research on case in Finnish has got stuck, if not literally at the level of pure factography, then at the level of a largely atomized perception of phenomena with quite a feeble theoretical foundation. The fact that descriptive practice (apart from a few isolated expositions) usually consists in the mechanical enumeration of case forms, their syntactic functions and contextual meanings effectively obscures the systemic nature of this component of the Finnish language. The present *Case Grammar* is envisaged as an attempt to make good these shortcomings. It brings to light, by means of explicitly formulated case theory, the formal, syntactic and semantic regularities of the Finnish case system in its entirety.

The subject of study of the present work is the systemic – syntactic and semantic – properties of the morphological nominal formations marked by means of the most grammaticalized modes of expression – namely endings – making up the Finnish case system. Such lingual phenomena as lexis, voice, number, person etc. are addressed only as auxiliary issues.

The empirical material on which the research is based was not obtained from any specific corpus. It was rather formed through trial and error from the nebula of data furnished by literature, television, radio, the press, and conversations. The con-

cept of case emerging from these many years of experience has allowed me to construct extensive case paradigms *sui generis*, which were subsequently verified in terms of their lingual correctness and discussed with Finnish native speakers with regard to their various semantic nuances.

While the cases (case forms) are excerpted from larger units (texts, sentences, syntagms), not all of these units deserve the same attention when the category of case is being considered. The analysis concerns only the relevant fragments of those units – the minimal case syntagms conceived of as valency, case government schemes comprising the appropriate case form(s) and the governing word. The case oppositions resulting from comparison of the appropriate minimal case syntagms make it possible to determine the size of the signicator of the case meaning(s). In order to bring to light the formal, syntactic and semantic regularities within the Finnish case system, the search should be directed primarily toward the detection of such signicators of case meanings whose size coincides with the size of the case (form). Such uses of cases constitute the pillars of case oppositions and – as it turns out – in many instances govern the appearance of appropriate cases in contexts in which they do not actually possess the status of autosignicators. The laborious procedure of extracting the autosignicators of case meanings has one more advantage: it enables the researcher to deal in ordered fashion with the problems of (at least the major part of) the polysemy of cases, to fix such semantic constants which, being the relatively least dependent on the context, characterize a given case as such. The notion of ‘constitutive meaning’ – in opposition to the ‘general meaning’ (*differential minimum of signification*, *Grundbedeutung*, *signification générale*) known from the literature – seems to crown these efforts without the need to resort to barely verifiable divagations. The way in which the abstract constitutive meaning is actualized (obligatorily) and the way in which other meanings are combined (ascribed) with the actualized meaning (facultatively) are verified non-metalingually by means of so-called case-conditional sentences.

The work is organized along the following lines. The first chapter contains an overview of the most influential approaches to the category of case, from antiquity up to modern times. In the history of investigation, there is seen to have been a gradual move away from atomistic descriptions in favor of systemic approaches. Since the form of cases seems to be much more easy to grasp than their meaning (for example, the speech sounds that are the building blocks of the form can be heard even by those who do not speak the language in question), particular efforts are made to bring to light the semantic unity of particular cases. There is also a visible tendency towards the elaboration of a theory of case which is not bound to any language-specific expression and content – a general case theory. The second chapter presents the case theory adopted here. On the basis of listed primitive terms, it is possible to define different kinds of case oppositions, morphological variation and

phonetic neutralization. A description is given of the regularities concerning the morphology, syntax and semantics of cases. The following five chapters (3–7) deal with the complexities of morphological marking, syntax and semantics of cases belonging to particular subsystems of the Finnish case system. Chapter 3 is devoted to the cases of the direct object – the accusative and partitive. It discusses the puzzling accusative split – the parallel occurrence of two accusative forms, of which one is homophonic with the nominative. Much space is devoted to the intricate way in which aspectual meanings combine with quantitative meanings to govern the choice of appropriate case for the direct object. Chapter 4 considers the cases of the subject – the nominative and absolutive. The problem of the puzzling apparent merger of subject and direct object in relation to intransitive verbs in so-called existential sentences is resolved by proposing the coexistence of two systems in Finnish – accusative and ergative. Some manifestations of the partitive and nominative (accusative II) are reinterpreted as the absolutive – the case of the subject in the ergative (sub)system. As it turns out, there is no point in considering the opposition between nominative and absolutive from a quantitative point of view. The two subject cases have different constitutive meanings only in the dimension of individuality. Chapter 5 deals with the cases of the predicative – the nominative and partitive. The choice of appropriate case for the predicative is governed first of all by quantification. Other meanings characteristic of these cases (e.g. the distributive meaning of the partitive-predicative in opposition to the collective meaning of the nominative-predicative) can be considered at most to be ascribed meanings. Chapter 6 deals with the exceptional case of the genitive, which is the only case having both attributive and adverbial uses. The difficulties in identifying formal, syntactic and semantic regularities in the case of the adnominal genitive result from the irreducible mixed grammatical-lexical character of the signifier of the target meaning(s). In turn, the adverbial genitive enters into oppositions of quite regular character with the cases of the subject and direct object. Chapter 7 is devoted to the cases of adverbial. These are classified as: (i) local cases: the inessive, illative, elative, adessive, allative, ablative, essive, translative (and conditionally the partitive) and (ii) marginal cases: the comitative, abessive and instructive. The local cases constitute a compact system of semantic oppositions only in as much as they are considered from the point of view of their spatial meanings. When other meanings are considered, the oppositions between them seem to undergo a significant blurring. The oppositions between the local cases in spatial meaning can be captured by referring to the dimensions of staticity, direction and proximity. Other meanings are only ascribed meanings. The marginal cases do not ever constitute a bound verb complement. As they approach the category of adverb, the meaning of the marginal cases is not subject to accommodation to the meaning of the head of the syntagm, as is characteristic of all other Finnish cases.

The findings of this work make it possible to fix the role of each Finnish case in the system, ascribing to it a discretely different bundle of morphological, syntactic and semantic properties. Emphasis is placed on phenomena of the most general, grammaticalized nature. More individual phenomena, bordering on lexicalization, are addressed only tentatively by means of the notion of ‘reinterpretation of meaning’. The reinterpreted meanings seem to occur in certain lexical contexts as combinatory variants of the actualized constitutive and/or ascribed meanings. Nevertheless, the issue of the reinterpreted meanings certainly requires a more profound investigation than has been possible here. Unless some other conceptual framework can be formulated, this aspect of the functioning of case seems to be describable only by pure enumeration of forms and their syntactic functions and meanings.

# 1. HISTORY OF INVESTIGATION

This introductory chapter will present, in chronological order, what are to my knowledge the most authoritative approaches to the notion of case. These are the approaches which have most significantly influenced understanding of the notion throughout the history of linguistic investigation.

## 1.1. Antiquity

The history of investigation in the era of antiquity will be presented from the standpoints of the main geographical centers of linguistic research in those times: ancient India, Greece, and the Roman Empire.

### 1.1.1. India

Chronologically speaking, the invention of the notion of case (विभक्ति (*vibhakti*)) can be attributed to **Pāṇini** (between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries BC), the author of the first known systematic Sanskrit grammar (अष्टाध्यायी (*Aṣṭādhyāyī*) ‘Eight Books’) and, generally speaking, the first grammar in the world. Pāṇini’s work deals with a whole range of linguistic issues, beginning with an explanation of the terms used and principles of analysis, through semantics, a minute description of nominal and verbal morphophonology, and ending with syntax. Bloomfield, in the introduction to his already classic work *Language* (1933: 11), evaluates it as “one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence”. On the other hand, somewhat more critical opinions have also been expressed. Heinz (1978: 25) claims that Pāṇini’s manner of presentation, which focuses on maximal compactness and mnemotechnical usefulness, gives the contemporary reader the impression of lack of a sense of the system, introducing chaos in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The whole material is

presented in the form of 3976 rules (सूत्र (sūtra)), which according to Esa Itkonen (1991: 23–44), the author of an insightful history of the most influential linguistic theories, can be systematically divided into two groups: (i) metagrammatical rules and (ii) grammatical rules. The metagrammatical rules consist of: (i) definitions and (ii) interpretation rules (explaining, for instance, the meaning of the symbols used). The grammatical rules consist of: (i) expression rules (assigning an abstract form to the target meaning), (ii) combination rules (putting together basic components of the word: lexical and grammatical morpheme(s)), and (iii) substitution rules (replacing the constructed abstract lingual forms with their concrete phonetic manifestation). As can be seen in the first German translation of Pāṇini’s grammar, accomplished by Böhlingk (1998: 43–74), one of the greatest Indologists of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the presentation of the Sanskrit case system in the second book, for example, is unsystematically interspersed with remarks about the word-derivational system. Among the numerous rules describing the semantic content of the Sanskrit cases there intervene rules concerning morphology and rules governing the connectivity of the relevant case forms with other words, for example prepositions. According to Esa Itkonen (1991: 19–22) it has not yet been possible to explain the ordering of the sūtras in Pāṇini’s work. He suggests, though, that it may result from a striving after economy of description. The principle of अनुवृत्ति (anuvṛtti) ‘rule ellipsis’ forbids the overt repetition of rules once they have been verbalized and applied to the appropriate item. Their subsequent application(s) must be understood from the context.

Pāṇini distinguishes a total of eight cases (*vibhaktis*) in Sanskrit (cf. Blake 1997: 65–67, Whitney 2005: 89):

(i)	प्रथमा	( <i>prathamā</i> )	‘first’,	i.e. ‘nominative’;
(ii)	द्वितीया	( <i>dvitīyā</i> )	‘second’,	i.e. ‘accusative’;
(iii)	तृतीय	( <i>tṛtīya</i> )	‘third’,	i.e. ‘instrumental’;
(iv)	चतुर्थी	( <i>catuṛthī</i> )	‘fourth’,	i.e. ‘dative’;
(v)	पञ्चमी	( <i>pañcamī</i> )	‘fifth’,	i.e. ‘ablative’;
(vi)	षष्ठी	( <i>ṣaṣṭhī</i> )	‘sixth’,	i.e. ‘genitive’;
(vii)	सप्तमी	( <i>saptamī</i> )	‘seventh’,	i.e. ‘locative’;
(viii)	सम्बोधन	( <i>sambodhana</i> )	‘calling’,	i.e. ‘vocative’.

According to Cardona (1997: 38–43), the above terms do not refer directly to particular cases, but rather to the corresponding nominal ending triplets (e.g. *prathamā*: -*SU*, -*AU*, -*JAS*), being portmanteau morpheme sets conveying certain constant case and different number meanings (e.g. -*SU*: NOM SG, -*AU*: NOM DU and

-JAS: NOM PL). What is more, verbal endings and some other affixes seem also to be referred to as *vibhaktis*.

The whole Pāṇinian grammar can be conceived of as a derivational system describing the “movement” from meaning to sound, from semantics to the extremely thoroughly elaborated morphophonology via a gradual “revealing” of the target concrete form. Beside the notion of *vibhakti*, Pāṇini introduces the notion of कारक (*kāraḥ*). *Kāraḥ* seem to be understood by the majority of Sanskritists as semantic roles assigned by verbs to their nominal arguments. Pāṇini distinguishes 6 *kāraḥ*:

(i)	कर्तृ	( <i>karṭṛ</i> )	[AGENT];
(ii)	कर्मन्	( <i>karman</i> )	[PATIENT];
(iii)	करण	( <i>karaṇa</i> )	[INSTRUMENT];
(iv)	संप्रदानम्	( <i>saṃpradānam</i> )	[DESTINATION];
(v)	अपादान	( <i>apādāna</i> )	[SOURCE];
(vi)	अधिकरण	( <i>adhikaraṇa</i> )	[LOCUS].

Nevertheless, as Cardona (1976: 219) points out, the *kāraḥ* cannot be regarded as pure semantic notions independent of Sanskrit noun morphology and syntax. For example, the word *PARAŚU* ‘axe’ in the sentence:

- (1) *Paraśur vṛkṣam chinatti*  
‘The axe is cutting the tree’

is assigned uniquely to the category of *karṭṛ* ([AGENT]). The role of *karaṇa* ([INSTRUMENT]), which seems obviously to belong to the axe in such a situation, is not considered by Pāṇini (compare with the expanded version of the above sentence referring to the same event: *I am cutting the tree with the axe*). There are also other examples confirming that *kāraḥ* do not remain constant under paraphrase (which they should do in order to be conceivable as semantic roles – cf. section 1.5.2). Cardona (1976: 215–222) argues that the *kāraḥ*-rules are intimately related to the syntactic rules, serving as an intermediary between semantics and grammatical expressions. Esa Itkonen also seems to be conscious of the incompatibility, as briefly outlined here, between the notions of *kāraḥ* and semantic role as understood in modern linguistics. However, his elucidation is somewhat different. *Kāraḥ* are to be viewed as semantic-ontological entities whose task would be to mediate between the ontological entities, being generally of no interest to linguistics, and purely lingual semantic entities (for example semantic roles), without coinciding exactly in scope with any of them. What is more, Itkonen maintains that Pāṇini overtly introduces such a plane of analysis. In the first introductory chapter of his grammar there

appear sentences in which *kāra*kas can be interpreted as *definiens*. Hence the *definiendum* are the aforementioned semantic-ontological entities, as entities desirable for the further analysis of the Sanskrit language, representing the first term of the trichotomy of *reality–meaning–form* and *category–role–case*. The *kāra*kas, according to Itkonen, are the real starting point of the Pāṇinian derivational system, and this explains the deviation of their behavior from that expected of semantic roles *sensu stricto* (Itkonen Esa 1991: 43–48). Hjelmslev, the author of the authoritative work *La catégorie des cas* ‘The Category of Cases’ (1935: 34), criticizes the Pāṇinian *kāra*ka-system because of the lack of systemicity. It is not shown, for example, what relations exist between different *kāra*kas. Some cases (genitive) remain outside the *kāra*ka-system, while some (nominative and instrumental) seem to belong and not to belong to it simultaneously. The nominative can on one hand deliver the meaning of *kartṛ* ([AGENT]), and on the other hand can be conceived of as the fundamental form of the noun (cf. Greek *ὄνομα* (*onoma*) ‘name’) not referring to any *kāra*ka. The instrumental can convey both the meaning of *karāṇa* ([INSTRUMENT]) and that of *kartṛ* ([AGENT]) (in passive constructions). The latter use makes it cognate to the nominative.

The notion of *vibhakti* can therefore also be interpreted as an approximate counterpart of the notion of case. The same seems to hold for the relation between *kāra*ka and semantic role. Within the Sanskrit nominal inflection system there are distinguished 8 *vibhaktis*, but for their semantic description there are provided only 6 *kāra*kas. Such *kāra*kas as [INSTRUMENT], [DESTINATION], [SOURCE] and [LOCUS] are expressed with very few exceptions by the instrumental, dative, ablative and locative respectively. The formal manifestation of [AGENT] and [PATIENT], in turn, exhibits variation related to diathetic transformations (cf. the active and passive voice) and takes place primarily using the nominative, accusative and instrumental. The *ṣaṣṭhī* ‘genitive’ is assigned a *kāra*ka ([AGENT] or [PATIENT]) only in its secondary appearances in nominalized phrases. In its primary use the genitive expresses संबन्ध (*sambandha*) ‘relation’ between two objects. For the last *vibhakti* – *sambodhana* ‘vocative’ – no *kāra*ka is ascribed (cf. Blake 1997: 65, Whitney 2005: 88–103).

The ambiguities outlined here in the description of the relation between *vibhaktis* (case forms/markers) and *kāra*kas (ontological, semantic and syntactic functions) can be considered a sign of the exceptionally complicated nature of the matter under discussion. At the same time, they are a token of the intellectual perspicacity of Pāṇini, who was dealing with issues that have continued to preoccupy the minds of linguists up to the present day. The achievements of Pāṇini (and those of other less eminent Indian grammarians) remained unknown to Europeans until the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.

### 1.1.2. Greece

The ancient Greeks, having no knowledge of the previous monumental achievements of the Indians, concentrated firstly in their philosophical considerations on the relationship between language (only Greek was taken into account), reality, thinking and logic. The ancient Greek thinkers were primarily occupied by the antinomy *φύσις (phýsis) : νόμος (nómos)*. They wanted to answer the question of whether between reality and language there is any inner motivation (*phýsis*), or whether, in the absence of such a motivation, the relation between them depends only on convention (*nómos*). The theoretical considerations concerning this antinomy, although without any clear conclusion, were summarized by **Plato** (427–347 BC) in the philosophical dialogue *Κρατύλος (Kratýlos)* ‘Cratylus’, regarded as the first European treatise with grammatical inclinations. The antinomy *phýsis : nómos* was later redefined by the Stoic philosopher **Chrysippus** (c. 280–205 BC) to produce a new one: *ἀναλογία (analogía) : ἀνωμαλία (anōmalía)*. Chrysippus (and many generations after him) wanted to answer the question of whether there is a proportionality (*analogía*) between language and logic, or whether such a proportionality does not exist (*anōmalía*). For the Stoic grammarians this antinomy is said to have had a somewhat different meaning than for the philosophers. It refers strictly to relations between lingual units, which can thus be regular or irregular. Needless to say, problems concerning analogies and anomalies in the description of any language remains current even nowadays. Robins (1967: 20–21) points out that the discovery of morphological classes (including case categories), and likewise their labeling by reference to their main, most conspicuous meaning, would not be possible at all without the use of analogy. Beside the above-mentioned antinomies (*phýsis : nómos* and *analogía : anōmalía*) the Stoics seem also to have perceived an opposition between “outer” and “inner” form; that is, the antinomy between *σχῆμα (schéma)* ‘(lingual) form’ and *ἔννοια (énnoia)* ‘meaning’ – one of the central issues in contemporary morphological analysis, described by Robins as strikingly reminiscent of the Saussurean distinction between *signifiant* ‘signifier’ and *signifié* ‘signified’ (ibid. 16).

Such a specific (from the contemporary point of view) linguistic notion as *πτῶσις (ptṓsis)* ‘case’ appeared somewhat later. In scattered fragments of **Aristotle**’s (384–322 BC) writings this term seems to have referred to all inflectional and derivational forms of words (called therefore *πτῶσεις (ptṓseis)* ‘derivatives’). These forms could theoretically be both nominal and verbal. Aristotle’s attitude towards the nominative, in turn, seems to have been quite labile. He called it simply *ὄνομα (onoma)* ‘name’, apparently without counting it among the cases. Only the Stoics, working on so-called *παρεπόμενα (parepomena)* ‘accidental grammatical categories’, shaped the meaning of *ptṓsis* as it is known in modern times. Firstly, it was narrowed to describe systematically only nominal inflectional forms. Secondly, it

was broadened to include also the nominative. The conspicuous syntactic opposition between the nominative and the remaining cases was nonetheless maintained, and was reflected in the Stoic system by the distinguishing of two types of cases:

- |      |  |                    |                         |                    |
|------|--|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| (i)  | <i>πτῶσις ὀρθή</i><br>( <i>ptōsis orthē</i> )        | ‘upright<br>case’  | i.e. ‘casus<br>rectus’  | (nominative); and  |
| (ii) | <i>πτῶσεις πλάγιοι</i><br>( <i>ptōseis plágioi</i> ) | ‘slanted<br>cases’ | i.e. ‘oblique<br>cases’ | (the other cases). |

Within the category of *ptōsis* the Stoics identified the appropriate subcategories – namely cases – with reference to Greek, giving them names based on their main, most conspicuous meaning. The fifth category (vocative) was probably recognized only by some of them (Heinz 1978: 41):

- |       |                   |                       |            |                    |
|-------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|--------------------|
| (i)   | <i>ὀνομαστική</i> | ( <i>onomastikē</i> ) | ‘naming’,  | i.e. ‘nominative’; |
| (ii)  | <i>γενική</i>     | ( <i>genikē</i> )     | ‘generic’, | i.e. ‘genitive’;   |
| (iii) | <i>δοτική</i>     | ( <i>dotikē</i> )     | ‘giving’,  | i.e. ‘dative’;     |
| (iv)  | <i>αἰτιατική</i>  | ( <i>aitiatikē</i> )  | ‘causing’, | i.e. ‘accusative’; |
| ((v)  | <i>κλητική</i>    | ( <i>klētikē</i> )    | ‘calling’, | i.e. ‘vocative’).  |

Sittig (1931: 25–29), analyzing the development of the technical Greek terminology relevant to case, points out that at least from 600 BC up to the times of the Stoics there had been distinguished for the Greek language only three inflectional nominal *ptōseis*, enumerated in the order: genitive, dative, accusative. Steinthal (1890: 302) maintains that the Stoics recognized the vocative as *Satzform* ‘sentence form’. Since in Aristotle the adverb was also referred to as *ptōsis*, and it is said to have gained its independence as a part of speech only at the insistence of **Antipater** (c. 397–319 BC), the fifth case in the Stoic system, mentioned already by Chrysippus, would have been the adverbial case. Robins (1951: 33), in turn, notes that already in antiquity it was realized that the functioning of the vocative has nothing in common with the other cases, because the vocative does not enter into any syntactic relation with any word in the sentence. Nonetheless, because of the scantiness of the extant evidence, the question of whether the vocative was included by the Stoics among the cases must be left open.

**Dionysius Thrax** (170–90 BC), an Alexandrian grammarian, is the author of the first Greek (and thus European) grammar, *Τέχνη γραμματική* (*Tékhnē grammatikē*) ‘The Art of Grammar’. In its English translation, accomplished by Davidson (cf. Thrax 1874), *Tékhnē grammatikē* is a compact booklet comprising no more than 14 printed pages divided into 25 sections. In the 13<sup>th</sup> section the author enumerates

eight parts of speech: noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, preposition, adverb and conjunction. In the description of the declinable parts of speech there are some scattered remarks about the supposed ontological properties of their physical referents (e.g. nouns refer to something concrete or abstract), but the main emphasis is placed on so-called accidents. The noun, for example, is said to have five such accidents: gender, species, form, number and case. From the contemporary point of view, a system comprising on one hand gender, number and case, and on the other hand species and form, seems somewhat heterogeneous. Gender, number and case are variables describing inflection, whereas species and form, in the sense ascribed to them by Dionysius Thrax, seem to be variables describing word-derivational phenomena. Species can be conceived of as a morphological dimension, comprising such features as primitive (i.e. non-derivational) and derivational (subdivided further into smaller ones). Form can be conceived of as a morphological dimension comprising such features as simple, compound and super-compound.

In his description of particular cases, Dionysius Thrax resorts, as was usual in his times, to an enumeration of them furnished with brief, intuitive, mainly semantically oriented statements without any theoretical support:

There are five *Cases*, the right, the generic, the dative, the accusative, and the vocative. The right case is called also the nominative and the direct; the generic, the possessive and the partial; the dative, the injunctive; while the accusative is named from *cause*; and the vocative is called the allocutive (ibid. 10).

It is apparent that, unlike the Stoics, the Alexandrians took the vocative univocally as a full-fledged member of the case paradigm. On the other hand, it is interesting that Thrax's grammar does not in fact include any examples showing the morphological properties of case (not to mention the syntactic properties, beside the difference between casus rectus and oblique cases). In the 7<sup>th</sup> section (*On Elements*) Thrax enumerates only the characteristic letters/sounds found at the end of the nominative case forms of all genders and numbers (ibid. 6). In the 20<sup>th</sup> section (*On the Article*) and in the 21<sup>st</sup> (*On the Pronoun*) there are enumerated appropriate inflectional forms of the definite article and personal pronouns, which constitute a closed set of lingual units characterized by a highly idiosyncratic morphology, and thus show nothing of the properties of more regular morphology (ibid. 13–14).

The ancient Greeks in their linguistic analysis indeed seem to have been conscious of phonetic and phonological problems. **Democritus** (c. 460–370 BC), Plato and Aristotle developed the view that the language consists of indivisible meaningless sound units – *στοιχεῖα* (*stokheia*) 'primary elements' (Milewski 1975: 30–31). At the same time, the smallest meaningful unit perceived by them was the word. Ancient Greek grammar can therefore be conceived of as word-based. Morphology, as practiced nowadays, was paradoxically overlooked (the notion of morpheme, for

example, appeared in European linguistics only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century after the discovery of the grammatical achievements of the ancient Indians). Syntax was treated generally as an automatic derivative of the relations between previously established word-forms (Robins 1967: 25).

This shortcoming seems to have been made good to some extent by **Apollonius Dyscolus** (c. 150 BC), the next eminent Greek grammarian, who tended to analyze word forms as elements of broader syntactic units, rather from the point of view of their textual function. Regrettably, Dyscolus' work specifically about the cases is no longer extant. It can be assumed, however, that the principles of his case theory are reproducible based on remarks included in his monumental oeuvre *Περί συντάξεως* (*Peri syntaxeōs*) 'On Syntax' (mainly in its third book).

In reference to the oblique cases, Dyscolus attempts to demonstrate which verbs require the genitive, dative and accusative cases. The genitive is generally required by verbs expressing less transitive, externally stimulated activities (e.g. *to hear*) or activities presupposing a kind of possession (e.g. *to govern*). With the preposition *ὑπό* (*ypó*) in passive constructions, it expresses the [AGENT]. The dative is required generally by all verbs expressing the idea of giving (e.g. *to give*) or presupposing an instrument (e.g. *to play*) etc. The accusative is required generally by verbs expressing physical (e.g. *to flog*), psychological (e.g. *to insult*), volitional (e.g. *to want*), sensual (e.g. *to fear*), hortative (e.g. *to instigate*) transitive activities, etc. (Dyscolus 2000: 257–272). Although there are doubts as to whether Dyscolus considered the nominative to be a case, he seems to confront it semantically with the oblique cases, by noting that the verb ascribes generally the activity (*ἐνέργεια* (*enérgeia*)) to the nominative and passivity (*πάθος* (*páthos*)) to the remaining cases, especially the accusative (Hübschmann 1875: 17). Hjelmslev (1935: 8–9) states that the accusative was established by Dyscolus to be the term truly opposed to the nominative, the (oblique) case *par excellence*. The genitive and dative were considered to express passivity to a lesser extent, since they approach the semantic domain of the nominative<sup>1</sup>. Dyscolus did not, however, determine which among the oblique cases constitute extremes of the opposition. The definitions given to each of them do not constitute any coherent whole. Robins (1951: 43), in turn, seems to be more indulgent. The setting down in relatively permanent form of the semantic and grammatical functions of case inflections as achieved by Dyscolus is justified by the way that grammatical category was understood in his epoch.

Apollonius Dyscolus is usually recognized as the forerunner of the so-called localist case theory (Heinz 1978: 55), so celebrated in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (cf.

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<sup>1</sup> Both the genitive and dative can express the [AGENT]: the genitive in passive constructions, e.g. *Δέρομαι ὑπό σοῦ* (*Deromai ypó sou*) 'I am being flogged by you', and the dative in constructions expressing mutuality, e.g. *Μάχομαι σοί* (*Mákhomai soi*) 'I fight with you (mutually)' i.e. 'I fight with you and you fight with me'.

sections 1.4 and 1.5). According to Blank (1987), however, such a conclusion is too far-reaching. Dyscolus indeed points out that all adverbs expressing spatial relations (*ποῦ* (*poû*) ‘where’, *πόθεν* (*pothen*) ‘whence’, *πόσε* (*pose*) ‘whither’) can normally be “translated” into one of the oblique cases (the dative for *where*, genitive for *whence*, accusative for *whither*). Nonetheless, the two categories (spatial adverbs and cases) are by and large discussed separately. There are no hints at any kind of generalizations about case meanings. A localist theory *sensu proprio* postulates that case meanings are spatial, from the point of view of both their origin and their synchronic so-called general meaning (German *Grundbedeutung*, French *signification générale*) (cf. section 1.5.1).

Summing up the achievements of the ancient Greeks, Hjelmslev (1935: 1–13) evaluates the theoretical attempts made in that time to describe the category of case as having been far from successful. He reproaches the Greeks for an inconsistency which makes impossible the systematic interpretation of the Greek case system as a whole. Practically the only distinction made is that between the nominative and the remaining cases. In this context Hjelmslev criticizes the Greeks for attempting to define the cases from outside (*du dehors*) rather than from inside (i.e. based on their semantics), by departing from the sentence and its diathetic structure, the dependence of appropriate case forms on the verb or nominal constituents. The definitions given do not constitute any coherent whole. On one hand, each case category was traditionally delimited by way of an enumeration of heterogeneous meanings ascribed to it, without striving to indicate the general meaning of the category taken as a whole. On the other hand, the individual cases were not opposed to each other holistically either, each of them being treated in isolation. This defective approach, which Hjelmslev considers an obvious result of the theoretical immaturity of the ancient Greeks in confrontation with the exuberance of forms and richness of anomalies in their language, was regrettably transferred to the Romans and in one way or another cultivated for centuries in European linguistics. Heinz (1978: 36–60), in turn, evaluates the results of the linguistic work of the ancient Greeks as fuller, more harmonious and theoretically better founded than the inductive, detailed, practice-oriented achievements of the ancient Indians. Nevertheless, he finds it odd that in spite of the ardent, centuries-long disputes concerning analogies and anomalies in language, no systematic attempt was made to demarcate inflection from word-formation (derivation), and analogously, stem and (inflectional) ending from (derivational) base and (derivational) affix. Neither the ancient Greeks nor later the Romans seem to have applied the notion of morpheme. Strangely enough, the striking difference between the maximally regular (analogical) phenomenon of inflection, and the less regular (more anomalous) phenomenon of word-formation, largely escaped their attention.

### 1.1.3. The Roman Empire

The ancient Romans found themselves in quite a different situation than the ancient Indians and Greeks. Their linguistic research could begin with the adaptation of the already highly developed, though from the Latin point of view somewhat idiosyncratic, Greek model.

**Marcus Terrentius Varro** (116–27 BC), one of the most eminent and independent Roman grammarians, the author of *De lingua Latina* ‘On the Latin Language’, is believed to have succeeded to a much greater extent than the Greeks in identifying certain word classes (i.a. inflectional paradigms and morphological categories) as the resultants of the action of analogy and anomaly. In his etymological analysis, which from a contemporary viewpoint can be understood rather as an analysis of synchronic inflectional-derivational relations, he noted that the way word(form)s are created in a language as a whole seems to be *a priori* arbitrary (i.e. anomalous) only in the case of some “primitive” words, such as *ago* ‘I drive’ or *homo* ‘man’. These words are the result of their imposition (*impositio*) on things by the “name-giver”. Other words take their origin in *declinatio* (‘declension’), and in contrast to the former group, they are therefore derivable by the operation of analogy. What is more, in the realm of *declinatio*, it is also possible on closer inspection to discover some arbitrariness, anomaly. Varro therefore drew a sharper boundary between inflection (*declinatio naturalis*, as he called it) and word-derivation (*declinatio voluntaria*). *Declinatio naturalis* ‘natural declension’ is claimed to be of a more general nature, imposing itself with its non-defectiveness and high regularity on every speaker of a language. *Declinatio voluntaria* ‘voluntary declension’, on the other hand, is less ordered and more facultative, giving language speakers some flexibility. Regrettably, later and more influential grammarians disregarded the latter observations of Varro (Robins 1967: 59). According to Esa Itkonen (1991: 198–200), it can even be said that Varro, in attempting to justify the analogous aspect of language, approached the position taken by the modern structuralists. The identity of a lingual unit is determined by its relations to the “neighboring” lingual units, on both the (i) paradigmatic and (ii) syntagmatic planes. For instance, the identical nature of the final sounds of the words *crux* ‘cross’ and *Phryx* ‘Phrygian’ can be revealed only when their paradigmatic “partners”, such as *cruces* ‘crosses’, *Phryges* ‘Phrygians’ (NOM PL), are taken into consideration. On the other hand, the different nature of such similar words as *nemus* ‘forest’ and *lepus* ‘hare’ becomes evident only when they are considered with syntagmatic “partners” such as demonstrative pronouns: *hoc nemus* ‘this forest’ (NEUT) vs. *hic lepus* ‘this hare’ (MASC).

Varro distinguishes six cases for the Latin language. Five of them are approximately analogous to the Greek cases (nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, vocative). The sixth case, called simply *casus sextus* ‘sixth case’ or *casus Latinus*

‘Latin case’ (somewhat later also *ablativus* ‘ablative’), is specific to Latin (Lersch 1838: 229–231). To summarize:

(i)	<i>nominativum</i>		‘nominative’;
(ii)	<i>patricus casus</i>	‘patrimonial case’,	i.e. ‘genitive’ <sup>2</sup> ;
(iii)	<i>casus dandei</i>	‘giving case’,	i.e. ‘dative’;
(iv)	<i>casus accusandoi</i>	‘accusing <sup>3</sup> case’,	i.e. ‘accusative’;
(v)	<i>casus vocandei</i>	‘calling case’,	i.e. ‘vocative’;
(vi)	<i>casus sextus</i>	‘sixth case’,	
	<i>casus Latinus</i>	‘Latin case’,	i.e. ‘ablative’.

This evident innovation led to numerous speculations concerning the number of cases relevant to a language, speculations which, in spite of their obvious weaknesses, ultimately proved to be quite fruitful in casting light on the nature of the relation between the case (form) and its meaning. **Quintilian** (35–100 AD) turned his attention to the Latin ablative and Greek dative. It turned out that these two cases, besides their own divergent meanings ([SEPARATION] for the ablative, [BENEFICIARY] for the dative) have one common meaning – [INSTRUMENTAL] – in both languages (cf. the use of the Latin ablative without a preposition: *Hasta percussa* ‘I struck with a spear’). Since at that time it was accepted that the cases were named (and consequently distinguished from one another) on the basis of one of their meaning(s), use(s), Quintilian raised the question of whether there should be recognized a *casus septimus* ‘seventh case’ for Latin (and consequently a sixth case for Greek) (ibid. 232–233). **Servius** (c. 4<sup>th</sup>–5<sup>th</sup> century AD) even mentions a *casus octavus* ‘eighth case’ which allegedly manifests itself in Latin in the form of the dative without preposition, e.g. *It clamor caelo* ‘The shout goes to heaven’ having the same meaning ([DESTINATION]) as the preposition *in* ‘in’ with the accusative, e.g. *It clamor in caelum* ‘The shout goes to heaven’ (Keil 1864: 433). The unproductive forms with locative meaning were, according to Robins (1952: 59, footnote 3), rightly omitted from the general Latin case system.

In referring to the Latin tradition, Hjelmslev seems to be more indulgent than he was toward the Greeks. He notes, of course, the continued undesirable use of atomism in semantic description, but at the same time he evaluates positively the methodological sobriety and rationality of the Roman grammarians in distinguishing for their language a case category which was not known in Greek – the ablative. This seems to demonstrate that linguistic empiricism was victorious in this regard over the speculative, aprioristic, logical approach to the language. The

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<sup>2</sup> The names *nominativus*, *genitivus*, *dativus*, *accusativus* can probably be found for the first time in Quintilian (Lersch: 1838: 232).

<sup>3</sup> The use of the term ‘accusative’ is considered to be Varro’s mistranslation resulting from the semantic ambiguity of the Greek *aitia* (*aitía*) ‘accusation, charge, cause’.

same applies to the abandonment, in later Latin grammars, of the seventh (and eighth) cases, which throughout all nominal paradigms are formally convergent with the ablative (dative) (Hjelmslev 1935: 13–17). Both in the influential didactic grammar of **Aelius Donatus** (4<sup>th</sup> century AD) (*Donati grammatici urbis Romae Ars grammatica* ‘The Art of Grammar of Donatus, a Grammarian from the Town of Rome’) and that of **Priscianus Caesariensis** (5<sup>th</sup> century AD) (*Institutiones grammaticae* ‘The Principles of Grammar’), who sums up the achievements of the Roman epoch, only six cases are distinguished as relevant to Latin.

The results of Roman teaching, inherited by medieval grammarians mainly in the form elaborated by Donatus and Priscianus Caesariensis, and cultivated in Europe in a more or less fossilized form for many centuries, are evaluated by Hjelmslev rather negatively. The cases could be identified only in languages which employed the desinential mechanisms characteristic of Latin. Priscianus Caesariensis, for example, begins his considerations of case with the statement:

*Casus est declinatio nominis vel aliarum casualium dictionum, quae fit maxime in fine* ‘Case is a declination of name or other case-inflecting words which occurs primarily at the end [of the word]’ (Keil 1855: 183–184).

What is more, the dogma of the universal validity of the Latin system of cases, and the unity of the semantic content ascribed to each of them, with relatively insignificant deviations, was abandoned slowly and with reluctance. Artowicz (2003: 302–318), in her monumental treatise on the morphosyntactic model of language in old Hungarian grammars, describes in detail what fatal consequences this rigid and aprioristic approach had on the description of the Hungarian case system, in which the number of cases varied between five and seven, reaching the number of 17 only at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the work of Ferenc Verseghy (similarly Antal 2005: 389–435). The same can be said in relation to Finnish (Wiik 1989: 12–17, 61–63) (cf. section 1.6). Case – as befits a meaningful lingual category – can be defined, according to Hjelmslev, only by means of reference to a semantic feature; more specifically the Saussurean *valeur* ‘value’ (cf. Saussure 1980: 150–169). The particular nature of the mode of expression does not have any importance here. The cases are thus omnipresent. They would be absent only in languages in which the idea of the cases were not expressed by any difference in the *signifiant* ‘signifier’; either suffixation, prefixation, or even amorphous word order (Hjelmslev 1935: 13–22). In reference to the more specific properties of the Latin case system, however, the attitude of the Roman grammarians seems to be more nuanced. The relevance of the notion of case as a whole seems on one hand to be limited to the description of the morphology of the words in which appropriate meanings are manifested by the endings, while on the other hand the subclassification of the words belonging to the category so defined does not primarily have to depend upon their particular form (i.e. implicitly endings). Priscianus Caesariensis writes:

(...) *casus fieri non vocis, sed significationis duntaxat* ‘(...) cases are made not by the sound/word but only by the signification’ (Keil 1855: 184).

In particular subsystems there may be no formal differentiation between certain case categories regarded as relevant to Latin (e.g. *puell/ae* ‘of the girl’ (GEN SG) vs. *puell/ae* ‘to the girl’ (DAT SG)). These case categories are regarded as separate because in some other appropriate subsystems they have explicitly different formal manifestations (e.g. *oppid/i* ‘of the town’ (GEN SG) vs. *oppid/o* ‘to the town’ (DAT SG)). In spite of the fact that the number of case forms can vary from one (in the case of the so-called *monoptota* ‘words with one case-form’) through 2 (*diptota*), 3 (*trip-tota*), 4 (*tetraptota*), 5 (*pentaptota*) up to 6 (*hexaptota*), the number of cases in Latin is not said to undergo fluctuation according to the subsystem in question. All of this seems to reveal the perspicacity of Roman grammarians in sensing the systemicity in the complicated and subtle interplay between the categories, descending simultaneously from different planes of analysis (morphological, syntactic and semantic) into what we usually call ‘case’.

## 1.2. The Middle Ages

The Middle Ages in Europe, coming after the collapse of the Roman Empire and its split into the Eastern and Western Empire, are often referred to as the “Dark Ages”. The development of medieval science is said to have been heavily restrained by its almost complete subordination to the requirements of faith. There was no need to endeavor to attain the truth, since it was regarded as being already known from theology and ancient science. One only had to justify and prove it. Linguistic investigations, however, did not cease, and especially in the second part of the Middle Ages, in the period of scholastic philosophy, there appear certain radical innovations. It is reasonable to treat medieval European linguistics from the standpoint of the two main centers where it was practiced; the Greek-oriented Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium), and the Latin-oriented Western Roman Empire and the western European countries which emerged after its collapse.

### 1.2.1. Byzantium

The Byzantine linguists are regarded mainly as heirs to the teaching of Dionysius Thrax, their activity being largely limited to making unproductive commentaries on his work.

One of them, **John Glykys** (Glykas) (14<sup>th</sup> century AD), is known as an ardent adherent of the maintenance of standard Greek against the alleged deviations occur-

ring within it over the course of time. He felt uneasy, for example, about the progressive disappearance of the case forms associated with the ancient dative, which were replaced by genitive case forms in colloquial Byzantine speech (Robins 1993: 174–175).

Glykys explains the Greek oblique cases by referring to their traditional “basic” meanings. The wide range of meanings of the genitive is “reduced” in such a way that the genitive is said to express the relation between the whole and its parts. When using the genitive, one always links a part to a whole. The dative is a “giving” case. The accusative, in contrast to the genitive, refers to the entirety (ibid. 180–183). According to Hjelmslev, if in *Dyscolus* the accusative was regarded as the oblique case *par excellence* (cf. section 1.1.2), in Glykys this role is assigned to the genitive. Glykys abandons the relation of dependence-independence, fundamental to the Greek case theory, in favor of a relation between genus (*genre*) and species (*espèce*). The genitive is defined positively. It signifies both the genus and species and the mutual relations of species to the genus from which they derive. The opposite of the genitive is the accusative, which expresses the genus without regard to the species. In reference to the dative, Hjelmslev is less convinced. It seems that it may indicate either species without regard to the genus constituted by them, or mutual relations between species (Hjelmslev 1935: 9–10).

Although Glykys did not endeavor to work out any coherent theory of case, his remarks about some aspects of the nature of case, which touch, probably unwittingly, on the deeper discrete nature of a lingual sign as such, seem to be worthy of attention. Namely, he focused on the use of two different cases with one verb, e.g. *ακούω* (*akouō*), which is combinable with both the accusative and the genitive. When linked with the genitive, it refers to partial, non-attentive perception of sounds (cf. English *to hear*). When linked with the accusative, it refers to total, attentive perception of sounds (cf. English *to listen*). Intermediate stages between the imaginable maxima of the intensity of the action, according to Glykys, are left by the language without the possibility of more discrete formal distinction than is accessible as a result of the interplay between the given lingual categories (here verbs and the nominal cases governed by them). Robins (1993: 185–186) boldly compared Glykys’ remarks to the fundamental Humboldtian insight that a language must always make infinite use of finite resources (cf. *Sie [Sprache] mufs daher von endlichen Mitteln einen unendlichen Gebrauch machen (...)* (Humboldt 1836: 106)).

**Maximus Planudes** (1260–1310 AD), a Byzantine polymath, seems in his work on linguistics to be more theoretically oriented than anyone else in the Eastern Roman Empire.

It is often asserted that the first explicit hints of a localist case theory were provided by Maximus Planudes. He writes that by answering such questions as *πόθεν* (*póthen*) ‘whence’, *ποῦ* (*poû*) ‘where’ and *πόσε* (*póse*) ‘whither’ it is possible to use

certain adverbial forms (e.g. *ἐκεῖ* (*ekeî*) ‘there’) or the oblique cases: genitive, dative and accusative respectively. The case forms having this function are generally furnished with the appropriate preposition, but sometimes they can occur without it; for example, the genitive: *ἀπὸ Ρώμης* (*apò Rhōmes*) ‘from Rome’, dative: *ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι* (*en tei Helládi*) ‘in Greece’, *Θήβησιν* (*Thēbēsin*) ‘in Thebes’, accusative: *εἰς τὸν ἀγρόν* (*eis tòn agrón*) ‘into the field’ (Robins 1993: 215–227).

Hjelmslev evaluates the case theory of Maximus Planudes as the best ever produced in reference to Greek. He praises it for the perspicacity and consistency that enable its systematic interpretation, while regretting that it did not exert a significant influence on later European case theories. The Planudean system is, according to Hjelmslev, based on two dimensions:

- (i) the fundamental one, with two features (*termes*) – independence and dependence – allowing one to distinguish the nominative from the other cases; and
- (ii) the secondary, accessory dimension, allowing one to distinguish the oblique cases from one another.

The genitive signifies [SEPARATION] (*éloignement*): ÷, the accusative [RAPPROCHEMENT] (*rapprochement*): +, whereas the dative occupies the neutral position between these two extremes by signifying the [REPOSE] (*repos*): 0. Of course, it should be realized that the second dimension can, in its total application, be conceived of as spatial only in a metaphorical sense. The following table presents the Planudean system (Hjelmslev 1935: 10–13):

	+	0	÷
dependence	ACC	DAT	GEN
independence		NOM	

Robins, however, is more cautious in his praise. To begin with, the first hints at such an approach can be traced back to Apollonius Dyscolus (cf. section 1.1.2) and even to Dionysius Thrax<sup>4</sup>. Nobody would argue that Planudes articulated a fully localist case theory as this is understood in modern times. He only provided the basis for such a theory, concluding more explicitly than any of his predecessors the gradual, cumulative development towards the notion that all particular meanings of cases are derivable from their general meanings and that those general meanings are among themselves semantically homogeneous (Robins 1993: 223–227). Blank notices that only one sentence in Planudes,

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. the quotation: “Some [adverbs] (...) indicate place (...) – of these there are three kinds, those signifying *in* a place, those signifying *to* a place, and those signifying *from* a place (...)” (Thrax 1874: 15) and the interpretation in: Blank 1987: 81, footnote 37.

actually a digression, has ever been cited as evidence for his generalized, localist case-meaning theory:

(...) κατά τινα φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν αἱ τρεῖς αὐταὶ ἐρωτήσεις τὸ πόθεν, καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῆ τὰς τρεῖς πλαγίας ἐκλήρωσαντο πτώσεις (κατά τινα φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν αἱ τρεῖς αὐταὶ ἐρωτήσεις τὸ πόθεν, καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῆ τὰς τρεῖς πλαγίας ἐκλήρωσαντο πτώσεις '(...) in a natural way the following three interrogations: whence or where or whither allotted the three oblique cases')<sup>5</sup>.

In comparison with Dyscolus, the only innovation made by Planudes is the statement that the order of the three oblique cases (genitive, dative, accusative) corresponds to the order of the interrogatives *whence*, *where*, *whither*, which reflects the nature of motion (one moves from a place to the other with an intermediary repose) (Blank 1987: 74–78).

**Theodor Gaza** (15<sup>th</sup> century), following the lines laid by Dyscolus, describes the oblique cases mainly in terms of their connectivity with particular semantic classes of verb. Moreover he describes them from the point of view of the subject. The object occurs in the accusative when the subject is conceived as getting outside (*nach aussen dringend*). The genitive is used when the subject is conceived as absorbing from outside (*von aussen aufnehmend*). The dative is used when the subject is conceived as attaching from outside (*von aussen anfügend*) (Schmidt 1859: 336–339). According to Hjelmslev, Gaza's theory once again confirms the weakness of the Greek grammarians' approaching case from the outside (cf. section 1.1.2). Gaza suggests that the attitude of the subject implies the existence of a certain meaning in the oblique cases. In order to define the cases properly (i.e. in terms of their semantics), Gaza's definitions should be reversed to see the cases from the point of view of the object, as was allegedly done by Planudes (Hjelmslev 1935: 10–11).

### 1.2.2. Western Europe

Scholasticism, the most powerful philosophical current developed in the West in the second period of the Middle Ages (from the 11<sup>th</sup> century up to the Renaissance) bore fruit in the sphere of linguistics in the form of so-called speculative grammars. Speculative grammarians, finding the description of the Latin language inherited from Donatus and Priscian Caesariensis to be inadequate, because of their excessive focus on data, attempted to explain the mechanism binding things with their lingual reflections by means of so-called *modi significandi* 'modes of signifying'. The Modistae, as the speculative grammarians were consequently called, seem to have believed in an underlying overall general grammar emerging from the ex-

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<sup>5</sup> According to Steinhal (1891: 276) this quotation may date back even to antiquity.

trilingual reality and operations of the mind, a kind of isomorphism between reality (which is), mind (which understands) and language (which signifies), manifesting itself perfectly in the Latin language, which they treated as a kind of metalanguage, the only language worthy of any scientific consideration.

In the Modistic system, the existent persistent/static and variable/dynamic phenomena have various properties, called *modi essendi* ‘modes of being’, which divide into: (i) *modi entis* ‘modes of entity’ for things (which in the ontological dimension absolutely precede everything) and (ii) *modi esse* ‘modes of to be’ for processes (which in the ontological dimension, separated from the substance, follow or depend on things). These properties are first actively apprehended by the mind by means of so-called active modes of understanding (*modi intelligendi activi*). In order to establish the link between apprehension and (lingually relevant) signification, there are introduced so-called passive modes of understanding (*modi intelligendi passivi*), thanks to which the mind can signify apprehended properties of things and processes by virtue of their previous comprehension, but without any lingual expression as such at this stage. According to the Modistic approach, the above phenomena are still lingually irrelevant because the process binding the units of reality with their lingual expression can now cease, limited to the bare mental concept, apperception. The mind attempts to give lingual form to the things and processes, previously handled by means of modes of understanding, by resorting to so-called *modi significandi* ‘modes of signifying’. In order to achieve this, so-called active modes of signifying (*modi significandi activi*) are conferred by the mind on sounds (*voces*), which consequently become words (*dictiones*) capable of signifying the properties of things and processes. These properties are represented at this stage *mutatis mutandis* by so-called passive modes of signifying (*modi significandi passivi*) (cf. the active and passive modes of understanding). Within the Modistic system, therefore, the structure of reality causes the structure of language, and the structure of language reflects the structure of reality. The word becomes a member of a certain part of speech (*pars orationis*), one of the central notions in speculative grammars, when for each of them there are established characteristic, discretely different, bundles of modes of signifying. It is worth emphasizing that a word’s belonging to a certain part of speech also determines its co-functioning with other words in minimal (i.e. consisting of two words) syntagms (*ratio consignificandi* ‘relation of co-signifying’). Seuren (1998: 34–37) refers to this as *Medieval Immediate Constituent Analysis*, comparable to that proposed in the 20<sup>th</sup> century by Bloomfield. According to Seuren, the relevant fragment of the text by **Thomas of Erfurt**, the most representative late Modista, could – with some terminological adjustments – almost serve in a modern textbook of linguistics. Bursill-Hall (1972: 35) in his vast commentary on the speculative grammar of Thomas of Erfurt, emphasizes that the syntactic function, in opposition to the inherited Greek-Latin tradition, was in

this way included as a latent factor in the reformulated analysis of word classes in Latin. This approach had particular implications for the Modistic understanding of the case system.

Each part of speech has its essential and accidental modes of signifying (*modi significandi essentialis, modi significandi accidentalis*). In Thomas of Erfurt, for instance, the essential modes of signifying of the nomen-class include *modus entis* ‘mode of entity’ (to contrast it with the verb), *modus determinatae apprehensionis* ‘mode of determinate understanding’ (to contrast it with the pronoun), etc. Having established the essential modes of signifying of a given part of speech, it is possible to establish its accidental modes of signifying, expressing variations which can occur within its essence without disturbing it. For Thomas of Erfurt the accidental modes of signifying for the nomen-class are (i) *genus* ‘gender’, (ii) *figura* ‘form’, (iii) *numerus* ‘number’, (iv) *casus* ‘case’, (v) *species* ‘type’<sup>6</sup> and, perhaps surprisingly, (vi) *persona* ‘person’ (ibid. 52–63). The entire category of case, for which the Modistae seem to show a predilection, as well as its subclasses (particular cases), are described by Thomas of Erfurt in terms of: (i) the syntactic function of the words belonging to it (whether they function as the first (head/terminant) or final constituent (determiner/dependent) of the two-word syntagm, or as both the first and final constituent); and (ii) the semantic analogy of their forms with the forms of the pronoun *quod* ‘what, which’; for example (ibid. 186–194):

- |       |     |   |     |                            |
|-------|-----|---|-----|----------------------------|
| (i)   | NOM | <i>Socrates currit</i><br>‘Socrates runs’,<br><i>Socrates amatur</i><br>‘Socrates is loved’,  | cf. | <i>quod</i> ‘what, which’; |
| (ii)  | GEN | <i>Socratis interest</i><br>‘the interest of Socrates’,<br><i>Misereor Socratis</i><br>‘I regret Socrates’,<br><i>filius Socratis</i><br>‘the son of Socrates’, | cf. | <i>cuius</i> ‘whose’;      |
| (iii) | DAT | <i>Socrati accidit</i><br>‘That happens to Socrates’,<br><i>Faveo Socrati</i><br>‘I favor Socrates’,  | cf. | <i>cui</i> ‘to whom’;      |

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<sup>6</sup> The modes of signifying of *figura* and *species* characterizing the nomen-class are regarded as syntactically irrelevant. They are therefore called absolute modes (*modi absoluti*) in opposition to the respective modes (*modi respectivi*). The *figura* refers to what we would now call the compositionality of a word, and the *species* refers to its derivational properties.

*similis Socrati*  
'similar to Socrates',

- (iv) ACC *Amo Deum* cf. *quem* 'whom';  
'I love God',  
*Socratem oportet*  
'It suits Socrates',
- (v) VOC *O Socrate!* 'Oh Socrates!';
- (vi) ABL *A Socrate legitur* cf. *quo* 'by/from whom'.  
'It is read by Socrates',

In comparison with the previous approaches to the category of case, it is an unquestionable achievement of the Modistae that they expressed so explicitly, probably for the first time in history, the indispensability of describing the syntagmatic functioning of the words belonging to this category, alongside the traditionally dominant semantic description. What is more, they seem to have implemented this systematically, aiming to construct a coherent general theory of grammar. One of the greatest disadvantages of their approach, apart from the aforementioned pretentious, almost obsessive, universalism and realism, is the total neglect of word morpho(phono)logy, which in reference to case, for example, is limited to remarks on the semantic parallelism between the analyzed case forms and the inflectional forms of the pronoun *quod* 'what, which'. However, within the framework of their theories, this attitude seems quite understandable. The concrete, actual lingual mode of expression was of peripheral importance for them.

It is worth noting that not the whole of medieval linguistics limited itself to the Latin language like the Modistic approach just described. **Ælfric** (c. 1000 AD), the author of the first Latin grammar in England, although not being mature enough to abandon the Latin six-case paradigm, nevertheless gives Anglo-Saxon equivalents when exemplifying the Latin cases, e.g. *hic homo – pes man* 'this man', *huius hominis – pises mannes* 'of this man', *huic homini – disum men* 'to this man', etc. (Zupitza 1880: 21).

### 1.3. From the Renaissance to the 19<sup>th</sup> century

The Renaissance is regarded as the time of revival of the sciences and arts after the medieval decadence, with the full rediscovery of the extensive Greco-Roman intel-

lectual heritage. Greek and Latin had up to that time in Europe been regarded as the only languages worthy of scientific reflection. Such a pearl as *Fyrsta málfræðiritgerðin* ‘The First Grammatical Treatise’ (12<sup>th</sup> century AD), by an anonymous author who, in dealing with issues of orthography in Old Icelandic, displayed an incredible perspicacity in the field of phonetics and phonology, making observations comparable to the achievements of the phonemic theory of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Benediktsson 1972: 35–38), was a rare exception which had to wait for exposure to a wider audience until the 19<sup>th</sup> century. From now on, however, the privileged position of Greek and Latin vanishes. Vernacular languages begin to be systematically studied.

The first broadly known, full-fledged non-Greek-Latin grammar in Europe is *Gramática castellana* ‘Spanish Grammar’, written in Spanish by **Nebrija** and published for the first time in 1492. Nebrija notices that different case meanings are manifested in Spanish by prepositions. However, his innovations end there. He distinguishes five cases: *notativo*, *genitivo*, *dativo*, *acusativo*, *vocativo*, just as in Greek, concealing the abundance of Spanish prepositions other than *de* marking the genitive and *a* marking the dative and accusative (cf. Nebrija 1909: 83–84, 87–89, 128–131).

The Port-Royal Grammar, written by two Jansenists, **Lancelot** and **Arnauld**, and published for the first time in 1660, was an influential grammatical vade mecum in 17<sup>th</sup>- and 18<sup>th</sup>-century Europe, gradually losing its prestige only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the face of the expansion of scientific horizons resulting from the study of an increasing number of languages (Leroy 1971: 12–13).

The authors’ methodological point of departure seems to be the supposition that all languages must have the same structural foundation based on the universal properties of mind and logic. There are three operations of our spirit: (i) apprehension, (ii) judgment, and (iii) reasoning. A judgment made by us about apprehended things is called a proposition (e.g. *La terre est ronde* ‘The earth is round’) which in its minimal form embraces two obligatory terms: (i) subject (*terre* ‘earth’) and (ii) attribute (*ronde* ‘round’), connected by the copula (*est* ‘is’) (Lancelot–Arnauld 1780: 64–66). The subject and attribute in separation refer to the first operation of the spirit (apprehension), whereas the copula shows the action of our spirit, the way we think, expressing primarily pure affirmation. The attributive, or affirmative, function is the essential function of a verb, while person, time, mood, etc. are only its secondary functions, mixed up with the affirmative function in a single word for the sake of brevity (ibid. 159). For example, the French *vit* ‘lives’ means nothing other than *est vivant* ‘is living’, where the pure affirmative function and other functions are expressed by two separate words: *est* and *vivant*. Lancelot and Arnauld held this to be their own original observation, pointing out that even Aristotle, in defining the verb, had stopped at the third of its significations (i.e. tense) (ibid. 157–161).

The sixth chapter of the second part is devoted to considerations concerning case, which seem somewhat inconsistent from the very beginning. According to the authors, different cases have been invented in some languages (Greek or Latin) because of the self-imposing necessity of expressing different relations between things than the already discussed fundamental subject-attribute relation. Other languages (French) lack cases and, in order to mark analogous relations, make use of prepositions or word order. Nevertheless, because there are very few languages which do not have cases in the pronominal subsystem<sup>7</sup>, in order to understand well the structure of the discourse, it is necessary to know what is meant by the notion of case. In spite of the preannounced universal character of the Port-Royal Grammar, its authors dare not go beyond the interior organization of the Latin nominal paradigm, distinguishing exactly six universal cases: nominative, vocative, genitive, dative, accusative and ablative (ibid. 82–90). The individual cases are described exactly as was the practice in antiquity and the Middle Ages, that is, primarily in the form of scattered remarks concerning their meanings without any attempt at systematization (ibid. 85–91).

There seems no doubt that all languages distinguish, among all relevant meanings, a certain subtype which can be called ‘case meanings’, and in this respect the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar seem to show their perspicacity. Nevertheless, both the manifestation of case meanings (desinential mechanism vs. any other) and especially the way in which the case meanings become neutralized in the morpho-syntactic plane of the language in particular case categories (which ultimately translates into the number of cases relevant for a particular language) seem to have been interpreted by Lancelot and Arnauld with naïve one-sidedness.

It is clear that the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar are rather helpless in the face of problems concerning case which do not fit exactly the model delivered by the Greek-Latin grammatical tradition. Although they identify case with the case ending, they are capable of finding cases in French in spite of the fact that the French noun lacks any relevant desinential distinctions. The support for this decision is supposed to be supplied by personal pronouns – the only words which have not lost their overt case inflection in the majority of vernacular languages. Lancelot and Arnauld propose to consider the French personal pronouns from the point of view of their three “usages”: (i) nominative, (ii) dative/accusative; and (iii) ablative/genitive (cf. *je-me-moi, tu-te-toi*). It can be inferred from the text that such a “usage” as dative/accusative can be understood as a specifically French case category (ibid. 115–125). This category seems to be named by referring to its main significations ([BENEFICIARY] and [PATIENT]) by means of the labels used for those significations

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<sup>7</sup> As far as I am aware, the pronouns in each language considered – French, Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Spanish and Italian (the last two supplying very few examples), German and Walloon (without a single example) – even nowadays have “case inflection” as it seems to be understood by the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar.

in languages with a longer grammatical tradition (Latin). Nevertheless, the phonetic neutralization of [BENEFICIARY] and [PATIENT] occurs in French only in the first and second persons of both numbers, whereas in the third person the phonetic opposition between the words conveying these two meanings is still maintained: *lui* ‘him, her’ vs. *le, la* ‘him, her’ and *leur* ‘them’ vs. *les* ‘them’. For this reason, one “super-case” called dative/accusative is not able to reflect properly this aspect of the structure of the French language. In the case of French nouns, where in fact no desinential distinctions are made, the authors consider it possible to speak of six cases, whereas in the case of pronouns, in spite of the fact that even at first glance more than three such distinctions are visible (cf. *ils* ‘they’ (NOM) vs. *leur* ‘them’ (DAT) vs. *les* ‘them’ (ACC) vs. *eux* ‘them’ (ABL)), they postulate only three cases.

Chomsky (1966: 32–52) evaluates the Port-Royal Grammar as the first so insightful and subtle attempt to translate the Cartesian distinction between body and mind into the two aspects of language, sound and meaning. He says that the descriptive framework of the Grammar presupposes a latent deep structure to each sentence which determines its semantic content, and a surface structure determining the phonetic structure of the sentence (exactly the same applies to case), a setup which resembles the modern generative-transformational approach to language. Esa Itkonen is somewhat more critical. He describes Chomsky’s claims about the importance of the Port-Royal Grammar as inflated. He also accuses the authors of the Grammar of falsely claiming credit for the discovery of the centrality of the copula, because of their ignorance of two thousand years of grammatical tradition. The notion of sentence, with the copula (no matter whether explicit or implicit) relating the predicate to the subject, is taken from Aristotle (Itkonen Esa 1991: 261–269). An outstanding grammarian, **Scaliger**, a century before the publication of the Port-Royal Grammar, in reference to the sentence *Caesar est clemens* ‘Caesar is clement’, remarks that the verb does not “signify something” but is “a link by means of which clemency is predicated of Caesar”. Padley (1976: 68) sees in it too the Aristotelian view that the verb makes affirmation about something.

A slightly more independent approach to the category of case in a vernacular language is that of **Murray**, in his celebrated *English Grammar*, published for the first time in 1795. He calls cases the modifications which denote that the nouns sustain to other words. For English he distinguishes three cases: nominative, possessive, objective (e.g. *mother–mother’s–mother*, *I–my–me*, *thou–thy–thee*, etc.) He admits that in the case of nouns the nominative and objective can be distinguished from each other only by means of their linear order. The objective occurs mainly after verbs and prepositions, but lacks any kind of desinential differentiation. This differentiation is still maintained in the case of the personal pronouns<sup>8</sup> (Swett 1843: 27–29, 33–37).

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<sup>8</sup> This essential theme for studies of case was taken up by Jespersen, a great Danish linguist, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. According to Jespersen (1965: 182–184), it is inappropriate to distinguish

One of the most important grammarians of the 18<sup>th</sup> century was **Dumarsais**, the author of *Logique et Principes de Grammaire* ‘Logic and Principles of Grammar’.

In his metaphysical considerations concerning language he seems to follow strictly the lines laid by the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar, in claiming that the thought precedes the language. To be transmitted to other people, an independent thought must first be decomposed and segmented by the language (Dumarsais 1760: 96–97). Since all men think and have to express their thoughts with words, the order in which we speak must be fundamentally uniform everywhere. Dumarsais, as was usual in his times, refers to this as *l’ordre naturel* ‘the natural order’<sup>9</sup>. In the construction where this order is observed (called therefore *construction naturelle* ‘natural construction’ or *construction simple* ‘simple construction’) the words are enunciated in the way the spirit knows the things. The cause precedes the effect, the [AGENT] precedes the [PATIENT] and so on, for example:

- (2) *Dieu a créé le monde.*  
 [AGENT] [PATIENT]  
 ‘God created the world.’

Languages may, for various reasons, not always follow this order, resorting to so-called *constructions figurées* ‘figurative constructions’. Nonetheless, the spirit must be informed about *l’ordre significatif* ‘the significative order’ of things by means of special grammatical devices, such as for example the voice of the verb (ibid. 100–108):

- (3) *Le monde a été créé par l’Être tout-puissant.*  
 [PATIENT] create-PASS [AGENT]  
 ‘The world was created by the omnipotent Being.’

The same applies especially to the case endings, as Dumarsais emphasizes throughout his work. For example, the three Latin sentences:

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an oblique case from the nominative for English nouns on the strength of an analogy with pronouns, because the distinctions made in one word class (pronouns) should not be transferred to other parts of speech (nouns). According to Wierzbicka (1981: 51–61), hypotheses about case homonymy should not be advanced too readily. While the phonetic coalescence of certain cases in Polish (specifically the genitive and accusative of masculine nouns) into one common case would deprive us of the possibility of certain indispensable generalizations, such a coalescence in English (specifically the nominative and oblique case of the whole class of nouns) would not affect the economy and adequacy of description of the language. In English, the relevant meanings are conveyed and syntactic functions distinguished from each other by means of word order: preverbal position – [AGENT], subject; postverbal position – [PATIENT], direct object.

<sup>9</sup> The notion of *l’ordre naturel* had had a strong presence in French linguistics at least since the appearance of Meigret’s grammar *Le tretté de la grammere françoëze* ‘Treatise on the French Grammar’ published in 1550 (Ricken 1977: 203).



another, as well as the precision achieved in the morphological analysis of Sanskrit, something unknown to Europeans at that time, seems to have been decisive for the development of linguistics in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. That period can generally be described as the time of the ascendancy of the diachronic approach, bearing features of a scientific nature, as opposed to the synchronic approach with strong metaphysical inclinations that had prevailed thus far. According to the romantic zeitgeist of the beginning of the century, in the framework of historical-comparative linguistics the past was regarded as something ideal and clear, whereas the present resembled rather an evolutionary decadence, a complication of the original state. Even in the positivistic, atomistic program of the Neogrammarians, proclaimed at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, so difficult to reconcile with the historical-comparative method implying the existence of a certain system (organism), the preference for the diachronic approach is quite visible. **Paul**, who codified the theoretical essentials of the Neogrammarian school, writes in his major theoretical work *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte* ‘Principles of the History of Language’ (1970: 20):

*Sobald man über das blosse Konstatieren von Einzelheiten hinausgeht, sobald man versucht den Zusammenhang zu erfassen, die Erscheinungen zu begreifen, so betritt man auch den geschichtlichen Boden (...) ‘As soon as one exceeds the mere statement of details, as soon as one attempts to catch the relation, to apprehend the phenomena, then one also enters the historical ground (...)’.*

The belief in the primacy of diachrony was overcome only in the 20<sup>th</sup> century by structuralism.

At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, **Bernhardi**, the author of *Anfangsgründe der Sprachwissenschaft* ‘Elements of Linguistics’, made the statement that the relations of dependence between substances (expressed linguistically by means of nouns) are marked either by case endings or by prepositions. The prepositions are therefore functional equivalents of the case endings. What is more, the case endings are not related functionally to the prepositions by mere accident – they are also related genetically. The case endings can be regarded as *verkürzte oder verdunkelte Präpositionen* ‘shortened or darkened prepositions’ (Bernhardi 1805: 133). Hjelmslev (1935: 24) considers Bernhardi’s view of prepositions in the context of case theory to be one of the most successful innovations of those times. Kempf (1978: 5, 26) goes even further, and compares Bernhardi’s insight to the Copernican theory, describing it as ingenious. The entirety of Bernhardi’s linguistic contribution, however, is evaluated more critically. He has been reproached for the fact that his abstractions are too far-reaching given the absence of empirical linguistic data in his works (Gardt 1999: 275).

In presenting the findings of the historical-comparative linguistics of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in relation to case, we shall adopt the Hjelmslevian division into localists,

antilocalists and demilocalists (cf. Hjelmslev 1935: 36–61). The Neogrammarian view will be discussed at the end of this section.

### 1.4.1. The localists

**Bopp**, the true founder of comparative-historical linguistics, in his main work *Vergleichende Grammatik des Sanskrit, Şend, Griechieschen, Lateinischen, Litauishen, Altslavischen, Gothischen und Deutschen* ‘The Comparative Grammar of Sanskrit, Şend, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Old-Slavonic, Gothic and German’, by way of an introduction to the chapter on case, writes that:

*Die Casus-Endungen drücken die wechselseitigen, vorzüglich und ursprünglich einzig räumlichen, vom Raume auf Zeit und Ursache übertragenen Verhältnisse der Nomina, d.h. der Personen der Sprachwelt, zu einander aus* ‘The case endings express the mutual, exquisitely and originally, uniquely spatial, from space into time and cause, transmitted relations between nouns, i.e. between the persons of the lingual world’ (Bopp 1856: 245).

The case endings, according to Bopp, are mostly of pronominal origin. In accordance with the belief in linguistic decadence characteristic of his times, Bopp writes:

*(...) so werden im gesunkeneren, bewußtloseren Zustande der Sprache die geistig todten Casus-Endugen in ihrer räumlichen Geltung durch Praepositionen, und in ihrer persönlichen durch den Artikel ersetzt, unterstützt oder erklärt* ‘(...) so in a more decayed, more unconscious state of the language the spiritually dead case endings are replaced, supported or explained in their spatial application by the prepositions, and in their personal one by the article’ (ibid. 246).

The remainder of Bopp’s considerations of case have less general value. He pays most attention to the extremely detailed comparative-historical morphological analysis of the case forms of the languages being considered.

**Wüllner**, the author of *Die Bedeutung der sprachlichen Casus und Modi* ‘The Meaning of Lingual Cases and Moods’ (1827) and *Ueber Ursprung und Urbedeutung der sprachlichen Formen* ‘About the Provenance and Original Meaning of Lingual Forms’ (1831), seems to be an adherent of the localist case theory, devoting more attention to the issue than his teacher, Bopp.

According to Wüllner (1827: 1–4), the greatest error in linguistic investigation consisted in searching for explanations in that which is objective. No attempt had been made to explain with what view of the idea (*Anschaung der Idee*) our spirit contemplates the objects and relations between them. The idea of every lingual form must be present in the human spirit, it must embrace all of its particular ap-

pearances. Without it it would be impossible to find unity (*Einheit*) in the language; the language would be manifested as chaos.

In Wüllner's view, the Greek and Germanic languages, just as Latin previously, have only three cases: genitive, dative and accusative. It is philosophically and historically incorrect to speak about such cases as nominative and vocative. They are used when the object is being viewed in itself, independently (ibid. 4–6). Cases and prepositions generally serve the same purposes. It is a matter of indifference for a language whether the cases (case meanings) are marked desinentially or by means of prepositions. If a language has case endings and prepositions, then they are often bound with each other. The prepositions are connected with desinential case forms according to their nature. Everything that a (desinential) case signifies with a preposition, it signifies too without the preposition, but more generally. If a case had to mean different, sometimes quite opposite, things, it would in fact mean nothing. Consequently, the general meaning (*Grundbedeutung*) of cases cannot be something more special than the spatial views (*Raumanschauungen*) (ibid. 6–13). For example, the general meaning of the genitive can be observed with the verbs of motion, where it denotes the object or point from which the motion starts (ibid. 13). The general meaning of the dative can be observed most clearly when it denotes a place where something is. The ablative (and the locative and instrumental) are explained by Wüllner as tints (*Schattirungen*) of the dative case (ibid. 71–77). In turn, the general meaning of the accusative refers to the transmission of something into or onto something (ibid. 99).

One of the topics addressed in Wüllner's *Ueber Ursprung und Urbedeutung der sprachlichen Formen* (1831) is the origin of case endings. The case forms arose by way of fusion (*Verschmelzung*) of original local adverbs with basic forms of nouns. The case endings have been largely abraded (*abgeschliffen*) or have vanished almost completely. At the same time, their meaning has become less recognizable. Nonetheless, the case meanings and the subjective lingual basic views (*die sprachlichen Grundanschauungen*) can be explained more clearly only based on the assumption of localist views. Wüllner writes:

*Die ursprünglichen Adverbia bezeichnen Raumanschauungen und Raumanschauungen, und nichts weiter, werden auch durch die Casus bezeichnet* 'The original adverbs signify localist views, and localist views, and nothing more, are signified too by the cases' (ibid: 147–150).

**Hartung**, the author of *Ueber die Casus, ihre Bildung und Bedeutung in der griechischen und lateinischen Sprache* 'About the Cases, their Formation and Meaning in the Greek and Latin Languages' (1831), appears also to be a localist. He regards the word (and its inflectional forms) in reference to its meaning as a natural entirety, not an aggregate of apparent similitudes. All meanings of a word constitute

its general meaning. The general meaning is reflected in every particular meaning. No particular meaning is more distant or less typical in comparison with any other particular meaning of the same case form. The acquisition of new meanings does not take place by way of change or modification of the previous meanings, but by way of their transmission to a new domain. The general meaning is the first meaning according to nature. Our apperception occurs partly by means of our senses and partly by means of our spirit. Sensory apperception is always first. That is why language too serves sensory apperception earlier than spiritual apperception. By virtue of the analogy between sensuality and spirituality, the word is transmitted to the domain of spiritual apperception. It is easier to perceive sensory phenomena, because they are more primitive. The same occurs with the word. It is easier to perceive its sensory reference, and only then can one transmit it to the spiritual plane.

Developing these preliminary remarks, Hartung states that the cases are the exponents of general relations of movement, directions and being in space – of *whence*, *whither* and *where*. The prepositions, in turn, express more detailed relations. These relations, however, contain in themselves the aforementioned more general relations. The use of prepositions does not make the inflectional endings superfluous<sup>10</sup>. Only in analytic languages are the general and detailed spatial relations mixed up. If the first case meanings are spatial, then relations in space can determine how many cases there will be. Languages most frequently have the *whence*-case (genitive), the *whither*-case (accusative) and one *where*-case. The latter is often split into two variants (cases): to distinguish the location directly occupied (i.e. instrumental (locative, ablative)) from that lying in the given direction (i.e. dative). The *whence*-, *whither*- and *where*-cases are indispensable, and hence can be found in every language. Some languages have at their disposal a superfluous abundance by having separate forms for spatial, temporal, modal, instrumental, etc. senses. This results from the breaking up of a single case in which those meanings were sensually and spiritually unified (ibid. 1–12).

Hjelmslev (1935: 36–45) gives a very positive evaluation of the effects of the work of these localists (Bopp, Wüllner and Hartung). He lists among their merits the capacity for the systematic encapsulation of case semantics. In addition, the localist theory seems to corroborate, from the semantic angle, the genetic affinity of the case

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<sup>10</sup> This is especially visible when we compare such pairs as Latin *in urbe* ‘in the town’ and *in urbem* ‘into the town’, where the carrier of the constant meaning [LOCUS] seems to be the preposition *in* ‘in’, while the variable meanings ([REPOSE] vs. [DESTINATION]) are conveyed by the case endings (ABL -*e* and ACC -*em* respectively). Kuryłowicz (1960a: 131–135) notes, however, that while *in urbem* occurs in a semantic relation with certain verbs, being governed by them (e.g. [*in urbem*] *ire* ‘to go [to the town]’), *in urbe* does not exhibit this kind of property – it is free from the verb. Because of this incomparability, the prepositional phrase cannot be morphologically analyzed as “preposition + stem + case ending”. It should be decomposed in such a way that the preposition and case ending together form a discontinuous synsemantic morph (i.e. *in...-e*, *in...-em*) as opposed to the autosemantic morph (*urb-*). The preposition does not govern the case, it only implies the use of a certain ending.

endings, local adverbs and prepositions – an implicit supposition already sensed in antiquity. Nevertheless, in the assertion that prepositions combined with appropriate desinential case forms express (spatial) meanings more precisely, Hjelmslev identifies the direct cause of later developments, which he regards as negative, resulting in the scission between the grammatical and local cases. Hjelmslev also notes the inability of the localists of that era to deal properly with the nominative, which actually seems to have been excluded by the 19<sup>th</sup>-century localists from the inventory of cases.

### 1.4.2. The antilocalists

**Rumpel**, in the introduction to his *Die Casuslehre in besonderer Beziehung auf die griechische Sprache* ‘The Science of Case with Special Reference to the Greek Language’ (1845: VI), announces that the questions concerning case which he addresses serve as prolegomena to any scientific study of syntax. Language occurs primarily in sentences, and only in sentences can it manifest itself. The sentence is the absolute beginning of a language. Nobody can utter a thought without putting it in the form of a sentence. The thought develops in a sentence in such a way that it manifests itself in its generality in the subject and in its particularity in the predicate. The thought requires for its representation such a double operation. The subject seeks for itself a noun, and the predicate a verb (ibid. 108–113). Every verb contains two moments: (i) that of the motion and (ii) that of the substance, and can be therefore decomposed into (i) the copula (auxiliary verb) denoting the motion and (ii) an adjective or a noun denoting the substance. The preponderance of the motional moment over the substantial in a verb, or conversely, causes the class of verbs to split into two genders: (i) transitive and (ii) intransitive. In the intransitive verbs the substantial moment is predominant. The verb in itself is denser, firmer, compacter, more rich in content (*dichter, fester, compakter, inhaltsreicher*). In transitive verbs the substantial moment evaporates (*verflüchtigt sich*). The motion does not complete in the verb, it seeks its termination (*Halt*), its inevitable complement in an object (ibid. 114–124). The nominative, and nothing more, is the case of the subject. It is the first, the most necessary case. The second necessary case is the accusative as the postulate of transitivity. The sentence (thought) can achieve the next degree of development in the genitive – originally the adnominal case. There remains only one more possibility. The subject and predicate can be thought of as a unity, as sentence substance (*Satzsubstanz*), and obtain a closer determiner in the form of the dative. The dative can branch off into the ablative, instrumental, locative, etc. Hereby all possible relations in which a noun can occur are exhausted. Beside the aforementioned cases there cannot be detected with thought the necessity for any other case.

The cases have their inner necessity in the language. Divergent uses of the same case in different languages are different ways of conceptualizing the same thought (ibid. 124–130). In addition, Rumpel offers some strongly critical words against the localist case theories. He reproaches the localists for the fact that none of them had attempted to deduce particular meanings from the general one. He also asserts that at the end of the day there remains nothing that resembles locality in these theories (ibid. 85–96).

**Michelsen**, in his *Kasuslehre der Lateinischen Sprache, vom kausal-lokalen Standpunkte aus* ‘Science of Case of the Latin Language, from the Causal-Local Viewpoint’ (1843: 14–24), notes that the causal case meanings can be exemplified in abundance, whereas for the spatial meanings it is often difficult to find any positive corroboration (e.g. the Latin genitive as *whence*-case). The causal concept should therefore be viewed as the necessarily primary one (at least from the contemporary standpoint). The spatial concept is only contained in the causal concept. Michelsen uses the notions of *grammatische Kasus* ‘grammatical cases’ and *Flexionskasus* ‘inflectional cases’. The grammatical cases can be conceived of as case meanings, and inflectional cases as specific morphological neutralizations of the established case meanings – that is, case forms. The grammatical cases bifurcate into two species: (i) necessary grammatical cases and (ii) possible grammatical cases. The necessary grammatical cases number only three: (i) subjectivity case (cf. [AGENT]), (ii) objectivity case (cf. [PATIENT]), and (iii) finality case (cf. [BENEFICIARY]). Such causal notions as cause, effect, purpose, action are present in every utterance and are expressed by the necessary grammatical cases in the following way: subjectivity case – cause and action; objectivity case – effect; finality case – purpose. Since any utterance can be complemented with the finality case (e.g. *Die Rose blüht (zu Gottes Ehre)* ‘The rose blossoms (of the glory of God)’), its absolute necessity can be questioned. The finality case constitutes a transition to the possible grammatical cases. The possible grammatical cases signify spatiality, but since the category of spatiality consists of the triad *whence-where-whither*, it can also be viewed as a subcategory of causality. While the number of grammatical cases is limited by considering the laws of causality (spatiality), the number of inflectional cases is practically unlimited (ibid. 27–88). Of great interest is the position taken by Michelsen towards such problematic cases as nominative, vocative and genitive. The nominative functions as *Nennkasus* ‘naming case’ only through ellipsis, and is nothing other than the subject case. The vocative in turn can be conceived of as a modification of the nominative in its naming function in reference to the second person. The interjection constitutes a transition from unarticulated to articulated tones (words). The vocative constitutes a transition from the simple naming function of the word to its function within the complete sentence (ibid. 117–119). The semantic scope of the genitive is indeed very extensive, but it seems to be limited on one hand by the adjective, which is “an

accomplished attributive form” (*vollendete Attributionsform*), and on the other by the apposition, which is “an attributive form in its becoming” (*Attributionsform in ihrem Werden*). What is more, the semantic scope of the genitive is practically equal to that of the nominative. The genitive is originally the adnominal, and nominative the adverbial case (*ibid.* 124–130).

Hjelmslev’s principal criticism of Rumpel’s syntactic theory of cases is that he attempts to bind the cases with the concepts of sentence (as logical judgment) on one hand, and discourse on the other. Both concepts, however, in Hjelmslev’s view, belong to the logical, transcendental, extralinguistic, stylistic order, and as such cannot be used as a basis for morphological definitions. While the cases cannot be defined by means of the notion of sentence, they can be defined by means of the relations (i.e. government) taking place within the syntagm, which is, in contrast to the sentence, a grammatical reality. Rumpel’s theory succeeded in seriously compromising the localist theory, which from that time on was seen as departing from the concrete and spatial facts in order to explain by means of them, according to the principle of metonymy (*le principe de la métonymie*), more abstract uses expressed by the cases (Hjelmslev 1935: 47–55). On the other hand, Hjelmslev’s principal criticism of Michelsen’s causal theory of cases is that causality is a less general concept than the abstract idea of direction offered by the localists (*ibid.* 45–47).

### 1.4.3. The demilocalists

**Hübschmann** (1875: 131–137), a well-known German orientalist, seems to take an intermediate position between the localists and antilocalists, by stating that the cases divide into two species:

- (i) the grammatical cases (nominative, accusative, genitive) conveying pure grammatical relations;
- (ii) non-grammatical cases (locative, ablative, instrumental) conveying spatial and temporal relations.

It is not clear in which group the dative should be placed. Hübschmann’s merits undoubtedly include the clearly stated desideratum that linguists should also pay attention to other languages, not only those belonging to the Indo-European family (*ibid.* 129).

According to Hjelmslev (1935: 55–61), the demilocalist theory (as presented by Hübschmann), although born in opposition to the localist theory, admits that there exist two kind of cases: (i) grammatical (or logical) and (ii) local (or concrete). What is more, the demilocalist local cases turn out to be units conveying the spatial mean-

ings literally – a state of affairs unknown in the localist approaches! Consequently, the antilocalist and demilocalist theories have only blurred the achievements of the localists.

The first part of **Wundt**'s *Völkerpsychologie* 'Psychology of Nations' appears to be a reaction against the one-sidedness of the positivistic and naturalistic program of the Neogrammarians, a kind of psychologicistic equivalent of Paul's *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte* (Heinz 1978: 185–189).

In reference to case theory, Wundt (1900: 69–73) notices that the explanatory force of the localist case theory does not seem to be sufficient, either psychologically or diachronically. There can be distinguished three main stages of the development of the (desinential) case formations:

- (i) a stage without any formal (desinential) case distinctions, where appropriate case meanings are expressed by word order or are contextually default;
- (ii) a stage of excessive abundance of (desinential) case formations expressing concrete relations between notions;
- (iii) a stage of secondary constraint of (desinential) case formations expressing some basic relations between notions (such a system prevails in the modern Indo-European languages, which abound in prepositions replacing lost case endings).

The localist case theory therefore overlooks an essential fact: the spatial meanings of such cases as genitive, dative and accusative are not original. These cases were enriched with spatial meanings only as a result of the loss of the concrete cases (ibid. 120–121). Wundt seems to be an adherent of the dualistic case theory. The cases bifurcate, in his view, into two groups:

- (i) cases in which the spatial meaning is only a peripheral one with respect to the logical-grammatical meaning (nominative, accusative, genitive and dative);
- (ii) cases in which the spatial meaning is the predominant one.

The cases of the first group (grammatical cases) can be expressed by mere word order and are called cases of interior determination (*Casus der inneren Determination*), whereas those of the second group (concrete cases) cannot generally lack a formal exponent and are called cases of exterior determination (*Casus der äußeren Determination*). The number of cases of interior determination is restrained by the linear properties of the language to only four: nominative, accusative, genitive and dative. The number of cases of exterior determination is unlimited (ibid. 73–80).

Hjelmslev evaluates the point of departure of Wundt's case theory as localist. Notwithstanding, Wundt's division between (i) the obligatory cases of interior determination and (ii) those of exterior determination, which are facultative, fails in the face of the lingual facts. First of all, many languages seem to possess mixed cases (i.e. conveying features of those of both interior and exterior determination). Wundt's theory would not therefore be applicable to them. Secondly, some languages seem to lack certain obligatory cases. In Finnish, for example, the meanings otherwise characteristic of the dative are distributed between the allative and illative, which themselves evidently possess content of the exterior order. According to Hjelmslev, although cases are present in every language, their semantic content (not to mention their manifestation) varies in unique ways from language to language. In the light of this, Wundt's theory in its totality, predicting universal (obligatory) cases with previously circumscribed semantic content and syntagmatic functioning, is false (Hjelmslev 1935: 62–70).

#### 1.4.4. The Neogrammarians

**Noreen**, the author of the monumental seven-volume oeuvre *Vårt Språk* 'Our Language', analyzes the category of case in Swedish in the fifth volume, which is devoted to semantics (*Betydelselära*) (1904). In his approach Noreen proposes to distinguish explicitly between *kasus* and *status*, that is between, roughly, 'case form' and 'case meaning'.

Noreen distinguishes for Swedish the following (types of) case forms: (i) *kasus rektus* 'casus rectus' and (ii) *kasus obliqvus* 'oblique case'. To *kasus rektus* belong the words functioning mainly as *hufvudglosa* 'head' and, under certain circumstances, as *biglosa* 'determiner'. *Kasus rektus* is equal to the noun's basic form, e.g. all nouns in the sentence *Fadern gaf gossen boken* 'The father gave the book to the boy' (*fadern* 'the father', *gossen* 'the boy', *boken* 'the book') belong to *kasus rektus*. To *kasus obliqvus* 'oblique case' there belong only words functioning as *biglosa* 'determiner'. The oblique cases, according to their formal manifestation, undergo further classification into: (i) *kasus suffixalis* 'suffixal case' (which can be: (a) incongruent (*kasus inkongruens*), e.g. *satan/s karl* 'devil's man' and (b) congruent (*kasus kongruens*), e.g. *satan/isk karl* 'devilish man'), (ii) *kasus komponens* 'componential case', e.g. *kyrk/o/råd* 'church council' (cf. *kyrk/a* 'church'), and (iii) *kasus partikularis* 'particle case', bifurcating into: (a) *kasus prepositionalis* 'prepositional case' and (b) *kasus subjunktionalis* 'subjunctional case'. The prepositional case can be: (1) *kasus antepositionalis* 'antepositional case', e.g. *foten på bordet* 'the leg of the table', (2) *kasus postpositionalis* 'postpositional case', e.g. *året om* 'throughout the year', and (3) *kasus cirkumpositionalis* 'circumpositional case', e.g. *för ett år*

*sedan* ‘one year ago’. The subjunctive case is marked by a particle (conjunction) and constitutes a sentence, e.g. *Jag hör att lärkan sjunger* ‘I hear that the lark is singing’ (cf. *lärkan/s sång* ‘the lark’s singing’) (ibid. 178–189). All this is summarized in the following table (the markers of the cases are bolded):

kasus							
rektus	oblikvus						
	suffixalis		komponens	partikularis			subjunktionalis
	inkongruens	kongruens		prepositionalis			
			ante-positionalis	post-positionalis	cirkumpositionalis		
<i>fadern</i>	<i>satan/s</i>	<i>satan/isk</i>	<i>kyrko/råd</i>	<i>på bordet</i>	<i>året om</i>	<i>för ett år sedan</i>	<i>att lärkan sjunger</i>

*Status* is conceived of as a specific semantic relation (*betydelseförhållande*) of the determiner to its head. For Swedish, Noreen defines 87 such relations, grouping them into two main classes: (i) *yttre status* ‘exterior statuses’ referring to space (*rum*) and time (*tid*), and (ii) *inre status* ‘interior statuses’ referring to different mental concepts, quite difficult to classify unambiguously. The exterior and interior statuses consequently divide into smaller classes, and those further into their appropriate subclasses, e.g. [ESSIVA] → [INESSIVUS], [INTERESSIVUS], [ADESSIVUS], etc., [INESSIVUS] → [LOKAL INESSIV], [TEMPORAL INESSIV] (ibid. 190–252).

The analysis appears essentially to adopt what Zwiegincew (1962: 118–127) calls the semasiological approach. Noreen, by treating the meaning (*status*) as the departure point, determines with incredible scrupulousness which forms (*kasus*) serve the lingual manifestation of the said statuses. For example, [LOKAL INESSIV] can be accomplished by the following types of *kasus*: (i) *rektus* (e.g. (rarely) *min våning Kungsgatan/Ø 65* ‘my flat at King’s Street 65’), (ii) *inkongruens* (e.g. *skogen/s fåglar* ‘the forest’s birds’), (iii) *komponens* (e.g. *skog/s/fåglarna* ‘the forest birds’), and (iv) *prepositionalis* (e.g. *fåglarna i skogen* ‘the birds in the forest’). [TEMPORAL INESSIV] can be accomplished by: (i) *rektus* (e.g. *föreläsningen nästa måndag/Ø* ‘the lecture next Monday’), (ii) *inkongruens* (e.g. *måndagen/s föreläsning* ‘Monday’s lecture’), (iii) *komponens* (e.g. *måndag/s/föreläsningen* ‘the Monday lecture’), and (iv) *prepositionalis* (e.g. *föreläsningen på måndag* ‘the lecture on Monday’), etc. (Noreen 1904: 191–192).

Noreen's conclusions have been criticized on many occasions. Hjelmslev (1935: 92–93), for example, ascertains that the number of statuses established for modern Swedish exceeds all expectations, their nature being of the extralinguistic order. Kempf criticizes Noreen essentially on the same basis. Case cannot be only a logical category; it must be a lingual category having its own grammatical markers. Since the meaning of, for example, both inseparable parts (e.g. *en gren af trädet* 'a branch of the tree') and separable parts (e.g. *huden af kreaturet* 'the skin of the animal') are marked by the same preposition *af* 'of', there is no reason to introduce two cases, partitive and separative respectively (Kempf 1978: 11–12). It is true that Noreen's approach is burdened with an impenetrable, chaotic network of relations between *kasus* and *status*. The author, however, does not state anywhere that the partitive and separative, or others, are two different morphological categories relevant to Swedish, as Kempf suggests (as the table above shows, there are only eight cases (*kasus*) in Noreen's approach). Noreen speaks about partitive and separative meanings and then turns to the analysis of their formal manifestations, which indeed seem to be neutralized phonetically to a considerable degree. Hjelmslev's criticism is more troublesome. There seems indeed to be no difference in grammatical character between, for example, the local and temporal inessive (cf. the examples quoted above). It is the whole context (mainly lexical) that actualizes the target meanings (e.g. spatial for *skog* 'forest' in *skogsfåglarna* 'the forest birds', and temporal for *måndag* 'Monday' in *måndagsföreläsningen* 'the Monday lecture'). Of what order is this actualization, if not lingual?

## 1.5. The 20<sup>th</sup> century

**Humboldt**, though he went unnoticed by his contemporaries in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, can be regarded as the forerunner of modern 20<sup>th</sup>-century linguistics. Although Humboldt's ideas were presented in a very general (or outright non-scientific, poetic) way, Heinz (1978: 146–147) considers that the whole notional apparatus of modern linguistics was practically sensed in one way or another by him. For example, one of the Humboldtian notions which has been extensively referred to in the literature – *innere Sprachform* 'inner speech-form' – is often regarded as a rapprochement to the later 'notional form' as opposed to 'notional substance'. Humboldt (1848: 46) writes:

*Der wirkliche Stoff der Sprache ist auf der einen Seite der Laut überhaupt, auf der andren die Gesamtheit der sinnlichen Eindrücke und selbstthätigen Geistesbewegungen, welche der Bildung des Begriffs mit Hilfe der Sprache vorausgehen* 'The real matter of the language is on one hand the sound generally, and on the other the entirety of the sensual impressions and

self-acting movements of the spirit, which precede the creation of the notion with the aid of the language’.

Humboldt (1836: 72) senses too the systemic nature of language:

*Man kann die Sprache mit einem ungeheuren Gewebe vergleichen, in dem jeder Theil mit dem andren und alle mit dem ganzen in mehr oder weniger deutlich erkennbaren Zusammenhange stehen* ‘One can compare language with an enormous web, in which each part with another part and everything with the whole remains in more or less clear-cut connection’.

### 1.5.1. Structuralism

**Hjelmslev** was the founder and main representative of the Copenhagen Linguistic Circle, together with its theoretical program – glossemantics – the first consistently formalized language theory, expounded in its most developed form in *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language* (Hjelmslev 1963). With this program, Hjelmslev believed that he was developing most faithfully **Saussure**’s (1980: 169) ideas that language is a form, not a substance (*la langue est une forme et non une substance*) and that the unique and true object of linguistics is language considered in itself and for itself (*la linguistique a pour unique et véritable objet la langue envisagée en elle-même et pour elle-même* (ibid. 317)). Hjelmslev (1954: 163) defines language as a specific form organized between two substances: that of the content and that of the expression (*une forme spécifique organisée entre deux substances: celle du contenu et celle de l’expression*). The language scheme can be viewed as composed of four strata: (i) two central ones: (a) that of expression-form (referring to the phonological system of a language) and (b) that of content-form (referring to the ordering of the matter, of the extralinguistic world, by a language); and (ii) two marginal ones: (a) that of expression-substance (referring to the speech sounds) and (b) that of content-substance (referring to the denoted matter, extralinguistic reality). This can be shown diagrammatically as follows:

<b>expression</b>	<b>substance</b>	phonetics
	<b>form</b>	glossemantics
<b>content</b>	<b>form</b>	
	<b>substance</b>	semantics

Glossemantics is interested only in the two formal planes and their relation to one other. The units of both planes exist only as terminals (*functives*) of appropriate relations (*functions*) between them. In both planes it is possible to distinguish their minimal terminals – *figurae* – which have neither any expression nor content. These are pleremes for the content plane (cf. semantic markers), and cenemes for the expression plane (cf. distinctive features of the phoneme). The pleremes and cenemes constitute so-called glossemes. Glossemantics therefore deals ultimately with the combinatorics of these (Helbig 1986: 60–72).

The work *La catégorie des cas* ‘The Category of Cases’ (Hjelmslev 1935) can be conceived of as an attempt to describe the localist case theory from a glossemantic point of view.

Hjelmslev states with regret that the case theories of his time are condemned to function within the framework of the Greek-Latin tradition. First of all, the category of case is defined negatively. The Greek, Latin and even Sanskrit case systems are distinguished in the plane of expression by the crossing of three categories: case, number, and gender. From the traditional point of view, by resorting to the principle of metonymy, it was quite easy to find tangible and concrete meanings for number and gender. The category of number expresses quantity, and the category of gender expresses sex. The paradigmatic configurations, in spite of the muddling of these three meanings, seem to be clearly structured. The series of cases repeat themselves in every number and gender with quite great regularity. Consequently, the cases are defined de facto as something that “remains” in the declension after the meanings of number and gender have been discarded from it, as an unexplained residue (*un résidu inexpliqué*). Secondly, the attachment to the desinential mechanisms of expression characteristic of the classical languages, excluding other possibilities, is condemned, especially because a rigorous distinction between lexical morphemes (*sémantèmes*) and grammatical morphemes (*morphèmes*), just like between syntheticity and analyticity, had not yet been achieved. Hjelmslev, in the spirit of his glossemantics, describes the difference between syntheticity and analyticity as a difference of expression and not one of lingual form. Differences in form between Latin and French, for example, are not greater than the differences between Latin and any other language. Thirdly, there is a certain reluctance to address any kind of particularity or defectivity. The traditional approaches content themselves with defining the most widespread system among different subsystems (declensions). To sum up, every discussion concerning the meaning and structure of the category of case had been viewed as theoretical frippery, as an ornament cast on an already finished edifice. Hjelmslev proposed to break with that tradition. On the old shards there should be erected the edifice of a new semantic theory, a fundamental system hiding behind every particular manifestation (ibid. 71–84).

In defining the cases one should take into account their general meaning (*signification générale*), which requires the abandonment of the principle of metonymy. The only case theory able to manage without resorting to that principle is the localist theory, which covers with sufficient abstraction not only spatial, but also temporal, logical and syntagmatic relations. Hjelmslev emphasizes that the localist theory does not have to exhaust all of the facts. From the general meaning, as a differential minimum of signification, one should be able to deduce more concrete uses of a case form treated as a grammatical unit. Besides, the grammatical unit should be defined by its relations to other units of the system. The general meaning is not equal to the sum of the uses neutralized in a grammatical form. By conveying the differential function, it should refer intrinsically to the whole language system, it should explain only that which is essential for the system<sup>11</sup> (ibid. 84–94).

Different hitherto existing case theories have recognized, more or less explicitly, a system of more than one dimension as constitutive for the meaning of cases in any language. The first dimension is that of {direction}. The other dimension, that of {dependence}, used to distinguish casus rectus from oblique cases, should be abandoned because it does not contribute anything essential. The concepts of independence-dependence go back to the general concept of direction. Case can be defined as a category which expresses a relation between two objects (*une catégorie qui exprime une relation entre deux objets*) (ibid. 93–98).

Roth (1815: 36–38) asserted that there is no case indicating pure independence as opposed to dependence (cf. casus rectus vs. oblique cases). The case(s) conveying the feature of independence is (are) opposed only to the cases conveying the complex feature of independence-dependence. Hjelmslev (1935: 98–102) interprets this as the opposition between a complex (for example: + 0 ÷) and simple idea (+ or 0 or ÷). In his view, this phenomenon is relevant to any grammatical dimension. The system is oriented towards only one feature of the dimension. In Latin, for example, everything seems to be arranged around the idea of [SEPARATION] (÷). The only case which is relatively well defined is therefore the ablative. The remaining cases indicate a neutral or complex idea of direction.

While the idea of cases is universal, the ideas of particular cases are not. There is no universal nominative, genitive etc. The denominations given to particular cases in different languages, for example Latin ‘genitive’, Greek ‘genitive’ and so on, are only of an approximate nature, and do not occur in any relation to the language system. The definition of a case is determined by the other cases occurring in a given system – by its differential value (ibid. 102–104).

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<sup>11</sup> Since it is difficult to find any semantic affinity between the vocative and other cases, Hjelmslev (1935: 4) concludes that the vocative does not belong to the category of case.

The cases are related to other lingual categories. They constitute an inflectional category which is paradigmatic and syntagmatic at the same time. Case government can be viewed as partially mechanical. The choice of the appropriate case can depend on the semantic affinity between the governor and the case affix attached to the governed member of a syntagm. At the same time, the case morpheme can convey its own meaning independently from the fact of the government. The syntagmatic facts presuppose the paradigmatic facts and are a consequence of them. This being so, case government can be explained fully only by the value of the case in question. Between the category of case and that of diathesis it is possible to state semantic affinity. The same applies to the relation between the category of case and that of prepositions, which the author classifies as a lexical category. The category of case can also be related to categories with which it does not seem to show any semantic affinity. In Latin, for example, the opposition between the nominative and accusative is suspended (syncretized) if those categories come into a relation with the neutral gender (*ibid.* 104–110).

Hjelmslev emphasizes that the semantic structure of any morphological category is organized within one dimension in such a way that only one of its subcategories is chosen as the pivot (or pole) of the system. The remaining subcategories are semantically grouped around it, acquiring a neutral or complex value in reference to the first one. Since any semantic zone (i.e. dimension) can contain the pivot of the system, the system can have positive (+), neutral (0) or negative (÷) orientation (cf. the idea of [SEPARATION] in the Latin case system). The case chosen as the pivot of the system has a tendency to concentrate the meaning, whereas the remaining cases have a tendency to spread the meaning into other zones. Hjelmslev briefly analyzes in this light particular subsystems of the category of case in Modern English, Gothic, Modern German and Turkish, exemplifying at the same time the functioning of one-dimensional systems. In the subsystem of the common nouns of personal gender in Modern English, taken in isolation, it is possible to identify only two cases: (i) the genitive ending in *-s*, tending to concentrate the meaning in the zone of [SEPARATION] (÷), and (ii) the non-genitive with formant *-∅*, tending to spread the meaning to all zones ([RAPPROCHEMENT] (+), [REPOSE] (0), and [SEPARATION] (÷)). While the systems with two cases are indifferent with regard to the distinction between the contrary opposition (for example: [SEPARATION] vs. [RAPPROCHEMENT]) and contradictory opposition (for example: [SEPARATION] vs. [RAPPROCHEMENT] and [REPOSE]), this difference becomes decisive in systems with three or four cases. In the framework of the subsystem of the common nouns of personal gender in Modern English, now taking into consideration meaningful word order, it is possible to identify four cases: (i) the subjective (taking the preverbal position), (ii) genitive (with the ending *-s*), (iii) dative (taking the first postverbal position), and (iv) translative (taking the second postverbal position). The subjective and translative enter into a contrary opposition (subjective: (mainly) [SEPARATION] vs. translative:

(mainly) [RAPPROCHEMENT]). The dative and genitive enter into a contradictory opposition (dative: (mainly) [RAPPROCHEMENT] and [SEPARATION] vs. genitive (mainly) [REPOSE]). Systems with five or six cases again contain cases occurring in participative opposition (for example: [SEPARATION] vs. [RAPPROCHEMENT], [REPOSE] and [SEPARATION]), just as in the systems with two cases. An example of a system with five cases is the subsystem of Modern German adjectives, and an example of a system of six cases is the system of Turkish nouns. The main corollary which follows from these considerations is that one-dimensional systems can contain a maximum of six cases. Depending on the number of cases, the semantic structure of the system, prescinding from its orientation, can admit the following forms:

two	case I	case II				
case system:	+	+ 0 ÷				
three	case I	case II	case III			
case system:	+ (0 ÷)	(+ 0) ÷	+ (0) ÷			
	case I	case II	case III			
	+ (0 ÷)	(+ 0) ÷	((+) 0) (÷)			
four	case I	case II	case III	case IV		
case system:	+ (0 ÷)	(+ 0) ÷	+ (0) ÷	((+) 0) (÷)		
five	case I	case II	case III	case IV	case V	
case system:	+	+ 0 ÷	+ (0 ÷)	(+ 0) ÷	+ (0) ÷	
	case I	case II	case III	case IV	case V	
	+	+ 0 ÷	+ (0 ÷)	(+ 0) ÷	((+) 0) (÷)	
six	case I	case II	case III	case IV	case V	case VI
case system:	+	+ 0 ÷	+ (0 ÷)	(+ 0) ÷	+ (0) ÷	((+) 0) (÷)

The case system is subject to certain solidarity laws (*lois de solidarité*). Two cases are solidary when they are present or absent in any case system. For example, solidary pairs include case I (+) vs. case II (+ 0 ÷) and case I (+ (0 ÷)) vs. case II ((+ 0) ÷). Case I (+ (0 ÷)) and case II ((+) 0 (÷)) are never solidary. Other solidary pairs of cases are: pair I (case I (+ (0 ÷)) and case II ((+ 0) ÷)) and pair II (case I (+ (0 ÷)) and case II ((+) 0 (÷)) (ibid. 111–126).

In order to state the general idea of the category of case, it is necessary to project the logical and prelogical system onto a common plane – a sublogical system, as Hjelmslev proposes. Such a sublogical system, containing the following three dimensions, would be sufficient to explain the systems of case and of prepositions observed in languages:

- |       |  |   |
|-------|--|---|
| (i)   | <i>direction</i><br>( <i>rapprochement-éloignement</i> ) | {direction<br>( <i>rapprochement-separation</i> )}; |
| (ii)  | <i>cohérence-incohérence</i>                             | {coherence-incoherence};                            |
| (iii) | <i>subjectivité-objectivité</i>                          | {subjectivity-objectivity}.                         |

The dimension of {direction} has already been referred to on many occasions. The dimension of {coherence-incoherence} refers to the degree of intimacy between two objects being bound with each other (e.g. [*something*] *on the table* (+), [*something*] *over the table* (÷)). This abstract concept also makes it possible to distinguish cases susceptible to concrete, spatial interpretation (incoherent) from those that are resistant to such an interpretation (coherent). The dimension of {subjectivity-objectivity}, in turn, refers to the role of the thinking individual in the relation between two objects. The relation [*L'oiseau est*] *sous l'arbre* 'The bird is] under the tree' is objective because the bird is under the tree independently of the position of the thinking individual. The tree has its objective bottom and top. The relation [*L'oiseau est*] *derrière l'arbre* 'The bird is] behind the tree' is subjective, because without the thinking individual the tree does not have an objective front and back side. The three dimensions constitute a hierarchy. The first dimension is present in every case system, while the third dimension is represented most rarely. The disappearance of any dimension in the description of a particular case system does not necessarily mean that the significations contained by definition in that dimension have to be non-existent. The appropriate distinctions can still be expressed implicitly, without any relation to the system. Every idea can be expressed in every language, but not everywhere systematically<sup>12</sup> (ibid. 127–136).

Since there are three dimensions, and every dimension can contain six features, the theoretical maximum number of cases is 216 (6<sup>3</sup>). Nevertheless, the existence of a language with so many cases has not yet been empirically corroborated. It is possible that, apart from the theoretical maximum, there may be an absolute maximum which is never surpassed in real lingual manifestations. The determination of such a maximum given the contemporary state of knowledge seems to be impossible.

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<sup>12</sup> In comparison with Hjelmslev, Maciejewski (1996: 128–131) seems to represent an even more localist point of view, finding a local semantic component in many other grammatical categories. He reasons, for example, that the quantitative conceptualization of objects (expressed by the markers of number) relies on qualitative distinctions, on their conceptualization as spatially comparable (i.e. substitutable). In reference to the Hjelmslevian matrix of semantic oppositions valid for the case system in every language, he nonetheless remains skeptical, ascertaining that such an universal matrix cannot exist (ibid. 27).

In subsequent sections of the work, Hjelmslev studies in detail the case systems of Tabassaran (52 cases)<sup>13</sup> and Lak (48 cases), and Caucasian languages, the only known languages with three-dimensional systems (ibid. 137–183). The second part of *La catégorie des cas* (Hjelmslev 1937) is devoted to the analysis of two-dimensional case systems of Caucasian languages from the theoretical viewpoint expounded in the first part: Avar (where the empirical number of cases coincides with the theoretical one: 36), Hurqili (23), Küri (19), Chechen (18), Udi (12), and one non-Caucasian language – Greenlandic (8).

**Jakobson**, one of the organizers of the Prague Linguistic Circle, had an extremely wide range of linguistic interests, which included morphology. In the article *Zur Struktur des russischen Verbums* ‘To the Structure of the Russian Verb’ (Jakobson 1971a), in emphasizing the role of linguistic analysis based on binary schema, he proposes to extend the properties of phonological correlations – markedness vs. unmarkedness (cf. Trubetzkoy 1970: 66) – to the domain of morphology. He assumes that any two opposing morphological categories are not equal in their rights (*gleichberechtigt*). They do not both possess positive meaning, nor can one of them be characterized by the absence of the meaning of its correlative. The meanings of correlative morphological categories are assigned differently. Whereas category I announces the presence of the meaning [A], the category II does not announce whether [A] is present or absent. For example, the present tense of Russian verbs can be regarded as unmarked in opposition to the past tense, because while the past tense expresses actions taking place in the past, the present tense can express actions which are temporally indeterminate (Jakobson 1971a: 3–8).

Jakobson’s considerations concerning the category of case, with special attention to its semantics, were published in *Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasuslehre. Gesamtbedeutungen der russischen Kasus* ‘Contribution to the General Science of Case. General Meanings of the Russian Cases’ (Jakobson 1971b). The author proposes there that the question of so-called *Gesamtbedeutungen* ‘general meanings’ of grammatical forms should constitute the natural basis of the theory of the grammatical system of a language. Although this question had been generally known to all holistic linguistic schools preceding him for at least one century, it had nevertheless been neglected in favor of an atomistic description of lingual facts. What is more, Jakobson sees the more moderate doctrine, in which particular cases are conceived of as carriers of whole bundles of diverse meanings, as resulting in the loss of any connection between the lingual sign and its meaning. In such an approach, case inevitably dissociates into homonyms, forms which are not bound with one another. However, the presence of cases in

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<sup>13</sup> Based on newer studies made by native speakers, Kempf (1978: 46–67) comes to the conclusion that there are (at least) 88 cases in Tabassaran.

language is objective, in opposition to the subjective nature of their arrangement in particular meanings (ibid. 23–24).

The aforementioned article contains a vast sketch of morphological correlations in the realm of the Russian cases, and clarifies their general meanings. The Russian language has, in Jakobson's approach, the following (desinential) cases<sup>14</sup>:

- (i) nominative;
- (ii) genitive I;
- (iii) genitive II;
- (iv) dative;
- (v) accusative;
- (vi) instrumental;
- (vii) locative I;
- (viii) locative II.

The nominative and accusative in Russian are opposed to each other in such a way that, while the accusative announces generally that the activity is directed at the object, the nominative as a whole does not announce whether such reference is present or not (cf. passive *Отец/Ø люблён сыном* 'The father is loved by the son' and active sentences *Отец/Ø любит сына* 'The father loves the son'). Consequently, indication of the presence of such a reference is a feature of the accusative as opposed to the nominative. The accusative should be conceived of as the marked, and the nominative as the unmarked, member of the opposition. The nominative and accusative differ from each other in the hierarchy of meanings. The accusative as such indicates that there is something in the statement that is superordinated to it. The accusative announces the hierarchy of meanings, whereas the nominative lacks such a feature (cf. the pure naming function of the nominative). The question of general meanings belongs to morphology, whereas the question of particular meanings belongs to syntax (or lexicology). The general meaning is independent of the environment, whereas the particular meaning is conditioned by it (cf. *ОТЕЦ* as [PATIENT] in the sentence *Отец/Ø люблён сыном*, and as [AGENT] in the sentence *Отец/Ø любит сына*). The particular meanings are conceived of as combinatory variants of the general meaning (ibid. 31–37).

From comparison of the Russian genitive (in the form of its two variations: I and II) with the nominative and accusative, it is concluded that the genitive announces the boundary of the participation of the object in the state of affairs (*die Grenze der Teilnahme des bezeichneten Gegenstandes am Sachverhalte der Aussage*), whereas

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<sup>14</sup> Jakobson (1971b: 28–29), unlike Hjelmslev, does not qualify prepositions or word order as case markers.

the nominative and accusative do not make any reference to that kind of meaning. Let us compare:

<p><b>genitive</b></p> <p>(8) <i>Люд/ей</i>      <i>собралось.</i>  <i>people-GEN PL</i>          ‘Some people gathered.’</p>	<p><b>nominative</b></p> <p>(8’) <i>Люд/и</i>      <i>собрались.</i>  <i>people-NOM PL</i>          ‘The people gathered.’</p>
<p><b>genitive</b></p> <p>(9) <i>Просил</i>      <i>денег/∅.</i>  <i>money-GEN PL</i>          ‘He asked for some money.’</p>	<p><b>accusative</b></p> <p>(9’) <i>Просил</i>      <i>деньг/и.</i>  <i>money-ACC PL</i>          ‘He asked for the money.’</p>

The opposition between the accusative (signaling the object of the activity) and the nominative (being indeterminate in the relevant dimension) is neutralized in the genitive (cf. sentences (8), (8’), (9) and (9’)). The genitive announces only that the scope of the participation of the object in the state of affairs is smaller than the whole scope of the object in question. Jakobson denies the traditional division made in the literature between the adverbial and adnominal uses of the genitive. Either the word on which the genitive is dependent directly limits the scope of the object marked by the genitive (cf. *стакан вод/ы* ‘the glass of water’) or it abstracts from the object something of its properties (cf. *красота девушк/и* ‘the beauty of the girl’, *слово человек/а* ‘the word of the man’), or else the direction of the abstraction of properties is reversed (cf. *человек слов/а* ‘the man of word’). The adnominal use of the genitive displays most completely its semantic particularity, being the only case that can refer to a thing without any verbal nuance (ibid. 37–44).

The dative, similarly to the accusative, expresses the object affected by the action. Consequently, the dative is the marked, and the nominative the unmarked, member of the opposition. The difference between the dative and the accusative consists in the fact that the dative refers to an object which takes a peripheral place in the action, whereas the accusative refers to an object about which it is not known whether it takes a peripheral or central place. The sentence type *Он посылает письма* ‘He sends letters’, lacking the dative, is not perceived as elliptic. Jakobson therefore calls the dative a *Randkasus* ‘peripheral case’, whereas the accusative is a *Vollkasus* ‘full case’. The dative announces the independent existence of an object, whereas the accusative does not announce whether it already exists without the action (cf. *читать книгу/у* ‘to read a book’) or does not (cf. *писать письмо/∅* ‘to write a letter’) (ibid. 45–46, 52–56).

Whereas the dative and accusative refer to objects affected by the action, the Russian instrumental, like the nominative, does not as a whole express whether or not the object is affected by the action (cf. *Министры управляют стран/ой* ‘The ministers govern the country’ (affected), *Страна управляется министр/ами* ‘The country is governed by ministers’ (not affected)). However, in terms of its position in reference to the action, the instrumental seems to be a peripheral case (just like the dative) in opposition to the central nominative. Among the peripheral cases, the instrumental takes an analogous position to that of the nominative among the full cases, by tending to perform the role of a pure lexical form (ibid. 45–52).

The locative, as with the genitive, neutralizes the opposition between the thing being affected by the action and the lack of any reference to that fact (cf. *Признаюсь в ошибк/е* ‘I recognize my mistake’ with the synonymous *Признаю ошибку/у* ‘I recognize my mistake’, and *площадь Маяковского в Москв/е* ‘Mayakovsky square in Moscow’ with the synonymous *площадь Маяковского, Москва/Ø* ‘Mayakovsky square, Moscow’). The use of the locative presupposes a hierarchy of meanings, just like the accusative and other cases with the exception of the nominative, for example: *о лун/е* – [someone] [speaks] about the moon, *на лун/е* – [something] [is] on the moon. What is more, just like the dative and instrumental, the locative takes a peripheral position in the action. The locative is the only obligatorily prepositional case in Russian. The object expressed by the locative is not represented in its whole extent, just as in the case of the genitive. The sentence *Подушка лежит на диван/е* ‘The pillow is lying on the couch’, for example, speaks only of the partial involvement of the couch in the action of lying on it, namely the involvement of only its surface. However, the locative, in contrast to the genitive, turns out to be a peripheral case. Consequently, on one hand the locative, as marked, turns out to be in opposition to the nominative/instrumental and accusative/dative as a case referring to quantitative relations, while on the other hand, in contrast to the nominative/accusative and genitive, it turns out to be a peripheral case. Jakobson presents the locative as the antipode of the unmarked nominative in the whole system of Russian cases (ibid. 58–60).

In the case of some Russian nouns there occur two heterophones of the genitive and locative: the so-called genitive I (for example: *мёд/а*) vs. genitive II (*мёд/у*) (both: ‘of the honey’) and locative I (for example: *(в) лес/е*) vs. locative II (*(в) лес/у*) (both: ‘in the forest’). Jakobson proposes to regard both the genitive II and the locative II as the marked member of the opposition, referring to an object that has undergone formation. The genitive II and the locative II can therefore be called *Gestaltungskasus* ‘formation cases’. For example, the phrase *бутылка мёд/у* (genitive II) ‘the bottle of honey’ refers to honey which must first be formed to occupy the space of the bottle, which does not hold for the phrase *приготовление мёд/а* (genitive I)

‘the preparation of honey’<sup>15</sup>. The locative II in the sentence *Сколько красоты в лес/у* ‘How much beauty in the forest’ refers to a formed forest, a forest which occupies a certain terrain. On the other hand, the locative I in the sentence *Сколько красоты в лес/е* ‘How much beauty in the forest’ does not require such a formation, referring instead to forest in general. The latter sentence could be also rendered in English ‘How much beauty is proper (generally) to the forest’ (ibid. 60–65).

All morphological correlations in the Russian case system can be presented by means of the following scheme, where in each correlation the marked member is found to the right of or below its unmarked equivalent (ibid. 65):

(NOM	~	ACC)	~	(GEN I	~	GEN II)
↓		↓		↓		↓
(INSTR	~	DAT)	~	(LOC I	~	LOC II)

**Wierzbicka** (1980) appreciates the brilliance of Jakobson’s analysis. Nevertheless, its weaknesses include its limited predictive power. The notations [+PERIPHERAL] and [–AFFECTED], for example, describing the meaning of the Russian instrumental, could be stretched in many different ways to make them fit the facts. Wierzbicka proposes instead to regard each case as having a bundle of appropriate meanings. In contrast to other scholars, she considers these meanings to be closely related to each other. For example, the instrumental in the sentences: *Иван объелся слив/ами* ‘Ivan ate himself full with plums’, *Окно было разбито деть/ми* ‘The window was broken by the children’, *Они встретились осень/ю* ‘They met in autumn’ seems to mean different things: [PATIENT], [AGENT], [TIME]. What holds all manifestations of the instrumental together is the demotion of the relevant participant. One concentrates on Ivan [who is full], the window [which is broken], them [meeting each other]. The plums, children and autumn are conceptualized as less important circumstances of the event.

According to **Albert Groot** (1939), the situation is a little more complicated than would result from the approach of Hjelmslev and Jakobson, suggesting that the cases in every language constitute rounded semantic systems of oppositions (*systèmes sémantiques arrondis d’oppositions*). In a case system there are two systems that seem to interweave more or less independently: the semantic and the syntactic. Within each system there are two values opposed to each other: marked (*avec fonction* (+)) and unmarked (*sans fonction* (–)). The Latin case system could, according to Groot, be provisionally presented as follows:

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Thomson’s (1911) approach, according to which the Russian *u*-genitive warrants the substantial view (*stoffliche Anschauung*) of the object, whereas the *a*-genitive expresses any other relation.

syntactic function					
–	+				
	semantic function				
	–	–	–	+	+
	the function is not indicated by the case as such	the function is indicated by a noun or an adjective	the function is indicated by a verb, a group of verbs or a preposition	without localization	with localization
VOC	NOM	GEN	ACC	DAT	ABL

The case theory outlined by **Kuryłowicz** in the article *Le problème du classement des cas* ‘The Problem of the Classification of Cases’ (1960a) seems to be based on quite opposite principles to those of Hjelmslev<sup>16</sup> and Jakobson. In it, syntax regains its decisive role, and the cases are “again” classified as grammatical and concrete in a much more sophisticated way than was done by Groot.

The point of departure is the conjecture that all meanings (functions) of a lingual sign divide into:

- (i) primary; and
- (ii) secondary functions<sup>17</sup>.

For example, the primary function of the (Indo-European) accusative consists in the syntactic subordination of a noun to a transitive verb. The transitivity of the verb is not, however, of semantic, but of purely syntactic order. The accusative ending attached to a noun in such a situation does not convey any semantic value. On the other hand, the conditions of the secondary uses of the accusative are always definable semantically in a positive manner. For example, the accusative of duration occurs in connection with the clearly defined class of verbs containing the idea of duration (cf. Polish *Pisał dwa tygodnie* ‘He wrote for two weeks’). The accusative

<sup>16</sup> This seems to refer rather to the synchronic aspect of Hjelmslev’s case theory. Elsewhere Kuryłowicz (1968: 20–24) expresses the opinion that such pronominal systems as for example English *here, there, where; hence, thence, whence; hither, thither, whither*, based ultimately on the local adverbs deriving from the speech situation (*here* vs. *there*), constitute the potential, persistent pivot of the case system, always making its renewal possible. Thus Kuryłowicz seems to be a localist, at least from the diachronic point of view.

<sup>17</sup> Previously this was applied by Kuryłowicz to the parts of speech. At first glance, each part of speech seems to be able to perform each syntactic function (e.g. the verb can function as a predicate, but also as an attribute or predicative (cf. participles), subject or object (cf. nominalization)). There is, however, in each part of speech a layer of words which do not need any special morphological marking to perform a certain syntactic function (cf. the attributive function of verbs, which must be signaled by the participle markers). The syntactic function performed by such morphologically unmarked words is the primary syntactic function of the part of speech they belong to, while its secondary function must be marked (cf. Kuryłowicz 1960b).


ending in its secondary uses is also a marker of pure syntactic subordination, but its semantics confer an adverbial character on the word to which it is attached (ibid. 135–138).

The essential difference between grammatical and concrete cases therefore lies primarily in their semantics. If the grammatical cases (cf. the accusative with transitive verbs) are semantically empty, then the concrete cases (cf. the accusative of duration) are semantically definable thanks to the nature of the verbs governing them. These two kinds of cases also differ in their relation to their governing verb. The grammatical cases are more central (i.e. less removable from the sentence), and the concrete cases are more marginal (i.e. more removable). The grammatical case in its secondary use undergoes adverbialization, whereas the concrete case in its secondary use undergoes grammaticalization (ibid. 138–140).

The skeleton of the case system is represented by the grammatical cases (in the Indo-European: nominative, genitive, accusative). The accusative, the case of direct object, is opposed to the other two grammatical cases. The place of the nominative in the system is determined by its opposition to the accusative in passive constructions without the agent phrase (cf. Latin *Host/is profligatur* ‘The enemy-NOM is conquered’ vs. *host/em profligare* ‘to conquer the enemy-ACC’). Other functions of the nominative (i.e. not those where it is minimally opposed to the accusative as just shown) are regarded as secondary (e.g. *Host/is incedit* ‘The enemy-NOM is marching’, *Host/is atrox erat* ‘The enemy-NOM was atrocious’, *Host/is obsides necavit* ‘The enemy-NOM killed the hostages’). The genitive in its objective and subjective function is founded both on the accusative and nominative. Other uses of the genitive are secondary. The concrete cases in their primary function constitute a somewhat fuzzy class, penetrating into that of adverbs. On the other hand, the concrete cases in their secondary function are iso-functional. They do not themselves seem to constitute any semantic system, being merely combinatory variants of the grammatical cases. The only solution allowing the systematic “attachment” of the concrete cases to the skeleton of the system formed by the grammatical cases, and simultaneously their removal from the class of adverbs, is recognition of the hierarchy of the two postulated functions (primary and secondary). The grammatical cases belong to the case system on the strength of their primary function, and the concrete cases on the strength of their secondary function. Kuryłowicz’s case system can be presented in the following manner<sup>18</sup> (the arrow means: founding case(s) → founded case) (ibid. 140–147):

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<sup>18</sup> The vocative, because of its appellative function, as opposed to the representative function of the other cases, is detached from the others in the first dichotomy in the case system (Kuryłowicz 1960a: 146–147).



Kuryłowicz's approach to case was generally maintained by his disciple **Heinz**. However, in *System przypadkowy języka polskiego* 'The Case System of the Polish Language' (1965), Heinz places the problem in a broader context, showing the immanent reference of the category of case to other grammatical categories, parts of speech and, ultimately, context.

Such (principal) parts of speech as noun, verb and adjective/adverb seem to acquire, on the strength of the natural extralinguistic character of their referents, certain primary syntactic properties. Nouns, designating things, function as subjects. Verbs, designating actions or states, function as predicates and determinate subjects. Adjectives/adverbs, designating qualities, function as attributes and determine both subjects and predicates. The principal idea of a language system, however, consists in enabling the use of each notion in every relation to any other notion. To perform this task, the language resorts mainly to grammatical morphemes (inflectional endings, and to a lesser extent derivational suffixes), as a result of which the primary syntactic functions of parts of speech are converted into secondary ones. An analysis of the Polish sentence *Wschód słońca opromienił jasnością rozległe równiny* 'The sunrise shone with brightness upon the immense plains' shows that no lexical morpheme is used here in its primary syntactic function. It is possible to use, for example, *SŁOŃCE* 'sun' in the secondary function of attribute only thanks to the genitive case ending *-a* (ibid. 53–62). The cases differ from other grammatical categories in that they are able to express syntactic differentiation, while maintaining among them a form (i.e. the nominative and to some extent vocative) possessing the primary syntactic property of the part of speech to which they belong (ibid. 25, 32–33).

**Kempf** expounded the main part of his case theory in *Próba teorii przypadków* 'An Attempt at a Theory of Cases' which was published in two parts (Kempf 1978, 2007).

The ancient conception of case being present only in desinential formations is considered insufficient. Analogous meanings can also be expressed in the world's languages by:

- (i) auxiliary words (pre- and postpositions);
- (ii) word order;
- (iii) context<sup>19</sup> (Kempf 1978: 5–7).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. the morphologically unmarked (French) *la tête entre les mains* 'the head between the hands' whose meaning does not change according to its order: *Jean était assis la tête entre les mains*, *La tête*

The notion of case refers generally to the relation expressed by grammatical means existing between two objects. The verb occupies the central position in establishing this relation. Many languages have verbal prefixes overtly announcing the case relation, e.g. Polish *w-* in: *Wkładam ptaka do klatki* ‘I put the bird into the cage’. In this example, the illative meaning is expressed redundantly: first by the verbal prefix *w-*, and then again by the preposition *do* bound with the genitive ending *-i*. Although marking of the case relation only in the verb would be ideal, languages cannot choose this possibility because the verb is also the carrier of other functions, and so it would cause great morphological difficulties. The presence of such adnominal cases as genitive and partitive does not seem to invalidate Kempf’s verb-oriented conception of case. As the source of such constructions as Polish *kawalek chleba* ‘piece of bread’, it is possible to imagine an initial construction including a verb: †*kawalek ukrojony chleba* ‘the piece cut off of the bread’ (ibid. 18–25). In prehistoric times, the appropriate case meanings must have been expressed exclusively by the word order. This word order had to reflect the temporally objective course of the phenomena, e.g. *MAN + STONE + SNAKE + KILL* (NOM + INSTR + ACC + verb) would mean: *The man kills the snake with the stone*. The anthropocentric factor has, however, largely disturbed this primordial state of affairs. Kempf does not accept the opposition between so-called grammatical/logical cases and concrete/local cases. In his view, all cases are spatial without exception. The genitive, dative, accusative and instrumental are only human modifications of such “objective” cases: ablative, allative, (absorptive) lative and sociative respectively (ibid. 26–45).

Kempf expands significantly on the traditional views regarding the ambiguity of cases. The partitive occurs in some languages (French, Lithuanian, Polish) as a case “coupled” (Polish *sprzężony*) with other cases. The French *de l’encre* in the sentence *Il y a de l’encre dans le magasin* ‘There is (some) ink in the shop’ represents the coupled partitive-nominative case. The nominative of the *de l’encre* is marked by the context, in contrast to the grammatical marking of the partitive by means of the preposition *de* ‘of’. In the case of the coupling partitive-instrumental (e.g. *avec de l’encre* in *C’est avec de l’encre que j’ai fait ce dessin* ‘It is with (some) ink that I made this drawing’) both functions are explicitly marked by the appropriate prepositions: *avec* for [INSTRUMENT], *de* for [PART]. In Lithuanian, the partitive again exhibits coupling with other cases (nominative or accusative). The mechanism of case coupling in Lithuanian, however, consists in:

- (i) “borrowing” the marker of one function ([PART]) from another case (genitive);  
and

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*entre les mains* *Jean était assis, Jean la tête entre les mains était assis* ‘John was sitting with his head between his hands’.

- (ii) eliding the marker of the other function ([STATIVE]<sup>20</sup> for the nominative, [PATIENT] for the accusative), which becomes recognizable only by means of the syntactic context.

Let us compare:

- (10) *Paukšči/ų*            *lakstė*    *ore.*  
*birds-GEN PL*  
 ‘Some birds were flying in the air.’

- (11) *Paukšči/ai*            *lakstė*    *ore.*  
*birds-NOM PL*  
 ‘The birds were flying in the air.’

The partitive and nominative are therefore coupled in Lithuanian in the form of the genitive (cf. sentence (10)). The nature of the ambiguity of such a case form as Lithuanian *paukščių* ‘birds, of birds’, and that of Polish *konia* ‘horse, of horse’, representing the Slavic syncretic genitive-accusative, are quite different. With case coupling, the case meanings neutralized in the case form are always present (e.g. *paukščių* in (10) carries the meaning [PART] (cf. genitive) and [STATIVE] (cf. nominative)). With the traditional case syncretism (e.g. the genitive and accusative in Polish), the case meanings neutralized in the case form exclude each other depending on the context (e.g. *Widzę koni/a* ‘I see the horse’ (*konia* – [PATIENT]) vs. *noga koni/a* ‘horse’s leg’ (*konia* – [PART]) (Kempf 2007: 47–55).

### 1.5.2. Transformational-generative grammar

The school of transformational-generative grammar was founded by **Chomsky** in the 1950s. Various metamorphoses of its ideas have been presented in works such as *Syntactic Structures* (1957), *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965), *Conditions on Transformations* (1973), *Lectures on Government and Binding* (1982), and *The Minimalist Program* (1996). What seems in general to differentiate the constant core of the various models of transformational-generative grammar from former approaches, besides its highly esoteric form<sup>21</sup>, is its view of language as an operational

<sup>20</sup> That is, ‘single actant of the intransitive verb’ or ‘being, entity referring to a certain state’ (Bańczerowski et al. 1982: 221).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. the strong criticism of both the form and the content of transformational-generative grammar in Mańczak (1996: 183–190).

system (as opposed to a descriptive one) of transformational-generative rules operating between the notional (semantic) and physical (phonetic) plane (Heinz 1978: 405).

**Fillmore** is considered to be the pioneer of so-called Case Grammars, which is fitting because of the growing role of semantics in the second phase of Chomsky's theory (Helbig 1986: 321–322). Fillmore criticizes the traditional approaches to case which, in his view, limit themselves to bare morphological description of nouns and the enumeration of case meanings (functions) attached to previously established case forms. Instead, he proposes to treat case more covertly, more universally, by postulating a relatively small class of so-called deep cases, understood as atomic semantic roles. He tentatively introduces an inventory of six such cases:

- (i) [AGENTIVE];
- (ii) [INSTRUMENTAL];
- (iii) [DATIVE];
- (iv) [FACTITIVE];
- (v) [LOCATIVE];
- (vi) [OBJECTIVE]

arguing that neither deep logical-semantic structures nor surface syntactic structures are capable of grasping the relevant case relations (Fillmore 1968: 21–25). The characteristic cases of a verb constitute its case frames. For example, the case frame of the English *to open* includes the [OBJECTIVE], and optionally [INSTRUMENTAL] and [AGENTIVE] case<sup>22</sup>. Each case can occur with a particular verb only once, i.e. one nominal phrase bears only one case. The syntactic functions of the nouns in a sentence with the verb belonging to the unmarked voice (e.g. active for English) are determined by the so-called deep case hierarchy. For example, by taking the so-called smaller perspective on a larger event such as 'my hitting the fence with the stick', manifested by means of the sentence:

- (12) *I hit the fence with the stick.*  
           [AGENTIVE]                    [OBJECTIVE]    [INSTRUMENTAL]

we get the sentence:

- (13) *The stick hit the fence.*  
           [INSTRUMENTAL]                    [OBJECTIVE]

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. *The door opened* (*door* – [OBJECTIVE]), *John opened the door* (*John* – [AGENTIVE], *door* – [OBJECTIVE]), *The wind opened the door* (*wind* – [INSTRUMENTAL], *door* – [OBJECTIVE]), *John opened the door with a chisel* (*John* – [AGENTIVE], *door* – [OBJECTIVE], *chisel* – [INSTRUMENTAL]).



explain various (diathetic) transformations involving these nominal phrases; for example:

(16) <i>Mary</i>	<i>was</i>	<i>the book</i>	<i>by John.</i>
	<i>sold</i>		
[LOC]		[NOM]	[ABL] [ERG]
[LOC] because:		[NOM] because:	[ABL] and [ERG] because:
(16a) <i>The book was</i>	(16b) <i>The <b>book</b></i>	(16c) <i>The book was bought</i>	
<i>sold by John</i>	<i>is sold.</i>	<i><b>from John</b> by Mary.</i>	
<i>to Mary.</i>		(16d) <i><b>John</b> sold the book</i>	
		<i>to Mary.</i>	

Anderson treats his case theory as a moderate variant of the localist case theory, and therefore proposes to call it localistic (ibid. 12). He points out the intimate relationship on one hand between the [ERGATIVE] and [ABLATIVE] as sources of the action (cf. *John* in sentence (16) and especially (16c)), and on the other hand between the [NOMINATIVE] and [LOCATIVE] as goals of the action in the presence of the [ERGATIVE] and [ABLATIVE] (respectively) (cf. *book* from (16) and especially (16d), *Mary* from (16) and especially (16a) and (16c)) (ibid. 169–174).

Other proposals put forward within the transformational-generative framework limit themselves to renaming, re-hierarchizing or coalescing the Fillmorean cases; Jackendoff (1972: 43): [AGENT], [LOCATION], [SOURCE], [GOAL], [THEME]; Riemsdijk and Williams (1986: 241): [AGENT], [PATIENT/THEME], [GOAL]; Dowty (1986: 340): [AGENT], [PATIENT], [EXPERIENCER], [THEME], [SOURCE], [GOAL]; Starosta (1988: 126): [PATIENT], [AGENT], [LOCUS], [CORRESPONDENT], [MEANS]; Haegeman (1991: 41–42): [AGENT/ACTOR], [PATIENT], [THEME], [EXPERIENCER], [BENEFAC-TIVE/BENEFICIARY], [GOAL], [SOURCE], [LOCATION]; Lazard (1998: 63–69): [OBLIGATORY ACTANT], [REQUIRED AND GOVERNED ACTANT], [GOVERNED AC-TANT], [ADSTANT], [CIRCUMSTANT]; Van Valin (2005: 53–67): [ACTOR] (i.e. [AGENT], [EXPERIENCER], [RECIPIENT]), [UNDERGOER] (i.e. [EXPERIENCER], [RECIPI-ENT], [STIMULUS], [THEME], [PATIENT]) (in reference to Finnish cf. Hakulinen A. (1972: 34–36)).

What is striking in the transformational-generative approach to case is the al-most total lack of correspondence with the approach developed for millennia in the Old World. We may simply note the absence of any acknowl-

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tion). Nevertheless, the role of [AGENT] must be assigned to Fred in the first sentence (volitional buy-ing), and to Reuben in the second one (volitional selling) (secondary action).

edgement of the Pāṇinian *kāraka*-system in the pioneering work of Fillmore. Even critical statements such as those of Cruse (2000: 281–284) postulating the grammatical (immanent) relevance of semantic roles, and those of Grunau (1985) criticizing the lack of systemicity in the inventory of semantic roles, seem to be somewhat behind the times, being reminiscent of Hjelmslev’s conclusions of at least 50 years earlier concerning the *kāraka*-system (cf. section 1.1.1).

## 1.6. Finnish linguistics

For obvious reasons, the contribution of Finnish linguistics to research into the category of case does not appear to have such general value as many of those discussed so far. It confines itself rather to those features that are peculiar to Finnish. What is more, the majority of available works concern only a fragment of the category (for example, only one case). Attempts to grasp the entirety of the Finnish case system are a rarity. This section presents a concise historical overview of the most general approaches to the Finnish case system. For mnemotechnical reasons, the less general approaches will be referred to in the chapters discussing the approach adopted in the present work.

The first known Finnish grammar (c. 1640), that of **Henricus Crugerus**, is no longer extant. Judging by the remarks of scholars who read the manuscript, it stood in contrast to the traditional Latin-oriented grammars of the time. For example, Crugerus postulated 12 cases for Finnish (Hovdhaugen et al. 2000: 75).

The oldest Finnish grammar that has been preserved is **Eskil Petraeus’** *Linguae Fennicae Brevis Institutio* ‘Short Introduction to the Finnish Language’ (1649). This work is so strongly influenced by Latin grammar that it takes the view that the categories of nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, vocative and ablative exhaust quantitatively and cover qualitatively the category of case in Finnish. The case markers generally recognized in modern Finnish linguistics which did not fit the Latin model were treated as particles occurring after words belonging to the six listed cases, e.g. *Pawali cutzu ahneuden caiken pahuden jure/xi* ‘Paul calls greed the root-TRANSL of the whole evil’ = *Paulus avaritiam radicem vocat malorum omnium (radicem ∈ ACC → jure(xi) ∈ ACC+(particle))* (Wiik 1989: 12–17). The grammar of **Martinus** (1689) was written in a similar vein (ibid. 45).

A turning point comes with **Bartholdus G. Vhaël’s** *Grammatica Fennica* ‘Finnish Grammar’, published for the first time in 1733. Vhaël (1968: 6–8) distinguishes 14 cases, including all of the contemporarily recognized cases apart from the comitative:

	Vhaël's cases	contemporary cases	examples	Latin equivalents	Swedish equivalents
1.	nominativus	nominative	<i>cala</i>	<i>piscis</i>	<i>fisk</i>
2.	genitivus	genitive	<i>calan</i>	<i>piscis</i>	<i>fiskens</i>
3.	dativus	allative	<i>calalle</i>	<i>pisci</i>	<i>åth fisken</i>
4.	accusativus	partitive / accusative	<i>calaa</i>	<i>piscem</i>	<i>fisken</i>
5.	vocativus	–	<i>cala</i>	<i>piscis</i>	<i>fisk</i>
6.	ablativus	elative	<i>calasta</i>	<i>de, ex pisce</i>	<i>om och uti fisken</i>
7.	locativus	inessive	<i>calasa</i>	<i>in pisce</i>	<i>uti fisken</i>
8.	mediativus / organicus	adessive	<i>calalla</i>	<i>cum pisce</i>	<i>med fisken</i>
9.	privativus	ablative	<i>calalta</i>	<i>a pisce</i>	<i>utaf fisken</i>
10.	negativus	abessive	<i>calatta</i>	<i>sine pisce</i>	<i>utan fisk</i>
11.	factivus / mutativus	translative	<i>calaxi</i>	<i>mutatus in piscem</i>	<i>blef til fisk</i>
12.	nuncupativus	essive	<i>calana</i>	<i>perrexit instar piscis</i>	<i>han for såsom en fisk</i>
13.	penetrativus	illative	<i>calahan</i>	<i>in piscem</i>	<i>inn i fisken</i>
14.	instructivus / descriptivus	instructive	<i>warcain</i>	<i>instar furis</i>	<i>såsom en tiuf</i>

Vhaël notices the dual nature of the accusative: (i) *accusativus partialis* ‘partial accusative’, e.g. *Söi leipää* ‘He ate (some) bread’ (Latin: *Comedit de pane*, Swedish: *Han åt af brödet*) and (ii) *accusativus totalis* ‘total accusative’, e.g. *Söi leiwän* ‘He ate the whole bread’ (*Totum comedit panem, Åt opp et helt bröd*) (ibid. 9–10). The remaining part of his analysis is devoted to the way the declensional forms are derived from the basic form of the noun (nominative) (ibid. 10–29). As far as the meaning of the other cases is concerned, Vhaël seems to consider it sufficient merely to give Latin and Swedish equivalents.

In this regard, **Hildeen**’s dissertation (1797) seems to be much more mature. First of all he omits the vocative, as being homophonous with the nominative (ibid. 10). The meaning of each of the 13 remaining Finnish cases is described more explicitly. It is notable that Hildeen attempts to show that certain contextual meanings of one case are bound with each other. For instance, the locative (i.e. inessive) expresses the interior of a thing, that a thing contains something (e.g. *Talo/sa on paljon tawarata* ‘There is a lot of stuff in the house’). Therefore, by answering the question *quanto temporis spatio?* ‘in what span of time?’, this case indicates the limit within

which something gets done (e.g. *Kuinga mone/sa päiwä/sä se tuli walmixi?* ‘In how many days was it done?’) (ibid. 20).

Another grammarian, **Strahlmann** (1816: 14–16), basing his analysis mainly on Vhaël’s, also distinguishes 14 cases. He describes their semantics in just one sentence: the nominative refers to the acting person, the other cases refer to things, places, states of the subject. In his view Finnish has forms of definite and indefinite declension, for example: *Hän otti leiwän* ‘He took the whole bread’ (French *Il prit le pain*, German *Er nahm das Brodt*) vs. *Hän otti leipää* ‘He took (some) bread’ (*Il prit du pain*, *Er nahm Brodt*).

In turn, **Judén** (1818: 19–21) distinguishes 17 cases, by dividing one former case (adessive) into three: (i) locativus superesse, (ii) possessivus, (iii) mediativus. This surprising division is based exclusively on changes in meaning without any change in form, e.g. (i) locativus superesse: *tuoli/lla istua* ‘to sit on the chair’, (ii) possessivus: *Tuoli/lla on neljä jalkaa* ‘The chair has four legs’, (iii) mediativus: *tuoli/lla lyödä* ‘to strike with the chair’.

Vhaël’s work as the standard grammar for Finnish was replaced only by **Becker**’s *Finsk Grammatik* ‘Finnish Grammar’ (1824). He abandoned the vocative and succeeded in showing how all Finnish cases could be divided into subclasses (Wiik 1990: 13–16). Let us compare:

Becker’s cases	contemporary cases	subclasses of cases
nominativus genitivus infinitivus accusativus	nominative genitive partitive accusative	syntactic cases
instructivus caritivus / defectivus	instructive / comitative abessive	marginal cases
dativus exterior dativus interior dativus formalis	allative illative translative	lative cases
locativus exterior locativus interior locativus formalis	adessive inessive essive	static cases
ablativus exterior ablativus interior / formalis	ablative elative	separative cases

**Renvall** (1840: 49–53) explicitly equates the case with its ending. Since the direct object of the verb is manifested by three forms (e.g. *sormi*, *sormen*, *sormea* ‘finger’), Finnish has three objective cases (nominative, genitive and partitive respectively). He also proposes to change the names of some cases. In consequence his terminology differs from our contemporary terminology in only a few instances (cf. infinitive vs. partitive, factive vs. translative, suffixive/adverbial vs. instructive).

**Eurén** based his work chiefly on previous research (especially that of **Lönnrot** and **Castrén**) rather than his own (Wiik 1991: 13–14). In one of his widely used grammars (Eurén 1849: 37–39) he distinguishes 15 cases. The accusative is omitted, but there appear the rarely used comitative and the unproductive prolativ. From the contemporary point of view it is interesting to note forms of the type: *vaimone* ‘with one wife’ (without possessive suffix!) and *maatse* ‘along a certain route’, which mean univocally, according to the author, that only one wife and one route are involved, whereas the forms of the type *vaimoine*, *maitse* are neutral in that regard.

The point of departure for the analysis of cases in **Jahnsson**’s *Finska Språkets Satslära* ‘The Syntax of the Finnish Language’ (1871) is the syntactic functions: subject, predicate, direct object, attribute, apposition and other case relations (*öfriga kasusförhållanden*), as the author calls them. Jahnsson presents his innovative insights into the question of the meaningful alternation between the nominative and genitive (i.e. accusative) on one hand, and the partitive on the other, in the functions of subject, predicative and direct object. The rule concerning the alternation of the so-called first and second accusative became immortalized under the name *Jahnssonin sääntö* ‘Jahnsson’s rule’ (cf. section 3.1.1).

**Setälä** published his *Suomen kielen lauseoppi* ‘The Syntax of the Finnish Language’ for the first time in 1880 at the age of 16. In spite of the fact that he was accused of plagiarism of Jahnsson’s grammar (a claim not entirely without justification), the numerous editions of his work became the canonical description of Finnish syntax until the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As far as case is concerned, Setälä follows the lines laid by Jahnsson, sharpening the semantic description in places and adding historical background information.

**Sebeok** (1946: 9–19) is one of the rare linguists who has made an attempt to go further than listing the functions of the distinguished cases (case forms). Adopting Jakobson’s approach (cf. section 1.5.1), he proposes to capture the Finnish case system by means of five semantic dimensions:

- (i) {location};
- (ii) {direction};
- (iii) {limitation};
- (iv) {marginality};
- (v) {closeness}.

Each case acquires in each dimension a feature announcing the presence of the relevant meaning [+] or a feature announcing the absence of the relevant meaning [–] (i.e. rather [+/–]) or sometimes remains neutral with regard to it [0]. The intuitive sense of the dimensions of {location} and {direction} seems to be rather clear. It is just worth noting that the accusative acquires in it the feature [+], since the action is

oriented to the referent of the direct object. The dimension of {limitation} refers – as the name indicates – to some sort of limit. The partitive, for example, acquires in it the feature [+] (cf. *Ottakaa viini/ä* ‘Take some wine’). Of the cases acquiring the feature [+] in the dimension of {direction} (illative-elative, allative-ablative), only the elative and ablative acquire the feature [+] in the dimension of {limitation}. The illative and allative acquire the feature [+/-] (cf. *Lapsi tulee alas vuore/ta* [+] ‘The child comes down from the mountain-ABL’ vs. *Helveti näyttää synkä/lle* [+/-] ‘Hell looks dismal-ALLAT’). The dimension of {marginality} refers to the possibility that a noun is marginal in its content from the point of view of the whole sentence (cf. comitative and abessive). The oppositions in the dimension of {closeness} may be illustrated more literally (cf. the so-called interior [+] vs. exterior [+/-] local cases) and more metaphorically. While a sentence of the type *Isäni oli lääkäri/Ø* ‘My father was a doctor-NOM’ signals permanence (i.e. [+] closeness), a sentence of the type *Isäni oli lääkäri/nä Oulussa* ‘My father was a doctor-ESS in Oulu’ signals transitoriness, impermanence (i.e. [+/-] closeness). All of this is summed up in the following diagram:

		<b>{location}</b>									
		[+/-]				[+]					
		<b>{marginality}</b>									
		[+/-]	[0]	[+/-]	[0]	[+]	[0]				
		<b>{closeness}</b>									
		[+]	[+/-]		[0]	[+]	[+/-]	[0]			
<b>{limitation}</b>	[+/-]	NOM		ESS			INESS	ADESS		[+/-]	<b>{direction}</b>
	[+]								PROLAT		
	[+/-]					COM				[0]	
	[+]	PART		GEN		ABESS					
	[0]		ACC		TRANSL						
	[+/-]						ILLAT	ALLAT		[+]	
	[+]						ELAT	ABL			

**Penttilä’s Suomen kielioppi** ‘Finnish Grammar’ (1957) is the first major Finnish grammar of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The author presents an inventory of 14 cases (ibid. 149). Next he analyzes the complexities of their formation, devoting approximately 60 pages to that topic (ibid. 149–211). The semantic analysis, covering about 100 pages, consists of an enumeration of their functions (ibid. 328–445). Penttilä states, for example, that the Finnish inessive can express location (e.g. *Asun kaupungissa* ‘I live in a city’) and time (e.g. *Olen syntynyt elokuussa* ‘I was born in August’). It is not clear that this is the most precise way of putting things. The suggested spatial and temporal meanings do not seem to be conveyed only by the case (marker). The lexical meaning of the noun stem (*kaupungi-* ‘city-’, *elokuu-* ‘August-’) and even the further context (*Asun* ‘I live’, *Olen syntynyt* ‘I have been born’) is undoubtedly in-

volved too. Hence, based on such a methodology, the question of what meaning is conveyed by the inessive (or any other case) is far from being answered. All in all, Penttilä seems to take a step backwards in comparison with Sebeok.

**Siro's** *Sijakielioppi* 'Case Grammar' (1975) appears to be an attempt to apply Anderson's localistic case theory (cf. section 1.5.2) to Finnish. Regrettably, Siro does not think it appropriate to adjust it in any way to the specific features of the Finnish language. He implies that the Finnish case system too can be captured by means of four case meanings ([NOMINATIVE], [ERGATIVE], [LOCATIVE], and [ERGATIVE]). It is not stated, for example, what is the semantic difference between the forms belonging to classical Finnish cases such as elative vs. ablative and illative, allative and translative. Let us compare:

- |      |             |                |                      |                        |
|------|-------------|----------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| (17) | <i>Hän</i>  | <i>siirtyi</i> | <i>oppikoulu/sta</i> | <i>yliopisto/on.</i>   |
| (18) | <i>Talo</i> | <i>siirtyi</i> | <i>isä/ltä</i>       | <i>poja/lle.</i>       |
| (19) | <i>Hän</i>  | <i>siirtyi</i> | <i>amatööri/stä</i>  | <i>näyttelijä/ksi.</i> |
|      | [NOM]       |                | [ABL]                | [LOC]                  |

- (17) 'He passed from the secondary school to the university.'  
 (18) 'The house passed from the father to the son.'  
 (19) 'He turned from an amateur to an actor.'

The most recent Finnish academic grammar, *Iso suomen kielioppi* 'The Great Finnish Grammar' edited by **Auli Hakulinen** (2004), represents a return to the classical approach:

- (i) the inventory of cases (ibid. 108);
- (ii) their formation (ibid. 108–132); and
- (iii) enumeration of their functions/meanings (ibid. 1173–1214).

Considering the passage of time and the expected consequent increase in the level of understanding of (any) lingual phenomenon, *Iso suomen kielioppi* appears unfortunately to be a simplified, diluted version of a grammar such as Penttilä's, written almost half a century earlier.

## 2. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Construction of the morphological grammar of a language is not possible unless we have at our prior disposal its semantic and syntactic grammar (Bańcerowski 1997b: 15). This epistemological posteriority of morphology to semantics and syntax is undermined by many scholars in a variety of ways. The morphological forms, being in fact the result of the semantic and syntactic analysis, are presented as the real independent point of departure for the semantic and syntactic analysis of a language. In the present work, avoiding methodological extravagance of this type, I shall adhere to Bańcerowski's approach. Of course, the morphological forms of cases are presented as known; nonetheless, the discussion of their meanings and syntactic properties will be directed towards confirming their prior semantic and syntactic analysis. The temporal structure of the presentation of the concept will not reflect the temporal course of its diachronic development.

The following is a list of the primitive terms that will be used in the present work. Their intuitive sense will be explained below.

- |        |  |                   |
|--------|--|-------------------|
| (i)    | the set of all actual nouns            | ( <i>Noun</i> );  |
| (ii)   | the set of all actual verbs            | ( <i>Verb</i> );  |
| (iii)  | the set of all case categories (cases) | ( <i>Case</i> );  |
| (iv)   | the relation of homolexy               | ( <i>hlk</i> );   |
| (v)    | the relation of homophony              | ( <i>hfn</i> );   |
| (vi)   | the relation of homosemy               | ( <i>hsm</i> );   |
| (vii)  | the relation of homosyntacticity       | ( <i>hsc</i> );   |
| (viii) | the relation of homodeterminationality | ( <i>hdt</i> );   |
| (ix)   | the relation of determination          | ( <i>dt</i> );    |
| (x)    | the relation of semantic homogeneity   | ( <i>shomo</i> ). |

**The set of all actual nouns** (*Noun*) can be exemplified by a set of the type: {*horse, horse, horse, a horse, the horse, horses, the horses, to the horse, house, houses,*

a house...}. In turn, a set of the type {*do, do, do, does, did, has done, is doing, have, has, had, has had...*} reflects the idea of **the set of all actual verbs (Verb)**. **The set of all case categories (Case)** refers to a set of the type {nominative, genitive, accusative...}. The relation of **homolexy (hlk)** mirrors the property of having the same lexical meaning. Lingual objects that are indistinguishable phonetically are bound by the relation of **homophony (hfn)**. Of course, the relation of homophony does not presuppose absolute phonetic equality. Two homophonic lingual objects may differ from each other phonetically to some extent. Nevertheless, this difference is ignorable from the point of view of language usage. The relation of **homosemy (hsm)** reflects the property of having the same meaning conveyed grammatically. The relation of **homosyntacticity (hsc)** exists between two lingual objects having the same syntactic properties. For example, the actual nouns *the student, the student* in the sentences *The student is sleeping, The student is reading a book* are homosyntactic because they belong to the same syntactic category – the subject. The relation of **homodeterminationality (hdt)** exists between two lingual objects having the same determinational properties. For example, the actual verbs *is sleeping, is reading*, in spite of being homosyntactic (predicate), are not homodeterminational because the word *is sleeping* cannot be determined by the word *a book* in the function of direct object. The words *a book, a newspaper, a letter* are homodeterminational in sentences of the type *The student is reading a book, The student is reading a newspaper, The student is reading a letter*. In the sentence *The student is reading a book* the noun *a book* determines the verb *is reading*. The verb *is reading* determines the noun *The student*. The words in question are bound by the relation of **determination (dt)** (cf. Bańczerowski 1980: 33–46). **The relation of semantic homogeneity (shomo)** binds such **case meanings** which are semantically homogeneous. Homogeneous case meanings make up a so-called **semantic dimension** (parameter). Apart from the homogeneous case meanings, in each semantic dimension there occurs the indeterminate meaning (feature) [0]. The Finnish case system will be discussed in the present work in terms of the following semantic dimensions:

- |        |                                  |   |
|--------|----------------------------------|---|
| (i)    | <b>{quantification}</b>          | [+TOTAL], [–TOTAL], [0];  |
| (ii)   | <b>{aspect/gender of action}</b> | [+RESULTATIVE], [–RESULTATIVE],<br>[+PUNCTUAL],<br>[+DURATIVE], [–DURATIVE], [0]; |
| (iii)  | <b>{identicalness}</b>           | [+IDENTICAL], [–IDENTICAL], [0];  |
| (iv)   | <b>{time}</b>                    | [+FUTURE], [–FUTURE], [0];  |
| (v)    | <b>{honorification}</b>          | [+POLITE], [–POLITE], [0];  |
| (vi)   | <b>{transitivity}</b>            | [AGENT], [PATIENT], [STATIVE], [0];   |
| (vii)  | <b>{individuality}</b>           | [+INDIVIDUAL], [–INDIVIDUAL], [0];  |
| (viii) | <b>{predicativity}</b>           | [PRAEDIFICATUM], [PRAEDIFICANS], [0];   |

(ix)	<b>{distributivity}</b>	[+DISTRIBUTIVE], [–DISTRIBUTIVE], [0];
(x)	<b>{permanency}</b>	[+PERMANENT], [–PERMANENT], [0];
(xi)	<b>{spatiality}</b>	[LOCUS], [LOCATUM], [0];
(xii)	<b>{possessivity}</b>	[POSSESSOR], [POSSESSUM], [0];
(xiii)	<b>{staticity}</b>	[STATIC], [DYNAMIC], [0];
(xiv)	<b>{direction}</b>	[TO], [FROM], [0];
(xv)	<b>{proximity}</b>	[+CLOSE], [–CLOSE], [0];
(xvi)	<b>{interiority}</b>	[+INTERIOR], [–INTERIOR], [0];
(xvii)	<b>{fastenedness}</b>	[+FASTENED], [–FASTENED], [0];
(xviii)	<b>{companionship}</b>	[COMPANION], [0];
(xix)	<b>{absence}</b>	[ABSENT], [0];
(xx)	<b>{instrumentality}</b>	[INSTRUMENT], [0].
...		

## 2.1. Case Grammar vs. Case Lexis

The notion ‘grammar’ can be understood in many ways. Grammar is customarily a science concerned with lingual phenomena of a regular, general character. In this sense it seems to be opposed to lexis, which deals with irregular, idiosyncratic lingual phenomena. Alternatively, grammar can be understood as the complete description of a language. In this sense it comprises both traditional grammar and lexis. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same applies to the grammar of case.

Although case in the traditional sense is conceived of as a grammatical category, it seems to be impossible to talk about it in total isolation from lexis. This results above all from the fact that case opposition is caused by:

- (i) valency; and
- (ii) case government

which depend ultimately on the lexical meaning of the governing word (most frequently the verb). The lexical meaning of the governing word has different susceptibility to the semantic generalizations relevant to case. In many instances it is extremely difficult to extract from it some general property which specifies the appropriate valency and case government. The appropriate valency and case government classes can therefore be captured only by enumeration. The unavoidability of lexis also concerns the case form itself, and more precisely, its stem.

Irrespective of how the notion of grammar is understood, grammar should systematize the problems of grammaticalization and lexicalization. A Case Grammar should therefore concentrate in the first place on describing the relevant

facts which are the relatively most grammaticalized – which have the least relation to lexis. These will be referred to as instances of **semification** (i.e. grammatical signification). There can be distinguished two types of semification: (i) **auto-semification** and (ii) **co-semification**. The facts having a tighter relation to lexis should be dealt with by the Case Grammar in second place. It is also possible to consider splitting them off as a separate area of research, concerned with Case Lexis. These will be referred to as instances of **semification-lexification**.

Auto-semification consists in conveying the target meaning(s) with only one grammatical morph. For example, in Finnish the accusative and partitive are auto-semificative in reference to quantitative meanings in sentences of the type *Luin kirja/t* ‘I read all the books’, *Luin kirjo/j/a* ‘I read (some) books’. The simple meaning [+TOTAL] is conveyed by the ending of the accusative (-*t*). The complex meaning [+/-TOTAL] (‘total’ or ‘proper part’) is conveyed by the ending of the partitive (-*a*).

Co-semification consists in conveying the target meaning(s) with more than one grammatical morph. In Finnish, the genitive and partitive are co-semificative in reference to meanings in the dimension of {transitivity} in syntagms of the type: *kirjo/j/en luke/minen* ‘reading of books’, *luke/a kirjo/j/a* ‘to read books’. The marker of the genitive case (-*en*) conveys the meaning [PATIENT] only in conjunction with the marker of the deverbal noun (-*minen*). The marker of the partitive (-*a*) conveys the meaning [PATIENT] only in conjunction with the marker of all verbal forms which are not deverbal nouns (here the infinitive ending in -*a*).

Semification-lexification consists in conveying the target meaning(s) with both grammatical and lexical morphs. In Finnish, the nominative and partitive are semificative-lexificative in reference to meanings in the dimension of {transitivity} in sentences of the type *Pekka/Ø seiso/o* ‘Peter stands’, *Antti lyö/Ø Pekka/a* ‘Andrew beats Peter’. The marker of the nominative (-*Ø*) conveys the meaning [STATIVE] only in conjunction with such lexical stems as *seiso-* ‘stand-’. The marker of the partitive (-*a*) conveys the meaning [PATIENT] only in conjunction with such lexical stems as *lyö-* ‘beat-’.

It is worth noting that the susceptibility to semantic generalizations of different governing words, taking part in semification-lexification relevant to case, is graded. The verbs *seisoa* ‘to stand’ and *lyödä* ‘to beat’ are in conspicuous opposition with respect to the property ‘transitivity’. It is difficult to say the same about the verbs *rakastaa* ‘to love’ and *tykkätä* ‘to like’ occurring in sentences of the type *Rakasta/n kirjo/j/a* ‘I love books-PART’, *Tykkää/n kirjo/i/sta* ‘I like books-ELAT’. Such instances seem to represent the relatively most lexicalized uses of cases. If grammar is to be understood in the traditional fashion, then these constitute the core of the area of research concerning Case Lexis.

## 2.2. Case oppositions

The cases (case forms) are excerpted from larger syntactic units – syntagms or sentences (which are in fact a special kind of syntagm). Not all syntagms are interesting in the same way from the point of view of the category of case. For example, the syntagm (sentence):

- (20) *Isoäiti luki kirjoja kääpiöistä naapurien lapsille talvella*  
'The granny was reading books about gnomes to the children of the neighbors in winter'

contains six cases (case forms): *isoäiti* (nominative), *kirjoja* (partitive), *kääpiöistä* (elative), *naapurien* (genitive), *lapsille* (allative), *talvella* (adessive). Nevertheless, as far as case is concerned, it is reasonable to consider only some of the syntagms contained in it, and not the sentence in its entirety:

- (i) *Isoäiti luki* 'The granny was reading';
- (ii) *luki kirjoja* '(she) was reading books';
- (iii) *Isoäiti luki kirjoja* 'The granny was reading books';
- (iv) *naapurien lapsille* 'to the children of the neighbors';
- (v) *luki lapsille* '(she) was reading to the children';
- (vi) *luki talvella* '(she) was reading in winter'.

Syntagms of this type will be referred to as **minimal case syntagms**.

The minimal case syntagms are conceived of as certain valency/case government schemes containing the appropriate case form(s) and the governing word. On the strength of this, the word *kääpiöistä* 'about gnomes' in the above sentence does not constitute a minimal case syntagm with any other word. The minimal case syntagms are non-elliptic. The syntagm *kirjoja kääpiöistä* 'books about gnomes' seems to lack the governing verb: *kirjoja* [*jotka kertovat*] *kääpiöistä* 'books [which tell] about gnomes', *kääpiöistä* [*kertovia*] *kirjoja* 'books [telling] about gnomes'. Although in particular instances the gradedness of the ellipticity allows the researcher some latitude in interpretation, the principle in itself is inviolable. Some syntagms containing cases (case forms) are not minimal case syntagms. Let us compare:

- |      |                  |                           |                   |
|------|------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| (21) | <i>kirjoja</i>   | [ <i>jotka kertovat</i> ] | <i>kääpiöistä</i> |
| (22) | <i>naapurien</i> | [ <i>?omaamille</i> ]     | <i>lapsille</i>   |
| (23) | <i>Suomen</i>    | [ <i>?</i> ]              | <i>pääkapunki</i> |

- (21) ‘books [which tell] about gnomes’
- (22) ‘to the children [?owned by] of the neighbors’
- (23) ‘the capital [?] of Finland’

**Case opposition** results from comparison of appropriate minimal case syntagms. Two minimal case syntagms which are the basis for establishing a case opposition constitute a **diacritic pair of minimal case syntagms**. It is possible to substantiate with high probability the empirical hypothesis that there exist only **four** schemes of co-occurrence of case with other component(s) in minimal case syntagms. These types are distinguished on the basis of:

- (i) syntagmic;
- (ii) diathetic;
- (iii) semantic; and
- (iv) syntactic

properties of the cases bound by the appropriate type of relation of case opposition.

As far as the syntagmic properties of the cases are concerned, case opposition can be (i) intrasyntagmic or (ii) intersyntagmic. Intrasyntagmic case opposition takes place in the same syntagm. For example, in Polish, *student* (NOM) and *książkę* (ACC) in the sentence *Student czyta książkę* ‘The student is reading a book’ occur in this type of case opposition. Intersyntagmic case opposition takes place between cases occurring in two syntagms, e.g. *książkę* (ACC) : *książka* (NOM) in the sentences *Student czyta książkę* ‘The student is reading a book’, *Książka leży na stole* ‘The book is lying on the table’.

As far as the diathetic properties of the cases are concerned, the case opposition can have diathetic consequences or can be diathetically neutral. It will be referred to in the first instance as (i) diathetic and in the second as (ii) adiathetic. Diathetic case opposition is exemplified in Polish by: *książkę* (ACC) : *książka* (NOM) in the sentences *Student czyta książkę* ‘The student is reading a book’, *Książka jest czytana przez studenta* ‘The book is being read by the student’. The opposition between *chleb* (ACC) and *chleba* (GEN) in the sentences *Kup chleb* ‘Buy a bread’, *Kup chleba* ‘Buy some bread’ is adiathetic because *chleb*, *chleba* belong to the same diathetically relevant syntactic (direct object) and semantic category ([PATIENT]).

Case opposition can have semantic consequences or can be semantically neutral. It will be referred to in the first instance as (i) semantic and in the second as (ii) asemanitic. The opposition between *chleb* (ACC) and *chleba* (GEN) in the sentences *Kup chleb* ‘Buy a bread’, *Kup chleba* ‘Buy some bread’ is semantic because both cases have different meaning; *chleb* [+TOTAL], *chleba* [+/-TOTAL]. In turn, the opposition between *książkę* (ACC) and *książki* (GEN) in the syntagms *Student kupił*

*książkę* ‘The student bought a book’, *kupowanie książki przez studenta* ‘buying of the book by the student’ is asemanic because both *książkę* and *książki* convey the same meaning ([PATIENT]).

Finally as far as the syntactic properties of cases are concerned, case opposition can be (i) syntactic (when having syntactic consequences) or (ii) asyntactic (when syntactically neutral). The opposition between *książkę* (ACC) and *książka* (NOM) in the sentences *Student czyta książkę* ‘The student is reading a book’, *Książka leży na stole* ‘The book is lying on the table’ is syntactic because the two cases belong to different syntactic categories; *książkę* to the direct object, *książka* to the subject. The opposition between *chleb* (ACC) and *chleba* (GEN) in the sentences *Kup chleb* ‘Buy a bread’, *Kup chleba* ‘Buy some bread’ is asyntactic because both cases belong to the same syntactic category, namely direct object.

Of course, the diathetic opposition already presupposes semantic and syntactic opposition. Nevertheless, not all semantic and syntactic oppositions are relevant to diathesis. It is not hard to guess that in the present section, in reference to the discussed types of case opposition, the notions ‘semantic’ vs. ‘asemanic’, ‘syntactic’ vs. ‘asyntactic’ will refer only to those semantic and syntactic lingual phenomena which are diathetically irrelevant.

#### Re 1 *Relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition*

The relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition reflects the rather trivial, obvious fact that cases serve to differentiate between diathetically relevant noun arguments of the same verb. For example, in the Finnish sentence (24) the word *Pekka* ‘Peter’ belongs to the nominative, fulfills the function of subject and signifies the [AGENT]. The word *Anttia* ‘Andrew’ belongs to the partitive, fulfills the function of direct object and signifies the [PATIENT]:

- (24) *Pekka/∅*     *lyö*     *Antti/a*.  
*Peter-NOM*             *Andrew-PART*  
 ‘Peter beats Andrew.’

In order to define the relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition, the following diacritic pair of minimal case syntagms should be considered:

- (24) *Pekka/∅<sub>1</sub>*             *lyö<sub>a</sub>*     *Antti/a<sub>2</sub>*.  
*Peter-NOM*                     *Andrew-PART*
- (25) *Antti/∅<sub>3</sub>*             *lyö<sub>b</sub>*     *Pekka/a<sub>4</sub>*.  
*Andrew-NOM*                     *Peter-PART*

(24) ‘Peter beats Andrew.’

(25) ‘Andrew beats Peter.’

Two words –  $w_1$  (*Pekka*),  $w_2$  (*Anttia*) – stand in the relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition if and only if there exist words  $w_3$  (*Antti*),  $w_4$  (*Pekkaa*),  $w_a$  (*lyö*),  $w_b$  (*lyö*) such that:  $w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4$  belong to case;  $w_1, w_3$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1, w_3$  are not homophonic and homolexical;  $w_2, w_4$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_2, w_4$  are not homophonic and homolexical;  $w_1, w_4$  are homolexical;  $w_1, w_4$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_2, w_3$  are homolexical;  $w_2, w_3$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a, w_b$  belong to verb;  $w_a, w_b$  are homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a$  determines  $w_1$  or  $w_1$  determines  $w_a$ ;  $w_2$  determines  $w_a$ ;  $w_b$  determines  $w_3$  or  $w_3$  determines  $w_b$ ;  $w_4$  determines  $w_b$ ; and there exist distinct cases  $C_x, C_y$  such that  $w_1, w_3$  belong to  $C_x$  and  $w_2, w_4$  belong to  $C_y$ .

Let us illustrate how the definition of the intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition (*idSCO*) would be written in the formal language:

$$w_1 \text{ idSCO } w_2 \leftrightarrow \exists w_3, \exists w_4, \exists w_a, \exists w_b [w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4 \in \text{Case} \wedge w_1 \text{ hsc} \cap \text{hdt} \cap \text{hsm} \wedge w_3 \wedge \neg w_1 \text{ hfn} \cap \text{hlc} \wedge w_2 \text{ hsc} \cap \text{hdt} \cap \text{hsm} \wedge \neg w_2 \text{ hfn} \cap \text{hlc} \wedge w_4 \wedge w_1 \text{ hlc} \wedge w_4 \wedge \neg w_1 \text{ hsc} \cap \text{hdt} \cap \text{hsm} \wedge w_4 \wedge w_2 \text{ hlc} \wedge w_3 \wedge \neg w_2 \text{ hsc} \cap \text{hdt} \cap \text{hsm} \wedge w_a, w_b \in \text{Verb} \wedge w_a \text{ hfn} \cap \text{hlc} \cap \text{hsc} \cap \text{hdt} \cap \text{hsm} \wedge w_b \wedge w_a \text{ dt } w_1 \vee w_1 \text{ dt } w_a \wedge w_2 \text{ dt } w_a \wedge w_b \text{ dt } w_3 \vee w_3 \text{ dt } w_b \wedge w_4 \text{ dt } w_b \wedge \exists C_x, \exists C_y (C_x, C_y \in \text{CASE} \wedge C_x \neq C_y \wedge w_1, w_3 \in C_x \wedge w_2, w_4 \in C_y)]$$

A subtype of the relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition would reflect the fact that some cases (especially the adnominal genitive) serve to differentiate between the diathetically relevant noun argument and its nominal head. For example, in the syntagm (26) the word *naapurien* ‘of the neighbors’ belongs to the genitive, fulfills the function of attribute and signifies the [POSSESSOR]. The word *lapset* ‘children’ belongs to the nominative, fulfills the function of the head of the syntagm and signifies the [POSSESSUM] (the possessed entity). The syntactic and semantic properties of the genitive *naapurien* do not depend upon the case of the head of the syntagm (*LAPSET* ‘children’). The genitive stands in the relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition with any other case (cf. *naapurien lapsille* ‘to the children of the neighbors’).

In order to define this type of relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition, the following diacritic pair of minimal case syntagms should be considered:

(26) *naapuri/en*<sub>1</sub>      *lapse/t*<sub>2</sub>  
neighbors-GEN      children-NOM

(27) *las/ten*<sub>3</sub>              *naapuri/t*<sub>4</sub>  
children-GEN      neighbors-NOM

(26) ‘the children of the neighbors’

(27) ‘the neighbors of the children’

Two words –  $w_1$  (*naapurien*),  $w_2$  (*lapset*) – stand in the discussed type of relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition if and only if there exist words  $w_3$  (*lasten*),  $w_4$  (*naapurit*) such that:  $w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4$  belong to case;  $w_1, w_3$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1, w_3$  are not homophonic and homolexical;  $w_2, w_4$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_2, w_4$  are not homophonic and homolexical;  $w_1, w_4$  are homolexical;  $w_1, w_4$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_2, w_3$  are homolexical;  $w_2, w_3$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic; and there exist distinct cases  $C_x, C_y, C_n$  such that  $w_1$  belongs to  $C_x$  and either  $w_2$  belongs to  $C_x$  or  $w_2$  belongs to  $C_y$  or  $w_2$  belongs to  $C_n$ .

## Re 2 *Relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition*

The relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition reflects the fact that some cases are especially burdened functionally from the paradigmatic point of view in comparison with other cases. For example, in the sentence (28) the word *kirjan* ‘book’ belongs to the accusative and signifies the meaning [+RESULT]. The word *kirjaa* ‘book’ in the sentence (29) belongs to the partitive and signifies the meaning [+/-RESULT]. Their indistinguishable diathetically relevant semantic ([PATIENT] – [PATIENT]) and syntactic statuses (direct object – direct object) make them unique carriers of the target meanings:

(28) *Luin*<sub>a</sub>              *kirja/n*<sub>1</sub>.  
book-ACC

(29) *Luin*<sub>b</sub>              *kirja/a*<sub>2</sub>.  
book-PART

(28) ‘I read the whole book.’

(29) ‘I read/was reading a/the book.’

Two words –  $w_1$  (*kirjan*),  $w_2$  (*kirjaa*) – stand in the relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition if and only if there exist words  $w_a$  (*Luin*),  $w_b$  (*Luin*) such that:  $w_1, w_2$ , belong to case;  $w_1, w_2$  are homolexical, homosyntactic and homodeterminational;  $w_1, w_2$  are not homosemic;  $w_a, w_b$  belong to verb;  $w_a, w_b$  are homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1$  determines  $w_a$  or  $w_a$  determines  $w_1$ ;  $w_2$  determines  $w_b$  or  $w_b$  determines  $w_2$ ; and there exist distinct cases  $C_x, C_y$  such that  $w_1$  belongs to  $C_x$  and  $w_2$  belongs to  $C_y$ .

### Re 3 *Relation of intersyntagmic-diathetic-asemantic-syntactic case opposition*

The relation of intersyntagmic-diathetic-asemantic-syntactic case opposition reflects the fact that the language is capable of expressing the same thing in various diathetic ways (cf. especially the subjective and objective genitive). For example, in the syntagm (30) the word *kirjan* ‘of the book’ belongs to the genitive, fulfills the function of attribute and signifies the [PATIENT]. The word *kirjaa* ‘book’ in (31) belongs to the partitive, fulfills the function of direct object and signifies the same meaning – [PATIENT]:

(30) *kirja/n<sub>1</sub>*      *luke/minen<sub>a</sub>*  
*book-GEN*      *reading*

(31) *luke/a<sub>b</sub>*      *kirja/a<sub>2</sub>*  
*to read*      *book-PART*

(30) ‘reading of a/the book’

(31) ‘to read a/the book’

Two words –  $w_1$  (*kirjan*),  $w_2$  (*kirjaa*) – stand in the relation of intersyntagmic-diathetic-asemantic-syntactic case opposition if and only if there exist words  $w_a$  (*lukeminen*) and  $w_b$  (*lukea*) such that:  $w_1, w_2$  belong to case;  $w_1, w_2$  are homolexical and homosemic;  $w_1, w_2$  are not homophonic, homosyntactic and homodeterminational;  $w_a, w_b$  belong to verb;  $w_a, w_b$  are homolexical and homosemic;  $w_a, w_b$  are not homophonic, homosyntactic and homodeterminational; and there exist distinct cases  $C_x, C_y$  such that  $w_1$  belongs to  $C_x$  and  $w_2$  belongs to  $C_y$ .

### Re 4 *Relation of intersyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition*

The relation of intersyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition reflects the fact that cases serve to differentiate between noun arguments of different verbs (verb forms). For example, in the sentence (32) the word *kir-*

*joja* ‘books’ belongs to the partitive, fulfills the function of direct object and signifies the [OBJECT BEING LOVED]. The word *kirjoista* ‘from the books’ in the sentence (33) belongs to the elative, fulfills the function of adverbial and signifies the [OBJECT BEING LIKED]:

(32) *Rakastan<sub>a</sub> kirjo/j/a<sub>1</sub>.*  
*books-PART*

(33) *Tykkään<sub>b</sub> kirjo/i/sta<sub>2</sub>.*  
*books-ELAT*

(32) ‘I love books.’

(33) ‘I like books.’

Two words –  $w_1$  (*kirjoja*),  $w_2$  (*kirjoista*) – stand in the relation of intersyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition if and only if there exist words  $w_a$  (*Rakastan*),  $w_b$  (*Tykkään*) such that:  $w_1, w_2$ , belong to case;  $w_1, w_2$  are homolexical;  $w_1, w_2$  are not homophonic, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a, w_b$  belong to verb;  $w_a, w_b$  are homosyntactic;  $w_a, w_b$  are not homophonic, homolexical, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1$  determines  $w_a$  or  $w_a$  determines  $w_1$ ;  $w_2$  determines  $w_b$ ; and there exist distinct cases  $C_x, C_y$  such that  $w_1$  belongs to  $C_x$  and  $w_2$  belongs to  $C_y$ .

### 2.3. The syntax of cases

As was mentioned in the chapter on the history of investigation, Kuryłowicz rightly reintroduced the syntactic component to the discourse concerning case after it had been compromised by such an authority as Hjelmslev (cf. section 1.5.1). However, Kuryłowicz’s conjecture that in the case of so-called primary uses of the grammatical cases one can consider them to be meaningless seems less convincing. The accusative in the Latin phrase *hostem profligare* ‘to conquer the enemy’ is certainly meaningful: it signifies the [PATIENT]. In the light of the modern theory of grammaticalization it is possible to interpret Kuryłowicz’s words in terms of ‘semantic bleaching’. Paradoxically, the more grammaticalized a certain type of lingual units is, the more vague their meaning seems to us (cf. Heine & Kuteva 2002: 2).

The cases are characterized by different ranges in syntactic categories. The Finnish accusative, for example, can fulfill the function of direct object in combination with every nominal stem. The lexical diapason of the accusative in other syntactic functions, for instance in the function of adverbial, is conspicuously nar-

rower (cf. *objektinsijainen määrän adverbiali* ‘adverbial of quantity occurring in the cases of direct object’ (Tuomikoski 1978)). Let us compare:

	ACC <b>direct object</b>	ACC <b>adverbial</b>
(34) <i>Näin</i>	<i>ihmise/t</i> <i>hiire/t</i> <i>asiakirja/t</i> <i>vede/n</i> ...	<i>tunni/n.</i> <i>minuuti/n.</i> ...
(35) <i>Omistin sille</i>	<i>tunni/n.</i> <i>minuuti/n.</i> ...	

- (34) ‘I saw all the people an hour.’  
all the mice a minute.’  
all the documents ...  
the whole water
- (35) ‘I devoted to this an hour.’  
a minute.’  
...

As has been pointed out, the primary task of the Case Grammar is to give an account of those grammatical mechanisms relevant to case which are lexically the least restricted. In Finnish, the range of the accusative in the syntactic category of direct object is unrestricted, whereas its range in the category of adverbial is not. The function of direct object can therefore be called **the primary syntactic function** of the Finnish accusative. The function of adverbial can be called its **secondary syntactic function**. By taking into account the primary syntactic function of particular cases, the case system can be divided into appropriate **subsystems**. In Finnish there operate five case subsystems, consisting of the following cases:

- (i) the cases of direct object: accusative, partitive;
- (ii) the cases of subject: nominative, absolutive;
- (iii) the cases of predicative: nominative, partitive;
- (iv) the case of attribute and adverbial: genitive;
- (v) the cases of adverbial: inessive, illative, elative, adessive, allative, ablative, essive, translative, comitative, abessive, instructive.

The **pillar** of case oppositions is those primary syntactic uses of cases which constitute inter- and/or intrasyntagmic governing word-case proportions. Such uses will be referred to as **proportional uses**. The cases in the proportional uses are the unique grammatical signifiers (i.e. auto-semificators) of the target meaning(s) in (at least) one semantic dimension. The **isolated uses** are those uses of the cases which break out of the said proportions. Let us compare the Finnish adessive, allative and ablative in their primary – i.e. adverbial – syntactic function:

	ADESS	ALLAT	ABL
(36) <i>Kävelin</i>	<i>laiva/lla</i>	<i>laiva/lle</i>	<i>laiva/ta</i>
(37) <i>Kuljin</i>	<i>laiva/lla</i> [ON] [WITH]	<i>laiva/lle</i> [TO]	<i>laiva/ta</i> [FROM]
(38) <i>Kirjoitin</i>	<i>kynä/llä</i> [WITH]		

- (36) ‘I walked on the ship to the ship from the ship’  
 (37) ‘I moved on the ship to the ship from the ship’  
           with the ship  
 (38) ‘I wrote with the pen’

The adessive, allative and ablative contrast with each other intersyntagmically with regard to their meanings in the dimension of {direction}; [0], [TO] and [FROM] respectively. Let us compare the following governing word-case proportions:

*Kävelin laivalla* : *Kävelin laivalle* :: *Kuljin laivalla* : *Kuljin laivalle*

*Kävelin laivalle* : *Kävelin laivalta* :: *Kuljin laivalle* : *Kuljin laivalta*

Uses of the type *Kävelin / Kuljin laivalla*, *Kävelin / Kuljin laivalle*, *Kävelin / Kuljin laivalta* are the proportional uses of the adessive, allative and ablative. The instrumental uses of the adessive are its isolated uses. Let us compare the non-occurrence of the discussed governing word-case proportions:

*Kuljin laivalla* : Ø :: *Kirjoitin kynällä* : Ø



- (40) ‘I drank/was drinking (some) water.’  
 (41) ‘While I was drinking water, the telephone rang.’

The accusative in the sentence (39) *Join veden* conveys i.a. the meaning [+TOTAL]. The partitive in the sentence (40) *Join vettä* conveys i.a. the meaning [+/-TOTAL]. Both sentences show the proportional uses of the accusative and partitive. The partitive in (41) *Kun join vettä, puhelin soi* conveys i.a. the meaning [-TOTAL]. The sentence (41) shows an isolated use of the partitive. The meaning [+TOTAL] is an actual meaning of the accusative. The meanings [+/-TOTAL] and [-TOTAL] are actual meanings of the partitive.

The meanings [+TOTAL] and [-TOTAL] are **simple meanings**. Simple meanings are conceived of as **atomic case meanings**. The meaning [+/-TOTAL] is a **complex meaning**. The complex meaning is a fusion (mereological operation of totification) of the appropriate homogeneous simple meanings – that is, the meanings in one semantic dimension (cf. the dimension of {quantification} with the atomic meanings [+TOTAL], [-TOTAL] and [0]).


The **constitutive meaning** of a case is a fusion of all of its homogeneous actual meanings in the appropriate semantic dimension which are conveyed by the case in question in its proportional uses (obligatorily) and in appropriate isolated uses (facultatively)<sup>26</sup>.

Two cases always have different constitutive meanings at least in reference to one dimension, whereas the same does not hold for actual meanings (cf. Hjelmslev’s ‘differential minimum of signification’ referred to in section 1.5.1). It is possible that some actual meanings of two cases are the same in reference to a dimension in which their constitutive meanings are different. The constitutive meaning of a case is of such a kind that that meaning (or at least a part of it) is **inalienable** in each proportional use and in the appropriate isolated uses of the case in question (cf. adscription and reinterpretation of meaning in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3).


In Finnish the constitutive meaning of the partitive in the dimension of {quantification} can be presented by means of the notation [+/-TOTAL]. In turn, the constitutive meaning of the accusative in that dimension is equal to its unique relevant actual meaning: [+TOTAL]. Let us visualize the process of constructing the constitutive meaning of the accusative and partitive in the dimension of {quantification} by means of the following scheme:

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<sup>26</sup> Cf. the notion of ‘potential’ meanings understood as all possible meanings in which a word could be used, as given in Batóg 1978: 56.



The **actualization** of meaning is the process of adjustment of the constitutive meaning to the context, resulting in the actual meaning. The constitutive meaning of the Finnish accusative, namely [+TOTAL], can be actualized only to the meaning [+TOTAL]. In turn, the constitutive meaning of the Finnish partitive, [+/-TOTAL], can be actualized to the meaning [+/-TOTAL] or [-TOTAL]. Let us visualize the process of actualization of the constitutive meaning of the accusative and partitive in the dimension of {quantification} in the given contexts:



It is possible to observe certain regularities in the process of actualization of meaning. The first regularity concerns the fact that in the case of a complex constitutive meaning, by passing to the actual meanings the complexity of co-

signification globally increases. While the partitive *vettä* in the sentence (40) *Join vettä* is auto-significative, and more precisely auto-semificative (compare it with (39) *Join veden*), the partitive in the sentence (41) *Kun join vettä, puhelin soi* is conspicuously co-significative. The meaning [-TOTAL] seems to be conveyed both by the case and (here) the whole sentential context in which it occurs.

The other regularity concerns the **paths** of the actualization of the complex constitutive meaning. Let us compare:

case	constitutive meaning		actualization	actual meanings		
PART	[+/-TOTAL]	→			[+/-]	[-]
PART	[+/-RESULT]	→		[+]	[+/-]	[-]
NOM	[+/-TOTAL]	→		[+]	[+/-]	
		→		[+]		[-]

Empirical research on the Finnish case system confirms that constitutive meanings of the type [+/-TOTAL], [+/-RESULT], etc. are actualized in such a way that within all actual meanings there always occurs a complex actual meaning ([+/-TOTAL], [+/-RESULT]). Paths of actualization of the type:

- \*[+/-TOTAL] → [+TOTAL], [-TOTAL] or
- \*[+/-RESULT] → [+RESULT], [-RESULT]

are inaccessible. This seems to corroborate the existence of unity in the meaning of the cases, which has been sensed intuitively since antiquity. One case cannot signify exclusively two totally opposing things.

### 2.4.2. Adscription of meaning

Adscription of meaning consists in ascribing to the actual meaning of the case (form) an actual meaning from some other dimension. Let us compare the following two sentences:

(42)	NOM	on	ADESS
	<i>Kirja</i> ∅		<i>pöytä</i> <b>llä.</b>
	[LOCATUM]		[LOCUS]



(45) <i>Pystyt/i/t/kö</i>	PART
	<i>telttä/a?</i>
	[+/-RESULT] [+POLITE]

(44) 'Did you pitch the tent?'

(45) 'Did you pitch the tent?'

'Were you pitching a/the tent?'

Under such circumstances, the question immediately suggests itself of how in this light the constitutive meaning(s) of the accusative and partitive should be constructed. Should these cases have only one constitutive meaning (for example in the dimension of {aspect}) or should they have two constitutive meanings, in the dimensions of {aspect} and {honorification}? The answer depends on which meanings are basic and which are ascribed actual meanings. Comparison of the sentences (44), (45) with the sentences (46), (47) indicates that the aspectual meanings are basic, and the honorificative meanings are ascribed meanings to the appropriate aspectual meanings in yes-no questions:

(46) <i>Pystyt/i/t</i>	ACC
	<i>telttä/n.</i>
	[+RESULT]

(47) <i>Pystyt/i/t</i>	PART
	<i>telttä/a.</i>
	[+/-RESULT]

(46) 'You pitched the tent.'

(47) 'You pitched/were pitching a/the tent.'

The constitutive meaning of the accusative is [+RESULT]. The constitutive meaning of the partitive is [+/-RESULT]. The accusative and partitive have no constitutive meaning in the dimension of {honorification}.

It is worth emphasizing that, in contrast to the process of actualization of meaning, where the simple meaning could not be actualized to a complex meaning, in the case of adscription of meaning to the simple basic meaning (cf. [+RESULT] in (44) *Pystyitkö telttä?*) there can be ascribed such a meaning which is complex (cf. [+/-POLITE]).

Let us visualize the discussed combination of actualization and adscription of meaning, resulting in the actual basic and ascribed meanings of the accusative and partitive:

	ACC	PART	
	<i>teltan</i> 'tent'	<i>telttaa</i> 'tent'	
<b>constitutive meaning</b>	[+RESULT]	[+/-RESULT]	
	↓	↓	↓
context	<i>Pystytit...</i>	<i>Pystytit...</i>	<i>Kun pystytit..., puhelin soi.</i>
	↓	↓	↓
<b>basic actual meanings</b>	[+RESULT]	[+/-RESULT]	[-RESULT]
	↓	↓	↓
context	<i>Pystyitkö...?</i>	<i>Pystyitkö...?</i>	<i>Soiko puhelin, kun pystytit...?</i>
	↓	↓	↓
<b>ascribed actual meanings</b>	[+/-POLITE]	[+POLITE]	[+/-POLITE]

The approach presented here seems to lengthen unnecessarily the process of generating the appropriate sentences corresponding to the intentions of the speaker. The Finnish speaker models his input (e.g. a wish to express a polite question as to whether somebody has pitched the tent) using the lexical-grammatical resources of the language in such a way that he obtains as output the sentence (45) (*Pystyitkö telttaa?*). From this point of view, the word *telttaa* acquires both actual meanings ([+/-RESULT] and [+POLITE]) as though *in statu nascendi*. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the case forms themselves, the situation may be somewhat different. By adding broader and broader contexts in which the word *telttaa* occurs, it is possible to shed light on its gradual acquisition of the appropriate meanings. In turn, the converse procedure allows one to identify those semantic constants which, being the relatively least dependent on the context, characterize the case as such.

### 2.4.3. Reinterpretation of meaning

The reinterpretation of meaning in the traditional sense is a diachronic process of transition from one semantic dimension into another – new – dimension, with the staging post of ascription of meaning. Let us compare:

(48) <i>Hän kuoli</i>	INESS
	(a) <i>metsä/ssä.</i> [LOCUS]
	↓
	(b) <i>jahdi/ssa.</i> [LOCUS] [TEMPUS]
	↓
	(c) <i>kesäkuu/ssa.</i> [TEMPUS]

‘He died (a) in the forest.’  
(b) on a hunt.’  
(c) on June.’

From the synchronic point of view, the **reinterpreted meaning** (in the example (48c) [TEMPUS]) exists parallel to the remaining actual meanings (the basic [LOCUS] and ascribed ones [TEMPUS]). It appears to be a combinatory variant of them. The reinterpreted meanings display a tendency to become more isolated (cf. the sentence (38) *Kirjoitin kynällä* ‘I wrote with the pen’).

### 2.5. The form of cases

The statement that one lingual form has many meanings and that one lingual meaning is conveyed by many lingual forms sounds like a truism. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to predict that the lingual mechanism would be dysfunctional if everything could mean anything and everything could be meant by anything. Globally, lingual forms and meanings are combined with each other selectively. Morphological categories are entities which reflect the regularities of the selective combinability between these two sides of the lingual sign.

Fillmore and his followers, in their Case Grammars, managed to divert linguists’ attention from the form of cases (cf. section 1.5.2). I shall not adhere to such an extreme one-sided treatment of the problem. The form is a lingual fact to the

same extent as the meaning. This is all the more so because the traditional – overtly desinential – marking of the Finnish cases does not present any special challenge against the background of the relatively well-tried classical approach. The same certainly cannot be said of the Fillmore-style Case Grammars, which are limited to the specificities of English, idolatrously generalized to all languages of the world.

The issue of the numerosity of the case paradigm (more colloquially – the number of cases) of a language seems to be theoretically extremely complicated, and – as the vacillation of linguists indicates – has never in fact been conclusively settled for any language (cf. the postulates of paradigmification in Bańcerowski 1999b: 29–36). This may result from the fact that case is a interfacial category, mediating between semantics, syntax and morphology.

Considering the contemporary state of linguistics, a case grammarian presents a list of cases which to his knowledge most adequately reflect the relevant formal-syntactic-semantic regularities of the language in question. Let us present the inventory of the Finnish cases and their desinential markers as adopted in the present work:

	<b>case</b>	<b>endings</b>
(i)	accusative	-Ø, -n, -t;
(ii)	partitive	-a, -ä, -ta, -tä, -tta, -ttä;
(iii)	nominative	-Ø, -t;
(iv)	absolutive	-a, -ä, -ta, -tä, -tta, -ttä, -Ø, -t;
(v)	genitive	-n, -den, -tten, -dän, -en, -ten, -in;
(vi)	inessive	-ssa, -ssä;
(vii)	illative	-Vn, -hVn, -seen, -siin;
(viii)	elative	-sta, -stä;
(ix)	adessive	-lla, -llä;
(x)	allative	-lle;
(xi)	ablative	-lta, -ltä;
(xii)	essive	-na, -nä;
(xiii)	translative	-ksi, -kse;
(xiv)	comitative	-(i)ne-;
(xv)	abessive	-tta, -ttä;
(xvi)	instructive	-(i)n.

The most adequate numerosity of the case paradigm for a language need not be equivalent to the number of heterophones in each particular case paradigm. Some formal fluctuations are admissible, which do not however ultimately influence the fixed numerosity of the case paradigm. These fluctuations are known to

linguists as: (i) morphological variation and (ii) phonetic neutralization or syncretism. Let us make some remarks about these seemingly obvious notions.

### 2.5.1. Morphological variation

Morphological variation can be conceived of as phonetic **over-distinguishability** within the framework of a single case. There can be distinguished (at least) two types of relation of morphological case variation:

#### Re 5 *Relation of stronger morphological case variation*

In order to define the relation of stronger morphological case variation, the following diacritic pairs of minimal case syntagms should be considered:

(49) *ihmis/ten*<sub>1</sub> *luonne*<sub>a</sub>  
*people-GEN* *character*

(50) *ihmis/i/en*<sub>2</sub> *luonne*<sub>b</sub>  
*people-GEN* *character*

(51) *Ihmis/ten*<sub>3</sub> *täytyy*<sub>c</sub>.  
*people-GEN* *must*

(52) *Ihmis/i/en*<sub>4</sub> *täytyy*<sub>d</sub>.  
*people-GEN* *must*

(49–50) ‘the character of people’

(51–52) ‘People must.’

Two words –  $w_1$  (*ihmisten*),  $w_2$  (*ihmisien*) – stand in the relation of stronger morphological case variation if and only if there exist words  $w_3$  (*Ihmisten*),  $w_4$  (*Ihmisien*),  $w_a$  (*luonne*),  $w_b$  (*luonne*),  $w_c$  (*täytyy*),  $w_d$  (*täytyy*) such that:  $w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4$  belong to case;  $w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4$  are homolexical;  $w_1, w_2$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_3, w_4$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1, w_2$  are not homophonic;  $w_3, w_4$  are not homophonic;  $w_1, w_3$  are homophonic;  $w_2, w_4$  are homophonic;  $w_a, w_b, w_c, w_d$  belong to verb or noun;  $w_a, w_b$  are homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_c, w_d$  are homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a, w_c$  are not homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic,

homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a$ ,  $w_d$  are not homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_b$ ,  $w_c$  are not homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_b$ ,  $w_d$  are not homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1$  determines  $w_a$  or  $w_a$  determines  $w_1$ ;  $w_2$  determines  $w_b$  or  $w_b$  determines  $w_2$ ;  $w_3$  determines  $w_c$  or  $w_c$  determines  $w_3$ ;  $w_4$  determines  $w_d$  or  $w_d$  determines  $w_4$ ; and there exists a case  $C_x$  such that  $w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4$  belong to  $C_x$ .

## Re 6 *Relation of weaker morphological case variation*

In order to define the relation of weaker morphological case variation, the following diacritic pair of minimal case syntagms should be considered:

(53) *Lu/i/n<sub>a</sub>*                      *kirja/n<sub>1</sub>*.  
*read-IND ACT*                      *book-ACC*

(54) *Lue/∅<sub>b</sub>*                        *kirja/∅<sub>2</sub>!*  
*read-IMP ACT 2 SG*                *book-ACC*

(53) ‘I read the whole book.’

(54) ‘Read the whole book!’

Two words –  $w_1$  (*kirjan*),  $w_2$  (*kirja*) – stand in the relation of weaker morphological case variation if and only if there exist words  $w_a$  (*Luin*),  $w_b$  (*Lue*) such that:  $w_1, w_2$  belong to case;  $w_1, w_2$  are homolexical and homosemic;  $w_1, w_2$  are not homophonic, homosyntactic and homodeterminational;  $w_a, w_b$  belong to verb or noun;  $w_a, w_b$  are homolexical;  $w_a, w_b$  are not homophonic, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1$  determines  $w_a$  or  $w_a$  determines  $w_1$ ;  $w_2$  determines  $w_b$  or  $w_b$  determines  $w_2$ ; and there exists a case  $C_x$  such that  $w_1, w_2$  belong to  $C_x$ .

The relation of weaker morphological case variation is a specific feature of Finnish (Balto-Finnic) and will be thoroughly discussed in section 3.1.1, which concerns the accusative case, and in section 4.2.2 concerning the absolutive case.

### 2.5.2. Phonetic neutralization – syncretism

The phonetic neutralization (syncretism) of case opposition can be conceived of as phonetic **indistinguishability** within the framework of at least two cases. There can be distinguished (at least) two types of relation of phonetic neutralization of case opposition:

Re 7 *Relation of dissoluble phonetic neutralization of case opposition*

In order to define the relation of dissoluble phonetic neutralization of case opposition, the following diacritic pairs of minimal case syntagms should be considered (examples from Polish):

- |      |                                      |                               |      |                          |                                |
|------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| (55) | <i>Widz</i> <sub>ξ<sub>a</sub></sub> | <i>dom/∅</i> <sub>1</sub> .   | (57) | <i>Stoi</i> <sub>c</sub> | <i>dom/∅</i> <sub>3</sub> .    |
|      |                                      | <i>house-ACC</i>              |      |                          | <i>house-NOM</i>               |
| (56) | <i>Widz</i> <sub>ξ<sub>b</sub></sub> | <i>kobiet/ξ<sub>2</sub></i> . | (58) | <i>Stoi</i> <sub>d</sub> | <i>kobiet/a</i> <sub>4</sub> . |
|      |                                      | <i>woman-ACC</i>              |      |                          | <i>woman-NOM</i>               |
| (55) | ‘I see a house.’                     |                               | (57) | ‘There stands a house.’  |                                |
| (56) | ‘I see a woman.’                     |                               | (58) | ‘There stands a woman.’  |                                |

Two words  $w_1$  – (*dom*),  $w_3$  (*dom*) – stand in the relation of dissoluble phonetic neutralization of case opposition if and only if there exist words  $w_2$  (*kobiet*),  $w_4$  (*kobieta*),  $w_a$  (*Widz*),  $w_b$  (*Widz*),  $w_c$  (*Stoi*),  $w_d$  (*Stoi*) such that:  $w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4$  belong to case;  $w_1, w_3$  are homophonic and homolexical;  $w_1, w_3$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_2, w_4$  are not homophonic;  $w_2, w_4$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1, w_2$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_3, w_4$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a, w_b, w_c, w_d$  belong to verb or noun;  $w_a, w_b$  are homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_c, w_d$  are homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a, w_c$  are not homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_b, w_d$  are not homophonic, homolexical, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1$  determines  $w_a$  or  $w_a$  determines  $w_1$ ;  $w_2$  determines  $w_b$  or  $w_b$  determines  $w_2$ ;  $w_3$  determines  $w_c$  or  $w_c$  determines  $w_3$ ;  $w_4$  determines  $w_d$  or  $w_d$  determines  $w_4$ ; and there exist distinct cases  $C_x, C_y$  such that  $w_1, w_2$  belong to  $C_x$  and  $w_3, w_4$  belong to  $C_y$ .

Re 8 *Relation of indissoluble phonetic neutralization of case opposition*

In order to define the relation of indissoluble phonetic neutralization of case opposition, the following diacritic pairs of minimal case syntagms should be considered (examples from Polish):

- |      |  |                             |
|------|--|-----------------------------|
| (59) | <i>Buduj/e si</i> <sub>ξ<sub>a</sub></sub> | <i>dom/∅</i> <sub>1</sub> . |
|      | <i>build-IMPERS</i>                        | <i>house-ACC</i>            |

(60) *Buduj/e się<sub>b</sub>*      *szkol/ę<sub>2</sub>*.  
*build-IMPERS*      *school-ACC*

(59) ‘One builds a house.’

(60) ‘One builds a school.’

(61) *Buduj/e się<sub>c</sub>*      *dom/Ø<sub>3</sub>*.  
*build-MEDPASS*      *house-NOM*

(62) *Buduj/e się<sub>d</sub>*      *szkol/a<sub>4</sub>*.  
*build-MEDPASS*      *school-NOM*

(61) ‘There is a house being built.’

(62) ‘There is a school being built.’

Two words –  $w_1$  (*dom*),  $w_3$  (*dom*) – stand in the relation of indissoluble phonetic neutralization of case opposition if and only if there exist words  $w_2$  (*szkolę*),  $w_4$  (*szkola*),  $w_a$  (*Buduje się*),  $w_b$  (*Buduje się*),  $w_c$  (*Buduje się*),  $w_d$  (*Buduje się*) such that:  $w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4$  belong to case;  $w_1, w_3$  are homophonic and homolexical;  $w_1, w_3$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_2, w_4$  are homolexical;  $w_2, w_4$  are not homophonic, homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1, w_2$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_3, w_4$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a, w_b, w_c, w_d$  belong to verb or noun;  $w_a, w_b, w_c, w_d$  are homophonic and homolexical;  $w_a, w_b$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_c, w_d$  are homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a, w_c$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_a, w_d$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_b, w_c$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_b, w_d$  are not homosyntactic, homodeterminational and homosemic;  $w_1$  determines  $w_a$  or  $w_a$  determines  $w_1$ ;  $w_2$  determines  $w_b$  or  $w_b$  determines  $w_2$ ;  $w_3$  determines  $w_c$  or  $w_c$  determines  $w_3$ ;  $w_4$  determines  $w_d$  or  $w_d$  determines  $w_4$ ; and there exist distinct cases  $C_x, C_y$  such that  $w_1, w_2$  belong to  $C_x$  and  $w_3, w_4$  belong to  $C_y$ .

Taking into account the general reluctance of Finnish linguists to recognize the fact of the phonetic neutralization of two cases (not to mention their division into types) – which must probably be considered to emphasize the exceptional nature of the language – the illustrative examples are provisionally taken from Polish, whose grammatical descriptive tradition in this regard is not so extravagant as that of Finnish. The complex matter of indissoluble phonetic neutralization of case opposition in Finnish will be thoroughly discussed in section 3.1.1, which is devoted to the accusative case.

## 3. THE CASES OF DIRECT OBJECT

There are two cases in Finnish – the accusative and partitive – whose markers signal the syntactic subordination of the noun to the transitive verb (cf. the approach of Kuryłowicz referred to in section 1.5.1). The accusative and partitive – as the cases of direct object – convey the diathetically relevant meaning [PATIENT]. Moreover, both cases enter onto the paradigmatic plane of the language in quite a regular semantic opposition, whose intricate nature will be the subject of analysis after the relevant morphological and syntactic properties have been discussed.

### 3.1. The accusative

The accusative in Finnish is marked by means of the following endings:

- (i) *-n*, *-t*, *-Ø* in the singular; and
- (ii) *-t* in the plural number.

Before discussing the accusative in more detail, let us briefly consider some initial questions concerning the use of the term ‘accusative’ in the Finnish linguistic literature. Göran Karlsson (1966) divided the history of the term into three periods. Up to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the term ‘accusative’ occurred in Finnish grammars only sporadically. Then, for at least half a century after the publication of *Suomen kielen lauseoppi* ‘The Syntax of the Finnish Language’ (1880), by the authoritative Finnish linguist Setälä, the accusative underwent a “renaissance”. Since the publication of Penttilä’s *Suomen kielioppi* ‘Finnish Grammar’ in 1957, however, the accusative has experienced a “decline”. The authors of *Iso suomen kielioppi* ‘The Great Finnish Grammar’, for example, propose explicitly breaking with the grammatical tradition which recognizes case syncretism between the accusative, genitive and nominative. They state laconically that the term ‘accusative’ has been used as a “syntactic notion”, not as the name of a “morphological case” (as if

putting things in such a way were not some false dichotomy in itself). They therefore propose to limit the use of the term ‘accusative’ to forms of personal pronouns such as *minut* ‘me’, *sinut* ‘you’, *hänet* ‘him, her, it’, *meidät* ‘us’, *teidät* ‘you’, *heidät* ‘them’, and the form of the interrogative pronoun *kenet* ‘whom’. These, in contemporary Finnish, are the only accusative forms phonetically distinguishable from the forms of the genitive and nominative (cf. *minut* ‘me’ (ACC) with *minun* ‘of me, my, mine’ (GEN) and *minä* ‘I’ (NOM) etc.) (Hakulinen A. et al. 2004: 1178).

It is difficult to find such proposals convincing. First of all, entirely contrary to the intentions of their authors, they seem to produce redundancy in the descriptive notional inventory. If case is to be univocally associated with the ending (one ending – one case), then what is the need to speak of both concepts, if they seem to be treated synonymously? In describing the relevant phenomena in Finnish, it would be sufficient to speak of an *n*-case or  $\emptyset$ -case or *-n* ending or  $\emptyset$  ending, instead of the genitive having its *-n* ending and the nominative having its  $\emptyset$  ending. If the criticized proposals are not only of a terminological nature, then their descriptive adequacy also seems dubious. Of course, it is clear that in certain declensional subsystems of the Finnish language, the accusative on one hand and the genitive and nominative on the other have coalesced phonetically. This circumstance indeed seems to motivate their summary treatment in those subsystems – or alternatively, the need to distinguish by referring to them by means of only one “common” morphological super-category (‘genitive-accusative’, ‘nominative-accusative’). The reason why these syncretized cases should be referred to simply by the terms ‘genitive’ or ‘nominative’ is far from clear. Such a statement as “the genitive and nominative have their own forms, whereas the accusative takes its forms from the genitive and nominative” is unacceptably biased. It might be proclaimed with exactly the same degree of “truth” that “the case which has its own forms is the accusative, whereas the genitive and nominative take them from the accusative”. The relation of homophony is a symmetrical relation. If some forms of the accusative are homophonic with those of the genitive and nominative, then the relevant forms of the genitive and nominative are homophonic with the forms of the accusative as well.

The forms of the accusative singular of all declinable words, beside the aforementioned pronouns, are homophonic with those of the genitive and nominative singular. The forms of the accusative plural of such words are homophonic with those of the nominative plural. In the case of the personal pronouns and the interrogative pronoun *kuka* ‘who’, as has been mentioned, the forms of the accusative are always phonetically different from the forms of the genitive and nominative<sup>27</sup>. If our

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<sup>27</sup> The importance of the mentioned pronominal forms for the contemporary Finnish case system is not invalidated by the fact that they seem to have appeared in the literary language relatively late and that the singular forms (*minut*, *sinut*, *hänet*) seem to have appeared by ousting the regular forms

aim is to describe this aspect of Finnish globally, then it turns out that a grammar which limits manifestations of the accusative only to the aforementioned pronoun forms deprives us of useful generalizations about the language. Let us compare a fragment of the grammar having the accusative only for the discussed pronouns, treating the accusative as an unproductive case, with the grammar with the “generalized” accusative, treating it as a productive case:

	accusative – unproductive			accusative – productive		
	‘hen’	‘hens’	‘I’	‘hen’	‘hens’	‘I’
<b>NOM</b>	<i>kana</i> [AG] [PAT] ...	<i>kanat</i> [AG] [PAT] ...	<i>minä</i> [AG] ... ...	<i>kana</i> [AG] ... ...	<i>kanat</i> [AG] ... ...	<i>minä</i> [AG] ... ...
<b>GEN</b>	<i>kanan</i> [PAT] [POSS] ...	<i>kanojen</i> [POSS] ...	<i>minun</i> [POSS] ... ...	<i>kanan</i> [POSS] ... ...	<i>kanojen</i> [POSS] ... ...	<i>minun</i> [POSS] ... ...
<b>ACC</b>	–	–	<i>minut</i> [PAT] ... ...	<i>kanan,</i> <i>kana</i> [PAT] ... ...	<i>kanat</i> [PAT] ... ...	<i>minut</i> [PAT] ... ...
<b>ADESS</b>	<i>kanalla</i> [LOCUS] ...	<i>kanoilla</i> [LOCUS] ...	<i>minulla</i> [LOCUS] ... ...	<i>kanalla</i> [LOCUS] ... ...	<i>kanoilla</i> [LOCUS] ... ...	<i>minulla</i> [LOCUS] ... ...

As can easily be inferred, the meaning of the nominative of such nouns as *kana*, *kanat* on the left side is different from that of the pronouns (*minä*). The meaning of the genitive singular (*kanan*) is different from that of the genitive plural (*kanojen*). The genitive differs in this respect from the other cases, whose meaning does not vary according to number (cf. *kanalla*, *kanoilla*). In the grammar with the “generalized” accusative, these divergences do not arise. Each case has the same meaning (or alternatively, bundle of appropriate meanings) independently of the word class or number. In spite of the remarkable extent of the phonetic neutralization between the accusative, genitive and nominative, as the presented relationships show, these three (morphological) categories have not yet been totally homophonized. Neither all forms of the genitive nor those of the nominative are homophonic with all forms of the accusative, and vice versa.

---

(†*minun*, †*sinun*, †*hänen* homophonic with the genitive forms) by analogy with the plural forms (*meidät*, *teidät*, *heidät*, cf. *kirjat* ‘books’) (cf. Ojansuu 1922: 116–119, Karlsson G. 1966: 20).

### 3.1.1. The accusative split

The category of the accusative of all declinable words in Finnish beside the aforementioned seven pronouns also exhibits, in the singular number, a thought-provoking split into two types of forms which cannot be treated as morphological variation as such. Setälä (1908: 53–54) spoke about:

- (i) the **desinential** (*päätteinen*, contemporarily *päätteellinen*) or **first** accusative (*ensimmäinen akkusatiivi*); and
- (ii) the **non-desinential** (*päätteetön*) or **second** accusative (*toinen akkusatiivi*).

The forms of the desinential accusative in the singular number are homophonic with those of the genitive singular (marked by *-n*). The forms of the non-desinential accusative in the singular number are homophonic with those of the nominative singular (marked by *-Ø*). The forms of the plural accusative are homophonic only with those of the plural nominative (marked by the ending *-t*). Let us summarize this by means of the following scheme:

ACC		
SG		PL
I ACC desinential ACC	II ACC non-desinential ACC	
<i>-n</i>	<i>-Ø</i>	<i>-t</i>
	= NOM SG	= NOM PL
= GEN SG	= NOM	

This split was probably consistently articulated for the first time by Jahnsson, the author of the previously mentioned Finnish grammar for Swedish speakers, at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He wrote:

*Objektet står i (...) Accusativus, om det är totalt och handligens subjekt tillika är utsatt (...) Nominativus, (...) om det totala objektet hänförs till en imperativus eller till en af imperativus beroende infinitivus (...) om det totala objektet hänförs till det s. k. passivum eller en deraf beroende infinitivform (...) om det totala objektet hänförs till en infinitivform uti en finsk sats, der personelt subjekt saknas (...)*<sup>28</sup> (Jahnsson 1871: 10–14).

<sup>28</sup> ‘The object stands in (...) the Accusative [i.e. desinential accusative] if it is total and the acting subject is also exposed (...) in the Nominative [i.e. non-desinential accusative], (...) if the total object is applied in the imperative or in an infinitive depending on the imperative (...) if the total object is applied to the so-called passive or to an infinitive form depending on it (...) if the total object is applied to an infinitive form out of a Finnish sentence [i.e. *infinitivus absolutus*] where the personal subject is missing (...)’ [original boldface removed].

With the application of certain necessary terminological co-ordinations with the native Finnish grammatical tradition of that epoch (cf. the remarks in square brackets in the English translation), the rule governing the occurrence of the forms of the accusative has been henceforth referred to in the literature as *Jahnssonin sääntö* ‘Jahnsson’s rule’. This rule states that accusative (or direct object) marking by means of the ending *-n* in the singular is suspended when, generally speaking, there is no opposition on the syntagmatic plane between it and the nominative. It therefore takes place in the following constructions:

- (i) impersonal: (63) *Kirja/∅ luetaan*  
‘One reads a/the book-II ACC’;
- (ii) mono-personal<sup>29</sup>  
infinitival: (64) *Pitää lukea kirja/∅*  
‘One must read a/the book-II ACC’;
- (iii) 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>  
person-imperative: (65) *Lue kirja/∅!*  
‘Read a/the book-II ACC!’.

The approach of Maling (1993) seems in essence to reflect the way in which many contemporary Finnish linguists treat the non-desinential accusative. She counts it among the manifestations of the morphological (sic!) nominative. To explain this state of affairs, Maling resorts to the so-called *Case-Tier Hypothesis*. According to this hypothesis, the (morphological) grammatical cases are assigned hierarchically to the words fulfilling the appropriate grammatical (i.e. syntactic) function. To “the highest available grammatical function” there is assigned the nominative (cf. sentences (63), (66), (67)). To the “next highest grammatical function” there is assigned the accusative (cf. sentence (67)):

	NOM		ACC
(63)	<i>Kirja/∅</i>	<i>luetaan.</i>	
(66) <i>Luetaan</i>	<i>koko ilta/∅.</i>		
(67)	<i>Kirja/∅</i>	<i>luetaan</i>	<i>koko illa/n.</i>

- (63) ‘One reads a/the book.’  
(66) ‘One reads the whole evening.’  
(67) ‘One reads a/the book the whole evening.’

<sup>29</sup> Cf. the criticism of the notion *yksipersonainen* ‘mono-personal’ in Penttilä 1954.

Sentences not observing this hierarchical assignment are not correct:

(68)	NOM	<i>Kirja/∅</i>	<i>luetaan</i>	ACC		* <i>koko ilta/∅</i> .
(69)	NOM	<i>Kirja/∅</i>	<i>Luetaan</i>	ACC	<i>*koko illa/n.</i>	

(68) ‘One reads a/the book the whole evening.’

(69) ‘One reads the whole evening.’

As can easily be inferred, Maling’s approach is based primarily on some (phonetic) facts relating to the same syntagm. For example, if the  $\emptyset$ -ending (i.e. nominative) has already been assigned to a nominal constituent in a certain syntagm (e.g. (63) *Kirja/∅ luetaan*), then in case of expansion of that syntagm, to the other nominal constituent there must be assigned a case marked by an overt ending (-n), which she classifies as accusative (e.g. (67) [*Kirja/∅ luetaan*] *koko illa/n*). However, the whole network of appropriate paradigmatic relations occurring between the relevant types of sentences seems to be concealed completely. Let us compare the following sentences:

(70)	NOM	<i>Mies/∅</i>	<i>tappoi</i>	ACC	<i>kana/n.</i>	
(71)	NOM	<i>Mies/∅</i>	<i>tappoi</i>	ACC	<i>häne/t.</i>	
(72)				ACC	<i>Häne/t</i>	<i>tapettiin.</i>
(73)				ACC	<i>Kana/∅</i>	<i>tapettiin.</i>

(70) ‘The man killed the hen.’

(71) ‘The man killed him.’

(72) ‘One killed him.’

(73) ‘One killed the hen.’

In a sentence of the type (70) *Mies tappoi kanan* the word functioning as direct object (*KANA* ‘hen’) is opposed on the syntagmatic plane to the word functioning as subject (*MIES* ‘man’) by means of the overt accusative ending -n (*kana/n*). In a sentence of the type (73) *Kana tapettiin* the word functioning as direct object is not opposed on the syntagmatic plane to any other nominal constituent and occurs without any overt ending. In the sentence types (71) *Mies tappoi hänet* and (72) *Hänet*

*tapettiin*, however, the word functioning as direct object (*HÄN* ‘he, she, it’) is marked by an overt ending (-*t*) in both instances (*hänet*). If *hänet* in (71) *Mies tappoi hänet* and (72) *Hänet tapettiin* belongs to the accusative, then on the strength of analogy, *kanan* and *kana* in (70) *Mies tappoi kanan* and (73) *Kana tapettiin* should be classified as belonging to the same morphological category (for more detailed discussion see Bielecki 2009)<sup>30</sup>.

Maling’s approach seems to me controversial for one more crucial reason. It is difficult to find in it any kind of relation between the cases and the syntactic functions fulfilled by the words belonging to them, at least within the scope presented by the author. The impression given is that in her approach, the nominative can fulfill any syntactic function: that of subject, direct object and even adverbial. How, then, are the syntactic functions fulfilled by nouns encoded in Finnish? Lexically? By means of word order? How is it possible to reconcile the syntactical omniconcategoriality of cases proposed by Maling with the fact that the Finnish language has at its disposal such an elaborate nominal desinential inflection? There is no doubt that the issue of the non-desinential accusative requires more profound reflection.

The first thing that draws the attention is the fact that the forms of the II accusative have a much greater degree of syncretism with those of the nominative than the forms of the I accusative. The extent of this syncretism, to an uninitiated observer, may at first glance even seem somewhat embarrassing. Practically only the forms of the seven aforementioned pronouns seem to maintain overtly, in the traditional sense, the opposition between this type of accusative and the nominative. Let us compare:

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<sup>30</sup> There is in fact an even greater variety of approaches to the question of which forms should be recognized as manifestations of the accusative in contemporary Finnish. Let us classify them in the following groups: (i) the accusative is non-existent in Finnish (all nominal forms ending in *-n* belong to the GEN SG, all nominal forms ending in *-Ø* and *-t* belong to the NOM SG and NOM PL respectively; the relevant pronominal forms ending in *-t* do not seem to belong to any case, they are “a peculiar objective form” (*en särskild objektiv form*) (sic!)) (Runeberg 1952: 27); (ii) the accusative forms are limited only to the forms of the mentioned seven pronouns (all nominal forms ending in *-n* belong to the GEN SG, all nominal forms ending in *-Ø* and *-t* belong to the NOM SG and NOM PL respectively) (Saareste 1926, Penttilä 1957: 149, Vainikka 1993: 157, Kiparsky P. 2001, Hakulinen A. et al. 2004: 1178, Vainikka & Brattico 2011); (iii) the forms of the accusative are limited only to the relevant forms homophonic with the GEN SG (ending in *-n*) (all forms homophonic with those of the NOM belong to the NOM, the mentioned pronominal forms are regarded too as NOM (sic!)) (cf. *minu/t* ‘me’ vs. *kirja/t* ‘books’) (Toivainen 1993: 113–114, 120); (iv) the accusative forms are those of the mentioned pronouns and those relevant forms which are homophonic with the GEN SG ending in *-n* (all nominal forms ending in *-Ø* and *-t* belong to the NOM SG and NOM PL, respectively) (Maling 1993: 51–52); (v) the accusative forms are those of the mentioned pronouns, and as for the other word classes, the relevant nominal forms ending in *-n* and *-Ø* belong to the ACC SG, the relevant forms ending in *-t* belong to the ACC PL (Kettunen & Vaula 1960: 64–65, Karlsson G. 1966: 25–27, Wiik 1972, Sadeniemi S. 1979: 24–25, 32, 125–126, Kudzinowski 1984: 69–70, Vainikka 1992: 317–319, Reime 1993: 93, 106, Bielecki 2009).

nominative			II accusative		
<i>minä</i>	<i>kirja</i>	<i>kirjat</i>	<i>minut</i>	<i>kirja</i>	<i>kirjat</i>
<i>sinä</i>	...	...	<i>sinut</i>	...	...
<i>hän</i>			<i>hänet</i>		
<i>me</i>			<i>meidät</i>		
<i>te</i>			<i>teidät</i>		
<i>he</i>			<i>heidät</i>		
<i>kuka</i>			<i>kenet</i>		
NOM ≠ II ACC	NOM = II ACC		II ACC ≠ NOM	II ACC = NOM	

The other conspicuous property of the non-desinential accusative is the occurrence of its forms within the Finnish nominal paradigms. Polish nominal paradigms, for example, can contain:

- (i) desinential accusative: *ksiązkę* ‘book’ (cf. nominative *książka*); or
- (ii) non-desinential accusative: *gęś/Ø* ‘goose’ (cf. nominative *gęś/Ø*).

The occurrence of the appropriate type of the accusative in Polish is regulated by the nominal declensional type of the word in question. For instance, feminine nouns ending in *-a* in the nominative have the desinential accusative ending in *-ę* (*książkę* ≠ *książka*). Feminine nouns ending in a consonant have the non-desinential accusative homophonic with the nominative (*gęś* = *gęś*)<sup>31</sup>. In Finnish nominal paradigms, the occurrence of the desinential and non-desinential accusative does not seem to be conditioned by factors of this kind. Both types of the accusative co-occur in all nominal paradigms, with the exception of those of the few pronouns whose accusative ends in *-t*. Let us compare:

case	Polish				Finnish			
	‘book’	‘goose’	...	‘I’	‘book’	‘goose’	...	‘I’
NOM	<i>książka</i>	<i>gęś/Ø</i>	...	<i>ja</i>	<i>kirja/Ø</i>	<i>hanhi/Ø</i>	...	<i>minä/Ø</i>
ACC	<i>książkę</i>	<i>gęś/Ø</i>	...	<i>mnie</i>	<i>kirja/n</i>	<i>hanhe/n</i>	...	<i>minu/t</i>
					<i>kirja/Ø</i>	<i>hanhi/Ø</i>	...	
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

We now come to what seems to be the most essential point: as concerns the functioning of the words belonging to the accusative in larger syntactic units, as has already been mentioned, the two forms of the Finnish

<sup>31</sup> Analogous dependencies would be valid for many other Indo-European languages which use the desinential mechanism of expression: Russian, Lithuanian, German, Icelandic, Latin, etc.

accusative cannot be treated as morphological variation *sensu stricto*. Let us compare the analyzed Polish and Finnish words:

	desinential accusative		non-desinential accusative
(74) (a) <i>Widzia//em</i> <i>see-PRAET-1 SG</i>	<i>książk/ę</i>	↔	<i>gęś/∅.</i>
(b) <i>Nä/i/n</i> <i>see-PRAET-1 SG</i>	<i>kirja/n</i> <i>hanhe/n</i>		<i>*kirja/∅.</i> <i>*hanhi/∅.</i>
(75) (a) <i>Widzi/an/o</i> <i>see-PRAET-IMPERS</i>	<i>książk/ę</i>	↔	<i>gęś/∅.</i>
(b) <i>Näh/ti/in</i> <i>see-PRAET-IMPERS</i> ( <i>see-PASS PRAET-3 SG</i> )	<i>*kirja/n</i> <i>*hanhe/n</i>		<i>kirja/∅.</i> <i>hanhi/∅.</i>

(74) ‘I saw a/the book/goose.’

(75) ‘One saw a/the book/goose.’

((b) ‘The book/goose was seen.’)

While *książkę* and *gęś* in Polish are substitutable for each other in both given contexts (cf. [*Widziałem*] or [*Widziano*] *książkę* ↔ *gęś*), the Finnish *kirjan/hanhen* and *kirja/hanhi* absolutely are not (cf. [*Näin*] *kirjan/hanhen* ↔ \*, [*Nähtiin*] *kirja/hanhi* ↔ \*). The words belonging to the two forms of the Polish accusative seem to be syntactically more similar to each other (if not homosyntactic) than those of the Finnish accusative, which are, in this respect, flagrantly disparate. The maintenance of the category of the accusative throughout all nominal paradigms, in spite of its formal confluence with the nominative (more in Finnish, less in Polish), must therefore be motivated by different premises in the grammars of both languages.

From the point of view of how the issues of (i) case syncretism, (ii) morphological variation, and (iii) case-voice compatibility are generally approached, the behavior of *kirjan/hanhen* on one hand and *kirja/hanhi* on the other resembles more the behavior of forms belonging to different cases than forms belonging to one case displaying ordinary morphological variation. In both Polish and Finnish, the accusative and nominative exhibit a certain degree of overlapping. Nevertheless, in Polish, within the scope of the phenomenon being analyzed, a change of voice (*Widziałem* → *Widziano*) does not imply such a consistent change in the form of the noun (*Widziałem książkę/gęś* → *Widziano książkę/gęś*) as it does in Finnish (*Näin* →

*Nähtiin*; *Näin kirjan/hanhen* → *Nähtiin kirja/hanhi*). Such a “global coincidence” between change of voice and change of noun form can be efficiently elucidated by means of a change of case:

[ <i>Widzialem</i> ]	<i>ksiqzk/ę</i>	→	<i>Ksiqzk/a</i>	[ <i>była widziana</i> ]
	<i>gęś/∅</i>		<i>Gęś/∅</i>	
ACT	ACC	→	NOM	PASS

This being so, the suspicion that different nominal forms occurring with different voices in Finnish ([*Näin*] *kirjan/hanhen* vs. [*Nähtiin*] *kirja/hanhi*) are manifestations of different cases (e.g. *kirjan/hanhen* ∈ ACC, *kirja/hanhi* ∉ ACC) seems to be to some extent legitimized.

### 3.1.2. The accusative and voice

The specialist literature which has grown up around the problem of the accusative split is immense. The cardinal problems considered can be formulated as follows:

How should the morphosyntactic status of the nominal constituent of a sentence of the type (75b) *Nähtiin kirja* be rendered from the synchronic point of view? Does it, beyond any doubt, fulfill the function of direct object? Or, because of its specificity, does it fulfill some other syntactic function, for example that of subject? What case does it consequently belong to: the accusative or rather the nominative?

The search for answers to these questions involves at the same time another extremely intricate problem, namely the assignment of the co-occurring finite verb forms to the appropriate voice, as alluded to above. Case and voice are categories that display a certain semantic affinity. Some cases and voices seem to be compatible with one another (e.g. the nominative and accusative with the active voice), whereas others do not (e.g. the accusative and passive voice, the nominative and the impersonal voice, etc.)<sup>32</sup>. Let us summarize, and at the same time comment on and expand where necessary, the essential issues of this discussion which are relevant to the Finnish case system.

The first fundamental issue concerns how many voices should be distinguished for the Finnish verb. Kangasmaa-Minn (1980: 69) seems to represent the most extreme standpoint, inferring that there is only one voice in Finnish – the active. The very idea of such an approach seems to be extremely dubious, if not totally

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. the relation of ‘concasion’ in Bańczerowski 2006: 17–19.

absurd. How would we know that the Finnish verb belongs to any voice, if that voice were not opposed to any other homogeneous grammatical category – that is, to another voice in the same language? The grammatical categories emerging from the linguistic analysis must after all be *oppositional entities* within the same lingual system. Such a proposal, because of its radical nature or possibly its internal inconsistency, is (fortunately) a rarity in Finnish linguistics<sup>33</sup>. For the overwhelming majority, the existence (descriptive relevance) of at least two voices is not usually questioned. The axis of the dispute is shifted rather towards problems concerning the properties of the voice (or voices) opposed to the active voice.

Finnish linguists usually distinguish two voices:

- (i) *aktiivi* ‘active voice’, and its opposite, denoted by the term
- (ii) *passiivi*, which, because of the specific nature of the phenomenon in Finnish, may be understood as both ‘impersonal voice’ and ‘passive voice’<sup>34</sup>.

As befits morphological categories as traditionally conceived, the two voices are opposed to each other paradigmatically by means of overt grammatical markers. Let us compare:

	<i>aktiivi</i>	<i>passiivi</i>
simple	<i>kutsu/Ø/i/n</i> <i>kutsu/Ø/i/t</i> <i>kutsu/Ø/i/Ø</i> ...	<i>kutsu/tti/in</i> ...
compound	<i>ole/n kutsu/nut</i> <i>ole/t kutsu/nut</i> <i>on/Ø kutsu/nut</i> ...	<i>ole/n kutsu/ttu</i> <i>ole/t kutsu/ttu</i> <i>on/Ø kutsu/ttu</i> ...

The simple (synthetic) forms of the *aktiivi*-voice have no formal marker (e.g. *kutsu/Ø/i/n* ‘I invited’, *kutsu/Ø/i/t* ‘you invited’, *kutsu/Ø/i/Ø* ‘he invited’, etc.). The simple forms of the *passiivi*-voice are marked by the interfix *-tt(a)-*, *-tt(ä)-*, *-t(a)-*,

<sup>33</sup> Cf. also the theory of the so-called fourth person of the active voice, proposed by Tuomikoski 1983: 234, accepted by Hakulinen and Karlsson 1988: 255 and Keresztes 1996: 21, and its criticism in Rajandi 1999: 68, footnote 40, and in Bielecki 2012: 32.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Eurén 1865: 46–61, Genetz 1882: 51, Setälä 1908: 92–98, Kettunen 1936: 62–63, Penttilä 1957: 213, 460, Siro 1964: 19, Kudzinowski 1984: 89–97, Shore 1986: 9–10, Tommola 1993, Löflund 1998, Siitonen 1999: 74–84, Holvoet 2001: 367–368.

-t(ä)- (e.g. *kutsu/tti/in* ‘one invited’ etc.). The compound forms of both voices consist of the appropriate forms of the auxiliary verb *olla* ‘to be’ without any relevant morphological marking. The autosemantic verb occurs in the appropriate form of the past participle. It ends in *-nut, -nyt* for the *aktiivi*-voice (e.g. *ole/n kutsu/nut* ‘I have invited’, *ole/t kutsu/nut* ‘you have invited’, *on/Ø kutsu/nut* ‘he has invited’, etc.), or in *-ttu, -tty, -tu, -ty* for the *passiivi*-voice (e.g. *ole/n kutsu/ttu* ‘I am invited’, *ole/t kutsu/ttu* ‘you are invited’, *on/Ø kutsu/ttu* ‘he is invited’, ‘one has invited’, etc.).

The second issue concerns the potential concord in person and number between the nominal and verbal constituent in minimal sentences with the verb belonging to the *passiivi*-voice. By means of analogy with the *aktiivi*-voice, it is possible then to speculate about the assignment of the relevant nominal constituents to the appropriate syntactic (subject – direct object) and morphological categories (nominative – accusative), and also the assignment of the finite verb fulfilling the function of predicate to the appropriate morphological category (passive voice – impersonal voice).

In contemporary Finnish there seem to co-exist two, functionally different, series of sentences with the verb containing the past participle ending in *-ttu, -tty, -tu, -ty*. In the first, identification of the aforementioned concord does not pose any problem. In the other, the identification of any kind of concord between the nominal and verbal constituent is beset with remarkable difficulties. It must be emphasized that the congruent and incongruent series of the analyzed sentences occur frequently in both colloquial and literary Finnish, in spite of rather reluctant and dogmatic declarations of some linguists with puristic inclinations towards the congruent type (cf. Saarimaa 1944, 1971: 150–151 vs. Kettunen 1959: 235–237, Karlsson F. 1977: 373–374, Häkkinen 1994: 251–252 and Kont 1959). Let us compare (the congruent morphs are bolded):

<i>aktiivi</i> -voice	<i>passiivi</i> -voice	
	congruent	incongruent
[ <b>Minä</b> ] <i>olen kutsunut.</i> ‘[I] have invited.’	[ <b>Minä</b> ] <i>olen kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘[I] am invited.’	[ <i>Minut</i> ] <i>onØ kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has invited [me].’
[ <b>Sinä</b> ] <i>olet kutsunut.</i> ‘[You] have invited.’	[ <b>Sinä</b> ] <i>olet kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘[You] are invited.’	[ <i>Sinut</i> ] <i>onØ kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has invited [you].’
[ <b>Hän</b> ] <i>onØ kutsunut.</i> ‘[He] has invited.’	[ <b>Hän</b> ] <i>onØ kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘[He] is invited.’	[ <i>Hänet</i> ] <i>onØ kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has invited [him].’

<i>aktiivi-voice</i>	<i>passiivi-voice</i>	
	<b>congruent</b>	<b>incongruent</b>
<p>[<b>Me</b>] <i>olemme kutsuneet.</i> ‘[We] have invited.’</p> <p>...</p> <p>[<i>Isä</i>Ø] <i>onØ kutsunut.</i> ‘[The father] has invited.’</p> <p>[<i>Isät</i>] <i>ovat kutsuneet.</i> ‘[The fathers] have invited.’</p> <p>...</p>	<p>[<b>Me</b>] <i>olemme kutsutut.</i> ‘[We] are invited.’</p> <p>...</p> <p>[<i>Isä</i>Ø] <i>onØ kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘[The father] is invited.’</p> <p>[<i>Isät</i>] <i>ovat kutsutut.</i> ‘[The fathers] are invited.’</p> <p>...</p>	<p>[<i>Meidät</i>] <i>onØ kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has invited [us].’</p> <p>...</p> <p>[<i>Isä</i>Ø] <i>onØ kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has invited [the father].’</p> <p>[<i>Isät</i>] <i>onØ kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has invited [the fathers].’</p> <p>...</p>
<p>[<b>Minä</b>] <i>en ole kutsunut.</i> ‘[I] have not invited.’</p> <p>[<b>Sinä</b>] <i>et ole kutsunut.</i> ‘[You] have not invited.’</p> <p>[<b>Hän</b>] <i>eiØ ole kutsunut.</i> ‘[He] has not invited.’</p> <p>[<b>Me</b>] <i>emme ole kutsuneet.</i> ‘[We] have not invited.’</p> <p>...</p> <p>[<i>Isä</i>Ø] <i>eiØ ole kutsunut.</i> ‘[The father] has not invited.’</p> <p>[<i>Isät</i>] <i>eivät ole kutsuneet.</i> ‘[The fathers] have not invited.’</p> <p>...</p>	<p>[<b>Minä</b>] <i>en ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘[I] am not invited.’</p> <p>[<b>Sinä</b>] <i>et ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘[You] are not invited.’</p> <p>[<b>Hän</b>] <i>eiØ ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘[He] is not invited.’</p> <p>[<b>Me</b>] <i>emme ole kutsutut.</i> ‘[We] are not invited.’</p> <p>...</p> <p>[<i>Isä</i>Ø] <i>eiØ ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘[The father] is not invited.’</p> <p>[<i>Isät</i>] <i>eivät ole kutsutut.</i> ‘[The fathers] are not invited.’</p> <p>...</p>	<p>[<i>Minua</i>] <i>eiØ ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has not invited [me].’</p> <p>[<i>Sinua</i>] <i>eiØ ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has not invited [you].’</p> <p>[<i>Häntä</i>] <i>eiØ ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has not invited [him].’</p> <p>[<i>Meitä</i>] <i>eiØ ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has not invited [us].’</p> <p>...</p> <p>[<i>Isää</i>] <i>eiØ ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has not invited [the father].’</p> <p>[<i>Isiä</i>] <i>eiØ ole kutsuttuØ.</i> ‘One has not invited [the fathers].’</p> <p>...</p>

A verb possessing such morphosyntactic properties as that in the second column (congruent *passiivi*-voice) is usually referred to as belonging to the passive voice (here, its subtype called ‘stative passive’, cf. German ‘Zustandspassiv’, Finnish ‘tilapassiiivi’). A verb possessing such morphosyntactic properties as that in the third column (incongruent *passiivi*-voice), in turn, is usually referred to as belonging to the impersonal voice. As can easily be inferred, in Finnish the two categories display significant syncretism.

As has been discussed in section 2.5.2, there can be distinguished two kinds of syncretism: (i) dissoluble and (ii) indissoluble. All compound forms of the impersonal voice (here: *on kutsuttu* ‘one has invited’, *ei ole kutsuttu* ‘one has not invited’) are homophonic with the appropriate compound forms of the passive voice (here: *on kutsuttu* ‘is invited’, *ei ole kutsuttu* ‘is not invited’), but not conversely. The category may however be disambiguated in relevant instances by the broader syntactic context. *On kutsuttu* in *Hän on kutsuttu* belongs univocally to the passive voice (‘is invited’), whereas *on kutsuttu* in *Hänet on kutsuttu* belongs univocally to the impersonal voice (‘one has invited’). *On kutsuttu* is, in the contexts given so far, dissolubly syncretic. The situation changes dramatically in the case of *on kutsuttu* in the sentence type *Isä on kutsuttu*. There seems to be no accessible syntactic test in Finnish by which the voice of *on kutsuttu* in this sentence type could be disambiguated in an analogous way as above. It belongs simultaneously to the passive and impersonal voice (‘is invited’ and ‘one has invited’). It is therefore indissolubly syncretic. The same refers, *mutatis mutandis*, to the morphosyntactic properties of the word *isä* in *Isä on kutsuttu*, which belongs simultaneously to the nominative and (II) accusative.

Besides, under the given conceptual framework, there are at least two other possible interpretations. The first of them can be summarized as follows: in order to “facilitate” the description of the Finnish language, in order to make it more univocal, let it be recognized that between the passive and impersonal voice on one hand, and the nominative and (II) accusative on the other, there is no syncretism of an indissoluble nature. The relevant words in the sentence type *Isä on kutsuttu* are assigned exclusively to the passive voice (*on kutsuttu*) and nominative case (*isä*). However, such a rearrangement does not seem to “facilitate” anything at all. Its sole result would be the asymmetrical impoverishment of the analogous impersonal paradigms. The nominal constituents complementing the impersonal verb could not belong to the singular number (with the exception of the small set of personal pronouns having accusative forms ending in *-t*) (cf. *Isä on kutsuttu* (*Isä* ∈ NOM SG, *on kutsuttu* ∈ PASS) with *Isät on kutsuttu* (*Isät* ∈ ACC PL, *on kutsuttu* ∈ IMPERS)). At the same time, the sentence type *Isä on kutsuttu* would be, in terms of its meaning, quite exceptional in comparison with the remaining sentences belonging to the same postulated type. All of them would mean more or less that somebody ‘is in-

vited’, for example. Only *Isä on kutsuttu* would be ambiguous, by conveying the meanings ‘The father is invited’ and ‘One has invited the father’. It is difficult to regard such an approach as adequate. The same applies to the other possible interpretation, which regrettably is very often adopted by contemporary Finnish linguists. In this framework, the verb type *on kutsuttu* indeed belongs to the impersonal voice, whereas its nominal complement, apart from the seven listed pronouns, belongs simply to the nominative case. I consider such a view to constitute an obvious violation of the aforementioned rules concerning the compatibility between cases and voices (at least in its classical shape). Though providing alleged superficial simplicity, it obfuscates the matter rather than clarifying it.

Let us now take a closer look at the simple forms of the *passiivi*-voice. Here the problem of the potential congruence between the nominal and verbal constituent seems to be more ephemeral than in the case just discussed. Let us compare fragments of the relevant sentential paradigms:

<i>aktiivi</i> -voice congruent	<i>passiivi</i> -voice incongruent
[ <i>Minä</i> ] <i>kutsuin</i> . ‘[I] invited.’	[ <i>Minut</i> ] <i>kutsuttiin</i> . ‘One invited [me].’
[ <i>Sinä</i> ] <i>kutsuit</i> . ‘[You] invited.’	[ <i>Sinut</i> ] <i>kutsuttiin</i> . ‘One invited [you].’
[ <i>Hän</i> ] <i>kutsui</i> ∅. ‘[He] invited.’	[ <i>Hänet</i> ] <i>kutsuttiin</i> . ‘One invited [him].’
[ <i>Me</i> ] <i>kutsuimme</i> . ‘[We] invited.’	[ <i>Meidät</i> ] <i>kutsuttiin</i> . ‘One invited [us].’
...	...
[ <i>Isä</i> ∅] <i>kutsui</i> ∅. ‘[The father] invited.’	[ <i>Isä</i> ∅] <i>kutsuttiin</i> . ‘One invited [the father].’
[ <i>Isät</i> ] <i>kutsuivat</i> . ‘[The fathers] invited.’	[ <i>Isät</i> ] <i>kutsuttiin</i> . ‘One invited [the fathers].’
...	...
[ <i>Minä</i> ] <i>en kutsunut</i> . ‘[I] did not invite.’	[ <i>Minua</i> ] <i>ei</i> ∅ <i>kutsuttu</i> ∅. ‘One did not invite [me].’
[ <i>Sinä</i> ] <i>et kutsunut</i> . ‘[You] did not invite.’	[ <i>Sinua</i> ] <i>ei</i> ∅ <i>kutsuttu</i> ∅. ‘One did not invite [you].’
[ <i>Hän</i> ] <i>ei</i> ∅ <i>kutsunut</i> . ‘[He] did not invite.’	[ <i>Häntä</i> ] <i>ei</i> ∅ <i>kutsuttu</i> ∅. ‘One did not invite [him].’
...	...

<i>aktiivi-voice</i>	<i>passiivi-voice</i>
congruent	incongruent
[ <i>Isä</i> ∅] <i>ei</i> ∅ <i>kutsunut</i> . '[The father] did not invite.'	[ <i>Isää</i> ] <i>ei</i> ∅ <i>kutsuttu</i> ∅. 'One did not invite [the father].'
[ <i>Isät</i> ] <i>eivät</i> <i>kutsuneet</i> . '[The fathers] did not invite.'	[ <i>Isiä</i> ] <i>ei</i> ∅ <i>kutsuttu</i> ∅. 'One did not invite [the fathers].'
...	...

As regards the simple forms of the *passiivi-voice* in isolation, that is, without reference to those of the compound *passiivi-voice*, it seems that between the nominal and verbal constituent there is no concord in person and number<sup>35</sup> (this has already been suggested in the above table by classifying the relevant series of sentences as 'incongruent'). Nonetheless, in spite of this difference, they accomplish the same semantic scheme (cf. the following proportionality: *Isä* : *on kutsuttu* :: *Isä* : *kutsuttiin*). Therefore, extension of the previously attested morphosyntactic interpretation of a sentence of the type *Isä on kutsuttu* (II ACC-NOM, IMPERS-PASS) to the corresponding sentence of the type *Isä kutsuttiin* seems to be legitimate. Let us visualize this:

<i>Isä</i> : <i>on kutsuttu</i> . II ACC IMPERS 'One has invited the father.' NOM PASS 'The father is invited.'	::	<i>Isä</i> : <i>kutsuttiin</i> . II ACC IMPERS 'One invited the father.' <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 30px; margin-top: 5px;"></div>
↓		
<i>Isä</i> : <i>on kutsuttu</i> . II ACC IMPERS 'One has invited the father.' NOM PASS 'The father is invited.'	::	<i>Isä</i> : <i>kutsuttiin</i> . II ACC IMPERS 'One invited the father.' <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 30px; background-color: #e0e0e0; margin-top: 5px;"> NOM PASS  'The father got invited.' </div>

In such a situation, between the nominal and verbal constituent there occurs concord in person (3<sup>rd</sup>) and number (singular). *Isä* also belongs to the nominative, and *kutsuttiin* to the passive voice. This interpretation seems to be corroborated to some extent

<sup>35</sup> Ikola (1959: 42, footnote 3) reports the use of the imperative simple *passiivi*-forms congruent with the nominal constituent with respect to number (e.g. *Wia/t ja rikokse/t tutki/tta/ko/ot ja rangais/ta/ko/ot* 'Let the guilts-NOM PL and crimes-NOM PL be examined-PASS-IMP-PL and punished-PASS-IMP-PL', cf. the incongruent (prevailing) forms: *tutki/tta/ko/on* 'let one examine', *rangais/ta/ko/on* 'let one punish'). His supposition was that such appearances of the *passiivi-voice* had been possible not only in the times preceding his. They were still admissible to some extent even at the time the article was written, in the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century. Shore (1986: 17–18), in turn, classifies them as ordinary slips of the tongue. No normative contemporary Finnish grammar gives an account of such forms.



(II) accusative – and hence it can be bound both with intransitive verbs in the active voice (*joutui* ‘(it) got into’) and with transitive verbs in the passive voice (*karkotettiin* ‘(it) got expelled’). Both the active and passive voices are compatible with the nominative case.

The relevant difference between the compound and simple forms of the *passiivi*-voice, therefore, consists in something else. Within the compound forms of the *passiivi*-voice there are passive and impersonal forms which are syncretic:

- (i) dissolubly: [Hän] on kutsuttu ∈ PASS,  
 [Hänet] on kutsuttu ∈ IMPERS,  
 [Hän] ei ole kutsuttu ∈ PASS,  
 [Häntä] ei ole kutsuttu ∈ IMPERS; and
- (ii) indissolubly: [Isä] on kutsuttu ∈ PASS ∧ IMPERS.

Within the simple forms of the *passiivi*-voice there are passive and impersonal forms which are syncretic only indissolubly. Let us compare:

[Isä] kutsuttiin ∈ PASS ∧ IMPERS

(cf. [Hänet] kutsuttiin ∈ IMPERS vs. \*Hän kutsuttiin,  
 [Häntä] ei kutsuttu ∈ IMPERS vs. \*Hän ei kutsuttu).

Because of this, the simple *passiivi*-forms, just like the relevant nominal constituents occurring with them, represent a kind of syncretism which is less susceptible to dissolution than the compound *passiivi*-forms.

The next issue concerns the assignment of the *passiivi*-forms to the appropriate person and number. The purposefulness of giving special consideration to this problem becomes clear when there are recognized at least two assumptions. The first general assumption, actually a kind of postulate, formulated for example by Zabrocki (1980: 136–137), states that there are no subjectless sentences. Some concrete sentence manifestations can indeed lack a lexicalized subject (e.g. Polish *pada* or Finnish *sataa* ‘it rains’). However, such a defective sentence can function as a lingual message on the condition that at least the category of person of the elliptic subject can be reconstructed from the verb morphology (cf. also Bańczerowski 1997a: 449–451, 1999a: 67). The other, more specific, assumption concerns the diathetic structure of the Finnish language. As has been argued, the Finnish transitive verb occurs in three types of argument-predicative frames, in spite of the significant overlap between the passive and impersonal structures. Let us compare:

active		
[Minä]	<i>ole/n kutsu/nut</i>	[sinut.]
[Minä]	<i>kutsu/i/n</i>	[sinut.]
...		
[Minä]	<i>ole/n kutsu/nut</i>	[isän.]
[Minä]	<i>kutsu/i/n</i>	[isän.]
...		
[AGENT]		[PATIENT]
subject	...Verb...	direct object
NOM		ACC (I) PART

passive		impersonal	
[Sinä]	<i>ole/t kutsu/ttu/∅.</i>	[Sinut]	<i>on/∅ kutsu/ttu/∅.</i>
...		[Sinut]	<i>kutsu/tti/in.</i>
[Isä]	<i>on/∅ kutsu/ttu/∅.</i>	...	
[Isä]	<i>kutsu/tti/in.</i>	[Isä]	<i>on/∅ kutsu/ttu/∅.</i>
...		[Isä]	<i>kutsu/tti/in.</i>
...		...	
[PATIENT]		[PATIENT]	
subject	...Verb	direct object	...Verb
NOM		ACC (II) PART	

Of course, in the case of those *passiivi*-forms which belong to the passive voice, the position seems rather obvious. Since there is congruence between the nominal and verbal constituent with respect to both meanings (cf. the subject-predicate congruence), the verb belongs to the same person and number as the nominal constituent. Let us compare:

[Sinä]                    *olet kutsuttu*  
*Sinä* ∈ **2 SG NOM**    *olet kutsuttu* ∈ **2 SG**,

[Isä]                     *on kutsuttu*  
*Isä* ∈ **3 SG NOM**    *on kutsuttu* ∈ **3 SG**,

[Isä]                     *kutsuttiin*  
*Isä* ∈ **3 SG NOM**    *kutsuttiin* ∈ **3 SG**, etc.

Those *passiivi*-forms which belong to the impersonal voice are not susceptible to such a test. What is more, in their case there is no point in seeking any (elliptic) nominal constituent fulfilling the function of the subject, for example a personal pronoun, to exhibit directly the verb's belonging to a particular person/number. As I have demonstrated previously, things must be this way to some extent *a priori* (Bielecki 2012: 32). The argument-predicative frames of the impersonal verb are so similar to the argument-predicative frames of the active verb that, if lexicalization of the subject were possible with respect to them, then they would necessarily belong to the active voice. In that case their actual morphological marking in Finnish (*-tt(a)-, -tt(ä)-, -t(a)-, -t(ä)-, -ttu-, -tty-, -tu-, -ty*) would be inexplicable, in view of its redundancy. Therefore, in order to determine the person/number of the impersonal verb, and at the same time the person/number of the subject implied by it, we have to base our inquiry on some other, more indirect, premises. Omitting superfluous arguments on this topic, let us state only the main conclusion: the Finnish impersonal verb and its non-lexicalized subject belong to all three persons simultaneously. As far as number is concerned, the fact of belonging to at least two persons implies belonging to the plural number.

In the cited article I put forward the hypothesis that such a “common” personal meaning is not conveyed lexically in Finnish. I would now express this thought slightly differently. The Finnish language indeed lexicalizes such a “common” personal meaning, in the form of the pronoun *me* ‘we’. *Me* ‘we’ can mean after all: *minä ja sinä* ‘me and you’, *minä ja hän* ‘me and him’, and of course *minä ja sinä ja hän* ‘me and you and him’, where the three personal meanings undergo coalescence. However, as can be easily observed, the meaning of *me* ‘we’ always implies the meaning of *minä* ‘I’. In other words, there must always be ‘me’ in ‘us’ – ‘me’ is included in ‘us’. The meaning of the person implied by the impersonal verb does not presuppose such an inclusion. It can mean for example *minä ja sinä ja hän* ‘me and you and him’ or *sinä ja hän* ‘you and him’ etc. The subtlety of this semantic difference makes itself felt in the morphosyntactic reinterpretation of the impersonal forms as active first person plural forms ([*minä* and/or *sinä* and/or *hän*] *lue/ta/an* ‘one reads’ > *me lue/taan* ‘we read’) in Finnish dialects and colloquial speech (cf. Nirvi 1947, Yli-Vakkuri 1986: 80–92, Pertilä 2000).

The time has now come to consider a cardinal and, as it turns out, quite perplexing question concerning the category of the accusative in Finnish: why has analogy not yet equalized the active and impersonal structures to the extent that seems possible, by eliminating the aforementioned accusative split? Why does the Finnish language maintain this difference, in contrast to many other languages, including Polish, where the old passive participles of neuter gender ending in *-no, -to* have been consistently reinterpreted as impersonal forms combining with the accusative (cf. Klemensiewicz et al. 1964: 432–435)? Let us compare:

ACT	<i>On zaprosił <b>ciebie</b>.</i>	:	<i>On zaprosił <b>ojca</b>.</i>
	<i>Hän kutsui <b>sinut</b>.</i>	:	<i>Hän kutsui <b>isän</b>.</i>
	‘He invited you.’		‘He invited the father.’
IMPERS	<i><b>Ciebie</b> zaproszono.</i>	:	<i><b>Ojca</b> zaproszono.</i>
	<i><b>Sinut</b> kutsuttiin.</i>	:	–
	‘One invited you.’		‘One invited the father.’

I believe that it is possible to formulate a tentative response to this question without entering into some sort of metaphysical divagations. The *aktiivi*-forms are opposed, as we know, to the *passiivi*-forms by means of the specialized grammatical markers (cf. *kutsu/Ø/i* ‘(he) invited’ vs. *kutsu/tti/in* ‘one invited’, ‘(he) got invited’, *on kutsu/nut* ‘(he) has invited’ vs. *on kutsu/ttu* ‘one has invited’, ‘(he) is invited’). The verb’s belonging to different voices implies different argument-predicative frames. Let us compare:

<i>kutsui</i> ∈ ACT	→	[ <i>Hän</i> ] [AGENT] subject NOM		<i>kutsui</i>	[ <i>isän</i> ] [PATIENT] direct object (I) ACC
<i>kutsuttiin</i> ∈ PASS	→	[ <i>Isä</i> ] [PATIENT] subject NOM		<i>kutsuttiin</i>	
∈ IMPERS	→	[PATIENT] direct object (II) ACC			

The diffusion of the suggested analogy is probably blocked in contemporary Finnish by the systemic occurrence of passive verbs which are significantly syncretic with the impersonal verbs. This syncretism naturally has its historical motivation. Putting aside rather unanswerable questions concerning the degree of development of the person congruence of the passive voice in the past, the Finnish impersonal voice seems to have originated relatively recently from the passive voice (cf. Setälä 1915: 137–139, 1916: 61–64, Niilus 1936: 112, Ikola 1959: 41–43, Posti 1961: 364–366, Lehtinen 1984: 34, 1985,

Schlachter 1984: 63, 1985: 25–28). From the contemporary synchronic point of view, however, it is not possible to say more than this: the weak delimitation of the impersonal and passive voice, their remarkable degree of overlap, implies a corresponding overlap of the nominative and (II) accusative.

### 3.1.3. The accusative and infinitive/imperative

The manifestations of the II accusative in Finnish, besides the discussed impersonal/passive constructions, are attested additionally in two distinct sentence types: (i) the so-called mono-personal infinitival (cf. (79)) and (ii) first and second person imperative constructions (cf. (80)). Let us compare:

(79) *Pitää*                      *kutsu/a*                      *isä/∅*.  
*must-PRAES 3 SG*    *invite-INF*                      *father-II ACC*  
 ‘One must invite the father.’

(80) *Kutsu/∅*                      *isä/∅!*  
*invite-IMP 2 SG*    *father-II ACC*  
 ‘Invite the father!’

According to the extensive monograph of Willem Grünthal (1941: 277–292) devoted to the non-desinential accusative, this odd state of affairs is found not only in Finnish, but also, with astounding regularity, in all contemporary Balto-Finnic languages except Livonian. The lack of overt accusative ending in the analyzed structures, being an obvious dissonance with the remaining (active) structures, is given a historical explanation, namely that they are a vestige from the Proto-Uralic period which has survived to the present day unequalized by analogy. In that period there were no inflectional endings; case relations were expressed simply by the juxtaposition of words (word roots). Wickman (1955: 15) points out that Grünthal’s theory, even if correct, does not say anything about how the discussed endingless form has been preserved precisely in those syntactical connections where it is actually found. In turn, Larin (1963) sees in it possible traces of the ergative substratum (or *дономинативный* ‘prenominative’ as he calls it), all the more so since a quite analogous phenomenon occurs in rudimentary form in Lithuanian, Latvian and Old Eastern Slavic.

The sentence type (79) *Pitää kutsua isä* ‘One must invite the father-II ACC’ was analyzed by Setälä (1926: 24–25) as the result of partial morphosyntactic reinterpretation.

tation of †*Isä pitää kutsua* ‘The father-NOM must be invited’. In this sentence type the considered word (*isä*) fulfilled the function of subject, belonging to the nominative case (†*Koira pitää tappaa* (= *Koira pitää tapettavaksi*) ‘The dog has to be killed’ > *Pitää tappaa koira* ‘One has to kill the dog’) (cf. also Kiparsky V. 1946). From this point of view, the morphosyntactic status of the words occurring in (79) *Pitää kutsua isä* resembles the instance of *Isä kutsuttiin*. However, there is a certain essential difference between the sentence type *Pitää kutsua isä* and *Isä kutsuttiin*. While the voice of the verb *kutsuttiin* has an overt grammatical marker (cf. *kutsu/tti/in* vs. *kutsu/Ø/i*), in *pitää kutsua* ‘one must invite’ both the finite (*pitää*) and the infinite verb (*kutsua*) lack such a marker (cf. *Hän pitää* ‘He holds-ACT’, *Hän haluaa kutsua* ‘He wants to invite-ACT’). Under these circumstances, attempting to explain the occurrence of the II accusative, homophonic with the nominative, by referring to the passive-impersonal syncretism is awkward and not so efficient as was possible with respect to *Isä kutsuttiin*.

The case of (80) *Kutsu isä* ‘Invite the father-II ACC’ seems to be even more exceptional. In (79) *Pitää kutsua isä* there is no person-number congruence between the verb and the noun. Let us compare:

*Pitää kutsua isä/Ø.*  
*Pitää kutsua isä/t.*

*Ei pidä kutsua isä/ä.*  
*Ei pidä kutsua is/i/ä.*

‘One must invite the father-II ACC.’  
 ‘One must invite the fathers-II ACC.’

‘One must not invite the father-PART.’  
 ‘One must not invite the fathers-PART.’

In turn, in (80) *Kutsu isä* the verb displays a regular person-number congruence with the subject. Let us compare:

	<i>(me) kutsu/kaa/mme</i>
<i>(sinä) kutsu/Ø</i>	<i>(te) kutsu/kaa</i>
<i>(hän) kutsu/ko/on</i>	<i>(he) kutsu/ko/ot</i>
	‘let us invite’
‘(you) invite’	‘(you) invite’
‘let him invite’	‘let them invite’

The usual elision of the subject in speech is of secondary importance. All of the listed forms undoubtedly belong to the active voice. To make matters worse, the problem of the Finnish imperative is complicated by the fact that its third person

forms govern the I accusative (*Hän kutsu/ko/on isä/n!* ‘Let him invite-IMP-3 SG the father-I ACC!’). Timberlake (1974: 170–179) endeavored to justify this by ascribing to the Finnish historical imperative (cf. *kutsu*, *kutsukaamme*, *kutsukaa*), as opposed to the historical optative (cf. *kutsukoon*, *kutsukoot*), the status of “systematically impersonal” form. In his view, the logical subject of the imperative cannot be expressed in the same way as the grammatical subject of a personal form. The reason lies in the special function of the imperative as an appeal form. The person of the logical subject is predictable from the speech act. The imperative in Indo-European languages, in contrast to the Finnish imperative, has personal status because it exhibits “extended uses” (cf. the concessive use in Lithuanian: *Nors vis/as bačk/as išlaižy/k, negausi nieko* ‘Even if you lick-IMP 2 SG out all-ACC PL the barrels-ACC PL, you will still get nothing’ (*išlaižy/k* ‘lick out’ = *išlaižy/si* ‘you will lick out’)). Finnish lacks such possibilities.

### 3.1.4. The accusative as morphosyntactic category

Let us now recapitulate the findings of the preceding sections. The accusative case in Finnish seems to be a set of words possessing quite a diversified syntactic connectivity. Of course, such a state of affairs is nothing strange in any language (cf. the Polish accusative in active and impersonal sentences: (74a) *Widziałem książkę* ‘I saw a/the book’, (75a) *Widziano książkę* ‘One saw a/the book’). What distinguishes the Finnish accusative from the Polish accusative is its conspicuous split into two relatively clear-cut morphological subcategories: I and II accusative. As has been discussed, this split seems to be correlated to some extent with certain syntactic properties of the words in question. Roughly speaking, the I accusative occurs in active sentences, and the II accusative in impersonal sentences. The latter class of sentences, probably because of its young age, displays a remarkable overlap with passive sentences. This motivates, from the synchronic point of view, the syncretism between the accusative and nominative. However, not all manifestations of the II accusative are nowadays interpretable in parallel as efficiently as nominatives (cf. (79) *Pitää kutsua isä*, (80) *Kutsu isä*). Correlating all relevant morphosyntactic properties of the analyzed sentence types with the occurrence of the respective types of the accusative case seems to be an unfeasible task. For example, the property ‘accusative opposed to the nominative on the syntagmatic plane’ vs. the property ‘accusative not opposed to the nominative on the syntagmatic plane’ turns out to be correlated with the occurrence of the I and II accusative in all sentence types with the exception of (80) *Kutsu isä*. Let us summarize these properties:

	I ACC		II ACC			
examples	<i>Hän kutsui isän.</i>	<i>Hän kutsukoon isän!</i>	<i>(Sinä) kutsu isä!</i>	<i>Pitää kutsua isä.</i>	<i>Isä kutsuttiin.</i>	<i>Isä on kutsuttu.</i>
syncretism	ACC not syncretic with NOM		ACC syncretic with NOM			
			ACC syncretic with NOM dissolubly		ACC syncretic with NOM indissolubly	
morpho-syntax	ACC opposed to NOM on the syntagmatic plane			ACC not opposed to NOM on the syntagmatic plane		
	not imperative mood	imperative mood	not imperative mood			
	verb morphologically unmarked in reference to voice			verb morphologically marked in reference to voice		

These facts appear to make it even more necessary to treat both types of forms as manifestations of one case (cf. also the pronominal accusative forms ending in *-t*). One can imagine that the instances of the accusative which are indissolubly syncretic with the nominative (*Isä kutsuttiin*, *Isä on kutsuttu*) could, taking the easy way out, be recognized as manifestations of only one case – the nominative. In the instances of the accusative dissolubly syncretic with the nominative ((79) *Pitää kutsua isä*, (80) *Kutsu isä*) it is difficult to find similar grounds for such a classification. This specific property of the Finnish language seems to require some loosening of the understanding of the notion of morphological variation. I have done this by introducing, in the theoretical chapter, the notion of ‘relation of the weaker morphological case variation’ (cf. section 2.5.1).

In the present work, as has already been mentioned, I attempt to describe the relevant phenomena by formulating the most systemic possible generalizations. For this reason, the accusative is recognized as a productive case in Finnish. The same applies to its two manifestations: the I and II accusative. The split of the accusative into two types is generalized in reference to all manifestations of that case, taking into account the discussed pronominal forms and the plural forms of nouns. The following table summarizes the adopted approach:

	ACC			
	I ACC		II ACC	
	SG	PL	SG	PL
endings	-n	-t	-∅	-t
	-t	-t	-t	-t
examples	<i>kirja/n</i> ...	<i>kirja/t</i> ...	<i>kirja/∅</i> ...	<i>kirja/t</i> ...
	<i>minu/t,</i> <i>sinu/t,</i> <i>häne/t,</i> <i>kene/t</i>	<i>meidä/t,</i> <i>teidä/t,</i> <i>heidä/t</i>	<i>minu/t,</i> <i>sinu/t,</i> <i>häne/t,</i> <i>kene/t</i>	<i>meidä/t,</i> <i>teidä/t,</i> <i>heidä/t</i>
syncretism	= GEN SG ≠ II ACC SG	= NOM PL = II ACC PL	= NOM SG ≠ I ACC SG	= NOM PL = I ACC PL
	≠ GEN SG = II ACC SG	≠ NOM PL = II ACC PL	≠ NOM SG = I ACC SG	≠ NOM PL = I ACC PL
	= GEN		= NOM	
	≠ GEN		≠ NOM	

### 3.2. The partitive

The partitive is marked by means of the following endings: *-a*, *-ä*, *-ta*, *-tä*, *-tta*, *-ttä*. The endings of the partitive, similarly to those of the accusative, generally signal the syntactic subordination of the noun to a transitive verb. Words belonging to this case category in connection with transitive verbs are relatively similar both syntactically (direct object) and semantically ([PATIENT]) to those belonging to the accusative.

### 3.3. The accusative-partitive opposition

The accusative and partitive are, as has been said, cases of direct object, encoding generally speaking the [PATIENT] in quite a number of sentences with transitive verbs. In spite of the aforementioned syntactic and semantic similarity between these two cases, the accusative and partitive cannot be treated synonymously. Let us illustrate the semantic opposition between the accusative and partitive with the following pairs of minimal case syntagms:

(81) <i>Lu/i/n</i> <i>read-PRAET-1 SG</i>	<b>accusative</b>	↔	<b>partitive</b>
	(a) <i>kirja/n</i> <i>book-I ACC SG</i>		(b) <i>kirja/a.</i> <i>book-PART SG</i>
	(c) <i>kirja/t</i> <i>book-I ACC PL</i>		(d) <i>kirjo/j/a.</i> <i>book-PL-PART</i>

- (a) ‘I read the whole book.’
- (b) ‘I read a/the book.’ ‘I was reading a/the book.’
- (c) ‘I read all the books.’
- (d) ‘I read (some) books.’ ‘I was reading books.’

(82) <i>Jo/i/n</i> <i>drink-PRAET-1 SG</i>	<b>accusative</b>	↔	<b>partitive</b>
	(a) <i>vede/n</i> <i>water-I ACC SG</i>		(b) <i>vet/tä.</i> <i>water-PART SG</i>

- (a) ‘I drank the whole water up.’
- (b) ‘I drank (some) water.’ ‘I was drinking water.’

As is indicated by the suggested English equivalents, the accusative and partitive can be conceived of as carriers of certain meanings which are:

- (i) **quantitative** (cf. *whole, some, all*); and
- (ii) **aspectual** (cf. *read, was reading, drank, was drinking*).

Göran Karlsson (1979) points out that since the publication of Vhaël’s Grammar in 1733, mainly because of Setälä’s authority, grammarians have attempted to capture the relevant meaning(s) of the accusative and partitive by means of the notions *totaalinen* ‘total’ and *partiaalinen* ‘partial’. He concludes, however, that these terms are actually nothing else than synonymic denominations of the accusative and partitive respectively, and are in consequence superfluous. Their relation to the supposed meanings of the cases in question is slender and often misleading. Koptjevskaja-Tamm and Wälchli (2001: 647, 652), analyzing the problem from the perspective of the alleged Baltic Sprachbund, come to the same conclusion. According to Vähämäki (1984: 26), the term ‘partitive’, serving as the scientific name of a case as morphological category, has exerted a folk-taxonomic influence on linguists. The Latin etymology of this term has led to a “partiality syndrome”, which causes the meaning [PART OF SOMETHING] to be perceived in every manifestation of the partitive case.

A turning point in the treatment of the meaning(s) of these cases seems to have been accomplished by Terho Itkonen. He put forward the idea that the accusative expresses *ylijäämän kieltävä paljous* ‘a quantity which forbids any surplus’, whereas the partitive expresses *ylijäämän salliva paljous* ‘a quantity which allows a surplus’ (Itkonen T. 1975a: 5). That is, by uttering a sentence of the type (81a) *Luin kirjan* or (82a) *Join veden*, a Finnish speaker wishes to communicate that he read the entire book from the beginning to the end, or that he drank the whole quantity of water in question. There is nothing left from the book to be read (at least on this occasion) or

from the water to be drunk. By uttering a sentence of the type (81b) *Luin kirjaa* or (82b) *Join vettä*, on the other hand, the speaker wishes to communicate only the fact of reading the book or drinking water, without addressing the question of how much of the book was read or how much water was drunk. It may be true that he read the whole book or that he read only a part of it, and similarly in the case of the water. From this point of view, the accusative and partitive seem to enter into a **participative** semantic opposition (cf. the approach of Hjelmslev described in section 1.5.1). The accusative conveys the bundle of meanings [+TOTAL] and [+RESULTATIVE]. The accusative is therefore the **marked** member of the opposition. The partitive, by leaving the question of the totality and resultativity open ([+/-TOTAL], [+/-RESULTATIVE]) is the **unmarked** member of the opposition. Needless to say, this innovative approach seems to be much closer to the truth than those which dominated earlier, according to which the semantic opposition between the accusative and partitive was regarded as being rather of **contrary** character (cf. [+TOTAL] vs. [-TOTAL] i.e. [PARTIAL]).

The introductory discussion has so far been focused on examples in which the semantic opposition between the accusative and partitive seems to be the most evident. However, it cannot be concealed that the semantic opposition between the two cases embraces the aforementioned bundle of quantitative and aspectual meanings only in some contexts. In some other contexts the opposition seems to be to a certain extent “diluted”, that is, it no longer embraces all of the listed types of meanings.

The opposition between the accusative and partitive in the sentences exemplified by (83c) *Näin kirjat* vs. (83d) *Näin kirjoja* and (83e) *Näin veden* vs. (83f) *Näin vettä* seems to be only of a quantitative nature. In addition, there occur contexts in which the opposition between the accusative and partitive undergoes a neutralization *sui generis*, that is, only one of the two cases can occur there. In the sentence type exemplified by (83a) *Näin kirjan*, the discussed opposition undergoes neutralization in favor of the accusative, while in the sentence types exemplified by (84a–f), (85a–d), (86e–f), (87a–f) and (88a–f) *Rakastin / En lukenut / En juonut / En nähnyt / En rakastanut – kirjaa / kirjoja / vettä* it undergoes neutralization in favor of the partitive. Let us compare:

	accusative		partitive
(83) <i>Näi/i/n</i> see-PRAET-1 SG	(a) <i>kirja/n</i> book-I ACC SG		(b) <i>*kirja/a.</i> book-PART SG
	(c) <i>kirja/t</i> book-I ACC PL	↔	(d) <i>kirjo/j/a.</i> book-PL-PART
	(e) <i>vede/n</i> water-I ACC SG	↔	(f) <i>vet/tü.</i> water-PART SG

- (a) 'I saw a/the book.'
- (b) ('I saw a/the book.')
- (c) 'I saw all the books.'
- (d) 'I saw (some) books.'
- (e) 'I saw the whole water.'
- (f) 'I saw (some) water.'

		accusative	partitive
(84)	<i>Rakast/i/n</i> love-PRAET-1 SG	(a) * <i>kirja/n</i> book-I ACC SG	(b) <i>kirja/a.</i> book-PART SG
		(c) * <i>kirja/t</i> book-I ACC PL	(d) <i>kirjo/j/a.</i> book-PL-PART
		(e) * <i>vede/n</i> water-I ACC SG	(f) <i>vet/tä.</i> water-PART SG

- (a) ('I loved a/the book.')
- (b) 'I loved a/the book.'
- (c) ('I loved all the books.')
- (d) 'I loved (some) books.'
- (e) ('I loved the whole water.')
- (f) 'I loved (some) water.'

		accusative	partitive
(85)	<i>E/n</i> <i>luke/nut</i> not-1 SG    read-PARTIC PRAET ACT	(a) * <i>kirja/n</i> book-I ACC SG	(b) <i>kirja/a.</i> book-PART SG
		(c) * <i>kirja/t</i> book-I ACC PL	(d) <i>kirjo/j/a.</i> book-PL-PART
(86)	<i>juo/nut</i> drink-PARTIC PRAET ACT	(e) * <i>vede/n</i> water-I ACC SG	(f) <i>vet/tä.</i> water-PART SG
(87)	<i>näh/nyt</i> see-PARTIC PRAET ACT		
(88)	<i>rakasta/nut</i> love-PARTIC PRAET ACT		

- (85) (a) ('I did not read the whole book.')
- (b) 'I did not read the whole book.' 'I did not read any book.'
- (c) ('I did not read all the books.')
- (d) 'I did not read all the books.' 'I did not read any books.'

- (86) (e) ('I did not drink the whole water up.')
- (f) 'I did not drink the whole water up.' 'I did not drink any water.'
- (87) (a) ('I did not see the book.')
- (b) 'I did not see any book.'
- (c) ('I did not see all the books.')
- (d) 'I did not see any books.'
- (e) ('I did not see the whole water.')
- (f) 'I did not see any water.'
- (88) (a) ('I did not love the book.')
- (b) 'I did not love any book.'
- (c) ('I did not love all the books.')
- (d) 'I did not love any books.'
- (e) ('I did not love the whole water.')
- (f) 'I did not love any water.'

Seeking to give a complete account of the phenomenon, Setälä (1952: 21–23) formulated three rules governing the choice of the appropriate case of direct object:

- (i) According to the first rule, the choice depends upon properties of the direct object itself (*objektin oma laatu*). The fact that the whole referent of the direct object has been affected by the action implies the use of the accusative, e.g. *Olemme syöneet mansika/t* 'We have eaten all the strawberries-ACC'. The fact that only a part of the referent of the direct object has been affected by the action implies the use of the partitive, e.g. *Olemme syöneet mansiko/i/ta* 'We have eaten some strawberries-PART'.
- (ii) According to the second rule, the choice of the case of direct object depends upon the negative or affirmative content of the sentence (*lauseen kieltävä tai myöntävä sisälllys*). If the sentence is negative, the direct object is conceived of as partial (cf. "partiality syndrome"). This implies the use of the partitive case, e.g. *Tyttö ei ole lakaisut lattia/a* 'The girl has not swept the floor-PART'.
- (iii) According to the third rule, the choice depends upon the properties of the action of the verb governing the direct object (*objektin hallitsevan verbin teon laatu*). The fact that the action is conceived of as resultative (*täyttynyt, täytyvä*) implies the use of the accusative, e.g. *Isä veistää kirvesvarre/n päivässä* 'The father will whittle an axe helve-ACC in a day'. The fact that the action is conceived of as continuative (*jatkuva, kehityksenalainen*) or irresultative (*täytymätön, tiettyyn tulokseen johtamaton*) implies the use of the partitive, e.g. *Isä veistää kirvesvart/ta* 'The father is whittling at an axe helve-PART' (cf. also Saxén 1916: 7–8).

Ikola (1954: 222–223, footnote 9) evaluates these rules as a ‘misleading assemblage’ (*harhaanjohtava kokoonpano*). He asks, rightly in my view, how we should know that, for example, with regard to the sentence *Minä olin hevos/ta tuomassa, kun tapasin hänet* ‘I was just bringing the horse-PART when I met him’, we have to apply the third and not the first rule. Since the action embraces the referent of the direct object in its entirety (I am bringing the whole horse, not its parts), why does *HEVONEN* ‘horse’ occur in the partitive and not in the accusative?

Some Finnish linguists offer an improved solution to these problems which seems to be free of such conflict-ridden rules as those formulated by Setälä. Matti Sadeniemi (1926), noticing the same problems as Ikola, proposes to reduce all factors governing the choice of case of the direct object in Finnish to a common denominator – ‘the possibility of the continuation of the action’<sup>36</sup>. Denison (1957: 169–170) sees some difficulties in applying Sadeniemi’s approach. In his view, it is the ‘decisive change’ implied by the meaning of the verb in context which overcomes these difficulties. For example, from the point of view of the verb *ampua* ‘to shoot’, the death of the creature being shot constitutes such a decisive change. For this reason, in the sentence meaning ‘I shot a bird dead’ the accusative appears (*Ammuin linnu/n*), whereas in the sentence meaning ‘I shot at a bird’ the partitive appears (*Ammuin lintu/a*), in spite of the fact that the latter sentence may also be interpreted as resultative (cf. Polish *Postrzelilem ptaka* and German *Ich habe den Vogel angeschossen*). Krifka (1992) raises the question of how it is possible that a verb-oriented category (aspect) is marked on the noun. He believes that this results from the semantic similarity between ‘cumulative’ and ‘quantized’ treatment of the referent of the noun (cf. ‘wine’ vs. ‘a glass of wine’) and ‘cumulative’ and ‘quantized’ treatment of the referent of the verb (cf. ‘run’ vs. ‘run a mile’). Paul Kiparsky (1998) considers Krifka’s approach to be incorrect for the current state of the Finnish language. He asserts that some allowable occurrences of the accusative-partitive opposition are explicable only as historically analogous to those explained by Krifka’s theory (cf. (82a) *Join veden* (quantized) : (82b) *Join vettä* (cumulative) :: *Ammuin linnun* (?) : *Ammuin lintua* (?)). Kiparsky unifies the aspectual and quantitative meanings by means of the notions of ‘boundedness’ and ‘unboundedness’ of the verb predicate licensing the accusative and partitive respectively. An analogous approach is taken by Leino (1991: 172–178), using the notions of *rajattuus* ‘bound-

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<sup>36</sup> *Jos verbin objektiin kohdistuva tekeminen jatkuu tai, jo päättyneenä, ei ole aiheuttanut olosuhteissa muutosta, joka tekisi sen jatkumisen mahdottomaksi, niin objekti on osittainen, mutta totaalinen, jos tämä tekeminen on päättynyt, tai ajatellaan päättyväksi, siihen, että se on aiheuttanut olosuhteissa sellaisen muutoksen, että se ei enää voisikaan jatkua* (ibid. 317) ‘If the activity directed to the object of the verb is continued or, if it is finished, it has not caused any change in the circumstances which would make impossible its continuation, then the object is partial, but it is total if this activity is finished, or thought to be finished, to the extent that it has caused such a change in the circumstances that it could not be continued.’

edness' and *rajaamattomuus* 'unboundedness' of the situation. Heinämäki (1984) shows that the accusative does not entail any semantically particular bound. In connection with telic verbs it can be to some extent modified, e.g. *Metsästäjä ampui lehmä/n silmäpuole/ksi* 'The hunter shot at the cow-ACC, making one-eyed-TRANSL of it'.

In my view, all of these undoubtedly valuable attempts entail a certain methodological error. It is not the task of linguistics to decide how so-called empirical facts (such as the death of a bird after being shot) govern the choice of the appropriate language units reflecting them. It is the lingual conceptualization of the world which is essential, not the actual description of the phenomenon. Neither is it the task of a Finnish Case Grammar to decide how 'resultativity' is interpreted from the point of view of each particular verb. This problem belongs to the lexicology of the Finnish language. The Case Grammar is interested only in the appropriate grouping of verbs, making it possible to formulate certain regularities in case government.

Finnish linguists have also tried to explain the synchronic state of affairs sketched here by referring to the historical development of the accusative and partitive. These considerations, in spite of their diachronic nature, are helpful in many ways for understanding the contemporary semantics of both cases.

The first step toward the situation observed in the contemporary Finnish language probably took place in the Proto-Volga-Finnic period. At that time the separative meaning of the primary Uralic †*tA*-ablative began to evolve, in favorable contexts, toward a partial meaning. Rudiments of this phenomenon are still traceable in the contemporary Mordvin languages. For example, the Erzya ablative – the descendant of the Uralic †*tA*-ablative – can sometimes be used with such transitive verbs as *ярсамс* 'to eat', *симемс* 'to drink', which otherwise govern the accusative. Let us compare:

- (89) (a) *Мон ярсан кал/до.* (b) *Мон ярсан кал/∅.*  
*fish-ABL fish-ACC*
- (cf. Fin. *Minä syön kala/a.*)  
 'I eat fish.'
- (90) (a) *Мон симан вед/ме.* (b) *Мон симан ведь/∅.*  
*water-ABL water-ACC*
- (cf. Fin. *Minä juon vet/ää.*)  
 'I drink water.'

This tendency would appear to be understandable. Separativity and partiality are bound with each other. The part arises after its separation from the whole. The next step occurred in the Proto-Balto-Finnic period, and consisted in a syntactic shift of the adverbials marked by the primary †*tA*-ablative into the class of “quasi-objects”. Later on, probably under the marked influence of the Baltic and Slavic languages, there arose a new morphological formation – the Balto-Finnic partitive. In consequence of this, the partitive has been largely ousted from the spatial paradigm by new morphological formations conveying the meaning [SEPARATION] (cf. the Finnish elative and ablative) and brought even closer to the accusative (and the nominative) (Kont 1958: 243–244, 1961, 1963: 49–50, Vahros 1959, Larsson 1983; for the Lapp context cf. also Itkonen Erkki 1972, 1973).

The explanation supplied by Larjavaara (1991), in spite of its relative brevity, seems to be much more instructive than those contained in the aforementioned works. Larjavaara endeavors to explain the problem by referring to the systemic semantic interaction of the cases of direct object with verbs. He too starts from the observations made concerning the Mordvin languages. Since in the Proto-Balto-Finnic period the partitive seemed to convey univocally the meaning [PART], it was consistently used with nouns that were susceptible to so-called *osakvantifikaatio* ‘partial quantification’.

Uncountable nouns conceptualize objects as divisible into parts in such a way that every part retains the properties of the whole. A portion of water (at least from the point of view of the natural human experience) does not cease to be water. A part of a book, on the other hand, cannot still be said to be a book. However, in dividing a set of books into its parts (i.e. books), we can still say that these are books. The partitive therefore appeared first of all in the case of:

- (i) uncountable nouns (e.g. *VESI* ‘water’); and
- (ii) countable plural nouns (e.g. *KIRJAT* ‘books’).

The uncountable nouns and countable plural nouns are referred to jointly by the term ‘**divisible**’ (*jaollinen*). The countable singular nouns (e.g. *KIRJA* ‘book’), in turn, are referred to as ‘**indivisible**’ (*jaoton*) (cf. Noreen 1904: 293–302, Airila 1924: 19, Siro 1943: 284–285, Penttilä 1957: 530, Ikola 1957: 287–291, Larjavaara 1988: 474–478).

It can be said that the use of the partitive resulted at this stage from semantic premises concerning the noun, and had little or nothing to do with the meaning of the verb. Larjavaara calls this *pelkkä tarkoitekvantifikaatio* ‘pure referent quantification’. All transitive verbs acquired direct objects in the accusative and partitive (if the previously mentioned noun-oriented conditions were met). Larjavaara’s concept, with some necessary simplifications, can be presented as follows:

divisible nouns	indivisible nouns
A	B
† <i>Söin ne nauriit.</i> ‘I ate these turnips-ACC.’  † <i>Söin niitä nauriita.</i> ‘I ate some of these turnips-PART.’	† <i>Siirsin isoäidi/n.</i> ‘I moved (my) grandmother-ACC.’
C	D
† <i>Muistin ne miehet.</i> ‘I remembered these men-ACC.’  † <i>Muistin niitä miehiä.</i> ‘I remembered some of these men-PART.’	† <i>Rakastan isoäidi/n.</i> ‘I love (my) grandmother-ACC.’

At that time it was rather the accusative that functioned as the unmarked member of the opposition. The sentence †*Söin ne nauriit* referred only to the fact of my eating turnips in the past. The sentence †*Söin niitä nauriita*, in turn, meant that I ate some turnips: that is, some of them were certainly left uneaten. The same applies to the sentences †*Muistin ne miehet* and †*Muistin niitä miehiä*. This quantitative opposition already implied, according to Larjavaara, a kind of “proto-aspectual” opposition: *loppuunsaatettuus* ‘completeness’ vs. *keskeneräisyys* ‘incompleteness’ of the action on the referent of the direct object. While the sentence †*Söin ne nauriit* meant both the completeness and incompleteness of the action, the sentence †*Söin niitä nauriita* univocally implied the incompleteness of the action. The result of the action was, somewhat perversely, the fact that only a part of the turnips were eaten, the rest remaining untouched.

The next semantic shift took place when the resultativity expressed lexically by the verb (here (A) *Söin* ‘I ate’) was correlated with the totality expressed grammatically by the case of the direct object. This was possible only after a change in the nature of the accusative-partitive opposition, that is, after the accusative became the marked and the partitive the unmarked member. Simply put, the sentence *Söin ne nauriit* came to mean ‘I ate all these turnips’, and *Söin niitä nauriita* ‘I ate these turnips’, as they are understood nowadays.

Only after the partitive ceased to imply univocally a part of something was it possible for it to spread to singular countable nouns. Finnish came to have sentences like *Siirsin isoäitiä* meaning ‘I moved (my) grandmother (a little)’ (not aberrantly \*‘I moved a part of (my) grandmother’). The new sentence type (*Siirsin isoäitiä*) was opposed to the *Siirsin isoäidin* type, which now however took on a new meaning: ‘I moved (my) grandmother (in such a way that she acquired a certain position and this position was foreseen as the result of the action)’.

The possibility of using the partitive singular not in the meaning [A PART OF THE OBJECT IN ITSELF], which would perhaps be unimaginable in the case of singular countable nouns, led to a reorientation, to use Larjavaara's words, in the scope of quantification. On top of pure 'referent quantification' (*tarkoitekvantifikaatio*) there was superimposed 'action quantification' (*tapahumiskvantifikaatio*), or simply aspect. The partitive of the singular countable nouns could now mean that the action had been accomplished 'a little', i.e. irresultatively.

Soon, on the strength of analogy with such sentences as *Siirsin isoäitiä*, the development began which led to the obligatory partitive government of the majority of verbs regarded as semantically irresultative (*irresultatiiviverbit*, e.g. *Rakastan* 'I love'). According to Larjavaara, pure referent quantification was at this stage deposed by aspect (*kumoutui aspektin voimasta*).

Larjavaara concedes, nevertheless, that the development was in many places largely inert, which resulted from the semantic diversity of verbs. Some Finnish verbs retained the possibility of occurrence with both cases of the direct object without any aspectual "admixture". In case of (C) *Muistin* 'I remembered' or *Näin* 'I saw' etc. we can still speak about the old pure referent quantification (cf. sentences (83c–f)). Such verbs remained untouched in the process of development of aspectual oppositions because they express punctual actions which cannot be quantified in the relevant sense. One can, of course, see something for a longer time, but the action of seeing initiated at the moment of catching sight of something does not progress, develop or accumulate, as for example in the case of drinking, eating, reading or moving something to another place. The punctual meaning kept the durative meaning, sensed simultaneously in this class of verbs, away from the proper irresultative meaning. This protected the analyzed class of verbs from the general development just described.

The reinterpreted system thus obtained the following form (the introduced semantic-morphosyntactic formations are marked by ↓↓):

divisible nouns	indivisible nouns
A	B
<p><i>Söin ne naurii/t.</i> 'I ate all these turnips-ACC.'</p> <p><i>Söin niitä naurii/ta.</i> 'I ate these turnips-PART.'</p>	<p><i>Siirsin isoäidi/n.</i> 'I moved (my) grandmother-ACC (to a place).'</p> <p style="text-align: center;">↓↓</p> <p><i>Siirsin isoäiti/ä.</i> 'I moved (my) grandmother-PART (a little).'</p>

divisible nouns	indivisible nouns
C	D
<p><i>Muistin ne miehe/t.</i> ‘I remembered all these men-ACC.’</p> <p><i>Muistin niitä mieh/i/ä.</i> ‘I remembered these men-PART.’</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p> <p><i>Rakastan isoäiti/ä.</i> ‘I love (my) grandmother-PART.’</p>

As can be seen from the cited literature and my comments on it, the problem of the Finnish accusative and partitive is generally viewed from two perspectives. In the first perspective, the analysis seems to be limited to the mere cases (case forms) and their semantics, in which quantitative and aspectual meanings are interwoven. In the other perspective, the analysis is broadened and embraces the relevant syntagms – the cases (case forms) and the governing verbs. With reference to the interaction between the semantics of the analyzed cases and verbs, attempts are made to explain the occurrence of different types of neutralization between the accusative and partitive. Larjavaara endeavors to reconstruct the development of the direct object in Finnish especially from the point of view of the semantics of the governing verb. It is not surprising that in his approach it is aspect which becomes central. In Setälä’s approach, aspect does not enjoy such a central position – the impression may even be given that quantification and aspect govern the choice of case of the direct object to equal degrees. As has been pointed out, such a solution fails to address those instances in which, in order to express the target meaning(s), one can use practically only one case (cf. the partitive in: *Minä olin hevostuomassa, kun tapasin hänet* ‘I was just bringing the horse-PART when I met him’), even though, from the point of view of the accessible rules, it would appear that both cases could be used. Itkonen’s approach to the meaning of the accusative and partitive, although much more adequate, seems to deal with this problem in an overly absolutist way. There are in Finnish some minimal case syntagms in which the partitive as opposed to the accusative ceases to be the unmarked member of the opposition.

The approach to the semantics of the accusative and partitive proposed in the present work can be viewed as an attempt to improve on, and make up the described shortcomings of, the approaches found in Finnish linguistics. Its principal assumptions consist in:

- (i) maintaining quantification as a necessary dimension relevant to the description of the meanings of the accusative and partitive (cf. Larjavaara);
- (ii) rethinking the nature of the subtle relations between quantification and aspect (cf. Setälä);

- (iii) identifying the contexts in which the partitive is the unmarked member of the opposition and the contexts in which the partitive ceases to be unmarked (cf. Itkonen).

### 3.3.1. Non-neutralizative contexts

In expounding my approach to the semantics of the accusative and partitive, I shall begin with the non-neutralizative contexts. Such verbs as *Luin* ‘I read’, *Join* ‘I drank’, *Näin* ‘I saw’, etc. admit both cases of direct object. Nevertheless, this holds on condition that the governed noun belongs to the category of divisible noun (*KIRJAT*, *VESI*). In the case of indivisible nouns (*KIRJA*), among the aforementioned verbal contexts only such contexts as *Luin* ‘I read’ and *Join* ‘I drank’ can be conceived of as non-neutralizative. Let us summarize:

		non-neutralizative contexts				
(i)	<i>KIRJAT</i> ‘books’	(81c)	[ <i>Luin</i> ] <i>kirjat</i>	↔	(81d)	[ <i>Luin</i> ] <i>kirjoja</i>
		(83c)	[ <i>Näin</i> ] <i>kirjat</i>	↔	(83d)	[ <i>Näin</i> ] <i>kirjoja</i>
(ii)	<i>VESI</i> ‘water’	(82a)	[ <i>Join</i> ] <i>veden</i>	↔	(82b)	[ <i>Join</i> ] <i>vettä</i>
		(83e)	[ <i>Näin</i> ] <i>veden</i>	↔	(83f)	[ <i>Näin</i> ] <i>vettä</i>
(iii)	<i>KIRJA</i> ‘book’	(81a)	[ <i>Luin</i> ] <i>kirjan</i>	↔	(81b)	[ <i>Luin</i> ] <i>kirjaa</i>
		(83a)	[ <i>Näin</i> ] <i>kirjan</i>	↔		*

#### 3.3.1.1. Divisible vs. indivisible nouns

In all of the above sentences in which there occur **divisible nouns** (*Luin kirjat*, *Luin kirjoja*, *Näin kirjat*, *Näin kirjoja*, *Join veden*, *Join vettä*, *Näin veden*, *Näin vettä*), the accusative conveys the meaning [+TOTAL], whereas the partitive conveys [+/-TOTAL]. Non-metalingually, the discussed semantic relation between the two cases of direct object is revealed by the following quantitative case-conditional sentences. The (case-)conditional sentence is adequate when its protasis has a more specific meaning (here: simple [+TOTAL]) than its apodosis (here: complex [+/-TOTAL]). If the apodosis has a more specific meaning than the protasis, the case-conditional sentence is inadequate. Let us compare:

- C1 *Jos luin (kaikki) kirjat, niin luin (jonkin verran) kirjoja.*  
*Jos näin (kaikki) kirjat, niin näin (jonkin verran) kirjoja.*  
*Jos join (koko) veden, niin join (jonkin verran) vettä.*

*Jos näin (koko) veden, niin näin (jonkin verran) vettä.*

‘If I read (all) the books, then I read (some) books.’

‘If I saw (all) the books, then I saw (some) books.’

‘If I drank the (whole) water up, then I drank (some) water up.’

‘If I saw the (whole) water, then I saw (some) water.’

C2 \**Jos luin (jonkin verran) kirjoja, niin luin (kaikki) kirjat.*

\**Jos näin (jonkin verran) kirjoja, niin näin (kaikki) kirjat.*

\**Jos join (jonkin verran) vettä, niin join (koko) veden.*

\**Jos näin (jonkin verran) vettä, niin näin (koko) veden.*

\*‘If I read (some) books, then I read (all) the books.’

\*‘If I saw (some) books, then I saw (all) the books.’

\*‘If I drank (some) water up, then I drank the (whole) water up.’

\*‘If I saw (some) water, then I saw the (whole) water.’

In turn, the following case-conditional sentences seem to reveal non-metalingually the fact that the accusative and partitive convey the appropriate aspectual meanings only in connection with such verbs as *Luin* ‘I read’ or *Join* ‘I drank’. Let us compare:

C3 *Jos luin kirjat (loppuun), niin luin kirjoja (jonkin aikaa).*

*Jos join veden (loppuun), niin join vettä (jonkin aikaa).*

‘If I read the books (to the end), then I was reading books (some time).’

‘If I drank the water (to the end), then I was drinking water (some time).’

C4 \**Jos luin kirjoja (jonkin aikaa), niin luin kirjat (loppuun).*

\**Jos join vettä (jonkin aikaa), niin join veden (loppuun).*

\*‘If I was reading books (some time), then I read the books (to the end).’

\*‘If I was drinking water (some time), then I drank the water (to the end).’

C5 *Jos (yhtäkkiä) näin kirjat, niin näin kirjoja.*

*Jos (yhtäkkiä) näin veden, niin näin vettä.*

*Jos näin kirjat (jonkin aikaa), niin näin kirjoja.*

*Jos näin veden (jonkin aikaa), niin näin vettä.*

*Jos (yhtäkkiä) näin kirjat, niin näin kirjat.*

*Jos (yhtäkkiä) näin veden, niin näin veden.*

*Jos näin kirjat (jonkin aikaa), niin näin kirjat.*

*Jos näin veden (jonkin aikaa), niin näin veden.*

‘If (suddenly) I saw the books, then I saw books.’  
‘If (suddenly) I saw the water, then I saw water.’  
‘If I saw the books (some time), then I saw books.’  
‘If I saw the water (some time), then I saw water.’

‘If (suddenly) I saw the books, then I saw the books.’  
‘If (suddenly) I saw the water, then I saw the water.’  
‘If I saw the books (some time), then I saw the books.’  
‘If I saw the water (some time), then I saw the water.’


Such actions as reading and drinking on one hand, and seeing on the other, seem to presuppose quite different aspectual implications. Reading and drinking can be conceived of as progressive, cumulative actions which, as though by exhausting the mass of the referent of the direct object, lead inexorably to a certain effect: the read book, the drunk water, etc. The effect of such actions must naturally be preceded by a phase in which there was still no effect. Put another way, reading and drinking can be conceptualized both irresultatively and resultatively. This intuition was expressed by Terho Itkonen (1975a: 10), who proposed to call the verbs designating reading, drinking, etc. *resultatiivis-irresultatiiviset verbit* ‘resultative-irresultative verbs’. As has already been mentioned, the action of seeing does not presuppose such phases. Here the converse situation applies. First one must catch sight of something (the meaning [+PUNCTUAL]), then one can possibly keep on seeing it (the meaning [+/-DURATIVE]), without any effect comparable to the final effect of reading or drinking. This intuition, in turn, already mentioned in the discussion of Larjavaara’s approach, was expressed again by Itkonen, who coined for such verbs the term *kvasirelatiiviverbit* ‘quasi-resultative verbs’ (ibid. 14)<sup>37</sup>. According to Leino (1991: 164), the quasi-resultative verbs designate such actions/states whose initial point can be conceived of as a kind of achievement. After this “achievement” the action/state can only be continued or simply terminated without any expansion. Tommola (1986: 154) proposes to call the meaning of the discussed verbs ‘constantly resultative’ (*постоянно-результативный*). Schot-Saikku (1990: 76) states that quasi-resultative verbs designate activities which are temporally indifferent. The temporal differentiation generates a change in the (lexical) meaning of the verbs, cf. *Minä näen häne/t* ‘I see him-ACC’ vs. *Minä näen hän/tä huomenna* ‘I meet him-PART

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<sup>37</sup> The pointlessness of any finer classification of Finnish verbs with respect to their aspect relevance seems to have been proved, quite unwittingly, I believe, by Groundstroem (1988: 1–42). Such verb types as: inchoative, terminative, creative-factive, ordinative, disordinative, collective-associative, distributive-dissociative, possessive-conservative, cognitive, performative, etc. do constitute some, semantically more or less substantiated, classes of Finnish verbs. However, there is doubt as to their relevance to case. The cited work does not reveal any difference in case government between the distinguished verb classes.


tomorrow’ or *Hän voittaa minu/t* ‘He defeats me-ACC’ vs. *Hän voittaa minu/a nyt jo minuutilla* ‘He is already one minute ahead of me-PART’.

While in the case of the first mentioned group (*Luin, Join*) it seems possible to carry out a split of the aspectual meanings positioned in different places on the irre-sultativity-resultativity axis, in the case of the second group (*Näin*) such a split seems to be excluded, as though the presupposed phases of seeing were indissolubly coupled with each other. Because of the scantiness of the Finnish verb morphology in marking aspectual oppositions, the task of disambiguating different aspectual meanings, inhering potentially in the lexical meaning of the verb<sup>38</sup>, rests upon the cases of the direct object. However, this disambiguation, in consequence of its described historical relations with ‘pure referent quantification’, is accessible only for the meanings [+RESULTATIVE] and [+/-RESULTATIVE], that is, meanings in the dimension of {**aspect**} as opposed to the dimension of {**gender of action**}. Let us depict the process of this disambiguation by means of the following scheme:



As the presented dependencies show, the aspectual meaning implied by the verb is disambiguated only when the broader syntactic context – in this instance the direct object – is revealed. In such a situation it is as though these implied aspectual meanings adhere secondarily to the quantitative meanings in such a way that the meanings [+RESULTATIVE] and [+TOTAL] are expressed grammatically by the morphological category called **accusative**, and the meanings [+/-RESULTATIVE] and [+/-TOTAL] are expressed by the another morphological category, **partitive**. The following scheme summarizes the actual quantitative and aspectual meanings of the accusative and partitive of divisible nouns in the discussed verbal contexts:

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *sisäinen aspekti* ‘internal aspect’ in Kangasmaa-Minn 1978.



Careful comparison of the relevant sentence types analyzed so far reveals that the occurrence of the quantitative meanings is context-bound to a lesser extent than the occurrence of the aspectual meanings. **In the case of divisible nouns the aspectual meanings do not occur without the corresponding quantitative meanings, but not vice versa.** This, in my opinion, restores quantification to its rightful place, in contrast with Larjavaara's aspect-centered approach.

As far as Setälä's approach is concerned, its shortcomings seem to result from his treating aspect and quantification as two dimensions whose meanings, dissociated into simple [+TOTAL], [-TOTAL] and [+RESULTATIVE], [-RESULTATIVE], can be combined freely with each other. Nevertheless, as the indicated dependencies show, the aspectual and quantitative meanings are in fact combined **selectively**. That is, the simple meaning [+RESULTATIVE] is combined with the simple meaning [+TOTAL], and the complex meaning [+/-RESULTATIVE] is combined with the complex meaning [+/-TOTAL].

The postulated selective combinability of the particular aspectual meanings with quantitative meanings is sometimes called into question by invoking some other, not yet analyzed, sentence types (cf. Dahl & Karlsson 1976: 40–43, Huomo 2006a: 504–524). Nevertheless, in my view the nature of these sentences seems to be such that it requires a separate comment if we wish to use them in discussing the semantics of the accusative and partitive.

Based on the presented network of paradigmatic relations, we are entitled to claim that the partitive in a sentence of the type (82b) *Join vettä* conveys first of all the meaning [+/-TOTAL]. Because of the verbal context in which it occurs – *Join* 'I drank' – it conveys at the same time the meaning [+/-RESULTATIVE]. Nevertheless, by means of a still broader context, this situation may be changed. The event of my drinking water, in a sentence of the type:

- (91) *Join vettä* [ja sitten menin pois].  
*water-PART*

'I drank (some) water up [and then went out].'

is no longer conceived of as ambiguous in the dimension of aspect, as was the case with the sentence (82b) *Join vettä*. The sentence (91) *Join vettä ja sitten menin pois* means that the drinking of water is conceived of aspectually as [+RESULTATIVE] (and quantitatively as [+/-TOTAL]). On the other hand, the event of my drinking water in a sentence of the type:

- (92) [*Kun*] *join vet/tä*, [*puhelin soi*].  
*water-PART*

‘[While] I was drinking water, [the telephone rang].’

is conceived of as aspectually irresultative ([−RESULTATIVE]) and quantitatively partial ([−TOTAL]). As far as the other member of the case opposition is concerned, the accusative in a sentence of the type (82a) *Join veden* conveys primarily the meaning [+TOTAL], and secondarily, because of the verbal context, the meaning [+RESULTATIVE]. Nevertheless, the event of my drinking water in a sentence of the type:

- (93) *Join vede/n* [*joka päivä*].  
*water-ACC*

‘I was drinking the whole water [every day].’


seems to be conceived of as [+HABITUAL]. Under certain circumstances, habituality (one of the meanings in the dimension of {gender of action}) can be interpreted as a kind of irresultativity (one of the meanings in the dimension of {aspect}). Habitual drinking of the whole foreseen daily portion of water ([+TOTAL]) cannot be accomplished resultatively, apparently *a priori*<sup>39</sup>. In the light of the presented facts, the impression is given that the aspectual meanings can be combined with the quantitative meanings not only in the manner presented above. Let us summarize:

	partitive		accusative
aspectual meanings	[+RESULT]	[−RESULT]	[+HABITUAL] ([−RESULT])
quantitative meanings	[+/-TOTAL]	[−TOTAL]	[+TOTAL]
examples	<i>Join vettä</i> <i>ja sitten menin pois.</i>	<i>Kun</i> <i>join vettä,</i> <i>puhelin soi.</i>	<i>Join veden</i> <i>joka päivä.</i>

<sup>39</sup> Cf. also the notion *kontinuaatiivinen resultatiivisuus* ‘continuative resultativity’ in Huomo 2006a: 517.

The structure of the sentence types analyzed here is – in comparison with the minimal case syntagms – of such a kind that it significantly hinders the identification of the unique significator (for our purposes – the case form/ending) responsible for conveying the target meanings. The claim that such combinations of meanings as those shown above are conveyed merely by the case forms can be perceived as a distortion, resulting, in my opinion, from incomprehension of the nature of paradigmatic relations<sup>40</sup>. By comparing such syntagms as (82b) *Join vettä* and (82a) *Join veden* we can draw a *caesura* between the (homophonic and homosemantic) syncretic part *Join* on one hand and the diacritic part *vettä*, *veden* on the other. This operation allows us to state that by means of the case alternation *vettä* ↔ *veden*, we achieve the appropriate change of meanings: [+/-TOTAL], [+/-RESULTATIVE] : [+TOTAL], [+RESULTATIVE]. In other words, the case (form) *vettä* conveys unambiguously the meanings [+/-TOTAL] and [+/-RESULTATIVE], while the case (form) *veden* conveys unambiguously the meanings [+TOTAL] and [+RESULTATIVE].

Let us now make a syntagmatic comparison between sentences of the type (91) *Join vettä ja sitten menin pois* and the appropriate minimal case syntagms (the diacritic segments are bolded):




The sentences (82b) *Join vettä* and (91) *Join vettä ja sitten menin pois* convey the same quantitative meaning, [+/-TOTAL], and different aspectual meanings: [+/-RESULTATIVE] and [+RESULTATIVE] respectively. As the diagram shows, the change of the aspectual meaning in passing from (82b) *Join vettä* to (91) *Join vettä ja sitten menin pois* seems to be achieved by means of the attachment of the segment *ja sitten menin pois*. Within such a limited network of paradigmatic relations, it turns out that the meaning [+/-RESULTATIVE] is conveyed in the sentence (82b) *Join*

<sup>40</sup> Cf. the notion of ‘bilateral disjunctiveness’ of both perceptible and functional features of the text in Bogusławski 2010: 17–52.

*vettä* by the phonetic zero (sic!). The sentences (82a) *Join veden* and (91) *Join vettä ja sitten menin pois* convey the same aspectual meaning, [+RESULTATIVE], and different quantitative meanings: [+TOTAL] and [+/-TOTAL] respectively. The change in the quantitative meaning seems to be achieved by the alternation *veden* ↔ *vettä ja sitten menin pois* (sic!).

*Mutatis mutandis*, the same refers to the sentences (92) *Kun join vettä, puhelin soi* and (93) *Join veden joka päivä*. Let us compare:



How, though, should these relations be adjusted to the relations between the sentences of the type (82b) *Join vettä* and (82a) *Join veden*? Let us project the results of both procedures of syntagmatic comparison onto a common plane:

- A *Join // vettä //  $\emptyset$ .* ↔ *Join // vettä // ja sitten menin pois.*
- B *Join // veden.* ↔ *Join // vettä ja sitten menin pois.*
- C  $\emptyset // \textit{Join // vettä} // \emptyset.$  ↔ ***Kun** // join // vettä, // puhelin soi.*
- D *Join // veden //  $\emptyset$ .* ↔ *Join // veden // joka päivä.*

The chaotic appearance of the discussed *caesurae* leads to the conclusion that we can never be sure what, in the long run, conveys the meanings in question. As I have postulated in the theoretical chapter, the sought formal-syntactic-semantic regularities can be detected only by means of the **reduction** of all contexts in which the cases (here: accusative and partitive) occur to contexts which are absolutely **minimal** (i.e. to so-called minimal

case syntagms). I consider sentences of the type (82b) *Join vettä*, (82a) *Join veden*, etc. to be manifestations of such minimal contexts. In the light of what has been said, the assumption that the aspectual meanings (as opposed to meanings in the dimension of {gender of action}) can be combined with quantitative meanings in a different way to [+RESULTATIVE], [+TOTAL] and [+/-RESULTATIVE], [+/-TOTAL] seems to be untenable if the partitive and accusative are to be conceived of as the unique carriers of these meanings.

The analysis of sentences in which the aspectual and quantitative meanings can be combined with each other in a different way than [+RESULTATIVE], [+TOTAL] and [+/-RESULTATIVE], [+/-TOTAL] reveals the other countenance of the previously described regularity concerning the lesser context-boundedness of the quantitative meanings in comparison with the aspectual meanings in Finnish. As it turns out, only the aspectual meaning can be actualized in such a manner that both the partitive and accusative occur in sentences conveying the same meaning of this kind. The actualization of the quantitative meaning always gives different meanings (cf. *Join vettä ja sitten menin pois* and *Join veden* (both [+RESULTATIVE]) with *Join vettä ja sitten menin pois* [+/-TOTAL], *Kun join vettä, puhelin soi* [-TOTAL] and *Join veden joka päivä* [+TOTAL]). **Historically, quantification has not been erased.**

Let us now proceed to analyze the semantics of the accusative and partitive of **indivisible nouns**. As has been indicated, in contemporary Finnish, the fact that a noun belongs to the class of indivisible nouns does not impede the occurrence of the accusative-partitive opposition, which in such a context seems to acquire a solely aspectual character (cf. (81a) [*Luin*] *kirjan* ↔ (81b) [*Luin*] *kirjaa*), [+RESULTATIVE] : [+/-RESULTATIVE]).

In uttering the sentence (81b) *Luin kirjaa*, one may, of course, mean a part of a book, but the book is not treated in such a context as a book divisible *in abstracto*. One can probably speak here only about the divisibility of the book from the point of view of the reading. That is, the book is indeed read gradually, part by part. The event of having read the book to the end presupposes the sub-event of having read at least a part of the book. Let us recall, however, the case of the ‘moved grandmother’, where analogous considerations seem to take the problem to absurd levels. The same would apply to the case of the ‘brought horse’ in Ikola’s example (*Minä olin hevos/ta tuomassa, kun tapasin hänet* ‘I was just bringing the horse-PART when I met him’), where the ‘horse’ is conceptualized as indivisible. Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences, which reveal non-metalingually the discussed semantic opposition between the accusative and partitive of indivisible nouns:


- C6 *Jos luin kirjan (loppuun), niin luin kirjaa (jonkin aikaa).*  
*Jos siirsin isoäidin (loppuun), niin siirsin isoäitiä (jonkin aikaa).*  
 ‘If I read a/the book (to the end), then I was reading a/the book (some time).’  
 ‘If I moved the grandma (to the end), then I was moving the grandma (some time).’
- C7 \**Jos luin kirjaa (jonkin aikaa), niin luin kirjan (loppuun).*  
 \**Jos siirsin isoäitiä (jonkin aikaa), niin siirsin isoäidin (loppuun).*  
 \*‘If I was reading a/the book (some time), then I read a/the book (to the end).’  
 \*‘If I was moving the grandma (some time), then I moved the grandma (to the end).’
- C8 *Jos luin (koko) kirjan, niin luin (vähintään osan) kirjaa.*  
 \**Jos siirsin (koko) isoäidin, niin siirsin (vähintään osan) isoäitiä.*  
 ‘If I read the (whole) book, then I read (at least a part of) the book.’  
 \*‘If I moved the (whole) grandma, then I moved (at least a part of) the grandma.’

In this light, it is more reasonable to treat all indivisible (singular countable) nouns as **indeterminate with respect to the dimension of quantification ([0])**. Of course, this standpoint does not exclude the existence of such homonyms as, for example, *HEVONEN*, which can mean both ‘horse’ and ‘horseflesh’, that is, it can be conceived of as either indivisible or divisible.

Summing up, the presented formal-syntactic-semantic regularities in non-neutralizative contexts make it possible to ascribe unambiguously to the accusative and partitive the role of signifiers of appropriate meanings. These meanings may be:

- (i) only of quantitative character (cf. sentences 83c–f);
- (ii) of both quantitative and aspectual character (cf. sentences 81c–d and 82a–b); or
- (iii) only of aspectual character (cf. sentences 81a–b).

Let us summarize this visually:



### 3.3.1.2. The constitutive meanings of the accusative and partitive

In the theoretical chapter, the constitutive meaning of a case (form) was described as the fusion of all of its homogeneous actual meanings in the appropriate semantic dimension which are conveyed by the case in question in its proportional uses (obligatorily) and in the appropriate isolated uses (facultatively). From this point of view, the Finnish accusative and partitive seem to be somewhat problematic. In which dimension – {quantification} or {aspect} – should their constitutive meanings be sought? As it turns out, there occur proportional uses of both cases in which there are absent either quantitative (cf. *Siirsin isoäidin* ↔ *Siirsin isoäitiä*) or aspectual meanings (cf. *Näin kirjat* ↔ *Näin kirjoja*).

In the case of proportional uses of the accusative and partitive of divisible nouns, the appropriate aspectual meanings seem to be interpretable as actual meanings ascribed to the basic actual quantitative meanings (cf. [+TOTAL] → [+TOTAL] + [+RESULTATIVE], [+/-TOTAL] → [+/-TOTAL] + [+/-RESULTATIVE], etc.). Hence it is in the dimension of {quantification} that the constitutive meaning of both cases should be sought. In turn, in the case of proportional uses of the accusative and partitive of indivisible nouns, the quantitative meanings come into play only in some specific contexts, with the stipulation that the divisibility is considered from the point of view of the verb. Hence in this instance it is rather the dimension of {aspect} in which the constitutive meanings of both cases should be sought.

If one wishes to treat the accusative and partitive in the entirety of their proportional uses, then these cases should be assigned constitutive meanings in both dimensions: {quantification} and {aspect}. The constitutive meaning of the accusative is either [+TOTAL] or [+RESULTATIVE], while the constitutive meaning of the partitive is either [+/-TOTAL] or [+/-RESULTATIVE].

### 3.3.2. Neutralizative contexts

Discussion of the accusative and partitive in neutralizative contexts is usually undertaken as a derivative of the discussion of those cases in non-neutralizative contexts. If in the neutralizative contexts only one case of direct object is admissible, then linguists tend to explain this circumstance on the basis of (at least partial) semantic agreement between the noun and the governing verb in the dimension of {aspect} in the broad meaning, i.e. covering both traditional aspect and gender of action.

In contemporary Finnish there can be distinguished two types of relevant neutralizative contexts:

- (i) pro-accusative (cf. sentence 83a), and
- (ii) pro-partitive contexts (cf. sentences 84a–f, 85a–d, 86e–f, 87a–f, 88a–f).

#### 3.3.2.1. Pro-accusative neutralizative contexts

As has already been stated, the duality of the formal manifestation of the direct object in contemporary Finnish – that is, its belonging to two cases, accusative and partitive – results from previous stages in the development of the language. It is probable that the accusative-partitive opposition was at first exclusively quantitative in nature. Next, there occurred the (necessary) association between the aspectual meanings implied by the lexical stem of the verb and appropriate quantitative meanings conveyed grammatically by the cases of the noun (cf. the Larjavaara's approach). The meaning [+RESULTATIVE] became associated with the meaning [+TOTAL], while the meaning [+/-RESULTATIVE] was associated with the meaning [+/-TOTAL]. In this manner, the discussed aspectual and quantitative meanings acquired a common grammatical significator – either the accusative or the partitive. The accusative-partitive opposition, now additionally having an aspectual character, was broadened by way of analogy beyond the class of divisible nouns (cf. [*Siirsin*] *isoäidin* ↔ *isoäitiä*). As soon as the noun is indivisible and the verb does not presuppose the bifurcation of the aspectual meanings into simple [+RESULTATIVE] and complex [+/-RESULTATIVE], which are, because of their historical relations with quantification, the only aspectual meanings susceptible to the discussed disambiguation, there are no grounds for the occurrence of the accusative-partitive opposition, and it becomes suspended.

In Itkonen's view, as we have seen, the reason why the neutralization in sentences of the type (83a) *Näin kirjan* takes place in favor of the accusative can be

sought in the ‘quasi-resultative’ character of the verb. Quasi-resultativity is understood as punctuality (i.e. in some sense resultativity) coupling only facultatively with durativity (cf. *Näin kirjan* ‘I caught sight of/saw a/the book’ and *Luin kirjan* ‘I read the whole book’). In turn, Larjavaara explains this state of affairs by referring to the divergence of the aspectual character of quasi-resultative verbs and other verbs, namely irresultative-resultative and irresultative verbs. For this reason, the development of aspectual oppositions has bypassed them. The relations in a sentential paradigm of the type (83a–f) [*Näin*] *kirjan*/\*, *kirjat/kirjoja*, *veden/vettä* reflect the old quantitative, pre-aspectual stage. Let us compare the following adequate case-conditional sentences which corroborate the described state of affairs:

C9 *Jos (yhtäkkiä) näin kirjan, niin näin kirjan.*

*Jos näin kirjan (jonkin aikaa), niin näin kirjan.*

‘If I (suddenly) saw a/the book, then I saw a/the book.’

‘If I saw a/the book (some time), then I saw a/the book.’

I agree in broad outline with the standpoints presented above. Nevertheless, I would like to make the additional observation that the suspension of the accusative-partitive opposition in favor of the accusative, in the context discussed, invalidates the argument that the accusative is the marked and the partitive the unmarked member of the opposition in every instance. My supposition is that the suggested repartition of the functions between the two cases of the direct object holds true only when:

- (i) the governed noun is divisible; and/or
- (ii) in the action designated by the governing verb there can be distinguished two phases:
  - (a) an introductory irresultative(-partial) phase and
  - (b) a final resultative(-total) phase.

When these two conditions do not hold, it is the accusative which becomes the unmarked member of the opposition. This property of the accusative in Finnish seems not to be readily noticed. Reasons for this include:

- (i) the relatively small number of quasi-resultative verbs;
- (ii) the fact that it is limited only to indivisible nouns (in the case of divisible nouns it is again the partitive which fulfills the function of the unmarked member of the opposition (cf. sentences 83c–f));

- (iii) the fact that in the context under discussion the accusative is not directly opposed on the paradigmatic plane to any other case (its meaning therefore seems to be to some extent blurred, including its relation to the other case of direct object – the partitive).

As regards the pro-accusative neutralizative contexts, it is also appropriate to consider sentences containing such verbs as *antaa* ‘to give’, *saada* ‘to obtain’, *ottaa* ‘to take’, etc. Kangasmaa-Minn (1978: 22) observes that with such verbs, the use of the partitive of indivisible nouns is possible only when “the moment is artificially stretched” (*hetkeä keinotekoisesti venytetään*), for example:

- (94) *Puheenjohtaja antaa juuri palkinto/a voittajalle.*  
award-PART

‘The chairman is just giving the award to the winner.’

Elsewhere (1985: 437) Kangasmaa-Minn writes that in such a situation the discussed verbs do not “normally” (*normaalisti*) take a direct object in the partitive case. I am not sure how the notions of ‘artificiality’ or ‘normality’ in reference to this kind of utterance should be understood. My knowledge of the Finnish language allows me to classify these at the most as correct sentences expressing irresultative, continuative actions. The lingual conceptualization (here: the contemplation of the situation from the point of view of the irresultative phase of giving) should not be judged by referring to so-called empirical facts (here: the instantaneity of giving).

Because of the specific aspectual meaning of verbs of the type *antaa*, their relevant occurrences with the partitive of the indivisible nouns are limited to sentences which unambiguously imply irresultativity. Since this is achieved by means of a still broader context (cf. *antaa [juuri]* ‘is [just] giving’), the mere context of the type *antaa* ‘he gives’ can be regarded as a pro-accusative neutralizative context. In such a context it is the accusative which fulfills the function of the unmarked member of the opposition. With divisible nouns, the partitive “again” becomes the unmarked member. Let us compare:

		ACC			PART
(95)	(a)	<i>Annoin</i>	<i>vede/n.</i>	(b)	<i>Annoin</i>
(96)	(a)	<i>Annoin</i>	<i>kirja/t.</i>	(b)	<i>Annoin</i>
(95)	(a)	‘I gave the whole water.’		(b)	‘I gave (some) water.’ ‘I was giving water.’
(96)	(a)	‘I gave all the books.’		(b)	‘I gave (some) books.’ ‘I was giving books.’

### 3.3.2.2. Pro-partitive neutralizative contexts


The pro-partitive neutralizative contexts can be divided into two types:

- (i) affirmative sentences with irresultative verbs (cf. 84a–f); and
- (ii) negative sentences (cf. 85a–d, 86e–f, 87a–f, 88a–f).

What noticeably distinguishes the pro-partitive neutralizative contexts from the pro-accusative neutralizative contexts is the fact that in the pro-partitive contexts the accusative-partitive opposition is suspended in the case of all kinds of nouns. In the pro-accusative contexts it is suspended only in the case of indivisible nouns.

The problem of the exclusive occurrence of the partitive with affirmative irresultative verbs seems to be a rather trivial one. Verbs of the type *Rakastin* ‘I loved’ convey the meaning [–RESULTATIVE]. Of the two cases of the direct object, only the constitutive meaning of the partitive may be actualized in such a way that it is semantically compatible with the actual aspectual meaning [–RESULTATIVE] implied by the verb. Disregarding the lexical meaning, the resultative-irresultative and irresultative verbs occur in the relation of participative semantic opposition. It is not surprising, therefore, that the irresultative-resultative verbs, being unmarked, occur in more numerous contexts than the marked irresultative verbs: (81a–d) *Luin* [*kirjan, kirjaa, kirjat, kirjoja...*] vs. (84a–d) *Rakastin* [*\* / kirjaa, \* / kirjoja...*].

Let us visualize the invoked semantic dependencies between the cases of direct object on one hand and irresultative-resultative and irresultative verbs on the other, with respect to aspect and case government:



It should be noted that the sentences with irresultative verbs also corroborate the lesser context-boundedness of the quantitative meanings in comparison with the aspectual meanings. Sentences of the type (84d) *Rakastin kirjoja*, (81d) *Luin kirjoja* convey the same quantitative meaning, [+/-TOTAL], but their aspectual meanings are

different: [–RESULTATIVE] and [+/-RESULTATIVE] respectively. The Finnish language loses the possibility of expressing grammatically the meaning [+TOTAL] in the analyzed contexts, as an epiphenomenon of the neutralization of the accusative-partitive opposition in favor of the partitive caused by the aspect of the verb. In order to express the meaning [+TOTAL] in pro-partitive neutralizative contexts, one must have recourse to lexical modes of expression (cf. *Rakastin kaikkia kirjoja* ‘I loved all the books’). This is not the case in non-neutralizative contexts (cf. (81c) *Luin kirjat* ‘I read all the books’). Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences:

- C10 *Jos rakastin (jonkin verran) kirjoja, niin rakastin kirjoja.*  
*Jos rakastin (kaikkia) kirjoja, niin rakastin kirjoja.*  
 ‘If I loved (some) books, then I loved books.’  
 ‘If I loved (all) the books, then I loved books.’

The issue of the exclusive occurrence of the partitive in negative sentences seems to be much more problematic<sup>41</sup>. Many different explanations have been put forward in the literature. Kont (1958: 242–244, 1961: 197–199, 1963: 117–118) emphasizes the role of the Baltic-Slavic influence. Let us compare the contemporary Lithuanian (97) and Polish (98) sentences:

		ACC		GEN
(97)	(a)	<i>Aš gėriau vandenį.</i>	(b)	<i>Aš negėriau vandenį.</i>
(98)	(a)	<i>Pilem wodę.</i>	(b)	<i>Nie palem wody.</i>

(97–98) (a) ‘I drank water.’ (b) ‘I did not drink water.’

Nevertheless, Kont does not reject the validity of the “logical” explanation based on the semantic dependencies within the Balto-Finnic languages themselves<sup>42</sup>. Setälä (1883: 26) argues that the object of the negated verb occurs in the partitive because a Finnish speaker sees things in such a way that, if one negates the fact of the influence of the subject on the object, that influence does not embrace even a part of the object, not to mention its entirety. Heinz (1955: 85), referring to the analogous phenomenon in the Baltic and Slavic languages, ascertains that the partitive apperception of the direct object after negated verbs results from the willingness

<sup>41</sup> Even if one disregards the deviations from the rule ‘negative verb form – partitive’ in, among others, rhetorical questions of the type *Eikö oteta lepoa?* ‘Wouldn’t we take a rest-II ACC?’ (cf. Karlsson G. 1957).

<sup>42</sup> A short summary of the discussion concerning the possibility of capturing the general meaning (*Grundbedeutung*) of the Indo-European genitive and that of the Balto-Finnic partitive, motivating their analogous use in both language groups, can be found in Ritter 1989: 7–18.

to express that nothing of the referent of the direct object has been embraced by the action. However, with time this expressive aspect of negation has become weaker. Fraenkel (1928: 42, 47–48) states that the partitive usage is central to the usage of the Lithuanian (and wider Indo-European) genitive. With transitive verbs, the accusative expresses the object in itself (*Atnešk man vandenį* ‘Bring me the water-ACC’), whereas the genitive puts more emphasis on the same object as indeterminate divisible matter (*Atnešk man vanden/s* ‘Bring me (some) water-GEN’). The partitive genitive in negative sentences indicates that the referent of the direct object does not come into question at all, e.g. *Ne tureki kyt/u diew/u preg manęs* ‘You shall have no other-GEN gods-GEN before me’. Lauri Hakulinen, in the authoritative *Suomen kielen rakenne ja kehitys* ‘The Structure and Development of the Finnish Language’ (1979: 537), writes that since the action of the negated verb is, from the point of view of the result, incomplete or even not commenced, it is understandable that the object of such a verb occurs in the partitive, as in irresultative affirmative sentences. The most original explanation seems to be that proposed by Terho Itkonen (1982: 433). The development originated from the sentences:

		ACC		PART		
(99)	(a)	† <i>Join</i>	<i>(kaike/n) vede/n.</i>	(b)	† <i>Join</i>	<i>vet/tä.</i>
(100)	(a)	† <i>Kaadoin</i>	<i>(kaikki/Ø) puu/t.</i>	(b)	† <i>Kaadoin</i>	<i>pu/i/ta.</i>
(99)	(a)	‘I drank the (whole) water up.’		(b)	‘I drank some water.’	
(100)	(a)	‘I cut down (all) the trees.’		(b)	‘I cut down some trees.’	

In the Proto-Balto-Finnic period the partitive still meant univocally that part of the referent of the direct object was subjected to the action. The meaning [PART OF SOMETHING] contains the whole scale of instances:

(99)	(c)	<i>Join paljon</i>	<i>vet/tä.</i>	‘I drank lot of water.’
	(d)	<i>Join jonkin verran</i>	<i>vet/tä.</i>	‘I drank some water.’
	(e)	<i>Join vähän</i>	<i>vet/tä.</i>	‘I drank a little water.’
	(f)	<i>Join tilkkasen</i>	<i>vet/tä.</i>	‘I drank a little drop of water.’

and the extreme instance of this scale is:

(99)	(g)	<i>En juonut (yhtään)</i>	<i>vet/tä.</i>	‘I did not drink any water (at all).’
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This model then spread to singular countable nouns:

- |       |     |                         |                |     |                              |                |
|-------|-----|-------------------------|----------------|-----|------------------------------|----------------|
|       |     | ACC                     |                |     |                              | PART           |
| (101) | (a) | <i>Rakensin</i>         | <i>koda/n.</i> | (b) | <i>En rakentanut</i>         | <i>kota/a.</i> |
|       |     | ‘I built the shack up.’ |                |     | ‘I did not build any shack.’ |                |

The Baltic model was only a catalyst which precipitated the native development. Göran Karlsson (1979: 50–51) rejects these proposals, if they are to be accepted in their entirety. He asks how the direct object can be conceived of as partial if the action expressed by the verb does not affect any of the parts of its referent. On the contrary, in many such instances it can be regarded as total.

All of the above-mentioned explanations and objections seem to be to some extent plausible. Nevertheless, in this work I would like to explain the neutralization of the accusative-partitive opposition with negative verbs in favor of the partitive strictly from the synchronic, contemporary point of view.

In Polish the negative counterparts of affirmative sentences do not admit a neutralized form in connection with negation. Let us compare:

- |       |     |                              |   |     |                                  |
|-------|-----|------------------------------|---|-----|----------------------------------|
| (102) | (a) | <i>Przeczytałem książkę.</i> | ↔ | (b) | <i>Nie przeczytałem książki.</i> |
|       |     | ↓                            |   |     | ↓                                |
| (103) | (a) | <i>Czytałem książkę.</i>     | ↔ | (b) | <i>Nie czytałem książki.</i>     |
| (102) | (a) | ‘I read the whole book.’     |   | (b) | ‘I did not read the whole book.’ |
| (103) | (a) | ‘I read a/the book.’         |   | (b) | ‘I did not read any book.’       |
|       |     | ‘I was reading a/the book.’  |   |     | ‘I was not reading any book.’    |

Therefore, the aspectual(-quantitative) opposition seems to be insensitive to negation in Polish.

In Finnish, the negative counterparts of the sentences of the type (81a) *Luin kirjaa* ‘I read the whole book’ and (81b) *Luin kirjaa* ‘I read/was reading a/the book’ admit one neutralized form: (85b) *En lukenut kirjaa*. In such a context, in comparison with the corresponding affirmative contexts, the Finnish language loses the possibility of univocal grammatical expression of the meaning [+RESULTATIVE]. A sentence of the type (85b) *En lukenut kirjaa* is ambiguous: ‘I did not read the whole book’, ‘I did not read/was not reading any book’. Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences:

C11 *Jos en lukenut kirjaa (loppuun), niin en lukenut kirjaa.*

*Jos en lukenut kirjaa (yhtään), niin en lukenut kirjaa.*

‘If I did not read the book (to the end), then I did not read a/the book.’

‘If I did not read the book (at all), then I did not read a/the book.’

It seems that in Finnish, in contrast to Polish for example, the regularity governing the choice of case of the direct object of a negative verb refers to the **aspectual implications of the input and not to the input itself**. Even if one wants to communicate that one did not read the whole book, the aspectual implication is that there is no final result. If one did not read/was not reading any book at all, there is no result either. On the strength of this, the exclusive use of the partitive in both instances can be explained analogously to the exclusive use of the partitive with irresultative verbs. Let us visualize this:

input	aspectual implications	output
$(\neg \text{Luin kirja/n.})$	<i>Kirjaa ei luettu loppuun.</i> ‘One did not read the book to the end.’ [–RESULT]  <i>Kirjaa ei luettu yhtään.</i> ‘One did not read the book at all.’ [–RESULT]	$\Rightarrow$ <i>En lukenut kirja/a.</i> ‘I did not read the whole book.’ ‘I did not read/ was not reading any book.’
$(\neg \text{Luin kirja/a.})$	<i>Kirjaa ei luettu yhtään.</i> ‘One did not read the book at all.’ [–RESULT]	

### 3.3.3. Quantification and aspect/gender of action – summary

Let us now summarize how the discussed meanings in the dimensions of:

- (i) {quantification}                    [+TOTAL],  
     [+/-TOTAL],  
     [0]; and

- (ii) {aspect/gender of action}: [+RESULTATIVE],  
 [+/-RESULTATIVE],  
 [-RESULTATIVE],  
 [+PUNCTUAL],  
 [+/-DURATIVE]

combine with each other in governing the choice of the appropriate case of the direct object in minimal case syntagms in Finnish.

The meaning [+TOTAL] is combinable with:

- (i) [+RESULTATIVE] (*Luin kirjat*) and with  
 (ii) [+PUNCTUAL] and [+/-DURATIVE] (*Näin kirjat*).

The nature of these two combinations is different. With the combination [+TOTAL] and [+RESULTATIVE] it is case that ultimately disambiguates the relevant meanings. A change to the partitive would change both of them (cf. *Luin kirjat* → *Luin kirjoja*). With the combination [+TOTAL], [+PUNCTUAL] and [+/-DURATIVE], a change to the partitive would change only the quantitative meaning. The meanings in the dimension of {aspect/gender of action} would remain the same (cf. *Näin kirjat* → *Näin kirjoja*).

The meaning [+/-TOTAL] can be combined with:

- (i) [+/-RESULTATIVE] (*Luin kirjoja*),  
 (ii) [-RESULTATIVE] (*Rakastin kirjoja*); and  
 (iii) [+PUNCTUAL] and [+/-DURATIVE] (*Näin kirjoja*).

The nature of these three combinations is different too. The combination [+/-TOTAL] and [+/-RESULTATIVE] is of such a kind that case is the carrier of both meanings (cf. the semantic consequences of the change *Luin kirjoja* → *Luin kirjat*). With the combination [+/-TOTAL] and [-RESULTATIVE], the case is of course the carrier of the meaning [+/-TOTAL] (such an utterance as *Rakastin* 'I loved' does not convey any quantitative meaning). The verb implies the aspectual meaning [-RESULTATIVE]. The meaning [-RESULTATIVE] is combinable only with the quantitative meaning [+/-TOTAL] in the governed noun. The change *Rakastin kirjoja* → *\*Rakastin kirjat* is not possible. With regard to the combinability of the meanings [+PUNCTUAL] and [+/-DURATIVE] with quantitative meanings, there are no such restrictions (cf. *Näin kirjoja* → *Näin kirjat*).

The indeterminate quantitative meaning ([0]) can be combined with all relevant meanings in the dimension of {aspect/gender of action}:

- (i) [+RESULTATIVE] (*Luin kirjan, Annoin kirjan*);
- (ii) [+/-RESULTATIVE] (*Luin kirjaa*);
- (iii) [-RESULTATIVE] (*Rakastin kirjaa*); and
- (iv) [+PUNCTUAL] and [+/-DURATIVE] (*Näin kirjan*).

The combination [0] and [+RESULTATIVE] may, by means of a change of the case of the direct object, be converted into [0] and [+/-RESULTATIVE] (cf. *Luin kirjan* → *Luin kirjaa*), or it may be inconvertible into anything else (cf. *Annoin kirjan* → \**Annoin kirjaa*). The combination [0], [+PUNCTUAL] and [+/-DURATIVE] cannot from the semantic point of view be converted into anything else (cf. *Näin kirjan* → \**Näin kirjaa*). The same applies to the combination [0] and [-RESULTATIVE] (cf. *Rakastin kirjaa* → \**Rakastin kirjan*).

Let us visualize what has been said by means of the following table (↕ – possible case alternation entailing the change of both types of meanings, ↓ – possible case alternation entailing the change of only one type of meaning):

			{quantification}		
			[+TOTAL]	[+/-TOTAL]	[0]
{aspect/gender of action}	RESULTATIVE	[+]	ACC <i>Luin kirjat</i> <i>Annoin kirjat</i>	–	ACC <i>Luin kirjan</i>
			↕↕ ( <i>Luin kirjoja</i> ) ( <i>Annoin kirjoja</i> )		↓ ( <i>Luin kirjaa</i> )
				ACC <i>Annoin kirjan</i>	
		[+/-]	–	PART <i>Luin kirjoja</i> <i>Annoin kirjoja</i>	PART <i>Luin kirjaa</i>
				↕↕ ( <i>Luin kirjat</i> ) ( <i>Annoin kirjat</i> )	↓ ( <i>Luin kirjan</i> )
	[-]	–	PART <i>Rakastin kirjoja</i>	PART <i>Rakastin kirjaa</i>	
		–	–		
	[+PUNCT] [+/-DUR]	ACC <i>Näin kirjat</i>	PART <i>Näin kirjoja</i>	ACC <i>Näin kirjan</i>	
		↓ ( <i>Näin kirjoja</i> )	↓ ( <i>Näin kirjat</i> )	–	

### 3.3.4. Other meanings

The opposition between the accusative and partitive in their proportional uses is additionally considered from the point of view of:

- (i) informational;
- (ii) temporal; and
- (iii) honorificative meanings.

Let us make a few additional remarks about these.

### 3.3.4.1. Informational meanings

As is indicated by the English translational equivalents of the following examples:

- (81c) *Luin kirjat* 'I read all **the** books';
- (81d) *Luin kirjoja* 'I read (some)  $\emptyset$  books',  
'I was reading  $\emptyset$  books'

the accusative can also be conceived of at first glance as the carrier of the meaning [+DEFINITE], and the partitive as the carrier of the meaning [-DEFINITE].

According to Erkki Itkonen (1972: 188), this state of affairs may result from a transfer of the semantic opposition [+DEFINITE] : [-DEFINITE] existing between the so-called desinential and non-desinential accusative in Proto-Finno-Ugric to the Balto-Finnic accusative and partitive respectively. This feature seems to have been preserved up to the present day in many Finno-Ugric languages. For example, in Komi the sentence:

- (104) *Ме ньӧби нянь/∅.*  
*bread-ACC*

with the non-desinential accusative *нянь* means that I bought some bread. In order to give the word functioning as direct object a definite meaning, there must be attached to it the phonetically non-empty accusative ending *-ӧс* (Fedjunëva 2000: 69–74, Bartens 2000: 331–335, Klump 2008: 156–158)<sup>43</sup>:

- (105) *Ме ньӧби нянь/ӧс.*  
*bread-ACC*

'I bought the bread-ACC.'

Kont (1963: 74) comments that it is difficult to settle the question of whether the discussed opposition in Balto-Finnic has anything to do with the corresponding relations in Proto-Finno-Ugric. He tends to recognize that the informational meanings

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<sup>43</sup> The same applies to the other Permic language, Udmurt: *Мон нянь/∅ басьтӱ* vs. *Мон нян/ез басьтӱ* (Perevoščikov 1962: 93–95), and to the Mordvin languages (examples from Erzya): *Мон раминь киш/∅* vs. *Мон рамия киш/нтъ* (Bartens 1999: 175).

are only an epiphenomenon (*kaasnähtus*) of the quantitative (and aspectual) meanings in the Balto-Finnic languages.

Rajandi and Metslang (1979), in *Määramata ja määratud objekt* 'The Indefinite and Definite Object', subjected to meticulous analysis, exactly from this point of view, the accusative and partitive in Estonian. They consider two ways of understanding the notion of 'definiteness':

- (i) The first way of understanding the notion relates to the thematic-rhematic structure of the sentence. The distinction between theme and rheme is manifested in Estonian mainly by word order and stress (the same applies to Finnish). The rheme tends to be stressed and placed at the end of the sentence. The sentence *Olga kinkis •sõrmuse* 'Olga donated a ring-ACC' implies that the ring is indefinite in the given discourse, while the sentence *Olga kinkis sõrmuse •sõbrale* 'Olga presented a friend with the ring-ACC' implies that it is definite. The new information refers to the beneficiary of the act (*SÕBER* 'friend'). The meaning [+DEFINITE] or [-DEFINITE] has nothing to do with the case of the direct object. The accusative and partitive can be combined freely with both meanings (cf. also Raible 1976: 52–54).
- (ii) The other way of understanding the notion 'definiteness' reflects only the properties of the theme of the sentence. According to the authors, the choice of the case of the thematic direct object is governed not only by quantification and/or aspect, as has been presented up to now. Another factor that is to some extent decisive is the question of its referential identity with the already known (*referentsiaalne identsus varem teadaolevaga*). If there is no factor causing neutralization of the discussed case opposition, then the accusative conveys the meaning which could be called 'total referential identity with the already known' ([+IDENTICAL]) and the partitive conveys the meaning 'irrelevance of such a total referential identity' ([+/-IDENTICAL]).

The most flamboyant example from the cited work is the following:

- |       |  |  |  |
|-------|--|--|--|
|       | (106a)   | <i>Aasta pärast leiti need naabersaarelt.</i>          |  |
|       |  |  | 'After a year one found them on the neighbouring island.'      |
| (106) | <i>Piraadid jätsid saarele kümme küülikut.</i> |  |  |
|       |  | 'The pirates left ten rabbits on the island.'          |  |
|       | (106b)   | <i>Aasta pärast leiti need kõigilt naabersaartelt.</i> |  |
|       |  |  | 'After a year one found them on all the neighbouring islands.' |

The use of the accusative in the sentence (106a) (*need* ‘them’) implies that all and exactly the same individual rabbits were found after a year. In turn, the use of the partitive in the sentence (106b) (*neid* ‘them’) implies that indeed some rabbits were found, but the animals found did not necessarily have to be the same rabbits left by the pirates: it may be that their offspring were found, and that more than ten rabbits were found. While the accusative in such a context, conveying the meaning [+IDENTICAL], implies the total referential identity with the already known, the partitive, conveying the meaning [+/-IDENTICAL], implies a “certain referential identity” or “type identity” (*liigiline identsus*).

Because of the far-reaching semantic convergence of the discussed cases with their Finnish counterparts, the conclusions drawn by the authors of this seminal article have also been extensively commented on by Finnish linguists. Viikuna (1992: 55–58), in her work on the marking of definiteness in Finnish, confirms that the meanings acquired by the Finnish accusative and partitive in the analogous context would be the same (cf. *Merirosvot jättivät saarelle kymmenen kania. Vuoden kuluttua niitä löydettiin kaikilta naapurisaarilta* ‘The pirates left ten rabbits on the island. After a year one found them-PART on all the neighbouring islands’ [in the original only the phrase *kymmenen kania* appears in italics]).

There is no doubt as to the accuracy of these observations in reference to both Estonian and Finnish. Nevertheless, I would like to make the additional remark that the discussed total referential identity ([+IDENTICAL]) or the irrelevance of such an identity ([+/-IDENTICAL]) can be conceived of at the most as meanings ascribed to the basic quantitative meanings [+TOTAL] and [+/-TOTAL] respectively. In talking about totality, one must talk about the totality of something. The accusative as the successor of the anaphoric relation (cf. *Jätsid kümme küülikut* ‘They left ten rabbits’ → *Leiti need* ‘One found them-ACC’) acquires the meaning [+IDENTICAL] as an ascribed meaning to the basic quantitative meaning [+TOTAL]. Totality in this context is the totality of the referent(s) of the antecedent of the anaphoric relation.

### 3.3.4.2. Temporal meanings

The forms of the so-called *preesens* ‘present tense’ are ambiguous. *Luen*, for example, means both ‘I read/am reading’ and ‘I will read’. The question of whether it refers to present or future time can be settled by means of, amongst other things, the case of the direct object (cf. Wawrzyniak 1980: 341). For example:

(107)	<i>Lue/n</i> <i>read-1 SG</i>	<table style="border-collapse: collapse; margin: 0 auto;"> <tr> <th style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">accusative</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">(a) <i>kirja/n</i> <i>book-I ACC</i></td> </tr> </table>	accusative	(a) <i>kirja/n</i> <i>book-I ACC</i>	↔	<table style="border-collapse: collapse; margin: 0 auto;"> <tr> <th style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">partitive</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">(b) <i>kirja/a.</i> <i>book-PART</i></td> </tr> </table>	partitive	(b) <i>kirja/a.</i> <i>book-PART</i>
accusative								
(a) <i>kirja/n</i> <i>book-I ACC</i>								
partitive								
(b) <i>kirja/a.</i> <i>book-PART</i>								

- (a) ‘I will read the whole book.’  
 (b) ‘I read a/the book.’ ‘I am reading a/the book.’  
 ‘I will read a/the book.’ ‘I will be reading a/the book.’

Comparing the sentences (107a) and (107b), one may conclude that the accusative conveys the meaning [+FUTURE], whereas the partitive conveys the meaning [+/-FUTURE]. However, analogously to the meanings [+IDENTICAL] and [+/-IDENTICAL], the temporal meanings [+FUTURE] and [+/-FUTURE] can be conceived of at the most as meanings ascribed to the basic aspectual meanings [+RESULTATIVE] and [+/-RESULTATIVE] respectively (cf. sentences (81a–b) *Luin kirjan* ↔ *kirjaa* where the case alternation does not influence the temporal meanings).

### 3.3.4.3. Honorificative meanings

The accusative-partitive opposition in interrogative sentences seems to be correlated with the degree of politeness. The sentence (108b) has more polite undertones than the sentence (108a):

(108)	<i>Ot/i/t/ko</i> <i>take-PRAET-</i> <i>-2 SG-INTER</i>	<b>accusative</b> (a) <i>telta/n</i> <i>tent-I ACC</i>	↔	<b>partitive</b> (b) <i>teltta/a?</i> <i>tent-PART</i>
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- (a–b) ‘Did you take a/the tent?’

According to Heinämäki (1984: 172), this difference results from one of the principles of politeness – in trying to be polite, one should not assume that the addressee is able or willing to do favors. The sentence with the accusative (108a) reveals the background information that there has been an agreement between the interlocutors concerning the taking of the tent. The sentence with the partitive (108b) does not reveal such a background. The questioner acts as if no agreement had been made before and, consequently, is more polite.

In my view, the meaning ‘higher degree of politeness’ or [+POLITE] can be treated at the most as a meaning ascribed to the basic aspectual meaning [+/-RESULT] in interrogative contexts. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same refers to the relation between the meaning [+/-POLITE] and [+RESULT]. Attention should be drawn to the fact that in the analyzed sentence type the ascribed actual meaning represents a complex meaning [+/-POLITE], whereas the basic actual meaning represents a simple meaning [+RESULT] (cf. section 2.4.2).

## 4. THE CASES OF SUBJECT

Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the semantics of the cases of subject, let us discuss first which cases can belong to this syntactic category. As will be shown, the answer is far from obvious, since we shall see later that there are two cases that come into play – the **nominative** and the **absolutive**.

### 4.1. The nominative

The nominative in Finnish is marked by means of the following endings:

- (i)  $-\emptyset$  in the singular; and
- (ii)  $-t$  in the plural number.

As usually befits a case category denoted by the term ‘nominative’, it signals the lack of syntactic subordination of the noun to the verb (cf. the approach of Jakobson referred to in section 1.5.1). In other words, the nominative is the case of the subject of the sentence; it constitutes the *determinatum absolutum* of its non-defective manifestation. Of course, this applies fully to the Finnish nominative too.

The diathetically relevant meaning of the nominative in combination with transitive verbs varies according to the voice of the verb. With the active voice the nominative conveys, generally speaking, the meaning [AGENT], while with the passive voice it conveys the meaning [PATIENT]. The nominative occurs in opposition, on the syntagmatic plane of the language, with both cases of direct object – the accusative and partitive. The diathetically relevant meaning of the accusative and partitive does not vary according to the voice of the verb. In combination with those voices that are compatible with the accusative and partitive (i.e. the active and impersonal voice), these cases convey the constant meaning [PATIENT]. Let us depict this state of affairs by means of the following scheme:

<b>nominative</b>		<b>accusative</b> <b>partitive</b>
[AGENT] [PATIENT] –	active voice passive voice impersonal voice	[PATIENT] – [PATIENT]

The Finnish nominative, as traditionally befits a case category denoted by that term, also functions as the case of the subject of intransitive verbs. With such verbs, generally speaking, it conveys the meaning [STATIVE]. Let us present some examples:

	<b>nominative</b>			
(109)	<i>Työkalu/∅</i> <i>tool-NOM SG</i>	<i>ol/i/∅</i> <i>be-PRAET-3 SG</i>	<i>laatiko/ssa.</i> <i>box-INESS</i>	
(110)	<i>Työkalut</i> <i>tool-NOM PL</i>	<i>ol/i/vat</i> <i>be-PRAET-3 PL</i>	<i>laatiko/ssa.</i> <i>box-INESS</i>	

- (109) ‘The tool was in the box.’  
(110) ‘The tools were in the box.’

The facts so far presented provide evidence of a certain regularity in Finnish. In combination with the active voice (unmarked diathesis), the nominative, a non-desinential case, conveys the meanings [AGENT] and [STATIVE]. The nominative is opposed to the accusative and partitive, which, as predominantly overtly desinential cases, convey the meaning [PATIENT]. These properties correspond fundamentally to those of so-called **accusative** languages (cf. Dixon 1994: 62–67). Let us summarize what has been said by means of the following scheme:

<b>nominative</b>		<b>accusative</b> <b>partitive</b>
-∅, -t	<b>active</b> <b>voice</b>	-n, -t      -a, -ä, (-∅, -t)    -ta, -tä, -tta, -ttä
[AGENT]	transitive verb	[PATIENT]
[STATIVE]	intransitive verb	

## 4.2. The absolutive

As has been discussed at length in the previous chapter concerning the cases of direct object, in Finnish the opposition between the subject and direct object is considerably neutralized. This is a direct consequence of the extensive syncretism between the nominative and accusative – the cases signaling those syntactic functions. The forms of the nominative of all declinable words, apart from seven exceptional pronouns, are homophonic with the forms of the accusative. Nevertheless, the analogous relation in the opposite direction does not hold. In the first mentioned word class there occur forms of the accusative singular which end in *-n*. These are not homophonic with the nominative. It is a feature of Finnish that the occurrence of the accusative ending in *-n* does not exclude the parallel occurrence, for the same nominal stem, of the accusative singular homophonic with the nominative (cf. the II accusative). The exception is, again, the seven pronouns. Apart from the adduced instances of heterophony between the manifestations of the subject (in the form of the nominative) and direct object (in the form of the accusative), the opposition between these categories is maintained most unquestionably by the other case of direct object – the partitive. The importance of the partitive in distinguishing the subject from the direct object, and consequently the nominative from the accusative, derives, as it turns out, from its phonetic properties. The forms of the partitive are never homophonic with the forms of the nominative.

However, this is only a half-truth about the Finnish language. The partitive also displays some troublesome behaviors which in a certain way invalidate what has just been said about it. In the sentence type for which Ikola (1954: 226) coined the term *eksistentiaalilauseet* ‘existential sentences’, it is combinable also with intransitive verbs, for example:

(111)	<i>Laatiko/ssa</i>	<i>ol/i/∅</i>	<table border="1" style="margin: 0 auto;"> <tr> <th style="padding: 2px 5px;">partitive</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;"><i>työkalu/j/a.</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;"><i>tool-PL-PART</i></td> </tr> </table>	partitive	<i>työkalu/j/a.</i>	<i>tool-PL-PART</i>
partitive						
<i>työkalu/j/a.</i>						
<i>tool-PL-PART</i>						
	<i>box-INESS</i>	<i>be-PRAET-3 SG</i>				

‘In the box there were (some) tools.’

Needless to say, of the two aforementioned syntactic categories – subject and direct object – it is rather the subject which is compatible with intransitive verbs.

The complications do not end there. In the analyzed sentence type the partitive enters into a semantic opposition of quite regular character with another mysterious case (cf. Itkonen T. 1953, Ikola 1962, Karlsson G. 1962), for example:

(112)	<i>Laatiko/ssa</i>	<i>ol/i/∅</i>	<i>box-INESS</i>	<i>be-PRAET-3 SG</i>	<b>nominative ~</b>
					<b>II accusative</b>
					<i>työkalu/t.</i>
					<i>tool-NOM PL ~</i>
					<i>tool-II ACC PL</i>

‘In the box there was a set of tools.’

As has already been anticipated in the glosses, the morphosyntactic properties of this case resemble those of the nominative, and at the same time, in spite of the use of an intransitive verb, those of the (II) accusative. Let us compare:

[ <i>Laatikossa oli</i> ]	<i>työkalu/j/a</i>	↔	<i>työkalu/t</i>
[ <i>Nähtiin</i> ]	<i>työkalu/j/a</i>	↔	<i>työkalu/t</i>

‘[In the box there were/was]	(some) tools	↔	a set of tools’
‘[One saw]	(some) tools	↔	all the tools’

The case forms marked by  $-\emptyset$  and  $-t$  have so far been classified as manifestations of two cases – the nominative and accusative. The nominative interpretation does not seem to have caused any great difficulties, at least in connection with the active voice. As far as the accusative interpretation is concerned, simplifying the presented argument, it can be said that such a classification is based on analogy with certain more univocal, non-syncretic forms. Let us compare:

<i>Isä/∅</i>	<i>kutsuttiin.</i>	‘One invited the father.’
<i>Häne/t</i>	<i>kutsuttiin.</i>	‘One invited him.’
<i>Kirja/∅</i>	<i>luettiin.</i>	‘One read the whole book.’
<i>Kirja/a</i>	<i>luettiin.</i>	‘One read/was reading a/the book.’

Extending the scope of inquiry to include the so-called existential sentences, the issue of the morphosyntactic status of the case forms marked by  $-\emptyset$  and  $-t$  becomes somewhat intricate, because the partitive – being the most infallible tool for distinguishing the subject (nominative) from the direct object (accusative) – appears (one would like to say regrettably) not to fulfill this distinctive function in such a context. At the same time, it is hardly convincing to attribute this situation to nominative-accusative syncretism of indissoluble character. The belonging of *isä* in *Isä kutsuttiin* or *kirja* from *Kirja luettiin* to both the accusative and nominative is not at

odds with the transitivity of the verb. The same certainly cannot be said about *työkalut* in (112) *Laatikossa oli työkalut*, where the verb is intransitive.

The specialist literature concerning the issue of so-called existential sentences is extremely extensive. The authors of the monumental work *The History of Linguistics in the Nordic Countries* (Hovdhaugen et al. 2000: 395) list research into this sentence type as one of the main interests of Finnish linguistics in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Different currents in the discussion have constantly revolved around one essential question:

What is the semantic difference between existential and non-existential sentences<sup>44</sup>?

Let us present, and at the same time supplement, the essential points of this discussion which are relevant to the category of case.

#### 4.2.1. The structure of the existential sentence

Many scholars seem to concur that, from the diachronic point of view, existential sentences represent an elliptic sentence type. Lauri Hakulinen (1979: 562) supposes that the word *väke/ä* in a sentence of the type:

(113) *Väke/ä*                    *tulee.*  
          *people-PART*

‘There are people coming.’

did not originally fulfill the function of subject. As befits a word marked by the ending of the ablative (cf. Uralic †*tA*-ablative), it functioned as an adverbial of place. Let us compare its reinforced contemporary counterpart:

(114) *Väe/stä*                    *päin*    *tulee.*  
          *people-ELAT*

‘(It) is coming from the people.’

The reinterpretation took place under the influence of the sentence type:

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. also the notion of *normaalilauseet* ‘normal sentences’ (Hakanen 1972: 36).



approach has not gained broad acceptance. Hakanen (1972) seems to take a hybrid position between the pro-subjective and pro-objective interpretation. In his view, the analyzed nominal constituents indeed fulfill the function of subject. However, they belong on one hand to the partitive, and on the other to the syncretic nominative-accusative. Terho Itkonen (1974: 386) does not univocally reject any of these possibilities. Auli Hakulinen (1983: 242–245) is prone to treat the words in question as belonging to the category of “non-prototypical subject”. Ojajärvi (1950: 130–132, 164–173), analyzing South Karelian dialects, notices the astonishing regularity of appearance of the singular partitive as the case of the subject of existential sentences, in opposition to other syntactic functions, in spite of the clear plural meaning, for example:

- (118) *Humalamies/tä tulou.*  
*drunkard-PART*

‘There come drunkards.’  
 (lit. ‘Of a drunkard it comes.’)

He concludes that this was the original state of affairs for all Balto-Finnic languages. As far as modern Finnish is concerned, Ojajärvi holds that speakers continue to perceive the singular partitive of an indivisible noun in this syntactical function as conveying plural meaning. Denison (1957: 255–256) evaluates Ojajärvi’s findings as an indication that “a feeling for the adverbial nature” of the subject of existential sentences must have long persisted in these dialects. In contemporary Finnish (and in all probability in Proto-Balto-Finnic) there is (was) no number congruence between the predicate and the adverbial. Fred Karlsson (1977: 371–372) announces that he has found quite a simple and natural answer to the question of why in the analyzed sentence type there is no concord between the alleged subject and predicate: it is because the speaker is not able to predict such concord in the regressive direction (predicate ← subject). I must admit that I do not share Karlsson’s enthusiasm as regards the simplicity and naturalness of his explanation. There is a whole range of Finnish sentences where prediction of the respective concord does occur in spite of its linearly regressive character. Let us compare:

- (119) *Laatikossa oli/vat* ← *kaikki/Ø työkalut.*  
*be-PRAET-3 PL*                      *all-NOM PL tools-NOM PL*

‘In the box there were all the tools.’

Why should only the existential sentences constitute an exception? Or, to put it another way, is their exceptional behavior not an indicator of some deeper divergence from the other sentence types than simply a reversed word order and absence of subject-predicate concord?

Because of the aforementioned structural incompatibilities of existential sentences with other sentence types, none of the above morphosyntactic interpretations of their nominal constituent seems entirely satisfactory. There can hardly be any doubt that the problem requires profound rethinking, an alternative approach from some other angle. In one of my articles (Bielecki 2012: 26), I expressed dissatisfaction with the descriptive status quo with regard to this phenomenon. I suggested that in order to describe it coherently, one would have to distinguish perhaps smaller syntactic categories than those considered traditionally. Fred Karlsson (1982a: 109) reasons in a similar way. However, his category of *jekti* ‘ject’ seems to be understood rather as a homonymic subject-direct object (*subjektin ja objektin oppositiovoimaltaan kumoutunut yhteisaine*), than as some other syntactic category opposed both to the subject and direct object on the same level of abstraction. This is not what I meant by ‘smaller syntactic category’. Here I would propose to rebuild the accessible conceptual framework in a different way, which seems to me to be more appropriate.

Some considerations that seem to go beyond the seemingly inadequate conceptual framework presented here have been made by Terho Itkonen (1974, 1975b, 1979), the author of insightful articles devoted to issues of ergativity in Finnish.

First of all, Itkonen evaluates the former diachronic approaches, which postulate the reinterpretation of an elliptic sentence type as non-elliptic, as simplistic and insufficiently systemic. He states that in the early phase of the Proto-Balto-Finnic period, intransitive verbs were combinable exclusively with the nominative. The development towards the contemporary position began only after the opposition between two cases of direct object had been established. One of the properties of human cognition is a strong inclination to polarize participants in various types of events or states according to the grade of their activity. Language tends to reflect this polarization, at least approximately, by means of different grammatical marking of the respective participant types. So, on one hand, within the unmarked diathesis the [AGENT] (active participant) was formally distinguished from the [PATIENT] (inactive participant) of the event. This was achieved in Finnish, as we know, by the use of the nominative as opposed to the accusative and especially the partitive. On the other hand, some inconsistency must still have been sensed. The [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] were marked differently, even though their status with respect to the activity was largely similar in many instances. This semantically unmotivated bifurcation in marking inactive participants occurred in particular in sentences containing homonymic transitive-intransitive verbs (e.g. *kasvaa* both ‘to bear (fruit)’ and ‘to

grow’). Itkonen’s concept regarding the initial phase of the reconstructed process, after the introduction of some necessary systematizations, can be presented as follows:

transitive verbs	intransitive verbs	
A	B	C
homonymic transitive-intransitive verbs		
[PATIENT] – rheme	[STATIVE] – rheme	[STATIVE] – theme
<p>†<i>Niitty kasvoi hyvä/n heinä/n.</i></p> <p>‘The meadow bore good-ACC hay-ACC.’</p> <p>†<i>Niitty kasvoi hyvä/ä heinä/ä.</i></p> <p>‘The meadow bore some good-PART hay-PART.’</p>	<p>†<i>Niityssä kasvoi hyvä/Ø heinä/Ø.</i></p> <p>‘On the meadow there grew good-NOM hay-NOM.’</p>	<p>†<i>Hyvä/Ø heinä/Ø kasvoi niityssä.</i></p> <p>‘The good-NOM hay-NOM grew on the meadow.’</p>
	<b>D</b>	<b>E</b>
		<p>†<i>Poja/t juoksivat pihalla.</i></p> <p>‘The boys-NOM were running in the yard.’</p>
		<b>F</b>
		<p>†<i>Tytöt/hymyilivät viidakossa.</i></p> <p>‘The girls-NOM were smiling in the jungle.’</p>

Under the influence of analogy with the transitive sentences (A) there emerged in the intransitive sentences (B) an innovation in the form of *Niityssä kasvoi hyvä/ä heinä/ä* ‘On the meadow there grew (some) good hay’, where to the word conveying the meaning [STATIVE] there was attached the ending of the partitive. The occurrence of the semantic-morphosyntactic proportionality of the type:

(*Niitty kasvoi*) *hyvä/n heinä/n* : (*Niitty kasvoi*) *hyvä/ä heinä/ä*  
 ::  
 (*Niityssä kasvoi*) *hyvä/Ø heinä/Ø* : (*Niityssä kasvoi*) *hyvä/ä heinä/ä*

changed the status of the former nominative, which began to be perceived as accusative (*hahmottui akkusatiiviksi*). At the same time, the partitive was accepted as a second case of subject (Itkonen T. 1975b: 37–40).

The described approximation of the formal encoding of [STATIVE] to the encoding of [PATIENT] took place, practically by definition, in connection with those intransitive verbs which warranted the inactivity of the [STATIVE]. In other words, not all Finnish intransitive verbs proved suitable for existential sentences. Airila (1924: 17–18) seems to have largely hit the nail on the head in the following passage:

*Mitä (...) predikaatin laatuun, tulee, niin näyttäisi, että predikaatin täytyy jättää subjektin epämääräisyys niin sanoakseni koskemattomaksi, se ei saa ilmaista subjektin toimintaa, tai mikä tai millainen se on. Siksi ne verbit, jotka tässä tulevat kysymykseen, merkitsevät, ainakin pääosaltaan, olemista, olemassa-oloa (olemaan tulemista, olemasta lakkaamista, olon muutosta). Niin pian kuin predikaatti ilmaisee subjektista enemmän, ja samalla kuin sen toiminnasta tai laadusta jotakin sanotaan, se siirtyy osittaisesta totaaliseksi. Predikaatin kautta tällöin ei enää ilmaista subjektia olevaksi, vaan edellytetään sen olemassa-oloa<sup>45</sup>.*

Because of the difficulties in describing this category in practice, as became apparent at further stages of research, Penttilä (1957: 623–627) took pains to enumerate the relevant verbs individually. According to Siro (1974), Penttilä’s list is not perfect, but its size allows one to formulate some generalizations. Existential sentences of the type (122) arise from the fusion of two sentences: (i) an existential matrix sentence of the type (120) and (ii) a non-existential embedded sentence of the type (121):

(120) *Poik/i/a*                    *on*                    *köysissä.*  
*boys-PART*

(121) *Poja/t*                    *heiluvat.*  
*boys-NOM*

(122) *Poik/i/a*                    *heiluu*                    *köysissä.*  
*boys-PART*

(120) ‘There are (some) boys on the lines.’

(121) ‘The boys are swinging.’

(122) ‘There are swinging (some) boys on the lines.’

<sup>45</sup> ‘As concerns the properties of the predicate, it turns out that the predicate has to leave the indefiniteness of the subject, so to speak, untouched, it cannot express the activity of the subject, or what it is or what it is like. Because of this, the verbs which come into consideration mean, at least roughly, being, existence (coming into being, ceasing of being, change of being). As soon as the predicate states more about the subject, and if at the same time there is said something about its action or properties, it switches from a partial to a total one. The predicate then no longer expresses the subject as being, but its existence is presupposed.’

The difficulties in distinguishing the verbs that are and are not suitable for existential sentences result from this two-layeredness. To put it another way, it is difficult to predict exactly which verb can be fused with the existential *olla* ‘to be’, because this property is relatively independent of its lexical meaning. Itkonen admits only that, after the establishment of the discussed proportionality between the manifestations of [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] with homonymic transitive-intransitive verbs, the described change later embraced intransitive verbs that did not have a transitive homonymic equivalent, subject to the condition that they were conceived as *epätoiminnallisia* ‘inactive’. It is interesting that, in spite of this more or less clear limitation, the class of relevant verbs came to include some intransitive verbs which are regarded rather as *toiminnallisia* ‘active’. One of these is *juosta* ‘to run’ (cf. *Pihalla juoksi poikia*). According to Schlachter (1958: 66–68), the meaning of such verbs in this context seems to undergo a kind of deactivation. The preserved sentences of the type *Pojat juoksivat pihalla* – with nominative subject – are conceived as expressing the action of active conscious runners, each of them running volitionally on his own, as though distributively. In turn, innovative sentences of the type *Pihalla juoksi poikia* – with partitive subject – express running in the yard accomplished by a collective runner with backgrounded volitionality. It is as though one wishes to say: ‘There was running of boys in the yard’, ‘It teemed with running boys in the yard’. According to Göran Karlsson (1963: 41–42), in the case of such sentences there comes into play only the meaning ‘collectivity’ whose different interpretation is allowed by the lexical meaning of the verb. The running of boys is always active in the same way. Huumo (2003) does not reject the essence of Schlachter’s ideas. In his view, however, only by expanding such simple constructions as those above with appropriate adverbials is it possible to demonstrate the occurrence of the postulated meanings. For example, from the sentence:

- (123) *Lapse/t*                      *leikkivät pihalla*              [*koko päivän*].  
*children-NOM*

‘The children played in the yard [the whole day].’

it is inferred that a set of specific children played in the yard the whole day. In turn, from the sentence:

- (124) *Laps/i/a*                      *leikki pihalla*              [*koko päivän*].  
*children-PART*

‘There were children playing in the yard [the whole day].’

it is implied only that the yard had some children playing in it in the given period of time. The children playing at the end of the day do not have to be the same children who were playing there in the morning. In sentences of the type *Lapset leikkivät pihalla*, *Lapsia leikki pihalla* these semantic distinctions remain latent. The latter sentences differ from each other only from the quantitative point of view. Tiainen (1997: 568) ascertains that this state of affairs results from the grammaticalization of the analyzed sentence type. Henceforth such sentences served to present events from a specific de-agentive point of view, relatively independently from what is called the lexical meaning of the verb. Notwithstanding, not all intransitive verbs are admissible in existential sentences, even in such a deactivated meaning. For example, in the case of *hymyillä* 'to smile' such a use turns out to be incorrect for some reason (cf. \**Viidakossa hymyili tyttöjä*) (Itkonen T. 1975a: 18–20, 1975b: 40).

The subtext of all these deliberations seems to be that it is much more difficult to draw a boundary between the classes of verbs that can and cannot be used in existential sentences than between any other verb classes, especially from the point of view of other languages. In my view, any excessive attachment to the semantics of one language can be misleading when analyzing the semantics of some other language. Why should the Finnish existential and non-existential verbs constitute any exception in this regard? At further stages of the discussion, the matter of the semantics of the Finnish non-existential and existential verbs will not be the subject of our inquiry, because such problems, as has already been emphasized, belong to the lexicology of the Finnish verb rather than to the Case Grammar, which is interested only in the classification of verbs to enable the formulation of case-government regularities.

The spreading of the innovation discussed above seems to have been driven not only by factors of a lexical nature referring to the level of activity of the relevant participants, as have been considered so far. A role also seems to have been played by structural factors, such as similarity of the informational structure. The morphosyntactic encoding of [STATIVE] was approximated to the encoding of [PATIENT] only in the rhematic position. Let us compare:

<b>theme</b>	<b>rheme</b>	<b>theme</b>	<b>rheme</b>
(A) <i>Niitty</i> // <i>kasvoi hyvän heinän.</i>		(B) <i>Niityssä</i> // <i>kasvoi hyvä heinä.</i>	
	↓		↓
<i>Niitty</i> // <i>kasvoi hyvää heinää.</i>		<i>Niityssä</i> // <i>kasvoi hyvää heinää.</i>	

Sentences not fitting this model were not embraced by the change:

<b>theme</b>	<b>rheme</b>
(C) <i>Hyvä heinä</i> // <i>kasvoi niityssä.</i>	
↑	
*	

It is worth citing the arguments advanced by Ikola (1955: 321–322) in attempting to capture the nuances of the meaning of Finnish existential and non-existential sentences and of their informational structure. In his view, existence can be thought of generally, without taking into consideration any limited location – implicitly ‘in the whole universe’ – for example:

- (125) *Ihmisi/i*      *ei silloin vielä ollut.*  
*people-PART*

‘There were then no people yet.’

It can also be thought of from a narrower point of view. In place of the universe there is then introduced a limited location from which the situation is being observed. A sentence of the type:

- (126) *Kattilassa on*      *vet/tä.*  
*water-PART*

‘In the kettle there is (some) water.’

expresses the existence of the water solely from the point of view of the kettle. The existence of the portion of water is not presupposed without the kettle. One does not assume that it would exist at any rate. One could suppose that the same portion of water in another situation would be steam, for example. However, this sentence does not say anything about these other possibilities. A negative non-existential sentence of the type:

- (127) *Kirkko/Ø*      *ei näy tänne.*  
*church-NOM*

‘The church is not seen here.’

implies that the said church exists, and expresses the location of its ‘not being seen’. In turn, a negative existential sentence of the type:

- (128) *Kirkko/a*      *ei näy tänne.*  
*church-PART*

‘There is no church seen here.’

does not say anything about the existence of the church, which may not exist at all. Penttilä (1956a: 40–48, 1956b: 360–362) criticized this refined understanding of the meaning of the two sentence types. In his view, both the non-existential sentence (129) and the existential sentence (130) presuppose the existence of ‘our disciples’:

(129) *Oppilaa/Ø/mme*                    *erehtyivät opettajainhuoneeseen.*  
*disciples-NOM PL-1 PL*

(130) *Oppila/i/ta/mme*                    *erehtyi opettajainhuoneeseen.*  
*disciples-PL-PART-1 PL*

(129) ‘Our disciples got into the staffroom by mistake.’

(130) ‘There got into the staffroom (some of) our disciples.’

The semantic difference consists in the fact that (129) *Oppilaamme erehtyivät opettajainhuoneeseen* refers to the whole group of our disciples, whereas (130) *Oppilaitamme erehtyi opettajainhuoneeseen*, refers only to a part of that group. Ikola’s response (1956: 340–345) to this objection was even more subtle. Of course, one presupposes that there are disciples (and anything else) in the universe, but a sentence of the type (130) *Oppilaitamme erehtyi opettajainhuoneeseen* does not presuppose the existence of these disciples. It is possible that the speaker had so many disciples that he did not know about the existence of the disciples who got into the staffroom by mistake. The sentence informs us about the existence of such disciples. The fact that there is a group which we can call ‘our disciples’ does not imply how big that group is or who belongs to it. It may contain individuals whose existence in the given arrangement of things is not presupposed, although the existence of the group itself is presupposed. This makes possible the use of the so-called existential sentence. In a subsequent article, Ikola (1957: 293–294) goes even further. In spite of the fact that the sentence:

(131) *Ei tullut enää*                    *Anna/a.*  
*Anna-PART*

‘There came no Anna anymore.’

with partitive subject implies Anna’s existence generally, it cannot be classified as predicating the existence of Anna (or rather her non-existence) because her current existence is not presupposed. The sentence leaves this possibility open. It is possible that she is dead at the time in question. Huumo and Perko (1993: 382) substantiate this with reference to the fact that ‘referential definiteness’ does not exclude ‘rela-

tional indefiniteness'. In other words, existential sentences can paradoxically inform us about the existence of the (already) known referent, in so far as they provide new information about its existence from the point of view of some place.

By leaving aside who is right and wrong in this dispute, which tends to border on scholastic hairsplitting, I would like to turn attention to a dangerous inclination concerning the opposing of the informational structure of existential and non-existential sentences (cf. also Karlsson F. 1978). In reading the Finnish linguistic literature, one can get the impression that this opposition is so sharp that the subject of the non-existential sentence belongs exclusively to the theme of the sentence. Putting it in a more mundane way; since the verb *hymyllä* 'to smile' does not occur in existential sentences (cf. *Tytöt hymyilivät* vs. \**Tyttöjä hymyili*), is it impossible to utter a Finnish sentence which would inform the listener who is smiling? Does the Finnish speaker always have to know, for example, how big is the group of smiling girls, and who belongs to it?

In consequence of the process described by Itkonen, the nominative has not been deprived of its function of subject of intransitive verbs. On the contrary, it can still fulfill this function in combination with all intransitive verbs in contemporary Finnish. The same certainly cannot be said about the partitive and the other case (nominative ~ II accusative) in existential sentences (Itkonen T. 1975b: 41). Let us summarize the final stage of the described process by means of the following scheme (the newly introduced semantic-morphosyntactic formations are marked with ↓↓):

transitive verbs	intransitive verbs	
A	B	C
[PATIENT] – rheme	[STATIVE] – rheme	[STATIVE] – theme
<i>Niitty kasvoi hyvä/n heinä/n.</i>	<i>Niityssä kasvoi hyvä/Ø heinä/Ø.</i>	<i>Hyvä/Ø heinä/Ø kasvoi niityssä.</i>
'The meadow bore the whole good-ACC hay-ACC.'	'In the meadow there grew the whole good-NOM~ACC hay-NOM~ACC.'	'The good-NOM hay-NOM grew on the meadow.'
	↓↓	
<i>Niitty kasvoi hyvä/ä heinä/ä.</i>	<i>Niityssä kasvoi hyvä/ä heinä/ä.</i>	
'The meadow bore (some) good-PART hay-PART.'	'In the meadow there grew (some) good-PART hay-PART.'	
	D	E
		<i>Poja/t juoksivat pihalla.</i>
		'The boys-NOM were running in the yard.'


transitive verbs	intransitive verbs	
A	B	C
[PATIENT] – rheme	[STATIVE] – rheme	[STATIVE] – theme
	↓ <i>Pihalla juoksi poik/i/a.</i> ‘There was running of boys-PART in the yard.’	
		F
		<i>Tytöt hymyilivät viidakossa.</i> ‘The girls-NOM were smiling in the jungle.’

#### 4.2.2. The ergative subsystem

The situation where [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] are neutralized with unmarked diathesis in the absolutive case, in opposition to the [AGENT] manifested by means of the ergative case, is a feature of so-called **ergative** languages (cf. Dixon 1994: 58–62). If we take into account only the contrastive case marking of the [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] and the case marking of the [AGENT] in connection with the unmarked diathesis, then Finnish – as is implied by the facts presented – indeed displays some clear systemic features of an ergative language. Terho Itkonen (1979: 84) emphasizes, however, that the relevant system of case marking differs from that of a typical ergative language. In Finnish, in connection with the unmarked diathesis, it is the [AGENT] which is expressed by means of a non-desinential case (nominative). In a typical ergative language, in such a context the [AGENT] is expressed by an ergative which is desinential. In turn, the [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] are marked in Finnish by cases of which one is univocally desinential (partitive). In a typical ergative language the [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] are marked by the absolutive, which is non-desinential. Because of this, Itkonen decides to call the phenomenon found in Finnish **inverted ergativity**.

The coexistence of accusative and ergative systems (consequently: subsystems) in one language is usually referred to as ‘split ergativity’. Roughly speaking, this phenomenon consists in selective, accusative or ergative, case marking of relevant event participants in different sentence types. In the case of accusative marking, in connection with the unmarked diathesis the [AGENT] and [STATIVE] are marked by the nominative. The [PATIENT] is marked in such a context by the accusative. In the case of ergative marking, the [AGENT] is marked by the ergative. The [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] are marked by the absolutive. Of course, between these four (theoretical)

cases – nominative, accusative, ergative and absolutive – there can occur different types of language-specific, more or less extensive, phonetic neutralizations. Nevertheless, what is characteristic of languages with split ergativity generally is the far-reaching syntactic similarity (if not identity) of the [AGENT] and [STATIVE] in the accusative subsystem on one hand and the [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] in the ergative subsystem on the other. The words conveying these meanings fulfill the function of subject (cf. the notion of ‘pivot’) and are opposed to the words conveying the remaining meanings – that of [PATIENT] fulfilling the function of direct object in the accusative subsystem, and that of [AGENT] fulfilling the function of adverbial in the ergative subsystem (cf. Dixon 1994: 70–110). Let us depict what has been said by means of the following scheme:



In Finnish, the postulated coexistence of accusative and ergative subsystems seems to be of a conspicuously different nature. In the accusative subsystem, the pivotal event participants – [AGENT] and [STATIVE] – are marked by the nominative. The non-pivotal event participant – [PATIENT] – is marked by the accusative and partitive. In turn, in the ergative subsystem the pivotal event participants – [PATIENT] and [STATIVE] – are marked by case forms which in the accusative subsystem serve as markers of both non-pivotal and pivotal participants (first the partitive, and then the nominative ~ II accusative). This gives the impression of the discussed merger of the categories of subject and direct object. The non-pivotal event participant – [AGENT] – undergoes lexicalization in the form of the genitive, which fulfills an adverbial function only in some individual necessitative infinitival constructions, for example:

- (132) *Minu/n pitää kutsua isä/Ø.*  
 [AGENT] [PATIENT]  
 I-GEN


‘I have to invite the father.’

more literally:

‘The father has to be invited by me.’

‘It has fallen to me to invite the father.’

One can say somewhat metaphorically that because of these features, there remains little or simply nothing to distinguish the Finnish ergative subsystem positively from the accusative subsystem. The Finnish ergative subsystem has not produced its specific signifiers, which makes it difficult to shed light on it. The subject in the ergative (sub)system is marked by the **absolutive**. In Finnish the partitive and nominative ~ II accusative in so-called existential sentences have been reinterpreted as the absolutive case. Let us depict the idea of the split ergativity of Finnish by means of the following scheme:



It is now time to address the questions posed concerning the morphosyntactic structure of the sentence type exemplified by (111) *Laatikossa oli työkaluja* and (112) *Laatikossa oli työkalut*.

The first question concerned the subject. This syntactic function is fulfilled by words of the type *työkaluja* and *työkalut*. These words belong to the absolute case, which is the subject case in the ergative (sub)system.

The second question concerned the lack of concord with respect to number (and person) between the subject and the predicate. This lack of concord is an illusion, a kind of misunderstanding, whose source lies in considering the forms *työkaluja*, *työkalut* from the point of view of the accusative subsystem. The sentences (111) *Laatikossa oli työkaluja*, (112) *Laatikossa oli työkalut* follow the ergative scheme, and it is only from that point of view that their morphosyntactic structure can reasonably be considered.

I postulate that, probably because of the relatively young age of the ergative subsystem, the Finnish absolute is of **defective** character. First of all, its forms belong only to the singular number. Therefore, from the point of view of the ergative subsystem, between the subject and predicate in sentences of the type (111) *Laatikossa oli työkaluja*, (112) *Laatikossa oli työkalut* there occurs congruence with respect to number. Of course, the words *työkaluja*, *työkalut* belong at the same time to the plural number. However, in the ergative subsystem their plurality is of no relevance, as if it were only a lexical or word-derivational feature (cf. plural *työkalut* ‘tools’ with collective singular *työkalusto* ‘equipment’).

The worthlessness of the accusative scheme becomes especially apparent when analyzing sentences of the type:

- (133) *Sinu/lla*      *on*    *minu/t*.  
          *you-ADESS*        *I-ACC*

‘You have me.’

more literally:

‘On you there is me.’

As can be inferred, the identification of the subject in the above example is made difficult by the fact that it has no nominal constituent resembling the nominative. The form *minut* ‘me’ seems to belong univocally to the accusative case. Finnish scholars have given different explanations for this phenomenon. Ikola (1954: 213–214) considers sentences of the type (133) *Sinulla on minut* to be an exception, a *constructio ad sensum* where possession is conceived of as an action and the property as the goal of this action. Siro (1960: 46–47) writes that the semantic nature of the relation between the subject and predicate in such sentences largely resembles that between the direct object and predicate. In this light it is “almost expected” (*melkein odotuksennemukainen*) that the personal pronouns take the accusative forms.

Ravila (1944: 125, footnote 1) sees it as a contamination by sentences with transitive verbs such as *saada* ‘to obtain’. According to Hakulinen and Karlsson (1975: 352–353), it is significant that the pronouns in the discussed sentence type are marked only as “non-nominative” (*ei-nominatiivi*). Otherwise, the rule of verb person congruence would cause confusion with sentences of the type:

- (134) *Minä/Ø olen sinu/lla.*  
 I-NOM                      you-ADESS

‘I am at your place.’

expressing purely spatial relations. Helasvuo (1996: 349) does not sympathize with either the pro-subjective or the pro-objective approach, limiting herself to the statement that the relevant sentence type is marginal.

In summary, all of the above-mentioned approaches avoid, in one way or another, giving any indication of how the relevant sentences have been morphosyntactically reinterpreted from the point of view of the contemporary synchronic state of the Finnish language.

My interpretation of the form *minut* ‘me’ is bicasal. Within the accusative subsystem it belongs to the accusative. It also belongs to the 1<sup>st</sup> person and singular number. Within the ergative subsystem it belongs to the absolutive. The absolutive is to be conceived of as defective not only with respect to number, but also with respect to person. The form *minut* ‘me’ belongs in the ergative subsystem to the 3<sup>rd</sup> person (*oli – minut*). Its belonging to the 1<sup>st</sup> person in the accusative subsystem is of no relevance for the ergative subsystem.

I am aware that a conceptual framework operating with the absolutive case may seem iconoclastic. Nevertheless, it simply infers a necessary conclusion from the approach of Itkonen, who in my view implicitly postulated the concept of the absolutive. The forms of the partitive and of the nominative ~ II accusative reinterpreted as absolutive in the ergative subsystem stand in the relation of weaker morphological case variation (cf. section 2.5.1).

Let us also summarize the diathetically relevant meanings of the absolutive. The absolutive seems to be less polysemic than the nominative, conveying the meanings [STATIVE] and [PATIENT]. The contextual meaning of the absolutive depends upon one factor – the transitivity of the verb:

- (i) intransitive verb → [STATIVE];  
 (ii) transitive verb → [PATIENT] (cf. (132) *Minun pitää kutsua isä*).

### 4.3. The nominative-absolutive opposition

Discussion of the meanings signified by the cases of subject is – as with the cases of direct object – contaminated to a considerable degree by the “partiality syndrome”. As has already been mentioned, this syndrome consists in detecting the meaning [PART OF SOMETHING] in every manifestation of the partitive, and *mutatis mutandis*, the meaning [TOTALITY OF SOMETHING] in every manifestation of the accusative and nominative case forms (cf. Vähämäki 1984: 26).

Setälä (1952: 10–12) speaks about the ‘total subject’ (*totaalinen subjekti*) and ‘partial subject’ (*partiaalinen subjekti*), and formulates three rules governing the choice of case of the subject:

- (i) According to the first rule, the choice of the case of the subject depends upon the properties of the subject itself (*subjektin oma laatu*). The fact that one is speaking about the whole referent of the subject or its determinate part implies the use of the nominative, e.g. *Ruoka/Ø on pöydällä* ‘(All) the food-NOM (in question) is on the table’. The fact that one is speaking about an indeterminate part of the referent of the subject implies the use of the partitive, e.g. *Ruoka/a on pöydällä* ‘(Some) food-PART(=ABS) is on the table’.
- (ii) According to the second rule, the choice of the case of the subject depends upon the properties of the predicate (*predikaatin laatu*). The non-existential character of the verb (cf. Airila’s description) implies the use of the nominative, e.g. *Miehe/t hakkaavat pihalla puita* ‘The men-NOM are cutting trees in the yard’, *Koulu/t ovat hyödyllisiä* ‘The schools-NOM are useful’. The existential character of the verb allows the use of the partitive as well as the nominative, e.g. *Tyttö/j/ä on tuvassa* ‘There are (some) girls-PART(=ABS) in the chamber’.
- (iii) According to the third rule, the choice of the case of the subject depends upon the negative or affirmative content of the sentence (*lauseen kieltävä tai myöntävä sisällys*). With the verbs *olla* ‘to be’, *näkyä* ‘to be seen’, *kuulua* ‘to be heard’ (and a few others) the subject can be marked by the endings of the partitive as well as the nominative, e.g. *Tässä kylässä ei ole suutari/a* ‘In this village there is no shoemaker-PART(=ABS)’ vs. *Suutari/Ø ei ole tässä kylässä* ‘The shoemaker-NOM is not in this village’.

Siro’s approach (1957: 189) seems to be more homogeneous only in as much as it refers to divisible nouns, disregarding the semantic nature of the case alternation of indivisible nouns (cf. *suutari* : *suutaria*). In such a situation, the choice of the case of subject is governed by a combination of meanings belonging to the dimensions of:

- (i) {quantitative definiteness} (*kvantitatiivinen spesies*); and
- (ii) {notional definiteness} (*notiivinen spesies*).

*Kvantitatiivinen spesies*, as the name indicates, refers to quantitative relations. *Notiivinen spesies* (alternatively *tuttuusominaisuus* ‘familiarity feature’) can be compared with traditional definiteness, expressed in English, for example, by means of appropriate articles (*the – a*). Both dimensions contain the appropriate definite ([+DEFINITE]) and indefinite meaning ([–DEFINITE]):

		{quantitative definiteness}	
		[+DEFINITE]	[–DEFINITE]
{notional definiteness}	[+DEFINITE]	A	C
		NOM (ABS=) NOM~II ACC	(ABS=) PART
	[–DEFINITE]	B	D
		(ABS=) NOM~II ACC	(ABS=) PART

Let us compare the following sentences:

- (135) *Pojat juoksevat pihalla.*  
‘The boys are running in the yard.’
- (136) *Pihalla juoksevat Niemelän lapset.*  
‘In the yard there are running Niemelä’s children.’
- (137) *Pojalta kuoli vanhemmat.*  
‘On the boy there died (simultaneously) the parents.’
- (138) *Suomessa on kylmät talvet.*  
‘In Finland there are (successively) cold winters.’
- (139) *Vettä on kattilassa.*  
‘(Some) water is in the kettle.’
- (140) *Tämän sarjan osia on sitojalla.*  
‘(Some) parts of this series are in the bookbindery.’
- (141) *Pihalla juoksee poikia.*  
‘In the yard there are (some) running boys.’


Combination A usually characterizes sentences following the accusative scheme: (135) and (136). This combination possibly also characterizes some sentences fol-

lowing the ergative scheme: (137). The remaining three combinations seem to characterize only sentences following the ergative scheme: combination B (138), combination C (139) and (140), and combination D (141).


Vähämäki (1984: 28–29) argues that not all of the combinations distinguished by Siro are tenable. In his view, the notions *notiivinen spesies* and *kvantitatiivinen spesies* correspond to two criteria employed in defining sets. *Notiivinen spesies* refers to the ‘equality’ of sets, that is, to the fact that they contain the same members. *Kvantitatiivinen spesies* refers to the ‘equivalency’ of sets, that is, to the fact that they contain the same number of members. Two ‘equal’ sets must be ‘equivalent’, but not vice versa. Therefore, notional definiteness, by implying quantitative definiteness, is incompatible with quantitative indefiniteness. Sentences of the type C (139) *Vettä on kattilassa* convey the meanings of quantitative and notional indefiniteness. Chesterman (1991: 156) ascertains that the combination C is tenable only under the condition that the two types of definiteness refer to different things. With a phrase of the type (140) *tämän sarjan osia* ‘(some) parts of this series’, the listener is assumed to know which set the parts in question belong to, but cannot identify those parts within this set. The combination B (notionally [–DEFINITE] + quantitatively [+DEFINITE]) seemed dubious to other linguists. Penttilä (1955: 151–153) links both dimensions, reaching the conclusion that the relevant meaning should be described as [HALF-DEFINITE] (*puolidefiniittinen*). In turn, Terho Itkonen (1980: 33) states that the dimension of {quantification} is irrelevant to the analyzed instance just as it is in reference to singular countable nouns. The nominative ~ II accusative reinterpreted as absolutive conveys the meaning [INDIVISIBLE ENTIRETY] (*jaoton kokonaisuus*).

Leaving aside the question of which approach is more appropriate, at this stage one thing can be said about all of them with certainty: the exemplifications used are heterogeneous to such an extent that, in fact, it makes sense to speak about any kind of meanings or lack of them only in reference to the entire sentences. The role of the cases of subject in conveying the target meanings remains unclear. In my opinion, analogously to the cases of direct object, the sought formal-syntactic-semantic regularities can be identified only by reducing all contexts in which the cases of subject occur to contexts which are absolutely minimal, that is, to contexts in which the target meaning(s) is (are) conveyed exclusively by the case forms, without additional co-significators. Neither the deletion of the disambiguating attributes such as *Niemelän* in (136) *Niemelän lapset* or *tämän sarjan* in (140) *tämän sarjan osia* nor the disregarding of the influence of the semantics of supralexonal units (cf. (137) *POIKA – VANHEMMAT* ‘boy – parents’) seems to be sufficient. The postulated reduction must also concern the variability in the framework of the theme-rheme structure of the sentence, all the more so because this structure seems to be linked in some way with the occurrence of the

appropriate case of subject (cf. also Nemvalts 1976: 411–412). The theme tends to be unstressed and put at the beginning of the sentence. The rheme tends to be stressed and put at the end of the sentence. Let us begin by considering the following sentences, which represent the most typical sentence types, unmarked in terms of word order and sentential stress, following the accusative and ergative scheme:



- (110) ‘The tools were in the box.’  
 (111) ‘In the box there were (some) tools.’  
 (112) ‘In the box there was a set of tools.’



- (142) ‘The water poured into the bottle.’  
 (143) ‘Into the bottle there poured (some) water.’  
 (144) ‘Into the bottle there poured an appropriate portion of water.’

Comparison of the pertinent sentence types ((110) vs. (111–112) and (142) vs. (143–144)) gives the impression that the signifier of the relevant meaning(s) entails:

- (i) case markers;
- (ii) verb endings;
- (iii) word order; and
- (iv) sentential stress.

In order to identify the desired formal-syntactic-semantic regularities, let us compare the following variations of the sentences (110–112) and (142–144) from the point of view of word order (column A), sentential stress (column B), and both word order and sentential stress (column C):

	word order variation	sentential stress variation	word order and sentential stress variation
	A	B	C
(110) <i>Työkalut olivat •laatikossa.</i>	–	• <i>Työkalut olivat laatikossa.</i>	<i>Laatikossa olivat •työkalut.</i>
(111) <i>Laatikossa oli •työkaluja.</i>	• <i>Työkaluja oli laatikossa.</i>	• <i>Laatikossa oli työkaluja.</i>	<i>Työkaluja oli •laatikossa.</i>
(112) <i>Laatikossa oli •työkalut.</i>	– <sup>46</sup>	–	–
(142) <i>Vesi valui •pulloon.</i>	• <i>Pulloon valui vesi.</i>	• <i>Vesi valui pulloon.</i>	<i>Pulloon valui •vesi.</i>
(143) <i>Pulloon valui •vettä.</i>	• <i>Vettä valui pulloon.</i>	• <i>Pulloon valui vettä.</i>	<i>Vettä valui •pulloon.</i>
(144) <i>Pulloon valui •vesi.</i>	• <i>Vesi valui pulloon.</i>	• <i>Pulloon valui vesi.</i>	<i>Vesi valui •pulloon.</i>

The following schemes exhibit pairs of sentences following the accusative scheme, containing the nominative, and those following the ergative scheme, containing the absolutive, where the role of the variable ‘word order and/or sentential stress’ has been eliminated by choosing sentences which do not differ from each

<sup>46</sup> Word order variation in sentences of the type (112) *Laatikossa oli •työkalut* seems to be admissible only in: (i) interrogative sentences, e.g. *Kuinka suuret vahingot tulipalosta aiheutui?* ‘How much damage resulted from the fire?’ and (ii) exclamatory sentences, e.g. *Miten ihanat näköalat meille avautuikaan!* ‘What marvellous views opened up to us at all!’. This results from the more general fact that the Finnish interrogative word (*kuinka, miten*) can occur only at the beginning of the sentence. In declarative sentences such a word order seems to be admissible only when the subject obtains a particular emphasis, e.g. *Vieläkö reppuun mahtuu saappaat?* – *No saappaat siihen ehkä vielä voi mahtua* ‘Will a pair of boots still fit in the bag? – Well, a pair of boots will maybe still fit in it’ (Karlsson G. 1962: 210–211; the original spacing of the singular verb forms has been removed). However, from the point of view of the present work, the above sentence types are of no relevance because of their extensive formal heterogeneity with the minimal case syntagms.

other in those respects. Scheme A contains sentences with the absolutive homophonic with the partitive, while scheme B contains sentences with the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative:

<b>A</b>	(110) <i>Työkalut</i> <i>olivat</i> • <i>laatikossa.</i>	–	(110B) • <i>Työkalut</i> <i>olivat</i> <i>laatikossa.</i>	(110C) <i>Laatikossa</i> <i>olivat</i> • <i>työkalut.</i>
	(111C) <i>Työkaluja</i> <i>oli</i> • <i>laatikossa.</i>	(111B) • <i>Laatikossa</i> <i>oli</i> <i>työkaluja.</i>	(111A) • <i>Työkaluja</i> <i>oli</i> <i>laatikossa.</i>	(111) <i>Laatikossa</i> <i>oli</i> • <i>työkaluja.</i>
(142) <i>Vesi</i> <i>valui</i> • <i>pulloon.</i>	(142A) • <i>Pulloon</i> <i>valui</i> <i>vesi.</i>	(142B) • <i>Vesi</i> <i>valui</i> <i>pulloon.</i>	(142C) <i>Pulloon</i> <i>valui</i> • <i>vesi.</i>	
(143C) <i>Vettä</i> <i>valui</i> • <i>pulloon.</i>	(143B) • <i>Pulloon</i> <i>valui</i> <i>vettä.</i>	(143A) • <i>Vettä</i> <i>valui</i> <i>pulloon.</i>	(143) <i>Pulloon</i> <i>valui</i> • <i>vettä.</i>	
<b>B</b>	(110) <i>Työkalut</i> <i>olivat</i> • <i>laatikossa.</i>	–	(110B) • <i>Työkalut</i> <i>olivat</i> <i>laatikossa.</i>	(110C) <i>Laatikossa</i> <i>olivat</i> • <i>työkalut.</i>
	–	–	–	(112) <i>Laatikossa</i> <i>oli</i> • <i>työkalut.</i>
(142) <i>Vesi</i> <i>valui</i> • <i>pulloon.</i>	(142A) • <i>Pulloon</i> <i>valui</i> <i>vesi.</i>	(142B) • <i>Vesi</i> <i>valui</i> <i>pulloon.</i>	(142C) <i>Pulloon</i> <i>valui</i> • <i>vesi.</i>	
(144C) <i>Vesi</i> <i>valui</i> • <i>pulloon.</i>	(144B) • <i>Pulloon</i> <i>valui</i> <i>vesi.</i>	(144A) • <i>Vesi</i> <i>valui</i> <i>pulloon.</i>	(144) <i>Pulloon</i> <i>valui</i> • <i>vesi.</i>	

The only sentences which satisfy the requirements imposed on the sought diacritic pairs of minimal case syntagms in the above schemes are the following:

- (i) (142) vs. (143C) (*Vesi valui •pulloon* vs. *Vettä valui •pulloon*), (142A) vs. (143B) (*•Pulloon valui vesi* vs. *•Pulloon valui vettä*), (142B) vs. (143A) (*•Vesi valui pulloon* vs. *•Vettä valui puloon*) and (142C) vs. (143) (*Pulloon valui •vesi* vs. *Pulloon valui •vettä*);
- (ii) (142) vs. (144C) (*Vesi valui •pulloon* vs. *Vesi valui •pulloon*), (142A) vs. (144B) (*•Pulloon valui vesi* vs. *•Pulloon valui vesi*), (142B) vs. (144A) (*•Vesi valui pulloon* vs. *•Vesi valui pulloon*) and (142C) vs. (144) (*Pulloon valui •vesi* vs. *Pulloon valui •vesi*); and
- (iii) (111) vs. (112) (*Laatikossa oli •työkaluja* vs. *Laatikossa oli •työkälu*).

On this basis it is possible to infer the following conclusion:

As far as the Finnish cases of subject are concerned, the relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition (cf. Re 2 in 2.2) exists only between:

- (i) in the case of singular nouns, the nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the partitive;
- (ii) in the case of both singular and plural nouns, the absolutive homophonic with the partitive and the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative.

The nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative do not stand in this kind of relation of case opposition. Sentences of the type (142) vs. (144C) (*Vesi valui •pulloon* vs. *Vesi valui •pulloon* etc.) are of practically no use for any paradigmatic comparison aimed at displaying the discussed type of case opposition between the nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative. In all relevant sentences the two cases seem to be indissolubly syncretic. The only sentence type in which this syncretism undergoes dissolution in favor of the appropriate manifestation of the absolutive case is (112) *Laatikossa oli •työkälu*. Nevertheless, this does not seem to constitute the desired type of diacritic pair of minimal case syntagms with its counterpart containing the nominative ((110C) *Laatikossa olivat •työkälu*) (cf. the verb forms *oli* vs. *olivat*).

Let us discuss first the opposition within the absolutive case, as this seems to be much more tangible.

#### 4.3.1. The opposition within the absolutive

At first glance, the identification of the meaning(s) of the partitive reinterpreted as absolutive in the case of nouns susceptible to quantification does not present any

difficulties. It can be captured simply by means of the notation [+/-TOTAL]. In turn, the description of the relevant meaning of the nominative ~ II accusative reinterpreted as absolutive turns out to be much more problematic.

The meaning of the accusative – as opposed to the partitive used with transitive verbs – has been described by means of the notation [+TOTAL]. By sentences of the type (81c) *Luin kirjat* or (82a) *Join veden*, one means all the books or the whole water. With sentences of the type (81d) *Luin kirjoja* or (82b) *Join vettä*, it is irrelevant whether one is speaking about all the books or the whole water or only about some books or some water. Of course, the application of sentences of the type (81c) *Luin kirjat* or (82a) *Join veden* is not limited to such extreme situations where one refers to all the books or water in the universe. The totality can be (and is) in practice relativized to the totality of the previously spoken about, even if it is more than clear that only a part of all the books or the whole water as such comes into question. Sentences of the type (112) *Laatikossa oli työkalut* or (144) *Pulloon valui vesi* cannot refer to even this contractual totality of tools or water, because the specific theme-rheme structure of these sentences excludes such a possibility. As has been mentioned, Penttilä tried to capture the relevant meaning by means of the notion [HALF-DEFINITE]. In turn, Terho Itkonen used the notion [INDIVISIBLE ENTIRETY]. Matti Sadeniemi (1955: 14–16) added the remark that this kind of indivisibility may result from the rigid relation between the location and the subject contained in it. *Lehdet* ‘leaves’ in the sentence following the ergative scheme:

- (145) *Koivussa on jo iso/t lehde/t.*  
*big-ABS leaves-ABS*

‘In the birch there are already big leaves.’

means the ‘whole leafage falling to one birch’. Otherwise *lehdet* refers to a entirety which is divisible (cf. also Ahlman 1928: 135–136, Nemvalts 1996: 113–121).

In my view, all of the approaches presented share one disadvantage: they describe the meaning(s) of both manifestations of the absolutive case with reference to different semantic dimensions – {quantification} vs. {divisibility} vs. {definiteness}. In order to avoid such heterogeneity, I would take the bold step of considering only the dimension of {quantification}. The unmarked member of the opposition (the absolutive homophonous with the partitive) conveys the meaning [+/-TOTAL]. The marked member of the opposition (the absolutive homophonous with the nominative ~ II accusative) conveys the meaning [+TOTAL]. Nevertheless, in the rhematic position the meaning [+TOTAL] should be actualized to something that could be called **totality ad hoc**. The tools or water serving a cer-

tain purpose (for example, repairing a tap, filling up a bottle) can be conceived of as totalities which are understandable without having previously been presented to the listener<sup>47</sup>. Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences, which confirm non-metalingually what has been said:

C12 *Jos laatikossa oli (tiettyyn tarkoitukseen käytettävät) työkalut, niin laatikossa oli (jonkin verran) työkaluja.*

*Jos pulloon valui (koko pullon täyttävä) vesi, niin pulloon valui (jonkin verran) vettä.*

‘If in the box there was a set of tools (used for a certain purpose), then in the box there were (some) tools.’

‘If into the bottle there poured the water (filling up the whole bottle), then into the bottle there poured (some) water.’

C13 *\*Jos laatikossa oli (jonkin verran) työkaluja, niin laatikossa oli (tiettyyn tarkoitukseen käytettävät) työkalut.*

*\*Jos pulloon valui (jonkin verran) vettä, niin pulloon valui (koko pullon täyttävä) vesi.*

\*‘If in the box there were (some) tools, then in the box there was a set of tools (used for a certain purpose).’

\*‘If into the bottle there poured (some) water, then into the bottle there poured the water (filling up the whole bottle).’

#### 4.3.2. The opposition between the nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the partitive

In the case of divisible nouns, the opposition in quantitative terms between the nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the partitive **arises only when the nominative belongs to the theme of the sentence**. The nominative in such a context conveys the meaning [+TOTAL]. Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences confirming what has just been said:

C14 *Jos (kaikki kyseessä olevat) työkalut olivat laatikossa, niin työkaluja oli laatikossa (jonkin verran).*

*Jos (koko kyseessä oleva) vesi valui pulloon, niin vettä valui pulloon (jonkin verran).*

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<sup>47</sup> Needless to say, the meaning [TOTALITY AD HOC] is accessible too under favorable conditions to the accusative case, e.g. *Minä ostin \*silmläsit ↔ \*silmläseja* ‘I bought a pair of glasses-I ACC ↔ (some) lenses-PART (loose)’.

‘If (all) the tools (in question) were in the box, then (some) tools were in the box.’

‘If the (whole) water (in question) poured into the bottle, then (some) water poured into the bottle.’

C15 \**Jos (jonkin verran) työkaluja oli laatikossa, niin (kaikki kyseessä olevat) työkalut olivat laatikossa.*

\**Jos (jonkin verran) vettä valui pulloon, niin (koko kyseessä oleva) vesi valui pulloon.*

\*‘If (some) tools were in the box, then (all) the tools (in question) were in the box.’

\*‘If (some) water poured into the bottle, then the (whole) water (in question) poured into the bottle.’

Notwithstanding, in the noun class under discussion, in other contexts **the nominative conveys the same quantitative meaning as the partitive, that is – the meaning [+/-TOTAL]**<sup>48</sup> (cf. also Itkonen T. 1975a: 41). Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences, which seem to be adequate in both directions:

C16 *Jos laatikossa olivat (jotkin) työkalut, niin laatikossa oli (jonkin verran) työkaluja.*

*Jos pulloon valui (jokin) vesi, niin pulloon valui (jonkin verran) vettä.*

‘If in the box there were (some/certain) tools, then in the box there were (some/several) tools.’

‘If into the bottle there poured (some (kind of)) water, then into the bottle there poured (some) water.’

C17 *Jos laatikossa oli (jonkin verran) työkaluja, niin laatikossa olivat (jotkin) työkalut.*

*Jos pulloon valui (jonkin verran) vettä, niin pulloon valui (jokin) vesi.*

‘If in the box there were (some/several) tools, then in the box there were (some/certain) tools.’

‘If into the bottle there poured (some) water, then into the bottle there poured (some (kind of)) water.’

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<sup>48</sup> The meaning [-TOTAL] seems to occur only in the case of singular countable nouns with the verb *näkyä* ‘to be seen’, e.g. *Vene/ttä näkyy jo niemen takaa* ‘A part of boat-ABS (=PART) can be seen already from behind the cape’ (cf. Penttilä 1956a: 29–31).

The discussed blurring of the quantitative opposition between the nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the partitive – in contrast with what is emphasized throughout the Finnish specialist literature – is supported additionally by the following facts:

- (i) If Itkonen is right in saying that the Finnish ergative subsystem was formed only after the opposition between two cases of direct object had been established, then the nominative and partitive were placed in an opposition which resembled that between the accusative and partitive. Nevertheless, for some structural reasons – i.e. verb morphology – the opposition NOM : ABS (=PART) is not so regular as the opposition ACC : PART. Let us compare: (144)–(143) *Pulloon valui •vesi* ↔ *•vettä*, (142)–(143C) *Vesi* ↔ *Vettä valui •pulloon*, but (110) *Työkalut olivat •laatikossa* vs. (111C) *Työkaluja oli •laatikossa*.
- (ii) There are plenty of relevant sentential paradigms in Finnish in which the opposition between the two manifestations of the absolutive case is neutralized because the absolutive appears here only in the form of the partitive. Let us compare: (141) *Pihalla juoksee poikia* vs. the incorrect *\*Pihalla juoksee pojat*. This state of affairs seems to result from the fact that the referents of some nouns cannot be conceived of, in terms of the mere arrangement of things being introduced by the relevant sentences, as totalities *ad hoc* (cf. a group of running boys vs. a set of tools for repairing a water tap).
- (iii) The maintenance of the quantitative opposition in the framework of the ergative subsystem itself (that is – between the absolutive homophonic with the partitive and the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative) is additionally hindered by the fact that the occurrence of the marked member of this opposition (the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative) is conditioned by more factors than in the case of the accusative subsystem. In the accusative subsystem, the opposition between the two cases of direct object can occur both in thematic: *•Minä ostin silmälasit* ↔ *silmläseja* and in rhematic position: *Minä ostin •silmälasit* ↔ *•silmläseja*. In the ergative subsystem the opposition between the absolutive homophonic with the partitive and the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative is limited to the rhematic position. Let us compare: (111)–(112) *Laatikossa oli •työkaluja* ↔ *•työkalut*.

Since in such a situation the fusion of all actual meanings of the nominative and absolutive homophonic with the partitive in their proportional and relevant isolated

uses would yield the same result, that is [+/-TOTAL], then in order to establish the differential minima of signification (constitutive meanings) of the discussed cases, one has to take into consideration some other semantic dimension.

The tools (plural countable noun) in the sentence (110C) *Laatikossa olivat •työkalut* seem to be conceptualized as a set of non-totalized (i.e. individual) tools. The tools in the sentence (111) *Laatikossa oli •työkaluja* seem to be conceptualized both as a set of non-totalized (i.e. individual) tools and totalized (i.e. non-individual) tools. In turn, the water (uncountable noun) in the sentence (142C) *Pulloon valui •vesi* seems to be conceptualized as a totalized (i.e. individual) portion of water. The water in the sentence (143) *Pulloon valui •vettä* seems to be conceptualized as a totalized (i.e. individual) portion of water or as a non-totalized (i.e. non-individual) portion of water. Let us summarize what has been said by means of the following scheme:

	nominative	↔	absolute (= partitive)
plural countable nouns	<i>työkalut</i>  non-totalized – <b>individual</b>		<i>työkaluja</i>  non-totalized – <b>individual</b> totalized – <b>non-individual</b>
uncountable nouns	<i>vesi</i>  totalized – <b>individual</b>		<i>vettä</i>  totalized – <b>individual</b> non-totalized – <b>non-individual</b>

As can be inferred, two opposing operations – that is, totalization (in the case of uncountable nouns) and partialization (in the case of plural countable nouns) – are conceptualized in Finnish as a single operation of **individuation**. I therefore propose to consider both cases of subject in terms of the dimension of **{individuality}**. The constitutive meaning of the nominative could be denoted by [+INDIVIDUAL]. The constitutive meaning of the absolutive homophonous with the partitive could be denoted by [+/-INDIVIDUAL]. This hardly palpable opposition becomes clearer when in the appropriate context (cf. de-activation) to the basic actual meaning [+INDIVIDUAL] there is ascribed the meaning [+DISTRIBUTIVE] (cf. *Pojat juoksevat pihalla*), while to the basic actual meaning [+/-INDIVIDUAL] there is ascribed the meaning [-DISTRIBUTIVE], that is [+COLLECTIVE] (cf. *Pihalla juoksi poikia*). Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences:

C18 *Jos pihalla juoksivat **pojat** (yksilöityinä olentoina), niin pihalla juoksi **poikia** (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena).*

*Jos laatikossa olivat **työkalut** (yksilöityinä olentoina), niin laatikossa oli **työkaluja** (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena).*

*Jos tupaan tuli **väki** (yksilöitynä kokonaisuutena), niin tupaan tuli **väkeä** (yksilöitynä kokonaisuutena tai osittain).*

*Jos pulloon valui **vesi** (yksilöitynä kokonaisuutena), niin pulloon valui **vettä** (yksilöitynä kokonaisuutena tai osittain).*

‘If in the yard there ran boys (as individualized entities), then in the yard there ran boys (as individualized entities or as an entirety).’

‘If in the box there were tools (as individualized entities), then in the box there were tools (as individualized entities or as an entirety).’

‘If into the chamber there came folk (as an individualized entirety), then into the chamber there came folk (as an individualized entirety or as parts).’

‘If into the bottle there poured water (as an individualized entirety), then into the bottle there poured water (as an individualized entirety or as parts).’

C19 \**Jos pihalla juoksi **poikia** (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena), niin pihalla juoksivat **pojat** (yksilöityinä olentoina).*

\**Jos laatikossa oli **työkaluja** (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena), niin laatikossa olivat **työkalut** (yksilöityinä olentoina).*

\**Jos tupaan tuli **väkeä** (yksilöitynä kokonaisuutena tai osittain), niin tupaan tuli **väki** (yksilöitynä kokonaisuutena).*

\**Jos pulloon valui **vettä** (yksilöitynä kokonaisuutena tai osittain), niin pulloon valui **vesi** (yksilöitynä kokonaisuutena).*

\*‘If in the yard there ran boys (as individualized entities or as an entirety), then in the yard there ran boys (as individualized entities).’


\*‘If in the box there were tools (as individualized entities or as an entirety), then in the box there were tools (as individualized entities).’

\*‘If into the chamber there came folk (as an individualized entirety or as parts), then into the chamber there came folk (as an individualized entirety).’

\*‘If into the bottle there poured water (as an individualized entirety or as parts), then into the bottle there poured water (as an individualized entirety).’

The historically younger ergative subsystem makes use rather of the passive meaning of the partitive case forms (cf. [PATIENT]) obtained from the historically older accusative (sub)system, by reinterpreting it as [IRRELEVANCE OF THE INDIVIDUALITY], that is [+/-INDIVIDUAL]. With good reason, the two cases NOM and ABS (=PART) contrast with each other in a relatively much greater number of relevant sentences, when the referents are conceivable as divisible *in abstracto*, independently of the action. Different conceptualizations of the grade of the discussed individuality seem to be possible only in the case of divisible nouns. One running boy always runs individually.

In case of **indivisible nouns**, the nominative-absolutive opposition occurs only in negative sentences with a few intransitive verbs such as *olla* ‘to be’, *tulla* ‘to come’, *löytyä* ‘to be found’, *ilmestyä* ‘to appear’, *kuulua* ‘to be heard’ and some others (cf. Siro 1960: 39). What is more, in such a context the opposition between the absolutive homophonic with the partitive and the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative is neutralized, because the absolutive appears here only in the form of the partitive. Let us now analyze the semantics of the cases of subject of this kind of noun:



(146) ‘The ghost is not in the cemetery.’

(147) ‘In the cemetery there is no ghost.’

According to Penttilä (1956a: 36), the meaning of the partitive of singular countable nouns in sentences of the type:

(148) *Matti/a* *ei ole täällä.*  
*Matthew-ABS(=PART)*

‘There is no Matthew here.’

can be captured by referring to the dimension of {quantification}. Any part of the entirety of the referent of the word *MATTI* is in the same situation as regards being. The incorrectness of the sentence:

- (149) \**Matti/a* *ei kaatunut pihalla.*  
*Matthew-ABS(=PART)*

‘There fell down no Matthew in the yard.’

can be explained by the fact that someone always falls down in his entirety. It is impossible that someone has fallen down while some parts of him have not. Ikola (1956: 337–338) strongly criticized Penttilä’s approach. Let us compare the following sentences:

- (150) *Täällä ei ole jänis/tä.*  
*hare-ABS(=PART)*

- (151) *Täällä on jänis/tä.*  
*hare-ABS(=PART)*

- (152) *Täällä on jänis/Ø.*  
*hare-NOM*

- (153) *Matti/Ø on täällä.*  
*Matthew-NOM*

(150) ‘There is no hare here.’

(151) ‘There is (some) hare here.’ (understood as divisible dish)

(152) ‘There is a hare here.’ (understood as indivisible animal)

(153) ‘Matthew is here.’

While the sentence (150) *Täällä ei ole jänis/tä* can be understood as the negation of both (151) *Täällä on jänis/tä* and (152) *Täällä on jänis/Ø*, the sentence (148) *Matti/a ei ole täällä* can be understood only as the negation of (153) *Matti/Ø on täällä*. There are only two possibilities: Matthew is here in his entirety or he is not.

As I have already shown in the chapter on the cases of direct object, considerations concerning the ‘divisibility’ of the referents of countable singular nouns generally take the problem to absurd levels. It is more reasonable to treat such nouns as indeterminate in the dimension of {quantification}. In my opinion, it is on the

basis of the opposition [+INDIVIDUAL] : [+/-INDIVIDUAL] that the opposition NOM : ABS (=PART) has been extended to nouns insusceptible to quantification, in connection with negation. In uttering the sentence (146) *Kummitus ei ole •hautausmaalla*, one conceptualizes the ghost as an individual ([+INDIVIDUAL]) which is not in the cemetery. Since the ghost is an individual which is not in the cemetery, the existential-locative implication of this sentence would be:

- (154) *Kummitus on jossain muualla kuin hautausmaalla.*  
 ‘The ghost is somewhere else than in the cemetery.’

In turn, in uttering the sentence (147) *Hautausmaalla ei ole •kummitusta*, one does not determine whether the said ghost is an individual or not. Therefore the existential-locative implication of the latter sentence would be:

- (155) *Kummitus ei ole hautausmaalla, mutta ei ole varmaa, onko kummitus jossain muualla kuin hautausmaalla.*  
 ‘The ghost is not in the cemetery, but it is not certain whether the ghost is somewhere else than in the cemetery.’

Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences:


- C20 *Jos kummitus (todellisesti olemassa olevana yksilönä) ei ole hautausmaalla, niin hautausmaalla ei ole kummitusta (todellisesti olemassa olevana yksilönä tai potentiaalisesti olemassa olevana yksilönä).*

‘If the ghost (as a really existing individual) is not in the cemetery, then in the cemetery there is no ghost (as a really existing individual or as a potentially existing individual).’

- C21 *\*Jos hautausmaalla ei ole kummitusta (todellisesti olemassa olevana yksilönä tai potentiaalisesti olemassa olevana yksilönä), niin kummitus (todellisesti olemassa olevana yksilönä) ei ole hautausmaalla.*

\*‘If in the cemetery there is no ghost (as a really existing individual or as a potentially existing individual), then the ghost (as a really existing individual) is not in the cemetery.’

The following scheme summarizes the semantic oppositions between the nominative and absolutive in its two manifestations in minimal case syntagms in the dimensions of {individuality} and {quantification}. Column (i) refers to divisible nouns, and column (ii) to indivisible nouns.



## 5. THE CASES OF PREDICATIVE

In comparison with other parts of the sentence, the predicative seems to be somewhat controversial. The form *seppä* ‘smith’ can acquire this function in Finnish only via the copula *olla* ‘to be’, for example:

- (156) *Mies on seppä.*  
‘The man **is** a smith.’

Otherwise, it is syntactically uncategoryable. For that reason *seppä* in the above example could be treated as a word-internal unit, a lexical stem serving for further noun-to-verb derivation, rather than a rightful part of the sentence. Let us compare:

<i>-seppä</i>	→	<i>on-seppä</i>	
‘-a-smith’		‘is-a-smith’	with:
<i>tuule-</i>	→	<i>tuule/e</i>	
‘wind-’		‘it-blow/s’	

Leaving aside the specific morphosyntactic status of the predicative, in Finnish there can be distinguished two cases fulfilling this function:

- (i) the nominative; and
- (ii) the partitive.

The cases of predicative are opposed, on the syntagmatic plane of the language, to the case of subject in the form of the nominative, in the dimension of {predicativity}. The nominative and partitive in the function of predicative convey the meaning [PRAEDIFICANS]. In turn, the nominative in the function of subject, in contrast to the cases of predicative, conveys the meaning [PRAEDIFICATUM]. The two cases of

predicative are also opposed to each other on the paradigmatic plane of the language. The meanings of the nominative and partitive in the function of predicative resulting from this opposition will be discussed in the two following sections.

## 5.1. The quantitative meanings

According to Matti Sadeniemi (1960: 34), the ‘partial predicative’ (*partiaalinen predikaatiivi*) expressed by means of the partitive, as opposed to the ‘total predicative’ (*totaalinen predikaatiivi*) expressed by means of the nominative, appeared due to the significant encroachment of the semantic opposition ‘totality-partiality’ into the Finnish language. He claims that sentences of the type:

- (157) †*Miehet ovat sepät.*  
men-NOM                  smiths-NOM

‘The men are (all the) smiths.’

with the nominative-predicative (*sepät*) were sensed as contradictory and became marginalized in favor of sentences of the type:

- (158) *Miehet ovat seppiä.*  
men-NOM                  smiths-PART

‘The men are (some) smiths.’

with the partitive-predicative (*seppiä*). This ‘marginalization’ of the sentences (157) †*Miehet ovat sepät* should be understood to mean not their disappearance, but the assumption by their continuators in the literary standard of a specific meaning in opposition to the innovative sentences (158) *Miehet ovat seppiä*. A sentence of the type:

- (159) *Me/Ø olemme voittajat.*  
we-NOM                  winners-NOM

with the nominative-predicative (*voittajat*) may occur in contemporary Finnish in contexts of the type:

- (160) [*Kilpailu on päättynyt. On voittajia ja häviäjiä.*] •*Me olemme voittajat.*  
‘[The competition is finished. There are winners and losers.] We are the winners.’



According to Itkonen, the nominative in the function of predicative conveys the meaning [INDIVISIBLE ENTIRETY] (*jaoton kokonaisuus*), whereas the partitive in the same function conveys the meaning [INDETERMINATE QUANTITY] (*epämääräinen paljous*).

Adopting the findings of the present work, the meaning of the nominative could be described by means of the notation [+TOTAL], which because of the specific theme-rheme structure of the analyzed sentence type, may undergo actualization to the meaning [TOTALITY AD HOC] (cf. appropriate portion, set). The meaning of the partitive could be described by means of the notation [+/-TOTAL] (cf. some/several). Let us compare the following adequate and inadequate case-conditional sentences substantiating the proposed solution non-metalingually:

C22 *Jos tuo on (tiettyyn tarkoitukseen käytettävä) lasi, niin tuo on (jotakin) lasia.*  
*Jos nuo ovat (tiettyyn tarkoitukseen käytettävät) lasit, niin nuo ovat (jotakin) laseja.*

‘If that is a glass (used for a certain purpose), then that is (some (kind of)) glass.’

‘If those are glasses (used for a certain purpose), then those are (some/several) glasses.’

C23 \**Jos tuo on (jotakin) lasia, niin tuo on (tiettyyn tarkoitukseen käytettävä) lasi.*  
 \**Jos nuo ovat (jotakin) laseja, niin nuo ovat (tiettyyn tarkoitukseen käytettävät) lasit.*

\*‘If that is (some (kind of)) glass, then that is a glass (used for a certain purpose).’

\*‘If those are (some/several) glasses, then those are glasses (used for a certain purpose).’

## 5.2. Other meanings

Matti Sadeniemi (1960: 27–30) points out that the partitive in the function of predicative (mainly adjectival) may also convey the meaning [+DISTRIBUTIVE]. That is, the property expressed by it refers to all conceivable parts of the referent of the subject. A sentence of the type:

(164) *Nuo/Ø silmälasit*                      *ovat hyv/i/ä.*  
*those-NOM glasses-NOM*                      *good-PART*

‘Those glasses are good.’

with the partitive-predicative (*hyviä*) may mean that each separate pair of glasses is good or that each separate part (lens) of each pair of glasses is good. In turn, a sentence of the type:

- (165) *Nuo/Ø silmälasit ovat hyväit.*  
*those-NOM glasses-NOM good-NOM*

‘Those glasses are good.’

with the nominative-predicative (*hyvät*) means that the glasses in question are good only in as much as they constitute a totality. The feature of being ‘good’ refers here only to this totality. It is possible that the separate lenses making up the glasses in question are not good in the given sense at all. The nominative in the function of predicative therefore conveys the meaning [–DISTRIBUTIVE], that is [+COLLECTIVE]. Denison (1957: 209–211) made creative use of Sadeniemi’s distributive meaning to interpret some other facts about Finnish which had appeared to defeat even the most eminent linguists. Terho Itkonen (1975a: 43–44), analyzing the sentence:

- (166) *Sooda/Ø on natriumkarbonaatti/a.*  
*soda-NOM sodium carbonate-PART*

‘Soda is sodium carbonate.’

is surprised by the use of the partitive in spite of the fact that the referents of the words *SOODA* ‘soda’ and *NATRIUMKARBONAATTI* ‘sodium carbonate’ cover each other exhaustively (cf. sentences of the type *Varpunen on lintu/Ø* ‘The sparrow is a bird-NOM’). He concludes that from the contemporary synchronic point of view the matter cannot be explained other than in terms of ‘dominant type of construction’ (*vallitseva konstruktio*) used as such because it does not cause any confusion. Denison concludes that the word *NATRIUMKARBONAATTI* should be interpreted in this context as an adjective. Under such circumstances, the feature of ‘sodium carbonate’ can be thought of as referring to each conceivable part of the referent of the word *SOODA* ‘soda’, which motivates the use of the partitive. The same would apply to idiomatic sentences of the type:

- (167) *Hän/Ø on kova/a poika/a.*  
*he-NOM tough-PART guy-PART*

‘He is a tough guy.’

in Denison’s translation:

‘He is quite a lad.’

in which the partitive ending attached to a countable noun (*POIKA* ‘boy’) seems to remove its countability, making an abstract concept of it and giving it the nature of an adjective.

From the point of view of the approach adopted in the present work, the meaning [+DISTRIBUTIVE] and its opposite [+COLLECTIVE] may be interpreted as ascribed meanings to the quantitative meanings [+/-TOTAL] and [+TOTAL] respectively. In the case of the sentences (163a) *Nuo ovat lasit*, (163b) *Nuo ovat laseja*, one does not know whether or not the nominative subject refers to something constituting a totality until the case of the predicative is revealed (cf. the pleonastic *Nuo lasit [ovat lasit]* vs. *Nuo lasit [ovat laseja]*). *Mutatis mutandis*, the same applies to *silmälasit* in the examples (165) *Nuo silmälasit ovat hyvät* and (164) *Nuo silmälasit ovat hyviä*. The meaning [+TOTAL] (totality *ad hoc*) conveyed by the nominative in the function of predicative disambiguates the meaning of *silmälasit* in favor of the meaning ‘(eye)glasses’ (cf. the pleonastic *Nuo silmälasit [ovat hyvät silmälasit]*). In turn, the meaning [+/-TOTAL] of the partitive in the function of predicative leaves open the question of whether one is speaking about glasses as totalities or only about some lenses which can possibly make up glasses (cf. the pleonastic *Nuo silmälasit [ovat hyviä silmälaseja]*). In the face of such incertitude, the property of being ‘good’ is ascribed, one could say accessorially, to each conceivable part of the referent of the subject. In this case the lenses constitute the lower limit of the linguistically relevant partialization of the (eye)glasses. Let us compare the following inadequate case-conditional sentences substantiating the discussed opposition between the nominative and partitive in the function of predicative in the dimension of {distributivity}:

C24 \**Jos (jotkut) silmälasit ovat hyvät (kokonaisuudeltaan), niin (kyseessä olevat) silmälasit ovat hyviä (kuviteltavilta aineosiltaan).*

\*‘If (some (kinds of)) glasses are good (from the point of view of their entirety), then the glasses (in question) are good (from the point of view of their imaginable components).’

C25 \**Jos (jotkut) silmälasit ovat hyviä (kuviteltavilta aineosiltaan), niin (kyseessä olevat) silmälasit ovat hyvät (kokonaisuudeltaan).*

\*‘If (some (kinds of)) glasses are good (from the point of view of their imaginable components), then the glasses (in question) are good (from the point of view of their entirety).’

Yli-Vakkuri (1969) turns attention to another aspect of the alternation between partitive and nominative in the function of predicative. In a sentence of the type:

- (168) *Heinä/t ovat kuiv/i/a.*  
*hay-NOM dry-PART*

‘The hay is dry.’

the partitive-predicative (*kuivia*) corroborates first of all the divisible character of the referent of the subject (*heinät*). Since divisibility seems to be the primary property of the hay, the property of being dry is attributed to it as though generally, timelessly, permanently (the meaning [+PERMANENT]). In turn, in a sentence of the type:

- (169) *Heinä/t ovat kuiva/t.*  
*hay-NOM dry-NOM*

the nominative-predicative (*kuivat*) causes the referent of the subject to be interpreted as indivisible. Since the indivisibility of the hay seems to be bound only with certain occasional circumstances, the feature of being dry is attributed to it as though transiently, occasionally (the meaning [–PERMANENT], that is – [+TRANSIENT]). The sentence (169) *Heinä/t ovat kuiva/t* could be interpreted as ‘The hay has got dry now’. Yli-Vakkuri admits that the occurrence of such minimal diacritic pairs as (168) *Heinä/t ovat kuivia* : (169) *Heinä/t ovat kuiva/t* seems to be a rarity. Finnish speakers tend to use the marked member of the opposition (the nominative) in combination with words that indicate the transiency of the described state of affairs lexically. Let us compare:

- (170) *Poja/t ovat ilois/i/a.*  
*boys-NOM glad-PART*

- (171) *Poja/t ovat iloise/t [saamastaan lahjasta].*  
*boys-NOM glad-NOM*

(170) ‘The boys are glad.’

(171) ‘The boys have got glad [about the received present].’

In the context of the present work, the words of Yli-Vakkuri seem to speak for themselves. The suggested meanings [+PERMANENT] vs. [+TRANSIENT] can be treated as ascribed meanings to the meanings [+/-TOTAL] and [+TOTAL] in the appropriate contexts. Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences, which are inadequate in both directions for the same reason as the two previous ones:

C26 \**Jos pojat (kokonaisuutena) ovat **iloiset** (juuri nyt), niin pojat (kokonaisuutena tai yksilöityinä olentoina) ovat **iloisia** (luonteeltaan).*

\*'If the boys (as an entirety) are glad (right now), then the boys (as an entirety or as individualized entities) are glad (by nature).'

C27 \**Jos pojat (kokonaisuutena tai yksilöityinä olentoina) ovat **iloisia** (luonteeltaan), niin pojat (kokonaisuutena) ovat **iloiset** (juuri nyt).*

\*'If the boys (as an entirety or as individualized entities) are glad (by nature), then the boys (as an entirety) are glad (right now).'

## 6. THE CASE OF ATTRIBUTE AND ADVERBIAL

In the subsystem of the case of attribute and adverbial there operates only one case – the genitive. The genitive in Finnish is for many reasons an exceptional case. Notable among the formal properties of its manifestations are the multitude of its markers and the fusional character of some of them – quite a rare phenomenon in an agglutinative language. The genitive is marked by means of:

- (i) the ending *-n* in the singular number; and
- (ii) the endings *-den, -tten, -dän, -en, -ten, -in* in the plural number.

The endings *-den, -tten, -dän* in contemporary Finnish can be conceived of as monosemic. In the forms *vene/i/den* ‘of the boats’, *ma/i/tten* ‘of the countries’, *me/i/dän* ‘of us’ there can be distinguished separate case (*-den, -tten*) and number markers (*-i-*). The endings *-ten, -in* are polysemic. In the forms *suomalais/ten* ‘of the Finns’, *vanhempai/in* ‘of the parents’ there can be distinguished only one grammatical morph, which is simultaneously the case and number marker (*-ten, -in*). The ending *-en* can be both monosemic (e.g. *kirjo/j/en* ‘of the books’) and polysemic (e.g. *lasi/en* ‘of the glasses’) (Karlsson F. 1982c: 286–290).

It is worth turning attention also to the problem of the formal confluence of the genitive with other cases. Genitive-accusative syncretism has already been discussed in section 3.1. In spite of the quite remarkable degree of phonetic neutralization between the genitive and accusative, these two morphological categories do not seem to have been absorbed (yet) by the relevant homophones. The Finnish genitive also turns out to be syncretic with the so-called ‘instructive case’. Korhonen (1991: 167–168) cleverly explains the historical source of this syncretism by supposing that both cases originated from one case – the Proto-Uralic  $\dagger n$ -lative. The genitive evolved from the  $\dagger n$ -lative used adnominally via the so-called dative-genitive, while the instructive evolved from the  $\dagger n$ -lative used adverbially. Kangasmaa-Minn (1973: 86) describes the progenitor of both cases only as “an old, undifferentiated, subordi-

nated element” (*ein altes, nicht differenziertes, subordiniertes Element*)<sup>49</sup>. Over the course of time, the genitive and instructive underwent formal dissimilation in the plural number. Let us compare:

<i>jala/n</i> ‘of the foot’		<i>jalko/j/en</i> ‘of the feet’
GEN SG		GEN PL
=		≠
<i>jala/n</i> ‘on foot’		<i>jalo/i/n</i> ‘on foot’
INSTRUC SG		INSTRUC PL

Ross, in her monograph *Instruktiiiv läänemeresoome keeltes* ‘The Instructive in Balto-Finnic Languages’ (1988), based on a considerable quantity of empirical material, demonstrates the far-reaching adverbialization of the instructive even in the languages where it still seems to be relatively most productive (Finnish and Karelian). The findings of Leskinen (1990) are essentially the same. In this context, the treatment of the genitive-accusative and genitive-instructive syncretism seems to be quite surprising. As has been mentioned, Penttilä (1957: 149–150) sees no reason to recognize the fact of genitive-accusative homonymy. He classifies all relevant forms ending in *-n* mechanically as manifestations of the genitive case. Nevertheless, this approach is not applied consistently when it comes to the genitive-instructive syncretism. When considering homonymic forms of the type *jalan*, *käden*, *rinnan* and so on, Penttilä meticulously distinguishes the manifestations of the genitive (‘of the foot’, ‘of the hand’, ‘of the chest’) from those of the instructive (‘on foot’, ‘by hand’, ‘in parallel’). The authors of *Iso suomen kielioppi* (Hakulinen A. et al. 2004: 1178) proceed in a similar vein, ascertaining: *Myös instruktiivi on n-päätteinen, mutta yleensä se eroaa genetiivistä sekä muodoltaan että tehtävältään* ‘Also the instructive has the ending *-n*, but generally it differs from the genitive in terms of both form and function’ (as though the genitive and accusative did not differ from each other in an analogous way).

As far as meaning is concerned, the genitive is one of the cases which seem to have afforded the most difficulties in the general theory of case, both in the Finno-Ugric and Indo-European languages (cf. Bielecki 2010, 2011). This probably results from its semantic vagueness, consisting in multilateral functions (meanings) which often overlap with those of other cases. The majority of scholars, however, seem to agree that there can be distinguished two main functions of the genitive case:

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<sup>49</sup> There are also other theories concerning the origin of the *-n* ending in Finnish. According to Weske (1873: 38–44), the ending *-n* of the genitive and instructive arose through apocope of the final vowel of the primary locative ending †*-na*, *-nä* (cf. also Kettunen 1956: 13–15, 1957 and the polemics in Itkonen Erkki 1957a, 1957b: 15–16).

- (i) adnominal; and
- (ii) adverbial.

Controversies over which of these two functions should be considered primary from a diachronic standpoint, and attempts to establish a common synchronic semantic denominator for them, do not yet seem to have found any satisfactory solution.

Tunkelo, based on Noreen's *kasus-status* theory, attempted to provide a taxonomy of the adnominal functions of the Finnish genitive. Regrettably, the only conclusion which the reader can draw from the 500 or so pages of his two monographs (1908, 1920) is that the meaning of the genitive results from the manner in which the lexical meaning of the determiner (*apugloosa*) relates to the lexical meaning of the head (*päägloosa*), for example:

- (i) *pommi/n/sirpale*  
'shard of a bomb' 'shard' vs. 'bomb' → *status partitivus*;
- (ii) *puhee/n alku*  
'the beginning of the speech' 'speech' vs. 'to begin something' → *status obiectivus*;
- (iii) *yhtiö/n omaisuus*  
'the assets of the company' 'assets' vs. 'company' → *status possessoris*; etc.

In consequence, the genitive does not seem to express more than a vague relation between two objects. Kangasmaa-Minn (1972) proposes to reduce the factors determining the meaning(s) of the genitive by eliciting the "grammatical status" (*kielioppilinen status*) of the determiner and its head in core sentences. Let us compare the phrase (172) with the sentences (173)–(174):

- (172) *Ruovede/n pitäjä*  
*Ruovesi*-GEN  
attribute
- (173) *Ruovesi/Ø on pitäjä.*  
*Ruovesi*-NOM  
subject
- (174) *Pitäjä on Ruovesi/Ø.*  
*Ruovesi*-NOM  
predicative

- (172) ‘the parish of Ruovesi’  
 (173) ‘Ruovesi is a parish.’  
 (174) ‘The parish is Ruovesi.’

On these grounds, the *genetivus definitivus* of the type (172) *Ruoveden* [pitäjä] could be interpreted as subjective-predicative. It is significant that almost 100 years after Tunkelo, the view taken by Finnish linguists remained essentially unchanged. Jaakola (2004: 277), considering also the adverbial genitive, concludes that from the semantic point of view the Finnish genitive can at the most be described as *rön-syilevä, kauttaaltaan polyseeminen merkitystihentymien ja niitä yhdistävien jatku-moiden verkko* ‘a meandering, thoroughly polysemic network of condensations of meanings and the continua binding them.’

Kuryłowicz (1960a: 140–147) considers the Indo-European genitive in its primary function – which is, according to him, the subjective and objective genitive – as a case without meaning. The genitive obtains its meaning only in its other, secondary, functions. Benveniste (1967: 147) seems to develop Kuryłowicz’s approach, showing how the extension of the subjective and objective (i.e. meaningless) genitive to the adnominal (i.e. meaningful) genitive could take place in Latin:

*Puer/Ø ridet.* ‘The boy-NOM is laughing.’  
 ↓  
*risus puer/i* ‘the laughter of the boy-GEN’  
 > *somnus puer/i* ‘the sleep of the boy-GEN’  
 > *mos puer/i* ‘the custom of the boy-GEN’ and finally:  
 > *liber puer/i* ‘the book of the boy-GEN’.

Heinz (1955: 44–45) describes the Indo-European genitive as a case expressing “relation in general”. In the Latin combination:

(175) *ripa mar/is*  
           *sea-GEN*

‘the shore of the sea’

the content of the word *maris* ‘of the sea’ specifies the content of the word *ripa* ‘the shore’, filling in an essential or occasional part of its referential scope (there can be seashore, lakeshore, etc). The word *maris* functions on the strength of its relation as a feature included in the features of the word *ripa* (cf. the synonymous adjectival construction *ripa maritima* ‘maritime shore’). From the facts that:

- (i) *ripa* as the head is related to *maris* as the determiner and not conversely (cf. feature (*maris* = *maritima*) + thing (*ripa*)), and that
- (ii) the determiner stands beyond the noun content of the head (the shore is, at the end of the day, something other than the sea), but is at the same time embraced by its relational scope (there can be more maritime things)

it is deduced that the head (*ripa*) may be apperceived as constituting part of the determiner (thing *mare* ‘sea’). In other words, the structure of this relation implies its partitive function in the broad sense of the term, which can be reinterpreted in the appropriate context as ablative or possessive. The partitive function with its contextual reinterpretations and the function of the relation in general are aspects of one and the same logical structure. Nikiforidou (1991) argues against treating the genitive either as a conglomerate of homonyms or as a semantically monolithic category defined by the abstract general meaning. The fact that different languages use the same morpheme to express the possessor, entirety, agent, kinship, holder of an attribute, material, standard of comparison, etc. cannot be a coincidence. Different meanings of the genitive arise by means of the naturally unidirectional metaphorization of its central possessive meaning. Let us compare:

- (176) *John’s book*
- (177) *the book written by John*
  
- (178) *Leaves are falling.*
- (179) *Oil prices are falling.*

The possessive meaning of *JOHN* from (176) *John’s book* can be metaphorized in the appropriate context as agentive ((177) *the book written by John*) in a way analogous to that in which spatial *FALL* in (178) *Leaves are falling* is metaphorized as quantitative in (179) *Oil prices are falling*.

## 6.1. The adnominal genitive

The Finnish adnominal genitive determining a non-derived noun (e.g. *linnu/n* [*pesä*] ‘[the nest] of the bird-GEN’ (cf. Toivonen–Itkonen–Joki 1962: 531)) does not seem to be related to any other case by either:

- (i) the relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition (Re 2); or

- (ii) the relation of intersyntagmic-diathetic-asemantic-syntactic case opposition (Re 3) (cf. section 2.2).

This implies that the significator of the target meaning(s) (e.g. [POSSESSOR], [POSSESSUM]) goes beyond the case form, embracing practically the whole minimal syntagm in question, including the lexical stems occurring in it. The difficulties in detecting the sought formal-syntactic-semantic regularities in the case of the adnominal genitive are a consequence of the mixed grammatical and lexical character of the significator.

## 6.2. The adverbial genitive

There exist some viewpoints which imply that the Finnish adverbial genitive stands in a relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition (Re 2) with:

- (i) the instructive; and
- (ii) the absolutive.

In my view, such a claim is false. Kangasmaa-Minn (1966: 39–40), for example, suggests that this kind of case opposition exists between the genitive and instructive. Let us compare her examples:

(180)	<b>genitive</b> <i>Jalko/j/en</i> <i>foot-PL-GEN</i>	on kuljettava kepeästi.
	↕	
(181)	<b>instructive</b> <i>Jalo/i/n</i> <i>foot-PL-INSTRUC</i>	on kuljettava kepeästi.

- (180) ‘The feet have to walk lightly.’
- (181) ‘One has to walk lightly on foot.’

Nevertheless, if one takes into account non-elliptic syntagms, it turns out that the genitive and instructive are not homodeterminational (cf. the relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition (Re 2) in section 2.2). A sentence of the type (181) *Jaloin on kuljettava kepeästi* can be complemented by the genitive encoding the [STATIVE], whereas sentences of the type (180) *Jalkojen on kuljettava kepeästi* cannot. Let us compare:

(180) 

genitive
<i>Jalko/j/en</i> foot-PL-GEN

*on kuljettava kepeästi.*

(182) 

genitive
<i>Varka/i/den</i> thieves-GEN

*on kuljettava*

instructive
<i>jalo/i/n</i> foot-PL-INSTRUC

*kepeästi.*

(180) ‘The feet have to walk lightly.’

(182) ‘The thieves have to walk on foot lightly.’

In turn, Penttilä (1957: 643–644) interprets so-called ‘necessitative infinitival constructions’ (*nessessiiviset infinitiivirakenteet*) by ascribing the function of subject to the words belonging to the genitive (183) and the partitive or nominative ~ II accusative (reinterpreted as absolutive) (184). Let us compare:

(183) 

genitive
<i>Keitto/n</i> soup-GEN

*tulisi olla heti valmiina.*

↑

(184) 

partitive
<i>Keitto/a</i> soup-ABS(=PART)

*tulisi olla heti valmiina.*

(183) ‘The soup ought to be ready at once.’


(184) ‘There ought to be ready (some) soup at once.’

The semantic opposition between these two sentence types is analogous to that between non-existential (185) and existential sentences (186)<sup>50</sup>:

<sup>50</sup> Cf. more extended comment in Ikola 1954: 209–219. At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Koskinen (1860: 95) considered the occurrence of non-genitive forms in the discussed infinitival construction to be possible even if the existential characteristic was lacking, e.g. *Suuret muutokset pitää tapahtuman* ‘Big changes have to happen’, *Taivas pitää muuttuman* ‘The sky has to change’. This sentence type did not come to be accepted in the literary language. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century Itkonen turned attention to the relative frequency of its occurrence in the contemporary standard language and proposed to rethink the pertinent literary language rule (Itkonen T. 1967: 303–311). The sentence *Lasten pitää sitten olla kilttejä* with the genitive (*lasten*) would mean that the children have to behave kindly deliberately. By contrast, the sentence *Lapset pitää sitten olla kilttejä* with the nominative (*lapset*) would mean that the children have to behave kindly by nature (Itkonen T. 1974: 392). This proposal was rejected by the Finnish Language Council (Itkonen T. 1981: 85). According to Timberlake (1977: 156), such a contrast might have arisen only as a transitory stage in the case assignment for the underlying subject. Nowadays, non-genitive constructions of this type are regarded as extremely archaic or not acceptable at all. However, according to a study by Laitinen (1992), the nominative type remains common in many Finnish dialects.



(cf. the sentence *Minun tulisi keittää keitto* ‘I ought to cook the whole soup’, with the non-desinential absolutive (*keitto*) lending even more credence to this kind of parsing). In turn, the syntactic structure of the sentence (190) *Minun tulisi istua* could be depicted at most in the following way:



Therefore the words *keiton* and *keittoa* in the examples (183) and (184) fulfill different syntactic functions: *keiton* that of adverbial, and *keittoa* that of subject. The relation between the genitive and absolutive is not the relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition (Re 2) as Penttilä seems to imply.

The Finnish adverbial genitive determining a derived deverbal noun (e.g. *pit/o* ‘keeping’ (cf. Toivonen–Itkonen–Joki 1962: 581), *laul/u* ‘song’ (cf. Toivonen–Itkonen–Joki 1958: 282)) stands in a quite regular relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition (Re 3) with:

- (i) the cases of direct object: the accusative and partitive; and
- (ii) the cases of subject: the nominative and absolutive.

Let us compare:

(191)	<i>linnu/n</i> bird-GEN	<i>pit/o</i> keeping	(193)	<i>linnu/n</i> bird-GEN	<i>laul/u</i> song
(192)	<i>pitä/ä</i> to keep	<i>lintu/a</i> bird-PART	(194)	<i>Lintu/Ø</i> bird-NOM	<i>laula/a.</i> sings
(191)	‘the keeping of a/the bird’		(193)	‘the song of the bird’	
(192)	‘to keep a/the bird’		(194)	‘The bird sings.’	

### 6.2.1. The diathetic meanings

Let us recapitulate the diathetically relevant meanings of the cases of direct object (accusative and partitive) and the cases of subject (nominative and absolutive) discussed in chapters 3 and 4:

- (i) accusative: [PATIENT]
- (ii) partitive: [PATIENT]
  
- (iii) nominative: [AGENT] [PATIENT] [STATIVE]
- (iv) absolutive: [PATIENT] [STATIVE]

The genitive, because of its polysemy, may be compared to the nominative. That is, it conveys all of the aforementioned diathetic meanings: [AGENT], [PATIENT] and [STATIVE]. The actual diathetic meaning of the genitive depends upon four interwoven factors:

- (i) finiteness of the verb: finite verb → [AGENT] or [STATIVE],  
infinite verb → [AGENT], [PATIENT] or [STATIVE];
  
- (ii) transitivity of the verb: transitive verb → [AGENT] or [PATIENT],  
intransitive verb → [STATIVE];
  
- (iii) voice of the verb: active voice → [AGENT], [PATIENT] or [STATIVE],  
passive voice → [AGENT];
  
- (iv) substantiveness of the verb: deverbal noun → [AGENT], [PATIENT] or [STATIVE],  
not deverbal noun → [AGENT] or [STATIVE].

The following scheme shows how the interaction of these four factors results in the actual diathetic meaning of the genitive.

The case of *pojan etsiminen* ‘the seeking of the boy’ seems to be intrinsically homonymic ([AGENT]–[PATIENT]). The disambiguation is achieved most frequently by the interference of the semantics of supra-lexical units (cf. *poja/n kirjoittaminen* ‘the writing of the boy’ → [AGENT], *kirjee/n kirjoittaminen* ‘the writing of the letter’ → [PATIENT]). In the case of co-occurrence of the [AGENT] and [PATIENT], the [AGENT] may be sometimes marked by means of a postposition, e.g. *pojan etsiminen äidin toimesta* ‘the seeking of the boy by (on behalf of) the mother’. Phrases in which it is marked by word order, e.g. *pojan äidin etsiminen* ‘the seeking of the

mother by the boy’ vs. *äidin pojan etsiminen* ‘the seeking of the boy by the mother’, border on incorrect (Tarvainen 1977: 82–83).

finiteness					
+			-		
transitivity					
+	-	+		-	
voice					
ACT			PASS		ACT
substantiveness					
-		+	-		+
<i>Minun tulisi keittää keittoa</i> ‘I ought to cook (some) soup’	<i>Minun tulisi istua</i> ‘I ought to sit’	<i>pojan etsiminen</i> ‘the seeking of the boy’	<i>pojan etsiessä</i> ‘during the seeking of the boy’	<i>pojan etsimä</i> ‘sought by the boy’ <i>pojan etsityä</i> ‘after the seeking of the boy’	<i>väen tuleminen</i> ‘the arrival of the people’
[AG]	[STAT]	[AG] [PAT]	[AG]	[AG]	[STAT]

### 6.2.2. The quantitative, aspectual and individutive meanings

Let us recapitulate the constitutive quantitative and aspectual meanings of the cases of direct object (accusative and partitive) and the constitutive individutive and quantitative meanings of the cases of subject (nominative and absolutive in its two forms), as discussed in chapters 3 and 4:

- (i) accusative: [+TOTAL]  
[+RESULTATIVE];
- (ii) partitive: [+/-TOTAL]  
[+/-RESULTATIVE];
- (iii) nominative: [+INDIVIDUAL]  
[+/-TOTAL];

(iv) absolutive (=PART): [+/-INDIVIDUAL]  
[+/-TOTAL];

absolutive (=NOM~II ACC): [+TOTAL].

The genitive in the objective role neutralizes both the quantitative and aspectual oppositions between the accusative and partitive, by conveying in the appropriate verbal context the meaning(s) of the unmarked member of the opposition. Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences:

C28 *Jos luettiin (kaikki) kirjat (loppuun), niin (joidenkin) kirjojen lukeminen tapahtui (jonkin aikaa).*

‘If one read (all) the books (to the end), then the reading of (some/certain/several) books took place (some time).’

C29 \**Jos (joidenkin) kirjojen lukeminen tapahtui (jonkin aikaa), niin luettiin (kaikki) kirjat (loppuun).*

\*‘If the reading of (some/certain/several) books took place (some time), then one read (all) the books (to the end).’

C30 *Jos luettiin (jonkin verran) kirjoja (jonkin aikaa), niin (joidenkin) kirjojen lukeminen tapahtui (jonkin aikaa).*

‘If one read (some/several) books (some time), then the reading of (some/certain/several) books took place (some time).’

C31 *Jos (joidenkin) kirjojen lukeminen tapahtui (jonkin aikaa), niin luettiin (jonkin verran) kirjoja (jonkin aikaa).*

‘If the reading of (some/certain/several) books took place (some time), then one read (some/several) books (some time).’

The genitive in the subjective role neutralizes both the individuating opposition between the nominative and absolutive homophonic with the partitive and the quantitative opposition between the absolutive homophonic with the partitive and the absolutive homophonic with the nominative ~ II accusative, by conveying in the appropriate context the meaning(s) of the unmarked member of the opposition. Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences:

- C32 *Jos laatikossa olivat (jotkin) **työkalut** (yksilöityinä olentoina), niin tapahtui (joidenkin) **työkalujen** oleminen laatikossa (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena).*  
 ‘If in the box there were (some/certain/several) tools (as individualized entities), then there took place the being of (some/certain/several) tools in the box (as individualized entities or as an entirety).’
- C33 *\*Jos laatikossa tapahtui (joidenkin) **työkalujen** oleminen laatikossa (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena), niin laatikossa olivat (jotkut) **työkalut** (yksilöityinä olentoina).*  
 \*‘If there took place the being of (some/certain/several) tools in the box (as individualized entities or as an entirety), then in the box there were (some/certain/several) tools (as individualized entities).’
- C34 *Jos laatikossa oli (joitakin) **työkaluja** (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena), niin tapahtui (joidenkin) **työkalujen** oleminen laatikossa (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena).*  
 ‘If in the box there were (some/certain/several) tools (as individualized entities or as an entirety), then there took place the being of (some/certain/several) tools in the box (as individualized entities or as an entirety).’
- C35 *Jos tapahtui (joidenkin) **työkalujen** oleminen laatikossa (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena), niin laatikossa oli (joitakin) **työkaluja** (yksilöityinä olentoina tai kokonaisuutena).*  
 ‘If there took place the being of (some/certain/several) tools in the box (as individualized entities or as an entirety), then in the box there were (some/certain/several) tools (as individualized entities or as an entirety).’
- C36 *Jos laatikossa oli (tiettyyn tarkoitukseen käytettävät) **työkalut**, niin tapahtui (joidenkin) **työkalujen** oleminen laatikossa.*  
 ‘If in the box there was a set of tools (used for a certain purpose), then there took place the being of (some/certain/several) tools in the box.’
- C37 *\*Jos tapahtui (joidenkin) **työkalujen** oleminen laatikossa, niin laatikossa oli (tiettyyn tarkoitukseen käytettävät) **työkalut**.*  
 \*‘If there took place the being of (some/certain/several) tools in the box, then in the box there was a set of tools (used for a certain purpose).’

## 7. THE CASES OF ADVERBIAL

The Finnish cases of adverbial and their markers can be classified roughly in the following way:

local		marginal	
INESS	-ssa, -ssä	COM	-(i)ne-
ILLAT	-Vn, -hVn, -seen, -siin	ABESS	-tta, -ttä
ELAT	-sta, -stä	INSTRUC	-(i)n
ADESS	-lla, -llä		
ALLAT	-lle		
ABL	-lta, -ltä		
ESS	-na, -nä		
TRANS	-ksi, -kse-		

### 7.1. The local cases

The so-called local cases (*paikallissijat*), in their most conspicuous (that is spatial) uses, enter into opposition on the syntagmatic plane of the language with the cases of subject and direct object in the dimension of **{spatiality}**. The local cases convey the meaning [LOCUS]. The cases of subject (195) and direct object (196) convey the meaning [LOCATUM]:

(195)	<i>Asiakas/Ø</i>	<i>astui</i>	<i>toimisto/on.</i>
	<i>customer-NOM</i>		<i>office-ILLAT</i>
	subject		
	[LOCATUM]		[LOCUS]



- (199) *Mies/Ø*      *keitti* *puuro/a*      *kattila/ssa*.  
*man-NOM*              *porridge-PART* *pot-INESS*  
 subject                      direct object  
    [LOCATUM]              [LOCUS]

(198) ‘The man boiled porridge at the cooker.’

(199) ‘The man boiled porridge in the pot.’

In the Finnish linguistic literature the opinion seems to prevail that the local cases constitute **among themselves** the relatively most compact, conspicuous system of semantic oppositions<sup>51</sup>. Siro (1964: 29–32) classifies them relative to two super-dimensions:

- (i) the super-dimension of **{direction}** (*suunta*); and
- (ii) the super-dimension of **{quality}** (*laatu*).

Within the super-dimension of {direction} the cases are classified as:

- (i) dynamic (*muutosijat*):
  - (a) lative (*tulosijat*),
  - (b) separative (*erosijat*); and
- (ii) static (*olosijat*).

Within the super-dimension of {quality} the local cases are classified as:

- (i) interior (*sisäiset*);
- (ii) exterior (*ulkoiset*); and
- (iii) general (*yleiset*).

Let us summarize what has been said by placing the names of the appropriate cases in the following table:

		<b>{direction}</b>		
		<b>static</b>	<b>dynamic</b>	
			<b>lative</b>	<b>separative</b>
<b>{quality}</b>	<b>interior</b>	inessive	illative	elative
	<b>exterior</b>	adessive	allative	ablative
	<b>general</b>	essive	translative	(†partitive) (elative)

<sup>51</sup> Cf. however the approach of Sebeok (1946: 11–19) as described in section 1.6, modeled after that of Jakobson (1971b), according to which all Finnish cases constitute among themselves a compact system of semantic oppositions.

The so-called general local cases seem to constitute a breach in the aforementioned compactness of the system of the Finnish local cases. Their manifestations in clearly spatial meaning are restricted to certain lexicalized forms (adverbs and postpositions), e.g. essive: *koto/na* ‘at home’, *luo/na* ‘at’, translative: *luo/kse* ‘to’, partitive: *koto/a* ‘from home’, *luo/ta* ‘from’, etc. By analyzing the productive uses of general local cases of the type:

(200) *Talo pysyi varakkaa/na.*  
*wealthy-ESS*

(201) *Revontulten loimo painui yhä pienemmä/ksi.*  
*smaller-TRANS*

(202) *Poja/sta tuli pappi.*  
*boy-ELAT*

(200) ‘The house remained wealthy.’

(201) ‘The glow of the aurora sank (by getting) smaller and smaller.’

(202) ‘From the boy there became a priest.’

the following conclusions can be inferred:

- (i) the spatial meaning can be found here only in a metaphorical sense (if at all) (cf. (200) *Talo pysyi varakkaana*, (201) *Revontulten loimo painui yhä pienemmäksi*);
- (ii) the historically separative case (partitive) is “replaced” by the interior local case, the elative (cf. (202) *Pojasta tuli pappi*).

Siro (ibid. 32–33) calls the relevant syntactic function of the general local cases ‘predicative adverbial’ (*predikatiiviadverbiaali*). Penttilä (1957: 371–434) classifies as local only the interior and exterior cases, whose appearance with spatial meaning does not seem to be subject to such lexical restrictions as that of the general local cases. The author makes clear, however, that the contextual meaning of even these cases in many instances is hardly conceivable as spatial. Approximately 60 consecutive pages of his grammar are devoted to a meticulous enumeration of their meanings, ranging from more adverbialized, more spatial (cf. sentence (203)) to more grammaticalized, less spatial uses (cf. sentence (204)):

- (203) *Veri juoksee haava/sta.*  
*wound-ELAT*
- (204) *Oletteko kuulleet asia/sta?*  
*thing-ELAT*

- (203) ‘Blood runs from the wound.’  
 (204) ‘Have you heard about the thing?’

There is no doubt that the majority of attempts to capture the semantics of the Finnish local cases resort to the principle of metonymy, which is strongly criticized by Hjelmslev (cf. section 1.5.1). The spatial meaning is considered to be their ‘main meaning’. Erkki Itkonen (1966: 268) calls it downright ‘the real meaning’ (*varsinainen merkitys*). As far as the other meanings are concerned, scholars attempt to derive them from the spatial meaning. For example, the authors of the extensive work *Suomen kielen paikallissijat konseptuaalisessa semantiikassa* ‘The Finnish Local Cases in Conceptual Semantics’ (Leino et al. 1990) begin with such an assumption, discerning apart from the so-called ‘spatial field’ (*spatialinen kenttä*) the following semantic fields: temporal, possessive, identifying (i.e. predicative), and circumstantial. To give an indication of how the discussed derivation of non-spatial meanings from the spatial meaning works, let us quote one example. The use of the translative (*elintärkeäksi*) in the predicative field in sentences of the type:

- (205) *Alueen puolustuksen elintärkeäksi lännelle.*  
*hallitus on julistanut*  
*vitally important-TRANS*

‘The government has declared the defense of the territory vitally important for the West.’

results from the fact that one is speaking here about a transition, and not the mere state. The declaration decrees the defense to be vitally important. The state of knowledge, the cognitive perception of things changes under the influence of the declaration (ibid. 203).

### 7.1.1. The super-dimension of direction

I have no wish to give the impression that I have found a foolproof solution to the problems signaled above. I have not, at least from the point of view of the presented methodology. Instead, my goal is to introduce some order into the issues under discussion, without resorting to any excessive speculations. Let us begin with the fol-

lowing examples, which illustrate the case oppositions with respect to the superdimension of {direction}:

	<b>inessive adessive (essive)</b>	<b>illative allative (translative)</b>	<b>elative ablativ (†partitive)</b>
(206) <i>Asun</i>	<i>Suome/ssa.</i> <i>Finland-INESS</i>		
(207) <i>Matkustan</i>	<i>Suome/ssa.</i> <i>Finland-INESS</i>		
(208) <i>Matkustan</i>		<i>Suome/en.</i> <i>Finland-ILLAT</i>	
(209) <i>Matkustan</i>			<i>Suome/sta.</i> <i>Finland-ELAT</i>

(206) ‘I live in Finland.’

(207) ‘I travel in Finland.’

(208) ‘I travel to Finland.’

(209) ‘I travel from Finland.’

Firstly, it is worth turning attention to the fact that the verbs governing the discussed cases in the spatial meaning constitute quite a numerous category, falling into two intuitively clear-cut subcategories distinguished on the basis of the homogenous criterion of ‘motion’. These categories are:

- (i) static verbs (cf. (206) *Asun* ‘I live’); and
- (ii) verbs of motion (cf. (207)–(209) *Matkustan* ‘I travel’).

The same cannot be said with certainty about other verbs governing the discussed cases. The local cases seem to constitute (even in contemporary Finnish) a compact system of semantic oppositions only in as much as they are considered from the point of view of spatial meanings. From the point of view of other meanings the oppositions between them seem to be very much blurred.

Secondly, the oppositions between the relevant cases (case classes) in their spatial meanings seem to be based on two separate semantic

dimensions *sensu stricto*, that is, dimensions containing homogeneous meanings, rather than on one super-dimension of {direction}, as it is usually interpreted in the Finnish linguistic literature. These dimensions are:

(i) the dimension of **{staticity}**

with the meanings: [STATIC], [DYNAMIC], [0]; and

(ii) the proper dimension of **{direction}**:

with the meanings: [TO], [FROM], [0].

The opposition between the so-called static and dynamic cases is ultimately – that is, taking into consideration their relevant constitutive meanings – of participative character ([STATIC]–[DYNAMIC] : [DYNAMIC]). The static cases constitute the unmarked and the dynamic cases the marked members of the opposition<sup>52</sup>. The opposition between the so-called lative and separative cases is of contrary character ([TO] : [FROM]). Let us summarize what has been said by means of the following scheme:

<b>{staticity}</b>		
[STATIC]–[DYNAMIC]	:	[DYNAMIC]
<b>{direction}</b>		
[0]	:	[TO] : [FROM]
inessive	illative	elative
adessive	allative	ablativ
essive	translative	(partitive)

Thirdly, the cases of adverbial which are opposed to each other in the dimension of {staticity} and the proper dimension of {direction} are, unlike the cases in the subsystems of direct object and subject, (implicitly) co-predicative. Putting it in a mundane way; it is always possible to complement sentences of the type (207) *Matkustan Suomessa*, (208)

<sup>52</sup> According to Korhonen (1975), among the local cases it is the lative cases that should be treated as unmarked in all Finno-Ugric languages. However, the only substantiation that he presents for this claim which is valid semantically and synchronically raises serious doubts. The Finno-Ugric lative cases are unmarked because they occur in more numerous contexts than the other Indo-European (sic!) local cases (cf. Finnish illative: *Hän jäi huoneeseen* and Polish (periphrastic) locative: *On został w pokoju* (both meaning) ‘He stayed in the room’). Stolz (1992: 86–88) undermines this, identifying the static cases as the unmarked cases at least in some Finno-Ugric languages. However, he does not provide any semantic substantiation for this conclusion. For example, he ascribes to the Estonian inessive and adessive the status of the unmarked member of the opposition only on the grounds of the form of their markers (cf. simple *-s* for inessive vs. *-sse* for illative, *-st* for elative, and simple *-l* for adessive vs. *-le* for allative, *-lt* for ablativ).

*Matkustan Suomeen* or (209) *Matkustan Suomesta* by adding an adverbial expressing: (i) the point of departure, (ii) the starting point<sup>53</sup>, or (iii) the whole location within which the motion takes place:

- (210) *Matkustan Suome/ssa, Helsingi/stä Oulu/un.*  
*Finland-INESS Helsinki-ELAT Oulu-ILLAT*
- (211) *Matkustan Euroopa/ssa, Puola/sta Suome/en.*  
*Europe-INESS Poland-ELAT Finland-ILLAT*
- (212) *Matkustan Euroopa/ssa, Suome/sta Puola/an.*  
*Europe-INESS Finland-ELAT Poland-ILLAT*
- (210) ‘I travel in Finland, from Helsinki to Oulu.’  
 (211) ‘I travel in Europe, from Poland to Finland.’  
 (212) ‘I travel in Europe, from Finland to Poland.’

Beyond the sphere of the spatial uses of the local cases, the semantic oppositions between them seem to undergo blurring to a significant degree, as has been mentioned already. Alhoniemi (1975: 13–16) tries to explain, among other things, the use of the elative in sentences of the type:

- (213) *Mies oppi kirjo/i/sta monta hyödyllistä asiaa.*  
*books-ELAT*

‘The man learned from the books many useful things.’

by suggesting that it expresses the point of departure of the motion. This motion, however, takes place only from the point of view of human cognition (cf. also Tunkelo 1931, Ruoppila 1945, Alhoniemi 1978, Huumo 2006b). His explanation is, of course, to some extent persuasive. Nevertheless, it overlooks the fact that the functional burden of the elative in this context undergoes a certain diminution. When used with the verb *oppia* ‘to learn’, for example, it is not opposed on the paradigmatic plane of the language to the illative:

- (214) \**Mies oppi kirjo/i/hin monta hyödyllistä asiaa.*  
*books-ILLAT*

\*‘The man learned into the books many useful things.’

<sup>53</sup> Cf. also Siro 1975: 84–87.

Kuryłowicz (1960a) stated outright that the so-called concrete cases in the Indo-European languages do not constitute any system of semantic oppositions in their grammaticalized uses. In indicating the syntactic subordination of the noun to the verb, they become simply combinatory variants of the accusative case. Siro (1956: 28–56) reaches a similar conclusion. The proximity of the local cases (especially the illative and elative) in their grammaticalized uses and the so-called grammatical cases (especially the partitive) seems to be confirmed by a whole range of sentences in which they alternate with each other on the paradigmatic plane of the language without in fact contributing to any semantic difference<sup>54</sup>, for example:

(215) *Älä hakkaa ove/en* ↔ *ove/a!*  
*door-ILLAT* *door-PART*

(216) *Hämmästyin sano/i/sta/si* ↔ *sano/j/a/si.*  
*word-PL-ELAT-2 SG* *word-PL-PART-2 SG*

(215) ‘Do not hit the door!’

(216) ‘I was amazed by your words.’

### 7.1.2. The super-dimension of quality

As far as the super-dimension of {quality} is concerned, Siro (1964: 32–37) puts forward one of the most far-reaching approaches. In his view, the interior local cases are cases of ‘locative adverbial’ (*lokatiiviadverbiaali*). The exterior local cases are cases of ‘habitive (i.e. possessive) adverbial’ (*habitiiviadverbiaali*). The general local cases – as has been mentioned already – are cases of ‘predicative adverbial’ (*predikatiiviadverbiaali*). Of these three series, only the interior and exterior local cases may have spatial meaning in their productive uses. Since only the interior local cases are “the real cases of the locative adverbial” (*lokatiiviadverbiaalin varsinaiset*

<sup>54</sup> The blurring of the semantic oppositions between the local cases in their non-spatial uses is also corroborated by some other phenomena characteristic of less conservative variations of Balto-Finnic. According to Riho Grünthal (2003: 116–159), the Veps separative cases (elative, ablative), which were transiently neutralized phonetically with the static cases (inessive, adessive), have been reinforced by the coaffix *-pai, -päi* of postpositional origin only in their spatial uses (e.g. *perti/š* ‘in a house’ : *perti/špäi* ‘out of a house’, *perti/l* ‘on a house’ : *perti/lpäi* ‘off a house’). In non-spatial uses the lost opposition does not seem to have been recovered (cf. Veps: *tat papi/l’ ot’ koume sadad* and Finnish: *Isä otti papi/ta kolme sataa* ‘The father took three hundred from the priest’). Estonian exhibits a similar phenomenon (cf. *Ta/l suri isa* ‘There died the father on him’ (Finnish: *Häne/ltä kuoli isä*) vs. *Ta/l sündis poeg* ‘There was born a son on him’ (Finnish: *Häne/le syntyi poika*)), although here there has not been any phonetic neutralization of the relevant case markers. In Finnish the analogical phenomenon occurs only in some dialects (Huomo 1995: 57–58).

*sijat*), the spatial meaning of the exterior local cases can be treated as secondary (cf. also Kangasmaa-Minn 1984: 27–28, and for historical background cf. Bartens 2000: 83). Other scholars hierarchize the spatial and possessive meanings of the exterior local cases the other way round. The possessive meaning seems to be only a reinterpretation of the primary spatial meaning (Leino et al. 1990: 183–199; for historical background cf. Pajusalu 1957, Aikio–Ylikoski 2007a: 48–52). In contemporary Finnish, characteristically, the spatial meaning does not cease to be perceived in the presence of the possessive meaning, which gives grounds for the treatment of the possessive meanings as ascribed meanings to the basic actual spatial meanings, for example:

(217) *Kirja on pöydällä.*  
*table-ADESS*  
 [LOCUS]

(218) *Kirja on isällä.*  
*father-ADESS*  
 [LOCUS]  
 [POSSESSOR]

(217) ‘The book is on the table.’

(218) ‘The book is at father’s (place).’  
 ‘The father has the book.’

It is a well-known fact that the interior local cases and the exterior local cases, when opposed to each other, in some tortuous way reflect the spatial relation between the [LOCATUM] and [LOCUS]. According to Penttilä (1957: 380, 414) the inessive expresses a limited place (*rajallinen paikka*), whereas the adessive expresses the surface of an object (*esineen päällyspinta*) or a territory with diffuse borders (*alue, jonka rajoja ei ajatella*). Alhoniemi (1979: 94), by comparing, for instance, sentences of the type:

(219) *Tarvoin suo/ssa.*  
*bog-INESS*

(220) *Tarvoin suo/lla.*  
*bog-ADESS*

(219) ‘I waded in the bog.’

(220) ‘I waded (paddled) on the bog.’

homogenizes this opposition by stating that:

- (i) the referents of nouns in the interior local cases are conceived of as three-dimensional physical objects having volume, depth and matter (cf. (219) *Tarvoin suossa*), whereas
- (ii) the referents of nouns in the exterior local cases are conceived of only as two-dimensional physical objects (cf. (220) *Tarvoin suolla*).

To these indubitably valuable remarks I would like to add the observation that, in order to formulate satisfactory generalizations concerning the nature of the opposition between the interior and exterior local cases, it is desirable to filter out the clearly spatial uses of the analyzed cases from those with idiomatic undertones. For example, the following pairs of sentences:

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>(221) <i>Mies on kaupungissa.</i><br/>town-INESS<br/>↓</p> | <p>(223) <i>Mies lähti metsään.</i><br/>forest-ILLAT<br/>↓</p> |
| <p>(222) <i>Mies on kaupungilla.</i><br/>town-ADESS</p>       | <p>(224) <i>Mies lähti metsälle.</i><br/>forest-ALLAT</p>      |

do not constitute any expected morphosemantic proportionalities. The sentence (221) *Mies on kaupungissa* with the inessive (*kaupungissa*) means simply that the man is in the town. In turn, the sentence (222) *Mies on kaupungilla* with the adessive (*kaupungilla*) means that the man is in a part of the town which is not his permanent place of employment or residence. The sentence (223) *Mies lähti metsään* with the illative (*metsään*) means simply that the man set off to the forest. In turn, the sentence (224) *Mies lähti metsälle* with the allative (*metsälle*) means that the man set off for hunting (ibid. 98–99). Let us compare the following pairs of sentences which, in my view, constitute the expected morphosemantic proportionalities:

	interior local cases	↔	exterior local cases
(225) <i>Oppilaat leikkivät</i>	(a) <i>koulu/ssa</i>	↔	(b) <i>koulu/lla.</i>
(226) <i>Kissa nukkuu</i>	(a) <i>lipasto/ssa</i>	↔	(b) <i>lipasto/lla.</i>
(227) <i>Naulat ovat</i>	(a) <i>kato/ssa</i>	↔	(b) <i>kato/lla.</i>
(228) <i>Minä asun</i>	(a) <i>Nokia/ssa</i>	↔	(b) <i>Nokia/lla.</i>
(229) <i>Minä asun</i>	(a) <i>Suome/ssa.</i>	↔	∅
(230) <i>Minä asun</i>	∅	↔	(b) <i>Venäjä/llä.</i>

- (225a) ‘The pupils play in the school.’  
 (225b) ‘The pupils play at school.’
- (226a) ‘The cat sleeps in the chest of drawers.’  
 (226b) ‘The cat sleeps on the chest of drawers.’
- (227a) ‘The nails are (driven) into the roof.’  
 (227b) ‘The nails are (loosely) on the roof.’
- (228a) ‘I live in Nokia.’  
 (228b) ‘I live in Nokia.’
- (229a) ‘I live in Finland.’  
 (230b) ‘I live in Russia.’

The meanings of the interior and exterior local cases seem to be slightly different in each of the four groups of sentences:

- (i) the opposition *koulussa* : *koululla* in (225) is of participative character ([+INTERIOR] : [+/-INTERIOR]);
- (ii) the opposition *lipastossa* : *lipastolla* in (226) is of contrary character ([+INTERIOR] : [-INTERIOR]);
- (iii) the opposition *katossa* : *katolla* in (227) is also of contrary character, but its nature ([+FASTENED] : [-FASTENED]) is different from that of the two previous oppositions;
- (iv) in the case of place-names ((228) *Nokiassa* : *Nokialla*, (229) *Suomessa* :  $\emptyset$ , (230)  $\emptyset$  : *Venäjällä*) the opposition seems to undergo two types of neutralization:
  - (a) semantic neutralization *sui generis* whereby both types of case become synonymous: [+INTERIOR] : [+INTERIOR], and
  - (b) morphosyntactic neutralization *sui generis* whereby (for reasons which, from the standpoint of the contemporary synchronic state of the Finnish language, remain rather unclear) in certain contexts (*ASUA Suome-* ‘to live Finland-’, *ASUA Venäjä-* ‘to live Russia-’) only one type of case is admissible.

I propose to capture the opposition between the interior and exterior local cases in their spatial meanings first of all by way of meanings in the dimension of **{proximity}**, entailing the following atomic case meanings: [+CLOSE], [-CLOSE], [0]. The constitutive meaning of the interior local cases can be described by the notation [+CLOSE]. The constitutive meaning of the exterior local cases can be described by

the notation [+/-CLOSE]. The constitutive meaning of the local cases undergoes actualization according to the following paths:

[+CLOSE] → [+CLOSE];  
 [+/-CLOSE] → [+CLOSE], [+/-CLOSE] or [-CLOSE].

To the basic actual meanings there can be ascribed, in some contexts, appropriate meanings in the dimensions of {interiority} and {fastenedness} according to the following correlation regularities:

basic actual meanings	ascribed meanings	
	{interiority}	{fastenedness}
[+CLOSE]	→ [+CLOSE] + [+INTERIOR]	→ [+CLOSE] + [+FASTENED]
[+/-CLOSE]	→ [+/-CLOSE] + [+/-INTERIOR]	
[-CLOSE]	→ [-CLOSE] + [-INTERIOR]	→ [-CLOSE] + [-FASTENED]

The actualization of the constitutive meaning and the adscription of meanings to the appropriate basic actual meanings of the local cases depends upon the idiosyncratic (mainly noun) context in which they occur. Let us summarize what has been said by means of the following scheme:

	[+CLOSE] : [+/-CLOSE]			
actualization	↓ [+CLOSE] : [+/-CLOSE]	↓ [+CLOSE] : [-CLOSE]		↓ [+CLOSE] : [+CLOSE]
adscription	↓ [+INT] : [+/-INT]	↓ [+INT] : [-INT]	↓ [+FAST] : [-FAST]	↓ [+INT] : [+INT]
	<i>koulu/ssa : koulu/lla</i>	<i>lipasto/ssa : lipasto/lla</i>	<i>kato/ssa : kato/lla</i>	<i>Nokia/ssa : Nokia/lla</i> <i>Suome/ssa : Ø</i> <i>Ø : Venäjä/llä</i>

Let us compare the following case-conditional sentences, which confirm non-metalingually what has been stated above:

- C38 *Jos oppilaat leikkivät **koulussa**, niin oppilaat leikkivät **koululla**.*  
 ‘If the pupils play in the school, then the pupils play at school.’
- C39 \**Jos oppilaat leikkivät **koululla**, niin oppilaat leikkivät **koulussa**.*  
 \*‘If the pupils play at school, then the pupils play in the school.’
- C40 \**Jos kissa nukkuu **lipastossa**, niin kissa nukkuu **lipastolla**.*  
 \*‘If the cat sleeps in the chest of drawers, then the cat sleeps on the chest of drawers.’
- C41 \**Jos kissa nukkuu **lipastolla**, niin kissa nukkuu **lipastossa**.*  
 \*‘If the cat sleeps on the chest of drawers, then the cat sleeps in the chest of drawers.’
- C42 \**Jos naulat ovat (lyötyinä) **katossa**, niin naulat ovat (irrallaan) **katolla**.*  
 \*‘If the nails are (driven) into the roof, then the nails are (loosely) on the roof.’
- C43 \**Jos naulat ovat (irrallaan) **katolla**, niin naulat ovat (lyötyinä) **katossa**.*  
 \*‘If the nails are (loosely) on the roof, then the nails are (driven) into the roof.’
- C44 *Jos minä asun **Nokiassa**, niin minä asun **Nokialla**.*  
 ‘If I live in Nokia, then I live in Nokia.’
- C45 *Jos minä asun **Nokialla**, niin minä asun **Nokiassa**.*  
 ‘If I live in Nokia, then I live in Nokia.’

Leino (1989: 194–195) considers the non-spatial uses of corresponding interior and exterior local cases to be non-random. Let us compare:

	interior local cases		exterior local cases	
(231)	(a) <i>Auto/ssa</i>	↔	∅	<i>on uudet jarrut.</i>
	∅	↔	(b) <i>Hakija/lla</i>	<i>on hyvät suositukset.</i>
(232)	<i>Lentäjä pelastui</i> (a) <i>onnettomuude/sta</i>	↔	(b) <i>onnettomuude/lla.</i>	

- (231a) ‘The car has good brakes.’  
 (231b) ‘The applicant has good recommendations.’
- (232a) ‘The pilot was rescued from the crash.’  
 (232b) ‘The pilot was preserved from the crash.’

The inessive in (231a) (*Autossa on uudet jarrut*) is conditioned by the presence of the meaning [INALIENABLE POSSESSION] (*erottamaton omistus*). In turn, the adessive in (231b) (*Hakijalla on hyvät suositukset*) is conditioned by the presence of the meaning [LOOSER POSSESSION] (*löyhempi possessiivisuus*). The elative in (232a) (*Lentäjä pelastui onnettomuudesta*) is conditioned by the fact that the pilot was really at the place of the crash, whereas the ablative in (232b) (*Lentäjä pelastui onnettomuudelta*) is conditioned by the lack of such an implication. The state of affairs described by this sentence could be “more naturally” expressed by the verbs *säästyä*, *varjeltua* ‘to be preserved’. The observations made by Leino are undoubtedly pertinent. Nevertheless, it remains unstated that the less spatial (more grammaticalized) the uses of the local cases are, the more blurred or neutralized their mutual oppositions become. This seems to be true also in terms of the super-dimension of {quality}. As is implied by remarks of Leino himself, even the sentences (232a–b) (*Lentäjä pelastui onnettomuudesta* vs. *Lentäjä pelastui onnettomuudelta*) are far from representing the sought morphosemantic proportionality.

## 7.2. The marginal cases

This survey of the Finnish cases will be concluded with the so-called ‘marginal cases’ (*marginaaliset sijat*): the comitative, abessive and instructive. Siro (1964: 63) substantiates the use of this term by the fact that the cases in question do not ever constitute a bound verb complement. Moreover the marginal cases have other properties which distance them markedly from the other cases.

The endings of the marginal cases turn out to be combinable only with a more or less limited set of noun stems. This applies especially to the instructive. According to a monograph by Ross (1988: 103–104, 117–121), the category of instructive in Finnish is definable only by enumeration of its manifestations. In the case of the other two marginal cases it is rather the other way round. The categories of comitative and abessive are definable by means of enumeration of the word stems that are not combinable with their markers (e.g. personal

pronouns) (Hakulinen A. et al. 2004: 1208). Nevertheless, in the contemporary standard language the desinential comitative and abessive forms are being ousted by the corresponding post- or prepositional-desinential forms (for the comitative: genitive forms + *kanssa* ‘with’; for the abessive: *ilman* ‘without’ + partitive forms<sup>55</sup>).

Another idiosyncrasy concerns their combinability with number. The forms of the instructive derived from singular stems (*käde/n*) and those derived from plural stems (*käsi/n*) have practically the same meaning (‘by hand, manually’). The forms of the comitative are derived only from stems which, from the contemporary paradigmatic point of view, are analyzable as plural (cf. *puoliso/i/ne/en* vs. *puoliso/i/ta/an* ‘from his spouses’). This fact, however, does not exclude the possibility of singular semantic interpretation. Let us compare:

(233) *Presidentti/Ø*      *tuli*      *puoliso/i/ne/en*.  
*president-NOM SG*                      *spouse-PL-COM-3 SG*

(234) *Presidentti/t*      *tulivat*      *puoliso/i/ne/en*.  
*president-NOM PL*                      *spouse-PL-COM-3 PL*

(233) ‘The president came with his spouse.’

(234) ‘The presidents came with their spouses.’

Indeed, the abessive markers can be attached to both singular and plural stems, retaining the appropriate semantic difference (cf. *ongelma/tta* ‘without a problem’ vs. *ongelm/i/tta* ‘without problems’), but for some reason only plural forms can be complemented by an adjectival attribute (*suuremm/i/tta ongelm/i/tta* ‘without bigger problems’), whereas the singular forms cannot (*\*suuremma/tta ongelma/tta* ‘without a bigger problem’) (ibid. 1209).

The forms of the comitative must necessarily be provided with the appropriate possessive suffix co-referential with the person and number of the (logical) subject or object of the sentence (cf. *puoliso/i/ne/en* ‘with his spouse(s)’ vs. *\*puoliso/i/ne* ‘with spouse(s)’). In turn, the forms of the abessive and instructive are not combinable with possessive suffixes. Let us compare the following sentences:

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<sup>55</sup> According to Häkkinen (1994: 207–208), the use of *ilman* results from the need for reinforcement of the abessive, which before the 19<sup>th</sup> century displayed a high degree of homonymy with the partitive (*ilman waimoita ia lapsita* ‘without wives and children’). In order to avoid such homonymy, after a long-lasting debate described by Pantermöller (2010), desinential markers of the required meaning(s) have finally been established for the standard Finnish language in the form of the extremely rarely used endings *-tta*, *-ttä*. At the same time, the pleonastic constructions of the type *ilman* + abessive have been supplanted by those of the type *ilman* + partitive.

(235) <i>Tuo patsas</i>	<b>comitative</b>	<i>näyttää aika kummalliselta.</i>
	<i>kiemurais/i/ne käsi/ne/en</i>	

(↕)

(236) <i>Tuo patsas</i>	<b>abessive</b>	<i>näyttää aika kummalliselta.</i>
	<i>kiemurais/i/tta käsi/ttä</i>	

(235) 'This statue with its winding hands looks quite weird.'

(236) 'This statue without winding hands looks quite weird.'

(237) <i>Taiteilija maalasi taulun</i>	<b>instructive</b>
	<i>käsi/n.</i>

(↕)

(238) <i>Taiteilija maalasi taulun</i>	<b>abessive</b>
	<i>käsi/ttä.</i>

(237) 'The artist painted the picture by hand.'

(238) 'The artist painted the picture without hands.'

The comitative conveys the meaning [COMPANION] in the dimension of {companionship}. The instructive conveys the meaning [INSTRUMENT] in the dimension of {instrumentality}. The abessive conveys the meaning [ABSENT] in the dimension of {absence}. Whether it concerns the lack of an accompanying or instrumental entity seems to be disambiguated by the lexical items occurring in the entire sentential context.

All of what has been said here implies that it is difficult to extract from the Finnish language minimal case syntagms displaying opposition between any marginal case and any other (marginal or non-marginal) case other than the relation of intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic case opposition (Re 1). The so-called marginal cases, in approaching the category of adverb, convey relatively constant meanings, which do not undergo any actualization according to the meaning of the head of the syntagm as was the case with the other Finnish cases.

## 8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The **first chapter** contained a survey of the most authoritative, influential approaches to case from antiquity (India, Greece and the Roman Empire) up to the present day.

The notion of case (*vibhakti*) was coined by **Pāṇini**, the author of the first known systematic Sanskrit grammar and the earliest known grammar anywhere in the world. He distinguishes for Sanskrit eight cases: (i) *prathamā* ‘nominative’, (ii) *dvitīyā* ‘accusative’, (iii) *tr̥tīyā* ‘instrumental’, (iv) *caturthī* ‘dative’, (v) *pañcamī* ‘ablative’, (vi) *ṣaṣṭhī* ‘genitive’, (vii) *saptamī* ‘locative’, and (viii) *sambodhana* ‘vocative’. Pāṇini’s grammar is a system of rules which, starting from the meaning, via a very thoroughly elaborated morphophonology, describe the derivation of the target lingual form. As far as case is concerned, there are introduced for this purpose six *kāraṅkas* ‘semantic roles’: (i) *karṭṛ* ‘agent’, (ii) *karman* ‘patient’, (iii) *karāṇa* ‘instrument’, (iv) *saṃpradānam* ‘destination’, (v) *apādāna* ‘source’, and (vi) *adhikarāṇa* ‘locus’. However, from the contemporary point of view, no conclusive interpretation of the *kāraṅkas* has been achieved. As it turns out, the *kāraṅkas* do not always remain constant under paraphrase. This seems to undermine their strictly semantic nature. Some of the *vibhaktis*, in all or some of their uses, remain beyond the *kāraṅka*-system (cf. the vocative and genitive). The same uncertainty as regards the establishment of a system of semantic oppositions between all cases in all of their uses is found throughout the centuries up to modern times in Europe, where the achievements of Pāṇini remained unknown until the turn of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.

The ancient **Greeks**, having no knowledge about the achievements of the Indians, had to start from scratch. The initially labile understanding of the notion *πτῶσις* (*ptōsis*) was fixed by the Stoics so that it referred only to the inflectional nominal forms, that is, the cases. The Greeks identified five cases, naming each of them according to what was conceived of as its main, conspicuous meaning: (i) *ὀνομαστική* (*onomastikḗ*) ‘nominative’, (ii) *γενική* (*genikḗ*) ‘genitive’, (iii) *δοτική* (*dotikḗ*) ‘dative’, (iv) *αἰτιατική* (*aitiatikḗ*) ‘accusative’, and (v) *κλητική* (*klētikḗ*) ‘vocative’.

Although the ancient Greeks were aware to some extent of phonetic and phonological issues, they did not address morphology as it is practiced nowadays. The smallest recognized meaningful lingual unit was the word. In their predominantly atomistic approaches, it is possible to identify some attempts to give a systemic account of case syntax and semantics.

The ancient **Romans** took over the highly developed Greek model. As far as case is concerned, the unquestionable merits of the Romans include the distinguishing of a specifically Latin case – the ablative. This innovation led to numerous speculations concerning the number of cases relevant to language, which turned out quite fruitful in revealing the intricate nature of the relation between the case (form) and its meaning. Regrettably, later, the number of the Latin cases and the semantic content ascribed to each of them, as well as their exclusively desinential manifestation, were cultivated in more or less fossilized form for many centuries in reference to the vernacular languages, even though this approach failed to fit the facts for those languages.

Linguistics in the **Middle Ages** was practiced in the spirit of the epoch; there was no need to endeavor to attain the truth, since it was known from theology and ancient science. It only had to be justified and proved. The Byzantine linguist Maximus Planudes is said to have attempted to establish for the Greek case system a coherent system of dimensions: (i) dependence-independence and (ii) direction. For this reason he is treated by some contemporary scholars as the forerunner of the **localist case theory**, which was popular in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

The **speculative grammarians** in Western Europe believed in an underlying overall general grammar which manifested itself perfectly in the Latin language, a metalanguage *par excellence*. Breaking away from the excessive focus on data inherited from antiquity, they attempted to explain the mechanism binding things with their lingual reflections by means of so-called *modi significandi* ‘modes of signifying’. In reference to case, the merits of the speculative grammarians include their emphasis on the need to describe the syntagmatic functioning of the words belonging to the case category.

The period in linguistics extending from the **Renaissance** up to the **19<sup>th</sup> century** (the discovery of Sanskrit), in spite of its undoubted achievement in dethroning Greek and Latin, was actually a time of stagnancy. The rigid ancient conceptual framework concerning case was abandoned in relation to the vernacular languages only gradually and with reluctance. The only innovation worthy of attention is the increasing awareness that cases (case meanings) can be expressed not only by endings, but also by word order and prepositions.

The relevant contribution of the **historical-comparative** linguistics of the 19<sup>th</sup> century is seen in the ascendancy of the **diachronically** inclined **holistic** approaches to case. The most ardent disputes took place between the supporters and opponents

of the **localist** case theory: the localists and antilocalists. The localist case theory of that time assumed that cases are spatial from both the diachronic and synchronic points of view. The case markers (endings) came into existence from “shortened and darkened” spatial prepositions. The contemporary polysemy of cases can be captured by means of the so-called **general meaning** (*Grundbedeutung*, *signification générale*). The general meaning is so abstract that it covers all particular meanings of a case (form). The general meaning is reflected in all particular meanings of the case in question. The contemporary general meanings of cases continue to be spatial. The Antilocalists questioned the usefulness of the notion of the spatial general meaning, because – contrary to what had been claimed – none of the Localists had made an effort to show how the particular meanings of a case (form) are derived from it. The localist and antilocalist standpoints seem to be reconciled by the demilocalists, who distinguish purely syntactic (grammatical) and semantic (concrete) cases. In turn, the approach to case developed by the **Neogrammarians**, the 19<sup>th</sup>-century rivals of the historical-comparative linguists, is an example of extreme **atomism**.

The most authoritative case theories worked out by the **Structuralists** in the 20<sup>th</sup> century seem superior methodologically to everything that had been done up to that time. **Hjelmslev**’s concept of case can be viewed as a modernized, de-diachronized version of the localist theory of the preceding century. He considers that the cases are to be defined **semantically**, based on a general meaning treated as the **differential minimum of signification**. The general meaning, covering with sufficient abstractness all types of case relations (including the syntagmatic relations), is spatial only **metaphorically**. The system of **three dimensions** (direction, coherence-incoherence, subjectivity-objectivity) is capable of capturing the case systems of all languages of the world. **Jakobson**, in his analysis of the Russian case system, employs the notions of **markedness** and **unmarkedness**. The morphological categories, from the point of view of their general meanings, are assigned in such a way that where the category I (the marked member of the opposition) indicates the presence of the meaning [A], the category II (the unmarked member of the opposition) does not indicate whether [A] is present or absent. The semantic extremism of Hjelmslev and Jakobson seems to be moderated by **Kuryłowicz**, an eminent Polish linguist, whose case theory strengthens the role of the **syntactic** component. The **grammatical cases** (accusative, nominative, genitive) belong to the case system on the strength of their **primary** function. The **concrete cases** (instrumental, dative, ablative, locative) belong to the case system on the strength of their **secondary** function. In this situation both types of cases are, because of the fact of their being governed by open classes of verbs, de facto **meaningless**. The concrete cases are combinatory variants of the grammatical cases. Otherwise, the concrete cases seem to constitute rather a fuzzy class penetrating into the class of adverbs.

Representatives of the **transformational-generative** current in linguistics, namely **Fillmore** and his followers, allegedly shifted the axis of dispute from the form to the meaning, by treating case in terms of **deep cases** or **semantic roles**. Nevertheless, as has been shown, these notions do not appear to represent any kind of novelty when one is aware of the achievements of linguistics that have been developed for millennia in the Old World (cf. the Pāṇinian *kāraka*-system). Nor does the predilection for treating case less formally necessarily have to result from anything revolutionary in their considerations. It is rather a consequence of the fact that the analysis concerns only one language – English – in which the traditional in-tralexonal formal distinctions occur only in vestigial form.

**Finnish linguists** are, for obvious reasons, interested mainly in the specific properties of case in the Finnish language. In spite of their advanced and detailed research, what is striking is the almost total lack of holistic approaches. This does not apply only to methodology. Works dealing with the Finnish case system as a whole, and not limiting themselves to the mere enumeration of cases (case forms) and their contextual meanings, are also a rarity.

The **second chapter** expounds the case theory adopted in the present work. By way of introduction, the emphasis is placed on the epistemological posteriority of morphology to semantics and syntax. The primitive terms are listed and their intuitive sense explained.

In spite of the fact that case is conceived of as a **grammatical category**, it turns out to be impossible to talk about it in total isolation from **lexis**. This results from the lexical restrictions imposed on the grammatical mechanisms. Irrespective of how the notion of grammar is understood, it ought to systematize the issues of **grammaticalization** and **lexicalization**. The **Case Grammar** deals first with those of the relevant phenomena which are the most grammaticalized. The more lexicalized phenomena may constitute an area of research called **Case Lexis**.

The cases (case forms) are excerpted from larger syntactic units, so-called **minimal case syntagms**. Minimal case syntagms are **non-elliptical schemes of valency and case government**. Case opposition results from the comparison of appropriate minimal case syntagms. It is possible to substantiate the empirical hypothesis that there exist only **four** relevant schemes of co-occurrence of case with other component(s) in the minimal case syntagms. The relation of **intrasyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic** case opposition reflects the rather trivial, obvious fact that cases serve to differentiate between diathetically relevant noun arguments of the same governing word (mainly verb) (cf. *Pekka lyö Anttia* ‘Peter-NOM beats Andrew-PART’). In turn, the fact that some cases are especially burdened functionally from a paradigmatic point of view in comparison with other cases, becoming the unique carriers of target meaning(s), is reflected in the relation of **intersyntagmic-**

**adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic** case opposition (cf. *Luin kirjan* ‘I read the whole book-ACC’ vs. *Luin kirjaa* ‘I read/was reading a/the book-PART’). The relation of **intersyntagmic-diathetic-asemantic-syntactic** case opposition mirrors the fact that the language is capable of expressing the same thing in various diathetic ways (cf. *kirjan lukeminen* ‘reading of a/the book-GEN’ vs. *lukea kirjaa* ‘to read a/the book-PART’). In turn, the fact that cases serve to differentiate between noun arguments of different governing words is rendered by the relation of **intersyntagmic-diathetic-semantic-syntactic** case opposition (cf. *Rakastan kirjoja* ‘I love books-PART’ vs. *Tykkään kirjoista* ‘I like books-ELAT’).

The cases are characterized by different **range in syntactic categories**. For example, the Finnish accusative can function as a direct object in combination with every lexical stem. The lexical range of the accusative in other syntactic functions is conspicuously narrower. The function of direct object is the **primary syntactic function** of the Finnish accusative. Other possible functions are its **secondary syntactic functions**. Based on the primary syntactic function of particular cases, the case system can be divided into appropriate **subsystems**. In Finnish there operate **five** case subsystems: (i) the cases of direct object (accusative, partitive), (ii) the cases of subject (nominative, absolutive), (iii) the cases of predicative (nominative, partitive), (iv) the case of attribute and adverbial (genitive), and (v) the cases of adverbial (inessive, illative, elative, adessive, allative, ablative, essive, translative, comitative, abessive, instructive). The **pillar** of the case oppositions is those primary syntactic uses of the cases which constitute inter- and/or intrasyntagmic governing word-case proportions. Such uses are referred to as **proportional uses**. The cases in the proportional uses are the unique grammatical signifiers (i.e. auto-semificators) of the target meaning(s) in (at least) one semantic dimension. The **isolated uses** are those uses of the cases which break out of the said proportions.

The approach to the **polysemy** of cases, based on the three processes of (i) actualization, (ii) adscription, and (iii) reinterpretation of meaning, makes it possible to fix such semantic constants which, being the relatively least dependent on the context, characterize a case as such.

The **actualization** of meaning consists in adjustment of the so-called **constitutive meaning** to the context, resulting in the **actual meanings**. The **constitutive meaning** of a case is a fusion of all of its homogeneous actual meanings in the appropriate semantic dimension which are conveyed by the case in question in its proportional uses (obligatorily) and in relevant isolated uses (facultatively). **Two cases always have different constitutive meanings in reference to at least one dimension** (cf. differential minimum of signification). The process of actualization of meaning is characterized by certain regularities. In passing from the complex constitutive meaning to the actual meanings, the **complexity of co-signification** globally increases. The **paths** of actualization of the complex constitutive meaning are sub-

ject to certain restrictions. The path of actualization of the type \*[+/-] → [+], [-] is inaccessible. This seems to corroborate the existence of the **unity** in the meaning of the cases which has been sensed intuitively since antiquity. One case cannot signify exclusively two totally opposing things.

The **adscription** of meaning consists in ascribing to the actual meaning of a case form a meaning from some other dimension. The **basic actual meanings** occur in more numerous contexts than the **ascribed actual meanings**. The process of adscription of meaning is controlled by so-called **correlation regularities** (cf. *Kirja on pöydällä* ‘The book is on the table’ ([LOCATUM], [LOCUS]) → *Kirja on isällä* ‘The book is at father’s place’, ‘The father has the book’ ([LOCATUM] + [POSSESSUM], [LOCUS] + [POSSESSOR])). The fusion of all homogeneous actual ascribed meanings is not considered in terms of the constitutive meaning.

The **reinterpretation** of meaning, when considered from the synchronic point of view, consists in **parallel, combinatory** occurrence of the reinterpreted meaning with the remaining types of actual meanings (cf. *Hän kuoli metsässä* ‘He died in the forest’ ([LOCUS]) vs. *Hän kuoli kesäkuussa* ‘He died in June’ ([TEMPUS])).

The **form** is treated in the present work as a lingual fact to the same extent as the meaning. In the contemporary state of linguistics, a case grammarian presents an **inventory of cases** which to his knowledge most adequately reflects the relevant formal-syntactic-semantic regularities of the language in question. From this point of view, Finnish is analyzed as having **16 desinential cases**: (i) accusative, (ii) partitive, (iii) nominative, (iv) absolutive, (v) genitive, (vi) inessive, (vii) illative, (viii) elative, (ix) adessive, (x) allative, (xi) ablative, (xii) essive, (xiii) translative, (xiv) comitative, (xv) abessive, and (xvi) instructive.

The formal fluctuations which do not ultimately influence the fixed numerosity of the case paradigm are discussed in terms of (i) **morphological variation** (i.e. phonetic over-distinguishability in the framework of one case) and (ii) **phonetic neutralization** (i.e. phonetic indistinguishability in the framework of at least two cases). To reflect the specificity of the Finnish accusative and absolutive, there is introduced the relation of **weaker morphological case variation** (cf. *Luin kirjan* ‘I read the whole book-II ACC’ vs. *Lue kirja!* ‘Read the whole book-I ACC!’). The relation of **indissoluble phonetic neutralization of case opposition**, in turn, makes it possible to address the intricate problem of nominative-accusative syncretism in Finnish.

The **third** chapter is devoted to analysis of the cases of **direct object** – the **accusative** and **partitive**.

The accusative, in spite of its conspicuous formal confluence with the genitive on one hand and the nominative on the other, is recognized as a **productive** Finnish case. That is, it is assumed that the relation of homophony is a **symmetrical** relation.

If some forms of the accusative are homophonic with some forms of the genitive or nominative, then the same relation holds in the opposite direction. The view that some cases have their forms, whereas others borrow them from other cases, is unacceptably biased.

Much attention has been devoted to the so-called **accusative split**, that is, to the co-occurrence of the accusative forms homophonic with the genitive (I ACC) and nominative (II ACC) throughout all nominal paradigms with the exception of the paradigms of the small number of personal pronouns and the interrogative pronoun *kuka* ‘who’. The nominal constituents in sentences of the type *Isä kutsuttiin* (‘One invited the father’, ‘The father got invited’) are interpreted as instances of the **indissoluble accusative-nominative syncretism**. In their case, the diffusion of the analogy with active sentences in which the I accusative occurs seems to be blocked by the systemic occurrence of the **indissoluble impersonal-passive syncretism**. In turn, the manifestations of the II accusative homophonic with the nominative in sentences of the type *Kutsu isä!* (‘Invite the father!’) do not admit such an interpretation. From the contemporary point of view it is found to be adequate to recognize all relevant nominal forms as belonging to a **common morphosyntactic category** – the accusative. Its two forms (I and II accusative) are bound by the relation of weaker morphological case variation.

In the framework of the canonical **synchronic** approach (cf. Setälä), the choice between the accusative and partitive as cases of direct object is governed **independently** by **quantification** and **aspect**. The **simple atomic quantitative** ([+TOTAL], [-TOTAL]) and **aspectual** ([+RESULTATIVE], [-RESULTATIVE]) **meanings are combinable freely** with each other. Nevertheless, for instance in the sentence *Minä olin hevosta tuomassa, kun tapasin hänet* ‘I was just bringing the horse-PART when I met him’, the use of the accusative (*hevose/n*) turns out to be inadmissible even though that case would be required by the relevant quantitative rule ([+TOTAL] → accusative). The opposing synchronic approaches, making use of the so-called common semantic denominator, obfuscate the intricacies of the Finnish quantitative-aspectual relations rather than clarifying them. Their disadvantages include the inclination towards analyzing case government from the point of view of **extralingual reality** (cf. Matti Sadeniemi, Denison, Kiparsky, Leino). The process of the **adscription** of the appropriate aspectual meanings implied by the verb to the appropriate quantitative meanings expressed primarily by the accusative and partitive of **divisible** nouns, as put forward by Larjavaara, is, in spite of its **diachronic** character, extremely helpful in understanding the contemporary semantics of both cases of direct object. It seems to present in an appropriate light the reasons for the appearance of both: (i) the proportional uses of the accusative and partitive of **indivisible** nouns (cf. *Luin kirjan* ‘I read the whole book’ : *Luin kirjaa* ‘I read/was reading a/the

book’) and (ii) different kinds of **neutralization** *sui generis* of the accusative-partitive opposition in specific minimal verbal contexts (pro-accusative: *Näin kirjan* ‘I saw a/the book’, and pro-partitive: *Rakastin kirjaa* ‘I loved a/the book’).

The identification of the desired formal-syntactic-semantic regularities from the contemporary synchronic point of view turns out to be feasible only in the case of **minimal case syntagms**. Otherwise the investigated phenomenon takes on a chaotic character, making it impossible to capture. As far as the accusative and partitive are concerned, it is reasonable to treat the **non-neutralizative** and **neutralizative** contexts **separately**. The same applies to **divisible** and **indivisible** nouns.

In the case of **divisible** nouns, in the minimal **non-neutralizative** case syntagms the appropriate quantitative and aspectual meanings are combined with each other **selectively**. The accusative auto-signifies the **simple meanings** [+TOTAL] and [+RESULTATIVE], whereas the partitive auto-signifies the **complex meanings** [+/-TOTAL] and [+/-RESULTATIVE]; for example: *Luin kirjat* ‘I read all the books’ vs. *Luin kirjoja* ‘I read (some) books’, ‘I was reading books’. The relevant aspectual meanings which are implied by the verb do not occur in the case of divisible nouns without the corresponding quantitative meanings, but the converse does not hold; for example: *Näin kirjat* ‘I saw all the books’ vs. *Näin kirjoja* ‘I saw (some) books’. The occurrence of the quantitative meanings is **context-bound to a lesser extent** than the occurrence of the aspectual meanings (this rule applies also to the non-minimal and neutralizative contexts). In the case of **indivisible** nouns there seem to occur only **aspectual meanings**, for example: *Siirsin isoäidin* ‘I moved the grandma (to a place)’ vs. *Siirsin isoäitiä* ‘I was moving the grandma’. In order to capture the differential minimum of signification of the accusative and partitive **in the entirety of their proportional and relevant isolated uses, the constitutive meanings** of both cases should be sought in the dimensions of {**quantification**} and {**aspect**}. The constitutive meaning of the accusative can be denoted as either [+TOTAL] or [+RESULTATIVE]. In turn, the constitutive meaning of the partitive can be denoted as either [+/-TOTAL] or [+/-RESULTATIVE].

The occurrence of the appropriate case of direct object in the **neutralizative** contexts is explained by means of (at least partial) **semantic compatibility** of the case of the noun and the governing verb in reference to the dimension of {**aspect**} in the broad meaning, i.e. covering both the traditional aspect and gender of action. The **punctual** verbs of the type *Näin* ‘I saw’ are, in the case of indivisible nouns, on the strength of analogy with verbs of the type *Luin [kirjan]* ‘I read [the whole book]’, combinable only with the accusative. In turn, the **irresultative** verbs of the type *Rakastin* ‘I loved’ are, in the case of all types of nouns, on the strength of analogy with verbs of the type *Luin [kirjaa]* ‘I was reading [a/the book]’, combinable only with the partitive. The surprising neutralization *sui generis* in **negative** contexts **in**

**favor of the partitive**, in consequence of which the Finnish language loses the possibility of univocal grammatical expression of the meaning [+RESULTATIVE] as opposed to the meaning [+/-RESULTATIVE] (cf. *En lukenut kirjaa* ‘I did not read the whole book’, ‘I did not read/was not reading any book’), has been explained by a rule according to which in contemporary Finnish the choice of case of the direct object of a negative verb refers to the **aspectual implications of the input and not to the input itself**. Even if one wants to communicate that one did not read the whole book, the aspectual implication is that **there is no final result**. If one did not read/was not reading any book at all, there is no result either. In both instances only the partitive can be used.

The relevant **informational**, **temporal** and **honorificative** meanings which can be conveyed by the accusative and partitive in their proportional uses have been interpreted at the most as **ascribed** meanings to the appropriate basic quantitative and aspectual meanings. The following correlation regularities are identified: [+TOTAL] → [+TOTAL] + [+IDENTICAL], [+/-TOTAL] → [+/-TOTAL] + [+/-IDENTICAL]; [+RESULT] → [+RESULT] + [+FUTURE], [+/-RESULT] → [+/-RESULT] + [+/-FUTURE]; [+RESULT] → [+RESULT] + [+/-POLITE], [+/-RESULT] → [+/-RESULT] + [+POLITE].

The **fourth** chapter is devoted to an analysis of the cases of **subject** – the **nominative** and **absolute**.

The status of the **nominative** as subject-case does not seem to arouse any controversy. The fact that the nominative, as a non-desinential case, in combination with the unmarked diathesis (active voice) conveys the diathetically relevant meanings [AGENT] and [STATIVE], whereas the (preponderantly) desinential accusative and partitive, as opposed to the nominative, convey the diathetically relevant meaning [PATIENT], allow Finnish to be classified as an **accusative language**.

Because of the extensive nominative-accusative syncretism, the opposition between the nominative and accusative (and consequently between the subject and direct object) is maintained most explicitly by the other case of direct object – the **partitive** – whose forms are never homophonic with those of the nominative. Nevertheless, the forms of the partitive seem to lose this differential function in so-called **existential sentences** (such as *Laatikossa oli työkaluja* ‘In the box there were (some) tools’, *Laatikossa oli työkalut* ‘In the box there was a set of tools’), giving the impression of an **remarkable merger of the subject and direct object**. The otherwise valuable considerations of Finnish linguists concerning the meaning of existential and non-existential intransitive verbs are evaluated as a matter pertaining to the **lexicology of the Finnish verb**. The Finnish Case Grammar is interested rather in a classification of verbs allowing one to formulate the desired case-

government regularities. In turn, the opposing of the subject of the existential sentence, as belonging exclusively to the **rheme** of the sentence, to the subject of the non-existential sentence, as belonging exclusively to the **theme** of the sentence, is evaluated here as inadequate.

In order to grasp the morphosyntactic structure of existential sentences adequately, I put forward a hypothesis which seems to go further than the Finnish linguists' proposals. According to this hypothesis, the forms of the partitive and nominative (II accusative) in the appropriate sentence types **have been reinterpreted as absolutive** which is a **subject-case in the ergative (sub)system**. The hitherto existing difficulties in interpreting adequately the morphosyntactic structure of existential sentences (cf. the alleged lack of number-person congruence between the subject and predicate) result from its analysis from the point of view of the accusative system. It is difficult to shed light on the Finnish ergative subsystem due to the fact that **it has not yet produced its specific signifiers**. The Finnish absolutive is a **defective** case which has only **singular** forms of the **3<sup>rd</sup> person**.

As far as the diathetically relevant meanings are concerned, **the absolutive is less polysemic than the nominative**. It conveys the meaning [STATIVE] in connection with intransitive verbs, and the meaning [PATIENT] in connection with transitive verbs.

As far as the diathetically irrelevant meanings are concerned, the available theories are actually incapable of answering the question of what is the role of the cases of subject in their signification. This results from the random nature of the empirical material used. Only by eliminating such obfuscating variables as **verb endings**, **word order** and **sentential stress** is it possible to obtain minimal case syntagms which make it possible to fix the semantic constants characterizing the Finnish cases of subject as such. The relation of intersyntagmic-adiathetic-semantic-asyntactic case opposition (Re 2), mirroring the special functional burden of the cases from the paradigmatic point of view, exists only between (i) the nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the partitive (of singular nouns), and (ii) the absolutive homophonic with the nominative (II accusative) and the absolutive homophonic with the partitive (without any constraints with regard to number). The nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the nominative (II accusative) do not stand in this kind of relation of case opposition.

The opposition between **the absolutive homophonic with the nominative (II accusative) and the absolutive homophonic with the partitive** (that is – the opposition within the absolutive case) may be captured by means of **quantitative** meanings. The unmarked member of the opposition (the absolutive homophonic with the partitive) conveys the meaning [+/-TOTAL]. In turn, the marked member of the opposition (the absolutive homophonic with the nominative (II accusative)) con-

veys the meaning [+TOTAL], which – because of the specific theme-rheme structure of the analyzed sentences – is actualized to the meaning [TOTALITY *AD HOC*], for example: *Laatikossa oli työkalut* ‘In the box there was a set of tools (used for a certain purpose)’.

The opposition between the nominative and the absolutive homophonic with the partitive can be considered from the quantitative point of view only when the nominative-subject belongs to the theme of the sentence. In other cases, the nominative and the discussed form of the absolutive **convey the same quantitative meaning** [+/-TOTAL]. As it turns out, in Finnish, two opposing operations, namely the operation of **totalization** (in the case of uncountable nouns: *VESI* ‘water’) and **partialization** (in the case of plural countable nouns: *TYÖKALUT* ‘tools’) can be conceptualized as a single operation of **individuation**. The nominative conveys the meaning [+INDIVIDUAL], for example: *Vesi valui pulloon* ‘The water (as an individualized entirety) poured into the bottle’, *Työkalut olivat laatikossa* ‘The tools (as individualized entities) were in the box’. The absolutive homophonic with the partitive conveys the meaning [+/-INDIVIDUAL], for example: *Pulloon valui vettä* ‘Into the bottle there poured water (as an individualized entirety or as parts)’, *Laatikossa oli työkaluja* ‘In the box there were tools (as individualized entities or as an entirety)’.

It is based on the **individuating** meanings (and not, as the majority of Finnish linguists ascertain, on the quantitative meanings) that the nominative-absolutive opposition **has been extended to indivisible nouns**. In the sentence *Kummitus ei ole hautausmaalla* ‘The ghost (as a really existing individual) is not in the cemetery’, with the nominative-subject, the ghost is conceptualized as an (existing) individuality (which right now is not in the cemetery). In turn, in the sentence *Hautausmaalla ei ole kummitusta* ‘In the cemetery there is no ghost (as a really existing individual or as a potentially existing individual)’, with the absolutive-subject, the question of whether or not the said ghost is an (existing) individuality is not settled. The sentence asserts only the “ghostlessness” of the cemetery in question.

The diathetically irrelevant constitutive meanings of the cases of subject are represented by the following notations – for the nominative: [+INDIVIDUAL], [+/-TOTAL]; for the absolutive homophonic with the partitive: [+/-INDIVIDUAL], [+/-TOTAL]; and for the absolutive homophonic with the nominative (II accusative): [+TOTAL] (*ad hoc*).

The **fifth** chapter is devoted to the cases of **predicative**. The controversies concerning the predicative arise from its specific syntactic status. The predicative acquires syntactic connectivity only after being combined with the **copula**. The function of predicative can be fulfilled in Finnish by two cases (case forms) – the **nominative** and **partitive**. The nominative and partitive in the predicative function

are opposed on the syntagmatic plane of the language to the nominative as subject-case. From this point of view, the nominative conveys the meanings [PRAEDIFICATUM] and [PRAEDIFICANS]. The partitive conveys the meaning [PRAEDIFICANS]. Both cases of predicative are also opposed to each other on the paradigmatic plane of the language. In such a context the partitive, as the unmarked member of the opposition, conveys the meaning [+/-TOTAL], whereas the nominative conveys the meaning [+TOTAL] (*ad hoc*). As has been established, the **distributive** meaning ([+DISTRIBUTIVE]) of the partitive-predicative can at the most be treated as an **ascribed** meaning to the basic quantitative meaning of the partitive [+/-TOTAL] in the adjectival context, for example: *Nuo silmälasit ovat hyviä* ‘Those glasses are good (from the point of view of their imaginable components)’. The **collective** meaning ([+COLLECTIVE] or alternatively [-DISTRIBUTIVE]) can be treated as an ascribed meaning to the basic meaning [+TOTAL] of the nominative in the analogous context, for example: *Nuo silmälasit ovat hyvät* ‘Those glasses are good (from the point of view of their entirety)’. The meanings [+PERMANENT] and [-PERMANENT] of the partitive- and nominative-predicative are also ascribed meanings to the meanings [+/-TOTAL] and [+TOTAL] respectively.

The **sixth** chapter is devoted to the only case of **attribute** and **adverbial** – the **genitive**. Attention is paid to the surprising inconsistency in approaches to the **genitive-accusative** syncretism (whose occurrence is usually negated) and the **genitive-instructive** syncretism (whose occurrence is not even questioned). All three categories (genitive, accusative and instructive) are – in spite of their partial formal overlapping – morphological categories relevant to contemporary Finnish. It has proved much more problematic to capture the meaning(s) of the genitive. Available analyses treat the problem in a remarkably **atomized** way. The insurmountable difficulties in detecting the formal-syntactic-semantic regularities in reference to the strictly **adnominal** genitive result from the mixed grammatical and lexical character of the signifier of the relevant case meaning(s) (cf. [POSSESSOR]). However, the **adverbial** genitive, which stands in quite a regular relation of intersyntagmic-diathetic-asemantic-syntactic case opposition (Re 3) with the cases of subject (**subjective genitive**) and of direct object (**objective genitive**), co-semifies the meanings characteristic of the unmarked member of the relevant opposition: [AGENT], [PATIENT], [STATIVE] (cf. nominative), [+/-TOTAL], [+/-RESULTATIVE] (cf. partitive), [+/-TOTAL], [+/-INDIVIDUAL] (cf. absolutive homophonic with the partitive).

The cases of **adverbial** in the **seventh** chapter are classified roughly into (i) **local** and (ii) **marginal** cases. The local cases are the **inessive**, **illative**, **elative**, **adessive**,

**allative, ablative, essive, translative** (and conditionally the **partitive**). The marginal cases are the **comitative, abessive** and **instructive**.

The **local** cases, in their most conspicuous (that is, spatial) uses, enter into opposition on the syntagmatic plane of the language with the cases of subject and/or direct object. The cases of subject and/or direct object convey the meaning [LOCATUM]. The local cases convey the meaning [LOCUS]. Furthermore, on the syntagmatic and paradigmatic planes of the language, the local cases also enter into oppositions among themselves. Even in contemporary Finnish, the local cases constitute a compact system of semantic oppositions only in as much as they are considered from the point of view of their **spatial** meanings. As regards their **other** meanings, the oppositions between them seem to be **blurred to a significant degree**. The opposition between inessive, adessive, essive vs. illative, allative, translative vs. elative, ablative (and partitive) is captured using meanings in two dimensions: {**staticity**} and (proper) {**direction**}. The inessive, adessive and essive convey the meanings [STATIC], [DYNAMIC], [0]. The illative, allative and translative convey the meanings [DYNAMIC], [TO]. The elative, ablative (and partitive) convey the meanings [DYNAMIC], [FROM]. The opposition between the so-called **interior** local cases (inessive, illative, elative) and **exterior** local cases (adessive, allative, ablative) is discussed without regard to the so-called **general** local cases (essive, translative (and partitive)), because their relevant spatial uses have undergone far-reaching lexicalization. The inessive, illative and elative are opposed to the adessive, allative and ablative in the dimension of {**proximity**}. The meaning conveyed by the inessive, illative and elative in the entirety of their proportional and appropriate isolated uses may be represented by the notation [+CLOSE], and the analogous meaning of the adessive, allative, ablative by the notation [+/-CLOSE]. Subsequently the meanings [+CLOSE], [+/-CLOSE] are actualized according to the described paths of actualization to the appropriate basic actual meanings ([+CLOSE] → [+CLOSE], [+/-CLOSE] → [+CLOSE], [+/-CLOSE], [-CLOSE]) to which in the appropriate idiosyncratic (mainly noun) contexts there are ascribed meanings from the dimensions of {**interiority**} and {**fastenedness**}: [+CLOSE] → [+CLOSE] + [+INTERIOR], [+CLOSE] → [+CLOSE] + [+FASTENED], [+/-CLOSE] → [+/-CLOSE] + [+/-INTERIOR], [-CLOSE] → [-CLOSE] + [-INTERIOR], [-CLOSE] → [-CLOSE] + [-FASTENED].

The **marginal** cases do not ever constitute a bound verb complement. Approaching the category of **adverb**, the marginal cases convey relatively **constant** meanings: [COMPANION] for the comitative, [INSTRUMENT] for the instructive, and [ABSENT] for the abessive. These do not undergo any actualization according to the meaning of the head of the syntagm as was characteristic of the other Finnish cases.

Let us summarize the findings of the present work by means of the following table:

case	case markers	syntactic function	constitutive meanings {dimensions}	actualization paths (if narrowed or ascribed)	ascribed meanings {dimensions}
ACC	-n, -t, -Ø	direct object	[PATIENT] {transitivity}  [LOCATUM] {spatiality}  [+TOTAL] {quantification}  [+RESULT] {aspect/gender of action}	→[+TOTAL]  →[+RESULT]	[+IDENTICAL] {identicalness}  [+FUTURE] {time} +[+/-POLITE] {honorification}
PART	-a, -ä, -ta, -tä, -tta, -ttä	direct object, predicative	[PATIENT] {transitivity}  [LOCATUM] {spatiality}  [+/-TOTAL] {quantification}  [+/-RESULT] {aspect/gender of action}  [PRAEDIFICANS] {predicativity}	→[+/-TOTAL]  →[-TOTAL]  →[+/-RESULT]  →[-RESULT] →[+RESULT]	[+/-IDENTICAL] {identicalness} +[+DISTRIB] {distributivity} +[+PERMANENT] {permanency}  [+/-FUTURE] {time} +[+POLITE] {honorification}

case	case markers	syntactic function	constitutive meanings {dimensions}	actualization paths (if narrowed or ascribed)	ascribed meanings {dimensions}
NOM	-Ø, -t	subject, predicative	[AGENT]– –[PATIENT]– –[STATIVE] {transitivity}  [LOCATUM] {spatiality}  [+INDIVIDUAL] {individuality}  [+/-TOTAL] {quantification}  [PRAEDIFICATUM]– –[PRAEDIFICANS] {predicativity}	→[AGENT] →[PATIENT] →[STATIVE]  →[LOCATUM]  →[+INDIVIDUAL]  →[+/-TOTAL] →[+TOTAL]  →[PRAEDIFICATUM] →[PRAEDIFICANS]	+ [POSSESSUM] {possessivity}  + [+DISTRIB] {distributivity}  + [–PERMANENT] {permanency}
ABS	-a, -ä, -ta, -tä, -tta, -ttä, -Ø, -t	subject	[PATIENT]– –[STATIVE] {transitivity}  [LOCATUM] {spatiality}  [+/-INDIVIDUAL] {individuality}  [+/-TOTAL] {quantification}	→[PATIENT] →[STATIVE]  →[LOCATUM]  →[+/-INDIVIDUAL]  →[+/-TOTAL] →[+TOTAL] →[–TOTAL]	+ [POSSESSUM] {possessivity}  + [–DISTRIB] {distributivity}
GEN	-n, -den, -tten, -dän, -en, -ten, -in	attribute, adverbial	[AGENT]– –[PATIENT]– –[STATIVE] {transitivity}  [+/-TOTAL] {quantification}  [+/-RESULT] {aspect/gender of action}  [+/-INDIVIDUAL] {individuality}	→[AGENT] →[PATIENT] →[STATIVE] →[AGENT]– –[PATIENT]	

case	case markers	syntactic function	constitutive meanings {dimensions}	actualization paths (if narrowed or ascribed)	ascribed meanings {dimensions}
INESS	-ssa, -ssä	adverbial	[LOCUS] {spatiality}  [STATIC]– –[DYNAMIC] {staticity}  [+CLOSE] {proximity}	→[STATIC] →[DYNAMIC]  →[+CLOSE]	+ [+INTERIOR] {interiority} + [+FASTENED] {fastenedness}
ILLAT	-Vn, -hVn, -seen, -siin	adverbial	[LOCUS] {spatiality}  [DYNAMIC] {staticity}  [TO] {direction}  [+CLOSE] {proximity}	→[+CLOSE]	+ [+INTERIOR] {interiority} + [+FASTENED] {fastenedness}
ELAT	-sta, -stä	adverbial	[LOCUS] {spatiality}  [DYNAMIC] {staticity}  [FROM] {direction}  [+CLOSE] {proximity}	→[+CLOSE]	+ [+INTERIOR] {interiority} + [+FASTENED] {fastenedness}

case	case markers	syntactic function	constitutive meanings {dimensions}	actualization paths (if narrowed or ascribed)	ascribed meanings {dimensions}
ADESS	<i>-lla, -llä</i>	adverbial	[LOCUS] {spatiality}  [STATIC]– –[DYNAMIC] {staticity}  [+/-CLOSE] {proximity}	→[LOCUS]  →[STATIC] →[DYNAMIC]  →[+/-CLOSE] →[+CLOSE] →[-CLOSE]	+ [POSSESSOR] {possessivity}    + [+/-INTERIOR] + [+INTERIOR] + [-INTERIOR] {interiority} + [-FASTENED] {fastenedness}
ALLAT	<i>-lle</i>	adverbial	[LOCUS] {spatiality}  [DYNAMIC] {staticity}  [TO] {direction}  [+/-CLOSE] {proximity}	→[+/-CLOSE] →[+CLOSE] →[-CLOSE]	+ [+/-INTERIOR] + [+INTERIOR] + [-INTERIOR] {interiority} + [-FASTENED] {fastenedness}
ABL	<i>-lta, -ltä</i>	adverbial	[LOCUS] {spatiality}  [DYNAMIC] {staticity}  [FROM] {direction}  [+/-CLOSE] {proximity}	→[+/-CLOSE] →[+CLOSE] →[-CLOSE]	+ [+/-INTERIOR] + [+INTERIOR] + [-INTERIOR] {interiority} + [-FASTENED] {fastenedness}

case	case markers	syntactic function	constitutive meanings {dimensions}	actualization paths (if narrowed or ascribed)	ascribed meanings {dimensions}
ESS	<i>-na,</i> <i>-nä</i>	adverbial	[LOCUS] {spatiality}  [STATIC]– –[DYNAMIC] {staticity}	→[STATIC] →[DYNAMIC]	
TRANSL	<i>-ksi,</i> <i>-kse-</i>	adverbial	[LOCUS] {spatiality}  [DYNAMIC] {staticity}  [TO] {direction}		
COM	<i>-(i)ne-</i>	adverbial	[COMPANION] {companionship}		
ABESS	<i>-tta,</i> <i>-ttä</i>	adverbial	[ABSENT] {absence}		
INSTRUC	<i>-(i)n</i>	adverbial	[INSTRUMENT] {instrumentality}		

## PODSUMOWANIE I WNIOSKI

W rozdziale **I** dokonano przeglądu najbardziej autorytatywnych, wpływowych podejść do przypadku od starożytności (Indie, Grecja i Imperium Rzymskie) po czasy dzisiejsze.

Pojęcie przypadku (*vibhakti*) zostało ukute przez **Pāṇiniego**, autora pierwszej znanej systematycznej gramatyki sanskrytu i pierwszej gramatyki na świecie. Wy różnia on dla sanskrytu osiem przypadków: (i) *prathamā* ‘nominativus’, (ii) *dviṭyā* ‘accusativus’, (iii) *trīṭyā* ‘instrumentalis’, (iv) *catuṛthī* ‘dativus’, (v) *pañcamī* ‘ablativus’, (vi) *ṣaṣṭhī* ‘genetivus’, (vii) *saptamī* ‘locativus’ i (viii) *sambodhana* ‘vocativus’. Gramatyka Pāṇiniego jawi się jako system reguł, które – wychodząc od znaczenia poprzez niezwykle gruntownie opracowaną morfofonologię – opisują derywację docelowej formy językowej. W tym celu z punktu widzenia kategorii przypadku wprowadzono sześć tzw. *kāraḥ*, czyli ról semantycznych: (i) *karṭṛ* ‘agens’, (ii) *karman* ‘patiens’, (iii) *karana* ‘instrument’, (iv) *saṃpradānam* ‘cel’, (v) *apādāna* ‘źródło’ i (vi) *adhikaraṇa* ‘miejsce’. Jednak z dzisiejszego punktu widzenia ostateczna interpretacja *kāraḥ* nie została osiągnięta. Okazuje się bowiem, iż *kāraḥ* nie zawsze pozostają niezmiennie w parafrazach, co podważa ich ściśle semantyczną naturę. Niektóre *vibhakti* we wszystkich lub w niektórych swoich użyciach pozostają poza systemem *kāraḥ* (por. vocativus i genetivus). Tego samego typu niepewność dotycząca ustalenia systemu opozycji semantycznych pomiędzy wszystkimi przypadkami we wszystkich ich użyciach przewija się w Europie – gdzie osiągnięcia Pāṇiniego pozostały nieznanne aż do przełomu wieku XVIII i XIX – po czasy dzisiejsze.

Starożytni **Grecy**, nie posiadając wiedzy na temat osiągnięć Hindusów, musieli wszystkie badania prowadzić od początku. Początkowo chwiejne rozumienie pojęcia *πτῶσις* (*ptōsis*) zostało ukształtowane przez stoików tak, by odnosiło się jedynie do fleksyjnych form nominalnych, tj. przypadków. Grecy rozpoznali pięć przypadków nazywając je na podstawie ich głównego, najbardziej rzucającego się w oczy znaczenia: (i) *ὀνομαστική* (*onomastikē*) ‘nominativus’, (ii) *γενική* (*genikē*) ‘genetivus’, (iii) *δοτική* (*dotikē*) ‘dativus’, (iv) *αἰτιατική* (*aitiatikē*) ‘accusativus’ i (v) *κλητική*

(*klētiké*) ‘vocativus’. Starożytni Grecy posiadali wprawdzie pewną świadomość zagadnień fonetycznych i fonologicznych, jednak morfologia uprawiana w taki sposób, jak to ma miejsce dzisiaj, była im nieznana. Najmniejszą uznawaną wówczas jednostką znaczeniową było słowo. W przeważnie silnie zatimizowanych podejściach Greków można jednak dostrzec pewne próby systemowego uchwycenia składni i semantyki przypadków.

Starożytni **Rzymianie** zaadaptowali rozwinięty specyficzny model grecki. W odniesieniu do przypadku w poczet niekwestionowanych zasług Rzymian należy zaliczyć wyróżnienie specyficznego przypadku łacińskiego – ablativu. Innowacja ta doprowadziła do licznych spekulacji na temat relewantnej językowo ilości przypadków, co okazało się dość owocne w wyjaśnianiu zawilej natury relacji pomiędzy przypadkiem (formą przypadkową) a jego znaczeniem. W późniejszych wiekach jednak zarówno liczba przypadków łacińskich, zawartość semantyczna przypisana każdemu z nich, jak i ich wyłącznie końcówkowa manifestacja były wbrew faktom w mniej lub bardziej sfosylizowanej formie kultywowane w odniesieniu do języków narodowych.

Językoznawstwo w **średniowieczu** było uprawiane zgodnie z duchem epoki; nie było potrzeby dążenia do osiągnięcia prawdy, skoro była ona znana z teologii i nauki antycznej. Musiano ją jedynie uzasadnić i dowieść. Jeden z językoznawców bizantyjskich, Maximus Planudes, usiłował ustalić dla greckiego przypadku spójny system wymiarów: (i) zależność-niezależność i (ii) kierunek. Z tego też powodu traktowany jest on przez niektórych językoznawców współczesnych jako prekursor **lokalistycznej teorii przypadku**, tak celebrowanej w wieku XIX i XX.

**Gramatycy spekulatywni** w Europie Zachodniej wierzyli w ukrytą, uniwersalną gramatykę manifestującą się w sposób doskonały w języku łacińskim, metajęzyku *par excellence*. Zrywając z nadmiernym nastawieniem na rejestrowanie danych odziedziczonym ze starożytności, usiłowali oni wyjaśnić mechanizm wiążący rzeczy z ich językowymi odzwierciedleniami za pomocą tzw. *modi significandi* ‘sposobów oznaczania’. W odniesieniu do przypadku w poczet zasług gramatyków spekulatywnych zaliczyć można podkreślanie konieczności opisu syntagmatycznego funkcjonowania wyrazów należących do kategorii przypadku.

Epokę obejmującą okres od **Renesansu** aż do **wieku XIX** (odkrycie sanskrytu) z punktu widzenia językoznawstwa, pomimo jej niekwestionowanego osiągnięcia polegającego na zdetrinizowaniu greki i łaciny, można scharakteryzować właściwie jako okres stagnacji. Sztywna antyczna siatka pojęciowa dotycząca przypadku porzucana była w odniesieniu do języków narodowych powoli i niechętnie. Jedyna innowacja warta uwagi polegała na wzroście świadomości, iż przypadki (znaczenia przypadkowe) mogą być wyrażane nie tylko przez końcówki. Tym samym celom mogą służyć także szyk wyrazów i przyimki.

Wkład językoznawstwa **historyczno-porównawczego** w wieku XIX widać w uzyskaniu przewagi przez **diachronicznie** nastawione **holistyczne** podejścia do przypadku. Najbardziej zaciekle dyskusje toczyły się pomiędzy zwolennikami i przeciwnikami teorii **lokalistycznej**, pomiędzy lokalistami i antylokalistami. Ówczesna teoria lokalistyczna zakłada, iż przypadki są przestrzenne zarówno z diachronicznego, jak i synchronicznego punktu widzenia. Markery przypadkowe (końcówki) powstały ze „skróconych i zaciemnionych” prepozycji przestrzennych. Obecna polisemia przypadków może zostać uchwycona za pomocą tzw. **znaczenia fundamentalnego** (*Grundbedeutung, signification générale*). Znaczenie fundamentalne jest tak abstrakcyjne, że pokrywa wszystkie poszczególne znaczenia przypadku (formy przypadkowej). Znaczenie fundamentalne znajduje swe odzwierciedlenie we wszystkich poszczególnych znaczeniach danego przypadku. Obecne znaczenie fundamentalne przypadków jest nadal przestrzenne. Antylokalisci kwestionowali użyteczność pojęcia przestrzennego znaczenia fundamentalnego, ponieważ – wbrew zapowiedziom – żaden lokalista nie podjął wysiłku, by wykazać, jak poszczególne znaczenia przypadku (formy przypadkowej) są z niego wyprowadzane. Podejście lokalistyczne i antylokalistyczne zostały pogodzone przez demilokalistów, którzy wyróżniają przypadki czysto syntaktyczne (gramatyczne) i semantyczne (konkretne). Z kolei podejście do przypadku wypracowane przez **neogramatyków**, współzawodniczących z językoznawcami historyczno-porównawczymi, to przykład ekstremalnego **atomizmu**.

Najbardziej autorytatywne teorie przypadku wypracowane przez **strukturalistów** w XX wieku wydają się przewyższać metodologicznie wszystko, co zrobiono do tej pory. Koncepcję przypadku **Hjelmsleva** można zinterpretować jako zmodernizowaną, zdediachronizowaną wersję teorii lokalistycznej z XIX wieku. Przypadki należy definiować według Hjelmsleva **semantycznie** w oparciu o ich znaczenie fundamentalne traktowane jako **dyferencyjne minimum sygnifikacji**. Znaczenie fundamentalne, pokrywające w sposób dostatecznie abstrakcyjny wszystkie typy relacji przypadkowych (włączając w to relacje syntagmatyczne), są przestrzenne jedynie **metaforycznie**. System **trzech wymiarów** (kierunek, koherencja-inkoherencja, subiektywność-obiektywność) jest w stanie uchwycić systemy przypadkowe wszystkich języków świata. **Jakobson** w swej analizie rosyjskiego systemu przypadkowego zastosowuje pojęcia **nacechowości** i **nienacechowości**. Kategorie morfologiczne z punktu widzenia ich znaczenia podstawowego są „rozłokowane” w taki sposób, że podczas gdy kategoria I (nacechowany człon opozycji) wskazuje na obecność znaczenia [A], to kategoria II (nienacechowany człon opozycji) nie wskazuje, czy [A] jest obecne, czy nie. Wydaje się, iż semantyczny ekstremizm Hjelmsleva i Jakobsona został złagodzony przez wybitnego polskiego językoznawcę **Kuryłowicza**, który w swej teorii przypadku wzmacnia rolę komponentu **syntaktycznego**. **Przypadki gramatyczne** (accusativus, nominativus, genetivus)

należą do systemu przypadkowego na mocy swej funkcji **prymarnej**. **Przypadki konkretne** (instrumentalis, dativus, ablativus, locativus) należą do systemu przypadkowego na mocy swej funkcji **sekundarnej**. W takiej sytuacji oba typy przypadków są, jako przypadki rządzone przez otwarte klasy czasowników, de facto **pozbawione znaczenia**. Przypadki konkretne są kombinatorycznymi wariantami przypadków gramatycznych. W przeciwnym razie przypadki konkretne wydają się raczej stanowić klasę rozmytą przechodzącą w klasę przysłówków.

Reprezentanci nurtu **transformacyjno-generatywnego** w językoznawstwie, **Fillmore** i jego naśladowcy, przesunęli oś dyskusji z formy na znaczenie, traktując przypadek w terminach **przypadków głębokich** lub też **ról semantycznych**. Jednak, jak wykazano, pojęcia te nie stanowią żadnej innowacji w kontekście osiągnięć językoznawców Starego Świata we wcześniejszych tysiącleciach (por. system *kāraḥ* Pāṇiniego). Ponadto, predylekcja do traktowania przypadku mniej formalnie niekoniecznie musi wynikać z rewolucyjności ich rozważań. Jest ona raczej konsekwencją analizy jednego języka – angielskiego – w którym tradycyjne wewnątrzwyrazowe formalne dystynkcje występują w formie szczątkowej.

**Językoznawcy fińscy** są z oczywistych powodów zainteresowani głównie osobliwościami przypadku fińskiego. Pomimo zaawansowanych badań szczegółowych uwagę zwraca u nich prawie całkowity brak podejść holistycznych. Nie odnosi się to tylko do metodologii. Opracowania poświęcone całości fińskiego systemu przypadkowego, nieograniczające się w praktyce do enumeracji przypadków (form przypadkowych) i ich znaczeń kontekstualnych, stanowią rzadkość.

W rozdziale **II** wyłożono teorię przypadku zastosowaną w niniejszej pracy. We wstępie podkreślono epistemologiczną posterioryczność morfologii wobec semantyki i składni. Wyliczono pojęcia podstawowe i wyjaśniono ich intuicyjny sens.

Mimo iż przypadek pojmowany jest jako **kategoria gramatyczna**, mówienie o nim w całkowitej izolacji od **leksyki** okazuje się niemożliwe. Wynika to z restrykcji leksykalnych nałożonych na mechanizmy gramatyczne. Niezależnie od sposobu rozumienia pojęcia gramatyki, powinna ona porządkować sprawy **gramatykalizacji** i **leksykalizacji**. **Gramatyka przypadku** w pierwszym rzędzie zdaje sprawę z tych relewantnych zjawisk, które są najbardziej zgramatykalizowane. Zjawiska najbardziej zleksykalizowane mogłyby stanowić dziedzinę badań tzw. **leksyki przypadku**.

Przypadki (formy przypadkowe) ekscerpowane są z większych jednostek syntaktycznych, tzw. **minimalnych syntagm przypadkowych**. Minimalne syntagmy przypadkowe to **nieeliptyczne schematy walencyjno-rekcyjne**. Opozycja przypadkowa wynika z porównania odpowiednich minimalnych syntagm przypadkowych. Można uzasadnić hipotezę empiryczną, iż istnieją tylko **cztery** relewantne schematy współwystępowania przypadku z innym komponentem (innymi komponentami) w minimalnych syntagmach przypadkowych. Relacja **intrasyntagmiczno-diatetyczno-**

**-semantyczno-syntaktycznej** opozycji przypadkowej odzwierciedla raczej trywialny, oczywisty fakt, iż przypadki służą do rozróżniania diatetycznie relewantnych argumentów rzeczownikowych tego samego wyrazu rządzącego (najczęściej czasownika) (por. *Pekka lyö Anttia* ‘Piotr-NOM bije Andrzeja-PART’). Z kolei fakt, iż niektóre przypadki są w porównaniu z innymi przypadkami szczególnie obciążone funkcjonalnie z paradygmatycznego punktu widzenia, stając się jedynymi nośnikami docelowego znaczenia (docelowych znaczeń), znajduje swe odzwierciedlenie w relacji **intersyntagmiczno-adiatetyczno-semantyczno-asyntaktycznej** opozycji przypadkowej (por. *Luin kirjan* ‘Przeczytałem całą książkę-ACC’ vs. *Luin kirjaa* ‘Czytałem książkę-PART’). Relacja **intersyntagmiczno-diatetyczno-asemantyczno-syntaktycznej** opozycji przypadkowej odzwierciedla fakt, że język jest w stanie wyrażać to samo na różne diatetycznie sposoby (por. *kirjan lukeminen* ‘czytanie książki-GEN’ vs. *lukea kirjaa* ‘czytać książkę-PART’). Z kolei fakt, że przypadki służą do rozróżniania argumentów rzeczownikowych różnych wyrazów rządzących, oddawany jest za pomocą relacji **intersyntagmiczno-diatetyczno-semantyczno-syntaktycznej** opozycji przypadkowej (por. *Rakastan kirjoja* ‘Kocham książki-PART’ vs. *Tykkään kirjoista* ‘Lubię książki-ELAT’).

Przypadki charakteryzują się różnym **zasięgiem w kategoriach syntaktycznych**. Na przykład fiński accusativus może funkcjonować jako dopełnienie bliższe właściwie w połączeniu z każdym tematem leksykalnym. Leksykalny diapazon accusativu w innych funkcjach syntaktycznych jest znacznie węższy. Funkcja dopełnienia bliższego jest **prymarną funkcją syntaktyczną** fińskiego accusativu. Inne funkcje są jego **sekundarnymi funkcjami syntaktycznymi**. Biorąc pod uwagę prymarne funkcje syntaktyczne poszczególnych przypadków system przypadkowy można pogrupować w odpowiednie **podsystemy**. W języku fińskim operuje **pięć** podsystemów przypadkowych: (i) przypadki dopełnienia bliższego (accusativus, partitivus), (ii) przypadki podmiotu (nominativus, absolutivus), (iii) przypadki orzecznika (nominativus, partitivus), (iv) przypadek przydawki i okolicznika (genetivus) i (v) przypadki okolicznika (inessivus, illativus, elativus, adessivus, allativus, ablativus, essivus, translativus, comitativus, abessivus, instructivus). **Filarem** opozycji przypadkowych są te prymarne użycia syntaktyczne przypadków, które stanowią inter- lub intrasyntagmiczne proporcje wyraz rządzący–przypadek. Użycia takie będą określane mianem **użyć proporcjonalnych**. Przypadki w swych użyciach proporcjonalnych są jedynymi gramatycznymi sygnifikatorami (tj. autosemifikatorami) docelowego znaczenia (docelowych znaczeń) (przynajmniej) w jednym wymiarze semantycznym. **Użycia izolowane** to te użycia przypadków, które wyłamują się z omawianych proporcji.

Podejście do **polisemii** przypadków operujące procesami (i) aktualizacji, (ii) adskrypcji i (iii) reinterpretacji znaczenia pozwala uchwycić takie stałe semantyczne, które będąc relatywnie niezależne od kontekstu, charakteryzują przypadek jako taki.

**Aktualizacja** znaczenia polega na dostosowaniu do kontekstu tzw. **znaczenia konstytutywnego** dającego w efekcie **znaczenia aktualne**. **Znaczenie konstytutywne** przypadku to fuzja wszystkich jego homogenicznych znaczeń aktualnych z odpowiedniego wymiaru semantycznego, które przenoszone są przez dany przypadek w jego użyciach proporcjonalnych (obligatoryjnie) i w odpowiednich użyciach izolowanych (fakultatywnie). Dwa przypadki mają zawsze różne znaczenia konstytutywne przynajmniej w odniesieniu do jednego wymiaru (por. dyferencyjne minimum sygnifikacji). Proces aktualizacji znaczenia charakteryzuje się pewnymi regularnościami. Przechodząc od złożonego znaczenia konstytutywnego do znaczeń aktualnych, **złożoność kossygnifikacji** globalnie wzrasta. **Ścieżki** aktualizacji złożonego znaczenia konstytutywnego podlegają pewnym restrykcjom. Ścieżki aktualizacji typu \*[+/-] → [+], [-] są niedostępne. Wydaje się to potwierdzać istnienie **jedni** w znaczeniu przypadków, którą uświadamiano sobie już od starożytności. Jeden przypadek nie może znaczyć wyłącznie dwóch przeciwstawnych rzeczy.

**Adskrypcja** znaczenia polega na przypisaniu do znaczenia aktualnego formy przypadkowej znaczenia z innego wymiaru semantycznego. **Bazowe znaczenia aktualne** pojawiają się w większej liczbie kontekstów niż **adskrybowane znaczenie aktualne**. Proces adskrypcji znaczenia sterowany jest przez tzw. **regularności korelacyjne** (por. *Kirja on pöydällä* ‘Książka jest na stole’ ([LOCATUM], [LOCUS]) → *Kirja on isällä* ‘Książka jest u ojca’, ‘Ojciec ma książkę’ ([LOCATUM] + [POSSES-SUM], [LOCUS] + [POSSESSOR])). Fuzja wszystkich homogenicznych aktualnych znaczeń adskrybowanych nie jest rozpatrywana w terminach znaczenia konstytutywnego.

**Reinterpretacja** znaczenia, rozpatrywana z synchronicznego punktu widzenia, polega na **równoległym, kombinatorycznym** występowaniu zreinterpretowanego znaczenia z pozostałymi typami znaczeń aktualnych (por. *Hän kuoli metsässä* ‘Umarł w lesie’ ([LOCUS]) vs. *Hän kuoli kesäkuussa* ‘Umarł w czerwcu’ ([TEMPUS])).

**Forma** traktowana jest w niniejszej pracy jako fakt językowy w takim samym stopniu jak znaczenie. Na obecnym poziomie rozwoju lingwistyki gramatyk przypadku prezentuje **inwentarz przypadków**, który zgodnie z jego wiedzą w najbardziej adekwatny sposób odzwierciedla formalno-syntaktyczno-semantyczne regularności danego języka. Z tego punktu widzenia język fiński rozpatrywano jako język posiadający **16 przypadków końcówkowych**: (i) accusativus, (ii) partitivus, (iii) nominativus, (iv) absolutivus, (v) genetivus, (vi) inessivus, (vii) illativus, (viii) elativus, (ix) adessivus, (x) allativus, (xi) ablativus, (xii) essivus, (xiii) translativus, (xiv) comitativus, (xv) abessivus i (xvi) instructivus.

Formalne fluktuacje, które w ostatecznym rozrachunku nie wpływają na ustaloną moc paradygmatu przypadkowego, poddane są rozważeniu w terminach: (i) **morfolo-gicznej wariacji** (tj. fonetycznej nadrozróżnialności w ramach jednego przypad-

ka) i (ii) **fonetycznej neutralizacji** (tj. fonetycznej niedorozróżnialności w ramach przynajmniej dwóch przypadków). W celu odzwierciedlenia specyfiki fińskiego accusativu i absolutivu wprowadzono relację **slabszej morfologicznej wariacji przypadkowej** (por. *Luin kirjan* ‘Przeczytałem całą książkę-II ACC’ vs. *Lue kirja!* ‘Przeczytaj całą książkę-I ACC!’). Z kolei relacja **nierozwiązywalnej fonetycznej neutralizacji opozycji przypadkowej** pozwala uchwycić zawily problem synkretyzmu nominatywno-akuzatywnego w tym języku.

Rozdział **III** poświęcono przypadkom **dopełnienia bliższego – accusativowi i partitivowi**.

Accusativus, pomimo rzucającego się w oczy formalnego złania z genetivem z jednej i nominativem z drugiej strony, uznano za **produktywny** przypadek języka fińskiego. Założono bowiem, iż relacja homofonii jest relacją **symetryczną**. Jeżeli niektóre formy accusativu są homofoniczne z niektórymi formami genetivu lub nominativu, to ta sama relacja ma także miejsce w kierunku przeciwnym. Deklaracja, iż niektóre przypadki mają swoje formy, podczas gdy inne pożyczają je od innych przypadków, jest nie do zaakceptowania w swej stroniczości.

Wiele uwagi poświęcono tzw. **rozłamowi akuzatywnemu**; to jest, współwystępowaniu form accusativu homofonicznych z genetivem (I accusativus) i nominativem (II accusativus) we wszystkich paradygmatach nominalnych z wyjątkiem paradygmatów nielicznych zaimków osobowych i zaimka pytajnego *kuka* ‘kto’. Frazy nominalne w zdaniu typu *Isä kutsuttiin* (‘Zaproszono ojca’, ‘Ojciec został zaproszony’) zinterpretowano jako przykłady **nierozwiązywalnego synkretyzmu akuzatywno-nominatywnego**. Rozprzestrzenianie się analogii ze zdaniami w stronie czynnej, w których występuje I accusativus, wydaje się zablokowane przez systemową obecność **nierozwiązywalnego synkretyzmu impersonalno-pasywnego**. Z kolei manifestacje II accusativu homofonicznego z mianownikiem w zdaniach typu *Kutsu isä!* (‘Zaproś ojca!’) nie poddają się takiej interpretacji. Z dzisiejszego punktu widzenia adekwatne wydaje się uznać, iż wszystkie relewantne formy nominalne należą do **wspólnej kategorii morfosyntaktycznej** – accusativu. Jego dwie formy (I i II accusativus) związane są relacją slabszej morfologicznej wariacji przypadkowej.

W ramach kanonicznego podejścia **synchronicznego** (por. Setälä) wybór pomiędzy accusativem a partitivem jako przypadkami dopełnienia bliższego rządzony jest niezależnie od siebie przez **kwantyfikację i aspekt**. **Proste atomowe znaczenia kwantytatywne** ([+TOTALNY], [–TOTALNY]) i **aspektualne** ([+REZULTATYWNY], [–REZULTATYWNY]) są **swobodnie kombinowalne**. Jednak choćby w zdaniu *Minä olin hevosta tuomassa, kun tapasin hänet* ‘Właśnie przyprawdzałem konia-PART, kiedy go spotkałem’ użycie accusativu (*hevose/n*) okazuje się nieakceptowalne pomimo faktu, iż to właśnie ten przypadek byłby implikowany przez odpowiednią

regułę kwantytatywną ([+TOTALNY] → accusativus). Podejścia synchroniczne, stojące wobec powyższego w opozycji, operujące tzw. wspólnym semantycznym mianownikiem, raczej zaciemniają niż wyjaśniają zawłości relacji kwantytatywno-aspektualnych w języku fińskim. Ich wadą jest skłonność do analizy rządu przypadku z punktu widzenia **rzeczywistości pozajęzykowej** (por. Matti Sadeniemi, Denison, Kiparsky, Leino). Opisany przez Larjavaarę proces **adskrypcji** odpowiedniego znaczenia aspektualnego implikowanego przez czasownik do odpowiedniego znaczenia kwantytatywnego wyrażanego prymarnie przez accusativus i partitivus rzeczowników **podzielnych** jest, pomimo swego **diachronicznego** charakteru, niezwykle pomocny w zrozumieniu dzisiejszej semantyki obu przypadków dopełnienia bliższego. Wydaje się on stawiać we właściwym świetle powody pojawienia się zarówno (i) proporcjonalnych użyć accusativu i partitivu rzeczowników **niepodzielnych** (por. *Luin kirjan* ‘Przeczytałem całą książkę’ : *Luin kirjaa* ‘Czytałem książkę’), jak i różnego typu **neutralizacji sui generis** opozycji pomiędzy accusativem a partitivem w specyficznych minimalnych kontekstach czasownikowych (neutralizacja proakuzatywna: *Näin kirjan* ‘Widziałem książkę’ i propartytywna: *Rakastin kirjaa* ‘Kochałem książkę’).

Wykrycie pożądaných regularności formalno-syntaktyczno-semantycznych z dzisiejszego synchronicznego punktu widzenia okazuje się wykonalne jedynie w przypadku **minimalnych syntagm przypadkowych**. W innych przypadkach badane zjawisko nabiera nieuchwytnego chaotycznego charakteru. W odniesieniu do accusativu i partitivu adekwatne jest **oddzielnie** traktowanie kontekstów **nieneutralizatywnych i neutralizatywnych**. To samo odnosi się do rzeczowników **podzielnych i niepodzielnych**.

W przypadku rzeczowników **podzielnych** w minimalnych **nieneutralizatywnych** syntagmach przypadkowych odpowiednie znaczenia kwantytatywne i aspektualne są skombinowane **selektywnie**. Accusativus autosygnifikuje **proste znaczenia** [+TOTALNY] i [+REZULTATYWNY], podczas gdy partitivus autosygnifikuje **złożone znaczenia** [+/-TOTALNY] i [+/-REZULTATYWNY], np. *Luin kirjat* ‘Przeczytałem wszystkie książki’ vs. *Luin kirjoja* ‘Przeczytałem (niektóre) książki’, ‘Czytałem książki’. Odpowiednie znaczenia aspektualne, które są implikowane przez czasownik, nie pojawiają się w przypadku rzeczowników podzielnych bez odpowiednich znaczeń kwantytatywnych, ale nie na odwrót, np. *Näin kirjat* ‘Widziałem/Zobaczyłem wszystkie książki’ vs. *Näin kirjoja* ‘Widziałem/Zobaczyłem (niektóre) książki’. Pojawienie się znaczeń kwantytatywnych jest **uwarunkowane kontekstualnie w mniejszym stopniu** niż pojawienie się znaczeń aspektualnych (regularność ta odnosi się także do kontekstów nieminimalnych i neutralizatywnych). W przypadku rzeczowników **niepodzielnych** wydają się pojawiać jedynie znaczenia **aspektualne**, np. *Siirsin isoäidin* ‘Przesunąłem babcię (do jakiegoś miejsca)’ vs. *Siirsin isoäitiä* ‘Przesuwałem babcię’. W celu uchwycenia dyferencyjnego minimum sygni-

fikacji accusativu i partitivu **w całości ich użyć proporcjonalnych i w odpowiednich użyciach izolowanych, znaczenia konstytutywne** obu przypadków powinny być poszukiwane w wymiarze {kwantyfikacji} i {aspektu}. Konstytutywne znaczenie accusativu może być opisane za pomocą notacji [+TOTALNY] lub [+REZULTATYWNY]. Natomiast konstytutywne znaczenie partitivu może być opisane za pomocą notacji [+/-TOTALNY] lub [+/-REZULTATYWNY].

Pojawienie się odpowiedniego przypadku dopełnienia bliższego w kontekstach **neutralizacyjnych** wyjaśniane jest za pomocą (przynajmniej częściowej) **kompatybilności semantycznej** przypadku rzeczownika i rządzącego czasownika w odniesieniu do wymiaru {aspektu} w sensie szerokim, tj. pokrywającym zarówno tradycyjny aspekt, jak i rodzaj akcji. Czasowniki **punktualne** typu *Näin* ‘Zobaczyłem’ są w przypadku rzeczowników niepodzielnych na mocy analogii z czasownikami typu *Luin* [*kirjan*] ‘Przeczytałem [całą książkę]’ kombinowalne jedynie z accusativem. Z kolei **irrezultatywne** czasowniki typu *Rakastin* ‘Kochałem’ są w przypadku wszystkich typów rzeczowników na mocy analogii z czasownikami typu *Luin* [*kirjaa*] ‘Czytałem [książkę]’ kombinowalne jedynie z partitivem. Osobliwa neutralizacja *sui generis* **na rzecz partitivu** w kontekstach **przeczących**, w wyniku której język fiński traci możliwość jednoznacznej gramatycznej ekspresji znaczenia [+REZULTATYWNY] przeciwstawionego znaczeniu [+/-REZULTATYWNY] (por. *En lukenut kirjaa* ‘Nie przeczytałem całej książki’, ‘Nie czytałem książki’), została wyjaśniona za pomocą regularności, zgodnie z którą w dzisiejszym języku fińskim wybór przypadku dopełnienia bliższego czasownika zaprzeczonego odnosi się do **aspektualnych implikacji inputu, a nie do samego inputu**. Nawet jeżeli ktoś zamierza zakomunikować, że nie przeczytał całej książki, implikacja aspektualna jest tego typu, iż **nie ma ostatecznego rezultatu**. Jeżeli ktoś nie czytał w ogóle żadnej książki, także nie ma rezultatu. W obu przypadkach może zostać użyty tylko partitivus.

Odpowiednie znaczenia **informacyjne, temporalne i honoryfikatywne**, które mogą być przenoszone przez accusativus i partitivus w użyciach proporcjonalnych, zinterpretowano co najwyżej jako znaczenia **adskrybowane** do odpowiednich bazowych znaczeń kwantytatywnych i aspektualnych. Zidentyfikowano następujące regularności korelacyjne: [+TOTALNY] → [+TOTALNY] + [+IDENTYCZNY], [+/-TOTALNY] → [+/-TOTALNY] + [+/-IDENTYCZNY]; [+REZULTATYWNY] → [+REZULTATYWNY] + [+PRZYSZŁY], [+/-REZULTATYWNY] → [+/-REZULTATYWNY] + [+/-PRZYSZŁY]; [+REZULTATYWNY] → [+REZULTATYWNY] + [+/-UPRZEJMY], [+/-REZULTATYWNY] → [+/-REZULTATYWNY] + [+UPRZEJMY].

Rozdział IV poświęcono przypadkom **podmiotu – nominativowi i absolutivowi**.

Status **nominativu** jako przypadku podmiotu nie wydaje się wzbudzać jakichkolwiek kontrowersji. Fakt, iż nominativus jako przypadek bezkońcówkowy w połączeniu z diatezą nienacechowaną (stroną czynną) przenosi relewantne diatetyczne znaczenia [AGENS] i [STATIVUS], podczas gdy accusativus i partitivus jako przypadki (przeważnie) końcówkowe przeciwstawione nominativowi przenoszą diatetycznie relewantne znaczenie [PATIENS], pozwala sklasyfikować język fiński jako **język akuzatywny**.

Z powodu rozległego synkretyzmu nominatywno-akuzatywnego opozycja pomiędzy nominativem a accusativem (i, w konsekwencji, pomiędzy podmiotem a dopełnieniem bliższym) w sposób najbardziej niezawodny utrzymywana jest przez drugi przypadek dopełnienia bliższego – **partitivus**, którego formy nigdy nie są homofoniczne z formami nominativu. Jednak formy partitivu wydają się tracić tę funkcję rozróżniającą w tzw. **zdaniach egzystencjalnych**, np. *Laatikossa oli työkaluja* ‘W skrzyni było (trochę) narzędzi’, *Laatikossa oli työkalut* ‘W skrzyni był zestaw narzędzi’, sprawiając wrażenie **osobliwego złania się podmiotu i dopełnienia bliższego**. Skądinąd wartościowe rozważania językoznawców fińskich nad znaczeniem zdań egzystencjalnych i nieegzystencjalnych oceniono jako sprawę **leksykologii fińskiego czasownika**. Gramatyka przypadku fińskiego zainteresowana jest raczej klasyfikacją czasowników umożliwiającą sformułowanie pożądaných regularności rekcyjnych. Z kolei przeciwstawianie podmiotu zdania egzystencjalnego, mającego należeć wyłącznie do **rematu** zdania, podmiotowi zdania nieegzystencjalnego, mającego należeć wyłącznie do **tematu** zdania, określono jako nieadekwatne.

Aby uchwycić morfosyntaktyczną strukturę zdań egzystencjalnych w sposób adekwatny, postawiono hipotezę, która wydaje się posuwać znacznie dalej niż propozycje fińskie. Według tej hipotezy formy partitivu i nominativu (II accusativu) w odpowiednich typach zdań **zostały zinterpretowane jako formy absolutivu**, który jest **przypadkiem podmiotu w (pod)systemie ergatywnym**. Dotychczasowe trudności adekwatnej interpretacji morfosyntaktycznej struktury zdań egzystencjalnych (por. rzekomy brak kongruencji ze względu na liczbę i osobę pomiędzy podmiotem a orzeczeniem) wynikają z ich rozpatrywania z punktu widzenia systemu akuzatywnego. Wydobyć na światło dzienne fińskiego podsystemu ergatywnego jest bowiem znacznie utrudnione przez fakt **niewytworzenia przezeń do tej pory swoich specyficznych sygnifikatorów**. Fiński absolutivus jest przypadkiem **defektywnym**, który występuje jedynie w **trzeciej osobie liczby pojedynczej**.

Z punktu widzenia znaczeń diatetycznie relewantnych **absolutivus jest mniej polisemiczny od nominativu**. Przenosi on znaczenie [STATIVUS] w połączeniu z czasownikami nieprzechodnimi i znaczenie [PATIENS] w połączeniu z czasownikami przechodnimi.

Z punktu widzenia znaczeń diatetycznie irrelewantnych dostępne teorie nie są właściwie w stanie dostarczyć odpowiedzi na pytanie, jaka jest rola przypadków

podmiotu w ich sygnifikacji. Wynika to z przypadkowości używanego materiału empirycznego. Jedynie eliminując takie zaciemniające zmienne jak **końcówki czasownikowe, szyk wyrazów i akcent zdaniowy** można otrzymać minimalne syntagmy przypadkowe pozwalające ustalić stałe semantyczne charakteryzujące fińskie przypadki podmiotu jako takie. Relacja intersyntagmiczno-adiatetyczno-semantyczno-asyntaktycznej opozycji przypadkowej (Re 2), odzwierciedlająca szczególne obciążenie funkcjonalne z paradygmatycznego punktu widzenia, wiąże jedynie (i) nominativus i absolutivus homofoniczny z partitivem (rzeczowników w liczbie pojedynczej) i (ii) absolutivus homofoniczny z nominativem (II accusativem) i absolutivus homofoniczny z partitivem (bez żadnych ograniczeń ze względu na liczbę). Nominativus i absolutivus homofoniczny z nominativem (II accusativem) nie są związane w języku fińskim tym typem relacji opozycji przypadkowej.

Opozycję pomiędzy **absolutivem homofonicznym z nominativem (II accusativem) a absolutivem homofonicznym z partitivem** (to jest – opozycję wewnątrz absolutivu) można uchwycić za pomocą znaczeń **kwantytatywnych**. Nienacechowany członek opozycji (absolutivus homofoniczny z partitivem) przenosi znaczenie [+/-TOTALNY]. Z kolei nacechowany członek opozycji (absolutivus homofoniczny z nominativem (II accusativem)) przenosi znaczenie [+TOTALNY], które – z powodu specyficznej struktury tematyczno-rematycznej analizowanych zdań – aktualizowane jest do znaczenia [TOTALNY AD HOC], np. *Laatikossa oli työkalut* ‘W skrzyni był zestaw narzędzi (używany w jakimś celu)’.

Opozycja pomiędzy nominativem a absolutivem homofonicznym z partitivem może być rozpatrywana z kwantytatywnego punktu widzenia jedynie wtedy, gdy podmiot w nominativie należy do tematu zdania. W innych przypadkach nominativus i omawiana forma absolutivu **przenoszą to samo znaczenie kwantytatywne** – [+/-TOTALNY]. Okazuje się, iż w języku fińskim dwie przeciwstawne operacje – to jest; operacja **totalizacji** (w przypadku rzeczowników niepoliczalnych: *VESI* ‘woda’) i **parcjalizacji** (w przypadku rzeczowników policzalnych w liczbie mnogiej: *TYÖKALUT* ‘narzędzia’) – konceptualizowane są jako jedna operacja **indywidualizacji**. Nominativus przenosi znaczenie [+INDYWIDUALNY], np. *Vesi valui pulloon* ‘Woda (jako zindywidualizowana całość) wlała się do butelki’, *Työkalut olivat laatikossa* ‘Narzędzia (jako zindywidualizowane byty) były w pudełku’. Absolutivus homofoniczny z partitivem przenosi znaczenie [+/-INDYWIDUALNY], np. *Pulloon valui vettä* ‘Do butelki wlała się woda (jako zindywidualizowana całość lub w częściach)’, *Laatikossa oli työkaluja* ‘W pudełku były narzędzia (jako zindywidualizowane byty lub jako całość)’.

Opozycja pomiędzy nominativem a absolutivem **została rozszerzona na rzeczowniki niepodzielne** w oparciu o znaczenia **indywidualatywne** (a nie, jak twierdzi większość językoznawców fińskich, kwantytatywne). W zdaniu *Kummitus ei ole hautausmaalla* ‘Duch (jako realnie istniejąca indywidualność) nie jest na cmentarzu’

duch jest konceptualizowany jako (istniejąca) indywidualność (która właśnie teraz nie jest na cmentarzu). Z kolei w zdaniu *Hautausmaalla ei ole kummitusta* ‘Na cmentarzu nie ma ducha (jako realnie istniejącej indywidualności lub jako potencjalnie istniejącej indywidualności)’, z podmiotem w absolutiwie, sprawa, czy omawiany duch stanowi (istniejącą) indywidualność, czy też nie, nie jest rozstrzygnięta. Zdanie stwierdza jedynie „bezduchowość” cmentarza.

Diatetycznie irrelevantne znaczenia konstytutywne przypadków podmiotu zostały uchwycone za pomocą następujących notacji: nominativus: [+INDYWIDUALNY], [+/-TOTALNY], absolutivus homofoniczny z partitivem: [+/-INDYWIDUALNY], [+/-TOTALNY] i absolutivus homofoniczny z nominativem (II accusativem): [+TOTALNY] (*ad hoc*).

Rozdział V poświęcony jest przypadkom **orzecznika**. Kontrowersje dotyczące orzecznika wynikają z jego specyficznego statusu syntaktycznego. Orzecznik nabywa łączliwości syntaktycznej dopiero w połączeniu z **copułą**. Funkcja orzecznika może być spełniana w języku fińskim przez dwa przypadki (formy przypadkowe) – **nominativus** i **partitivus**. Nominativus i partitivus w funkcji orzecznika przeciwstawiane są na syntagmatycznej płaszczyźnie języka nominativowi jako przypadkowi podmiotu. Z tego punktu widzenia nominativus przenosi znaczenia [PRAEDIFICATUM] i [PRAEDIFICANS]. Partitivus przenosi znaczenie [PRAEDIFICANS]. Poza tym oba przypadki orzecznika są przeciwstawiane sobie na paradygmatycznej płaszczyźnie języka. Partitivus jako nienacechowany członek opozycji przenosi w takim kontekście znaczenie [+/-TOTALNY], podczas gdy nominativus przenosi znaczenie [+TOTALNY] (*ad hoc*). Jak ustalono, znaczenie dystrybutywne ([+DYSTRYBUTYWNY]) orzecznika w partitwie może zostać zinterpretowane co najwyżej jako znaczenie **adskrybowane** do bazowego znaczenia kwantytatywnego partitivu w kontekstach przymiotnikowych, np. *Nuo silmälasit ovat hyviä* ‘Tamte okulary są dobre (z punktu widzenia ich wyobraźalnych części składowych)’. Znaczenie **kolektywne** ([+KOLEKTYWNY] lub alternatywnie [-DYSTRYBUTYWNY]) może zostać potraktowane jako znaczenie adskrybowane do bazowego znaczenia [+TOTALNY] nominativu w analogicznych kontekstach, np. *Nuo silmälasit ovat hyvät* ‘Tamte okulary są dobre (z punktu widzenia ich całości)’. Znaczenia [+PERMANENTNY] i [-PERMANENTNY] orzecznika w partitwie i nominativie także są znaczeniami adskrybowanymi odpowiednio do znaczeń [+/-TOTALNY] i [+TOTALNY].

Rozdział VI poświęcono jednemu przypadkowi **przydawki** i **okolicznika** – **genetivowi**. Zwrócono uwagę na niepokojącą niekonsekwencję w podejściu do synkretyzmu **genetywno-akuzatywnego** (którego obecność jest zazwyczaj negowana) i synkretyzmu **genetywno-instruktywnego** (którego obecność w ogóle nie jest poddawana w wątpliwość). Wszystkie trzy kategorie (genetivus, accusativus i instruc-

tivus) są – pomimo ich częściowego formalnego pokrywania się – morfologicznymi kategoriami relewantnymi dla dzisiejszego języka fińskiego. O wiele bardziej problematyczna okazała się próba uchwycenia znaczenia (znaczeń) genetywu. Dostępne opracowania traktują ten problem w sposób niesłychanie **zatomizowany**. Nieprzewidywalne trudności w wykryciu formalno-syntaktyczno-semantycznych regularności w odniesieniu do *stricte* **adnominalnego** genetywu wynikają z mieszanego – gramatyczno-leksykalnego – charakteru sygnifikatora relewantnego znaczenia (relewantnych znaczeń) (por. [POSSESSOR]). Jednak genetyvus **adwerbalny** związany relacją intersyntagmiczno-diatetyczno-asemantyczno-syntaktycznej opozycji przypadkowej (Re 3) o dość regularnym charakterze z przypadkami podmiotu (**genetyvus subiectivus**) i przypadkami dopełnienia bliższego (**genetyvus obiectivus**), kosemifikuje znaczenia charakterystyczne dla nienacechowanego członu opozycji: [AGENS], [PATIENS], [STATIVUS] (por. nominativus), [+/-TOTALNY], [+/-REZULTATYWNY] (por. partitivus), [+/-TOTALNY], [+/-INDYWIDUALNY] (por. absolutivus homofoniczny z partitivem).

Przypadki okolicznika w rozdziale VII zostały sklasyfikowane z grubsza jako przypadki (i) **lokalne** i (ii) **marginalne**. Do przypadków lokalnych zaliczono: **inessivus**, **illativus**, **elativus**, **adessivus**, **allativus**, **ablativus**, **essivus**, **translativus** (oraz warunkowo **partitivus**). Do przypadków marginalnych zaliczono: **comitativus**, **abessivus** i **instructivus**.

Przypadki lokalne w swoich najbardziej rzucających się w oczy (tj. przestrzennych) użyciach wchodzą na syntagmatycznej płaszczyźnie języka w opozycję z przypadkami podmiotu i/lub dopełnienia bliższego. Przypadki podmiotu i/lub dopełnienia bliższego przenoszą znaczenie [LOCATUM]. Przypadki lokalne przenoszą znaczenie [LOCUS]. Co więcej, przypadki lokalne wchodzą na syntagmatycznej i paradygmatycznej płaszczyźnie języka w opozycje między sobą. Nawet w dzisiejszym języku fińskim przypadki lokalne stanowią zwarty system opozycji semantycznych, o ile rozważane są z punktu widzenia ich znaczeń **przestrzennych**. Z punktu widzenia **innych** znaczeń opozycje między nimi ulegają **daleko idącemu zatarciu**. Opozycję pomiędzy inessivem, adessivem, essivem z jednej strony a illativem, allativem, translativem z drugiej strony oraz elativem, ablativem (i partitivem) uchwyciono za pomocą znaczeń z dwu wymiarów: {**stacyjności**} i (właściwego) {**kierunku**}. Inessivus, adessivus i essivus przenoszą znaczenia: [STATYCZNY], [DYNAMICZNY], [0]. Illativus, allativus i translativus przenoszą znaczenia [DYNAMICZNY], [DO]. Elativus, ablativus (i partitivus) przenoszą znaczenia [DYNAMICZNY], [Z]. Opozycję pomiędzy tzw. **wewnętrznymi** przypadkami lokalnymi (inessivus, illativus, elativus) a **zewnętrznymi** przypadkami lokalnymi (adessivus, allativus, ablativus) omówiono z pominięciem tzw. **ogólnych** przypadków lokalnych (essivu, translativu (i partitivu)), ponieważ ich relewantne użycia przestrzenne uległy daleko

idącej leksykalizacji. Inessivus, illativus i elativus są przeciwstawiane adessivowi, allativowi i ablativowi w wymiarze **{bliskości}**. Znaczenie przenoszone przez inessivus, illativus i elativus w całości ich użycie proporcjonalnych oraz odpowiednich izolowanych można uchwycić za pomocą notacji **[+BLISKI]**. Analogiczne znaczenie adessivu, allativu i ablativu można uchwycić za pomocą notacji **[+/-BLISKI]**. Z kolei znaczenia **[+BLISKI]**, **[+/-BLISKI]** są aktualizowane zgodnie z opisanymi ścieżkami aktualizacji do odpowiednich bazowych znaczeń aktualnych (**[+BLISKI]** → **[+BLISKI]**, **[+/-BLISKI]** → **[+BLISKI]**, **[+/-BLISKI]**, **[-BLISKI]**), do których w odpowiednim idiosynkratycznym (głównie rzeczownikowym) kontekście adskrybowane są znaczenia z wymiarów **{wewnętrzności}** i **{przytwierdzoneści}**: **[+BLISKI]** → **[+BLISKI]** + **[+WEWNĘTRZNY]**, **[+BLISKI]** → **[+BLISKI]** + **[+PRZYTWIERDZONY]**, **[+/-BLISKI]** → **[+/-BLISKI]** + **[+/-WEWNĘTRZNY]**, **[-BLISKI]** → **[-BLISKI]** + **[-WEWNĘTRZNY]**, **[-BLISKI]** → **[-BLISKI]** + **[-PRZYTWIERDZONY]**.

Przypadki **marginalne** nigdy nie są rządzone przez czasownik. Zbliżając się do kategorii **przysłówka**, przypadki marginalne przenoszą stosunkowo stałe znaczenia: comitativus – **[TOWARZYSZ]**, instructivus – **[INSTRUMENT]**, abessivus – **[NIEOBECNY]**, które nie ulegają aktualizacji w związku ze znaczeniem wyrazu rządzącego, jak to miało miejsce w odniesieniu do pozostałych przypadków języka fińskiego.

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**ROBERT BIELECKI** – adiunkt Instytutu Językoznawstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, autor szeregu publikacji naukowych z dziedziny językoznawstwa ugrofińskiego oraz pierwszego na polskim rynku wydawniczym trzatomowego podręcznika do nauki języka estońskiego.

Rozprawa *Finnish Case Grammar (From the Syntactic and Semantic Perspectives)* porusza temat wyjątkowo bogatego w dystynkcje końcówkowe, egzotycznego z indoeuropejskiego punktu widzenia, fińskiego systemu przypadkowego. Szczególnie dużo miejsca poświęcono analizie zjawisk o charakterze najbardziej zgramatykalizowanym, takim jak: niezwykle rozległa neutralizacja *sui generis* kategorii podmiotu i dopełnienia bliższego (*ä* w konsekwencji *nominativu*, *akuzativu* i *partitivu*), kombinowalność znaczeń kwantytatywnych z aspektualnymi i tzw. indywidualnymi. Język fiński sklasyfikowano jako język mieszany – akuzatywno-ergatywny, pomimo że proponowany podsystem ergatywny nie zdążył jeszcze wytworzyć swoich specyficznych wykładników (sygnifikatorów), a *absolutivus* (homofoniczny z *partitivem* i *nominativem* lub *akuzativem*) jako przypadek podmiotu tegoż podsystemu jest przeciwstawiany *ergativowi* (w formie *genetivu*) w sposób mało wyraźny.

prof. dr hab. Romuald Huszcza  
z recenzji wydawniczej



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