Professor Ordinarius Zdzisław Wąsik (born 1947) teaches in Wrocław and Poznań. As author of individual publications, editor of collective series, frequent participant of conferences and guest lecturer abroad, he was elected fellow of the International Communicology Institute in Washington, DC. Subsequently, he become also nominated regular member of the Romanian Association of Semiotic Studies, Semiotic Studies of America as well as honorary member of the Semiotic Society of Finland.

“The outcome of Professor Zdzisław Wąsik’s research activity is always an event of highest scientific value, which provides the domain of semiotics with a particular splendor. In his new monograph, a profound European erudition is combined with original insights into the roots of various investigative paradigms, such as linguistic semiotics, existential phenomenology, epistemology, philosophy and psychology of language.” Eero Tarasti, Honorary President of the International Association for Semiotic Studies.

“From Grammar to Discourse traces the human capacity for sign use from its linguistic and cultural context. Such scholarship suggests the foundation of a discursive paradigm for semiotics stuck in mundane phenomenology, associated inter alia with the contributions of Leo Zawadowski and Ernst Cassirer drawing their inspiration from Karl Bühler. Serious scholars will find it a “must read” volume!” Richard L. Lanigan, Director and Fellow, International Communio Institute, Washington, DC.

“What has been originated here is an extraordinarily mature academic handbook, not only with regard to methodological awareness and epistemological knowledge that may be of interest both for learners, doctoral students and researchers in various social disciplines who out of necessity stand before discursive aspects of subject-oriented references and communication between participating subjects forced to consider advanced tools, analytical perspectives, and critical confrontation, but also in respect to the care for the quality of various cultural practices.” Lech Witkowski, Professor of the Philosophy of Education, Culture and Epistemology, Pomeranian Academy in Słupsk.
FROM GRAMMAR TO DISCOURSE:
TOWARDS A SOLIPSISTIC PARADIGM
OF SEMIOTICS
Zdzisław Wąsik

FROM GRAMMAR TO DISCOURSE: TOWARDS A SOLIPSISTIC PARADIGM OF SEMIOTICS

POZNAŃ 2016

The following book consists of sixteen chapters divided into four parts dealing with the metascientific status of semiotics, aspects of language as a semiotic system, inquiries into the nature of semiotic objects, and the semiotic self in the discursive domains of everyday life. Separately attached are a bibliography of works cited and consulted, notes referring to discussed issues of selected chapters, two indexes referring to authors and subjects from the main text, and a Polish summary of the text contents in English.

KEY WORDS: linguistic semiotics, philosophy of language, existential phenomenology, social constructivism, theory of discourse

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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements  
In Homage to the Author’s Preceptors and Colleagues ........................................ VII

Introduction  
Linguistic Semiotics from a Bird’s Eye View ................................................................. 1

**PART I: Metascientific Status of Semiotic Disciplines**

Chapter One  
Delimiting the Scopes of Semiotics and Linguistics ..................................................... 21

Chapter Two  
Paradigms and Scientific Revolutions in Linguistics ..................................................... 35

Chapter Three  
Epistemological Positions of Semiotics ................................................................. 56

**PART II: Aspects of Language as a Semiotic System**

Chapter Four  
Heteronomies of Language and the Division of Linguistic Labor ............................. 79

Chapter Five  
Speech as a Linguistic Faculty of Human Species ................................................... 96

Chapter Six  
Form and Substance in the Teaching on Language ....................................................... 110

Chapter Seven  
Changeability and Variability of Languages in Time and Space ............................. 122

Chapter Eight  
The Wording of the World as a Semiotic Trace of Humanity .................................... 138
PART III: Inquiries into the Nature of Semiotic Objects

Chapter Nine
Semiotic Universals of Language in the Universe of Animals and Humans ...... 151

Chapter Ten
Searching for the Epistemological Roots of Sign Conceptions ....................... 165

Chapter Eleven
Epistemological Awareness in Translations of Semiotic Terms ....................... 183

PART IV: The Semiotic Self in Discursive Domains of Everyday Life

Chapter Twelve
Modeling the Conceptual Types of Semiotic Objects .................................... 199

Chapter Thirteen
The Semiotic Self in the Realm of Nature and Culture .................................. 216

Chapter Fourteen
Significance as a Subjective Construct in Human Semiotics .......................... 230

Chapter Fifteen
A Solipsistic Paradigm in Cognitive and Existential Semiotics ........................ 246

Chapter Sixteen
Discursive Life-World of Communicating Selves .......................................... 261

Notes
References to Selected Chapters ........................................................................ 284

Bibliography
Works Cited and Consulted .............................................................................. 292

Index
Names of Authors from the Main Text ............................................................. 331

Index
Selected Terms from the Main Text ................................................................. 338

Streszczenie
Od gramatyki do dyskursu. W stronę solipsystycznego paradgmatu semiotyki ...... 364
The subject matter of this book is a recapitulation of the author’s achievements (Zdzisław Wąsik, born 1947) in the domain of general linguistics and semiotics considering the language as a system of signs. Some relevant words on the genesis of the following chapters, including his indebtedness to his professional masters and scientific associates, will therefore be expressed in the first person. A preliminary sketch for their foundation were elaborated between the late 1970s and 1980s in the Chair of General Linguistics at Wrocław. Subsequent outlines of the theme were continued in the Institute of English Philology at Opole and in the School of English at Poznań over the last five years.


Every attempt, such as this, to present a synthesis of the sciences of signs from the standpoint of linguistics is indebted to many people and many publications as the bibliography shows. For particular insights and stimulations, I owe a heavy debt of gratitude, first of all, to my teachers from the University of Wrocław. The first fascination for a linguistic theory of language involving the question of the opposition between a mentalist concept of a bilateral sign and a functionalist concept of a unilateral
sign were evoked by the lectures given by Professor Dr. habil. Leon Zawadowski (born 1914) for the Faculty of Philology in the academic year of 1968/1969. Decisive for the origination of my interest in the interdisciplinary position of linguistics among the other sciences of language was Professor Dr. habil. Antoni Furdal (born 1928), who employed me in his Chair of General Linguistics as a Teaching Assistant acting as a supervisor of my doctoral dissertation devoted to a structural typology of interrogative utterances on the basis of contemporary Indo-European languages, and then as a reviewer of my D.Litt. dissertation and a monographic treatise for the attainment of my professorial title. To my spiritual masters belonged afterwards Professor Dr. habil. Stanisław Pietraszko (1928–2010), the founder of cultural studies in Poland, who exerted an enormous impact on my ways of reasoning as regards the heteronomy-and-autonomy distinction with reference to the functioning of language as a social means of communication and the division of academic disciplines.

The year 1980 was a milestone in my future career in semiotic and communication sciences abroad. It started, nota bene, as early as January 20–February 18, 1980, the most fruitful long-lasting cooperation with Professor Dr. Richard Leo Lanigan (born 1943), who was appointed as my Research Associate by the Vice-Dean of the College of Communications and Fine Arts, Southern University at Carbondale, USA, Professor Dr. Richard Mitchell Blumenberg (1935–1997). Three of the lectures conducted there at that time deserve to be mentioned here, namely, (1) Three Notions of Signs: Saussure, Bühler, Ogden and Richards. Chair of Speech Communication Proseminar, on January 28, 1980; (2) Classification (Typology) of Signs. Linguistics Chair Colloquium on January 31, 1980; (3) Functions of Language Text According to Karl Bühler (and Leo Zawadowski). Class Lecture: SPCH 445 Semiology and Semiotic Communication, on February 4, 1980. Special thanks are due to Dr. Lanigan’s generosity because at that time he had collected above 70 books and sent them to me in Wrocław, so that I could conduct my future MA seminars while applying the methodology of communication and semiotics to the analyses of literary and journalistic works. They have played an invaluable role in my becoming a semiotician and a phenomenologist of communication. As a result of frequent meetings at various semiotic conferences our mutual cooperation has been crowned with the initiatives of organizing common enterprises in Poland and the United States, among which such events deserve to be mentioned: the Fifth ICI Summer Conference: Symposium: “Human Understanding: The Matrix of Communication and Cul-

The next turning point in my way to the gatherings with world-famous semioticians was my participation in the *International Semiotic Symposium: Philosophy of Sign*, Puławy, on Sept. 25–26, 1980, where I had been very privileged to be engaged in a broad-minded and stimulating chat with Professor Dr. Max Harold Fisch (1901–1995), the founder of the Peirce Edition Project in 1976, which had become since 1983 an integral part of the School of Liberal Arts at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. It was also in Puławy where I had a chance to walk with Hans-Heinrich Lieb (born 1936) along the Vistula-river bank while discussing the idea of his *Integrational Linguistics* (cf. Lieb 1983).

From August 1982 until June 1983, I had received a ten-month stipend of the Fulbright Fellowship for Senior Scholars with an appointment in the State University of New York at Buffalo where my Research Associate happened to be Professor Dr. Paul Lucien Garvin (1919–1994), the founding father of a Graduate Group of Semiotics from the Department of Linguistics. To his crucial merits belonged his views on epistemology that had deeply influenced my direction of inquiries into the philosophical foundations of science. Moreover, at that time I had an opportunity to take part in the *7th Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America*, organized in the Statler Hotel at Buffalo, NY, on October 21–24, 1982, where I met Professor Fisch for the second time. In a salutation talk, he outspokenly expressed his wonder what I was doing at Buffalo with a peripheral links to semiotics. Following his opinion, the best place for conducting my research would be if not the Department of Linguistics at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, than the Research Center for Language and Semiotic Studies at Bloomington, Indiana, under the direction of Distinguished Professor Dr. Thomas Albert Sebeok (1920–2001).

With the view of a prospective invitation to Bloomington, I asked Professor Lanigan to introduce me to Professor Sebeok. Initially these consultations were only meant to be conducted over a short visit for one month. But after negotiations with the Department of State of the United States, I had received an approval to move there with my family for the second part of my stipend to the Indiana University, starting from February 1983, to work under the guidance of the eminent founding father and
true promoter of semiotics in the whole world. As regards my first find-
ings, I had presented there my paper on the “Methodological Status of
Linguistics as a Science of Signs” at the Visiting Scholars Evening Lecture
Series. Fourth International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural
Studies, held at Bloomington, Indiana, on May 30–June 26, 1983. Under
the influence of Professor Sebeok’s lectures given at this School in the
Indiana University Library, I became one of the adherents of Jakob Johann
von Uexküll (1864–1944), a Baltic German biologist, the founder of Um-
had been supplementarily extended, at first for two months and then, due
to supportive opinions of Dr. Michael Herzfeld, Associate Chair and
Thomas A. Sebeok, Chairman of the Center, for an additional period of
five months. Having spent a year in Bloomington, I was able to collect
complete investigative materials for my future habilitation on the semiotic
paradigm of linguistics and several consecutive books and articles devoted
to the subject-oriented conceptions of sign and meaning bridging the sci-
ences of biology and anthropology. In subsequent years, we occasionally
got together at various semiotic congresses, conferences and symposia in
America and Europe. As a frequent participant of Toronto–Imatra Summer
Schools of Semiotics, organized by Professor Dr. Eero (Aarne Pekka)
Tarasti (born 1948), Director of the International Semiotics Institute at
Imatra, I had a chance to meet him mostly in Finland and hear his brilliant
lectures perfused with traces of his personal and professional life-history.
I felt the extraordinary distinction of being fortunate enough to take active
part in the festivities of Hommage à Thomas A. Sebeok, 80 Years—From
Fennougrian Studies to Biosemiotics, celebrated during the Nordic-Baltic
Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies and 19th Annual
Meeting of the Semiotic Society of Finland, held at Imatra, Finland, on
June 12–21, 2000. Throughout the last four decades, his inspiring spirit
permeated not only my activity but also the scientific labor of the centers
he had promoted or brought to life in Warsaw, Tartu–Moscow, Helsinki–
Imatra, or semioticians he had cooperated with, as in Budapest, Vienna,
Paris, etc. Thomas A. Sebeok may be thus regarded as an embodied sign of
the whole solipsistic conceptual and methodological framework of new
semiotics.

To the direct achievements of my stay in the US belonged my habilita-
tion dissertation Semiotyczny paradygmat językoznawstwa (A semiotic para-
digm of linguistics, Wrocław 1987), written in Polish and then popularized
through numerous papers and lectures delivered at international congresses
and conferences, which had contributed to the elaboration of: (1) the conception of epistemology as a set of investigative perspectives, and (2) the typological survey of sign conceptions based on their existence modes and manifestation forms, and (3) the introduction of a solipsistic (subjective-self-oriented) paradigm into the investigative domain of language sciences.

My contribution to the epistemology of linguistics had obtained a vivid acceptance when I presented a paper on “Investigative Perspectives in Linguistics and Other Sciences” at the XXIst Annual Societas Linguistica Europaea Meeting: “Modalitäten linguistischer Empirie”, held at Freiburg im Breisgau on June 12–15, 1988. The principal organizer of the SLE meeting, Professor Dr. Herbert Pilch (born 1927), not only discussed the topic of my presentation and mentioned it in his presidential address, but also invited me personally to his office after the conference to continue the discussion on the usage of cognitive perspectives in the sciences of language. He notified me about the publications of his own Professor Eberhard Zwirner (1899–1984)—well known due to his multilingualist position towards the object of linguistics studies—who had also referred to the same famous dictum of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) as myself, namely, «C’est le point de vue qui crée l’objet». (cf. Saussure 1916/1922; 23).

The next very important personality, in the context of Zwirner, was Professor Dr. Sydney MacDonald Lamb (born 1929)—as a proponent of a monolingualist panmentalism—who had agreed to be my Research Associate and had taken care of my accommodations and well-being there when I came for a two-months placement as an International Research Exchange Scholar to the Chair of Linguistics and Semiotics, Rice University, Houston, Texas, from August 28 until October 30, 1991. The importance of Lamb for the advancement of my training in cognitive semiotics was marked in two spheres. Firstly, I was given his book of freshly published lectures: Language and Illusion. Toward a Cognitive Theory of Language (cf. Lamb 1991). Secondly, I was invited as a discussant to Philosophical Luncheon Meetings conducted regularly on Fridays between 12 a.m. and 1 p.m. Significant were my lectures given there, and announced in a special news gazette of the Rice University sent to different countries abroad, available, among other places, in Australia. To my semiotics-related presentations belonged: (1) “The Concepts of Sign and Meaning in Linguistics”. Class Lecture for Graduate Students in Semiotics (Dr. James Copeland), on September 24, 1991; (2) “The Concepts of Sign and Meaning in the Theory of Culture”. Class Lecture for Graduate Students in Semiotics (Dr. James Copeland), on September 24, 1991; (3)

However, the largest part of my conclusive conceptions pertaining to the epistemology of semiotics and the multipolarity of the linguistic sign, have been developed in cooperation with Professor Dr. habil. Roland Posner (born 1942), the Director of the Research Center for Semiotics at the Technical University in Berlin. I had an occasion to be acquainted with Professor Posner when I delivered a lecture on “A Contribution to the Theme: The Interdisciplinary Position of Linguistics”, at the Session of the Selection Committee for the Culturological Faculty of the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) at the Free University Berlin, Institute for Romanist Philology [„Ein Beitrag zum Thema: Die interdisziplinäre Position der Linguistik und die Kulturwissenschaften”. Sitzung der Berufungskommission für die Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt an der Oder. Freie Universität Berlin, Institut für Romanische Philologie], on December 15, 1992. Soon afterwards, I was invited by Prof. Roland Posner to deliver a special lecture on “The Multipolarity of the Linguistic Sign” for the Research Center for Semiotics at the Technical University of Berlin, the Series of Lectures in the Institute for Linguistics [„Mehropoligkeit des sprachlichen Zeichens“. Technische Universität, Arbeitsstelle für Semiotik, Berlin, Vortragsreihe am Institut für Linguistik], on December 19, 1994.

A separate account of these investigative novelties was summarized in my book *An Outline for Lectures on the Epistemology of Semiotics* (1998). Enriched by the selected contents of the book on systemic and ecological properties of language in interdisciplinary investigative approaches (Systemowe i ekologiczne właściwości języka w interdyscyplinarnych podejściach badawczych, 1997) and several papers published later, the next monograph *Epistemological Perspectives on Linguistic Semiotics* (2003) had received its final shape as a contribution to linguistic semiotics. It included some parts of elaborated articles: “On the Axiosemiotics of Postcards” (1992), and “Verbal Means as Signs of Human Needs” (1997), “Jakob von Uexküll’s ‘Umwelt-Theory’: A Link Between the Semiotics of Nature and the Semiotics of Culture”, delivered at a special session to Honor Thomas A. Sebeok’s 80th birthday in Imatra, Finland (2000). It comprised also an extended version of the latter having been published, thanks to the editorial elaboration of Professor Dr. Winfried Nöth, as “On the Biological Con-

Among scholars who have played a pivotal role in my curriculum vitae, special expressions of gratitude are due to Professor Dr. habil. Jacek Izydor Fisiak (born 1936), a Polish Philologist of the English Language, a world-famous specialist of the History of English from the Adam Mickiewicz University. He not only introduced me to the world of international conferences in linguistics at the forum of Societas Linguistica Europaea, but also supported me in my way to the domain of human-centered science so that my works became known not only among outstanding members of the International Association of Semiotic Studies, but also among members of the International Communicology Institute. Consequently, in the year 2005 I was elected as Fellow of the International Communicology Institute on the recommendation of its Director, Professor Richard L. Langan. Moreover, my Department of Linguistic Semiotics and Communicology was officially certified as a Research Group Affiliate of the International Communicology as of November 1, 2009. In turn, on November 15, 2009 I was appointed as Member of the ICI Bureau, and in Autumn of 2011 as Director of Regional-Continental Coordinators for Europe. These earlier and later recognitions contributed in the last years to my becoming a Nominated Member of the Romanian Association of Semiotics (2007), a Nominated Member of the Semiotic Society of America (2011), and an Honorary Member of the Semiotic Society of Finland (2012).

I feel also obliged to express my thankfulness to Professor Dr. Daina Teters (born 1963) from the Latvian Academy of Culture in Riga, appreciating her inspirational encouragement in the preparation of my paper “The Word as a Trace of Man” presented at the international conference *Metamorphoses of the World: Traces, Shadows, Reflections, Echoes and Metaphors* in 2008 and then published in the proceedings of 2010.

Poznań, 2016

Zdzisław Wąsik
INTRODUCTION

Linguistic Semiotics from a Bird’s Eye View

Mission and Scope of the Monograph

*From Grammar to Discourse: Towards a Solipsistic Paradigm of Semiotics* aims at presenting a metascientific account of research conducted from a bird’s eye view in the domain of semiotic objects, which embrace, on the one hand, the language- and culture-centered conceptions of sign and its meaning and, on the other, human-centered ecosemiotic systems of communicating selves who aggregate into discursive communities on the basis of observable interpersonal and inferable intersubjective groupings when they send and receive as well as process and interpret similar messages.

It is the first academic monograph that exposes linguistic semiotics within the framework of epistemology as a theory of knowledge about how scientific objects exist (ontology) and how they can be cognized in exploratory approaches (gnoseology). Combining linguistic, philosophical, logical and anthropological inquiries into sign- and meaning-related issues, which have been hitherto conducted within the span of the last fifteen years, it puts forward a proposal to merge the domains of biological and cultural studies into the investigative paradigm of linguistic semiotics.

Regarding its aspects of novelty and originality, at least five main areas of research provide entirely inventive resolutions and creative proposals, namely, (1) an outline of metasemiotics as a network of epistemological paradigms, (2) a systemic-structural approach to the semiotic universals of language, (3) an epistemological modeling of sign-and-its-referent relationships, (4) a solipsistic conception of subjective significance in the value-and-need- or function-and-purpose-oriented domains of human activity, and (5) a reflection on discursivism from the viewpoint of its applicability to the context of human competence. In this particular study, the main emphasis is put on analyzing and explaining the role of human individuals as signifying and communicating selves who take part in the formation of
discursive communities linked through praxeological and axiological means of interpersonal message transmission and intersubjective message comprehension.

This book offers to an adept in semiotic and linguistic studies at best three methodological benefits, deducible from the conviction: firstly, that semiotic objects are multiaspectual, secondly, that the subject matter of semiotic investigations can be reached through the choice of respective epistemological perspectives and, thirdly, that, on the metascientific level, all investigative approaches are equal in right. It is a work that any scholar conducting specialized seminars or student in linguistics, semiotics and communicology would welcome as a source of inspiration as far as it provides a fresh account of the most challenging topics predominant in the professional literature of recent times. However, the prospective distributors of academic books in the international forum have to take into account that the subject of this monographic book written in English is addressed to advanced recipients working and studying at the university level.

**Outline and Focus of Particular Chapters**

The following book consists of sixteen chapters pertaining to theoretical issues subsumed under four parts regarding the metascientific status of semiotics, aspects of language as a semiotic system, inquiries into the nature of semiotic objects, and the semiotic self in the discursive domains of everyday life. Separately attached, apart from the preface and table of contents, are informative parts comprising a bibliography of works cited and consulted, notes to certain chapters, indexes referring to names of authors and selected terms from the main text, and a summary in Polish.

To answer the question of how to delimit the investigative domains of linguistics and semiotics, Chapter One starts with a discussion of the most controversial issues connected with the status and nature of the semiotic object usually equalized with the sign as an entity, or the unity of the sign and its meaning or reference. To grasp the semiotic nature of language, it starts with explaining the relationship of the discipline, the object of which is signs in general, to one of the linguistic disciplines, the object of which is verbal signs in particular. As it is shown, the objects investigated in the domain of semiotics are not homogeneous. In the first dimension, semiotics, as a scientific discipline, investigates the sign- and meaning-related objects that are found in the realm of nature and culture. In the second,
semiotic objects are investigated with regard to their meaning-indicating functions either as facts or processes. Formulating, therefore, the idea of general semiotics, one has to consider the extremity of such views on the scope of its investigative domain.

The aim of Chapter Two is to consider the applicability of the notion of paradigm, which presents the history of ideas as a succession of investigative and methodological convictions of particular communities of scholars resulting from scientific revolutions caused by extraordinarily outstanding individuals, to the past and present state of linguistic thought. It ends with the statement that the development of linguistics is not to be described in terms of paradigms that replace each other. What the historians of linguistics can distinguish are heterogeneous traditions of formation and growth of divergent approaches to language that have their own records of continuity, breaks and returns. With the assumption that the term paradigm might be useful for appreciating the investigative approaches in the history of linguistics, it is proposed that the term paradigm is not to be applied to the convictions or beliefs characterizing certain individuals or communities of scholars but rather to the sets of propositions and notions expressed in their texts, i.e., in their objective utterances, and other means of communication that are exhaustive, simple and verifiable in praxis. In such a reduced scope, paradigms might be seen as encompassing all frames of reference organizing the human experience and theorizing the human cognition. In other words, the term paradigm is said to denote every possible framework that systematizes the human experience in a scientific way as any epistemological frame of reference, i.e., a set of conceptual and cognitive-methodological assumptions about the nature of the object of study, and about the way to approach it while applying investigative tools, why formulating postulates and operational definitions. In a very broad sense, the notion of paradigm is considered as a synonym of an investigative approach, including methodological standpoints, cognitive perspectives, heuristic models and concepts, and, furthermore, also trends or theories propagated either by individual scientists or scientific communities, united within the so-called schools of scientific thought. As a result, the paradigm does not present itself as a closed system. It might be regarded as composed of paradigms, constituting parts of the systems of higher or lower range. It could be distinguished as standing in relation to appropriate levels of reference. In view of that, a given type of science, as a system situated within other systems, does not necessarily need to have all places occupied by previously-existing actual paradigms. It could have also
some slots open for new potential paradigms, in the traditional understanding of the term in question, for other new subsystems, models, concepts, and investigative approaches to various sides, forms of manifestation, and levels or structures of the investigated object. While appreciating the relational value of paradigms, practitioners of historiography should consider whether the disputed frames of reference occupy the same place, or not the same, within the whole system of science. Eventually, they may be interested in paradigms that exclude each other or overlap, that belong to a superior, or ulterior, level, thus forming constituents of other paradigms of higher or lower order.

Chapter Three departs from the notion of epistemology as a branch of philosophy that studies the nature and the grounds of knowledge regarding the limits and functional validity of diverse investigative approaches used in particular scientific disciplines in order to determine their subject matter. It is assumed that an epistemological analysis of a given discipline consists in the examination of its ontological and gnoseological foundations. Thus, the aim of epistemology is to answer how far the commitment of scientists to their attendant views on their object of study corresponds to its investigative approachability. The examination of epistemological positions occupied by representatives of a given discipline is based on a guiding principle that the choice of a selected investigative approach should determine their outlook upon the nature of their object of study. In consequence, this outlook should initially determine the choice of conceptual and operational investigative apparatus offering a basis for the formulation of eventual investigative postulates. As regards an epistemological approach to the positions held by semiotics among the other scientific disciplines, the author is of the opinion that it should focus on answering the questions of how the knowledge of the relevant properties of its object, or its domain (as a set of objects) of study, is formulated and ordered. As he adds, the properties of the objects, being homogenous or heterogeneous, coherent or incoherent in the domain of semiotics, may be revealed through different philosophical and logical positions providing metascientific or metadisciplinary foundations for the methodology of particular scientific disciplines.

Thus, having stated, in this framework, that the epistemology of semiotics is shaped by various scientific paradigms, discussed in Chapter Two, the author is of the opinion that the properties of its objects may be studied *inter alia* through a set of meta-, hypo-, inter-, intra-disciplinary and disciplinary perspectives, useful for distinguishing its relevant categories and
notions. In the end, he puts forward a postulate that the epistemological assessment of specific disciplines of semiotics may aim at the elaboration of a typological matrix that allows one to go through all distinctions between ontological and gnoseological positions with which the theoreticians and practitioners representing particular schools of semiotic thought have aligned themselves.

The focus of attention in Chapter Four is put on the characteristic features of language regarded on the one hand as the subject matter of the principal object of scientific study and, on the other, as the aspects of the subject matter of the adjacent objects being studied from either disciplinary or interdisciplinary perspectives. Its special objective is to expose the idea of epistemological awareness of scientists in the division of their investigative labor. Hence, crossing the boundaries between isolationist and integrationist approaches, it is important to specify which of the manifestation forms and the existence modes of language are autonomized as the subject matter of linguistics and which belong to the heteronomous conditionings of the objects studied by its neighboring disciplines. To separate the investigative domain of linguistics from the domain studied by non-linguistic disciplines, this chapter suggests to observe the distinction between language “as an object” of study and language “as a relational property” of other objects. In consequence, the practitioner of language sciences is expected to be aware when he observes the extra-systemic properties of language conditioned by its environment and when he detaches the systemic-structural properties of a particular language from its environment. In keeping with an appeal to their disciplinary awareness, scientists are advised to remember that language as an object of study is indivisible while the investigative boundaries of the disciplines depend on the choice of viewpoints. And so, from a structural-systemic perspective, the following three conceptual levels of language will be distinguished: (1) in general and in particular, (2) as a definitional model, as an abstract and concrete object, and (3) as a theoretical construct, as an inductive generalization, as an autonomous sociolect, or as a heteronomous idiolect. To summarize the whole discussion about the heteronomous existence modes of language and its autonomization in use and cognition, it is explicitly noted that not only the linguists are able to autonomize their object of study. In investigative practice, any heteronomy of language can be made autonomous from the viewpoint of any discipline or any interdisciplinary perspective.
Within the framework of distinctions introduced in Chapter Five, the properties of language have been discussed in relation to communicating individuals as a dynamic (processual) and static (factual), social and individual phenomenon. The core of such distinctions constitutes, on the one hand, the notion of: *speech* as a species-specific faculty of humans to communicate by using vocal signs while implementing articulatory-auditory physiological skills; *language* as a system of vocal signs referring to observed and concluded extralingual reality; *text* as a realization of language in the acts of thinking and speaking simultaneously, and, on the other: *competence* as a linguistic ability of an individual to create and recognize verbal means of communication as mutually distinguishable, grammatically correct, semantically logical, and pragmatically appropriate to a given situation, and *performance* as an execution of linguistic abilities in generating an infinite number of textual utterances, which serve the purposes of interpersonal communication, both commonly known ones and new ones never heard before. While considering the question whether language is not a ready-made product but an uninterrupted process, the view is that language is both a social activity and a social fact. Against the usage reducing the linguistic object to the oppositions between *system* and *text*, the distinction between dynamic and static aspects of language and its realization in texts, has been presented in four phases of speech: “text as an action”, “text as an act”, “language as work” and “language as a structure”.

It is emphasized that the notion of language as a social feature of human speech, which is relatively independent of the will of its individual speakers and listeners, assuming that nobody is allowed to create the language as a personal property of him- or herself and to transform it into a means of communication when it is not accepted by the power of a social contract established by members of a given communicative community. An individual has to learn it in order to cognize and to obey its rules. A child, for example, acquires it for himself gradually. Language exists even in the form of a capability, as in the case of a person who has lost the ability of speaking. One can say, by way of illustration, that someone possesses the language when he/she understands only the texts of a determined language, while conceiving them as verbal, spoken or written signs. The problem with the so-called proprietorship of language is connected with the social character of verbal means. Individual uses of language are sanctioned by social norms, sometimes imposed by authorities. They are governed by the principles of common acceptability, which the particular members of speech communities have the duty to conform to. Anoth-
er form of possessing speech as “the linguistic faculty proper” concerns two kinds of human abilities; in one sense, it means the ability to acquire the language of an ecologically determined community during the so-called “critical period” in the development of a child, and, in the other, it may also indicate the ability of an individual to construe his/her interindividual communicative means, established even on the neighboring areas between different varieties of one and the same language or diverse languages spoken by regional communities, ethnic minorities or national majorities in a given environment.

Chapter Six—paying special attention to metaphorical devices—deals with the educational modes of explaining the notion of form in correlation with the notion of substance as encountered in the academic handbooks by the students and practitioners of language sciences. Against the background of the development of philosophical thought, it has been stated that the application of term *form* in linguistic writings along with its lexicographic usage do not stand in one-to-one correspondence. In the modern usage, “form” has been placed in opposition to “content”, i.e., to sense or meaning. The notion of form has been, for example, equalized with grammatical entities and structures distinguished from lexical (and stylistic) ones on the basis of their category-related features. Accordingly, the elements of form have been discussed within the framework of a functionalist structuralism as text elements that correspond to the elements of extratextual content. For this reason, “form” has been either counterpoised or placed in relation to “function” or “meaning”. Another point must be made about the interrelationship between form and substance. A linguistic substance has been mostly defined in a negative way. Everything, which may be defined as a substance, has been considered as not a form, i.e., as not belonging to the system of interdependencies that constitute the structure of each of the given objects. In consequence, paying more attention to form than to substance, some linguists prone to this way of thinking believe that form is independent of substance. Assuming that the elements of language are interchangeable because they can be expressed in different substances, they have treated the form of language as a system of pure values. The form thus constitutes, in abstractly conceived reality, the system of relations between the values of linguistic elements. One can say, therefore, that the *form*, as a systemic network of relations, superimposes itself upon the *substance*, as the textual realization in speech or writing. The adherents of a formalist structuralism, on the other hand, have spoken in favor of such a definition of the term *form*, which appears to be synon-
ymous with the relational value of substance. Thus, linguistic form is implied to operate, as a specific carving pattern, on amorphous non-linguistic matter giving in the output a network of relations, into which the elements of linguistic character enter mutually among themselves.

The subject matter of Chapter Seven consists of the views on the changeable nature of language resulting from its relation to the time-bound character of the environment, in which it is generationally transmitted as a means of interpersonal communication. These views take into consideration, among other things, such semiotic properties of language as conventionality, learnability and forgetability. The approach to language as a system of pure values, which are determined by nothing other than the arrangement of text elements in a given moment of time, means that language should be considered on “the axis of simultaneity” and not on “the axis of succession”. The language as such exists only as an organized system in the consciousness of its individual users, in the collective consciousness of given communicative communities, and by virtue of this also in the individual acts of speaking and understanding only in a synchronic cross section. The users of a determined language are not interested in the history of its constituents, when they utilize it as a tool of communication nor, indeed, when they intend to evoke the behavior and reactions of receivers and to express their own feelings and emotional states. From a diachronic perspective, the properties of language are studied mainly by historians and to a lesser degree by those who speak it, since the evolution of language phenomena is a slow process, which is rarely perceivable by its users. Each of the levels of language, each structure or each of its constitutive elements can have their own separate history. Research into their nature is therefore never ultimately complete. It is rather partial when one takes into account the fact that the particular, simultaneously functioning, elements of the system of a determined language, which is present also in the consciousness of different users, can be situated on different levels of the development. In such a context, a remarkable opposition regarding the sources of changes and differentiation of languages is presented by representatives who reject the assumption that languages are to be reduced to “stages” and stages should be identified with “systems” while showing that they exist in the usage of human individuals as members of a given society. Therefore, the practitioners of linguistics are advised to give credence only to source materials being collected from the speakers of actually spoken languages. They should pay attention to the fact that this personal language in question can simultaneously or interchangeably adhere
not only to one or more varieties of one and the same language but also to the varieties of two or more either neighboring or distant languages. As regards the changeability and variability of languages, extreme positions of theoreticians are confronted of those who accept the existence of multilingualism in the world as an accomplished historical fact which is not to be altered by legal acts or scientific declarations, and who see language as a dialectal continuum in the collective sense.

Chapter Eight exposes the notion of word denoting the textual object of philological studies and the notion of trace specified against the classificatory background of semiotic objects. Turning attention to the word as a trace of humans, the author has considered, on the one hand, the metamorphoses of the human universe resulting from the linguistic-communicational activity of social groupings on ethnic or national, regional or professional, global or local levels, and on the other, the changes taking place in the environments of human individuals on a uniquely personal level. In the first case, there are two trace-leaving processes that come into being, firstly, “the wording of the world” realized through naming and the terminological ordering of things and their states of being, and in the second case, a constructivist “objectification” of language, in which its users know “how to do things with words”. Considering the theory of memes, the word might be interpreted as an indicator of borrowed or inherited features of languages or as an exponent of motivational preference of humans in their creation of new meaning-bearers. Execution of linguistic abilities may show the tendencies of minimizing the communicational effort of language speakers or provide evidence for their communicational proficiency and knowledge of cultural tradition. The word is considered here not only as an expression of intimate spirituality of communicating individuals but also of speech communities to which they belong. Relevant also is the style of the word choice as reflecting the cultural tradition of humankind. Its traces are especially visible in literary works, in translations from a determined language into other languages, in the usage of expressive and/or impressive means. Likewise, preceptor-oriented studies may reveal traces left by other authors as a source of inspiration when they are anonymous or intentionally omitted. It is noticeable that the word as a property of its creators is changeable by nature when considered in terms of a meaning-creating activity in opposition to a meaning-bearing fact. Therefore, the subject matter of a trace-related study is seen in the typology of verbal meaning-bearers to be observed in the products resulting from the species-specific behavior of people who create and interpret the universe
of meanings as communicating individuals and participants of interpersonal communication. Researchers are principally interested in conditions under which words might be treated as vestiges of man’s communicational customs, assuming that the basic function of language is to form interpersonal and intersubjective communities of speakers and receivers who send and receive, produce and understand messages in a similar way. These conditions of word-processing acts, as inherent and relational properties of language in use, constitute, in one dimension, the levels of particular linguistic systems and, in another dimension, the domains of human life in which they function as a means of communication.

Chapter Nine raises the question of semiotic properties of language. Summing up the research on the universals of language conducted hitherto by practitioners of linguistics and its neighboring disciplines, the author concentrates on the defining characteristics of speech derivable from the contrast between nonverbal and verbal means of communication used in the world of man and animals. The subject matter of the study presented in details comprises the semiotic universals of language specified as sign- and meaning-related properties of verbal means deduced from the contrast between human and the non-human means of communication. Consequently, the author takes into consideration the interdisciplinary search for “the defining characteristics of language”. On the basis of knowledge accumulated in academic handbooks, he has stated that the defining properties of language are neither sufficiently substantiated nor exhaustively ordered. To identify which of the discussed semiotic universals are relevant for the investigative domains of the neighboring disciplines of language sciences and linguistics proper, he proposes therefore to observe the boundaries between the properties pertaining to: (I) form and structure of language as a codified system of verbal signs used for cognitive and communicational purposes, (II) substance of codes and communication channels, (III) cognitive faculties and communicational abilities of humans determining the ways of language acquisition and language attrition across cultures and generations, and (IV) relationships between the verbal signs of a determined language and their referents, as well as between language speakers and their knowledge of extralingual reality. Those four groups of properties have been correspondingly subsumed under the separate classes of (A) extrasystemic and relational properties of language (groups II–IV) that belong to the investigative domain of the neighboring disciplines of language sciences, and (B) systemic and inherent properties of language (group I) that constitute the subject matter of linguistics proper.
The detachment of systemic-structural properties of the verbal means of interpersonal communication from all their inherent and relational properties has allowed, against the background of the preceding discussion, to postulate a classificatory approach to the semiotic universals of language which bears in mind the specific nature of language in the context of its systemic and non-systemic properties constituting the subject matter of linguistics proper and the non-linguistic sciences of language. In such a view, the systemic properties of language are to be deduced from the comparison between nonverbal verbal and means of communication in the light of linguistic semiotics itself and not necessarily from the perspective of man’s place in the environment of other living species.

Research questions posed in Chapter Ten are connected with the origins of the conception of language as a system of signs. The most disputable issues presented here relate to the ontological status and cognitive approachability of the category of sign. As it has been noticed, the views of theoreticians and practitioners of semiotic disciplines are not unanimous as to whether the sign is a concrete or mental entity, being cognized as a real or ideal object. Further questions about the forms of manifestation of signs refer to whether their material shapes, possessing a spiritual replica in the mind of their users, are sensible or intelligible, concrete or abstract, extraorganismic or intraorganismic forms of being, which might be examined subjectively or objectively. What is more, semioticians still argue whether the sign is to be treated as a separate or as a multifaceted phenomenon consisting of related features. To answer these and other related questions pertaining to the explanation of the concrete and mental nature of language in relation to reality the author proposes to scrutinize the antique provenance of three philosophical traditions, namely Platonism, Aristotelianism (modified through Cartesianism), and Stoicism. He takes for granted that the conception of the sign as a oneness of two inseparable psychic sides expressed in Saussurean category of parole, which means both thinking and speaking simultaneously, might have been influenced by the Platonic idea of logos. But the same cannot be said, as the author argues, with respect to the conception of the bilateral sign as mental unity, in which both parts of the sign are considered as being in equal degree psychic. In his view, this absolute psychologist definition of the sign as a two-sided entity, which unites not a thing and a name but a concept and a sound pattern, probably originates in the late rationalist phase of Aristotelian heritage, developed under the influence of Cartesian thought. In turn, language in a triadic sequence or a unified triangle is seen as derived from the
philosophical reasoning of Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, who introduced the
third element to the original dyad, consisting of sound and thought of man,
namely human intellect expressed in words, which play a mediating role in
speech. As the subsequent searches for historical roots have indicated, the
Aristotelian triadic sequence of thing—intellect—voice, initially replaced by
three constituents, thing—concept—term of a triangular scheme, and modi-
fied by various conceptions of a semantic triangle and a trilateral sign or
the sign as a triadic relation, tends in the direction of detaching four con-
stituents of a semantic quadrangle, including the concrete manifestation of
the sign and its referent as well as their separate reflections in the mind.
The detachment of the sign from its referent has its roots in Antiquity
going back to the heritage of Stoics who have treated signs as corporeal
phenomena which reveal something that is real but non-evident through
conditional implications.

Chapter Eleven puts forward an idea of epistemological equivalence to
be achieved in translational praxis. It concentrates around the question of
how the translations of sign-related terms selected from Cours de linguis-
tique générale (CLG) of Ferdinand de Saussure reflect the ontological and
gnoseological awareness of their translators. On the basis of selected quo-
tations excerpted from the French original of CLG with their two distinct
translations into English against the background of an earlier German
translation, various connotations of analyzed terms have been evaluated
regarding how they may exert an impact upon the recipients of educational
discourse in semiotics. The following three groups of examples illustrate
the search for translational equivalence in rendering the French terms of
(1) the mental representation of linguistic signs in concepts and images
acoustiques, (2) the definition of the bilateral sign: « Le signe linguistique
unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique »,
and (3) the replacement of concept et image acoustique respectively by
signifié et signifiant. In concluding remarks, the author submits a postulate
for an ecumenical translation where the knowledge of scholarly traditions
and the epistemological connotations of discipline-specific terms should
constitute the central aim of translators’ schooling. Hence, readers are ad-
vised to critically accept the results of translational practices with aware-
ness of their interpretative consequences.

The interest sphere of Chapter Twelve consists of the status and nature
of the semiotic object which is equalized with the sign as an entity, or the
unity of the sign and its reference. As it has been deduced from historical
searches, popular conceptions of the sign (and its reference) are formulat-
ed either in terms of a unilateral sign in which the sign–vehicle and its referent are treated as separate entities, or a bilateral sign whose two parts, the signifier and the signified, comprise a twofold psychical unity. Some semioticians adhere to the concept of a semantic triangle in which the sign–vehicle, its meaning (thought or notion), and its referent form separate parts, and some prefer a trilateral sign concept where the sign–vehicle, its meaning (the interpretant generating one or more signs), and its object of reference form a threefold unity. Separately noted are also the concepts of the sign as a dyadic relation and the sign as a triadic relation. As far as these sign conceptions exhibit not only differences in the usage of terminology but also in the formation of their visual representations, the proposal is put forward to find an appropriate parameter or matrix that would contain features and constituents specific for particular approaches to their forms of being and manifestation. Having noticed that the constituents of all hitherto known sign conceptions are to be found within framework of a semantic quadrangle, the author proposes to consider the usefulness of a typological matrix, which encompasses unified explanatory and illustrative primitives. A survey of actual sign conceptions, brought to the common denominator within the framework of a semantic quadrangle, demonstrates how its two main constituents, the sign and its referent, as a token and a type, with their collective and individual properties exclusively and inclusively, may be modeled as oscillating between logical positivism, rational empiricism, empirical rationalism and absolute rationalism.

While putting together the anthropological and phenomenological models of the human life-world with the biological and semiotic conceptions of subjective universe, Chapter Thirteen extends the concept of the semiotic self, initially referred to an organism that recognizes and produces environmental signals as significant for its functioning, through the notion of the signifying and communicating self who emits and receives as an observable person the sensorially perceivable meaning-bearingers and who processes and interprets as an inferred subject these mentally apprehensible meaning-bearingers for the sake of intersubjective understanding. In such a viewpoint, the interpersonal life-world of an outer self who produces and receives concrete signs as meaning-bearingers is regarded as a counterpart of the subjective universe of an inner self formed by the sensual knowledge coming from individual experiences and consensual knowledge of the meaning being derived from the contents of collective communication. Consequently, the anthropological foundations of subject-centered semiot-
ics, in the realm of culture, are discussed with respect to a biological need-oriented conception of meaning in the natural environment of organisms.

Within the framework of Chapter Fourteen, which departs from the viewpoint of individual and social selves, a nature- and culture-centered conception of subjective significance in the realm of the human life-world is combined with the conception of intersubjective understanding. The main interest focus of a scientist working in the investigative field of human semiotics, which encompasses the sign- and meaning-related properties of signifying and communicating selves, is placed on the fulfillment of purposes or the satisfaction of needs of real persons who take active part in interpersonal communication. In alluding to the conceptions of subjective significance borrowed from anthropology and biology, which unites human and non-human selves in the semiotics of culture and nature, specially exhibited are the communicational practices and patterns of meaning-creation and meaning-utilization in interpersonal interactions and intersubjective understanding.

Accordingly, the investigative domain of human-centered semiotics has been delimited by the nature of sign- and meaning-processing and sign-and meaning-interpreting activities of communicating selves who utilize the objects found in their personal-subjective universe as functional tools or valuable goods of culture. The sources of such subject-oriented conceptions of sign and meaning are identified in the praxeological, i.e., function- and purpose-oriented view of culture, on the one level, or the axiological, i.e., value- and need-oriented view of culture, on the other. Understood in semiotic terms, culture is presented thus as a set of praxeosemiotic and/or axiosemiotic regularities that occur between the meanings of functions or meanings of values fulfilled through meaning-bearing processes and products of human selves, as communicating persons and signifying subjects, which co-determine and condition the socially constructed realization of their interpersonal and intersubjective life-worlds. Exposed, in this human-centered theory of culture, is the role of a cultural subject who acts as a meaning-utilizer or meaning-evaluator while nominating and subsuming the objects of culture as signs of his/her purposes or needs. On account of two semiotic spheres of culture, one from the viewpoint of praxeology and another from the viewpoint of axiology, there are two forms of meaning-nomination and meaning-subsumption: praxeosemiotic nominations and subsumptions involve the ascription of functions to cultural objects being not useful for preceding purposes, whereas the axiosemiotic ones result in the transfer of products and behavior of people to the realm of objects,
which have not been included as cultural goods before. To underline the differences between persons and subjects, interpersonal and intersubjective relationships, it has been indispensable to introduce a distinction between the features, aspects or constituents of the physical domain, being empirically tested with experimental methods, and the features of the logical domain, being rationally concluded through shared knowledge of social communication. Thus, these properties of signifying and communicating selves, which are realized in observable meaning-bearers, will be considered as features of the physical domain of investigation. However, semiotic properties, which are only assumed in terms of conceptual and propositional contents, inaccessible to direct observation, will be qualified as aspects or constituents of the logical domain of inference. In reference to the latter distinction, this chapter ends with constructivist theories, elucidating that the personal-subjective contact of signifying and communicating selves with their natural, social and cultural environments is mediated through language, which is said to “objectify” the experiences shared by members of particular speech communities. In such a way, the individual semiotic selves functioning in the role of social selves construe their everyday reality composed of typical contents while becoming not only the source but also the tool of interpersonal communication and creating the intersubjectively comprehensive knowledge.

In support of the idea of an individual signifying and communicating self, functioning in the realm of social and cultural semiotics, Chapter Fifteen presents the language-related concept of an individual monolingual self, embedded into a collective multilingual world, where the epistemological perspective of solipsism, being as a rule opposed to collectivism, is consequently discussed under the label of “collective solipsism”. On the basis of a phenomenological claim that objective reality does not exist beyond the sphere of subjective experience, reported is here a cognitive theory localizing language as a mental system within the brain of human individuals, which is accessible only during their speaking activities. It is sustained by a belief that the mental contents of the communicating self, founding the primary object of linguistic investigations, may be revealed through the mediation of empirical texts regarded as the extensions of the minds of all human individuals, which constitute parts of a general human mind exposed through communication. Supporters of this panmentalist and monolingualist attitude call for investigating language as a mental system located within the brains of individual selves as such by unfolding their verbal performances in order to find out how this intraorganismic mind of
all social selves in the terrestrial world operates. So far, what enables the
direct accessibility of verbal texts makes up the investigative domain of
descriptive semiotics, which is engaged in answering the question of how
extraorganismic information structures are processed while involving signs
of facts and events existing in the real world accessible to cognition. How-
ever, descriptive semioticians must be aware that their sensory experiences
are filtered through perceptual and conceptual information, which form the
cognitive networks of relationships in their mental sign-processing and
sign-interpreting activities as the source of immediate experience. Chapter
Fifteen ends with a solipsistic view of the investigative object of neosemi-
otics, which takes as a point of departure the backgrounds of existential
phenomenology. The objects of scientists’ interest consists here of the
verbal exponents of the distinction between the existence of organismic
forms of being “in itself” and “for itself”, expressed in the terminology of
respective authors, German and French in particular. What is relevant for
the existential aspects human individuals and as members of society is the
opposition between “I” and “Me” and the “Self” in group encounters.
Hence, it is evident why it is reasonable to state that human individuals
appear in two existence modes as real persons with sensible qualities and
as rational subjects with intelligible qualities.

Chapter Sixteen concentrates on the methodological assessment of dis-
cursivism as an investigative perspective from the viewpoint of its applica-
bleness to the context of human competence. Investigating the communica-
tional aspects of human competence, it will specify the understanding of
discourse as the realization of language and culture in human interactions,
which contribute to the formation of ecologically determined systems of
communication. The notion of discourse is explained there in terms of
relational properties of meaning-bearers or meaning-processing activities
embedded into the social roles of communication participants, depending
upon the rules of language and culture. Seen against the background of the
distinctions made by philologists, the domain of discourse studies is thus
placed in a broader context of social sciences. Accordingly, it has been
noted that the practitioners of philological sciences, linguists and theoreti-
cians of literature, refer the term discourse above all to the socially and
culturally determined properties of the types of texts or text-processing
activities characterizing the respective domains of language use in the
universe of human life. However, those scholars who study the semiotics
of human communication see discourse as a material manifestation of
language and culture in sensible meaning-bearers, equated with text-like
objects, which perform the semiotic functions of indicating, signaling, appealing, symbolic, iconic, i.e., pictorial or mimetic signs in the nonverbal and verbal behavior of communication participants. From the perspective of sign-communicational sciences, dealing with the domain of culture, discourse will be, at this point, considered in terms of semiotic codes and processes, which link the individual communicating selves who take part in group interactions as observable persons and inferable subjects into interpersonal and intersubjective collectivities when they create and interpret the meanings that are embodied in material bearers forming the nonverbal or verbal means and modes of human understanding. In consequence, against the background of terminological apparatus of language-centered communicational sciences, the author introduces appropriate distinctions between linguistic collectivities and linguistic communities, on the one hand, and discursive collectivities and discursive communities, on the other. This distinction between the two extents of social groupings in which individuals are taking part depends, in the first instance, upon a “modular” view of language as embedded into the culture or, in the second, upon a “holistic” view of culture as including language among the other systems of meaning-bearers belonging to the realm of human semiotics. To establish a typology of discursive communities as aggregations of communicating selves who interact in various domains of human communication, it is advisable to specify the common tasks they realize for the satisfaction of their survival needs and cultural values, as well as for the fulfillment of public requirements and environmental conditionings.

The notion of human competence, in turn, is considered here as a dispositional property of individual communicating selves, which enables them to effectively interact with other individuals while performing their role-oriented tasks in speech acts under the pressure of collective sanctions. Correspondingly, it is argued that some aspects of human competence are connected with the modeling of personality traits, which foster the development of interdiscursive competence of communicating selves in cultural and educational domains of human communication, governed by the rules of generationally transmitted traditions and socially construed norms.

In search of the genus proximum of this human property of being competent, which implies the possession of a required capacity, such as skills and knowledge, the original concept of idealized linguistic competence is confronted with the extended scope of communicative competence, which has been productively lent to the domain of language pedagogy and devel-
oped as a pre-constructed set of individual qualities under the influence of the neighboring disciplines of general and applied linguistics, such as psycho- and sociolinguistics, text linguistics, pragmatics, discourse studies and semiotics of communication. It is observed that such related disciplines as psychology and sociology, providing their own frameworks, have also contributed to the extension of the concept of communicative competence within the scope of general competence. Thus, the term “metacompetence” is not to be omitted for relating to referential characteristics of particular types of human competencies. The summarizing statements of the chapter establish that personal competence is a theoretical construct, which can be judged, measured, designed or imposed and controlled when it becomes visible through concrete realizations in the particular domains of human communication.

This book ends with a wide-ranging list of reference works which have been not only cited within the text of particular chapters and notes attached separately but also selected for further consultations. In the same manner, a curious reader may find the penetrative index of names and terms appearing in the main text of the whole book as a useful guide to particular topics organized around the thematic contexts of communication, culture, epistemology, language, linguistics, meaning, sign, or semiotics.
PART I

METASCIENTIFIC STATUS OF SEMIOTIC DISCIPLINES
CHAPTER ONE

Delimiting the Scopes of Semiotics and Linguistics

The Subject Matter and the Object of Semiotic Studies

The subject matter presented in this chapter is determined by the view of language as a semiotic system. Semiotics is treated here, in a much-generalized way, as a domain which encompasses any meaning-bearers (i.e., semeia) and/or processes of meaning-creation (i.e., semioses) and, furthermore, meaning-interpretation in the realm of communicating subjects. Included into the domain of semiotic objects, the signifying products or communicational events, distinguished by a researcher as relevant for his/her investigative purposes, may be treated either as correlates of certain functions, values of their objects of reference, expressions of subjective needs or as motives of communication participants. Thus, semiotics in itself appears to an adept scientist as an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary theory utilizing the achievements of all those traditionally recognized academic disciplines which deal with the concepts of—very broadly taken—sign or meaning, communicative means or communicational events, as their descriptive categories.

The task of linguistic semiotics is to search for meaning-bearers in the domain of spoken and written texts, their social and cultural contexts and extra-textual reality. Analyzed in terms of indices (indexes or indicators), symptoms, signals, appeals, symbols, icons (iconic or mimetic symbols) as well as nonverbal and verbal signs, those meaning-bearers, occupy a unique place among other variables found as constituents in various schemes modeling the ways and means of human understanding. To related varieties of communication constituents featuring diverse types of human communication, one may include, inter alia, the source and destination of information, channel of communication, communication media as well as contexts and situations accompanying the mutual understanding of people, and the like. The typology of interpersonal relationships in dyadic,
small group, public or mass communication belongs, however, to the subject matter of the neighboring disciplines of linguistic and semiotic studies, which are usually discussed within the framework of a general communication theory.

Language is localized within the broadly understood systems of communication in order to show how the verbal means of communication should be understood in the sign-and meaning- or sign-processes-related terms. The interest sphere of this study situates itself on the level of metascientific investigations. As such, it does not deal with applicative problems, but focuses on the state of the art within semiotics as it is. Therefore, it classifies different approaches to semiotic objects and to the domain of semiotics, without taking any standpoint towards them. It concentrates rather on the consequences resulting from a particular epistemological position, taken for granted in accordance with a certain investigative goal.

For grasping the nature of language as a semiotic system, it is indispensable to explain the relationship of the discipline, the object of which are the signs in general, to one of the linguistic disciplines, the object of which are verbal signs in particular. As it appears, the objects investigated in the domain of semiotics are not homogeneous. In the first dimension, the domain of semiotics embraces both natural and cultural objects. In the second, semiotic objects are investigated with regard to their meaning-indicating functions either as facts or processes. Formulating, therefore, the idea of general semiotics, one should consider the extremity of views on the scope of its investigative domain.

From a broad perspective, semiotics is characterized as studying all sign-processes in the realm of living organisms together with evolutionary changes and metabolism. Within a narrow scope, the semiotic domain is reduced to arbitrary sign-systems used intentionally for cognitive-communicational purposes of human agents. Intermediating positions occupy semioticians interested in everything that performs a significative function and serves for the fulfillment of communicational tasks. Hereto belong also opinions that semiotics should include the whole sphere of knowledge, i.e., all cognitive and descriptive means, by which humans conceive, memorize and make meaning. There are also views limiting the domain of semiotics only to the inferred objects of interpretation or to everything that is purposeful and conventional in human communication or solely to objects organized into the systems of interpersonal signification and communication.
The Nature of the Semiotic Object

Before going into details about the discussion as to what constitutes the subject matter of semiotics, one has to state, in the first place, that its domain comprises both the objects of culture and the objects of nature. As such, it may be studied with respect to their sign- and/or meaning-related properties, either from factual or processual viewpoints. Formulating the idea of general semiotics some authors commit themselves to a wide scope, some to a medium, and some others to a very narrow scope of their domain of investigation.

The history of the term *semiotics* and its investigative object goes back to antiquity. It was Hippocrates (460–367 B.C.), the founder of medical sciences, who supposedly coined the term *semieiotiké*, as a branch of medicine studying *semeia*, i.e., symptoms of illnesses (cf. Danesi 2002, 29). As John Deely (2000, 23–26) points out, the Greek term Σεμιειον [semeion] has been equalized with the Latin *signum* since the Middle Ages. From this time, a broad understanding of the term *sign* was due to St. Augustine (Augustinus Aurelius, 354–430), the bishop of Hippo, distinguishing both *signa naturalia* and *signa conventionalia* while counterpoising *signa data* in the realm of man to *signa sacra*. Της τερμ Σεμιοτική [semiotiké] appeared as a synonym of “the doctrine of signs” for the first time in the writings of John Locke (1632–1704), *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* of 1690 who omitted epsilon separating mu from the iota in the Greek word Σεμιειοτική [semieiotiké] (cf. Deely 2000, 37).

Less conservative philosophers of modern semiotics, as, for example, Georgio Prodi (1977), discussed by Felice Cimatti (2000) and Winfried Nöth (2001), as well as John Deely (2001), propose to consider the existence of protosemiosis or physical semiotics in nature, which refers to an assumed pre-biological world, asking whether there is final causality also outside of the mind of an interpreting subject in objects that serve as a potential sign. Moreover, another question is raised as regards the intercourse between metaphysical and physical semiotics derived from the belief that there is continuity between mind and matter, according to which “semiosis is … the origin, matter the end of cosmic evolutions” (Nöth 2001, 23).

However, considering the views of traditional theorists (Garvin 1977, 1978; Baron 1979; Douglas 1982; and Halliday, Lamb & Regan 1988, as discussed by Wąsik, Z. 1987, 97–98, 102–104; 2003, 14–15; 2014, 48–50) who reject or accept the presence of sign- and meaning-related domains in
the world of all living organisms, at least seven positions as regards the delimitation of semiotic thresholds (an outline of which is based on the distinctions of Morris 1964, 1; Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1987, 7–13; Regan et al. 1982/1987, 2–6; Pelc 1982, 200–222) might be distinguished (cf. also Hervey 1982, 3–4):

(1) Broadly defined, the scope of semiotics, as an investigative domain, encompasses sign-processes in the realm of all living systems, including the cell, from the viewpoint of evolutionary changes and metabolism (Thomas Albert Sebeok, 1920–2001);

(2) To the domain of semiotics belongs everything that signifies and is used for the purposes of communication in the realm of animals, men and machines (Charles Sanders Peirce, 1839–1914, Charles William Morris, 1901–1979);

(3) Semiotics studies only information systems and information structures, both cognitive and descriptive by nature, including the whole sphere of human knowledge and the network of relationships between language and other means with which humans memorize, think, learn and make meaning (Sydney MacDonald Lamb, 1929–);

(4) The domain of semiotic studies is limited by logical inferences occurring in human interpretation and communication processes (Jerzy Pelc, 1924–);

(5) Semiotics should be interested in everything that is deliberate and conventional in human communication (John Langshaw Austin, 1911–1960, John Rogers Searle, 1932–);

(6) Semioticians devote their attention mainly to objects guided by organizing principles that form systems of interpersonal signification and communication (Roland Barthes, 1915–1980, Algirdas Julien Greimas, 1917–1992);

(7) Exclusively arbitrary conventional systems of signification used consciously and intentionally by human beings for the purposes of cognition and communication are regarded as true semiotic objects (Ferdinand de Saussure, 1857–1913, Louis Trolle Hjelmslev, 1889–1965).

Without having a general model that specifies, by way of a logical definition, the genus proximum and differentia specifica of the objects studied within its domain, the practicing semiotician has sometimes at his/her disposal only a list of specific fields in which they occur. Following Umberto Eco (1932–2016), he/she may identify here: zoosemiotics, olfactory
signs, tactile communication, codes of taste, paralinguistics, medical semiotics, kinesics and proxemics, musical codes, formalized languages, written languages, unknown alphabets, secret codes, natural languages, visual communication, systems of objects, plot structure, text theory, cultural codes, aesthetic texts, mass communication, rhetoric, etc. (cf. Eco 1976/1979, 9–14).

The explanation of the very fact that semiotics does not create a uniform system of investigation but rather a network of different approaches should be found in the provenance of its basic concepts and methods. The frames of reference encountered in semiotic writings are usually formed on a primary level by different disciplines, such as philosophy and logic, linguistics and the theory of literature, natural sciences and mathematics. On a secondary level, they are derived from different layers of the extra-disciplinary traditions of study, distinguishing, for example, the focus of interest characteristic of European science from the interest sphere specified in American scientific works. Semiotic terms and categories are derived, henceforth, from incommensurable paradigms that confront the pupils of Ferdinand de Saussure with the adherents of Charles Sanders Peirce, the followers of functional structuralism with the followers of biological behaviorism, the theoreticians of culture with the theoreticians of nature (cf. Hervey 1982, 1–8, discussed also by Wąsik, Z. 1987, 97 and 2003, 16).

**Semiotics and/or Semiology as a Domain and a Discipline**

Incommensurable traditions are reflected also in the alternative, exclusive, inclusive or discriminate usage of the terms *semiotics* and/or *semiology*. Due to their interdisciplinatory or inter-continental source of origin, semiotics and semiology are treated as synonyms (discussed by Pelc 1982, 10–14, and 29; cf. also Sebeok 1974, 211–264, mainly 211–213 and 239). However, some practitioners observe distinctions between semiotics studying natural signs in the realm of organisms and semiology being interested only in the social life of conventional signs (mainly Christian Metz and Algirdas Julien Greimas, cf. Pelc 1982, 15).

Not widely known is the claim of Peter Wunderli (1976, 33–68, mainly 57 and 68) that semiotics, as a doctrine of all signs, should embrace semiology limiting its interest sphere to artificial, partly conventionalized signs. A well-suited proposal has resulted from the distinction between
semiotics as an investigative domain and semiology as a scientific subject (Louis Hjelmslev and early Umberto Eco, for a discussion see Wąsik, Z. 1987, 100–101 and 2003, 16–17).

Different backgrounds of scientific traditions are reflected in the use of the terms semiotics and/or semiology, referring to both the investigative domain and the discipline of study, alternatively, separately, inclusively or exclusively, as presented in the following more detailed statements.

(1) Semiotics and semiology are synonyms. Independently of their definitional content and range of validity, semiotics and semiology are viewed as being concerned with the domains of signs. The use of whichever of them depends upon the choice of a particular mode or direction of study. It may be either European or American, linguistic or logical and philosophical, structuralist or behaviorist in provenance (see, in particular, Pelc 1982, 10–14, and 29; cf. also Sebeok 1974, 211–264, especially 211–213 and 239);

(2) Semiotics and semiology deal with different domains of signs. Semiotics is concerned with signs as investigative objects of natural sciences, and semiology as objects of humanities (cf. Pelc 1982, 15);

(3) Semiotics, being originally a wider term, encompasses semiology. According to this standpoint, semiology is to be considered as a separate kind of semiotics interested in artificial and partly conventionalized signs (following the interpretation of Peter Wunderli (1976, 33–68, especially 57 and 68);

(4) Semiotics is a particular domain of signs, and semiology is a scientific discipline dealing with all types of sign-related domains. Considering this fourth standpoint, one can say that there are various kinds of semiotics that make up the investigative field of semiology (for details see Wąsik, Z. 1987, 100–101).

One has to consider the fact that the domain of semiotics, estimated on a methodological plane as obiectum reale, possesses various aspects and forms of manifestation occurring in the realm of man, animal and plant or even in the realm of all living systems. Hence, the properties of semiotic objects can be studied not only from the perspectives that contribute to the disciplinary subject matters of linguistics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, biology, and the like. They may be exhibited also in the light of interdisciplinary theories, such as, e.g., the theory of communication, the theory of systems, the theory of being, etc. Such a statement might be
supported by the assumption that the object or the set of objects studied by semiotics in sign-related terms is to be viewed as a partial system situated within the other systems of higher rank. Since the semiotic object simultaneously enters the composition of various dependencies in the external and internal reality, it can be approached with regard to its multiaspectual nature expressed through its inherent and relational properties from various perspectives and formulated as subject matter, i.e., as *objectum formal* of various definitional models.

It is clear, therefore, and not controversial, as some beginners in this field might claim, that semiotics is both an interdisciplinary theory and a multidisciplinary scientific discipline. In the latter case, it is composed of those subparts of academically recognized disciplines, which use the concepts of sign and meaning or the concept of sign-processes, as one of their descriptive categories characterizing their object of study, although not necessarily their subject matter proper. The evidence for such a statement may be found in the opposition between the general and particular scope of related inclusive disciplines, as in the case, for example, of:

- Linguistics, which studies language(s) and semiotics of language, which studies language signs (or language sign-processes);
- Culturology (a theory of culture proper), which studies culture(s) and culturo-semiotics (or anthrosemiotics), which studies cultural signs (or cultural sign-processes); or
- Biology, which studies living beings and semiotics of nature (or biosemiotics), which studies natural signs (or natural sign-processes), both intraorganismic and extraorganismic in character, etc.

**On the Investigative Scopes of Linguistics and Semiotics**

The relationships between linguistics and semiotics can be viewed from two-dimensional perspectives. With reference to their place among other sciences, in relation to anthropology, ethnology, sociology, philosophy, psychology, and biology, one should treat linguistics and semiotics as parallel disciplines, but as to their common sign-communicational perspective—as disciplines overlapping with regards to their respective scopes. Very often, the latter view is located, in the fourth place, among the opinions of linguists, deducing their positions from semiotics or the opinions of semioticians deducing their positions from linguistics, while discussing
who borrows from whom terms and investigative procedures. These opinions (summarized after numerous consulted authors by Wąsik, Z. 1987, 102–105; 2003, 59–62; 2014, 57–60) may be grouped as follows:

(1) Semiotics is descended from linguistics. Semiotics utilizes categories and terminological distinctions, elaborated on the ground of linguistics, describing the ways of verbal communication to present other ways of communication in which non-linguistic or non-language-like semiotic systems are applied.

Linguistically oriented semioticians formulate their attitudes towards the priority of language studies for the elaboration of semiotic categories based on two generally held beliefs. The first attitude refers to the conviction regarding the leading role of linguistics in all domains in which the interdisciplinary perspectives, such as, structuralism, functionalism, formalism, generativism, tagmemism, stratificationism, or cognitivism, derive their descriptive terms from the analysis of the linguistic system of signs. The second one is based on the premises of the metadesignational nature of language, which takes for granted that every semiotic system, including also every natural and artificial language, is translatable into every (hitherto existing) ethnic language.¹

The assumption regarding linguistics as “a pilot” science was vigorously expounded, predominantly during the period of structuralism when this discipline reached its highest stage of development as far as the notional and methodological apparatus in the domain of systemic studies was concerned. Scientists had, therefore, acknowledged that linguistics was a more mature science in comparison to semiotics, which had been still in the state of being created. This opinion had been grounded as long as the terms and categories determined for a narrow scope of linguistics as a science of verbal signs were applicable to all domains of semiotics as a science, which were seen as dealing with all potential signs, satisfying in that way all representatives of respective specific disciplines. One should, however, recall the fact that the general principles embracing all semiotic facts within the scope of its investigative domain might be sometimes either irrelevant or too reductionistic against the background of the facts studied in natural languages.

There is no absolute certainty whether the anthropocentric belief is correct that the capability to communicate by using verbal means in the realm of man could guarantee understanding every form of communica-
tion, not only among humans. Hence, one should relegate to the metaphorical ways of saying an ungrounded conviction that semioticians would be able to successfully utilize methods of linguistic studies in the description and interpretation of the so-called language of painting, music, sculpture, architecture, inter-human relations, kinship, or genetic relationships, etc.

The practice of misusing linguistic terms and categories or of conducting such analyses that resemble linguistic methods in application to non-language-like objects, or also of searching for parallelisms between heterogeneous objects, does not guarantee that the results of such investigations can be accepted as valuable every time and everywhere. The fact that such investigations are performed where one imitates linguistic approaches does not necessarily mean that they should be recognized as relevant for all remaining aspects of investigated and described objects which belong to the domain of respective scientific disciplines.

(2) Semiotics constitutes a superordinate discipline for linguistics. This statement results, in the first instance, from the praxis of placing language among other semiotic facts. It starts from a semiocentric point of view.

However, taking for granted that the investigative domain of semiotics has been properly specified, one should remember that linguistics in the broadest sense contains not only semiolinguistics within its domain. There are also other linguistic disciplines, which aim at describing the remaining non-semiotic heteronomies of ecologically determined languages in particular and the definitional model of language in general. Therefore, one has to reject many of “pansemiotistic” claims of certain promoters of semiotics, according to which this field should embrace all domains of human activity and knowledge.

(3) Linguistics and semiotics are regarded as separate disciplines with mutually exclusive scopes when the role of linguistics is exclusively limited to the studies of language, and the investigative domain of semiotics encompasses only semiotic facts, which are non-linguistic by nature.

The investigative praxis and mutual relationships among representatives dealing with theoretical connections between the two disciplines show, however, that the fourth opinion has won, namely:
(4) Linguistics and semiotics have investigative scopes, which are partly overlapping, and partly mutually excluding.

Both the former and the latter disciplines pose investigative goals which are not to be placed under a common denominator, and which are to be mutually separated in the core of its interest sphere. Linguistics intersects with semiotics mainly within the scopes of the theory of system, theory of sign and theory of communication. Both disciplines have also different goals, methods and investigative boundaries that result either from the various heteronomies of language, irrelevant for semiotics, or from the nature of other semiotic objects, which do not belong to the investigative domain of linguistics.

From the viewpoint of the sciences of language, there is no need to pursue the results of all semiotic investigations achieved in the domains, in which the non-language-like objects are retrieved, when they are irrelevant for linguistic studies. As far as semiotics is concerned, one should also remember that not all the investigative aims and results of linguistic investigations and not all the investigative techniques and procedures applied in various linguistic disciplines and non-linguistic sciences of language, can be treated as useful for the methodology of semiotic studies.

When semiotics and linguistics are placed on the opposite poles with regard to the scopes of their investigative domains, then it is enough to bear in mind the distinction between the inherent properties and the relational properties of the investigative objects of respective disciplines, i.e., one should define what the main object of study is and what its aspects under investigation constitute. That means that intermediating positions between the investigative domains of semiotics and linguistics are occupied by linguistic semiotics and semiotic linguistics. Semiotics is interested in the sign as the main object of study in relation to or independently from the aspects of objects belonging to the investigative domain of other disciplines. Linguistic semiotics, or the so-called semiotics of language, studies the language as a principal investigative object principally in relation to language as a verbal means of signification.

Semiotic linguistics, in turn, called also as semiolinguistics, studies the language as a principal investigative object mainly in relation to its significative properties. And, linguistics proper studies language as a principal object solely with regards to its systemic structural properties, sometimes independently from its semiotic functionality.
Theoretical reflections over the status of semiotics are affected by its interdisciplinary character, which practically means that there exists a multiplicity of voices on the level of a metasemiotic discourse. In order to take part in this discourse, one has to undertake the endeavors towards a systematization of conceptual and methodological frameworks being useful for a given disciplinary field of study, which are specified from the beginning. For a linguist, it means starting with semiotic investigations within the standardized context of linguistics.

Researchers who arrive at semiotic deliberations on the ground of language sciences have to be aware of the need for the unification of terms which are utilized in the bordering zones between linguistics and semiotics. They should also bear in mind the requirement for the choice of those theories, basing on which they could order the interrelationship between different methodological procedures applied in both domains. Striving for a unity of theory and method, they must possess full knowledge about the peculiarity of the investigative domains characterizing both disciplines in question, namely, semiotics and linguistics, when they choose only one aspect connected with the sign- and meaning-related nature of language. A “pilot-oriented” approach to his or her own investigative domain necessitates for the researcher of language sciences that he or she assesses the complexity of problems connected with the theory of sign, in order to avoid eclectic operational tools or procedures marked by one-sided reductionism, which is sometimes characteristic of contemporary human sciences. Consistent with their investigative aims, they should then differentiate between semiotic and non-semiotic aspects of their object of study.

**Defining the Domain and the Tasks of General Semiotics**

In the context of multifarious understandings of the semiotic object, it would be worth pondering the introduction to the methodological duties of integrational linguistic semiotics the following investigative tasks: (a) to determine the epistemological status of linguistics as a science of verbal signs among the other sciences dealing with interpersonal communication from the viewpoint of anthropology, psychology and sociology, (b) to inquire into the sign-communicational role of language in the cognitive activities of individuals and interpersonal relationships, (c) to explain the provenance of semiotic terms functioning in current theories of language, methods of observation and validation of investigative techniques in lin-
guistics, as well as, (d) to conduct studies on the epistemological awareness of linguists in the educational discourse and translational praxis.

In the investigative domain of semiotics to be found are various meaning-bearers, produced and interpreted by communicating subjects. As such, semiotics has a status of an interdisciplinary investigative perspective, utilizing the achievements of traditionally recognized disciplines, which place among their descriptive categories the notions of sign and meaning, and, more broadly, means and processes of communication. Included into the realm of semiotic objects, verbal expressions that bear certain meanings are to be considered from the perspective of their users, producers or receivers as correlates of certain functions, values or contents deduced from the domain of their references.

To the tasks of linguistic semiotics belongs the search for meaning-bearers in the domain of language texts, social and cultural contexts and extra-textual reality. These bearers of meaning, analyzed as indicators, symptoms, signals, appeals, symbols or icons, or as nonverbal or verbal signs, enter the composition of variables constituting the model of interpersonal communication. Among such constituents of various schemes modeling different types of human communication, to be distinguished are also variables which are oriented towards the source and destination of information, towards the channel of communication and media, and the contexts and situations accompanying the processes of mutual understanding between individuals and groups of people. People usually communicate in dyadic and small groups extending to public and furthermore to mass aggregations. Separate types of communication, occurring in the realm of man, form intrapersonal (solipsistic) and organizational (collective) communication. The subject matter of semiotic-communicational studies constitutes interpersonal relationships, deduced from nonverbal and verbal behavior of people participating in communicational events, which are analyzed in term of interactions and/or transactions.

Relations described as interactions among participants of communicational events are characterized, by the mutual exchange between sources (authors, senders) and destinations (addressees, receivers), that is, each communication participant functions in interchangeable roles, sending or receiving, processing or interpreting appropriate messages. The notion of transaction implies that people are not always identical in different social relationships and communicational situations. They change and adapt mutually to themselves in dependence of social, cultural, natural and personal conditionings of communication.
The ontological status and gnoseological approachability of the semiotic object in accordance with the assumptions of its forms of manifestation belongs, without any doubt, to the central problems that should be analyzed in the light of epistemology. Such a reconstruction has to concentrate on the search for investigative perspectives, which form the background of different sign and/or meaning conceptions and their applicative consequences.

Given the plurality of approaches that descend from various disciplines dealing with methodological tools of semiotics, one has to be very careful in posing demands for a restrictive use of the terms introduced by some theoreticians of general semiotics. Acknowledging the autonomy of every specific discipline of semiotics, one should be aware not only of the diversity in classificatory approaches to semiotic objects, but also of the “climate of opinions” that has influenced different ways of thinking and contributed to the formations of different methodological and conceptual frameworks.

A number of contemporary disputes over the relevant properties of semiotic objects have undoubtedly found their origins in the different traditions of studies carried out in philosophy, logic and the methodology of sciences:

(1) whether the semiotic objects are material or spiritual (corporeal or intelligible, physical or mental), concrete or abstract, real or ideal, subjective or objective, extraorganismic or intraorganismic by nature;

(2) whether the semiotic objects manifest themselves in the form of a monolateral entity or a plurilateral unity of related (two, three, or four) constituents, a relation or a network of relations between constituents; and furthermore

(3) whether the semiotic objects should be studied extrospectively or introspectively, in relation to meaning-creators or meaning-utilizers, as implicative phenomena, non-artificial or artificial, non-inferred or inferred, non-conventional or conventional, non-arbitrary or arbitrary in character, through tokens as variants of a general type or through types as invariants encompassing common features of tokens, in individual or collective occurrences, in the realm of man only, in the realm of all living systems, or in the universe of all possible mortal and/or immortal forms of beings and creatures, including the extraterrestrial and the divine.
To resolve these and related problems it is necessary to state, in the first instance, what kinds of semiotic objects one is interested in. Then one should specify the domain in which they occur. The search for investigative perspectives that characterize the epistemological foundations of general semiotics, as unified subdiscipline dealing with theoretical statements, and of specific semiotic subdisciplines, formulating their conclusions on the basis of observational statements, belongs to the domain of metascientific studies.

The task of metascientific investigations is to be viewed in finding parameters and construing general models or schemes that could serve as a matrix thereby allowing one to reduce to a common denominator and to classify all specific concepts and approaches that characterize the diversity of particular semiotic subdisciplines. From the viewpoint of metascience, all epistemological positions that contribute to the formation of terms and concepts subsumed to general semiotics should be seen as equal in right when they do not contradict each other with reference to aims and methods of investigation elaborated in the disciplinary-specific subdivisions of semiotics. Definitions of specific concepts, classifications of specific objects can, however, be taken into account only when they respond to the cognitive standpoints of semioticians without imposing on them any cognitive attitude which would lead them to fruitless modes of investigation or valueless directions of study.

General semiotics has to follow such a perspective or sets of perspectives that distinguishes and/or that distinguish its subject matter as an aggregate of characteristic properties of its objects studied in its domain against the background of the investigative domains of other scientific disciplines. However, terminological distinctions made on the grounds of general semiotics should be general enough in order to avoid forcing the practitioners of semiotic subdisciplines to make commitments to any epistemological position that might appear to them as too reductionistic or irrelevant. To be mentioned here is the practice of oversimplifying the complex nature of semiotic objects as well as sign- and/or meaning-related issues to the point of minimizing their importance or distorting their image. Anyway, as to the present state of the art, semiotics is a heteronomous field of scientific activity. Its striving for autonomy does not need to mean a struggle against diversities in opinions, but rather a pursuit of knowledge towards the explanation of positions and criteria that have contributed to the development of different conceptions concerning its subject matter motivated by individual histories of particular semiotic subdisciplines.
CHAPTER TWO

Paradigms and Scientific Revolutions in Linguistics

The Notion of Paradigm as a Set of Epistemological Commitments of Scientists to Theoretical and Practical Positions in Their Research Activities

In this chapter, it is the notion of scientific paradigm which constitutes, first and foremost, the subject matter of a thorough discussion in relation to the understanding of epistemology of semiotics as a set of investigative perspectives elaborated in Chapter Three. It takes for granted that nowadays the term paradigm has been accepted, without any precautionary grounding, as a conceptual or methodological framework which unites practitioners of science at a determined period of time providing them with modeling research questions and postulates. Undoubtedly, the reasons for the selection of an investigative frame of reference have been equated with the initial choice of investigative perspectives performed by scholars when they are interested in the existences modes of their investigative objects and in the investigative methods they are supposed to apply for reaching their relevant features. Thus, by placing the conception of the paradigm as a parallel, an equivalent or an antecedent conception of the investigative perspective, it is meant that epistemology as a theory of knowledge, which deals with questions of how the objects of scientific study exist and how researchers can experience them in cognition, is a decisive constituent of a disciplinary plane of scientific reasoning along with the domains of analysis, description and investigation. It is worthwhile to express that the epistemological, i.e., ontological and gnoseological, commitments of scientists to the choice of investigative perspectives are based either on inferences, which involve conjectural speculations and unconditionally expressed convictions, and, on the other, on observable statements, which require empirical evidence through experiment. Seeing, in a very unrestricted sense, the structural parallels between the science as a set of in-
vestigative paradigms with the epistemology of semiotics, it is proposed to regard the properties of its objects in terms of set of meta, hypo-, inter-, intradisciplinary, and disciplinary perspectives in synchrony and diachrony on macro and micro-levels.

The History of Linguistics from the Vantage Point of Kuhn’s Conception of Paradigms and Scientific Revolutions

To evaluate the history of language sciences, the following report shows how the theoreticians of linguistic thought have taken a stand on the applicability of the term paradigm introduced by Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922–1996) in a widely known book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. This seminal work, which was published for the first time in Chicago in 1962 as one of the subsequent volumes of the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, had found its reflection in critical or favorable opinions of sociologists of knowledge, anthropologists and philosophers of science, summarized in 1965 by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (cf. Masterman 1970). The results of two major conferences, the first organized by the historiographers of language sciences in Burg Wartenberg near Gloggnitz in Austria 1964 and the second in Chicago in 1968 revealed that not all linguists had given as much approval to Kuhn’s concept of science as his followers or the author himself expected (for a detailed discussion see Wąsik, Z. 1986, and 1987, 24–41).

Kuhn (1962/1970, 13–15) had departed from the assumption that there was a determined point in time when a scientific discipline had achieved its maturity by acquiring its “first paradigm”. Prior to that event, there had been the so-called “pre-paradigm” stage characterized by the lack of a common framework uniting practitioners who usually allocated their time and energy to the accidental collecting of empirical data and endless theoretical discussions about the scope of the investigative domain of their discipline. In the light of this criterion of maturity, some research fields, as, for example, the social and behavioral sciences, were considered by Kuhn (1970, 15) as those disciplines which had never acquired their “first paradigm”, and in which, as a consequence, their practitioners remained locked in a continuous state of disagreement about the legitimacy of scientific theories and methods.
In reviewing Kuhnian theory, which had relegated linguistics to the same non-scientific status as that of social and behavioral sciences, Walter Keith Percival (1976) stated, while summarizing the opinions of historiographers, that it is not applicable either to the contemporary state of linguistics or to the past one.

In the assessment of Percival, if there were linguists who still tended to search for paradigms of a mature scientific community in the Kuhnian sense, they had to conclude that modern linguistics had not been a science from its inception. Having concluded that the application of Kuhn’s theory had failed to succeed, Percival (1976, 291) warned the practitioners of language sciences against its naïve recognition while arguing that it could rather lower than raise scientific standards within the domain of their study. In consequence, as he argued, it could be better, especially for adept practitioners of linguistic disciplines, not to evaluate their own activity from the perspective of Kuhn’s distinctions as they might feel obliged to accept premature assent to any new paradigm of scientific reasoning and research, which they observed as gaining a broader support, for fear of being isolated as adherents of an older paradigm.

Appreciating the importance of Kuhn’s theory W. Keith Percival (1976, 285) admitted that there were two basic theses, which had attracted the attention of linguists in their discussion of the history of linguistic ideas. The first thesis referred to the nature of science and the second one to the question of how the scientific disciplines develop.

**Relativism in the Understanding of Science**

According to Kuhn, a science cannot be identified with a collection of facts, theories and methods as exhibited in books and in various forms of knowledge. It is not to be regarded as a cumulative enterprise, in which more and more successful generalizations are achieved on the basis of more and more successful measurements and calculations. The notion of what is to be accepted as scientific or unscientific in the practicing activity of scholars is a matter of a relative point of view.

Thus, Kuhn assumes that outdated theories are no less scientific than those which are current today; and all that one can say about them is the fact that the canons of scientific theory and practice may vary from period to period. Scientific disciplines, as Kuhn ascertains, do not develop solely through the accumulation of discoveries over time. The line of the devel-
development of science, when drafted on a diagram, may be seen not only as a smooth upward-going curve but also as a curve interrupted by quantum leaps (sudden jumps) showing the discontinuity of changes. Kuhn proposes to regard those periodic quantum leaps as scientific revolutions, while the smooth portions of the curve—as a “normal science” (rendered in Stefan Amsterdamski’s translation of 1968 into Polish as an “institutional science”). Kuhn does not see, however, the scientific revolutions literally as a break in the continuity of particular scientific traditions, but rather as events brought about by certain striking achievements of a single genius.

**Single Innovators and Scientific Revolutions**

The role of a single innovator is crucial to Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolutions. His favorite examples (cf. Percival 1976, 286) form theoretical upheavals associated with such names as Nicolaus Copernicus (Mikołaj Kopernik, 1473–1543, a Polish astronomer), (Sir) Isaac Newton (1642–1727, an English physicist and mathematician), Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (1743–1794, a French chemist), and Albert Einstein (1879–1955, a German physicist, and a citizen of the United States from the 1940).

Speaking about the intervals between scientific revolutions, Kuhn maintains that each period of a normal science in the development of a given scientific discipline is accompanied by only one framework that unites the community of scholars, i.e., a scientific paradigm. This framework is founded on the widespread scientific achievements being acknowledged at a given stage of the development and providing the community of scholars with modeling problems and solutions.

As it results from the analyses of Kuhn’s ideas, the term *paradigm* may encompass not only all the internalized convictions of a scientific group or a common feature or belief of all the people who deal with a given branch of knowledge. As summarized by Margaret Masterman (1970), it may as well be referred to a set of scientific habits, methods, and traditions together with actual instrumentation governed by a general epistemological viewpoint or an organizing principle, or a new way of seeing the world.

Kuhn himself has devoted more attention to the sociological dimension of his theory. In an answer to his critics in 1969, opposing his theory, he has proposed to speak about the frameworks that unite communities of scholars not in terms of, ambiguously understood, “paradigms” but rather “disciplinary matrices”. In his explanation, disciplinary matrices should
contain four components: symbolic generalizations, models, values and exemplars (cf. Percival 1976, 286).

Symbolic generalizations are formal elements of a disciplinary matrix, in other words, phrases which can straightway be expressed in logical molds. Models are conceptual approximations to the ontological framework of investigated reality. Values influence the criteria used by the members of a paradigm to judge between opposite theories, distinguish fixed schemes, and validate the particular modes of conducting research. Finally, exemplars are the concrete problem-solutions that students come across during their scientific schooling when they work in laboratories, pass examinations, or study the summaries of the chapters in handbooks.

The term disciplinary matrices has been not so widely accepted as the term paradigm. It has been criticized for its ambiguity and incompleteness concerning its conceptual content; and some theoreticians of science, as (Sir) Karl Raimund Popper (1902–1994), Ernest Nagel (1901–1985), Imre Lakatos (1922–1974), Paul Karl Feyerabend (1924–1994), and others, have tried to replace it with other terms (cf. the discussions summarized by Masterman 1970).

Returning, therefore, to the more familiar and popular term paradigm, one should devote attention mainly to the relationships between paradigms and scientific revolutions, as it has been formulated in the original work of Kuhn. As Kuhn (1970, 91) points out, scientific revolutions are to be taken as those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an incompatible new one replaces an older paradigm in whole or in part. Thus, one could say that the revolution uniquely determines the character of the paradigm, which has been adopted in the aftermath, because each scientific revolution introduces, in consequence, a new paradigm and vice versa.

**The Uniform Assent as a Defining Attribute of a Paradigm**

There seems to be an important difference (as Percival states in 1976, 287) between the two discussed notions. While it is single innovators who perform revolutions, paradigms are social phenomena, namely—in accordance with Kuhn’s account—systems of beliefs, opinions and group engagements shared by all the practitioners of a given scientific discipline without exception.

A uniform assent of all the members of a scientific community is a necessary defining attribute of any genuine paradigm in Kuhn’s stipula-
tions. Knowing that this *consensus omnium* of scholars is, in reality, not achieved at once, one should go back to the prerequisites of revolutions in order to explain the reasons for paradigm shifts. One should remember that the source of scientific revolutions, according to Kuhn, is the conviction of the practitioners of science that the hitherto existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the explorations. Moreover, this prerequisite conviction leads to a crisis, and each crisis—as a natural consequence—weakens the role of a still existing paradigm (cf. Kuhn 1970, 91–92).

Kuhn (1970, 92–93) is of the opinion that each crisis deepens when an increasing number of practitioners becomes increasingly estranged from one scientific tradition and behaves more and more eccentrically within it. Soon afterward, it happens that many individual scientists commit themselves to concrete proposals for the reconstruction of an existing tradition in a new institutional framework or paradigm. At that point scholars are divided into competing groups, some seeking to defend an old institutional order and some others seeking to institute some new ones. Though a normal science often suppresses fundamental novelties, as they are subversive of its basic commitments, nevertheless, these commitments usually gain priority as the very nature of normal research ensures that the novelty shall not be suppressed for very long.

And what happens when this *consensus omnium* is not achieved at the very beginning. Kuhn points here out that (1970, 19):

[T]here are always men who cling to one or another of the older views, and they are simply read out of the profession which thereafter ignores their work. The new paradigm implies a new and rigid definition of the field. Those unwilling or unable to accommodate their work to it must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to some other groups.

A new paradigm meets during the period of a scientific revolution with an uncompromising resistance of many specialists because, entering into their domain, it causes deep changes in the rules governing the practice of a normal science. Kuhn sees the grounds of this conflict not in the difference between particular schools of thought, but in what he calls dogmatically “incommensurability of world views”.

Between the propagators of a new paradigm and the followers of an old one, it comes to a break of mutual understanding, since both sides represent different viewpoints and even the terms which they use possess different meanings. Following Kuhn, such a situation may be compared to
a gestalt-switch. Being members of different communities, the scholars have to become interpreters of their new paradigms.

Another very important element of the Kuhnian theory is the criterion defining the maturity of scientific disciplines. Kuhn hypothesizes that every scientific discipline has a chronologically earlier paradigm. In other words, there is a definite point in time when a field achieves its scientific maturity, and it does so by acquiring its “first paradigm”. Prior to that event, there is a jungle of competing schools of thought. It is just the so-called “pre-paradigm” period characterized by the unavailability of a common framework that could unite practitioners. Since they lack a universally shared framework which may determine the character of their research, the scholars waste their time and energy in random data-gathering and fruitless controversies about the fundamentals of their discipline (cf. Kuhn 1970, 13–15). According to this criterion of maturity, some research fields have never acquired their “first paradigm” and, in consequence, their practitioners remain locked in a chronic state of disagreement about the nature of legitimate scientific problems and methods. Kuhn (1970, 15) means here the social and behavioral sciences (cf. also the summary of this fact in Percival 1976, 288).

What characterizes, in turn, the period in which a given discipline has acquired its first paradigm? Kuhn’s (1970, 19) answer has been that it is the reception of a paradigm which transforms a group, previously interested in the study of nature, into a profession or at least a separate discipline. He adds that the reception of the first common paradigm in whichever discipline is usually connected with the foundation of specialized scientific societies, with the formation of professional journals, and the claim for a special place in the curriculum of subjects being taught at schools.

**Applying of the Notion of Paradigm to the History of Linguistics**

Kuhn’s view of the history of science had found its reflection in the writings of the historiographers of language sciences, as Peter A. Verburg (1974), Paul Diderichsen (1974), Dell Hathaway Hymes (1974), Paul Kiparsky (1974), Ernst Friderik Konrad Koerner (1975, 1978), Walter Keith Percival (1976), and Dell Hymes and John Fought (1975). Having reviewed the development and the present state of linguistic ideas in search of para-
digms and scientific revolutions, they focused on the following issues of interest:

(a) When was the first linguistic paradigm established?
(b) What kind of theoretical and methodological changes in linguistic thought might be regarded as indices of scientific revolutions?
(c) Who were those single innovators who had contributed to bring about the development of linguistics in Kuhnian terms? Furthermore, the mentioned historiographers wanted to inquire:
(d) Had the history of linguistics confirmed, in general, the main principles of Kuhnian tenet about the history of science?

**Controversies in the Historiographic Understanding of Kuhnian Distinctions**

Particularly serious problems were connected with the proper understanding of the notion of “paradigm” and its relation to other elements of Kuhn’s theory, as, e.g., to the notions of “normal science”, “crisis in science”, “scientific revolutions”, “consensus omnium of scholars” (scientific communities with a uniform assent), and “single genius in science”. Percival (1976) had noticed, for example, that Kuhn’s notion of revolution borrowed from the history of non-scientific fields could be applied to the analysis of the history of linguistics. However, the same would be not true with regard to his key-notion of paradigm when it had to be treated as resulting from an outstanding scientific achievement on the part of a single innovator commanding a uniform assent among all practitioners of a discipline. If these two requirements ought to be fulfilled, as Percival had stated, then the Kuhn’s concept of paradigm could not be applied either to the history or to the present state of linguistics.

In a very broad sense, Peter A. Verburg (1974) proposed, among the other things, to apply the notion of paradigm to the analyses of changes in the development of linguistic thought. Stressing their doctrinal character and/or disciplinary provenance, he tried to reconstruct the occurrence of such paradigms taking into account all approaches to language from Antiquity to the present time (cf. Verburg 1974, 191–230). Verburg was aware of the fact that when linguistics became an independent discipline with its own subject matter, the number of paradigms was increasing and it might be difficult to arrange them both chronologically and systematically,
for more and more novel disciplines were entering language studies in modern times.

Quite all of the linguists who examined the history of their discipline within the framework of Kuhn were unanimous in their opinion regarding the fact that the proper paradigm of the sciences of language had been inaugurated at the beginning of the 19th century. The real problem emerged, however, when the question was raised who should be given the role of a single innovator being responsible for the formulation of the first linguistic theories and the development of the first methods of comparative historical studies applied later to all languages of the world. Some (cf. Hymes 1974, 1–34) pointed at Franz Bopp (1791–1867) and some others Rasmus Kristian Rask (1787–1832), or both philologists along with Jakob Ludwig Karl Grimm (1785–1863). Some historiographers (as, e.g., Kiparsky 1974) were of the opinion that the comparative paradigm had formed itself not earlier than between 1860s and 1870s thanks to the activity of August Schleicher (1821–1868), i.e., simultaneously with the growth of the positivistic methodology initiated by the Neogrammarians (Germ. Junggrammatiker).

Yet, research on pre-paradigmatic and paradigmatic periods in linguistics had revealed that the persons who were depicted as revolutionizing in the Kuhnian sense had their antecedents at various epochs in the past. For instance, Paul Diderichsen (1974) was the one who came to this conclusion in a penetrating study on Rasmus Rask and the background of the first comparative grammars. He was certain about the existence of a scientific tradition, which must have preceded the works of Rask, Bopp and Grimm, and tried, in this way, to turn away the historians of science from the attribution of the term paradigm to the evaluations of their achievements in question.

While speaking about Rask, Diderichsen claimed that Rask merely “applied the theories and methods of the eighteenth century philosophical etymology and grammar to all the main languages of Europe, Indo-European as well as others” (Diderichsen 1974, 301). He went even further stating that “the philosophical grammar of the eighteenth century, by integration and extension of some ancient ideas, worked out a paradigm of research, in Kuhn’s terms, such that continuous scientific progress could be made by problem solving” (Diderichsen 1974, 301). Thereupon, in Diderichsen’s view, Rask did nothing more than mopping up after Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727–1781), one of the collaborators on a French encyclopedia published in the 18th century. Of course, for the lack of criteria, which might be accepted by all, it is hard to decide whether it was
Rask who had created his own paradigm or whether he had only improved an earlier paradigm worked out by his forerunners.

Another participant in this discussion, John Greene (1974, 498) rejected the opinion of Diderichsen while concluding that, as far as the encyclopedist Turgot had not demonstrated his own method in the actual research, one could not say about him that he was the one who had founded a new discipline. It was also Yakov Malkiel (1974, 315–330) who came to a similar conclusion as Diderichsen with reference to Rask when he wrote on “Friedrich Diez’s debt to pre-1800 linguistics”. In his view, Diez’s monumental work Grammatik der romanischen Sprachen I–III (1836–1844), despite the fact that it had contributed a lot to the development of Romanist studies, did not differ remarkably from earlier scientific traditions. Therefore, it could not be viewed as a paradigmatic breakthrough.

Probably as problematic, the historians of linguistics might treat also the statement of Paul Kiparsky concerning the existence of two paradigms within the comparative linguistics (cf. Percival 1976, 291 or Hymes 1974, 340), the so-called “Paleogrammarians and Neogrammarians”. Kiparsky noticed, namely, a fundamental difference between Bopp’s generation interested in the reconstruction of proto-languages and the age group of linguists who came to the fore of science in the 1860s and 1870s, turning their attention to the explanation of derivatives.

As to the Neogrammarians, Kiparsky departed from a simple view that the revolution had been initiated a good decade earlier before they arrived on the scene and that the new conceptual and methodological framework, which united them, had been accepted both by the Neogrammarians and by their opponents. In fact, Kiparsky’s concept of the development of linguistics had deviated from Kuhn’s point of view in that he diminished the role of a single genius in science, admitting at the same time the existence of alternatives within the same paradigm.

**Delimiting Paradigmatic Stages and Scientific Revolutions as Resultant from the Achievements of Single Innovators in Linguistics**

Subsequently, one should make known the position of E. F. Konrad Koerner, a historiographer, who proposed the division into periods of the development of linguistics from the perspective of a single innovator. However, Koerner’s understanding of the notion of paradigm was narrower than that
which could be deduced from the Kuhn’s theory. Stressing the social and professional nature of ideas uniting the community of scholars, he proposed a new complementary term, namely, *climate of opinion* referring to interests and goals, as well as to intellectual currents of a given period. In his own depiction (Koerner 1975, 720):

\[ C \text{limate of opinion denotes the particular atmosphere prevailing at a given period of time, whereas 'paradigm' is used to characterize the particular achievement of one individual working in a branch of scientific activity who puts forward a comprehensive theory developed within the 'climate of opinion', but which leads to new interests in a given discipline and possibly also outside its immediate concern.}\]

In the early years of his fascination for the study of scientific trends within the framework of Kuhn’s theory, Koerner (1975, 717–827) opted for distinguishing paradigmatic stages in the development of language sciences taking as a criterion the achievements of selected innovators. He believed that the history of linguistic ideas might be divided into three subsequent paradigmatic periods marked by the theoretical and methodological achievements of three scholars responsible for revolutionary changes in linguistics, namely August Schleicher, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), and Noam Avram Chomsky (1928–). In Koerner’s view, they had influenced and attracted many adherents and supporters, being, as he said, “members of a particular scientific credo” (Koerner 1975, 720). However, as Koerner stressed, it was not the originality or novelty of Schleicher’s, Saussure’s and Chomsky’s ideas because they really did not work without antecedents. The merit was credited to them because they had systematized the whole of linguistic knowledge accumulated at their epoch.

Schleicher, for example, had worked out a theory of language based on the conviction that the object of linguistics should belong to the domain of natural sciences and, therefore, it had to adopt a methodology as rigorous as that of botany or comparative anatomy. The fact, however, that Schleicher regarded language as a natural organism, which could be classified into genera, species and subspecies, indicated against background of the climate of opinion that it might be considered within the framework of evolutionism. This concept, being considered as a novelty, was shared not only by the generation of first comparatists, especially by Bopp, Grimm and Rask, but also by August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767–1845), and his brother Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829), as well as by (Friedrich) Wilhelm (Christian Karl Ferdinand) von Humboldt (1767–
1835). A structural approach to languages had been influenced by the classification of plants, widely applied in botanical works since the publication of *Genera plantarum* by Carolus Linnaeus (Carl von Linné, 1707–1778, the Swedish original name: Carl Nilsson Linnaeus) in 1742. It was as early as in the year 1848 when Schleicher proposed to compare languages to living organisms, on the account of which his biological naturalism should have been explained rather through the climate of opinion than the direct influence of Charles Robert Darwin’s (1809–1882) theory of evolution.

As Koerner had pointed out, Schleicher made known his assumption about the Indo-European languages in terms of cognate family members, i.e., related by kinship, in 1850, and then he developed his concept of the genealogical tree in 1858. Schleicher’s next work of 1860 *Die deutsche Sprache*, in which he confronted three genealogical families of Indo-European languages, had been undoubtedly finished and conveyed to the publisher before he got in touch with Charles Darwin’s *opus magnum, On the Origin of Species*, edited in London in November of 1859. August Schleicher himself, as Koerner brought to light, denounced this widespread opinion that he had been indebted a lot to the Darwinian thought in the introductory words to *Die Darwin’sche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft: offenes Sendschreiben an Herrn Dr. Ernst Haeckel*. In this work of 1863, unfortunately with a suggestive title for future historiographers, he informed his friend Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), a biologist and co-founder of the biogenetic law in ontogeny (cf. Haeckel 1866), that he did not see *On the Origin of Species* before he had written his own work. Just the opposite, he expressed his indebtedness to the antecedents of evolutionism in botany and geology (cf. Koerner 1975, 754–755).

As for the next paradigm, which might have replaced the Schleicherian framework permanently, Koerner expressed his conviction that Ferdinand de Saussure should not be seen as the only innovator who initiated the scientific revolution in linguistics. What he had done was that he had presented only a coherent theory of one of the alternative approaches to language. Such conceptual categories, as, for example, structure, system, sign, value, social character of language, psychological qualities of individual speech acts, arbitrariness of language signs, synchrony vs. diachrony, and the like, did not belong to the new findings of Saussure, because they had appeared also in some philosophical works of his contemporaries.

Searching for sources of inspiration made upon the work of Saussure, Koerner disagreed with opinions suggesting that the Swiss linguist had
owed many insights of his theory to such scientists as the philosopher Anton Marty (1847–1914) and the philologist Adolf Gotthard Noreen (1854–1925). He gave rather priority to Hermann (Otto Theodor) Paul’s (1846–1921) Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (1880), taking for granted that Saussure must have studied it during his formative years he spent at Leipzig and Berlin. Moreover, Koerner strongly opposed also the conviction of Witold Doroszewski (1899–1976) that Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale (1916) had been influenced by the work of French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) Les règles de la méthode sociologique (cf. Durkheim 1894/1895). Made popular in the 1930s (through the articles of 1933, “Sociologie et linguistique, Durkheim et de Saussure” & “Durkheim et F. de Saussure”), Doroszewski’s (1933a, 1933b) claim, as Koerner (1975, 787 and 795–796) noticed, became quite a dogma in the historiography of linguistics. The fact that many important parallelisms between the two authors existed did not necessarily imply that Saussure was strictly dependent in his views on Durkheim. As Koerner remarked, such theoretical assumptions about non-historical, static and structural nature of language, as well as sociologism and psychologism, had existed also in the “climate of opinion”, prevailing at that particular epoch. The same might be said about the notion of valeur. Having been introduced into the political economy as valeur d’échange by Léon Walras (1834–1910) through the mediation of Éléments d’économie politique pure, ou Théorie de la richesse sociale (1874), it supposedly found its reflection in Saussure’s systemic view of relational properties of the entities of language (cf. Koerner 1975, 796).

With reference to the next paradigm of Noam Chomsky, Dell Hymes and John Fought (1975, 1142), the opponents of Koerner’s statement, represented the opinion that there was no sufficient reason for claiming that transformational-generative grammar had to be viewed as a breakthrough in the state of contemporary linguistic knowledge. In their estimation, Koerner had rather relied on the beliefs of Chomsky’s adherents who proposed to analyze the first striking wave of transformational-generative grammar at the end of 1960s as having the traits of revolutions. Some adherents pointed out the unusual achievements of a single individual embodied in such works as Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957), and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Some claimed (cf., e.g., Mathews 1974, 216) that linguistics in the late 1950s and 1960s “underwent a Chomskyan revolution, and even since we are supposed to be working within the new paradigm of generative grammar. If not, we are clinging to old ways”
(quoted after Percival 1976, 288). As Percival (1976, 288) observed, some other historiographers who had written about Chomskyan generative grammar in Kuhn’s terms were aware of the fact that there was a sharp exchange of views between the adherents of a new theory and the representatives of older traditions. Those who cultivated the great heritage of a post-Bloomfieldian framework (tracking Leonard Bloomfield, 1887–1949) regarded both Chomsky and his "epigones" as vulgarians. The mere fact that this kind of conflict had occurred at all was interpreted by historiographers as an indicator that the opposite viewpoints were semantically incommensurable, and that this time again the older generations had failed to undergo the necessary experience of “conversion”. Some were also convinced that the transformational-generative grammar could be applied to all investigative domains of language study. Roman (Osipovich) Jakobson (1896–1982), for example, saw in the Chomskyan framework even a synthesis of the direct and distant past, proposing to distinguish the sequence: traditional grammar, structuralism and Chomskyan transformational grammar, in accordance with the distinction of Georg (Wilhelm Friedrich) Hegel (1770–1831), as a negation of negation, i.e., thesis—antithesis—synthesis (cf. Hymes & Fought 1975, 905).

Besides, there were some other attempts in analyzing the sociological dimension of the Chomskyan theory, namely, in terms of the four constituents of disciplinary matrices. The argumentation was formulated in the following way: the rules of the base and transformational components of the generative theory, expressed in logical forms, might be qualified as symbolic generalizations according to the Kuhnian understanding. Furthermore, the ontological model uniting the adherents of the grammar appears in the notion that natural language could be regarded as a set of strings generated by appropriate well-defined mathematical properties. In addition to this, it was assumed that Chomsky and his followers had a clearly defined system of values, which mostly placed a premium on simplicity and generality, de-emphasizing thus factual accuracy (cf. Percival 1976, 289).

Finally, such a textbook as The Fundamentals of Linguistic Analysis by Ronald W. Langacker (born 1942), might be regarded as a good example of “problem-solutions” in the light of the theory of science as presented by Kuhn (cf. Langacker 1972). Hymes and Fought, however, were of the opinion that Chomsky had not only reformulated some previously existing notions (e.g., that of Saussure) adding successively some new elements to his theory in reply to the growing number of critical voices along with the
growth of his own linguistic knowledge. Nevertheless, the fact that Chomsky had developed some crucial categories of Saussure in a new way, giving preference to deductive reasoning instead of generalizing based on inductive proofs, formalizing theoretical models instead of describing natural languages, did not necessarily testify that Chomsky’s proposal should be viewed as a revolutionary change. Yet, if historiographers had agreed that linguistics really underwent such a kind of revolution the adherents of Chomskyan approach were convicted of, they still did not have any evidence that transformational-generative grammar had become a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense.

As Percival (1976, 289) rightly noted, generative grammar did not command any uniform assent among linguists from all over the world. Not all members of profession shared it as a conceptual framework. One could encounter a lot of linguists who subscribed themselves to other branches of linguistic knowledge, for example, structuralism in Europe or stratificational grammar, tagmematics, string analysis, etc., in America. Even the adherents of generative grammar had split into numerous competing schools of thought. With reference to John Searle (1972/1974, 8), Percival (1976, 289) pointed out, in this particular context, that a new generation of so-called “Young Turks” was now offering the same kind of challenge to the transformational establishment as Chomsky did to the post-Bloomfieldians in 1957.

Consequently, in answer to the critical voices of Percival, Hymes and Fought, and others, Koerner repudiated his initial enthusiasm concerning his assessment of Chomskyan grammar as a paradigm and the appraisal its impact upon scholars as a breakthrough in the sciences of language. He referred, however, to his earlier disclosure: “as I have indicated in the cases of Schleicher and Saussure … Chomsky’s ideas cannot be regarded as entirely novel and without antecedents” (Koerner 1978a, 41, quoted in: Jaszczolt 1989, 102). This time Koerner exposed Chomsky’s direct links with Zellig Sabbetai Harris (1909–1992), Nelson Goodman (1906–1998), Roman Osipovich (Osipovič) Jakobson, and Morris Halle (originally Pinkovics or Pinkowitz, born 1923), and indirect links with the Praguean phonology and post-Saussurean structuralism. Some historiographers, as cited by Katarzyna Jaszczolt (1989, 101), were of the opinion that “if there was a Chomskyan revolution, it was not a Kuhnian one”. There was no sufficient reason to regard generative grammar as an obligatory paradigm for all linguists. However, taking a non-Kuhnian point of view, one could speak about a new paradigm in the case of Chomsky’s grammar exclusively
against the background of the grammar of Harris. Chomsky’s transformation rules changed deep structures into surface structures, whereas Harris’ rules referred to the relations between surface structures. Certain doubts might arise, whether such a turning point within the distinction between the deep- and surface-structure was a revolution or only a transition from one conceptual domain to another and, correspondingly, whether such a transition had contributed to any increase of verisimilitude or explanatory adequacy of a theory.

The Development of Linguistic Thought as “a Succession of Cynosures and Discontinuity”

The history of linguistic trends teaches us, as Hymes (1974, 1–38) has noticed, that neither of the investigative approaches has governed the whole discipline, even being in the center of interest, i.e., “neither has been exclusive holder of the stage. Each has had the center, but not the whole” (see Hymes 1974, 10). When one approach has dominated, another one has been still continued, or a new one has appeared.

Following Hymes’ reasoning, one may agree that the members of certain scientific enterprises are aware of some revolutionary changes having occurred and that some scientific communities regard themselves as paradigmatic ones, but they have never had the opportunity to control the whole discipline. The grounds for such a differentiation, Hymes sees, especially in the diversity of cognitive interests and orientations which successively or alternatively have competed for exclusivity in deciding what the scope of linguistic studies was. Furthermore, he has noticed the existence of many trends and directions of study arguing for the recognition of the importance of investigative approaches and social functions of language. Apart from these two methodological observations, Hymes has added that the scope of scientific interests in language is not in the same way institutionalized at different schools and scientific centers. The development of linguistics should, therefore, not be described in terms of paradigms that replace each other, according to Hymes.

What the historians are aware of constitutes heterogeneous traditions of formation, continuation, and the growth of divergent approaches to language that have their own records of continuity, breaks, and returns. It occurs, for example, that the same approach, which has been the center of
interest at a certain place or a certain time, disappears at another one, without finding any further propagator or follower.

In the history of linguistic thought, as Hymes (1974, 19) concludes, we have to deal with “a succession of cynosures and discontinuity”. Although he has not proposed to reject the notion of paradigm as a methodological device, Hymes advises the historiographers to be very careful in approaching its application. The success of this notion, when accepted uncritically and literally, could encourage some linguists, especially from younger generations, to express prejudices against their own discipline, the picture of which would appear to them in the light of Kuhnian concepts as full of gaps and breaks.

Very critically, Percival (1976, 289) has approached the problem of the applicability of the Kuhn’s concept of paradigms, expressing his conviction that linguistics is rather in an ambiguous position. It is either a field which remains “in the pre-paradigmatic stage of inter-school rivalry”, having failed to achieve scientific maturity, “or else a field, which, (though scientific), intrinsically eludes analysis in terms of paradigms” (Percival 1976, 291, cf. Wąsik, Z. 1986, 104–105, quoted by Jaszczołt 1989, 99).

On maintaining his mode of reasoning, Percival comments that linguists who have tried to depict generative grammar as a Kuhnian paradigm have not sufficiently understood the theory to realize that it does not apply either to the contemporary state of linguistics or to a past one. Certainly, it is applicable but only in a very loose sense, relegating linguistics to the same non-scientific status as that of social and behavioral sciences. If, after all, linguists still like to identify the paradigms of a mature scientific community, they must conclude that modern linguistics has not been a science from the beginning. Nor it has been a “mature science” in the Kuhnian sense.

Thus, if linguistics falls outside the previews of Kuhn’s theory so does some other fields, which are commonly regarded as “legitimately scientific” (Percival 1976, 291). Having concluded that the application of Kuhn’s theory to the history of linguistics has failed to succeed, Percival warns the practitioners of language sciences against its uncritical acceptance, explaining that it could lower rather than raise scientific standards within the domain of their study. Hence, it could be better for them not to regard their own activity from a Kuhnian vantage point, as they might feel impelled to give premature assent to any novel theory, which has gained a wide support, for fear of being isolated as adherents of a discarded paradigm.
Redefining the Concept of Paradigm for the Aims of Historiography

In spite of the fact that the Kuhn’s theory had been negatively esteemed by historiographers of language sciences, e.g., as a “Procrustean bed” or a treacherous guide across the disciplines, its main terms reformulated and redefined, had contributed significantly to a sociological view of the development of linguistic ideas. In a collection of his subsequent works, Koerner (cf. 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, and 1978d) affirmed that the straight application of Kuhn’s doctrine would be impossible. Nevertheless, some concepts, as, e.g., that of “paradigm” might be useful, according to him, “if, and only if, they were redefined for the particular requirements of linguistic historiography” (Koerner 1978d, 190). As he maintained (1978b), a new type of historiography should be established, which would be based on strong, well-defined principles, and which would equalize the current state of knowledge with that of a “normal science”. However, Koerner was aware of the fact that linguistics could not be treated as a “normal science” on the same level as natural sciences. It could only use select accomplishments of natural sciences to reveal some aspects of its object of investigation (cf. Jaszczołt 1989, 103). Similarly as Percival (1976), Koerner (1978) expressed also his objection to the way in which the term revolution had been applied to the analysis of linguistic changes.

As Koerner noticed, some linguists who had tried to apply it to certain changes proving the continuity and development of the sciences of language had misused this notion. The best policy, according to Koerner (1978, as brought to light by Jaszczołt 1989, 103), would be to adopt Kuhnian theory with these of Imre Lakatos, Robert King Merton (1910–2003), Ernst Nagel, Karl Popper, and others, using them critically, which would be better than having no conceptual framework. In fact, it would be easier to judge any historical events as the evolutionary ones, when one looked at them from a certain distance being not influenced by the present state of scientific movements and prevailing trends.

Accordingly, for Koerner (1978d, 203), the year 1876 marked a revolutionary change in linguistics with the achievements of Schleicher, whereas 1957—with Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures—did not. The latter had to be seen rather as an outcome of a long process of theory change than a sudden change of a scientific paradigm.
Postulating a New Understanding of the Term Paradigm

The survey of the standpoints of linguists, against the background of those of the philosophers of science, critically discussed inter alia by Alina Motycka (1980), shows that the debate on the applicability of Kuhn’s notions to the description of the state and development of linguistic thought has added to the linguistic historiography a new non-Kuhnian dimension. Among them, a stable place is occupied by the term paradigm. As Stefan Amsterdamski (1929–2005) has noticed (cf. 1968, 197), it has been widely accepted because of its close understanding to Karl Mannheim’s (1893–1947) term Erkenntnisperspektive (cognitive perspective) (cf. 1929/1936 [1954]; cited edition of 1936, 244, 246, 259).

In a popular usage, the term paradigm refers to a prevailing concept, focus of interest, dominating disciplinary and interdisciplinary doctrine, and at length to a system of common views summed up by a prominent individual or a group of scientists representing prior trends of research. Approximately the same meaning is attached to the term micro-paradigm, introduced on the Polish ground by Maria Nowakowska (1980, 5, cf. footnote 1), in order to embrace both the sets of methods, theories, and theoretical convictions accepted in a given social group. However, along with the use of the term paradigm new pragmatic aspects of traditional terms have been exposed, as, e.g., climate of opinion, tradition, frame of reference, intellectual innovation, etc. In this context, as Jaszczolt (1989, 92) rightly noticed, the term mini-revolution relating to the proposal of Barbara Tuchańska (1987) would also be worth mentioning.

Methodological Postulates or the Applicative Value of the Term Paradigm

If we agree that the term paradigm might be useful for appreciating investigative approaches which happen to be distinguished in the history of linguistics, we would limit its scope to the structure of objective knowledge lying beyond the knowing subject. That means, we would not relate it to convictions or beliefs characterizing certain individuals or communities of scholars, but rather to the sets of propositions and notions expressed in their texts, i.e., in their objective utterances, and other means of communication that are exhaustive, simple, and verifiable in praxis. In such a reduced scope, paradigms would be referred to all frames of reference or-
ganizing the human experience and theorizing the human cognition or, in other words, every possible framework that systematizes human experience in a scientific way. Exactly speaking, we would embrace with the term *paradigm* any epistemological frame of reference, i.e., any set of conceptual and cognitive-methodological assumptions about the nature of the object of study and about the way of how to approach it while applying investigative tools, or formulating postulates and operational definitions.

In a very loose sense, we would confine ourselves to the notion of paradigm as a synonym of an investigative approach, including methodological standpoints, cognitive perspectives, heuristic models and concepts, furthermore also trends or theories propagated by individual scientists or scientific communities united within the so-called schools of scientific thought. In this broad view, the paradigm would not present itself as a closed system. It might be regarded as composed of sub-paradigms or micro-paradigms, constituting the part of the systems of higher range. As such, it could be distinguished as standing in relation to supra-paradigms or macro-paradigms, and so on, depending on the hierarchical situation of appropriate levels of reference (e.g., ad-paradigms, co-paradigms, hyper-paradigms, hypo-paradigms, meta-paradigms, and the like).

The science in particular, as a system situated within other systems, does not necessarily need to have all places (the so-called slots) occupied (or filled out) by hitherto-existing actual paradigms. It could have also some slots open for new potential paradigms, in the traditional understanding of the term in question, for other new subsystems, models, concepts, and investigative approaches to various sides, forms of manifestation, levels, and structures of the investigated object.

**Summarizing Statements**

While appreciating the relational value of paradigms, practitioners of historiography should consider whether the disputed frames of reference occupy the same or not the same place within the whole system of a given type of science. Eventually, they may be interested in paradigms that exclude each other or overlap, that belong to a superior or ulterior level, forming constituents of other paradigms of higher or lower order.

The survey of trends shaping the history of linguistic thought has shown the development of theoretical and methodological approaches to language is not to be formulated in terms of paradigms replacing each
other through revolutions. Historiographers of linguistic ideas are rather in a position to study the formation, continuation, and successive differentiation of heterogeneous traditions that possess their separate notations, interruptions and returns.

Taking into consideration the heteronomous nature of language and diverse ways of approaching it in an investigative practice, one is entitled to state that in linguistics, and in the broadly understood sciences of language, there exist not only substitutable but also equivalent investigative paradigms. Accordingly, they have to be reviewed both in diachrony and in synchrony, either as the succession of differing paradigms that replace each other, or as the co-existence of paradigms that intersect, mutually complement, include or exclude each other. In dependence upon the place of linguistics among other sciences, as to its common, adjacent, or bordering object of study, methodology and application of knowledge, they form a network of supra-, and superordinated or intrinsic and extrinsic investigative perspectives. The necessity of their hierarchical and systemic arrangement should be formulated as a postulate for the epistemology of linguistic semiotics.
CHAPTER THREE

Epistemological Positions of Semiotics

On the Metascientific Status of Epistemology

To begin with, this chapter, basing on the earlier author’s works (Wąsik 2003, 13–42 and 2014, 27–46), alludes to the understanding of epistemology as specified by French philosophers in the dictionaries of Didier Julia (1991) and semiotics of Algirdas Julien Greimas and Joseph Courtés (1979 [1982]), while relating to the distinctions of Paul Lucian Garvin (1919–1994) introduced in his prominent publications (cf. Garvin 1977, 101–110; and 1978, 331–351). It assumes that epistemology is a branch of philosophy studying nature and grounds of knowledge with regard to limits and functional validity of investigative approaches used in particular scientific disciplines for determining their subject matter. The domain of epistemology embraces not only the reflections upon investigative methods and procedures but also theoretical axioms and hypotheses of a given type of science. In this sense, epistemology is seen as the highest level in the disciplinary matrix of science, i.e., succeeding the object of study, the description of its subject matter, and the methodology determining its descriptive concepts. Thus, the aim of epistemology is a profound critique and verification of the methodological plane by testing its coherence and evaluating its adequacy in its relation to the descriptive plane.

An epistemological analysis of a given discipline consists in the examination of its ontological and gnoseological foundations in order to answer how far the commitment of scientists to their attendant views on their object of study corresponds to its investigative approachability. Hence, the study of epistemological positions occupied by a given discipline is based on the conviction that the choice of a given investigative approach initially stipulates a scientists’ outlook upon the nature of their investigated object. In consequence, this outlook usually coincides with the choice of conceptual and operational investigative tools providing a basis for the formulation of investigative postulates. On a metascientific level, the choice of an epistemological orientation means the choice of an appropriate investigative
perspective determined by both the accepted tasks of investigation and the nature of the investigated object (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 12–13.

**Controversies Over the Disciplinary Boundaries of Semiotic Studies**

An epistemological approach to the positions held by semiotics among the other scientific disciplines should concentrate on answering the questions as to how the knowledge of the relevant properties of its object, or its domain (as a set of objects) of study, is itself organized. Its purpose, as one may assume after Roland Posner (1988, 168) is to state what kinds of investigative perspectives are used for determining its specific subject matter (in a more extensive elaboration cf. also Posner 2003).

For determining the epistemological position of an investigative object, it is important to distinguish between reality and knowledge, i.e., between *obiectum reale* and *obiectum formale*.

- *Obiectum reale*, i.e., reality in itself, embraces all inherent and relational aspects of an object to be studied existing independently of subjective cognition, and *obiectum formale*, i.e., knowledge of the reality, constitutes a cognitive model of the subject matter of the study distinguished by a subject of science as a set of relevant features of an object which is detached from a given investigative domain.

- *Obiectum reale* consists, in the philosophical sense, of essential and accidental qualities of things and states of affair as existing objectively beyond the knowing subject, and *obiectum formale* makes up all relevant and contingent features of cognized things and states of affair that have been known by an individual subject of science, i.e., perceived, received, apperceived and conceived mentally, as a set of properties.

*Essence* and *accidence* are assumed as definitionally necessary and unnecessary qualities of intelligible forms of being. *Relevance* and *contingency*, in turn, are seen as functionally indispensable and dispensable features, i.e., the properties of sensible forms of being. To be exhibited is that “essence” and “relevance” are referred to the same characteristic mass of things and states of affair as types although they are not synonymous.

It might be appropriate to mention that the specification of the subject matter construed by scientists for characterizing the nature of their domain...
of study, or deduced from the observable features of their objects of study, depends upon the choice of a given investigative perspective or a set of concatenated investigative perspectives.

The properties of the objects belonging to the domain of semiotics, which are studied from semiotic and non-semiotic viewpoints, may also be revealed by different philosophical and logical positions that provide a metascientific basis for partial methodologies of individual types of sciences. Thus, having stated, in this framework, that the epistemology of semiotics is shaped by various scientific paradigms, it is assumed that the properties of its objects may be studied, *inter alia*, through the set of meta, hypo-, inter-, intradisciplinary, and disciplinary perspectives, useful for distinguishing its relevant categories and notions.

**Epistemology of Semiotics as a Set of Investigative Perspectives**

The search for investigative perspectives, which has taken part in the specification of the subject matter of semiotic disciplines throughout the history of science, can start from the bird’s-eye-view considering the panorama of all ontological beliefs, doctrines, trends and directions of scientific conduct. They are collected and defined in philosophical dictionaries or books on the epistemology of sciences (cf., *inter alia*, Podsiad and Więckowski 1983; Podsiad 2000; Honderich 1998 [1995]), under the names that refer to their notional contents, disciplinary provenance, ways of presentation, authors and/or followers.

A provisional list of investigative perspectives, arranged alphabetically, may distinguish, in particular: absolutism, activism, agnosticism, aintelectualism, anthropocentrism, anthropologism, antiinductivism, antinaturalism, antipsychologism, aposteriorism, apriorism, Aristotelianism, associationism, atheism, atomism, behaviorism, Bergsonism, Berkeleianism, biology, causalism, cogitationism, cognitivism, collectivism, comparativism (or comparisonism), conceptualism, concretism or reism, conditionalism, conformism, conscientialism, constructivism, conventionalism, creativism, Darwinism, deductivism (or anti-inductivism), descriptivism, determinism, diffusionism, dogmaticism, dualism, dynamism, emanationism, emergentism, emotionalism, empiricism, empiriocriticism, empiriocommonism, empiriosymbolism, energetism, environmentalism, essentialism, eventism, evolutionism, existentialism, experimentalism, explanationism, extrospec-
Epistemological Positions of Semiotics

A survey of the list of investigative perspectives, elaborated by the representatives of metascientific subdisciplines, philosophers and logicians (cf., e.g., Jadacki 1985, 39), provides followers of semiotics with a sufficient image that the task imposed upon them to pursue the epistemological foundations of their field of study, taken as a whole, is enormous. Besides, one should bear in mind that the list is not complete yet, for more names of particular perspectives appear in various articles and treatises dealing with specific problems of the methodology of semiotic disciplines, as, for example, (pan)experientialism, (pan)psychism, connectionism, taxonomism, systemism, synchronism, stratificationism, tagmemism, generativism, not mentioned above. One should also not forget to add those perspectives that derive their names from the authors of famous systems of beliefs or dominant conceptions, notably, Cartesianism, Saussureanism, Chomskyanism, Marxism, Neohumboldtianism, Freudianism, Weberianism, and so on.

What is relevant for the epistemology of semiotics refers mainly to those studies performed from the frog’s-eye view in a search for positions occupied by selected authors of leading theories (e.g., Thomas A. Sebeok 1974, Sándor Hervey 1982, Jack Fisher Solomon 1989, or David Savan 1983, discussed by Thomas L. Short 1994, and Raivo Vetik 1994). Therefore, because of the narrow scope of these lectures, attention will be fo-
Cognitive Attitudes and Cognitive Standpoints of Scientists

While making a commitment to a given epistemological position, a semiotician is expected to notice that the names of certain investigative perspectives sometimes express evaluative connotations that are positively or negatively esteemed. Although this division may embrace not all of the enumerated perspectives and the borderlines between them are not clear-cut, one can, nonetheless, distinguish two kinds of approaches toward the nature of the investigated object. One the one hand, investigative perspectives are specified as cognitive attitudes, i.e., intro- or projections, which are based on hypothetical speculations and categorically expressed beliefs, and, on the other, as cognitive standpoints, i.e., ascertainment statements, which refer to experiential knowledge.

- Cognitive attitudes rely on investigative directives of scientists who impute certain expected properties to their object (or to the sets of objects in their domain) of study because of its (their) resemblance to the subject matter of preferred conceptions or dominating theories, which are in fashion at a given period. Alongside cognitive attitudes, one may place also the dogmatic statements of scholars who regard their particular approach as the only admissible and legitimately scientific mode of conduct.

- Cognitive standpoints represent the opinions and postulates of scientists who verify their hypotheses and convictions by means of empirical observations and proved conclusions regarding the approachability and the fundamental nature of the object under their consideration.

A remarkable difference between the two kinds of perspectives, cognitive attitudes and cognitive standpoints, appears, for example, in the derogatory and appreciative use of names given to justified or unjustified assumptions about language. It is especially visible, for example, in the case of biologist, psychologism or historicism as opposed to biological, psychological, and historical approaches applied in the domain of linguistics and the non-linguistic sciences of language.
Biologism, as a metaphorical perspective borrowed from biology, represents the cognitive attitude of linguists who regard language in terms of a living organism that may be born and may die, that lives and grows, has ancestors and descendants just like any man, animal or plant. Thus, from a “biologicist” point of view, languages, their structures and elements are classified into species, kinds and sorts, families, offspring and parents, or described, for example, in terms of kinship, or indeed compared to a genealogical tree, and so forth.

By contrast, taking a biological perspective, practitioners of a given discipline adjacent to linguistics tend to pay their attention to the interrelation-ship between the language faculty understood as an innate form of human communicative behavior, and the maturation of mankind in the light of evolution and genetics. As a matter of fact, the biological perspective, as such, is grounded on the assumption that the capacity of man to make notions and to realize the cognitive function of language is the species-specific property of human beings (for more on this see, e.g., Duranti 1997/2000, Foley 1997, Ingold 1996/1999).

Another example of this kind of distinction is evident in the opposition between the perspectives of psychology and psychologism. In the latter case, the transition from a standpoint to an attitude depends, however, upon the aims of investigation, i.e., upon resolving the question of the essence of language manifested in the mind of its users, while at the same time dealing with the problem of its approachability in investigations. So, there is an oscillation of viewpoints from the psychology of language through psycholinguistics towards the antipsychologism of empirical linguistics, and vice versa.

Considering the extremity of positions, which exist between a historical perspective and historicism, one may notice that, from the viewpoint of its history, a determined language is investigated in terms of its development, being placed within the context of the development of nations, ethnic groups, communities and individuals, etc. The name historicism, on the other hand, reflects the application of a cognitive attitude of scientists who are convinced that only the historical approach to language can reveal its true nature (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1992a, 543–545).

The investigative perspectives distinguished by a semiotician as relevant for specifying the borderlines of his domain may be classified according to their chronological order and typological systematization. In an ordering diachronic overview, one can learn that certain investigative perspectives have succeeded each other under the influence of the intellec-
tual “climate of opinions”, which governed in particular epochs, or have coexisted within the same perspective of higher or lower rank, having their breaks, continuations and returns.

As far as the systematizing viewpoint is concerned, one may ask whether the investigative perspectives have occurred or indeed have not occurred within the frameworks of particular disciplines. A short overview of linguistic thought against the background of the development of other sciences can supply us with examples of how particular sciences of language have formulated their disciplinary frames of reference. They have been influenced, on the one hand, by philosophical doctrines regarding the nature of the investigated object, such as rationalism, empiricism or pragmatism, and their related forms, as logical positivism, phenomenology, dialectical materialism, etc. On the other hand, they have been shaped by interdisciplinary perspectives, as, *inter alia*, evolutionism, diffusionism, structuralism, behaviorism or generativism.

Among the interdisciplinary perspectives borrowed from the neighboring disciplines of linguistics, to be mentioned are, among others, those which have played an important role in the creation of linguistic models, such as, biologism, historicism, psychologism, sociologism, and anthropologism. Parallel to them oscillated such peripheral investigative perspective, as, e.g., comparativism, naturalism, taxonomism, descriptivism, distributionism, formalism, functionalism, stratificationism or connectionism, cognitivism, and others. Furthermore, one should also mention idealizationism, abstractionism, binarism, or semiotism, called also semioticism, which, although rarely encountered, are nonetheless relevant regarding the epistemological position of linguistics.

Groups of investigative perspectives may be classified *in tandem* with particular types of sciences, which have promoted the acceptance of preferred patterns of “scientficity” characteristic for particular epochs, and imitated as the modeling ones. Compare, for example: evolutionism against the background of history, archeology, botany, zoology, geology; structuralism—physics, chemistry, anatomy, logic, statistics, geography; functionalism—psychology, biology, anthropology, sociology; generativism—algebra, combinatorics, informatics, computer sciences, formal logic, cognitive psychology, and the like.

Furthermore, investigative perspectives may be classified into groups of perspectives connected with particular conceptions, interdisciplinary trends or directions of study, characteristic, as such, for particular types of sciences or for the whole of science. In consequence, these classifications
afford the opportunity to apprehend the structure of concatenations between different perspectives, which may be characterized as including or excluding, mutually overlapping, tolerating or replacing each other in the same position of the whole system of science, etc.

Searching, for binary oppositions, one should mention that some epistemological positions, occupied by linguists or representatives of semiotics-related disciplines, have usually oscillated between two poles. Hereto belong such perspectives as: rationalism and empiricism, monism and dualism, mentalism and mechanism (the view that all biological processes may be described in physicochemical terms), finalism and causalism governed the views on the nature of the investigated object. Besides, to be mentioned are also: realism and idealism, formalism and substantialism, solipsism and collectivism related to manifestation forms. Similarly, methodological choices have been determined by the oppositions between: induc-tivism and deductivism, synchronism and diachronism, introspectivism and extrospectivism, subjectivism and objectivism, absolutism and relativism, particularism and holism, isolationism and integrationism, etc.

To appreciate the whole system of investigative perspectives characterizing particular branches of sign-centered disciplines and linguistic semiotics, it would be necessary to employ a typological matrix subsuming all actual and potential philosophical standpoints, gnoseological doctrines, cognitive beliefs, or directives of study, and the like. In this context, the axis of time is unimportant. The only thing that might count here would be a positive marker showing the occurrence of a given investigative perspective which has found its reflections in a given concept or a certain theory of sign (sign processes and/or meaning). The markers of presence or absence in a typological matrix can point to the fact that some places are occupied and some are not occupied by a given set or by particular investigative perspectives.

Numerous orientations predominant in the history of linguistic thought have provided examples of how linguists discover or perceive the importance of only one aspect of language. They usually deem this aspect as either exclusively scientific or decisive for the whole domain of studies, while rejecting the viewpoints of their immediate opponents, and holding defensively their positions when new prospective opponents appear on the stage proclaiming that their ideas are no longer valid. In fact, such scholars, holding with all their might their horizons determined by a frog's perspective, are often unable able to amount to such a position from which
they could observe the place of their approach to language as one amongst
the possible others (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1999a).

It is suggested therefore to bear in mind the principle: «c’est le point
de vue qui crée l’objet », expressed by Ferdinand de Saussure (1916/1922,
23) in the context of linguistics, stressing that it is the investigative per-
spective (or a set of investigative perspectives) which creates the subject
matter of semiotics. Hence, the practitioners of semiotics have the duty to
consider all cognitive standpoints and cognitive attitudes that remain in
agreement with chosen aims and methods of investigation as equal in
rights. At the same time, they should also check their “object-related”
suitability, being aware of the possibility of the mutual influence between
the adherents of neighboring disciplines or followers of distant disciplines
in accordance with the law of social conformity. This means, they have to
know that scientists adapt to the patterns of scientific conduct prevailing in
particular stages of the development of their discipline against the back-
ground of other disciplines. Not to be omitted is also the methodological
determinism that results from the first investigative apparatus used by
representatives of sign- and meaning-oriented disciplines, before they
become adept scholars, during the first years of their research activities.

It is quite common that scholars borrow certain categories and terms or
conceptual tools and methodological distinctions from a homogeneous
field of study to a heterogeneous one, making certain initial assumptions
about the possible or probable nature of their object. What is significant in
such a transplantation of investigative perspectives should be ascertained
by answering at least two questions referring either to systemic analyses or
investigative tools. In the first case, one needs to ask whether objects being
compared are isomorphic, and in the second, to inquire whether the terms
and categories applied to different domains have the same connotations as
in the original discipline or interdisciplinary theory (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1992a,
545).

**A Quest for the Core of Epistemological Commitments**

Theoreticians who pave their own way towards this new academic subject,
called semiotics or semiology, usually formulate questions regarding the
properties, which are essential for objects studied in its domain, and to the
properties that may be considered as decisive for specifying the scope of
the whole domain in question.
There is no agreement among the scholars, who are considered as entitled to speak in the name of general semiotics as to whether the object-related scope of their discipline should encompass signs or sign processes. In accordance with the first position, the interest sphere of semioticians lies in searching for static facts that convey meanings. Adherents of the second one claim that they should devote their attention rather to semioses as dynamic processes, which contribute to the generation of meanings through the network of relationships between the interconnected facts constituting the “functives” of information structures.

(1) Interested to learn about the boundaries of semiotics, an outsider to the discipline or the follower of sign- and meaning-related approaches may pose questions to explain the difference between the positions occupied by leading theoreticians and practitioners of semiotics who are influential in imposing their own views on the limits of semiotic threshold.

One might encounter also two positions regarding the question of what should be considered as the basic notional constituent of semiotics. Some logical and philosophical discussions about the essence and ontological status of the sign reduce the problem of its function or meaning belonging to the interest sphere of the neighboring disciplines of semiotics, either to linguistics or psychology. The extremity of such a view is derived from Charles William Morris (1938, 1964) who maintained that semiotics does not rest upon the theory of meaning. In Morris’s (1938/1975, 44) opinion, the concept of meaning is to be either abandoned or indeed clarified in terms of semiotics before being transferred into domains where an understanding of the process of creating signs, called semiosis, is important.

A contrary position, in which the concept of meaning prevails and the category of sign is treated only as a prerequisite of semantic processes, can be found in various works from the sciences of language, cultural anthropology and sociology. This is especially true in relation to such synonyms of meaning as “significance” or “value” that may be found in the domain of language related to human individuals and society (cf. Eco 1976/1979, 22–29, and 177; Pietraszko 1980, especially 1982, 139).

(2) The controversies over the nature of semiotic objects starts with a question whether they should be seen as *ergon* (‘product’, ‘fact’) or
energeia (‘process’, ‘action’). This perspective reflects adherence to two opposite philosophical attitudes towards the nature of the whole world, which may be labeled as factualism and processualism, expressed, for example, in atomism vs. dynamism or energetism, or eventism, and/or substantialism vs. activism or actualism.

According to atomism, the world is to be viewed as composed of elementary units and their combinations, either material or spiritual in their nature. An atomistic theory holds that these elements, which can be distinguished as minute, discrete, finite and indivisible entities, are the ultimate constituents of all reality. Supporters of dynamism would regard the matter and the spirit as endowed with immanent forces capable of occasioning change and transmitting energy. Those, however, who believe in absolute energetism would try to explain the world without appealing to the terms of matter and spirit and tend to follow the theories or philosophical systems that seek to explain the phenomena of nature by the action of force. In such a view, the nature of reality should be interpreted rather in terms of physics as opposed to metaphysics.

As a position that stands very close to dynamism and energetism one should mention also eventism, which claims that the basic elements of reality constitute events conceived as occurrences and successions of causes and effects, which are expressed in terms of conditional antecedence and consequence. A such, one should understand the world as composed of happenings rather than of enduring entities, when considering Alfred North Whitehead’s (1861–1947), explication that “[n]ature is a structure of evolving process, and the universe of knowing and reality is a process in which its parts are interwoven” (Whitehead 1925, 106, quoted after John Regan in: Regan et al. 1982/1987, vi.).

Another pair of oppositions can be deduced from the division between the particle mechanics and wave mechanics. It leads, in consequence, to the concept of wave-particle duality in modern physics, which associates the wavelength with a material particle and the momentum of energy with a wave to explain the states of electromagnetic radiations. However, substantialism refers not only to the properties of material facts, described in terms of phenomena accessible to cognition. It encompasses also spiritual facts conceived as being independent of the body in its existence and activity. Therefore, the followers of a substantialist viewpoint may distinguish between real and ideal substances.
A contradictory place occupy here the philosophical attitudes of theoreticians who claim that the reality is active by nature, and that the action is prior to a substance, for the substance constitutes the product of an action. In consequence, tending towards activism, they stress the role of an individual agent.

(3) In discussions regarding the nature of semiotic objects, it is unavoidable to speak about the status of their components. Controversies over different epistemological positions are exhibited here in terms of three concatenated pairs of opposition, i.e., materialism vs. spiritualism as their ontological basis, monism vs. dualism as an organizing principle of their existence forms, and realism vs. idealism as the aspects of their cognoscibility.

Philosophical beliefs that regard matter and its motions as constituting the universe, and all its inherent phenomena, including those of mind, as due to material agencies, are considered to be opposed to beliefs that all reality is spiritual. While appealing, however, to the opposition between materialism and spiritualism, the theoretician of semiotics has at his disposal not only such monistic doctrines in which it is said that matter is the basic reality of the universe, or that spirit constitutes the substance of every possible reality. He may also take into consideration the viewpoints that stress the dualism of matter and spirit. Dualistic materialism and dualistic spiritualism differ from one another to such an extent that, in the first position, spirit is shown as being derived from matter and, in the second, the spirit is believed to precede the matter. Both substances are regarded, however, as different as for their essential properties, although their coexistence may be considered as accidental or causal in character, or as established by someone’s intention. Neither should one omit pluralism mentioned in some philosophical conceptions as opposed to monism. In the context of materialistic positions, pluralism is identified with dualism, according to which matter and spirit are conceived as two separate realities entirely heterogeneous by nature, whereas spiritualistic pluralism assumes the existence of many spiritual substances.

The opposition between realism and idealism is understood here in terms of the attitudes that scientists maintain towards their object of study within the framework of gnoseology. Idealism, taking as its starting point the analysis of cognition, ascertains that a cognizing subject is not able to
cognize the reality, which is external to him or her, and he or she cognizes only their sensations, imaginations and thoughts. According to idealism, the subject is able only to cognize phenomena and not the reality in itself. Realism, on the other hand, acknowledges the approachability of the object external to the cognizing subject. Nevertheless, philosophers differ as to the experiential (naïve realism) or intellectual source (critical realism) of their cognition.

To the first group belong the followers of the belief that the real being possesses ontological attributes of a physical being, i.e., a being accessible to experience, or genetically connected with what is accessible to experience, or existing as a necessary cause of what is accessible to experience. For the second group, the beings objectively existing are physical objects of sense perception that have an existence independent of the act of perception.

(4) Those who undertake the endeavors to resolve the problem of the approachability of semiotic objects pay attention not only to the perspectives connected with the source of their cognition as, for instance, empirical experientialism vs. rational intellectualism. They, appeal also, inter alia, to the pairs of opposition between perceptual sensualism and mental intuitionism, or subjectivism and objectivism, while relating to their gnoseological properties.

The followers of experientialism rely on the knowledge obtained through direct impression or gain their judgements by empirical practice. Moreover, those who follow the doctrine of intellectualism tend to discover the principle of reality in reason alone or try to derive their knowledge exclusively from the process of rational thinking.

Among some gnoseological perspectives related with experientialism, one should place, on one hand, sensualism, and, on the other, intuitionism. For the first group of beliefs the cognition experienced by the senses is a necessary and sufficient condition of any cognition. For the second, the mind is not only in a position to directly perceive external reality, but also to intellectually apprehend logical dependencies creating an ideal (or absolute) model of reality (in itself). Such intuitions have better chances to occur when the subjects are able to suspend their processes of physiological perceptions and psychological imaginations dependent on time and space.
Subjectivism is an attitude of scientists who treat the process of cognition as subordinated to individual choices and conditions of a cognizing subject, or who admit no other reality than that of the thinking subject. According to gnoseological subjectivism, the subject cognizes reality only in such a form in which it appears to him- or herself, i.e., he or she cannot cognize anything apart from their own imagination. The consequence of an ontological subjectivism is a reduction of reality to the construct of mind existing for the subject or in itself.

Objectivist approaches, on the other hand, give precedence to the knowledge of objects over the knowledge of self, i.e., to the knowledge of external objects and events having real, substantial existence quite independent of the imaginings and emotions of the cognizing subject. Gnoseologically, objectivists represent a realistic standpoint claiming the cogniscibility of the existence forms and the properties of objects, which are as such independent of the cognizing consciousness, and metaphysically, they express a realistic attitude acknowledging the existence of things external to the subject and independent of them.

(5) After having made a commitment to a certain position on the ontological and gnoseological properties of semiotic objects, the semiotician has to choose an appropriate perspective that determines the way of approaching them through the application of methodological tools. Accordingly, he or she may apply either the methods of empiricism or rationalism, or eventually follow the principles of pragmatism, by obtaining their data either extrospectively or introspectively, and draw conclusions, gain, interpret or test his knowledge through inductive, deductive or hypothetical kinds of reasoning.

An empiricist in the epistemological or gnoseological sense considers experiment as the only source of knowledge and, in the methodological sense, he or she represents the conviction that the aim of science should consist in arriving at inductively inferred generalizations on the basis of individual ascertainments. In turn, an adherence to rationalism means that a scientist shares a doctrine regarding the priority of reason over the other powers or sources of cognition.

In the methodological sense, a rationalist ascribes the dominating role in cognition to reason, and not to experiment. Reason, as such, is for him or her not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition of cognition,
whereas the experiment serves the mind only to realize the data given prior to it. Taking the position of an absolute or extreme rationalism in its pure form, one may be willing to regard reason and intellectual apprehension as the last instance in the appreciation of the worth of human cognition. In accordance with this pure rationalistic attitude, one formulates the so-called rational conception of science postulating to follow only rational criteria in the cognition and in the activity characterizing the scientific conduct.

Among the perspectives related to empiricism but opposed to rationalism, one should mention also pragmatism, a doctrine that postulates testing the validity of certain laws or theories by the possibilities of drawing practical consequences from them. For a pragmatist, truth is not attainable by metaphysical speculations. As true might be considered only that kind of knowledge that leads to an effective activity or that becomes true because of such an activity.

The choice between an empiricist or rationalist position towards the sources of knowledge implies in consequence an extrospectivistic or introspectivistic outlook on the elicitation of data. Introspectivism, for example, is a general name referring to philosophical considerations that base their findings on the internal experience of the observer. Introspectivistic methods rely on the observations of consciousness within the individual’s body and mind. Extrospectivism, on the other hand, is a methodological attitude of those empirically and objectively oriented scientists who reject observation based on internal experience, insisting rather that the object of study is to be approached through observations controlled outside the observer’s body and mind.

Concerning the methods of observation, it is necessary to answer the questions that concern the basis according to which a scientist has to draw conclusions. In the first instance, he or she has to answer whether to infer from individual facts arriving at generalizations (inductive reasoning), or to apply a general principle to the individual cases in which facts are verified (deductive reasoning). Secondly, he or she has to decide whether they should test a general hypothesis based on as many numbers of particular observations as it is possible, to find respective counterarguments.

In a narrower sense, inductivism is a position appreciating the exclusiveness or the importance of the inductive method in empirical sciences, especially in the contexts of discoveries. In a broader sense, inductivism combines induction with deduction, which plays the role not only of a formal combination, but serves also for the purposes of drawing conse-
Epistemological Positions of Semiotics

71

quences, which underlie tests. Moreover, both perspectives, as such, are bound to empiricism. However, in transcendental philosophy, deduction consists in the introduction of general principles of the science from elementary structures of the mind, i.e., “categories” discovered through philosophical reflections without having recourse to experiment. In the same context, one should situate a heuristic mode of inductive reasoning that refers to an intellectual apprehension of a general content, common for the whole set of certain concrete objects, based on the knowledge of particular elements of the set.

Not far from the moderate rationalistic forms of reasoning, one can place antiinductivism, a position opposed to inductivism, called also deductivism, since it stresses the role of deductive method in the empirical sciences. Antiinductivists reject the argument about the independence of the observational language from a theoretical language and the irrevocability of empirical statements. While bringing out a creative power of theoretical statements, which exceed, in fact, beyond the limits of experience, they consider them as not only conventions or cognitive tools but as the most simplified and the best explained from the possible descriptions of the world.

Another intellectual form of expressing antiinductivism in the methodology of sciences is that of hypothetical reasoning. Hypotheticism stresses the role of decision making in the acceptance of tentative assumptions postulating, in opposition to inductivism, that the acceptance of a conjecture has to be unanimously determined by appropriate inductive procedures based on probability calculus. Hypotheticism proposes for the acceptance of scientific laws the principle that they should be formulated in a form mostly subjected to refutations through experiments. Only laws that have proved themselves as reliable in the face of strenuous testing trials can deserve to be acknowledged by scientists.

(6) Further questions refer to the source of origin of semiotic objects asking: whether they constitute purposeful artifacts or a goal-directed activity, whether they have been designed by a certain creator or they have appeared as a result of an unforeseen revolution, and, finally, whether they are explainable in terms of animate-life forces or inanimate physical-chemical forces directing the existence modes of organisms. These questions may be answered through the choice of the following cognitive attitudes expressing the oppositions, in the first case, be-
between finalism and causalism, in the second, between creativism and emergentism, and, in the third, between vitalism and mechanism.

Those who stress the importance of final causes, assuming that natural and historic processes are determined by their ultimate purposes, follow an attitude of finalism, called also teleologism. Accordingly, taking into account the categories of motives and purposes, philosophers distinguish four kinds of teleology: metaphysical, transcendental, immanent, and anthropocentric teleology. Scientists who believe in metaphysical teleology claim that the development of the world is subordinated to a final purpose.

Disciples of transcendental teleology accept the explanation that the world and all things possess, apart from an immanent purpose, also a purpose existing beyond them. Adherents of immanent teleology, in turn, rely on the statement that the purpose of the world and all things is included in themselves. However, followers of anthropocentric teleology consider man as the purpose of all things and the purpose of itself. Standing at the opposite pole to finalism, the perspective of causalism is connected with etiology, the branch of philosophy dealing with factors of causation. Followers of etiologism prefer to explain the development of events in the world of things as a chain of causes and effects and not as an act striving towards purposeful ends.

According to creativism the world is believed to be created out of nothing only by a free act of God. In addition, the being of the world may be considered as based on continuous creation, which constitutes the conservation of the world. In contrast to the belief that everything has been created, the antimechanic theory of emergentism states that the world undergoes continuous changes. During such changes new qualities develop all of a sudden by way of unexpected leaps and emerge on a higher level always in novel shapes, which happen to be better and better than the previous ones. However, one has to remember interpretations, according to which a rational and spiritual factor is seen as resultant from an emergent revolution.

Some semioticians, being influenced by the philosophers of biology who distinguish between animate and inanimate matter, lay emphasis on the origin of life as irreducible to physical and/or chemical processes. Following the vitalists’ tenets, they believe that, within an organism, there exists an innate vital principle, i.e., an impulse of life—called after Henri Bergson (1859–1941) *élan vital* ‘a life force’ (cf. Bergson 1907 [1911]) or “entelechy” (a vital agent or force directing growth and life)² after Aristotle
Empirically inclined semioticians, however, who reject the autonomy of life, support their beliefs by mechanist theories saying that the workings of the universe can be explained only by physics and chemistry. According to mechanism, the laws of mechanics dealing with energy and force, in their relation to material bodies or the axioms of geometry and the principle of dynamics, are sufficient enough to explain the existence of physical, biological and psychical reality.

(7) The range of occurrence of semiotic objects may depend upon the scientist’s position to naturalism, immanentism or transcendentalism. Within the limits of those attitudes, one has to commit oneself either to panexperientialism, pantheism, or panpsychism. Another dimension form questions as to whether practitioners of semiotics should follow an idealistic attitude of solipsism, and whether they should believe in the idea of collective solipsism or follows an objectivistic standpoint of collectivism.

Naturalism, among the other uses of this term, is considered as the mode of thought (religious, moral or philosophical) glorifying nature and excluding supernatural and spiritual elements. A semiotician who assumes a naturalist attitude regards nature in the cosmological sense as the ultimate reason of its own existence and activity and rejects the existence of any transcendental being.

The philosophy of immanentism states that all elements of reality are mutually included in itself. They are closely interconnected, and constitute a single and unique reality, which is cognizable (panexperientialism), in which one can perceive the existence of God everywhere (pantheism), or in which everything is assumed to have a soul (panpsychism).

A subjectivist idealistic perspective supports the view that reality does not exist independently of cognition, and that it constitutes a set of contents embedded within consciousness. Moreover, what really exists for the followers of immanentism are the objects of thought.

According to a solipsist view, the contents of thought are understood as connected with the individual human mind. There is also such belief—labeled as collective solipsism—which combines immanentism with a general human mind externalized through the minds of individuals (no-
noticeable is here the positions expressed by Thomas A. Sebeok and Sydney MacDonald. Lamb in: Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1988, 12 and 18–19).

As an extreme variety of immanent dualism, solipsism even claims that it is impossible to provide evidence for the real existence of the world external to the individual Self, including also the reality of the other Selves. As such, it stands in opposition to collectivism, an attitude based on dialectical materialism, which assumes that only social groups constitute the objective reality for empirical studies. Thus, from the point of view of objective semiotics, which rejects solipsism and individualism, it might be appropriate to study the semiotic objects as realized in social products and behaviors.

Semioticians who might adopt the position of transcendentalism tend to believe that, apart from immanent reality, there are beings that exist beyond the parameters of possible human experience and to cognize them exceeds the limits of any knowledge. Hence, transcendental semiotic objects would be considered as being above and independent of the limitations of the material universe.

(8) The boundaries of semiotics may also be specified by the scopes of the domains in which semiotic objects occur or by the scope of the definitions of semiotic objects, wherein the focus of interest constitutes the essence of God (theocentrism), Man (anthropocentrism), Life (biocentrism) or the Sign in itself (semiocentrism).

Theocentrism is an attitude expressing the conviction that God is the cause, means and the ultimate purpose of everything in the world. From the position of semiotics everything what exists is the sign of God’s creation and the sense of humankind, its existence, and fate and is determined by God’s will. In turn, the followers of anthropocentrism recognize Man as a center and purpose of the whole reality. Important is the autonomous role ascribed to human consciousness in cognition. The central position of humankind is a prerequisite of its dignity and superiority over other creatures. In a biocentric depiction of the world everything in nature has its value and meaning. Therefore, human beings are equated with animals. The whole earth is shared by living being. All organisms are interdependent and should live together and harmoniously. Every organism should be protected as a bearer, producer or utilized of meaning and therefore should be valued as a unique creature which is equal in its own right. In a semio-
centric view, the whole universe animated vs. inanimated, personal vs. impersonal is perfused with signs, and the ontological reality produces signs in itself and for itself being related to the sense of information.

**Concluding Statements**

The assessment of the epistemological foundations of semiotics, of its specific disciplines, may start with the elaboration of a typological matrix embracing all distinctions between ontological and gnoseological positions occupied by theoreticians and practitioners of semiotics representing particular schools of semiotic thought. However, a serious problem connected with patterns of scientific conduct may arise as regards the adherence of leading authors of a given scientific discipline to dominant disciplinary paradigms. A separate attention should be then devoted to the incommensurability of views represented by those authors, schools of thought or disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives.

Nevertheless, having recognized that all investigative paradigms as a network of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives are equal in right on a metascientific level, the scientist may start with: the choice of his/her views upon the nature of investigated objects, the status of their components, as well as the organizing principles of their existence modes. Furthermore, he/she has the duty to determine the properties of objects with regard to: their genesis and range of occurrence as well as the scope of the domains in which the scientists usually study them, the approachability of their cognizable aspects, the source of their cognoscibility and the methodological and conceptual tools serving to expose their functional relevance.

In consequence, the apprehension of the object-related scope of a semiotic domain may result from the acceptance of viewpoints regarding: (1) whether the semiotic objects exist only in the cognizable world (in the physical and psychical reality, outside the body and inside the mind, in the physical reality both extraorganismic and intraorganismic by nature) or also beyond the (physical and psychical, extraorganismic or intraorganismic) reality of the cognizing subject, and (2) whether the semiotic objects occur in the realm of God only, God and man, in the realm of man only, or in the realm of all living systems, belonging to the properties of an individual subject or a group of individuals constituting a phatic communion which shares the same communicational system.
PART II

ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE
AS A SEMIOTIC SYSTEM
CHAPTER FOUR

Heteronomies of Language and the Division of Linguistic Labor

Introductory Statements

The focus of attention in this chapter, based on the distinctions elaborated by the author (Wąsik, Z. 2006), will be concentrated on the characteristic features of language taken into account, on the one hand, as the subject matter of the principal object of scientific study and, on the other, as the aspects of the subject matter of the adjacent objects being examined from either disciplinary or interdisciplinary perspectives. Its special objective is to expose the idea of scientists’ epistemological awareness in the division of academic disciplines.

In the history of linguistic thought, linguists have studied various aspects of the verbal means of human signification and communication while emphasizing the importance of only one aspect and presenting their own approach as scientific or relevant for the whole investigative domain. They have fought against their opponents defending their initial positions without stating that all questions related to the properties of language are equal in right on a metalinguistic level. Hence, crossing the boundaries between isolationist and integrationist approaches, it might be important to specify which of the manifestation forms and the existence modes of language could be autonomized as the subject matter of linguistics, and which of the forms of its manifestation should be treated as belonging to heteronomous conditionings of objects studied by its neighboring disciplines.

For detaching of domains of disciplinary and interdisciplinary studies, it will be essential to enumerate all modes in which language as a set of extraorganismic and intraorganismic properties of its speakers and learners, i.e., as observable and inferable meaning-bearers, exists in: (1) externalized products of speech, (2) internalized products of thought, (3) concrete processes of articulation and audition, (4) mental faculties of creation and interpretation, (5), relationships between verbal means, their meaning,
and use, (6) mental associations between verbal means of signification, (7) observable links between interpersonal collectivities of communicating individuals, (8) assumable links between intersubjective collectivities of communicating individuals, (9) physiological and intellectual endowments of man as a talking animal, and (10) genetic codes transmitted in the evolution of human species.

To separate the investigative domain of linguistics from the domain studied by non-linguistic disciplines, it is enough to observe the distinction between language “as an object” and language “as a relational property” of other objects of study. In consequence, practitioners of linguistic disciplines should be aware of the fact when they observe the extrasystemic properties of languages conditioned by external environments, and when they detach the systemic-structural properties of a particular language from its environment. By this reference to the disciplinary awareness of scientists, it is emphasized that language as an object of study is indivisible. However, the same cannot be said about the scope of the disciplines which depend on the choice of viewpoints.

Taking a structural-systemic perspective, the author proposes to distinguish three conceptual levels on which the object of linguistic studies is investigated: (1) language in general—language in particular, (2) language ex definitione—language in abstracto—language in concreto, and, furthermore, (3) language as a theoretical construct—language as an inductive generalization—language as an autonomous sociolect—language as a heteronomous idiolect. As he points out, interlingual differences are so great that, from all languages of the world, it is impossible to create a new system of verbal means which may serve for the purposes of mutual understanding. In the same way, one cannot believe in the creation of any natural language, considered as a natiolect or ethnolect, from the aggregation of its idiolects. To summarize the discussion about heteronomous existence modes of language and its autonomization in their use and cognition, the author concludes that not only the linguists are able to autonomize their object of study. Any heteronomy of language can be made autonomous from any (inter)disciplinary point of view.

Investigative Approaches to Language

The history of linguistic thought provides examples (for details and references see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 56–57) that linguists have studied various as-
pects of verbal means of human communication while exposing the importance of only one aspect, and considering only their own way of seeing things as relevant for the whole investigative domain or as exclusively scientific. Consequently, multifarious cognitive interests and directions of study have been developed arguing about the true nature of the linguistic object. Being split into various schools, practitioners of linguistic sciences strived to find solutions for determining which properties of language and its functions appear to be most important, and to decide which of the approaches to its existence modes and manifestation forms are to be considered as legitimately scientific. Moreover, particular interest domains of language sciences are unequally institutionalized in particular academic centers of research and education.

Studies on the nature of language started with philosophical speculations about the principles of universal grammar common for the whole of mankind. This was the heritage of Enlightenment. When linguistics freed itself from the complex of a servant of philology, its representatives devoted more attention to spiritual and ethnic-cultural manifestations of language.

The results of comparative historical studies, conducted in the 19th century, led the founding fathers to the ascertainment that particular languages were related natively. The objective of such genetic-evolutional studies was seen in a systematization of the principles of language changes, or in an explanation of the directions of their development.

Afterwards, a discovery of the diversity of languages due to the achievements of structural-comparative studies contributed to a recognition that ethnic or national languages evolved from vernaculars on various levels of social stratification. In the typology, in turn, a conviction that languages as objects of study should be treated with respect to their internal and external properties shifted to an assertion that they could simultaneously belong to various structural types. Instead of speaking about typological constructs of language systems, linguists started to propose typological matrices of systemic properties of languages, their elements and structures.

Furthermore, the interest in differences and similarities between linguistic systems turned into inquiries about functional convergences and divergences which could be found in the structure of languages of the world. This objective was achieved, in the first instance, by elaborations of partial typologies of linguistic categories, entities, units and constructions, as in the case of the typology of future forms, of passives, of modality, of
reflexives, of questions, etc. Gradually, typological comparative studies were replaced by contrastive studies, which started to be conducted along with the search for language universals and partial typologies of language phenomena, not for the interest domain of linguistics proper, but to serve for other disciplines bordering with linguistics.

In general linguistics, the object of study had been not uniformly understood; it was referred either to inductive generalizations drawn from all disciplines dealing with languages of the world, or only to hypothetical-deductive assumptions abstracting the model of language *sensu stricto* from all investigated languages. In the beginning of the 19th century, general studies in language, identified with the philosophy of language, the subject matter of which was seen in the faculty language of mankind, had been abandoned in favor of comparative linguistics.

However, towards the end of the 19th century general linguistics included also a structural typology of differences in the structure of all languages of the world, and, as such, it occupied its place in a tripartite division of disciplines along with the disciplines studying particular languages, and comparing them from a historical-genealogical point of view. Departing from a synchronic point of view, as elaborated in the domain of general theoretical and particular descriptive linguistics, researchers started to cross the borders of linguistics proper, entering the zones of newly-created neighboring disciplines.

In interdisciplinary searches, scientists collected various linguistic data, aiming to support those scientific disciplines, the main object of which belonged to functional environments of languages. As an alternative for strictly linguistic studies, the subject matter of which was language in itself, practitioners of language sciences had switched their interest sphere to studies conducted from a perspective of neighboring disciplines. The reason for such a differentiation of investigative domains was that linguists had departed sometimes from incommensurable views expressed in the form of either projections or ascertainties. Their epistemological commitments to the views on the nature of language and its approachability had oscillated between extreme perspectives, based on assumed attitudes or experiential standpoints, such as, *inter alia*, inductivism or deductivism, individualism or collectivism, positivism or idealism, monolingualism or multilingualism, synchronism or diachronism, evolutionism or diffusionism, factualism or processualism, formalism or substantialism, taxonomism or explanationism, idiographism or nomologism, normativism or descriptivism, instrumentalism or generativism, isolationism or integrationism, etc. At
times they had been influenced by the prevailing theories espoused in the philosophy of language, or being fashionable in the philosophy of science. As a rule, they had treated language as an autonomous object of study principally in abstraction from its external conditionings.

Linguists and semioticians (discussed by Wąsik, Z. 2003, 83–94) who exhibit the social character of language from a perspective of systemic structuralism usually regard as autonomous either (1) the set of mental signs composed of concepts and sound patterns that are shared by all members of a particular speech community, as postulated in the lectures of Ferdinand de Saussure (1916/1922), or (2) the set of concrete types of verbal means of signification that are used for communicating about the extra-linguistic reality, in accordance with the linguistic theory of language Leon Zawadowski (1966), following the functionalist principles of Karl Ludwig Bühler (1879–1963) summarized in his work of 1934.

In approaches of isolationists, natural languages are reduced to “stages” and stages are identified with “systems”. Integrationists, in turn, expose investigative problems relatable to actual speakers, as they cooperate communicatively and interactively within the frame of discourse practices with other members of social groupings, such as interindividual, public and mass aggregations of local or global, national or international communities connected by blood kinship or ethnic descent, common profession or confession, and shared means of signification or cognition.

Against the background of isolationist or integrationist positions in the division of disciplinary work, one should speak in favor of an assumption that natural language is heteronomous by nature, but it may be autonomized as a separate object of study. As such, any language can be studied by itself, or in relation to its functional environments.

The question of how to detach the boundaries of linguistic and non-linguistic disciplines is connected with the answer of how to analyze the correspondence between the commitments of practitioners of science to the views on their object of study and its investigative approachability. Hence, from a holistic point of view, it will be necessary to depict the functional nature of language taking into account all properties of communicating individuals with their biological and cultural endowments as representatives of living species, with their sensorial and intellectual faculties as persons, and with their semiotic and axiological capabilities as members of social collectivities.
The Existence Modes of Language

On account of concrete and mental, static and dynamic, substantial and relational manifestations of language as a property of human beings, the object of linguistic study, in agreement with the principles of hard-science linguistics after Victor H. Yngve (1986), may be specified in terms of at least one of six separate existence modes (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 35):

(1) Language manifests itself in collectively accepted patterns of vocal sound waves which are articulated by speakers and segmented by listeners as verbal means of individual signification and interindividual communication;

(2) Language sustains itself in the consciousness of speakers/listeners as mental equivalents of vocal sound waves being processed and interpreted as verbal means of individual signification and interindividual communication;

(3) Language recurs in concrete speaking and listening activities of individuals who possess physiological endowments for the production and reception of vocal sound waves as the significative means of interindividual communication;

(4) Language endures in mental sign-processing and sign-interpreting activities of individuals who possess intellectual abilities to create and recognize vocal sound waves, and their sensorially perceivable surrogates, as significative means being distinguishable from each other, grammatically correct, semantically logical and pragmatically appropriate to respective contexts and situations;

(5) Language is deducible from socially abstracted networks of relational values of significative means which are externalized by individual communicators in their concrete speaking and listening activities;

(6) Language is assumable from networks of associations between mental equivalents of significative means and their relational values which are internalized by individual communicators in their sign-processing and sign-interpreting activities.

It has to be noticed that all the enumerated six existence modes of language—in the products of verbal speaking and thinking, in the processes of sending and receiving, encoding and decoding of verbal products as meaning-bearers, in the relational values of verbal products being realized in speech and memorized through associations in thought—constitute
extraorganismic and intraorganismic properties of communicating individuals. In opposition to speech processes, thoughts or networks of associations, which depend upon physiological and mental capabilities or competencies of individual communicators, only the sets of externalized patterns of verbal products, as well as their relational properties, become independent from the will of particular members of certain collectivities when they function as a means of social communication. But in the real world, language as a property of collectivity does not constitute a set of empirical data. It may be only assumed as a theoretical construct consisting of those interindividual means and contents of communication that are typified from observable changes in individuals when they are engaged in communicating activities. What can be concretely singled out are no more than referential behaviors of communicators the interpretational practices of whom have to be mentally inferred from the shared knowledge of communication participants.

Thus, in the physical dimension, communicating individuals are linked with other each other through sound waves and energy flow carried out in their sending and receiving activities, and in the logical dimension, intersubjective links come into being through the mutual understanding of people when communicating individuals negotiate and confirm a meaning of verbal means through interpretative practices and referential behavior on the basis of internally concluded commonalities of experience, or knowledge about the same domain of reference.

Considering the role of language in the formation of communicative communities, one can distinguish after Elżbieta Magdalena Wąsik (2007, 55–56), on the basis of observable and concluded similarities in their referential behavior and their interpretational activities, two additional existence modes of language, where:

(7) Language unites communicating individuals into concretely observable interpersonal groupings that occur between communication participants when they produce, emit, perceive, and receive verbal meaning-bearers in the form of sound waves and their surrogate codes through respective physical channels;

(8) Language can be deduced from intersubjective groupings that arise between individual communication participants when they understand or interpret the received verbal meaning-bearers in the same way while referring them to mutually shared extralingual reality known to each other separately.
Apart from interpersonal links related to the use of language that come into being through the exchange of energy flow being sent and received, and the intersubjective domain of reference being inferred by communication participants, there are also interorganismic links, which should be considered, namely the linguistic faculties inherited genetically. Therefore, alluding to ascertainments of the researchers of human mind, such as, inter alia, the biologist Richard Dawkins (1976/1989, 1982, and 2006), the philosopher Daniel Clement Dennett (1995 and 1996), and the psychologist Susan J. Blackmore (1998 and 1999), with special consideration of Kalevi Kull (2000a), a semiotician of biology from the Tartu School, one is entitled to assume that language exists also in the generational memory of organisms in the form of mental memes or biological-semiotic texts.

Worth mentioning is the hypothesis of Edward Sapir (1984–1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941) that the perception of extralingual reality is formed by the structure of a determined language (cf. Whorf 1956). To be exposed is also the claim regarding the innate faculty of language about the genotype-phenotype interplay in the genetic code of organisms put forward by Marc D. Hauser, Noam Avram Chomsky and W. Tecumseh Fitch (2002), and the presence of primitive semantic patterns in the lingua mentalis, advocated by Anna Wierzbicka (cf. 1972 or 1980). These conceptions allow us to formulate a statement about the two additional existence modes of language.

(9) Language is possible due to an innate speech faculty localized in genetically specialized neuronal centers of human brains to communicate by using vocal systems of verbal means with a threefold duality of pattern structure and sequential segmentation while implementing complex physiological techniques of articulation and audition.

(10) Language has emerged as a result of evolutionary changes of animal organisms adapting to their natural and artificial surroundings through the extension of their communicational abilities preexisting in their genetic memory as a set of primitive and more developed verbal means.

Defining the Formal Object of Linguistics

Linguists may determine somehow the autonomy of their object of cognition by abstracting language as obiectum formale from language as obiectum reale embedded in different heteronomous dependencies, i.e., by spec-
ifying their subject matter and its various aspects, by stipulating its domain of occurrence, or by enumerating their tasks and methods on the investigative level, etc. Since such a phenomenon as an overall human language, representing or including every natural language, does not exist at all, and only various linguistic systems, situated on various levels, are accessible to cognition, the distinction between language as *objectum formale* vs. language as *objectum reale* entails also the opposition between “language as a definitional model” in general and “language as an ecologically determined specimen” in particular.

In order to answer the question of what the formal object of linguistic studies is, one has to know the boundaries between the systemic facts of language and non-systemic facts of language. There are also other disciplines which are interested in the concrete manifestation forms of particular languages in their social environments but from non-linguistic viewpoints (cf. Grucza 1983, 282).

Model 4-1. Semantic relationships between the terms related to the division of linguistics, the properties of language, and the linguistic and non-linguistic sciences of language

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<tr>
<th>LINGUISTICS</th>
<th>“external”</th>
<th>“internal”</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PROPERTIES OF LANGUAGE</strong></td>
<td>relational</td>
<td>inherent</td>
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<tr>
<td>ecological</td>
<td>lexical</td>
<td>grammatical</td>
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<td>non-linguistic</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SCIENCES OF LANGUAGE</strong></td>
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Because separating the facts to be described as linguistic objects from the facts that belong to the domain of other sciences depends on the criteria employed in the delimitation of “extra”-linguistic facts from “intra”-linguistic facts, one has to decide which of the properties of language become autonomous as tools of interpersonal communication, and which possess a heteronomous character, being dependent on biological and psychological conditionings of individual users. That means, one should determine the boundaries between the subject matter of the so-called “external” linguistics and the subject matter of “internal” linguistics, following Ferdinand de Saussure’s suggestion (adapted from Wąsik, Z. 2003, 36–38). However, the claim that “external” linguistics is interested in the
extralinguistic facts of language, and that intralinguistic facts of language are studied by “internal” linguistics has to be contested. In accordance with the opinion of Leon Zawadowski, there are also extralinguistic facts belonging to the domain of linguistics that result from the relation of text elements to extratextual reality (cf. Zawadowski 1966, 75 and Saussure 1922, 40–43 and 261). Hence, it is better to distinguish between relational and inherent properties of language, bearing in mind that there are two kinds of relational properties, namely “lexically relational properties”, being *ipso facto* language-specific, and “ecologically relational properties”, considered as non-language-specific.

In an attempt to define the subject matter of “internal” linguistics, one needs to detach those grammatically inherent and lexically inherent as well as lexically relational properties which form the system of language from the ecologically relational properties which are to be subsumed under the non-systemic properties of language. The latter, encompassing the subject matter of the so-called “external” linguistics, are studied within the domain of the so-called non-linguistic sciences of language (cf. Model 4-1).

Therefore, linguists have to separate the system of language from its ecology (cf. Haugen 1972, 324–39), including its grammatically and lexically inherent as well as lexically relational properties—subsumed under the so-called ecological-relational properties of language (cf. Zawadowski 1966, 75). From the viewpoint of ecological conditionings in which the languages of the world function as separate, major, and small or minor, systems of signification and communication, the specification of non-systemic properties of languages seems to be useful for typological purposes. Ecological properties correspondingly incorporate such variables as, for example, name, history, users, territory, standardization and codification, domains of use, symbiosis with other languages in contact, forms of struggle for independence, language loyalty and ethnic solidarity, legal status and attitudes toward language.

**Linguistics and the Non-Linguistic Sciences of Language**

Owing to the multiaspectuality of language, it is important to delimit those properties that constitute the subject matter of linguistics from those which serve as criteria for defining the scope of the subject matter belonging to the other non-linguistic sciences of language, or to their neighboring disciplines (as illustrated in Model 4-2).
To separate the domains of linguistics and the neighboring sciences of language, it is enough to observe the distinction between language as “an object” of study and language as “a relational property” of objects studied by other disciplines. For example, as far as the object of anthropology is concerned, a scientist may be curious about what the definitional attributes of the category of the human being are. For a psychologist, the performance of language abilities can be treated as a clue as to how the mind (psyche), being the principal object of his study, operates. Furthermore, in the sociology of language, the social group (society) is a formal object of study and the language spoken by this group serves as a criterion determining its scope. Thus, one can say that language can be studied from the viewpoint of non-linguistic sciences of language in the ecology of man, i.e., in the communicational settings of individuals and collectivities.

Model 4-2. The sciences of language and the division of linguistic subdisciplines

Linguistics proper studies language as a principal object, but sometimes in relation to its ecological settings, and sometimes in abstraction from the ecology in which it functions. In the first case, heteronomies of language—studied by neighboring disciplines, such as, for instance, anthropology, psychology, and sociology—are assigned as the properties of the formal object of linguistic studies belonging to anthropolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and sociolinguistics. In these “ecolinguistic” disciplines, language constitutes the main object of study, and man, mind, or society are used as criteria embracing the scope of objects studied in the domains of so-called heteronomous linguistics. In the second case, the so-called autonomous linguistics claims to study linguistic facts solely on an intra-systemic ground. Linguists try to make generalizations about systemic
properties of language as a whole, or describe and compare systems of particular languages of the world, while abstracting them from the ecology of their individual speakers, social groups, or ethnic, national, or international communities. The boundaries of autonomous linguistics are to be delimited from those of heteronomous linguistics and the ecological sciences of language by distinctions made between language as _obiectum reale_ and language as _obiectum formale_. But the division of autonomous linguistics into the domains of general linguistics and particular linguistics is a consequence of the distinction between a theoretical approach to the systemic properties of language as a definitional model and a material one to languages as ecologically determined specimens.

Model 4-3. The investigative domains of linguistics and the non-linguistic sciences of language from theoretical, descriptive, comparative and applied points of view

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A matrix of ecological properties of language in general</th>
<th>Definitional and abstract properties of language and its structures in general</th>
<th>Theoretical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecological properties of a language in particular</td>
<td>Systemic and structural properties of a language in particular</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological typology of languages</td>
<td>Typology of languages and language structures</td>
<td>Comparative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological history of languages</td>
<td>History of languages and language structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language planning and glottopolitics</td>
<td>Language policy and mastering of language in use- and acquisition</td>
<td>Applied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the subject matter of autonomous linguistics, one has to take into account that the language as a definitional model is not to be equated with properties characterizing all languages of the world, or a selected language in particular. It is also not the “language in itself” which is specified in terms of observational statements as the subject matter of comparative linguistics. Correspondingly, systemic properties of ecologically determined languages are studied in typological linguistics in a search for primariness and secondariness, universalness and exclusiveness, isomorphisms and allomorphisms, and in historical linguistics—for origin and evolution, separation and unification, continuity, or disappearance of structures which realize respective communicative functions.
On the basis of a division between disciplines that deal with language, it is not enough to consider the description of its actual state as a system in itself and to present its ecological situation. Useful here might also be comparative studies, historical and typological, conducted in a parallel manner both in the domain of linguistics as well as of the non-linguistic sciences of language. Such studies (as distinguished in Model 4-3) are important in both investigative domains for the elaboration of the so-called tertium comparationis, which would embrace, on the one hand, a matrix of ecological properties and, on the other, a definitional model of language as a semiotic system.

Apart from “pure” studies based on taxonomic or explanatory statements which evaluate the state of language as it is, or explain why so and so is as it is, one conducts in the domain of linguistics also “applied” studies, based on directive statements that determine what should be done in order to reach certain states of language to be avoided or achieved, as for example foreign language teaching, lexicography, speech aphasia, speech pathology, speech therapy, rhetoric and language standardization, and the like (for details see Grucza 1983, especially 274–340, and 341–475; cf. also 390 and 436–438).

The practical applicability of the knowledge of language is not only relevant for linguistic disciplines mastering the use of verbal means and its optimal acquisition for the purposes of interpersonal communication; there are also issues belonging to the domain of the neighboring disciplines of linguistics, which are connected with language politics in the planning of vehicular languages for interethnic and international communication.

Thus, practitioners of language sciences have to be aware of when they describe the properties of language conditioned by its environment, and when they deal with the systemic properties of a language from a structural and functional point of view. Taking a selected viewpoint, they have to observe the boundaries of disciplines in accordance with respective investigative domains, i.e., they have to know when they are on the ground of the neighboring disciplines of linguistics, or the non-linguistic sciences of language, being interested in facts which belong to the investigative field of other sciences, and when they are on the ground of heteronomous linguistics, or finally—autonomous linguistics, investigating purely linguistic facts. They have to observe: firstly, whether they have entered the domain of anthropology, psychology, or sociology, secondly, whether their domain coincides with that of the anthropology of language, the psychology of language, or the sociology of language, thirdly, whether their subject
matter is formulated in terms of so-called hyphenated disciplines, such as, for example, anthropolinguistics, psycholinguistics, or sociolinguistics, and fourthly, whether their reflections apply to systemic properties of language autonomized within linguistics proper independently of other disciplines. By this reference to disciplinary awareness, it is emphasized that “language as an object of study is indivisible”. However, the same cannot be said about the investigative perspectives and disciplines, which depend on the choice of viewpoints, theories and definitions. To be mentioned is a common practice of linguists who exceed the boundaries of their own discipline. While invading the fields explored by practitioners of other disciplines, they occasionally speak in the names of psychologists, sociologists or ethnologists, politicians or historians, sometimes even without having sufficient training in those respective domains.

Irrespective of the divisions between autonomous linguistics and heteronomous linguistics, one must state that language in its entirety can be approached from various perspectives. Remembering the famous tenet «c’est le point de vue qui crée l’objet» (Saussure 1922, 23), one has to bear in mind that the subject matter of linguistics is created by investigative perspectives both of the disciplinary and interdisciplinary provenance. It is worthwhile mentioning also the perspectives derived from philosophical positions, and furthermore, doctrines and frames of reference that are developed on metascientific premises (cf. Waśik, Z. 2003, 45).

As a matter of fact, it is not only linguists who are able to autonomize their object from a purely linguistic viewpoint; psychologists, sociologists, logicians, or philosophers, for example may construe their own model of language even though they do so from a perspective of its external conditionings. Methodologically important for the linguists in question is when their model is formulated according to a linguistic theory of a language system delimited from its ecology, and when the gnoseological subject matter of particular autonomous linguistics means also a relative autonomy of a given natural language from its individual users in an ontological sense.

**Methodological Aspects of Linguistics**

In considering the division of investigative domains, not to be forgotten is also a super-ordinate level of metascientific studies, namely, metalinguistics, whose duty is to formulate statements about linguistics as an investigative object. In confronting metascience in general with metalinguistics
in particular, there is no need, however, to distinguish separate sets of the sciences of science and the sciences of linguistics, as for example philosophy of science and philosophy of linguistics, psychology of science and psychology of linguistics, sociology of science and sociology of linguistics, logic of science and logic of linguistics, methodology of science and methodology of linguistics, history of science and history of linguistics. Their place is on the level of the sciences of science in general. Considering, for example, logic and methodology as common for all sciences, one is not entitled to treat the distribution of their statements and laws as characteristic for particular scientific disciplines. It is rather more appropriate to speak about methodological aspects of the sciences of language (for details and references see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 44), than about the methodology of linguistics. In fact, every particular discipline, dealing with different internal and external properties of language, belongs to a separate type of science with respect to its methodology. It is only within the domain of general methodology where the practitioners of language sciences are able to distinguish partial methodologies which embrace the linguistically relevant neighboring disciplines of linguistics and the disciplines of linguistics proper as well as their sub-disciplines, as applying methods characteristic of particular types of science in general. The duty of such partial methodologies is to consider the co-occurrence of various gnoseological conceptions and various investigative approaches to objects articulated in the domains investigated by smaller or larger partial disciplines of language studies (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 45).

Worth mentioning here are those disciplines which apply common methods derived from shared or borrowed investigative perspectives of disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and metadisciplinary provenance, for example, geography of language, ethnography of speaking, statistics, history, naturalism, functionalism, cognitivism, and the like. Not to be omitted among the neighboring sciences is also a number of those auxiliary disciplines which study the substance of linguistic codes, such as phonetics, utilizing the achievements of natural sciences and graphetics, tied up with cultural sciences and art, and the like. The picture of disciplines useful to the sciences of language will be incomplete if one does not add those disciplines whose objects border with language within the domain of the higher range, such as library sciences, literary studies, or archeology.
Conceptual Levels in the Understanding of Language

For the reason that theories depend on certain authorized viewpoints, one has to acknowledge the statement that language assumed as a theoretical construct, does not exist really. Nor can it be abstracted from any concrete hitherto existing language. Distinguishing an uncountable “language as a theoretical construct” from a countable “language” as a real object”, scientists have to be aware that “language as a definitional model” is not to be equated with the properties common to all languages of the world or with the properties characteristic of one language in particular.

Model 4-4. The notion of language and the problem of its empirical approachability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Level</th>
<th>2nd Level</th>
<th>3rd Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language in general</td>
<td>Language \textit{ex definitione}</td>
<td>theoretical construct on a hypothetical-deductive basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language in particular</td>
<td>Language \textit{in abstracto}</td>
<td>generalization of inductively observed language properties in time and space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language in concreto</td>
<td>Language \textit{in concreto}</td>
<td>(1) shared means of verbal signification and communication, autonomized collectively by virtue of social sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) linguistic idiosystem without interindividual norm principles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, the opposition between “language in general” and “a language in particular” does not reflect a distinction known \textit{nota bene} since the nineteenth century from the lectures of the Austrian linguist Friedrich Müller (1834–1898) as “die Sprache an und für sich”, i.e., \textit{in abstracto} vs. “die Sprache als Individuum”, i.e., \textit{in concreto} (cf. Müller 1876, 1 and 50). It appears to be insufficient for us, when we confront “language as a definitional model” and “a language as an ecologically determined specimen” in the context of the disciplinary and interdisciplinary delimitation of the system of language from the ecology of language (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 58).

Therefore, at least three conceptual levels of language have to be distinguished, as illustrated in Model 4-4: (1) in general and in particular, \textit{ex definitione, in abstracto} and \textit{in concreto}, and (3) as a theoretical construct, as an inductive generalization, as an autonomous sociolect, or as a
heteronomous idiolect. As one may notice, language in general can be understood either as language *ex definitione*, i.e., a theoretical construct on a hypothetical-deductive basis, or as language *in abstracto*, i.e., a generalization of inductively observed language properties in time and space. Furthermore, language in particular seen as synonymous with language *in concreto*, may be specified either as a shared means of verbal signification and communication, autonomized collectively by virtue of social sanctions, or as a linguistic idiosystem without interindividual norm principles.

**Concluding Statements**

In the same way as it is impossible to abstract an overall human language from hitherto existing languages of the world that might stand for current and for future languages as well, one cannot believe in the creation of a particular language on ethnic or national levels from the totality of its idiolects. It is particularly unrealizable when the language as a system of shared means of communication, which provides the rules for socially accepted norms, does not possess autonomy from its user as a knowing subject.

In concluding statements, one should state that to cross the boundaries between isolationist and integrationist approaches, it is important to specify the existence modes of language that are autonomized as the subject matter of linguistic studies against the background of its heteronomous dependencies in the domain of human sciences. Since a basic heteronomy of language are individuals who speak and understand it, linguistic texts constitute their “dispositional” properties (cf. Quine 1960/1965, ix) as far as they may be referred each time to extratextual reality during the process of interpretation. These properties can be inductively abstracted from all individual realizations of texts repeated by communication participants in the same way in all typical communicational settings. As observable parts texts become linguistic “extensions” of monolingual selves (cf. Lamb 1991, 62) realizing their intended communicational goals, tasks or needs.
CHAPTER FIVE

Speech as a Linguistic Faculty of Human Species

General Introduction

Within the framework of distinctions introduced in this chapter, the properties of language in general are discussed in relation to man as a social and individual, as well as a dynamic (processual) and static (factual) phenomenon. The core of such distinctions, widely popularized and confronted with each other, comprises the following three terms, known from the lectures of Ferdinand de Saussure: langage (‘speech’), langue (‘a language in particular’) and parole (‘both speaking and thinking’), and the two terms introduced to the epistemology of linguistics by Noam Avram Chomsky, namely competence (‘knowledge of a language’) and performance (‘realization of a language’). What is common for both authors is the claim about the intraorganismic existence mode of language as a complete system and its intra- and extraorganismic manifestations in particular acts of mental thinking and concrete activities of speaking and listening.

While alluding to the famous tenet of Wilhelm von Humboldt that language “is not a ready-made product but an uninterrupted process” (cf. Introduction, p. 6), the view is exposed that language is both a social activity and a social fact. What is more, against the usage reducing the linguistic object to the oppositions between system and text, the concurrence between dynamic and static aspects of language and its realization in texts is presented here on the basis of the four phases of speech formulated by Karl Bühler, such as “speaking as an action” and “language as work” against the background of “speaking as an (accomplished) act” and “language as a (created) structure”. In this confrontation of “speaking” vs. “language”, “action” and “act”, as textual aspects of speech, are placed in opposition to “work” and “structure”, constituting ipso facto the systemic aspects of speech.
Saussure’s conceptual construct is known through three terms: *le langage*, specified as a physiological-mental faculty of humanity, *la langue*—as an abstract and social system of signs, and *la parole*—as an individual act of creation and comprehension of verbal signs in speaking and thinking processes. A determined language, as a system of associated types of mental signs consisting of two parts, the concepts of word meanings and sound patterns of word forms that mutually imply each other, functions for the purposes of communication only in synchrony, that is to say, on the axis of simultaneity. Its particular elements, however, are manifest in diachrony, i.e., on the axis of succession, having separately different sources of origin and different historical records in time and space. The mere term *langage*, known from the interpretation of Saussure’s lectures, has been abandoned in English translations depicted through (uncountable) *language* or *speech* as a synonym of the faculty or power of speaking, i.e., the ability to express one’s thoughts and emotions by speech sounds. Nonetheless, it has been retained primarily in respect to the concept of speaking understood as the “speech activity” of an individual.

Chomsky, in turn, is recognized a promoter of a nativist conception of language as a set of inborn lexical ideas and grammatical rules localized in the human brain, thanks to which communicating individuals possess the so-called linguistic competence, understood as an *ad hoc* knowledge, preceding their sensual experience, to create and recognize what is effective in its communicational usage. Chomsky’s supposition about the creative capacity of human minds which allows speakers/listeners of a given language to generate and understand unlimited numbers of communicative entities, units and constructions realized through performative activities on the level of sentences, clauses, phrases, words, morphemes, and phonemes out of a finite number of basic constituents stands in close connection with a nativity assumption about the linguistic endowment of human brains. Following Chomsky, a competent speaker/listener should be judged according to his or her execution of linguistic abilities in the formation of contextually appropriate, communicatively acceptable, grammatically well-formed, and phonetically faultless utterances.

In subsequent proposals of sociological and educational adaptations, the Chomskyan notion of communicative-linguistic performance has been subsequently altered into the realization of communicative competence of speakers, where their verbal and nonverbal performances are understood as an execution of their linguistic and semiotic abilities in generating an infinite number of textual realizations of language which serve the purpos-
es of interpersonal communication about the reality both the commonly known and never encountered before. It is thus assumed that communicating individuals may be judged from the educational point of view as maladjusted or well-adjusted with respect to of their linguistic, semiotic, social, and cultural competences.

Language and Speech

The debate about the opposition between “language” and “speech”, and furthermore between “system” and “text”, usually starts with Saussure’s categories langage—langue—parole. From the three proposed terms, only the opposition between “language” and “text” is widely held in the linguistic tradition. The third element, namely langage, has been abandoned because of its ambiguity in linguistic writings. Nonetheless, its sense still exists in the usage of the English term speech. “Speech” is exploited sometimes along with “language” as a synonym of the faculty or power of speaking, i.e., the ability to express one’s thoughts and emotions by speech sounds, but it has been retained primarily in respect to the understanding of the “act of speaking”.

According to Ferdinand de Saussure, langue and parole constitute two aspects of langage. The Saussurean distinction, however, as Adam Heinz (1914–1984) has noticed (1978, 240), is unsatisfactorily precise. It is not clear enough how langue and parole should be seen in relation to such categories as “process” and “product” (energeia and ergon), as well as to “system” and “text”.

In Karl Bühler’s (1934, 48–68) specification, then again, “speech” is divided into the four phases of realization, namely Sprechhandlung (‘speaking as an activity’), Sprechakt (‘speaking as a realized act’), Sprachwerk (‘language as work’), and Sprachgebilde (‘language as a created structure’). In these sequential phases of speech, Bühler confronts de facto the two oppositional pairs, such as process vs. product and text vs. system. In the first instance, he places Handlung (‘activity’) and Werk (‘work’) as two different kinds of processes against the background of Akt (‘act’) and Gebilde (‘structure’) as two kinds of ready-made product. In the second, while distinguishing between Sprechen (‘speaking’) vs. Sprache (‘language’), Bühler sees Handlung (‘activity’) and Akt (‘act’) as textual aspects of speech standing in opposition to Werk (‘work’) and Gebilde (‘structure’) which are acknowledged as systemic aspects of speech.
Speech as a Linguistic Faculty of Human Species

The Saussurean term *langage* has not lost its validity for the representatives of the non-linguistic sciences of language, or the neighboring sciences of linguistics. Joseph Vendryes (1875–1960) argued earlier, independently of Ferdinand de Saussure, in favor of the distinction between the studies of “speech” and the studies of “language”. In his handbook, written in 1914, i.e., two years before *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916), which appeared in print under the characteristic title *Le langage* as late as in 1921, Vendryes expressed his conviction that the search for the origins of speech was not a linguistic problem. The majority of linguists who wrote about the origins of speech were, in his opinion, wrong when they tried to resolve this problem from a linguistic point of view as if it were identical with the origins of languages. As he affirmed, conforming with the term introduced by Arsène Darmsteter (1846–1888) in 1887 (cf. Darmsteter 1887/1921), “Between speech and language, there is such a difference that speech constitutes an ensemble of physiological and psychological abilities, which a human being has in command in order to speak, while languages constitute practical applications of these abilities” (Vendryes 1921, 275, trans. is ours: ZW).

The observance of the difference between language and speech has appeared to be relevant for neuropsychologists. Mariusz Maruszewski, a Polish psychologist (1932–1973), for example, proposes to define language as a socially actualized system of symbols having a specific meaning, which are utilized in human communication in accordance with the principles of how to construe linguistic utterances being independent of an individual (1970, 17 [1975]).

In other words, language, in Maruszewski’s view, is considered as an objective system that comprises the resources of socially created means for denoting elements of reality (understood in its broadest sense) perceived by a speaker and means for expressing the relationships between these elements. By stressing the objectivity of this system, Maruszewski means only that it is a social norm. As such, language system has to be equated with a set of rules serving mutual understanding, which are used by a given social group, and which has to be acquired by each of its members, so that he/she is able to participate in this mutual understanding.

By speech, Maruszewski proposes to understand an ensemble of activities that consist in the processes of mutual understanding achieved through the use of a language. As he has asserted, an individual acquires the ability of performing such activities as a consequence of being in contact with other speaking individuals. Thus, speech is a kind of individual activity,
which consists in the realization of the rules of language for the purposes of mutual understanding. From this point of view, one should distinguish between the two groups of activities constituting the speech: the activities of sending the speech products and the activities of receiving the speech products (cf. Maruszewski 1970, 17 [1975]).

To have a clear picture of the difference between speech and language, it is worthwhile mentioning the position of the authors of *Dictionnaire de linguistique*, Jean Dubois et al. (1973). Under the lexical entry *langage*, one can read there that speech is a specific faculty of mankind to communicate by using systems of vocal signs while implementing complex physiological techniques. This faculty implies the existence of a symbolic function and genetically specialized neuronal centers, and vocal signs used by a determined social group (i.e., a speech community) constitute particular languages.

**System and Text**

The *langue*-and-*parole* distinction coming from the lectures of Ferdinand de Saussure has been popularized in the area of functional structuralism in the epistemology of linguistics—under the influence of the static interpretation of language as a tool halted at a certain stage of development—as an opposition between “system” and “text”. Since language as a system is primarily conditioned by the texts produced by its speakers, its substantial realization has to be interpreted in terms of a token-and-type distinction. Within a pair: “a set of tokens (of specimens)” vs. “a set of types (classes of specimens) of tokens”, the first member of this distinction is to be presented in terms of the remaining others.

The “text” is usually rendered as a product of speech, i.e., a concrete realization of language as a system of signs having both an abstract and a social character. In this sense, it can be included into the realm of *parole*, as proposed by Saussure, when one takes into consideration this alone what originates in the individual act of text-processing connected with an individual act of text-understanding in the mind of individual language speakers and listeners.

In functional linguistics, the text is therefore treated as a primary form of the manifestation of language which serves as a tool of mutual understanding by means of speech. On the one hand, it is a material bearer of meanings conventionally ascribed to it, and on the other, a means of com-
munication. As such, the text is to be considered as a basic constituent of all elements of language, although it can manifest itself in any substantial shape.

The “system” of language, however, is conceived in terms of its textual realization making up a set of typical elements and relations between these elements which repeat always in the same way throughout all communicational events. As such, they become a basis for the realization of speech behavior of individuals and social groups in a conventional and commonly accepted form.

The sets of types of text elements, which serve for transmitting information about extralinguistic reality (and in individual acts of speaking and understanding—about extra-textual reality), are inductively deciphered from all language phenomena repeated in the same way and in the same situational environment. To be precise, one may say that the system of language is composed of these abstracted categories of text elements, their properties, entities, units, and constructions, which appear on the levels of phonology, morphology, semantics, syntax, and stylistics. Their hierarchy is as follows: distinctive feature, phoneme, morpheme, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, utterance, and discourse.

In the process of acquiring a particular language, an individual speaker has the possibility to appreciate all actual qualities of constructions and to preview their potential combinations in realization. Nevertheless, he/she is unable to acquire it in totality. As a whole, a given system of language, normalized and standardized by a certain speech community, exists only in the sets of text types, mastered by all of its actual and potential speakers and processed in all contexts of its social forms of manifestation connected with its application, acquisition and attrition.

Moreover, because the system of each natural language is abstract by nature, it can be deduced from concrete texts only by inferences. Additionally, a particular language has a social character, because, as a whole, it recurs mainly in the processes and products of communication among people. One should thus agree that “language in general”, assumed hypothetically as a theoretical construct by researchers who strive to discover all its regularities by observation of its various forms of manifestation in particular types of communicational events, is de facto empirically unapproachable. It is true that the realization of language achieves a concrete observational shape solely in the texts of its individual speakers.
Collectivity and Individuality

Linguistic facts of speech present themselves in two human-centered conditionings that govern their states of being, namely in the individual and social modes of existence. What manifests itself in particular acts of speaking and understanding constitutes the properties of individual participants in human communication. As social facts, in another dimension, one has to recognize these collectively accepted tools of interindividual communication which crystallize themselves in the acts of speech as sets of shared verbal means. In its social existence form, a particular language appears as an organized set of the types of text elements that are acquired and realized for the needs of speakers/hearers and requirements of speech communities in accordance with commonly accepted rules of usage and norms of correctness.

In abstracting language in general from individual products and acts of speaking, called *parole* in Saussurean terms, one not only detaches the social facts from the individual ones, but also, at the same time, one distinguishes the properties of linguistic texts which are “abstractively” relevant from those which are functionally irrelevant. In other words, it is possible to distinguish these properties of the linguistic facts which are essential from some others which are less or more accidental in its substantial realization. One can say that a language in particular is not a function of a speaking person, but rather a ready-made product which an individual initially acquires in a passive way. As opposed to language, *parole* constitutes an individual act of will and human intelligence, related both to thinking and speaking operations being simultaneously performed. In the first instance, *parole* exhibits combinations by means of which the speaker subordinates certain communicative functions to elements of a certain code taking into consideration their word-for-word meaning, communicational impact, or stimulus-response effect. In the second, it involves psychophysical mechanisms that allow a particular person to express these combinations through products, also called “genres of speech” which are perceivable by human senses in specific communicational events.

Process and Product

Another kind of “aspectual” approach to functional properties and forms of the manifestation of language in speech has been expressed in the dis-
Discussions between representatives of two opposite orientations arguing about the fact whether language is a process or a product (for interpretations and references see Helbig 1973, 119–148, especially pp. 124 and 127–135). Recognized, in this respect, has been the claim of Wilhelm von Humboldt from the Introduction to the first volume of his work Über die Kawi- Sprache auf der Insel Jawa of 1836, to be found also in his separately published and more known work Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts also of the same year 1836.

One can accordingly say after further contemporary interpretations that language is *energeia* and not *ergon*; in other words, it is a generative activity of expression and an affective force which repeats always in the same way and always in a new way. A characteristic feature of language, considered under the dynamic aspect, is that its speakers, by producing verbal signs from a finite number of means which they have at their disposal, execute an infinite number of communicational events. Hence, (Johann) Leo Weisgerber (1899–1985) has proposed, in his work *Vom Weltbild der deutschen Sprache* (1953), to interpret the assertion “language is energeia” rather as “language is a spiritual force” (Germ. *die geistige Kraft* or *die geistige Macht*) which transforms things and affairs into phenomena in such a way that they become the property of human thought. In this dynamic view, language is ascribed to have its own life in a given society when it oscillates between reality and human minds as “the intermediate spiritual world” (Germ. *die geistige Zwischenwelt*).

As *ergon* one has to regard, following the Humboldtian view, these outputs of language which become a ready-made product, liberated from the process of speaking. Leo Weisgerber, in turn, has interpreted *ergon* as the result of “the ‘wording’ of the world” (Germ. *das ‘Worten’ der Welt*;
cf. Weisgerber 1955), i.e., as a crystallization of “a world view” (Germ. die Weltansicht) in the consciousness of individuals, communities and nations, and, consequently, in the spoken and written texts of a language.

**Competence and Performance**

Language as a social aspect of human speech is relatively independent of the will of its individual speakers and listeners. Nobody is able to create his/her language as a personal property and to transform it into a means of signification and communication when it is not accepted by a social contract established by members of a given speech community. An individual has to learn it, in order to cognize it and to obey its rules. A child, for example, acquires it for itself gradually. Language exists even in the form of a capability, as in the case of a person who has lost the ability of speaking. One can say, by way of illustration, that someone possesses a language when he/she understands only its texts while conceiving them as verbal, spoken or written signs. The problem with the supposed proprietorship of a language is connected with the social character of verbal means. Individual uses of language are sanctioned by social norms, sometimes imposed by authorities. They are governed by the principles of common acceptability which the particular members of speech communities have the duty to conform to. Another form of possessing the speech is specified in Saussurean terms as “the linguistic faculty proper” (« la faculté linguistique par excellence »). It refers to two kinds of abilities: in one sense, it means the ability to acquire the language of an ecologically determined community during the “critical period” of maturation in the development of an individual, and in another, it may also connote the ability to create one’s own inter-individual communicative means which is developed on the bordering zone between separate varieties of one and the same language, or several languages spoken by regional communities, ethnic minorities, or national majorities in a given communicational setting. This kind of proprietorship related to a particular language, mastered by society or individuals, is usually understood as the “linguistic competence”.

The term *competence* has entered the domain of linguistic theory owing to the proposal of Noam Avram Chomsky (1965, 3–15). In accordance with the intention of the author, this term was referred initially to the knowledge of grammar applied in actual speaking (see Chomsky 1965, 3):
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogenous speech community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.

Slightly later, with the inclusion of a phonemic and semantic capability of speakers, the notion of linguistic competence has covered the totality of linguistic knowledge, the abilities and habits of an ideal language speaker and listener who functions in a homogeneous speech community not polluted by any influences from the outside. At the same time, sociologically inclined linguists (after Dell Hymes 1962, 1966, 1971, 1972) have noticed the need for introducing a pragmatic component into a more general notion of “communicative competence” while emphasizing that considerations of language use are often indispensable for the comprehension of much of the linguistic form. Instead of assessing what can be said in a language, practitioners of language sciences have rather to account for “what can be said when, where, by whom, to whom, in what manner, and under what particular circumstances” (Saville-Troike 1982, 8). Consequently, the area of communicative competence is proposed to involve knowing not only the linguistic code, but also to deal with the social and cultural knowledge, speakers are presumed to have, to enable them to use and interpret linguist forms. Ultimately, the conceptual scope of communicative competence encompasses not only the notion of social competence but also the notion of cultural competence, or the total set of knowledge and skills which speakers employ in a situation, as one may conclude from the following statement of Muriel Saville-Troike (1982, 22–23):

Communicative competence extends to both knowledge and expectation of who may or may not speak in certain settings, when to speak and when to remain silent, whom one may speak to, how one may talk to persons of different statuses and roles, what appropriate nonverbal behaviors are in various contexts, what the routines for turn-taking are in conversations, how to ask for and give information, how to request, how to offer or de-cline assistance or cooperation, how to give commands, how to enforce discipline, and the like—in short, everything involving the use of language and other communicative dimensions in particular social settings …

A competent speaker/listener is seen as being able to create and recognize linguistic utterances as mutually distinguishable under the phonological
aspect, as correct with regard to its grammar, logical from a semantic point of view, and as suitably adjusted to an appropriate situational context. An empirical testimony of such a broadly understood linguistic competence is to be found in the communicative-linguistic performance of an individual. Verbal performance refers to the execution of linguistic abilities in generating an infinite number of textual utterances, which serve the purposes of interpersonal communication, both the commonly known and new ones not heard before. The general competencies of individuals, having a linguistic, communicative, social, and cultural character, are usually judged in relation to ideal interlocutors in an ideal speech community, including good manners or maladjustment that result from inappropriate educational treatment. Sometimes, the statement of “incompetence” may give rise to social sanctions or even discriminations due to misjudgments.

Defined on the ground of language sciences, the notion of linguistic competence as well as a broadly understood notion of communicative competence has found its reflection in the methodology of foreign language teaching. Accordingly, the perspective of “communicativism” is frequently suggested as an epistemological attitude of practitioners of foreign language teaching who become convinced that, apart from structural facts of the language system, the learners should be trained in the pragmalinguistic, social and cultural environment of communication.

The normative model of intercultural communicative competence in the area of globalization for the tasks of the world citizenship, has been widely popularized by Michael Byram (1997, 32–47), the promoter of a belief that to draw appropriate conclusions from learning alien cultures, the learners of a foreign language should first realize and understand their own culture. According to this model, teachers of foreign languages, while using appropriate didactic materials for transmitting cultural knowledge and improving linguistic skills, are expected to shape the intercultural communicative competence of their pupils through instilling into their minds five kinds of the respective “savoirs”, such as (1) savoir, i.e., knowledge of native and foreign cultures along with accepted norms of conduct in public and private institutions in relation to differences inside the society and language variations, (2) savoir être, i.e., positive attitudes marked by curiosity, openness to modify ways of thinking and perceiving the others, and readiness to transform the way of perceiving the foreign culture and to show keen interest to otherness, (3) savoir comprendre, i.e., linguistic skills of interpreting and comprehending, which enable an individual to assess, for example a document or an event, and to uncover opac-
ities or allusions in their connotative meaning, (4) savoir apprendre, i.e., educational skills of acquiring new knowledge about a foreign culture or unknown cultural practices, and to manage this knowledge with appropriate attitudes in communicative interactions, (5) savoir s’engager, i.e., operational skills of comparing and contrasting native and foreign cultures on the basis of well-defined principles. (discussed by Wąsik, E. 2014).

Moreover, in the domain of applied linguistics, Michael Canale and Merill Swain (1979, 1980, 1988), and separately also Michael Canale (1983), advocating the idea of a communicative approach to the foreign language teaching, have proposed to integrate the communicative competence within the framework of the four constituents: (1) grammatical competence, referring to the knowledge of vocabulary and grammatical rules, (2) sociolinguistic competence—suitability to the situation, (3) discursive competence—cohesion and coherence, and (4) strategic competence—appropriate use of communicational tactics.

Communicative competence is composed minimally of grammatical competence, sociolinguistic competence, and communicational strategies, or what is also called as strategic competence. There is no strong theoretical or empirical motivation for the view that grammatical competence is more or less crucial to successful communication than the sociolinguistic competence or strategic knowledge. The primary goal of a communicative approach must be to facilitate the integration of these types of knowledge for the learner, an outcome that is not likely to result from overemphasis on one form of acquisitional competence over the others throughout the program of foreign language teaching (Canale & Swain 1980, 27).

Theoretical specifications pertaining to the notion of linguistic and communicative competence have been utilized by practitioners of foreign language teaching in the preparation of language tests. According to Lyle F. Bachmann and Adrian S. Palmer, the testing of verbal skills can be accepted as a surrogate form of linguistic performance in specific situations or contexts. Bachmann (1990/1991, 81–90), for example, has assumed that the communicative competence consist of language knowledge, i.e., in other words, a capability or an ability to introduce this knowledge in a speech performance. In his opinion, the communicational language abilities include: linguistic competence, strategic competence and psychophysiological mechanisms of individuals.

In their subsequent work, however, Bachmann together with Palmer (1996/2000, 62–82) have departed from the assumption that each communicative performance of verbal abilities is based on complex and multidi-
imensional interactions between the properties of individual language speakers and listeners. To these properties belong: (1) personality characteristics, which encompass age, sex, nationality, residence status, native language, level, and type of general education, or prior experience with a given text, (2) topical knowledge about the real-world and culture as well as (3) affective and emotional correlates of topical knowledge. As far as the knowledge of a language is concerned, understood as linguistic competence, one may distinguish after the authors two of its levels. The first level, called organizational knowledge, includes the erudition of how to construe texts as a sequence of utterances and sentences, which includes both: (1) grammatical knowledge about word formation, sentence composition, and even their realization in spoken and written texts, (2) textual knowledge including the rhetorical rules of cohesion and conversational rhetoric.

The second level includes pragmatic knowledge, i.e., the knowledge about the relationships of utterances to the goals of language users and to the contexts of language use, which embraces (1) the functional knowledge of language users about how to formulate utterances, so that they fulfill respective functions, as, e.g., ideational, manipulative, heuristic, or imaginative, as well as (2) the sociolinguistic knowledge pertaining to the acquaintance with social contexts of how to construe utterances under the differentiation of language varieties, registers, idiomatic expressions, cultural references and figures of speech. Thus, it is obvious for the specialists of language teaching that the acquisition of purely linguistic abilities which can be tested is not enough, as far as they must cooperate with various situational contexts of language use.

Alluding to the questions pertaining to the communicative competence as a kind of knowledge achieved by learners through their participation in social and cultural life of human individuals, the authors (Coste et al. 2001) of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment, discussed to a great extent by Hanna Komorowska-Janowska (2006, 65–66) in the context of second language pedagogy, and summarized with reference to linguistic properties of communicating individuals by Elżbieta Magdalena Wąsik (2007, 173), have mostly taken into consideration the extensive proposal of Byram (1997). This document prepared by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg takes into consideration the development of the following general competences: declarative knowledge (savoir), skills and know how (savoir-faire), existential competence (savoir-être), and ability to learn (savoir-apprendre).
The first domain of sociolinguistic competence includes, among the other things: the knowledge about the culture of communicative communities who speak in a particular language, especially about the everyday life of people (eating, drinking, holidays, working hours, or recreation), environmental conditionings (standards of living, housing), interpersonal relations (social class, family patterns, gender- and generation-determined roles), values, beliefs and attitudes (in the domain of history, politics, art or religion), body language, social customs and ritual behavior, as well as the attentiveness to differences between bearers of different cultures, covering the knowledge, awareness and understanding of relations (similarities and noticeable differences) between communicating individuals and groups.

The second domain institutes mainly practical skills (i.e., social, existential, professional, and recreational), as well as communicational skills in interpersonal and intercultural relationships (the ability to establish mutual relationships between the cultures of a native and foreign language, to show sensitivity, to identify with and to apply various strategies in the in the contacts between representatives of different cultures, to fulfill a mediating role between domestic and foreign cultures, to counteract against misunderstandings, or conflicts that result from the lack of respect, and to overcome the disagreements based on stereotypes or prejudices).

To the third domain, one may include the existential competence of communication participants which embraces their behavioral attitudes of showing interest and openness towards new experiences and views, new persons, societies and cultures. Special positions occupy here also the willingness to accept beliefs, opinions, and cultural values of others, or the readiness and ability to assume conventional attitudes toward intercultural differences in customs, beliefs, motivations, cognitive styles and personality factors, etc.

The fourth domain, referring to the ability of learning, constitutes a condition for achieving all four kinds of communicative competences in interpersonal contacts between representatives of different linguistic and cultural communities. Their foundations are formed by epistemological and vocational awareness, cognitive and heuristic abilities, such as, for example, the ability to learn new terms along with new experiences, to learn new things, to utilize modern informational technologies in conformity with communicational goals tasks or needs, and so forth.
CHAPTER SIX

Form and Substance in the Educational Discourse on Language

Delimiting the Domain of Interest

The subject matter of this chapter (based on the version of Wąsik, Z. 1999b, including the references of Wąsik, Z. 1997 and 1998, which has been partly summarized in 2003 and extended in 2008)5 comprises—with special regard to figurative devices—the educational modes of explaining the notion of form in correlation with the notion of substance, as encountered in the academic handbooks by the students and practitioners of language sciences. Therefore, the topic of the following inquiry has been limited to linguistic semiotics which the users of academic handbooks, dictionaries and encyclopedic entries usually meet during their university studies.

Understanding the Notion of Form, Its Scope and Contextual Usage

Against the background of the development of philosophical thought, it should be noted that the applications of the term form in linguistic writings together with its lexicographic usage do not stand in one-to-one correspondence. In the modern usage, form is placed in opposition to content, i.e., to sense or meaning, whereas the notion of form is usually equalized with the grammatical (i.e., phonological, morphological and syntactic) entities and structures distinguished from the lexical (and stylistic) ones on the basis of their category-related features. Another view of form is connected with the opposition between phonological and semantic planes in language. Accordingly, the elements of form are discussed within the framework of functionalist structuralism as text elements that correspond to the elements of extratextual content. For this reason, form is frequently
either contrasted with or placed in relation to function or meaning. What is more, the adherents of formalist structuralism otherwise propose to speak in favor of such a definition of the term form which appears to be synonymous with a relational value of substance. Thus, the linguistic form is meant to operate, as a specific carving pattern, on the amorphous non-linguistic matter giving, in the output, a network of relationships, into which the elements of linguistic character mutually (among themselves) enter (cf. Dubois et al. 1973, forme).

**Substantial Form as an Existential Determinant of Matter**

In the context of the notion of form in its relation to substance, one has to place the issue of the so-called zero-signs, or the question of the order of words, which are considered to be meaningful. This topic might be better understandable when one confronts the statement of Ferdinand de Saussure, a forerunner of abstract structuralism: “So it is not even necessary to have any material sign in order to give expression to an idea the language may be content simply to contrast something with nothing” (Saussure 1972 [1983, 86]), with an illustrative declaration of Louis Hjelmslev, a founder of formalist glossematics:

In the general calculus there is no question of whether the individual structural types are manifested, but only whether they are manifestable and, nota bene, manifestable in any substance whatsoever. Substance is thus not a necessary presupposition for linguistic form (italics BS), but linguistic form (italics BS) is a necessary presupposition for substance. Manifestation, in other words, is a selection in which the linguistic form is the constant and the substance the variable (Hjelmslev {1953, 94}, quoted by Bertha Siertsema 1955/1965, 127).

One can thus notice that the linguistic substance has been principally defined in a negative manner. Everything which may be defined as a “substance” has been considered as not a “form”, i.e., as not belonging to the system of interdependencies that constitute the structure of each of the given objects. In consequence, paying more attention to form than to substance has lead some formally inclined linguists (cf. Heinz 1978, passim) to believe that the form is independent of the substance.
Alluding to the Antique Heritage of the Notion of Form, Substance and Matter

The notion of substantial form as a principle constituting the real existence of matter is descended from Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), nota bene the pupil of Plato (427–347 B.C.). However, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) has reinterpreted it in a mentalist direction, assuming the existence of a priori forms, due to which thought, by virtue of its internal structure, orders subjective experience and creates the science. But he has applied the term form only with reference to sensorial perceptions in the context of matter (cf. Podsiad & Więckowski 1983, forma). From that time on, following Kant’s reinterpretation, form has been placed in relation to (and as independent of) matter. And the matter as corporeality, being the notion of Platonic heritage, has been opposed to its Aristotelian understanding as the raison d’être and the ground of changes.

In consequence, the interaction between Platonist and Aristotelian ways of reasoning has contributed to neglecting the unorganized matter and paying more attention to the importance of the form. In this combination of approaches, where the “form” is defined as a counterpart of a “function” or a “meaning”, and where the “substantial form” is treated as an organizing principle of being and the “matter”, in fact, a constitutive quality of language.

Language as a Carving Pattern Operating in Speaking and Thinking Processes

Being influenced by a structuralist way of seeing the nature, in one of the chapters devoted to the understanding of linguistic value, Saussure has stated that: “In order to realise that the language itself can be nothing other than a system of pure values, one needs only consider the two elements which are involved in the way it functions, ideas and sounds” ([1983, 110]), as far as: “The characteristic role of a language in relation to thought is not to supply the material phonetic means by which ideas may be expressed. It is to act as intermediary between thought and sound, in such a way that the combination of both necessarily produces a mutually complementary delimitation of units” (Saussure [1983, 110]; cf. Wąsik, Z. 1998, 33).
This above quoted statement and its further extension in Saussure’s lectures have explicitly shown how language as a carving pattern operates in speaking and thinking processes ([1983, 110–111]):

Thought, chaotic by nature, is made precise by this process of segmentation. But what happens is neither a transformation of thoughts into matter, nor a transformation of sounds into ideas. What takes place, is a somewhat mysterious process by which ‘thought-sound’ evolves divisions, and a language takes shape with its linguistic units in between those two amorphous masses. One might think of it as being like air in contact with water: changes in atmospheric pressure break up the surface of the water into series of divisions, i.e. waves. The correlation between thought and sound, and the union of the two, is like that.

As it results from the Saussure’s reasoning, (1) language orders thoughts on the one plane and speech sounds on the other, providing them with forms, and also (2) language forms itself by mediating between the substances of internal ideas and external sounds (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1998, 34).

**Language as a Domain of Articulation: The Sheet-of-Paper Metaphor**

Speaking about the unification of thought with sound material, Saussure has exposed the concept of language as a system of pure values. However, having in mind its role in the creation of basic sign structures, he has defined language as a domain of articulation where the idea establishes itself in the sound and where the sound becomes a sign for the idea, as follows: “Linguistic structure might be described as the domain of articulation … Every linguistic sign is a part or member, an articulus, where an idea is fixed in a sound, and a sound becomes the sign of an idea” (Saussure [1983, 111]). This view is reflected in Saussure’s comparison of linguistic structures to a sheet of paper where the thought constitutes its *recto*, and the sound—its *verso*, as it is shown in his own statements:

A language might also be compared to a sheet of paper. Thought is one side of the sheet and sound the reverse side. Just it is impossible to take a pair of scissors and cut one side of paper without at the same time cutting the other, so it is impossible in a language to isolate sound from thought, or thought from sound. To separate the two for theoretical purposes takes us into either pure psychology or pure phonetics, not linguistics.
Linguistics then, operates along this margin, where sound and thought meet. *The contact between them gives rise to a form, not a substance* (Saussure [1983, 111]).

One can, therefore, state that it is impossible to cut up the first side without cutting up the second one. Similarly, in a language, one is not able to separate either sound from thought, or thought from sound; one can grasp the essence of the linguistic sign only through the abstraction of either pure psychological or pure phonological facts.

**Metaphorical Depiction of Language as a Game of Chess**

The popular *dictum* of Saussure (1916/1949, 169]) «La langue est une forme et non une substance» (quoted by Siersema 1965, 6), i.e., “language is a form and not a substance” (Saussure [1983, 120]), should be interpreted that language is not only a set of physical expressions but also a set of values of elements that mutually imply each other. In view of the fact that the elements of language are interchangeable, because they can be expressed in different substances, the form of language alone is understood as a system of pure values.

Thus, one can, say in accordance with the Saussurean approach that the form constitutes a set of relations between pure values and that it superimposes itself as a system upon the substance (e.g., in speech or writing). Hence, form in opposition to substance is to be seen as language-specific and substance as a property which is characteristic of the so-called *parole*.

Figuratively, Saussure has presented a relation between form and substance on the basis of a parallel between the language and the game of chess. As experts know, chess is a game played on a chessboard by two people who maneuver 16 pieces each according to rules governing movement of the six kinds of pieces (pawn, rook, knight, bishop, queen, king), in order to bring the opponent's king into checkmate. In educational discourse, linguists use the notion of rules applied in the chess game to particular pieces located and relocated on a chessboard to compare them with the rules of language utilized by its speakers in a certain contextually determined communicational situation. In the same way as chess players tacitly define their moves in the game, which allows them to play in an effective way with an infinite number of potential outcomes, the users of verbal signs from a particular language realize their communicational
goals by making use of the system of rules and words that enable them to perform their speech acts in actual instances of speech communication.

In a chess game, for example, the material shape of each piece, what they are made of (of wood or of ivory, etc.), is not relevant when those pieces are exchangeable, when they are got lost, even by the pieces of chalk or stone. However, a mutual relation between them, and the role separately ascribed to chess-pieces in a given moment when they are placed on the chessboard is relevant.

… to say, for instance, that the parts of speech do reflect linguistic structure, simply because they are logically viable categories—is to forget that linguistic facts do not exist independently of sound-sequences divided into meaningful segments … The point can be brought out once again by comparison with chess (cf. p. 125ff). Consider a knight in chess. Is the piece by itself an element of the game? Certainly not. For as a material object, separated from its square on the board and the other conditions of play, it is of no significance for the player. It becomes a real, concrete element only it takes on or becomes identified with its value in the game. Suppose that during a game this piece gets destroyed or lost. Can it be replaced? Of course it can. Not only by some other knight but even by an object of quite a different shape, which can be counted as a knight provided it is assigned the same value as the missing piece. Thus it can be seen that in semiological systems, such as languages where the elements keep one another in a state of equilibrium in accordance with fixed rules, the notions of identity and value merge.

That is why in the final analysis the notion of value covers units, concrete entities and realities. There is no fundamental difference between these notions, but they allow the same problem to be formulated in a variety of different ways. Whether we are trying to determine units, realities, concrete entities, or value, it will always come down to the same central question, which runs throughout the whole of static linguistics (Saussure [1983, 108–109]).

Substance and Form of Language in the Metaphor of a Sand Pie

Hjelmslev, in turn, although alluding to Saussure, has presented a slightly different opposition between form and substance which coexist within the same two planes of language, namely the plane of expression and the plane of content. If truth be told, Hjelmslev (cf. 1943 [1953/1961/1963, 13 and 52–58]) has confirmed Saussure’s claim as to the duality of the sign, but he
has proposed to regard its two sides *signifié* and *signifiant* as two separate “functives”, i.e., expression form and content form which are interconnected by a sign function. By this proposal, Hjelmslev has rejected the widespread opinion (*nota bene* of Polish logicians) that the sign is something which stands for something else. In his view, the sign is not an expression that points to a content outside the sign itself, but a two-sided entity which acts in two directions: “outwards”, i.e., to the substance of expression and “inwards”, i.e., to the substance of content.

As Hjelmslev has assumed, without linguistic signs the so-called substance of expression may create a disordered row, or an unorganized mass of sounds to which none of language users can ascribe any content. Furthermore, the substance of content may appear as an unordered set, or a shapeless mass, of thought about things and states of affairs which have no boundaries and which are not classified at all.

By the form, one should understand in the Hjelmslevian sense an abstract scheme or a principle organizing structural relations between functives connected with each other by a sign function in both planes: the plane of expression and the plane of content. In Hjelmslev’s interpretation ([1953, 44]), the form operates as a curving pattern on both planes of the linguistic sign which are connected with each other, making them mutually subordinate as both the substance of content and the substance of expression.

What constitutes a formless continuum in both planes, what has been ordered differently by the form of each of the languages in particular, Hjelmslev has proposed to call the “matter”. As he has explained, the so-called “purport” of substance, following its English translation, constitutes the “factor that is common … and that remains common to all languages” (Hjelmslev [1953, 46], quoted by Siertsema 1965, 148). In Hjelmslev’s opinion, the same matter can exist in different languages receiving only a different shape, i.e., a different form. And what this shape determines, are exclusively the functions of language, the sign function and the functions, which are derived from them. Matter itself remains, in each case, substance for one or another form. As it results from Hjelmslev’s formulations, the “matter” (of content, or of expression) can become a “substance” only then, when it appears in the role of a functive connected by a sign-function with the “form” (of content or expression). The substance is, in Hjelmslevian terms, this part of the matter of content, or expression, which constitutes a concrete product ordered and organized by the form that has been shaped for the purposes of communication by means of verbal signs.
To illustrate the difference between matter (purport), substance and form of a language, Hjelmslev has utilized the metaphors of a piece of sand, a mold form and a formed sand pie. By the substance of sand, he has understood the sand which is found within a mold form. The form, he has seen in the shape given to the sand pie (in question) by a mold. The starting difference between sand as matter and sand as substance depends from the fact, whether a determined set has an ordered character, provided by a given form. A handful of sand as the matter can become a substance for different sand pies formed by a number of different molds.

The unformed purport extractable from ... linguistic chains is formed differently in each language. Each language lays down its own boundaries within the amorphous “thought-mass” and stress different factors in it in different arrangements, puts the centers of gravity in different places and gives them different emphases. It is like one and the same handful of sand that is formed in quite different patterns, or like the cloud in the heavens that changes shape in Hamlet’s view from minute to minute. Just as the same sound can be put into different molds, and the same cloud take on ever-new shapes, so also the same purport is formed or structured differently in different languages. What determines its form is solely the functions of the language, the sign function and the functions deducible therefrom. Purport remains, each time, substance for a new form, and has no possible existence except through being substance for one form or another (Hjelmslev [1963, 52]).

How should one see the terms distinguished by Hjelmslev in the context of the plane of expression and the plane of content in a language? In accordance with the interpretation of the author of this conception himself, matter in the plane of expression should constitute all kinds of sounds emitted by people in different languages. The speech sounds, forming constituents of signs of a particular language, in which people communicate, are to be determined as a substance of the expression plane. However, phonemes, by means of which those particular signs are distinguished from other sign in the system of language, should be treated as belonging to the form of the expression plane. A good analysis of Hjelmslevian view of the plane of expression is provided by Siertsema (1965, 146):

As an example of the elements marked off in this way by different languages in the expression plane Hjelmslev gives “the continuum made by the median profile of the roof of the moth, from the pharynx to the lips”. (What is meant is, of course, the sounds produced in the various
places of this “continuum”, not the continuum itself). In familiar languages
this zone is usually divided into three areas, a back k-area, a middle t-area,
and a front p-area, Eskimo and Lettish, however, have two k-areas, whose
lines of division do not coincide in the two languages. Eskimo places the
boundary between a uvula and a velar area, Lettisch between a velar and a
vela-palatal area. This, too, might be schematically represented.

Scheme 6-1. The zones of p, t, k area in the segmentation of the expression plane
(adapted from Siertsema 1965, 146)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>p</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>k₁</th>
<th>k₂</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engl.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lett.</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>k₁</td>
<td>k₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esk.</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>k₁</td>
<td>k₂</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As far as the plane of content is concerned, Hjelmslev has illustrated the
difference between matter, substance, and form, on the basis of samples
taken from semantics and morphology. As the most representative, he has
selected some instances of segmenting and naming the color spectrum in
different languages of the world. From the viewpoint of an external ob-
server, the spectrum of colors might be regarded as an objective matter.
The segments of spectrum, however, delimited by the names of appropri-
ate colors constitute the substance of the plane of. However the scope of
names, forming determined semantic fields, by which particular languages
of the world differ one from another, are treated as facts belonging to the
form of the plane of content. In the plane of content, the substance of
words denoting particular colors is a continuum of the length of light
wave; and the form introduced for the purpose of deeming the lexical
oppositions denotes different colors, which characterize an ecologically
determined language. Particular languages transform this continuum into
perceivable and distinct features, being equal as to their number, or differ-
ent in one or another language, once at the same point of the continuum,
one at different points. Again one may utilize the analysis of the color
spectrum exemplified by Berta Siertsema (1965, 145):

… Welsh, for instance, has in its content plane the element ‘glas’, which
covers the English content-element ‘blue’. But it also includes the bluish
green which the English call no longer blue but green, plus the bluish grey
which in English is called ‘gray’; it ‘covers’ part of the English content-
elements ‘grey’ and ‘green’. For the other shades of grey, the brownish
ones, the Welsh have another word” “llwyd”, which also includes,
however, what English is called “brown”. Hjelmslev ([1953, 49]) represents it as in Scheme (2):

**Scheme 6-2. The content plane illustrating the segmentation of colors**
(adapted from Siertsema 1965, 145)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English green</th>
<th>Welsh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>glass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gray</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brown</td>
<td>llwyd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In another kind of exemplification (cf. Dubois et al. 1973), one may also point to the English word *brown* that refers similarly as the French *brun* and *marron* to a certain class of color shade (substance). However, the curving out, which operates on this substance, is not identical with the one that operates on French equivalents, in the way that it has established the existence of two French variables in opposition to singular terms in English.

Pursuing Hjelmslev’s reasoning with respect to the segmentation of matter, one should add that particular languages differ in the plane of content not only by means of entitative signs fulfilling a lexical function but also by means of categorial signs fulfilling a grammatical function. Generally speaking, one can state that particular languages of the world differ typologically from one another under the formal aspect, although the matter can be always the same. This contributes to the fact that there exists a possibility of making interlingual translations and that every language can be passed on from generation to generation in the process of learning *via* cultural transmission.

As one may see, the Hjelmslevian view of sign, inspired by Saussure’s *parole*, resembles the Platonic *logos*, but it reflects also the Aristotelian way of delimiting the substance from the matter through the form. Being a Platonist, Hjelmslev believed that language functions formally unite the
internal mental facts with the external physical facts which men have at their disposal. One may say that both matters, the amorphous mass of thought and the amorphous phonic continuum, are organized by the form of expression, and the form of content into the substance of each plane, i.e., into the substance of expression and the substance of content (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1998, 34–35).

Although Hjelmslev has treated the substance as a part of the matter (the purport) organized by the form, he has spoken in favor of Saussure’s statement that language is a form and not a substance. In opposition to the Prague-School functionalists who have investigated the substance of language as relevant for semantic function, the pupils of Hjelmslev and the adherents of the Copenhagen School are called formalists (cf. Umberto Eco, in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 943–946, and Teresa H. Hołówka in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 937).

Extreme formalism of the Copenhagen School, exposing only the networks of semiotic relations between expression forms and content forms realized in different substances of communicative means, is represented in the works of Sydney MacDonald Lamb (cf. 1984, 78). Lamb interprets the sign as a relation between content and expression or, using Saussure’s terms, between a signifié and a signifiant. But Lamb does not follow Saussure’s depiction of the sign as an object of two sides implying each other, since, as he explains, a sign in particular is often a sign for more than one signifié.

The Form as Mediating Information in Creative Relationships

With reference to the language as a system of values mediating between conceptual and acoustic images, which forms itself in the segmentation of thoughts and sounds by means of signs, it would be good to add (after Wąsik, Z. 1997, 1999, and 2003) the opinion of Simone Weil (1965, 96). The mere fact, according to Weil, that logos has been translated into verbum, indicates that something has been lost, because the logos means, in the first instance, a relation, and for Plato and Pythagoras (of Samos, c. 570–c. 495 B.C.), it has been a synonym of the number. As far as “harmony” means also “mediation”, she would have translated the sentence: “In the beginning was the Word” as: “In the beginning was the Mediacion”.

Applied in the context explaining the beginnings of biological and psychological life, the statement of Weil has been recognized as a cybernetic manifesto by the professor of medical sciences, Jan Trąbka (1983, 213ff). In Trąbka’s view (see Polish quotation in Wąsik, Z. 1997, 134; and 1999, 94, subsequently translated into English 2003, 87; trans. is ours: ZW):

The essence of information consists in the mediation. Through the mediation of information the cells unite themselves in one organ, and the individuals of one species join themselves into one group, in order to form a singular more perfect organism, equipped with new properties, not encountered before, within a singular cell or within a singular individual.

If biological semioticians had spoken—acknowledging the kinship of “logos” with “number”—in favor of the Greek *logos* translated as relation and not as *verbum* denoting a “thing”, they would probably accept the opinion of Trąbka (1983, 214, trans. is ours: ZW) that:

The life begun at that time when two prototypical cells (already detached from their environment and being with it in a dynamic state of equilibrium) initiated a mutual informational contact with each other, when there appeared a mediation between the source-sender and addressee-receiver.

By this acknowledgement of the original understanding of the *logos* as a relationship, respective followers of this assumption would accept as reasonable an approach to language as a pure form from the perspective of connectionist cognitivism. In such a view, it is worthwhile to discuss the changeability of linguistic form both in the substantial realization of text elements along with their systemic arrangements on the axis of time.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Changeability and Variability of Languages in Time and Space

Opening Comments

In accordance with the rules and principles of linguistic historiography, the subject matter of this chapter consists of a short survey of some relevant views on the changeable nature of language resulting from its relation to the passing-time-bound nature of the environment, in which it is spoken and generationally transmitted through education as a means of human communication. These views taking into consideration such semiotic properties of language as conventionality, learnability, and forgetability, aim to popularize some main points of the author’s achievements that come from his earlier works published in subsequent years (Wąsik, Z. 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2003).

Synchrony vs. Diachrony Distinction in the Study of Language

The approach to language as a form, realized substantially in individual acts and products of communicational processes, is connected with the definition of language as a system of pure values, which are determined by nothing other than the arrangement of text elements in a given moment of time (for discussion and important references see Wąsik, Z. 2003). This means, according to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1916 [1959, 80], or 1972 [1983, 80]) suggestion that language as a functional unity should be considered on “the axis of simultaneity” and not on “the axis of succession”. As such, it exists, only as an organized system in the consciousness of its individual speakers/hearers, as members of given communicative communities, and by virtue of this also in the individual acts of speaking and understanding in a synchronic cross section. The individual users of a
language are not interested in the history of its constituents realized in actual utterances, which they utilize as a tool of communication with the aim to evoke the behavior and reactions of their interlocutors, or to express their own feelings and emotional states. From a diachronic perspective, the properties of language are studied mainly by historians and to a lesser degree by those who speak it (cf. Saussure [1959, 79–100], or [1983, 79–98]), since the evolution of language phenomena is a slow process which is rarely perceivable by its users. Each of the levels of language, each structure, or each of its constitutive elements, can have their own separate history. Research into their nature is therefore never ultimately complete. It is rather partial when one takes into account the fact that the particular, simultaneously functioning, elements of the system of a particular language, which exist also in the consciousness of its different users, can be situated on different levels of its development.

Explaining the difference between the synchronic and diachronic description of language, Saussure also takes advantage of the analogy of the chess game. With reference to this metaphor, one can say that a chess player, at a given moment in time when he/she sees the situation of the various chess pieces on the board, is not interested in the fact of what has happened earlier. Yet, he or she takes into consideration simultaneous functional dependencies between them, in order to predict the consequences of their own move, which may cause changes in a given situation.

Synchronic linguistics, which has formed its foundations on the basis of Saussure’s principles, proposes to study only a static aspect of language how it functions at the present time in a taxonomical way. That means, it aims to appreciate the relations between elements of a particular language system, reduced to a certain stage of its development in a state of a relatively functional stability, and to characterize thus the systems of different languages with typological respect of their structural properties. Diachronic linguistics, contrariwise, stresses the temporal succession of changes within language systems. It deals with the changes in an explanatory way based on historical-comparative methods. Having noticed some particular changes within a given system, historians estimate the causes of transformations of whole systems of language, their subsystems and constitutive levels, into new qualitatively different systems, or into new forms of cognate systems constituting the continuation of previous systems and their preceding forms. Hence, in historical linguistics, systemic properties of particular languages are specified in terms of observational statements and compared as empirical data in search of the genesis and development,
separation and unification, continuity, or disappearance, of such structures, which serve the realization of their respective functions.

Evolutional and Conventional Nature of Language Phenomena

Language as an extraorganismic system of verbal means of signification and communication is generationally transmitted through education and participation in culture. Only the speech faculty, which constitutes an intraorganismic property of humans, can be genetically inherited. Therefore, every representative of the species *homo sapiens*, called also *homo animal symbolicum*, can acquire every language, create his or her own linguistic system, or also forget a particular language which they have learned. *Learnability* implies here also *translatability* of every language learned by users as a second, third or fourth, etc., language. *Cultural transmission* through education in a given generational context and *creativity* are connected with the defining characteristics of language, such as *conventionality*. The consequence of conventionality is the formation not only of new languages, but also of mixed languages, or their new functional and stylistic varieties, new expressions and utterances, which have not been heard before in a given language, etc. The conventional nature of language also contributes to interlinguistic contacts of bilingual, or multilingual, speakers, to diglossic situations where different languages, or their different varieties, coexist functionally on the basis of equality, or alternative occurrence.

A prominent place among the representatives of the first view is occupied by Sydney MacDonald Lamb (1991) who defines the subject matter of linguistics as a continuous mental phenomenon, i.e., as a cognitive system to be abstracted from all the individual and composite linguistic systems of the world. For Lamb (1991, 65), however, language in the collective sense is an illusory object. Only individuals, described as “language knowers”, “language doers” and “language users”, are believed to communicate on the basis of verbal signs shared on different levels of social, ethnic, national, or international, organization.

To make Lamb’s monolingualist conception of language more transparent, one has to recall the understanding of general linguistics as the study of language in a holistic perspective as suggested by Hugo Ernst Mario Schuchardt (1842–1927). In his review of Ferdinand de Saussure's
Changeability and Variability of Languages in Time and Space

*Cours de linguistique générale* (1916), this pioneer of pidgin and creole studies has stated, *inter alia*:

> Die ‘allgemeine’ Sprachwissenschaft setzt besondere Sprachwissenschaften voraus, die aber gibt es nicht … die Sprache bildet eine Einheit, ein Kontinuum. … In der Sprache lassen sich keine festen Scheidewände erkennen, ihre verschiedenen Gestaltungen verhalten sich zueinander wie Mundarten [...] General linguistics presupposes particular kinds of linguistics, which do not exist however … Language forms a unity, a continuum. … In the language there are no permanent subdividing walls which can be recognized; its various forms relate to each other in the same way as dialects do] (Schuchardt 1917, 7 [1921/1928, 318]; trans. is ours: ZW).

An opposite view, although similar with reference to “a systemic” point of departure, has been proposed by Eberhard Zwirner (1899–1984) with his multilingualist position towards the formal object of linguistic studies. For Zwirner (1963, 1967), the true essence of empirical studies is comprised only of the “system of languages” to be found in all existing languages of the world. Zwirner’s contention is that linguists are only able to describe variations of languages and to detect invariance in the structures of a language. By drawing conclusions from abstract features of all languages of the world, it is impossible for them to create a new system of verbal signs, which could be utilized as an overall means of communication, and which might stand not only for actual, but also for future languages.

As regards the relationship between a language and its individual speaker/listener, it is of crucial importance to contrast the theory of *Integrational Linguistics* developed by Hans-Heinrich Lieb (1936–) with Lamb’s conception of *Language and Illusion*. These two views about language overlap, as a matter of fact, with reference to the notion of the idiolect understood as an individual communicative means, or as an individual linguistic system.

There is also a link uniting Zwirner’s methodological assumptions and Lieb’s conviction that “a theory of language is a theory about languages”, where the domain of linguistic studies is to be specified as a compositional set covering all natural languages (Lieb 1983, 15). In asserting that his theory refers to “all actual languages whether past, present or future”, Lieb (1983, 19) puts his outline of the concept of “natural language” in relation to both a given historical language from its inception to its (possible) extinction, and also to periods of historical languages. In such a context, Lieb rejects the assumption of post-Saussurean linguistics that natural lan-
guages are to be reduced to “stages” and stages to be identified with “sys-
tems”. Instead, he suggests that language variability should be encom-
passed in terms of synchrony and diachrony within the boundaries of an
integrated domain of linguistic studies. Consequently, it seems indispen-
sable to Lieb that a theory of language should be relatable to actual speak-
ers as they exist in space and time within a given society, i.e., linguists
should be aware of the way in which “a language” is related to its use
(Lieb 1983, 22). However, this set of individual means must be consid-
ered, in Lieb’s view, as belonging to a particular language. Thus, as he
states (Lieb 1983, 23):

A means of communication that is an element of a language is to be
homogeneous relative to the varieties of the language: only in its entirety
can it belong to any given variety. It may well belong to several varieties
simultaneously, to a regional dialect, sociolect, style of speech, etc.

Practitioners of linguistics, giving credence to the source material collect-
ed from actual speakers, should pay attention to the fact that an individual
language user may also develop his or her own sub-variety of communica-
tive means, “during the entire time of his or her existence” (Lieb 1983,
23). They should also become aware of the possibility that this personal
language in question can simultaneously, or interchangeably, adhere not
only to one or more varieties of one and the same language, but also to the
varieties of two or more (both neighboring or distant) languages. This
necessitates their taking into account both mixed and non-standardized
varieties of languages as well as the inconsistency of individual speakers.

It is noticeable that both Lieb and Lamb propose to study idiolects as
individual realizations of language in general, or languages in particular,
without restricting them to stages and periods of time. However, they
differ in their understanding of the notion of “language as a whole”. Lieb
assumes the existence of “a language in particular” as countable unity of
varieties distinguished by characteristic properties whereas Lamb believes
that there is only one “language in general”, which constitutes itself an
uncountable entity common to all human beings in the world.

Both authors, Lieb and Lamb, acknowledge the communicative means
of a speaker as directly accessible to linguistic observations, but they stress
different aspects. Lieb does not see any difference between individual
means of communication and idiolects in the traditional sense, specifying
them as sets of abstract texts consisting of form and meaning. For Lamb,
in turn, “the texts themselves are not the objects of investigation but clues
to the nature of an underlying system which is not directly observable” (Lamb 1991, 60).

To avoid confusion with the commonly understood term “idiolect system”, Lamb has preferred to call the cognitive system located in the mind of an individual speaker a “linguistic idiosystem”. Moreover, the texts processed by the individual speaker in question, are to be treated as an idiolect “extension” of an individual human being (Lamb 1991, 62).

Lamb’s solipsist assumption about the mental existence mode of the linguistic system (i.e., located in the mind of speaking individuals) might be confronted with the manifesto on the psychological nature of language, summarized by Andrzej Gawroński (1885–1927) during the interwar period, as follows:

(1) Language is a phonic and articulated form of the psychic interior of an individual, and, as a medium expressing human mind, it may be compared to the fine arts;

(2) The psychic interior consists both of intellectual elements related to the senses of words, to their notional representations, and of emotional elements evoked by extralinguistic facts and/or language forms;

(3) All changes in a language correspond to changes in the mind, but not all changes in the mind have to be reflected in a language;

(4) Language, as a lifeless form of a living psychical interior, adapted by an individual to his/her needs, is always in arrears in its development in relation to the development of human intelligence when it is relatively constant as a means of communication;

(5) Communication, as a social factor, is subjected to the automatization of human habits, whereas language, as a personal matter, is dependent, with respect to the possibilities of changes, upon the will of an individual striving for the deautomatization of habits;

(6) Social language does not exist at all; in the same way as there is neither a collective spirit nor collective intelligence, and such notions are a kind of fiction based on the content of communication (see Gawroński 1927; quoted and trans. by Wąsik, Z. 1999a, 175).

To come closer to the subject matter of our discussion, it is worthwhile to recall some traditional approaches to the notion of idiolect, as summarized by Els Oksaar (1987, 293–97). It was Bernard Bloch (1907–1965) who has introduced the term idiolect to the domain of structural linguistics, referring to “the totality of all possible expressions of a single speaker at a
given single time, who uses a determined language to become integrated with another speaker” (Bloch 1948, 7). Both the proprietorship of a language and the mode of expression in a language included in this definition imply that *idiolect* characterizes also single speakers. They can, according to Bloch, possess different dialects within different life spans and, indeed, both one and two, or more, idiolects at the same time.

In a narrower sense, Charles Francis Hockett (1916–2000) has defined the idiolect as “the total set of speech habits of a single person at a given time” (1958/1959, 321), or as an individual realization of the language system. To be added here is also the view of André Martinet (1908–1999):

> [I]f a linguistic description has to be consistent, it must be that of an idiolect, i.e., the language as spoken by a single individual. But does this not contradict our assumption that language is above all an instrument of communication? … we cannot be satisfied with limiting our observation to one single individual, since that individual will not handle his language tomorrow in exactly the same way as he does or did the day before. The idiolect, as a frame of linguistic description, needs to be precisely dated (Martinet 1962, 105–106).

What's more, the term *idiolect* is understood here also as connoting the totality of language-distinguishing peculiarities of a social, professional, regional, or psychophysical, nature of an individual, as one can gather from the following explanatory remarks.

The term *idiolect* has been introduced to describe individual usages. Two main aspects of the idiolect concern the linguist, namely the use of *register* and *style*. *Style* is a variation with reference to the interpersonal tension between speaker and listener, ranging from the most formal, e.g., in reading a list of minimal pairs, to the most spontaneous, as in familiar discourse. *Register* covers variations conditioned by the social context, e.g., the register of the lawyer in the courtroom, which contrasts with registers appropriate to the club, or domestic environment. All idiolects thus select from a potential range of style and register in a given communicative community, and it is this selection between categories of variety which—in addition to idiosyncratic habits of pronunciation—marks the speech of an individual speaker in a dialect-speaking community (cf. Meetham & Hudson 1969, 242–43).

Since this personal language is attached not only to one or more varieties of the same language but also to a group of languages, one has to consider the incidence of mixed and non-standardized versions of vernacu-
lars and the occurrence rate of their inconsistent speakers, following the opinion of Norbert Reiter (1928–2009). Therefore, personal language should be confronted with the traditional notion of “idiolect” as an individual set and that of “sociolect” as an inter-individual set of communicative means, which are directly accessible to linguistic observations.

To dispense with the term *idiolect*, Reiter (1986) proposes the expression *der individuelle Zeichenbestand* (‘the individual sign reservoir’). This kind of an individual language is to be specified as „die Gesamtheit aller sprachlichen Zeichen, die ein Individuum zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt weiß‘ (‘the totality of all linguistic signs which an individual knows at a given point in time’, Reiter 1986, 142; trans. is ours: ZW).

As Reiter maintains, speech communication occurs only then when there is a correspondence between the sign reservoirs of two individuals. The individual sign reservoirs, in turn, which correspond to each other in the knowledge of two individuals, are labeled by Reiter as *das interindividuelle Zeicheninventar* (‘the interindividual sign inventory’). And progress in interindividual communication on the social level might be achieved, in Reiter’s view, through the aggregation of sign knowers into an organized whole, where the number of interlocutors (inter-actors) happens to be transformed from a dyad into a “pleiad” (cf. 1986” 149).

**Multilingualism and Variability of Languages as a Historical Fact**

From the viewpoint of their systemic properties, in accordance with the claim of Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson (1989, 450–457), languages, created for the needs of individuals and requirements of communities as a tool for mutual understanding, should be treated as equal in right. However, with regard to their external environments, called by sociologists of language ecological properties, languages appear to be unequal, and the degree of their inequality can differ. They can have a status of an international means of communication, or they can be classified according to the number of speakers and domains of importance when they are used not at all times and not at all places as languages with universal *lexis*. Therefore, multilingualism, major and small languages of the world, and language majorities and minorities have to be considered as issues which should be discussed in the light of the neighboring disciplines of linguistics.
Chapter Seven

The variability of languages in time and space, which is perceived as a barrier of communication in the functional environment of the major languages of the world, occupies a stable place in the application of knowledge derived from linguistics and non-linguistic sciences of language. This knowledge is particularly relevant for disciplines that are interested in the optimization of language-in-use in the process of its acquisition, or in the planning of vehicular languages for the purposes of interethnic and international communication, as well as language politics and language policy making.

As an investigative problem, the existence of multiple languages in the world is the concern of foreign language teachers, lexicographers, and specialists for the codification of languages not possessing their own alphabet, interpreters of foreign literature, communication engineers, missionaries, librarians cataloging alphabetically and systematically books and periodicals published in particular languages, neurophysiologists examining the brain of bilinguals or multilinguals, and others. They all have to know how far human language, as an overall phenomenon, is dependent on its heteronomies. In particular, they should question how particular varieties of interindividual verbal signs, which unify certain groups while separating them from others, autonomize themselves ontologically in their structures and functions as independent semiotic systems, becoming relatively resistant to the influence of their individual users.

Trying to explain the sources of multilingualism in the world, practitioners of language sciences may be also interested to answer questions regarding the origin of the language faculty as an “anthropolectic” category, as well as examining the direction of development, separation or differentiation, uniformization or unification of language varieties. These and other questions regarding monogenesis or polygenesis of various linguistic systems depend not only upon the possibilities of comparative historical linguistics but also upon cooperation between linguistics, the non-linguistic sciences of language and their adjacent disciplines.

Within the domain of language sciences, there are also investigative problems, which are connected with the existence of inequalities among communicative communities. Such problems raised in the context of multilingualism, however, which result from the conventional nature of language, do not belong to the subject matter of linguistics, since it is not only linguists who can resolve them.

For those who pursue the very nature of multilingualism, it is important to ask on what level of interpersonal communication the shared
systems of verbal signs are to be described as separate languages. The merry fact that the boundaries between neighboring languages and dialects are indistinct, especially when not only the systemic but also the ecological criteria are pondered, gives rise to the problem of a general definition of language. Nevertheless, one cannot agree with the statement according to which every linguistic system created by humans for the purposes of communication can be called a language, because it possesses certain properties common to all known and described languages of the world. In such a case, multilingualism would be seen (in the estimation of Wąsik, Z. 2003, 52) as appearing even on the level of idiolects, and going further, on the level of sociolects, dialects, ethnolects or natiolects, and polylects.

Systemic properties of particular languages are determined mainly on the basis of their lexical-grammatical distinctiveness both on the evolutionary genetic and the structural-functional levels. A language might be considered as structurally developed when its subsystems—phonological, morphological, syntactic, and lexical—form together a complex unity differing in particular from the subsystems of genetically related languages. This differentiation, observed in the partial subsystems, is characteristic of varieties of the same language, or for the mixed languages.

One can notice (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 52) that some varieties of the same language differ from others only with regard either to the realization of pronunciation or to the application of certain grammatical rules, or certainly to the usage of lexical, or stylistic, registers. There are cases, known from the domain of interlingual contacts where, within the system of a language constituting a substructure of the so-called substrate language, only the sound system remains, and grammar and vocabulary are adopted from another superposed language. It happens also that the borrowing language retains its original phonetic and morphological-syntactic structure, dispensing only with its own vocabulary.

Researchers who deal with dialectology are aware of the fact that due to contacts and parallel developments the majority of particular languages appear as separate communicational systems being more, or less, mixed in the domain of phonetics and lexis. One should also add that the criterion of structural distinctness is not a sufficient and ultimate condition for determining a certain set of communicative means, shared by a particular ethnic, or national, community, as a separate language. Systems, which are genetically cognate and structurally related, can become separate languages when they have developed themselves to such an extent that they possess a separate ecology. Among them one may find such similar lan-
guages which are utilized by different speech communities in a separate
territory, or which have been codified in another way and possess various
realizations of spoken texts in writing in all domains of social life.

In the context of the opposition between system and ecology (of a lan-
guage), one should bear in mind also that the ecological properties, i.e.,
demographic, geographical and political can have an impact on the sys-
temic differentiation of languages and their varieties (for references see
Wąsik, Z. 2003, 52). Different varieties of a particular language, as a sys-
tem, depend not only on the differentiation of users but also on the situa-
tions, and communicational requirements of speech communities as well
as on the domains of communication.

The entirety, for example, of territorial, social and functional variants
of a language, which is used as a historically formed means of communi-
cation by a nation, is called a natiolect, or in the terminology of everyday
life—a national language. However, the term *ethnolect* is referred rather to
an ethnic group, called also a nationality group, or a national minority,
which in a given territory, using its own language, has not achieved yet
these historically motivated political laws to which another national group

The bearers of a minority language who live within a larger national
group inhabiting a certain territory, being bound by a common past and
culture, and possessing also shared political views and economic interests,
are treated as an ethnic group. The term *ethnic* pertains to a people sharing
a common and distinctive culture, religion, language, etc., especially a group
that is a minority within a larger society. From the perspective of historical
studies, speech communities forming nationality groups are divided into
native ethnic groups, i.e., descending from local ancestors and influx
groups coming from other ethnic territories, i.e., originating from migra-
tions of peoples.

Minority languages are the languages of ethnic minorities who do not
possess their own statehood within the territory of a given state, and who
manifest their feeling of ethnic separateness and will to persist by means
of cultivating their own language (and often cultural traditions, or religious
beliefs). In cases, where a language is, in the first instance, an integrating
factor, and serves as a means of group identity separating it from the rest
of population within a certain society, one can speak about linguistic mi-
norities (for reference see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 53). For some practitioners of
linguistics, minorities constitute folk groups utilizing a native language
other than the language of the state, or the language of official communi-
cation utilized by the majority in the whole country (for references and discussion see Wąsik, E. 1999, 21).

With reference to a variety spoken in a smaller, or larger, region, one applies also the term dialect, denoting a vernacular. Sometimes, these two terms—dialect and vernacular—are understood as synonyms. Sometimes, the term vernacular is used as a hyponym of the term dialect, i.e., denoting a subcategory of a more general class, and dialect, alternately, as a hyperonym, i.e., denoting a general class under which a set of vernaculars is subsumed. In turn, by using the name vernacular, one means such a variety of a spoken language, which is bound to a speech community of a given environ. Vernaculars distinguishing themselves against the background of other varieties by certain systemic rules constitute an intermediate level as the core, on which national languages develop. To stress the existence of commonalties between the features of certain groups of local vernaculars, i.e., not only for the purposes of naming any variety of a national language, one uses the term dialect as a superordinate term.

_Dialect_ is a variety of a determined language which distinguishes itself from other varieties by features of phonology, grammar, and vocabulary, and by its use by a group of speakers set apart from others geographically or socially. Linguists define as a dialect sometimes a provincial, rural, or socially distinct, variety of a language that differs from the standard language, especially when considered as a nonstandard, or special, variety of a language—the literary dialect. In historical linguistics, the name _dialect_ refers also to a determined language considered as one of a group that have a common ancestor (in Greek _diálektos_ means ‘discourse, language, dialect’; as a noun it is derivative of _dialégesthai_ ‘to converse’ cf. _dia- + légein_ ‘to speak’). A vernacular is considered here as a native, or indigenous, language, as opposed to a non-naturally learned one, used by ordinary people in everyday communication (respecting the etymology of Latin _vernacul lus_/i.e., ‘household’, ‘domestic’ or ‘native’, akin to _verna_, meaning ‘a slave born in the master's household’ (cf. Random House 1992/1995/1997. _Webster’s College Dictionary_).

The terms _natiolect_ and _dialect_ do not exclude each other in such a case when they are referred to linguistic systems, which do not distinguish themselves in their inherent properties, but which separate themselves from each other with respect to their ecological conditionings. Such a situation occurs, for example, when nationality, culture, religion, writing, or political systems distinguish their users, etc.
Along with dialects and vernaculars, which constitute the property of selected social groups that distinguish themselves from other groups though the same variety of a common language, to be mentioned also are sociolects (for details see Wąsik, Z. 1997, 21), being the result of tendencies for diminishing any kind of differences in the social domains of communication. The term sociolect covers all subordinated varieties of language, used by certain groups of interest, levels and social classes, which differ in principle from the other varieties as regards the lexical system. In the context of such particular sociolectal variants, one should name also, among others, jargon and slang (called in French argot). Among stylistic varieties, or functional styles, to be enumerated also are informal registers.

Scholars who deal with the sociology of language usually designate as a register such a variety, which is typically used in a specific kind of communicational setting. The name jargon connotes, in a positive sense, the vocabulary of specialists, i.e., a professional terminology avoiding, in a purposeful way, universal understanding, and in a negative sense, the spoken variety of language with a lower degree of codification. By jargon, one understands especially the vocabulary, peculiar to a particular trade, profession, or group: medical jargon, or unintelligible talk or writing; gibberish; babble, and sometimes a kind of language use that is characterized by an uncommon, or pretentious, vocabulary, and convoluted syntax and is often vague in connotative meaning. To jargoneize exactly means ‘to utter with a gargling sound’, ‘to gargle’, ‘rattle the throat’ (cf. Random House 1992/1995/1997. Webster’s College Dictionary).

The lowest place in the hierarchy of sociolects is occupied by varieties, which do not belong to the standard language. Being artificially created by certain social groups, they are meant to deceive the environment with distorted meanings of words and expressions. Along with them, practitioners of language sciences use also such terms as slang or jargon, or names, which refer misleadingly to the varieties of a higher order, namely as a synonym of dialects, e.g., the dialect of thieves, of pupils, of criminals. Slang is a very informal usage of vocabulary and idiom that is characteristically more metaphorical, playful, elliptical, vivid, and ephemeral than ordinary language. As slang one considers, in the colloquial terminology, a kind of speech, or writing, characterized by the use of vulgar or socially taboo, vocabulary, and idiomatic expressions.

The term jargon when referred to a particular usage of professionals, etc., or the special vocabulary of thieves, vagabonds, and the like, is also considered as a synonym of argot or cant. Argot connotes a specialized
vocabulary peculiar to a particular group of people, devised for private communication and identification: thieves, or the special vocabulary and idiom of a particular profession, or social group. In the same context, 

cant

is taken also as a private language variety of the underworld, or the words and phrases characterizing a particular class, or profession.

Practically, one cannot reject the situation in which a determined language, recognized by linguists as a separate system of signification, has, at a given moment in time, only one speaker who uses it in intrapersonal communication being both sender and receiver. There are also cases when it may be used only in small group communication by local collectivities dispersed in different parts of the country, or by those who live in diaspora on different continents, while functioning in symbiosis with other speech communities within the domain of public and mass communication.

Since multilingualism is an accomplished historical fact not to be altered by legal acts, or scientific declarations, linguists are not willing to accept such an extreme claim (cf. Schuchardt 1928, 318), according to which the language as a whole manifests itself in the form of a continuum in the collective sense. The language as a oneness—constituting the totality of all linguistic systems of the world common for all people on the human planet (cf. Lamb 1991, 65)—should be therefore relegated to scientific hypotheses. If not, they would then be obliged to treat particular verbal systems encountered in the world of humans as textual extensions of the same language. Accordingly, its varieties, which have the same definitional properties as linguistic systems, would be distributed on different levels of interpersonal communication between all people of the world, such as linguistic idiosystems, linguistic sociosystems, linguistic diasystems, and, furthermore, linguistic ethnosystems, linguistic natosystems, or even linguistic polysystems.

Linguistic discussions on the development of languages and their varieties were initiated in 19th century within the framework of comparativism. That determined languages were related genetically in the form of language families had brought the founding fathers of comparative grammar (Friedrich Karl Wilhelm Schlegel, 1772–1829, Franz Bopp, 1791–1867, Jakob Ludwig Karl Grimm, 1785–1863) to the idea that parental languages could be reconstructed. The objectives of such genetic-evolutional studies, conducted, inter alia by August Schleicher (1821–1868) and Johannes Schmidt (1843–1901), were expressed predominantly in the systematization of the principles of language change, or in the explanation of the directions of their development. Afterwards, the discover-
ties of linguistic geography, started by Georg Wenker (1852–1911), and continued by Jules Gilliéron (1854–1926); contributed to the recognition of the mixed character of languages in the report of Hugo Schuchardt (1917). As a result of revised findings of the late Neogrammarians (Karl Brugmann, 1849–1919, and Paul Kretschmer, 1866–1956), an entirely new view was approved that the so-called reconstruction was rather to be seen as a theoretical construction of languages which never occurred in reality, as noticed by Hanns Oertel (1868–1952) in a book on general linguistics with a historical orientation (cf. Oertel 1901, 128). Accordingly, at least four assumptions about potential directions in the evolution of languages characterized the epistemological formation of comparative linguistics, where homogeneous passive language users turned to active heterogeneous language doers:

— from a homogeneous means of verbal signification and communication, which initially served a uniform intercourse community, to corrupted vernaculars, which started to fulfill communicational requirements of differentiating dyadic, or small-group, linguistic collectivities and linguistic communities;

— from an accomplished arena of hitherto heterogeneous linguistic varieties to a mixed form of the first degenerating and then homogenized means of verbal signification and communication;

— from naturally pure varieties of local vernaculars to artificially cultivated linguistic systems, which subsequently became unified on individual, group-specific, regional, ethnic, national and international levels on the basis of social sanctions being imposed on communicating individuals through conventions;

— from ephemeral and domestic ways of individual speaking and regional idioms to shared means of verbal communication on each level of the social stratification of interacting linguistic collectivities and linguistic communities.

In typological linguistics, the conviction that particular languages should be treated with respect to their internal and external properties shifted in the direction of the statement that they could simultaneously belong to various structural types. Instead of concerning themselves with typological constructs of language systems, linguists (for details see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 57) proposed to elaborate typological matrices of systemic properties of languages, their elements and structures. Besides, the interest in differ-
ences and similarities between linguistic systems evolved into investigations of functional convergence and divergences, which could be found in the structure of the languages of the world. This objective was achieved, in the first instance, through the elaboration of partial studies on the typology of linguistic categories, entities, units and constructions, as in the case of the typology of future forms, of passives, of modality, of reflexives, of questions, etc. In the meantime, typological comparative studies were replaced by contrastive studies, which along with the search for language universals (conducted by Joseph Harold Greenberg (1916–2001), cf. his 1963/1966 position) and partial typologies of language phenomena were conducted for the purposes not only of linguistics proper but also other neighboring disciplines of language studies.

**Summarizing Statements**

To sum up the debate on the object of linguistic studies, it is advisable to consider the following ascertainments (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1996, 35–56):

1. The boundaries between multilingualism and monolingualism can be overcome, if one extends the scope of language variability from a language in particular into language in general, assuming that “a variety of a language is to be a subset of the language” (Lieb 1983, 22);
2. Particular varieties of an overall set of communicative means, which are organized at different levels of social stratification, can be regarded as separate linguistic systems as far as they possess the same definitional properties;
3. Individuals knowing several linguistic varieties must have at their disposal a core of shared means, which enables them to communicate at regional, ethnic, national as well as international levels;
4. The formation of a linguistic idiosystem in language contact situations depends not only upon the activity of a single bilingual, or multilingual, subject, but is also a continuous and gradual development of communicational abilities in an individual achieved through the exchange of verbal signs with other individuals;
5. In the same way as it is impossible to create an overall language from all languages of the world, one cannot believe in the formation of a particular language from the totality of its idiolects when there is no standard variety possessing a relative autonomy from its users.
CHAPTER EIGHT

The Wording of the World
as a Semiotic Trace of Humanity

Semiotic Substantiation of the Theme

The subject matter of this chapter (based on Wąsik 2010c having been popularized in 2014) constitutes a methodological survey of conditionings in which the word as a meaning carrier of humans becomes a trace of their creative and interpretive activity in interpersonal communication. Referring to the terms exposed in the title, the notion of “wording” is derived from the pragmatics human communication doing things with words, and the notion of the “trace” is specified against the functional classification of semiotic objects. What is characteristic of traces is that, originating in the source, or being produced by source agents, they do not need to be present when they are received and/or interpreted by their target agents.

As regards the wording as a trace of human activity, one has to consider, on the one hand, the metamorphoses of human universe resulting from the linguistic and communicative performances of social groupings, and on the other, the changes taking place in the environments of human individuals on a uniquely personal level. Investigating the changes in the life-world of man, one can notice the following two trace-leaving processes that come into being: (1) “the wording of the world” due to the naming and terminological ordering of objects and states of affairs, and, (2) the objectification of language where its speakers know “how to do things with words”.

Considering the subjective changes in the performance of communicating selves, one may utilize the theory of “memes” according to which the word might be interpreted as an indicator of borrowed or inherited features from one language into another, or as an exponent of human preferences in the creation of new meaning carriers that minimize their communicational effort. Linguistic performances of people provide evidence for their immersion in the general knowledge and cultural heritage of hu-
humanity, being especially visible in literary works and/or in interlingual translations. Likewise, the preceptor-oriented studies may reveal the traces left by particular authors as a source of inspiration in the case when they are anonymous or intentionally omitted.

Specifying the Notional Scopes of *Word* and *Trace*

Before specifying the subject matter of this study, it is indispensable to explain the notional contents of the two terms *word* and *trace*, specifically exposed in the title of its presentation. The notion of the word will be deduced from the connotation of a name denoting the object of philological studies, and the notion of the trace will be highlighted against the classification of semiotic objects. Both the word, as an investigative object, and the trace, as an investigative perspective, are referred at this point to the results of the linguistic-communicational activity of humans, as an investigative domain.

The point of departure, namely the “word”, is connected here with the Greek *lógos*, the second part of the names *philology* and *philologist*. The former one, *philology*, denotes a specific field of scientific activity and a specific subject of institutional teaching, and the latter, *philologist*, a particular specialist performing a certain role in science and education. Descended from the Latin *philologus*, subsequent to the Greek *philologos*, “philologist” means ‘the lover of the word’, where the form *philo-*-, from the Greek *philos*, connotes the sense ‘loving’, ‘treating with love’, or just ‘taking care of’. Likewise, ‘the love for the word’, as the object of philological studies, is a devotion to the study of texts primarily spoken and secondarily written. Relevant is that *lógos* might be rendered as “word”, “speech” and/or “discourse”, regarding its derivation from the Greek verb *légein* denoting ‘to choose’, ‘to collect’, ‘to speak’, and, what is more, even as “proportion”, or “relation”, understood in the ancient philosophy as the notional principle which governs the order of universe. To be added is also that *lógos* was rendered in Christian theology as *Word* denoting the second person of the Holy Trinity, i.e., the Word of God, the light and the source of life, embodied in Jesus Christ (cf. Random House 1992/1995/1997. *Webster’s College Dictionary*).

The understanding of the “trace” in the following approach to the properties of the word might be explained from the viewpoint of things which fulfill a substitutive function with respect to other things for the
sake of their makers or utilizers. In the first instance, the trace can be evaluated in terms of semiotic objects distinguished as a mark (Gk *semeion*, i.e., an indicating sign), a name (Gk *ónama*, i.e., a verbal designation of things, persons, places, states, phenomena, etc.), and a symbol (Gk *symbolon*, i.e., a token of an object broken into two parts, which means only when it is reunited with another token into a single entity; a token of identity verified by comparing its other half; cf. Gk. *symballein* ‘to bring/put/throw together’, e.g., ‘a contract’). In the second, the position of traces is to be considered, within the framework of associated stimuli or implicational phenomena, as indices (or indexes), symptoms, signals, appeals, symbols, icons (pictorial or mimetic symbols), as well as non-motivated verbal signs forming the modes and means of human understanding (see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 96–98; 2014, 114). In the third, the quality of the verbal sign as a trace might be also exhibited against the background of various representations of reality, as, for example, reflection (mirroring), photography, picture (painting), model, scheme, map, including replicas, and the like.

The traces as tokens or types of natural and cultural objects are considered as possessing, within the boundaries of communicational reality of humans, both the features of non-motivated and motivated, non-intentional and intentional, non-artificial and artificial, non-teleological and teleological phenomena and states of affair being created involuntary or voluntary, without or with an aim-in-view, etc. What appears to be an essential property of traces is their “translocation in time and space”, that is, when they are received and/or interpreted by their target or destination agents (as recipients, addressees, and the like), the source agents of their origin (as authors or spokesmen, as senders or emitters) do not need to be present at a particular moment or place. Thus, traces constitute material objects representing something that exists immaterially when they are perceived. By saying that the traces make present what is absent here/there and now/then, it is meant that their implied objects, or domains of reference, belong to the inferential extrasemiotic reality.

With reference to its main theme, the focal point of this chapter is to answer how the humans contribute to metamorphoses of the world through the word as a means of signification and communication. It departs from an assumption that the word as a property of its creators is changeable by nature when considered in terms of a meaning-creating activity in opposition to a meaning-carrying fact. Therefore, the subject matter of this trace-related study constitutes a typology of verbal meaning carriers to be observed in products resulting from the species-specific behavior of people
who create and interpret the universe of meanings as communicating individuals and participants in interpersonal communication. To be more precise, its principal interest sphere pertains to conditions under which the words might be treated as vestiges of humans’ communicational customs, assuming that the basic function of language is to form interpersonal and intersubjective communities of speakers and receivers who send and receive, produce and understand messages in a similar way. These conditions of word-processing acts, as, for example, inherent and relational properties of language in use, constitute, in one dimension, the levels of particular linguistic systems and, in another dimension, the domains of human life in which they function as a means of communication.

**Communicational Conditionings of Trace-Leaving Processes**

Studying the word as a trace of humanity, a practitioner of semiotic studies might be interested, in general, to learn how human universe changes its nature as a result of linguistic activity of social groupings on ethnic or national, regional or professional, global or local levels, and, in particular, to make a survey of changes that take place in the environments of human individuals when they communicate on a uniquely personal level.

In the semiotics of human communication, there are two trace-leaving processes that come into being, firstly, “the wording of the world” as a consequence of nomination and terminological subsumption of objects (things and states of affairs) and, secondly, through the objectification of language assuming that its users realize “how to do things with words”. Anybody who distinguishes between a folk and scientific nature of experience can notice that the names given to objects on the basis of their conventional usage and arbitrary choice are not identical with the names grounded on the acceptance of classificatory or typological principles. It is especially visible when one confronts, for example, the names of kinship or colors in everyday life with the names of species in botany or zoology. Similarly, anybody who belongs to a community of knowers or believers may easily understand the difference between a referential value of utterances or expressions that predicate about ordinary facts or nominate the domains of human life in time and space (for example, places, times, events, towns, rivers, cities, etc.) and a binding force of utterances or expressions that perform the new types of social facts (for example, official
documents, marriage contracts, oaths, curses, bets, legal verdicts, and the like). Correspondingly, the traces of personal activity based on the expressive and impressive functions of verbal means in interpersonal communication are to be confronted with the cultural and social traces of typical human activities (as, for example, commemorative inscriptions on rocks or trees, stones or tables in churches, cemeteries, graves or even houses in which renowned personalities used to live or make a stopover).

Taking into account, furthermore, the theory of memes, the word might be interpreted as an indicator of borrowed or inherited features of language. Under the term *meme*, philosophers of mind understand any nonverbal and verbal product or behavior of humans that can be transferred from individuals to individuals, from groups to groups, from generations to generations by imitation or learning, both in a conscious and unconscious way. Among memes, one can enumerate not only observable practices, habits, or fashions, either in technology or cultural customs, like poems, songs or dances, and the like, but also intersubjective beliefs, attitudes, convictions, emotions, and the knowledge that stay behind them in mental spaces of communicating individuals, as, for example, ideas and concepts, propositional contents and theories that unite people referring to the same intersubjective experience when they communicate. In speech, memes are seen as disseminating themselves in broadcast messages through a social-semiotic sphere of chains and aggregations of communicators in the same manner as infectious diseases.

Speech can be interpreted as providing evidence for preferences and motivations in the formation processes of vocabulary and grammar. The same statement refers to lexical borrowings, cultural transfers of products along with their names, variability and changeability of languages, the phenomena of linguistic substrates, superstrates, or adstrates, as well as linguistic interferences occurring as mental transfers of native structures in language contact situations. The terms *substrate* and *superstrate* stand for the contact relationships between the language of invaders and the language of indigenous population. A substrate situation occurs when the language of invaders places itself upon the language of indigenous population in view of that it has a greater prestige even though some features still remain in the core or periphery of the language as traces of the previous indigenous structures.

The *superstrate* situation takes place when the language of local populations absorbs only some marginal features of a superimposed language because of the minor prestige of invaders. Superstratal traces may be
found in the speaking habits of indigenous peoples first and foremost in the pronunciation or vocabulary. As parallel to *substrate* and *superstrate*, linguists have also coined the term *adstrate* to describe mutual influences between languages spoken on the territories inhabited by neighboring populations. Thus, one could find the traces of grammatical and lexical properties in the structure of adjacent languages or their dialects.

While cultural transfers are outcomes of collective intercourses and borrowings, interferences have a solipsistic character, as far as they occur in mental spaces of individuals. Linguistic interferences in the mind of foreign-language learners are based on the reduction of image schemata, composed of concepts and sound patterns, to their equivalents from a native language previously acquired in a natural way. In short, interference can be described as an influence of the patterns of a native language upon the patterns which are processed mentally and physiologically in a foreign language. Linguistic interferences may be considered in terms of positive or negative transfers. The latter is the source of errors in the acquisition of a foreign language, affecting, for example, patterns of pronunciation, word formation, inflectional morphology, and phrase or sentence structures. One should stress, however, that a verbal interference takes place not in the system of a language but in the text-processing activities of communicating individuals who transfer mental patterns of meaning carriers and their interpretations as meaning bearers from the knowledge of one language to the realization of another, from the discursive patterns of one language to the discursive practices of another one. As a matter of fact, there are several links between members of different groups where the word mediates in such transactions as face-to-face communication, written correspondence, commercial trades, commodity exchanges, sexual coupling and transportation traffic.

Exposing, therefore, the social nature of communicative communities where conversation, talk, colloquy and parley dominate, one has to distinguish between speech communities, intercourse communities, called in German *Verkehrsgemeinschaften* or *kommunikative Gemeinschaften*, and discursive communities. Linguistically inclined studies expose speech relations among communicators as attributed by system-specific properties of a particular language. However, the rise and existence of *Verkehrsgemeinschaften* are determined by extra-systemic properties of different languages, their standards, dialects and varieties, the speakers of which are engaged in various conjugal intercourses, as industrial, technological, religious, cultural, political, and/or matrimonial ones. As to the discursive (discourse-
based) communities, their nature depends on the realization of communicational tasks in various domains of social life realized among representatives speaking the same language at a national level or different languages at an international level. Their existence is determined by certain types of texts or text-formation activities of communication participants embedded into their roles played in society and culture. Thus, as to the usage of words, communicating individuals in speech communities are united, and in discursive communities they are divided according to their group membership.

The word as a trace may exhibit the tendencies of minimizing the communicational effort of speakers that result in the reduction of sounds or omission of frequently realized lexical items, due to the principle of redundancy. In the case of individual speakers, the spoken (or written) word may sometimes be recognized or serve also as an exponent of their social, professional, regional or ethnic identity. More detailed issues, which deserve to be exposed here, are inborn aptitudes and capabilities of human individuals to acquire a determined language, to be bilingual or multilingual.

Not to be forgotten are also the cases of language attrition (when the number of speakers diminishes), negative or positive transfer of lexical elements in the expression plane and the content plane (when the contact situations occur between language speakers and listeners who belong to different cultures). Linguistic performance of individuals may be studied as evidence of their competence and immersion in the generally available knowledge and cultural heritage. Moreover, the word is not only a trace of human abilities in creating artistic poetry or prose, it might be also considered as a clue to the understanding of how the general mind works in which the minds of particular individuals are embedded.

Investigative Implications and Assumptions

To propose the domains of linguistic inquiries, one should add that the word is to be seen not only as an expression of intimate spirituality of human individuals but also as a trace of intercourse communities to which they belong. The esthetics and style of the word as reflecting the cultural tradition of humankind are also relevant for consideration. Their traces are especially visible in literary works, in translations from a determined language into other languages, in the choice of expressive and/or impressive means. Sometimes the preceptor-oriented studies may reveal the traces left
by other authors as a result of inspiration source or even plagiarism. To describe the nature of intertextuality, in postmodernist approaches to literary texts of secondary degree, where their author is declared “to be dead” in terms of “the archeology of knowledge”\(^\text{24}\), or in which the source of their origin or inspiration is not documented or intentionally omitted, like forgeries, fakes, falsifications, imitations, and the like, the term \textit{palimpsest} has been used.\(^\text{25}\) According to an antique or mediaeval usage \textit{palimpsest} refers to a parchment (i.e., the skin of sheep, goats, or other animals prepared as the leather for writing on), or another kind of material from which the original writing has been partially or completely erased or scraped to make room for another kind of writing.\(^\text{26}\) Known from the 17th century in English the nominal form \textit{palimpsest} along with its adjectival form \textit{palimpsestic} is usually specified as a novel text written by hand on materials from which one can see traces of another earlier handwritten text.\(^\text{27}\) Special attention deserves, furthermore, the statistical analysis of linguistic means identifying the semiotic traces the authors of texts when they are anonymous or not identified.

**Selected Examples of Verbal Traces in Human Communication**

Speaking about the suggestions and consequences of such a broadly defined scope of the investigative domain, it might be important to provide also a few widely known examples (being also available in online encyclopedias or dictionaries) excerpted from cultural spheres of human life-world, which pertain to a particular individual, social or ethnic group and to the language of humankind in general.

(1) Traces of morphological and semantic motivation are to be found in marked or unmarked practices of naming and/or categorizing extralingual objects of reference, as, \textit{inter alia}: (a) in conventional word-formations: Germ. \textit{Kugelschreiber}, Engl. \textit{ball pen} or \textit{ballpoint}, also \textit{ballpoint pen}, French \textit{le stylo à bille}, \textit{styo-bille} or \textit{pointe-bille}, cf. Polish \textit{długopis} a ‘long writing’ means, (b) in customary commemorations, etc.: \textit{Sixtus} (the sixth son in the family), Gagarinka (the girl’s name glorifying the first flight to Cosmos by Jurij Gagarin), or (c) in emotional signals of adherence to the representatives or followers of a certain political leaning: \textit{Franz}, \textit{Franziska}, \textit{Francesca}, \textit{Joseph}, \textit{Josephine} (the most popu-
lar name in the Austrian provinces during the rule of Kaiser Franz Joseph), Adolph (Adolf), Adolphine (Adolfina), Hitlerike (after the first and last name of the German chancellor during the Nazi time), Vladlena, Ninel (blended or sound-inverted forms of Vladimir Lenin), or even (d) in inferred indices of a flattering submission to imposed rules: Stalinka, Stalingrad (former Caricin, and later Wolgograd) Stalin-Straße, Karl-Marx-Allee, Karl-Marx-Stadt, (‘Karl Marx Town’, former and later Chemnitz), and the like.

(2) Furthermore, in contact situations between the bearers of the same language and/or of different languages, one could trace: (a) the generational transmission of similar sounds, as mama, papa, dada, nana, or cognate words, as deva in Sanskrit, deus in Latin and Zeus in Greek, etc., (b) the remnants of substrate and superstrate relationships, cf. e.g. Eng. cheese, school, and Germ. Käse, Schule against the background of Lat. caseus, schola, etc.; likewise, the Nynorsk kyrkje, Eng. Church, and Germ. Kirche, against the background of Greek kyri (a) kón (dóma) ‘the Lord’s (house)’ kyriaké ‘dem Herrn gehörig’, (c) the acceptance of synonyms and suppletive forms as a result of borrowings, e.g., by English speakers from Scandinavians, and later from French Normans, engaged in various conjugal intercourses: to and till, sick and ill, cf. also sickness and illness vs. malady; forms of “to be”: am, are, be, is, was, were, been, being (as historical vestiges of “aran”, “beon” and “wesan”), (d) the expansion of behavioral memes realized in specific blends, interjections or particles, as, e.g., “O.K.” (oll or orl korrect representing all correct), “KO” (a knockout in boxing), “Hi!” (hey! or how-are-you!), “Gee!” (used in a slang to express an anger but surprise or pity in the sense of English Jesus!), “Exactly!” (‘that’s right/true’, Germ. genau!, Polish dokładnie!, Italian exactamente!), (e) interferences as equivalents from the native language previously acquired in a natural way, e.g., in idiomatic expressions, as, e.g., *How many years do you have? instead of “How old are you?”; similarly: *Wieviel Jahre hast du? instead of „Wie alt bist du?“, *What hour is it? instead of “What time is it?”, *Welche Stunde ist es? instead of „Wieviel Uhr ist es?“ or „Wie spät ist es?“ ‘How late it is’ (comp. respectively in French « Quelle âge as-tu? » ‘Which age do you have?’« Quelle heure est-il? » or Polish structures „Ile masz lat?” ‘How many years do you have?’ „Która jest godzina?” ‘Which (of the order) is the hour?’).
Interesting instances of inter-generational transmission that belong both to the domain of naming motivations, mentioned under (1), and the domain of intercultural borrowings, specified under (2), might be found also in the linguistic customs concerning the division of time or quantity, as the testimony of earlier distinctions which are etymologically forgotten, for example, (a) Sunday is the first day and Saturday is the last of the week, cf. in Portuguese, historically: Domingo (“primo dia” ‘first day’) – Segunda-feira (“segundo dia” ‘second day’) – Terça-feira (“terço dia” ‘third day’) – Quarta-feira (“quarto dia” ‘fourth day’) – Quinta-feira (“quinto dia” ‘fifth day’) – Sexta-feira (“sexta dia” ‘sixth day’) – Sábado (“último dia” ‘last day’), and the usage after the ISO (International Organization for Standardization) normalization: Segunda-feira (“1° dia” ‘1st day’) – Terça-feira (“2° dia” ‘2nd day’) – Quarta-feira (“3° dia” ‘3rd day’) – Quinta-feira (“4° dia” ‘4th day’) – Sexta-feira (“5° dia” ‘5th day’) – Sábado (“6° dia” ‘6th day’) – Domingo (“último dia” ‘last day’), and practically, one can encounter in the sense of ‘Sunday’, e.g., in Colombia, Séptimo día ‘seventh day’), (b) Wednesday is the middle day of the week, compare, for example, German: Sonntag – Montag – Dienstag – Mittwoch (‘mid-week’) – Donnerstag – Freitag – Samstag; Polish: niedziela – poniedziałek – wtorek – środa (‘mid-week’, cf. “dzień w środę tygodnia” ‘the day in the middle of the week’) – czwartek – piątek – sobota; Finish: sunnuntai – maanantai – tiistai – keskiviikko (‘mid-week’) – torstai – perjantai – lauantai, (c) Monday is the first and Sunday is the last day of the week, compare, for example, Polish: poniedziałek (= “dzień po niedzieli”, i.e., the day ‘after Sunday’) – wtorek (from “wtóry” as a synonym of “drugi”, i.e., ‘2nd day’) – środa – czwartek (‘4th day’) – piątek (‘5th day’) – sobota – niedziela (Polish “nie działać” means ‘do not work’, i.e., ‘not a working day’); Latvian: pirmdiena (‘1st day’) – otrdiena (‘2nd day’) – trešdiena (‘3rd day’) – ceturtdiena (‘4th day’) – piektdiena (‘5th day’) – sestdiena (‘6th day’) – svētdiena (‘holly day’), (d) Saturday is a bathing day in Scandinavian languages (Old Norse laugardagr, laug ‘bad’; Old Danish løverdag), compare, for example, Faroese: mánadagur – týsdagur – mikudagur – hósdagur – fríggjadagur – leygardagur – sunnudagur; Danish: Mandag – Tirsdag – Onsdag – Torsdag – Fredag – Lørdag – Søndag; Finish: – maanantai – tiistai – keskiviikko – torstai, – perjantai – lauantai – sunnuntai, (e) September, October, November, December are the vestiges of the Roman calendar, which was initially lunar, when the year had ten months with March as
the first and December as the tenth month, compare in English (from Latin): [January, February – added in the later Roman Republican calendar], March – April – May – June – July – August – September (‘7th month’) – October (‘8th month’) – November (‘9th month’) – December (‘10th month’), etc.

(4) The realization of the principle of least effort in verbal behavior has left its traces: (a) in the historical changes of frequent words and their structures, compare, for example, Lat. lingua teodisca, Germ. Deutsch and Norwegian Tysk; Eng. English and Faroese enskt, Germ. Norwegisch, Norwegian Norsk; Germ. Schwedisch and Swedish svensk, etc., (b) in the fast-speech reduction of redundant communicational features, cf., e.g., I don’t (I do not), He’ll (he will, he shall), he’d (he would, he should, he could); I wanna talk to you (I want to talk to you), I’m gonna be (I am going to be), It’s gonna be all right (It is going to be all right).

To sum up, one has to remark that only the language- and-context-specific explorations might reveal the metamorphic nature of humans investigated in the domain of their control and reference. The subject matter of such studies should constitute then the trace-leaving types of interpersonal transmission of meaning carriers and their intersubjective interpretations derived from the texts and text-processing activities of communicating agents embedded into their social roles and culture.
PART III
INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF SEMIOTIC OBJECTS
CHAPTER NINE

Semiotic Universals of Language in the Universe of Animals and Humans

On the Idea of Semiotic Universals

The following chapter is based on the author’s paper “The Search for Universals of Language in a Semiotic Perspective”, delivered for the first time at the Societas Linguistica Europaea 29th Annual Meeting: Universals versus Preferences (In Synchrony and Diachrony) in Klagenfurt on September 4–8, 1996. Popularized in his subsequent monographs in English (Wąsik, Z. 1998 and 2003), its main ideas have been outlined for the presentation (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2005) “In Search of Semiotic Universals of Language Among Design Features of Human Communication Systems” in the Global Semiotics Section, directed by Eero Tarasti, at the International Summer School for Semiotic and Structural Studies Under the Auspices of the IASS/AIS at Imatra, Finland, on June 11–19, 2005. Some of the results of these explorations have been also published lately (Wąsik, Z. 2007; 2014, 65–78).

The so-called “universals of language” have been explored by practitioners of linguistics and its neighboring disciplines at least in three domains: (1) as properties which are to be found in all languages of the world (mainly by Joseph Harold Greenberg, 1915–2001, and Uriel Weinreich, 1926–1967), (2) as communicative competencies of speakers and/or listeners, which may be deduced from their communicative performance when they create and recognize linguistic utterances as phonologically diacritic, grammatically correct, semantically accurate and pragmatically appropriate (by Noam Avram Chomsky, born 1928, Dell Hathaway Hymes, 1927–2009, and their followers), or (3) as defining characteristics of speech derivable from the contrast between verbal and non-verbal means of communication used in the universe of humans and animals (by Charles Francis Hockett, 1916–2000, Stuart A. Altmann, born 1930, and Charles Egerton Osgood, 1916–1991).
In Search of the Defining Characteristics of Language

The subject matter of this chapter consists of a search for the defining characteristics of language conducted by Hockett (1958/1959, 1959, 1960a, 1960b, 1963/1966) against the background of classificatory proposals done by Altmann (1962, 1967), as well as Hockett and Altmann (1968) along with further extensions delivered by Osgood (1980, 9–50), which have been earlier confronted and elaborated by the author himself (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 67–71; 1997a, 47–56; 1998, 64–69; and 2003, 78–82) with reference to the state of the art exposed in contemporary academic handbooks and encyclopedias.

However, the sets of properties in Hockett’s framework, as to their number and arrangement, have been developed gradually. As one can read from Table 9-1, the seven key properties of language proposed by him in 1958 (Hockett 1958/1959), have been extended to thirteen in 1960 (Hockett 1960a), then the sixteen properties, and afterward supplemented with three additional characteristics in 1963 (Hockett 1963/1966).

### Table 9-1. Charles F. Hockett’s key properties of language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) duality,</td>
<td>(1') vocal-auditory channel, (2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning</td>
<td>(1') vocal-auditory channel, (2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning, (14') prevarication (intentional avoidance of truth or deception), (15') reflexiveness, (16') learnability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) productivity,</td>
<td>(2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning</td>
<td>(1') vocal-auditory channel, (2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) arbitrariness,</td>
<td>(3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning</td>
<td>(1') vocal-auditory channel, (2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning, (14') prevarication (intentional avoidance of truth or deception), (15') reflexiveness, (16') learnability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) interchangeability,</td>
<td>(4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning</td>
<td>(1') vocal-auditory channel, (2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning, (14') prevarication (intentional avoidance of truth or deception), (15') reflexiveness, (16') learnability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) specialization,</td>
<td>(5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning</td>
<td>(1') vocal-auditory channel, (2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning, (14') prevarication (intentional avoidance of truth or deception), (15') reflexiveness, (16') learnability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) displacement,</td>
<td>(6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning</td>
<td>(1') vocal-auditory channel, (2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning, (14') prevarication (intentional avoidance of truth or deception), (15') reflexiveness, (16') learnability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) cultural transmission</td>
<td>(7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning</td>
<td>(1') vocal-auditory channel, (2') broadcast transmission and directional reception, (3') rapid fading, (4') interchangeability, (5') total complete feedback, (6') specialization, (7') semanticity, (8') arbitrariness, (9') discreteness, (10') displacement, (11') openness, (12') tradition, (13') duality of patterning, (14') prevarication (intentional avoidance of truth or deception), (15') reflexiveness, (16') learnability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While proposing a fixed set of properties amounting to sixteen, Hockett has detached the group of ten properties as “a defining set for language”. In his opinion, any system that has openness, i.e., 11', displacement—10', duality—13', arbitrariness—8', discreteness—9', interchangeability—4', complete feedback—5', specialization—6', rapid fading—3', and broadcast transmission with directional reception—2', deserves to be called a language; so far “any language manifested by our own species will be called a human language” (Hockett 1966, 15).

The remaining six characteristics, among sixteen, such as vocal-auditory channel—1', semanticity—7', cultural transmission/tradition—12'', prevarication—14'', reflexiveness—15'', learnability—16'', have appeared to Hockett as non-defining properties. In his view, every language must possess such a property as semanticity, assuming that the contrast between arbitrariness (included into the defining set) and iconicity (to be eventually included among the non-defining properties) would make no sense at all. All the same, he has assumed as possible that “every language has prevarication … and reflexiveness …; at least every human language does” (Hockett 1966, 15).

Charles F. Hockett’s “key properties of language” had been elaborated in turn by Stuart A. Altmann, who used to work in the field of behavioral ecology and sociobiology of primates, although within the so-called “design-feature approach to animal communication”. In Altmann’s contributions, first individually (Altmann 1962 and 1967) and then cooperatively (Hockett & Altmann 1968), the emphasis was shifted from the properties of language—as far as he was not sure about their universality—to the so-called “design features” of communicative behavior of humans against the background of “all organic behavior of any sort, or even of the behavior of all matter, living or inert” (Hockett & Altmann 1968, 61). As a matter of fact, Altmann (1967, cf. Hockett & Altmann 1968, 63–71) was probably the first researcher who had subsumed the sixteen “design features” (recorded as DF) of Hockett (1963) under certain types of groupings, called frameworks (A, B, C, D, E), as follows:

**FRAMEWORK A**—features determined by the channel or channels—(DF1) Vocal-Auditory Channel, (DF2) Broadcast Transmission and Directional Reception, (DF3) Rapid Fading;

**FRAMEWORK B**—features derived from the social setting—(DF4) Interchangeability, (DF5) Complete Feedback, (DF8) Arbitrariness, (DF14) Prevarication, (DF15) Reflexiveness;
FRAMEWORK C—features expressing the behavioral antecedents and consequences of communicative acts—(DF6) Specialization, (DF7) Semanticity, (DF10) Displacement, (DF11) Openness;

FRAMEWORK D—features reflecting continuity and change in the nature of communication systems—(DF12) Tradition, (DF16) Learnability.

However, Altmann’s and Hockett’s proposal of design-features of language subsumed under five frameworks pertaining to animal communication cannot be approved in totality from the viewpoint of structural linguistics, having in mind that such design features undoubtedly determine the intrasystemic properties of language, such as (1) Arbitrariness, Semanticity, and Openness, in addition to Discreteness and Duality of Patterning; whereas (2) Prevarication, Reflexiveness, Specialization, Displacement are to be seen as another group of extrasytemic properties of language. Likewise, against the background of the correctly classified relational properties of language, which pertain the physical-acoustic nature of communication, as (3) Vocal-Auditory Channel, Broadcast Transmission and Directional Reception, as well as Rapid Fading (of the Voice Sound), one should subsume under the same framework pertaining to a communicating individual and communicative community such features as (4) Interchangeability, Complete Feedback, Tradition and Learnability.

Having been inspired by the exchange of opinions at a conference of 1961 devoted to language universals, which were published in 1963, Charles E. Osgood (1980, 47, see especially his footnote there) undertook another elaboration of Hockett’s ideas. As a result, he submitted a slightly similar set of the so-called “defining characteristics of language”, having been enriched more quantitatively than qualitatively.

As to the primary set of six defining characteristics of language, Osgood (1980, 10–14) proposed that they should be general enough to serve as criteria for evaluating the nature of communication in the realm of all species. Thus, anything that is to be called a language must have, in Osgood’s view, signals that [1] nonrandomly recur in some communication channel, [2] are producible by the same organisms that receive them and manifest themselves in such nonrandom dependencies as [3] pragmaticity, [4] semanticity, [5] syntacticity, and [6] combinatorial productivity.

With these six hypothetically assumed characteristics in mind, Osgood sees the need to accept the existence of a language among some animals; the absolute NO-answer he declares with regard to clams, partly YES to
birds and dogs and a certain YES to the ways of communication among bees and apes.

Ten additional characteristics Osgood (1980, 20–26) submits to accept as decisive to get through the threshold of being a language when they are to be determined as a species-specific property of man. The first five of them Osgood suggests to denote—without any comments on the use of terms—as “structural” and the remaining five as “functional”. If there is something which is a language and deserves “to be called a human language”, it must be distinguished, according to Osgood (1980, 20–23), by such “structural characteristics”, not only involving [7] the use of the vocal-auditory channel, and resulting in [8] a nondirectional transmission but directional reception as well as [9] the evanescence in time of the forms in the channel, but also requiring [10] the integration over time of the information derived from the physical forms and the necessity of [11] providing prompt feedback to the sender of his or her own messages. Noticeable is in Osgood’s highlighting that the enumerated structural characteristics are relatable to combined functions of the physical nature of sound and the biological nature of human organism.

In turn, the necessary qualities of human language have to be determined, in Osgood’s (1980, 23–26) depiction, by the following “functional characteristics”: [12] the semantic relations between forms and meanings must, in general, be arbitrary rather than iconic, and [13] the forms in the channel that distinguish meanings must be discretely rather than continuously variable. It also appears indispensable for Osgood that these forms in the communication channel are [14] analyzable hierarchically into levels of units-within-units, with [15] large numbers of units at each higher level being exhaustively analyzable into relatively small numbers of components at each lower level. The final place occupies the Osgood’s functional conditioning, according to which the [16] extension of a language within the species, both generationally and geographically, must be via experience (rather than via inheritance (maturation)).

As Osgood (1980, 26–32) argues, apart from these sixteen defining characteristics of language, considered hitherto as universals, one should additionally take into account a number of other qualities consisting of two types of five non-defining characteristics, without which, as he claims, language would be still regarded as a human language though a rather strange one.

The first type of these five additional characteristics (cf. Osgood 1980, 27–29) reflects certain intellectual and cultural traits that are common to
human species rather than linguistic regularities that pertain to messages of any determined language, such as [17/1] *propositionalizing*, stating that messages “are testable as to their truth and falsity”, [18/2] *prevarication*—“messages can be intentionally false, deceptive, or meaningless”, [19/3] *reflexiveness*—“messages can be used to talk about other messages and/or their components”, and finally [20/4] *learnability*, stating that messages of any language “can be acquired by any normal human being”, plus [21/5] *translatability*—“any natural human language can be translated into any other human language”.

The second type in the Osgood’s record (1980, 29–32) consists of these five non-defining characteristics of language, which form rather statistical than absolute universals across all languages of the world and the levels of their entities, units and constructions, as far as they are based on psycholinguistic performance principles and their interactions, such as [22/1] *the rules of selection and combination of alternative forms*; [23/2] *the principle of progressive differentiation of meaning-signaling forms*; [24/3] *the least effort principle*, stating that “the higher the frequency-of-usage level (1) the shorter the length of forms, (2) the smaller the number of forms, and (3) the larger the number of different meanings (senses) of the forms used”; [25/4] *affective polarity*—“affectively positive forms are distinguished from affectively negative forms (1) by marking (either overt or covert) of the negative members of pairs and (2) by priority of the positive members of pairs in both the development (in the language and in the individual) and from sequencing in messages”; [26/5] *the Pollyanna Principle*—“affectively positive forms and constructions are more diversified, more frequently used, and more easily processed cognitively than affectively negative forms and constructions”.

To discuss the constituents of the Osgood’s typology of language universals, specified as a search for the so-called “defining characteristics of language” which evaluate the nature of communication in the realm of all species, against the background of Hockett’s “key properties of language” and, furthermore, also Altmann’s contributions as “design features of language”, one has to take into consideration only the absolute universals, i.e., sixteen of the supposed defining characteristics and five of the supposed non-defining characteristics of language, without taking any position to the question whether they are exhaustive or completely substantiated.

A deeper analysis has shown that the characteristics distinguished by Osgood overlap in their principal part with the characteristics of Hockett,
without taking into account their order, with an exception however that a slightly different treatment have such properties of language as specialization and duality in Hockett’s distinctions, and pragmaticity and syntacticity in Osgood’s counterproposals. A remarkable modification of Hockett’s approach to broadcast transmission and directional reception makes up Osgood’s characteristics referring to recurrence of forms in communication channel and integration over time of forms derived from physical forms, as one can state against the background of the following summary of Osgood’s search for the “defining characteristics” of language from the viewpoint of communication in the realm of all species, cf. [8], [1], [10]: To new proposals, one should include hierarchical and componential organization and also translatability of languages. The property of translatability seems to be obvious because it can be derived from the learnability of language. To sum up, it is worth comparing the sets of defining and non-defining characteristics as enumerated in Review 9-1 and Review 9-2.

**Review 9-1. Osgood’s Defining Characteristics of Language Considered as Semiotic Universals**


**Review 9-2. Osgood’s Non-Defining Characteristics of Language**

Semiotic Properties of Language  
in the Light of Structural Linguistics

On the basis of knowledge accumulated in contemporary academic hand- 
books, one can state that the defining properties of language have been  
neither in Hockett’s nor in Osgood’s works sufficiently and/or convinc- 
ingly substantiated and exhaustively ordered. The cause of such a state is to  
be seen in unclear criteria for formulating what a definition is from a logi- 
cal point of view. Nothing is to be found about the next kind to which  
the language as a defined object might be compared.  

What linguists have as an alternative at their disposal is an elaborated  
set of heterogeneous characteristics exposing only specific differences. For  
example, from an intrasystemic point of view, only such properties might  
be relevant as arbitrariness, discreteness, duality, hierarchicality, compo- 
nentiality, syntacticity, semanticity, openness (or productivity in other  
terms). As standing very close to the domain of language sciences, one can  
deem the property of pragmaticity. However, pragmaticity being oriented  
towards indirect or direct usage of the verbal form(s) of communication  
should be relegated to the extrasystemic properties of language.  

Furthermore, among the intrasystemic properties of language, structur- 
alist the linguists may notice the lack of a double class character of verbal  
signs expressed through the division of morphemes into grammatical and  
lexical, which is nota bene not the same as the double articulation of ver- 
bal signs into meaningful and diacritic segmental entities, i.e., morphemes  
and phonemes. Without doubt philosophers of language would also add  
such properties as, for example, transparency and gestalticity of verbal  
means used in communication.  

As far as the most of Hockett’s and Osgood’s properties of language  
along with some additionally proposed in our discussion above have a  
fixed position in the epistemology of linguistics, it will be worthwhile to  
explain them again in terms of semiotic linguistics, as presented in Table  
9-2, elaborated by the author of this monograph in his earlier works  
semiotic universals are relevant for investigative domains of the neighbor- 
ing disciplines of language sciences and linguistics proper, it is recommend- 
ed to observe the boundaries between the properties that pertain to the:  

(I) form and structure of language as a system of verbal means of signifi- 
cation and communication;
(II) substance of codes and the channels of communication;
(III) the cognitive faculties and communicational abilities of human beings
determining the ways of language acquisition and language attrition
across cultures and generations;
(IV) relationships between the verbal means as signifiers and their signi-
fied referents in the extralingual reality, as well as between the verbal
means and their speakers and listeners in accordance with pragmatics

Table 9.2. Extrasystemic versus intrasystemic properties of language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ecological- and lexical-relational properties of language</th>
<th>Grammatical- and lexical-inherent properties of language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The above distinguished four groups of properties (I–IV) might be sub-
sumed under two separate classes of “extrasystemic properties of lan-
guage” (groups II–IV) that belong to the investigative domain of the
neighboring disciplines of language-related sciences, as, for example, psychology of language, (cultural) anthropology of language, philosophy of language or logic, and their auxiliary disciplines, as, for example, articulatory or acoustic phonetics within the domain of natural sciences (anatomy and physics) and “intrasystemic properties of language” (group I) that belong to the subject matter of autonomous linguistics proper.

**Extrasytemic Properties of Language**

From the viewpoint of substantial properties of codes and the channels of communication, one can separately distinguish four types of characteristic features (abbreviated henceforth as Language Properties = LP): [LP 1] *vocal-auditory*, stating that phylogenetically conditioned verbal signs have a phonic character; they are emitted through the vocal tract and received by ear; [LP 2] *centrifugal transmission and directional reception*—sound waves expand in all directions (centrifugally), but they are received from that direction in which the receiver finds himself while listening; [LP 3] *evanescence in time*—due to physical laws, phonic substances of speech sounds are transitory and volatile; [LP 4] *linear integration over time*—receivers apprehend sound waves as a sequence of segments arranged in a line.

Considering sensorial and intellectual properties of language with reference to the receptive and productive activities and the cognitive and creative capabilities of language users and language doers, one is able to separate two subgroups of species-specific properties of humans. The first subgroup refers to their biological characteristics, as [LP 5] *interchangeability of sender-receiver roles*, stating that the communicating individuals, who can be both a sender and a receiver of his or her own signs and the signs of other individuals, can produce, perceive and reproduce their own or foreign signs as many times as they want; [LP 6] *complete (total) feedback*—the sender, while speaking, can not only simultaneously perceive reactions of others, but he or she can also react to the form and content of what they emit him- or herself; which also gives them the possibility of controlling and/or correcting their errors.

The second subgroup of sensorial and intellectual properties of language relates to cultural distinctiveness of humankind, as: [LP 7] *cultural transmission*, stating that languages are not genetically inherited, but generationally transmitted through education and participation in culture;
creativity, learnability and forgetability—as far as speech faculties can be inherited, every representative of the species \emph{homo sapiens}, understood also as \emph{homo animal symbolicum}, can not only acquire every language but also create his or her own linguistic system, or forget a determined language which they have learned; \[LP 9\] \emph{translatability}—the feature of learnability implies also the feature of translatability of every language learned by users as a second, third or fourth, and so forth, language; \[LP 10\] \emph{conventionally determined changeability in time and variability in space}—bearers of a determined language, as members of communicative communities can contribute, on the basis of a social agreement or contacts between different languages or their different varieties, to the formation of not only new but also mixed languages or their new functional and stylistic varieties as well as new expressions and utterances never heard before in a determined language, etc.

Referential-utilitarian properties of significative means, realized in communicational events, constitute another group of properties characterizing the language, which depend upon the will, knowledge and intention of its users. Among them, one can distinguish, in the first instance, \[LP 11\] \emph{specialization}, stating that language not only fulfills expressive and evocative functions but also has developed for fulfilling various kinds of significative and communicative functions; \[LP 12\] \emph{contextuality}—the meanings of verbal means of communication specify themselves in dependence of contexts and/or “con-situations”; \[LP 13\] \emph{translocation}—using memorized and uttered verbal signs of a particular language humans may speak about things and states of affair being remote in time and space; \[LP 14\] \emph{metadesignation (metalinguistic reflexivity)}—since verbal signs are things by nature that serve the purposes of speaking about other things, humans may speak in a language also about the language as an object of extralingual reality; \[LP 15\] \emph{prevarication}—the extralingual reality of verbal signs can be both true and false, observed and inferred, abstract and concrete, as well as imagined and real; it can be perceived as ambiguous or meaningless; \[LP 16\] \emph{pragmaticity}—linguistic utterances can be interpreted directly according to its literal word-for-word value, i.e., locutionary meaning, or indirectly while exerting an impact upon receivers as a result of their illocutionary force; \[LP 17\] \emph{intentionality}—the sender can deliberately manipulate with a communicative sense of an utterance while changing its literal referential value in indirect speech acts; \[LP 18\] \emph{transparency}—conventionalized verbal signs lacking ambiguity or illocutionary force are usually transparent by nature as far as receivers understand them immedi-
ately as denoting the objects of reference; [LP 19] **gestalticity**—verbal signs
used for artistic and pragmatic purposes happen to be “gestaltic”, i.e.,
possessing a shape or configuration of properties that cannot be derived by
the summation of its component parts, so that the receiver does not grasp
their locutionary meaning directly, but he or she interprets them in de-
pendence of their illocutionary force or inferred intertextuality; [LP 20]
**autonomization** (**lexicalization**)—in everyday use verbal signs strive to
become independent from derivational meanings of their constituents so
that their user does not identify or remember their morphological motiva-
tion, etymology or phrase-structure rules.

**Intrasystemic Properties of Language**

When the semiotic properties of language are not searched for in the do-
main of its speakers and listeners and/or their functional environments, but
within the realm of verbal means which humans utilize for the purposes of
signification and communication, i.e., when the object of definition is the
language in itself, and not the human being in relation to language, then a
separate group among semiotic universals can be distinguished, as far as
the intrasystemic properties of language are concerned.

Accordingly, the language among the other semiotic systems distin-
guishes itself through such properties which can be labeled as lexical-
grammatical properties of verbal means of signification and communica-
tion: [LP 21/1] **semantic referentiality**, stating that the semantic function
of verbal signs results from their substitutive character, i.e., from their
reference to the extralingual reality based on implication. Verbal signs are
not parts of extralingual reality. The relation between signs and their ob-
jects of reference always repeats in a similar way, although always in new
surroundings, in the processes of interpersonal communication and inter-
subjective signification as well as in the cognitive processes of mental
associations and inferences; [LP 22/2] **conventional arbitrariness**—the
relationship between verbal signs and their objects of reference in the
extralingual reality is not natural by origin; it depends upon the social
usage and customs conditioned by free and non-motivated choices;
[LP 23/3] **discrete distinctiveness**—verbal means of signification and
communication are not continuous and global by nature; they are articulat-
ed and perceived as text elements being mutually distinguishable and
replaceable in the same contextual environment; [LP 24/4] **double articu-
lateness—verbal means can be divided on the morphological and phonological level into smallest meaningful text elements (morphemes) and smallest diacritic text elements (phonemes); [LP 25/5] morphological duality—verbal means can be divided on the morphological and semantic levels into two classes of signs: categorial and entitative, i.e., grammatical and lexical morphemes; [LP 26/6] bipartite significance—verbal means as textual constituents of predication frames can be divided, on the syntactic level, into sentences and word phrases that realize, on the logical and semantic level, both the function of propositions and the function of concepts; [LP 27/7] functional and compositional hierarchicality—regarded as subordinating text elements of lower order function within entities, units or constructions of higher order on the basis of hierarchical subordination: phonemes within morphemes, morphemes within semantemes (stems), semantemes within words, words within phrases (word groups), phrases within sentences, sentences within utterances, utterances within discourses, discourses within texts, and texts are defined as the last instance in terms of verbal signs opposed to non-verbal signs. On a superordinating level—text elements of higher order consist at least of one entity, unit or construction of lower order, i.e., a text consists at least of one discourse, and a discourse consists at least of one utterance, an utterance consists at least of one sentence, a sentence consists at least of one phrase, a phrase consists at least of one word, a word consists at least of one semanteme (stem), a semanteme consists at least of one morpheme, a morpheme consists of at least of one phoneme. In the last instance, the phoneme is a further indivisible entity constituting a bundle of simultaneously realized diacritic features of human speech sounds; [LP 28/8] binary isomorphism of text structures—basic (segmental) text structures, for example, syllable, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, are, as to their binary forms, identical on each level of the hierarchy of language elements, having both a constitutive component and an accessory component. For example, for a syllable, a constitutive component is the vowel or semivowel, for a stem—the lexical morpheme, for a word—the stem, for a phrase—the determined word, for a clause—the verbal phrase, for a sentence—the main clause. Accessory, on the contrary, for a syllable is the consonant, for a stem—the derivational affix, for a word—the inflectional ending, for a phrase—the determining word, for a clause—the nominal phrase, for a sentence—the subordinated clause; [LP 29/9] syntagmatic integrativity and paradigmatic commutability—verbal signs can create entities, units and constructions appearing in form of segments and/or suprasegmental
features. Examined in their functioning on the level of utterances and locutions, both the simple signs and the composed signs are regarded as complex signs of higher order as to their global meaning, where the sum of their components is not equal to the sum of their partial meanings. All meaningful forms as simple signs or composed signs are considered as members of the same syntactic paradigm when they can alternatively replace each other within the same context of locutions and/or utterances; [LP 30/10] combinatorial-productive openness—the system of language functions as an open system, so that its users have the opportunity to produce an infinite number of signs from a finite number of simple elements and conventionally established phraseological constructions.

The specification of ten (1–10) among thirty (LP 1–30) intrasystemic properties of verbal means of interpersonal communication and intersubjective signification, as these characteristic features of language that belong to the investigative domains of autonomous linguistics in opposition to the extrasystemic properties that may constitute the interest sphere of heteronomous linguistics or the non-linguistic sciences of language, can lead to the specification of its semiotic definition, under the condition that the language will be confronted with other systems of understanding on the basis of searching for the genus proximum of the linguistic sign among the other semiotic objects.

Investigative Postulates

Against the background of the preceding discussion, it is proposed that the classificatory approach to the semiotic universals of language has to bear in mind the genus proximum and differentia specifica of language in the context of its intrasystemic and extrasystemic properties constituting the subject matter of linguistics and the non-linguistic sciences of language. In such a view, the semiotic properties of language are to be deduced from the comparison between the verbal and non-verbal means of communication in the light of linguistic semiotics itself and not necessarily from the perspective of man’s place among other living species. In the end, a recent line of reasoning has to be taken into account arguing that linguistic diversity is a crucial datum for investigation, as put forward by Nicholas Evans, and Stephen Curtis Levinson in their intensely contested article "The Myth of Language Universals: Language Diversity and Its Importance for Cognitive Science" (2009).
CHAPTER TEN

Searching for the Epistemological Roots of Sign Conceptions

Controversies over Language as a System of Signs

The research question (cf. Wąsik 2003, 84) posed in the following chapter are connected with the epistemological position of language as a systems of signs, whether it should be seen as: (1) a material or spiritual state of being (materialism vs. spiritualism), (2) an ideal, abstract or concrete fact, or a set of relational properties (reism vs. realistic idealism vs. connectionism), (3) something which manifests itself both in the physical and psychical reality, outside the body and inside the mind, only in physical reality but extraorganismic or intraorganismic by nature, or only in the psychical reality, or beyond the physical and psychical reality of the knowing subject (dualism of body and mind vs. materialistic monism vs. idealistic monism vs. transcendentalism), (4) accessible to the cognizant and knowing subject through sensual experiences or intellectual apprehension (empirical experientialism vs. intellectual rationalism), (5) observed outside body and mind or within the individual’s body and mind, or inside the organism (extrospectivism vs. introspectivism), (6) experienced and created by internal feelings, imaginations or sensations of an individual self, or noticed and controlled by his or her senses outside the organism (subjectivism vs. objectivism), (7) perceived through individual tokens as variants of a general type, or conceived through types as invariants encompassing common features of tokens (inductivism vs. deductivism), (8) constituting the property of an individual self or the possession of a collective community (individualism, solipsism vs. collectivism), (9) created by the free act of a supernatural power, by a rational factor, or emerged unexpectedly by the way of an accident (creativism vs. emergentism, teleologism vs. causalism), (10) occurring in the realm of God and man or only in the realm of man, etc. (theism, theocentrism vs. anthropocentrism).
Ontological and Gnoseological Status of Signs

The most controversial issues presented here pertain to the ontological status and cognitive approachability of the category of the sign. As it has been noticed, the views of theoreticians and practitioners of semiotic disciplines (discussed by Wąsik, Z. 2014, 79–96) are not unanimous as to whether the sign constitutes a concrete or mental entity, and whether its material shape, possessing a spiritual replica in the mind of its users, can be approached as an ideal or real object. As to the manifestation forms of signs, being specified as sensible or intelligible, extraorganismic or intraorganismic forms of being, the questions arises whether they might be examined subjectively or objectively.

Semioticians still argue whether the sign is to be defined as a separate phenomenon or as a complex of related phenomena. One can encounter certain views according to which the sign is specified either as a monilateral entity or a plurilateral unit comprised of interrelated constituents, or as relations between those constituents. An overview of semiotic thought can illustrate that the conceptions of the sign are expressed either in terms of (I) a unilateral sign, in which the sign-vehicle and its referent are treated as separate entities, or (II) a bilateral sign, whose two parts, the signifier and the signified, constitute a twofold psychical unity. Some linguists adhere to the concept of (III) a semantic triangle, in which the sign-vehicle, its meaning, as a thought or notion, and its referent form separate parts. Moreover, philosophers prefer to speak about (III') a trilateral sign, where the sign-vehicle, its meaning as an interpretant (generating one or more signs), and its object of reference constitute a threefold unity. Separately distinguished are also the concepts of (II') the sign as a dyadic relation and (III'') the sign as a triadic relation.

To explain the background of divergences in the formulation of sign-conceptions, it is proposed to explore the status of its constituents. An adept observer may notice—in all conceptions of signs and their objects of reference, investigated in terms of two constituents existing concretely and mentally, that is, to say in other words, residing in the intraorganismic and extraorganismic reality of communicating individuals—the occurrence of four common elements: an externalized stimulus serving as a concrete sign, an internalized stimulus acting as mental reflection of the sign, an externalized response serving as concrete referent of the sign, and an internalized response acting as a mental reflection of the referent of the sign. Thus, instead of a semantic triangle, which is favored among the theorists
of sign- and meaning-oriented disciplines, the adept of semiotic studies should rather speak of a semantic quadrangle.

Those and other controversies have undoubtedly found their roots in the three philosophical ways of thinking about the concrete and mental nature of language in relation to reality, namely Platonism, Aristotelianism (modified through Cartesianism), and Stoicism (for the discussion of terms see Koyré 1961 and Encyclopedia Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986).

The Dual Character of the Linguistic Sign

Platonic lógos and Saussurean parole

It was Plato, a Greek philosopher, who initiated the dualistic idealism assuming that speech and thought are inseparable, and that both capabilities form a unity, called lógos. On the basis of the belief that speech is a faithful replica of thought, the followers of Plato put forward a postulate to study verbal activities for gaining the knowledge of how the mind of humans works (for reference to Plato after Chajim Heymann Steinthal, 1823–1899, 1863/1890, 51–112, and after Ernst Hoffmann, 1880–1952, 1925, 34; see Pazukhin 1983, 15–17).

The Sign as a Oneness of Two Separable Psychic Sides

Undoubtedly, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), a Swiss linguist, might have been inspired by the Platonic idea of lógos (Greek λόγος) when he has introduced, in his lectures, a category of parole (cf. 1916/1922, passim and 101) underlying both speaking and thinking simultaneously. However, as not exactly fitting within the context of Platonism—even though appealing to the idea of duality—one has to consider Saussure’s conception of the sign as a twofold mental unity composed of signifié and signifiant, usually rendered as ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’, or equated with ‘signification’ and ‘signal’ in an incorrect translation of Roy Harris (cf. Saussure 1972 [1983, 67]), in which both parts of the sign are considered as a oneness of two inseparable sides, being in equal degree psychic.
An absolute psychologist definition of the sign which unites, in Saussure’s view, not a thing and a name but a concept and an acoustic image (rendered as “sound image” or “sound pattern”), probably originates in the late rationalist phase of Aristotelian heritage (cf. also the opinion of Eugenio Coseriu 1967, 81–112), developed under the influence of Cartesian thought by the authors of the Port-Royal grammar. Although published anonymously, the authorship of this grammar, the so-called *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* (A general and reasoned grammar) of 1660, has been ascribed to Claude Lancelot (1615–1695) Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694). As Jacques Bourquin (1991, 346) points out “The grammar belongs to the rationalist current of thought … deeply influenced by René Descartes (1596–1650)”, a French philosopher and mathematician (for details see also Crystal 1987, 84). In such an understanding the linguistic sign according to Saussure is viewed as a two-sided mental oneness, which unite not a thing and a name but a concept and a sound-pattern.

The Unity of Speech and Thought in *Parole* as the Realization of Language

Saussure’s lectures exhibit, however, inconsistency in rationalistic presentations of the sign as a unity of two mental sides: *concept* ‘concept’ (interpreted also as ‘image’ or ‘notion’) and *image acoustique* ‘acoustic image’. One of his chapters devoted to the problem of the linguistic value (cf. Saussure 1916/1922, 155–169) shows explicitly his adherence to the Platonic unity of (external) expressions and (internal) thoughts.

Saussure’s (1922, 157) conception of the duality of language may be interpreted as a Platonic heritage when recalling his metaphorical illustration which states that the unity of speech and thought in the realization of language may be compared to a sheet of paper where it is impossible to cut
up the first side without cutting up the second one; similarly, in a lan-
guage, one is not able to separate either sound from thought or thought
from sound; The domain of linguistic study is thus placed by Saussure on
the borderland where the elements of two orders are combined into a unity
of linguistic form (cf. Chapter Six, pp. 113–114).

The Hjelmslevian Duality of the Sign:
Expression and Content as Two Functives
United by a Sign Function in Speech and Thought

The Hjelmslevian view of the sign, motivated by Saussure’s conception of
parole, resembles the Platonic notion of lógos, but it reflects also the Ari-
stotelian way of delimiting the substance from the matter through the form.
Louis Hjelmslev (cf. 1943 [1953/1961/1963, 13 and 52–58]) confirmed
Saussure’s claim as to the duality of the sign, but he proposed to regard its
two sides in terms of functives: expression form and content form, con-
nected by a sign function. Hjelmslev rejected the widespread opinion of
logicians that the sign is to be described as something that stands for
something else. In Hjelmslev’s view, the sign is not an expression that
points to a content outside the sign itself but a two-sided entity that acts in
two directions: to the outside, i.e., to the substance of expression, and to
the inside, i.e., to the substance of content (cf. Chapter Six, pp. 115–120).

As a Platonist, Hjelmslev believed that the so-called sign function
unites both internal mental facts with external physical facts which hu-
mans have at their disposal. Appealing to his terminology, one may say
that the amorphous mass of thought (the matter of content) as well as the
amorphous phonic continuum (the matter of expression) are organized by
the form of each plane into the substance of expression and the substance
of content. Although Hjelmslev treated the substance as a part of the mat-
ter (the purport) organized by the form, he favored in fact Saussure’s
statement that language is a form and not a substance (cf. also the respec-
tive statement of Saussure in Chapter Six, p. 114):

Consequently, in opposition to the functionalists of the Prague School
investigating the substance of language as relevant for semantic function,
the pupils of Hjelmslev and the adherents of the Copenhagen School were
called formalists (cf., inter alia, Umberto Eco in Encyclopedia Dictionary
of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok, 1986, 943–946, and Teresa E. Hołówka in Ency-
A separate reflection of Platonist ideas might also be found in the distinction between *Bedeutung*, i.e., inferable meaning and *Kundgabe*, i.e., observable manifestation, introduced into the philosophy of language by Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859–1938). According to Husserl, the act of speaking forms an intentional act of meaning where the connotative meaning is deducible from the verbal signs as spoken. Hence, the meaning and manifestation are, for Husserl, mutually exclusive as phenomena when tied as products of speech to indication (cf. Richard Leo Lanigan in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 697).

**Language in a Triadic Sequence or a Unified Triangle**

**The Mediating Role of Human Intellect**

It was Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, who introduced to the original dyad, consisting of the sound and thought of man, a third element, namely the things in reality he learns and communicates about. In comparison to Plato, Aristotle made progress by distinguishing the thought about reality from the expression of this thought in words (called *lexis*), as two heterogeneous phenomena.

The Aristotelian sequence was reinterpreted by William of Ockham (alias Occam, an English scholastic philosopher, 1285–1347)29 in his *Summa Logicae*, written between 1323 and 1326, giving the rise to a nominalist triangle. However, the translated terms of Aristotle: *res—in* _intellec<sup>tus—vox* ['thing—intelect—voice'] were replaced by Ockham through: _res—conceptus—terminus* ['thing—concept—term'] (cf. Ockham 1974). For Aristotle, concepts mediated between things and words, and in Ockham’s depiction concepts were tied to things by a natural bond, and the relation between words and things was based, on a convention (cf. Pazukhin 1983, 61–63). And Ockham believed that thinking activities can be carried out not only by manipulating words in an acoustic or in a voiceless mental form, but also that mental acts can be performed without words (verbal thinking vs. pure thinking).

Against the background of medieval conceptualism, the idea of Aristotle had been modified by his rationalist continuators from the Port-Royal School. According to a rationalist hypothesis, the thinker was operating with concepts directly and making use of words only when his/her accounts of reasoning were to be communicated to others.
As far as the relation between reality, thought and language is concerned, the Aristotelian threefold sequence reappeared in the assumption of the spiritual intermediate world (Germ. die geistige Zwischenwelt), put forward by the followers of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836 [1988]). In the 20th century, the Aristotelian triad also found its expression in the works of Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941), widely known under the label of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis regarding the conception of linguistic determinism in human cognition, but with the stress on the sequence: “language, thought and reality”.

The Aristotelian idea of the mediating role of the human mind, through innovations of Scholastic thinking, underwent further modifications. It was still continued by the interpreters of the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), and Charles William Morris (1901–1979) pertaining to the relationships between human actions and various signs created by man (cf. Petrilli 2013, 1–34).

Peirce elaborated (around 1897) the concept of a trilateral sign, or a triad, as an ideal unity of three constituents. This concept, however, cannot be uniformly interpreted. From one formulation, distributed in his various writings, one might conclude that Peirce has understood (1) the sign as a threefold representamen of the sign-vehicle that is capable to stand for its object and to signify its interpretant which produces another sign referring to the same object. From another, one might view (2) the sign as a triadic relational structure that participates in generating different interpretations of meaning by producing other signs determined by the same object.

With reference to the latter understanding of the subject matter of semiotics, it is worth emphasizing Peirce’s idea of continuous semiosis the limits of which are demarcated by the ultimate interpretant of the sign. It points the way towards a dynamic view of sign action that generates an interpretant itself. However, since every sign can generate an interpretant, which is another sign in turn, and every interpretant can be a sign, the distinction between both terms is analytically relative, as has been exposed by Joseph Ransdell (1931–2010, see in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 675–681). What's more, as far as any given sign is itself an interpretant of a prior sign of the same object, it seems obvious that the distance between the sign and its object is greater when more intermediating signs are generated in the process of interpretations.

In the same context, as important for the theory of sign production, it is appropriate to mention another philosopher, namely Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) who has been interested in resolving the problem of how to approx-
imate the meaning of a given sign through the explanation of its senses. Frege is usually mentioned as the originator of a triadic scheme (developed around 1892), in which three elements: *Zeichen, Sinn, Bedeutung* (interpreted as: “sign, sense, indication”) are engaged in grasping the meaning of a given sign, as an ideal object, through other signs of the same language (cf. Frege 1892, 100, as discussed by Eco 1979, 60–61).

**The Semantic Triangle and its Interpretational Variants**

As closer standing to Aristotle than to Ockham, one should consider the so-called semantic triangle known widely under the names of Ogden and Richards (1923), in which all three of its constituents form separate entities, and only one of them is a sign.

Model 10-2. Separate constituents of a semantic triangle

```
    [2]
   /|
  / \
[1]——[3]
```

Comparing various interpretations of a semantic triangle, one encounters more or less appropriate epistemological substitutes of its three original terms. The names for these [1–3] constituents of a semantic triangle can be traced in the proposals of various authors:

Model 10-3. Charles A. Ogden’s and Ivor A. Richards’ semantic triangle

\[ \text{THOUGHT (or reference)} \]

\[ \text{SYMBOL} \]

\[ \text{REFERENT} \]


Model 10-4. Gustav Stern’s constituents of a semantic triangle

\[ \text{MEANING} \]

\[ \text{WORD} \]

\[ \text{REFERENT} \]


Model 10-5. Stephen Ullmann’s constituents of a semantic triangle

\[ \text{SENSE} \]

\[ \text{NAME} \]

\[ \text{THING} \]

There are, however, also adherents of the concept of a semantic triangle who have tried to make use of a bilateral sign conception, as, for example:

Model 10-6. John Lyon’s four constituents within a three-angled scheme


Model 10-7. Pierre Guiraud’s placement of Saussurean bilateral sign within the scheme of a semantic triangle

The most remarkable divergence occurs in the interpretations of the term symbol used by Ogden and Richards. For that reason, a beginner in the field of linguistic semiotics has to choose from amongst different proposals. He/she must decide whether “symbol” is a word, a name, a form of
a word, or whether it may be considered as oneness in two manifestations, i.e., *both a signifying form and its acoustic image*.

Model 10-8. John Lyons’ and Pierre Guiraud’s constituents of a semantic triangle illustrated within the framework of a semantic quadrangle

John Lyons has introduced the term *word* as a unity of form and meaning, whereas Pierre Guiraud has treated “the physical form” and “its mental reflection” as two sides of a symbol. While Lyons has referred the *form* to a mental counterpart of the word, i.e., to mental meaning, Guiraud has regarded it as a concrete part of the bilateral sign in Saussurean outlining. To identify divergences in the formulations of a semantic triangle, one has to check the ontology of its constituents in comparison to those distinguished in particular conceptions of a unilateral sign.

When comparing the sign conception of Pierre Guiraud (cf. 1971 [1974]; 1971 [1975]) where separate entities are to be distinguished in the following definition: « un signe est un stimulus—c'est-à-dire une substance sensible—dont l'image mentale est associée dans notre esprit à celle d'un autre stimulus qu'il a pour fonction d'évoquer en vue d'une communication. ». (Guiraud 1971, 29), one can understand why it has been impossible to place the four constituents into the angles of a triangle, such as (1) the sign itself, (2) the mental image of the sign, (3) the mental image of the referent, and (4) the referent itself, in the following definition:

The sign is a stimulus (1), i.e., a sensorial substance, the mental image (2) of which is associated in our mind with the image (3) of another stimulus (4), and the function of which is to evoke the latter for communication. (Guiraud 1971 [1974], 29; the introduction of numbers and interpretation of respective terms after the French original and its Polish translation is ours: ZW).
Detachment of the Sign from Its Referent

The Implicational Nature of the Sign

Along with Plato and Aristotle, one should mention the Stoics who made a major contribution to the theory of sign and meaning in Antiquity. The main source of our knowledge about their teachings, including those of Chrysippos (c. 280–296 B.C.), are critical treatises (Against the Logicians; Against the Mathematicians or Against the Grammarians) of Sextus Empiricus (fl. c. 180–200 A.D.), one of the representatives of the Skeptics (cf. Sextus Empiricus 1933–1949, available in the English translation of Robert Gregg Bury, a British priest and scholar, 1869–1951).


(1) The Stoics treated signs as corporeal phenomena that reveal something what is real but non-evident through conditional implications;
(2) The Stoics have distinguished between logical inferences as ideal and incorporeal by nature and psychological judgments expressed in corporeal sentences;
(3) The Stoics viewed all signs as existing materially either in a sensible or intelligible form of a both cosmic and human soul in the activities of speaking and thinking. Only the meanings of the signs inferred through logical reasoning were considered as possessing an ideal form of existence;
(4) The Stoics noticed that signs occur not only in the realm of humankind but also among animals, although only humans can combine the past and the future with the present and speak about signs that are designates (referents) of other signs.

St. Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis, A.D. 354–430, one of the Latin fathers in the early Christian Church; bishop of Hippo in North Africa), a medieval philosopher, although a Platonist with respect to metaphysical matters in theology, is included among the continuators of Stoic thinking on the basis of his views regarding the semiotic nature of language. It is he who has placed signs among things the function of which is
to signify other things, and who has put forward the idea of “meta-designation”, i.e., the ability to speak in signs about other signs, as the main characteristics of human beings. To the most quoted definitions of sign belongs his statement (cf. Augustinus 1962):

Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire [A sign is that thing which, besides the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else beyond itself to come under one’s knowledge] (Augustinus 397 [1958], De doctrina Christiana, Liber secundus, I. 1., trans. is ours: ZW).

One has, however, to notice that St. Augustine’s attitude to the nature of meaning is, in fact, Aristotelian. It is probable that his doctrine about verbum interior (‘the inner word’), seen not as a replica of the spoken word of any language known by speakers, but identified with mental images, might well have its source in the Aristotelian belief about the meanings as thoughts of things being developed in the human mind. Aristotle is supposed to say that while words of national languages differ from one another, their mental counterparts must have universal character for all men.

In the same context, according to Rostilav Pazukhin (1983, 63), Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (Boëthius, A.D. 475?–525?), Roman philosopher and statesman, interpreted mental images as specific natural signs of things (cf. Boethius 1877/1880). The compromise between the Augustinian tenet of the heteromorphism of speaking and thinking—including the assumption that thoughts could be formed by means of mental signs before they are expressed in words—and the Boethian interpretation of Aristotle have found its reflection in the sign theory of Ockham.

As a result of Ockham’s nominalist views (mentioned above in the context of Aristotle) the logical theory of propositions has been developed claiming that there are two varieties of sentences having dissimilar structure and composition: mental sentences (propositiones mentales) and spoken sentences (propositiones vocales). However, in the investigative practice, modern logicians who adopt a positivistic attitude toward language understand the propositional content as referring to an ideal or abstract counterpart of a sentence, the bearer of truth or falsity.

Along these lines, it might be appropriate to emphasize that the contemporary usage of the term proposition reflects the Stoics’ mode of reasoning, when stressing the conditional character of logical inferences. To sum up, one should add that the teachings of Stoics have influenced not only the Scholastic thought in the Middle Ages, but have also survived
within the modern propositional logic developed from a positivistic and objectivistic point of view.

One may also agree with the conclusion that Stoicism as a semiotic approach to language is present in the work of contemporary logicians and linguists who follow a perspective of positivism, and who comply to the distinction between signification and indication, as well as between natural and conventional signs. It is especially true with respect to Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), and the Vienna Circle, Ludwig (Josef Johann) Wittgenstein (1889–1951), and the Lwów–Warsaw School, as well as Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963), and their followers and pupils (cf. Pazukhin 1983, 61; Louis Gerard Kelly in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 715–21; Dąmbska 1973, 7–14; Simone 1973, 19; and 31; Jacek Juliusz Jadacki in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 479; Holówka in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 936 and 939).

**Linguistic Functionalism as a Heritage of Stoic Tradition**

Stoicism is also embodied in the sign conception of Karl Ludwig Bühler, standing very close to the Prague School in respect to linguistic functionalism while footing at the same time on the psychological foundations as far as the theory of apperception is concerned. For Bühler (cf. 1934/1965, 28–36, and 1934/1982 [1990, 34–36]), the principal property of a concrete sign is seen in its representational function (*die Darstellungsfunction*).

In Bühler’s interpretation, the sign is defined as a perceptual thing standing for something else and used for the purposes of communication. With reference to “the principle of abstractive relevance” (*das Prinzip der abstraktiven Relevanz*), Bühler has stated that not all concretely realized features of the sign are important for the fulfillment of its communicative function (*die Mitteilungsfunktion*). However, some of them, which constitute its functionally relevant features, may appear as redundant in the event that they become reduced without disturbing the process of communication, and supplemented by receivers through their apperception (i.e., through the traces of their memorized experiences). Karl Bühler has contributed to the instrumentalist functionalism in linguistics, the result of which is the distinction between phonetics and phonology. The instrumentalist view of language, exposing the functionality of elements that play a
serviceable role in relation to their users or makers, has been borrowed, however, from intellectual trends prevailing in art and architecture.

The instrumentalist functionalism arose in the “climate of opinion”, popular in Austria, Switzerland and then in Germany after World War I, which promoted the perspectives of purpose-and-need-oriented rationalism in architecture, utility products, and environmental urbanist constructivism. Within an instrumentalist approach to function, the main attention of researchers was paid to abstractly relevant features inherent in the structure of elements playing a serviceable role with regard to human needs and social requirements (cf. Wąsik, E. 2011). Through the mediation of constructivism in applied arts and instrumentalist functionalism, which turned into a kind of functionalist structuralism aiming at the demarcation of what is typical and general from what is accidental and individual, researchers started to be interested in determining what is functionally relevant and irrelevant in the structure of their objects of study.

As a mode of thinking and tendency among intellectuals and architects, functionalism was opposed to expressionism. The propagators of functionalism postulated to consider the needs of average people while producing the utility goods which conform rationally to the requirements of everyday life and are not falsified by abundant ornament and useless form. The rationalist principle demanded that architecture and applied arts reflect pure relationships between humans and their environment while taking account of their biological, social and culture-creative nature. The followers of rationality principle in art and architecture exposed the adequacy of function in relation to purpose, and argued that the beauty is the mirror of what grows as a result of appropriate uses for specified purposes.

In Bühler’s instrumental model of language (das Organon Modell der Sprache, cf. Model 10-9), the sign was identified with a sensible phenomenon standing for something else (aliquid stat pro aliquo) and functioning as a tool by means of which one person communicates to another person about the real things and states of affairs lying beyond the sign itself. For Bühler, the fundamental property of the sign was seen in its symbolic function, i.e., its semantic capacity to represent other objects.

Bühler defined the communicative function of language along with the symbolic function of its signs in terms of a threefold performance of language while considering the role of the linguistic sign in its relation to the sender as a symptom, in its relation to the receiver—an appeal signal, and to the extralingual reality—a symbol (Cf. „Dreifach ist die Leistung der menschlichen Sprache, Kundgabe, Auslösung, Darstellung”. Bühler 1965, 28).
The circle in Model 10-9 illustrates the phenomenon of the sound, that is, the actual word spoken. The triangle demonstrates the linguistic sign and shares common space with the circle in some areas, while extending beyond it in other areas. This overlapping exposes the two key features of the relationship between the sign and its physical realization. Where the circle overlaps the triangle, the phenomenon sound contains more acoustic information than the sign does. The triangle also envelops space beyond the circle. This means that some part of the message may be missing due to either misspellings or omissions on the side of the sender, or because the channel is subjected to interferences. In this case, receivers are still able to fill in the gaps to create a meaningful message when they can mentally supply what got lost. This phenomenon is what Bühler has called an ‘apperceptive enlargement’ (*eine apperzeptive Ergänzung*).

Model 10-9. Karl Bühler’s instrumental model of language (adapted from Bühler 1965, 28 in conjunction with the respective terms translated into English; cf. Bühler 1990, 35)

The core of his theory constituted the definition of language as a semantic system with grammar and universal lexicon in a functional and ecological sense, i.e., the system that can be used everywhere by everyone for every task as a set (of classes) of text elements serving to communicate about the (set of classes of referents in the) extratextual reality.

Departing from the disciplinary-specific perspective of autonomous linguistics, Zawadowski, treated the sign as a token of a type of text-elements that represents a token belonging to another type of elements, called referents or extratextuals. He also opted for considering complexes of characteristic (functional) features of texts and extratextuals as a signifier and meaning, as a signified.

Model 10-10. Delimitation and abstraction of differential and non-differential features in the sequence of simple sign T and its referent R as meaning (adapted for didactic purposes from Zawadowski 1975, 84)

Zawadowski (1975) distinguished between the sets of individual and normal-usage features, on the one hand, and the mass of characteristic proper-
ties of the simple sign as a text-element and its referent, standing in a semantic relation of representation (T and R), on the other. By this, he subsumed meaning-bearers and referential meanings to the same category of observable objects. For example, his description of the T-element contained such features as, in particular: (1) the boundary of the total mass of sounds, (2) independent characteristic set, i.e., independent part of phonic social norm, (3) minimum differential set (phonemic, phonological, ‘relevant’, ‘functional’, or ‘distinctive’).

Accordingly, following Zawadowski one can find in the description of the referent, understood as an R-element of extratextual reality, respectively: (1) the boundary of the total mass of referent, (2) independent characteristic set, i.e., fundamental meaning (the norm of referent), and (3) minimum differential set (minimum differential meaning). Regarding the individual and social features of signs and their referents, Zawadowski labeled them as accidental features and reserve non-differential features, being redundant as such.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Epistemological Awareness in Translations of Semiotic Terms

Presenting the Objective of Inquiry

The aim of this chapter is, in general, to put forward an idea of epistemological equivalence, which should be achieved in translational praxis, and its focus concentrates, in particular, around the question of how the translations of sign-related terms selected from the students’ and editors’ lectures *Cours de linguistique générale (CLG)* of Ferdinand de Saussure reflect the epistemological, i.e., ontological and gnoseological, awareness of their translators (see Wąsik, Z. 2009a, 415).

The focus of the interpretative inquiry is Saussure’s model of the sign as a twofold entity consisting of mental parts, a signifier and a signified, which mutually imply each other. For that reason, some original samples of quotations from the text of *CLG* are confronted with an earlier German translation and two distinct translations into English in order to check how the possible meaning disparateness of analyzed terms may exert an impact upon the addressees of lectures in general linguistics and semiotics.

In concluding remarks, the proposal for an ecumenical translation is submitted, where the knowledge of scholarly traditions and the epistemological connotations of discipline-specific terms establish the central aim of a translator’s schooling. Hence, a critical approach to the translational praxis, with special reference to its interpretative consequences, which have a place in academic teaching, appears to be indispensable (for details see Wąsik, Z. 2009a, 415–428; and 2014, 97–109).

On the Idea of Epistemological Equivalence in Translation

To explain the investigative perspective of his inquiry, the author departs from the assumption that epistemology deals with the philosophical foun-
lations of human knowledge being accumulated in the body of theories and methods which result from the research activities of scientists. Accordingly, the purpose of an epistemological analysis of the scientific discipline in question is seen in the examination of the extent to which the scientists are aware of the correspondence between the respective views on their object of study and its investigative approachability (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 13; 2009a, 415; for more on this see Chapter Two).

As to evaluative aspects of translational praxis constituting this investigative domain, the category of epistemological equivalence is considered at the word level following the classificatory proposals of Mona Baker (1992, 11–12) and detailed distinctions summarized in the compilation of Dorothy Kenny (1998). However, in conformity with the statement of Jean-Paul Vinay and Jean Darbelnet (1958/1968 [1995]), the notion of equivalence is associated not only with a semantic search for corresponding expressions which are listed in bilingual dictionaries. Hence, it is worthwhile to quote the opinion of the authors who state that “the need for creating equivalences” should arise from the situations to which the translated texts refer, because the entries in the dictionaries can not always be recognized as exhaustive (cf. Vinay & Darbelnet [1995, 255–256]). Even if the semantic equivalent of an expression in the source language text is available in a dictionary, it is not sufficient for creating an accurate translation. So, the equivalence-oriented translation could be viewed as a kind of procedure that “replicates the same situation as in the original, whilst using completely different wording” (Vinay & Darbelnet [1995, 342]).

In view of the terminological distinctions of Vinay and Darbelnet introduced in 1958, practitioners of linguistic semiotics are advised to be aware of the fact that, for arriving at translational equivalence, the stylistic impact of the source language text has to be maintained in the target language text. This estimated impact might eventually be redefined, following Eugene Albert Nida’s proposals (1964, 159), as a dynamic correspondence based upon “the principle of equivalent effect” between the terms functioning in appropriate texts of source languages and target languages, which have been regarded as two different codes in Roman Osi- povich Jakobson’s framework (1959/1971, 233), for whom “translation involves two equivalent messages in two different codes”.

In the light of pragmatics, it is worth mentioning that the terms being translated should have, according to Juliane House (1977, 203), the same argumentative or expository force. To be added is also the conviction of Eugene Albert Nida and Charles Russell Taber (1982/2003, 200) who state
that the equivalent effect occurs in a situation when a translator seeks to translate the referential meaning of an original term in such a way that the target-language wording will exert the same communicative impact on the target-text addressees as the original source language wording did upon the source-text addressees.

Entering the domain of the following study from a methodological perspective, one has to take for granted that the epistemological commitments of translators regarding the existence mode and cognoscibility of objects, to which the translated terms in question refer, might undoubtedly be stipulated by their choice of investigative attitudes acquired through education or borrowed from the climate of intellectual opinion prevailing at a specific time in a respective discipline of science.

Ferdinand de Saussure’s Bilateral Sign as a Type of Semiotic Object

The object of analysis in the domain of translational study on the basis of Saussure’s lectures represents here an absolute-rationalist model of the sign as an indivisible entity of two sides evoking each other in the mind of a communicating individual during his or her understanding and interpreting activities. A comprehensive survey of terminological distinctions, derived from logical, philosophical and linguistic semiotics would be relevant for presenting the position of this bilateral-sign conception among all models of the sign which have originated in the sciences of language and culture (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2009b, 126–127).

Worth mentioning, in this context, is the question (extensively discussed in Chapter Ten, pp. 165–166) of their existence modes, where signs are specified in terms of a one-sided item or a many-sided composite encompassing interrelated constituents, or a network of relations between those constituents. Additional kinds of questions refer to the manifestation forms of signs, that is, whether they appear as concrete or abstract objects in material or spiritual (physical or psychical) forms of being, whether they are observed inside or outside of the mind as real or ideal, sensible or intelligible, namely as extraorganismic or intraorganismic phenomena. Accordingly, from a gnoseological perspective, signs are approached either extra- or introspectively, through individual tokens or general types, occurring in the realm of humans only, in the realm of all living systems, or in the universe of creatures, extraterrestrial and divine in nature.
Controversies in the Translations of the Two Sides of the Linguistic Sign

Having confronted a number of quotations coming from the French original of *CLG* with their two distinct translations into English against the background of the preceding German translation, the author of this study tries to evaluate various connotations of analyzed terms while pondering how they may exert an impact upon the recipients of educational discourse in semiotics. The following three groups of examples should illustrate the search for translational equivalence in rendering the French terms of [I] the mental representation of the linguistic sign in «*concepts*» and «*images acoustiques*», [II] the definition of the bilateral sign: «Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique», and [III] the replacement of «*concept et image acoustique*» respectively by «*signifié et signifiant*».

Translating the Two Mental Sides of the Linguistic Sign

The two sides of the sign called originally *concept* and *image acoustique* had no uniform interpretations in languages other than French when Sausser’s lectures, published by his pupils after his death, came to the foreground of semiotic structuralism in Europe among linguists and later sociolinguists and anthropologists of culture. This is visible in the comparison of excerpted fragments from the original translated into German and English in two different versions (the second one is marked by a bold font). Cf.

[I]

Le point de départ du circuit est dans le cerveau de l’une, par example A, où les faits de conscience, que nous appellerons concepts, se trouvent associés aux représentations des signes linguistiques ou images acoustiques servant à leur expressions. Supposons qu’un concept donné déclanche dans le cerveau une image acoustique correspondante : c’est un phénomène entièrement *psychique*, suivi à son tour d’un procès *physiologique* : le cerveau transmet aux organes de la phonation une impulsion correlative à l’image : puis les ondes sonores se propageut de la bouche de A à l’oreille de B : procès purement *physique*. (*Saussure 1916/1922, 28–29*)
Model 11-1. Ferdinand de Saussure’s *concept* and *image acoustique* mutually implying each other as mental constituents of a bilateral sign

![Diagram](image)

Der Ausgang des Kreislaufes liegt im Gehirn des Einen, z. B. A, wo Bewuβtseinsvorgänge, die wir Vorstellungen schlechthin nennen wollen, mit den Vorstellungen der sprachlichen Zeichen oder akustischen Bilder assoziiert sind, welche zu deren Ausdruck dienen. Stellen wir uns vor, daß eine gegebene Vorstellung im Gehirn ein Lautbild auslöst: das ist ein durchaus psychischer Vorgang, dem seinerseits ein physiologischer Prozeß folgt: das Gehirn übermittelt den Sprechorganen einen Impuls, der dem Lautbild entspricht; dann breiten sich die Schallwellen aus dem Munde des A zum Ohr des B hin: ein rein physikalischer Vorgang. (Saussure 1922 [1931, 13–15])

Model 11-1.1. Hermann Lommel’s translation of *concept* and *image acoustique* as two mental sides of a bilateral sign

![Diagram](image)

Suppose that the opening of the circuit is in A’s brain, where mental facts (concepts) are associated with representations of the linguistic sounds (sound-images) that are used for their expression. A given concept unlocks a corresponding sound-image in the brain; this purely psychological phenomenon is followed in turn by a physiological process: the brain transmits an impulse corresponding to the image to the organs used in producing sounds. Then the sound waves travel from the mouth of A to the ear of B: a purely physical process. (Saussure 1916 [1959], 11–12)
Chapter Eleven

188

Model 11-1.2. Wade Baskin’s translation of concept and image acoustique as two mental sides of a bilateral sign

The starting point of the circuit is in the brain of one individual, for instance A, where facts of consciousness which we shall call concepts are associated with representations of linguistic signs or sound patterns by means of which they may be expressed. Let us suppose that a given concept triggers in the brain a corresponding sound pattern. This is an entirely psychological phenomenon, followed in turn by a physiological process: the brain transmits to the organs of phonation an impulse corresponding to the pattern. Then sound waves are sent from A’s mouth to B’s ear, a purely physical process. (Saussure 1972 [1983, 11–12])

Model 11-1.3. Roy Harris’ translation of concept and image acoustique as two mental sides of a bilateral sign

In the German edition of 1931, Hermann Lommel has translated the French term concept (‘concept’) as Vorstellung, i.e., ‘(mental) image’ or ‘(mental) idea’, and image acoustique ‘acoustic image’ as Laubild, i.e., ‘sound-image’. As a consequence, the difference between the epistemological positions of German and French terms may be more understandable if one confronts with each other the definitions of Vorstellung, and the German Begriff (which is exactly an equivalent of the French term concept).

With reference to a lexicographic sense, one has to explain that the German entry word Vorstellung refers, in effect, not to a denotative meaning of the mental image or idea as a product, but rather to a mental imagi-
Epistemological Awareness in Translations of Semiotic Terms

nation; whereas the imagination itself is to be understood as a psychical process involving, in the consciousness, an evocation of the images of objects and situations which, at a given moment, do not effect the sensorial organs of a human individual, but are based on past perceptions and/or fantasies (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 113; 2009a, 421).

As far as the German *Begriff* is concerned, it might be perhaps translated not only as a “concept” but also as a “notion” into English. One has to be aware, at this instant, of the synonymous or vague connotations of both terms *notion* vs. *concept* occurring in the English philosophical literature, as it has been noticed by Alfred Tarski who expressed serious doubts in his endnote no. 4 to the article “The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics” (Tarski 1944, 341–375): “sometimes they refer simply to a term, sometimes to what is meant by a term, and in other cases to what is denoted by a term. Sometimes it is irrelevant which of these interpretations is meant; and in certain cases perhaps none of them applies adequately”.

It is obvious, therefore, why the term *notion*, etymologically pertaining to “knowledge” and/or “cognition” (cf. the derivatives of Latin *noscere* ‘to come to know’ or *notificare* ‘to make known’ having its roots in the Greek *gignóskéin*) has never been applied in the translation of Saussurean terms. As a matter of fact, only the English “conceive” as a verb of action might be compared with a respective derivational base of the German *begreifen*, in the sense ‘to grasp’, ‘to capture’ or ‘to comprehend’ what someone says.

The English term *concept* (descendent from the Latin *conceptum* ‘something conceived’, originally neuter of *conceptus*, a past participle of *concipere*; cf. Old French *conceivre* having its roots in the Latin *concipere* ‘to take fully’, ‘take in’ composed of *con-* + *-cipere*, a combinatorial form of *capere* ‘to take’) refers to the connotative meaning of a name, mental equivalent of the set of features characteristic for objects, to which the name is referred, i.e., their designates in particular (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 113 and Random House 1992/1995/1997, Webster’s College Dictionary, discussed by Wąsik, Z. 2009a, 421).

Differences in the understanding of original terms following Saussure’s depiction of the rational nature of a two-sided sign have without doubt their source in the lack of distinctions between imaginationist psychology, which pertains to the mental activity of visualizing the shape of cognized and perceived phenomena and events as individual tokens, and conceptualist psychology, which exposes the mental recollection of characteristic (or similar) features of phenomena and events formed and con-
cluded as general types. Being engaged in the translation of the two sides of the bilateral sign, one has to take for granted that both the *signified* and the *signifier* might be rendered in terms of imaginative reflections evoked by sensorial-perceptive features of things and names in the consciousness of sign users.

In the same way also, within the framework of conceptualist psychology, making a reference to knowledge about the characteristic sets of tokens and types of signs as well as their designates, one is entitled to assume that both the signified and the signifying sides have mental equivalents of these sets in the consciousness of their users, namely, the conceived minimal mass of differential features of a referent should have as a counterpart the conceived minimal mass of differential features of a sign-vehicle. However, such a distinction does not exist, in the logical, philosophical or psychological terminology, as the conceptual features of the sign, in other words, a conceived, i.e. mental reflection of characteristic features of a sign corresponding to the concept of a referent (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 113; discussed also by Wąsik, Z. 2009a, 421).

A careful researcher being trained in epistemological distinctions of psychology may become aware of the fact that the German translator has located both terms of Saussure within the domain of imaginationist psychology, pertaining as such to mental associations which form a configuration of simultaneous properties that cannot be derived by the summation of its componential parts.

As to the English translation of the French *concept* and *image acoustique* their word-for-word translations in terms of “concept” and “acoustic image” had functioned in the intellectual climate of opinion of linguists and semioticians until the time when the two respective terms were first rendered as *concept* and *sound-image* by Wade Baskin, and then replaced by Roy Harris, in his translation of *CLG*, through the terms *concept* and *sound pattern*. To explain his reasons for rendering *image acoustique* not as “*acoustic image*” but as *sound-image* the former editor, Baskin, made the following observation in a footnote:

> The term *sound-image* may seem to be too restricted inasmuch as beside the representation of the sounds of a word is also that of its articulation, the muscular image of the phonational act. But for F. de Saussure language is essentially a depository, a thing received from without (see p. 13). The sound-image is *par excellence* the natural representation of the word as a fact of potential language, outside any actual use of it in speaking. The
Harris’ proposal to introduce the term *sound pattern* appears to be suitable for subsuming both sides of the bilateral sign under the same epistemological position. It is remarkable that both *concept* and *sound pattern* belong to the domain of conceptualist psychology, as far as they refer to the types of similarities between particular tokens of the sign constituents. With reference to the position of earlier English terms in Baskin’s translation, one has to state that his *sound-image* and the original French term *image acoustique* remain in the same domain of imaginationist psychology; whereas both the English term “concept” and the French *concept* are to be subsumed under the heading of conceptualist psychology.

Model 11-1.4. Possible German rendering of Saussurean *concept* and *image acoustique* within the framework of conceptualist psychology

As far as the German translations are concerned, *Begriff* and *Lautmuster* would possibly be more appropriate as translational equivalents against the background of the English “concept” and “sound pattern”, which coincide with each other as belonging to the domain of conceptualist psychology. In this sense, the terms “sound pattern” and *Lautmuster* would be placed in opposition to “sound-image” and *Lautbild* in English and German.

**Searching for Translational Equivalence in the Definition of a Bilateral Sign**

A similar problem, as with the translation of its constituents, occurs also with the definition of the linguistic sign as a two-sided psychic entity (a so-to speak psychic entity with “two facets”) translated from the original: « Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique ». There is, however, a noticeable exception in the
English proposal of Roy Harris, rendering the statement: ‘The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name, but a concept and an acoustic image’, having been known from the climate of opinion as a literal, word-for-word translation by: “A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern”.

More divergences are seen in the translation of the second consequential statement: « Ces deux éléments sont intimement unis et s’appellent l’un l’autre » [‘these two elements are intimately united and appeal (to themselves), each to the other’]. Against the background of the German translation: „Diese beiden Bestandteile sind eng miteinander verbunden und entsprechen einander“, the sentence in question might be rendered in the following words: ‘Both of these constituents are closely linked to each other and correspond each to the other’.

Probably closer to Lommel’s translation stands the interpretation made by Harris with reference to the idea of a linking relationship assumed to exist between the two sides of the linguistic sign. Compare, in this respect, the first part of Baskin’s translation: “The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the other” with Harris’: “These two elements are intimately linked and each triggers the other”.

The same, however, cannot be said about the second part of the sentence as regards the equivalence at a word level, when one confronts the French phrase « s’appellent l’un l’autre » with the German „entsprechen einander“ and the English (in Baskin’s translation) “each recalls the other” or (in Harris’ translation) “each triggers the other”.

In French, the latter phrase, « s’appellent l’un l’autre », means exactly ‘evoke each other’, which is not at all reflected in the German „entsprechen einander“ (which should be literally rendered as ‘correspond to each other’). As regards the sentence: “These two elements are intimately linked”, to be added is, at the margin of this particular study devoted to the analysis semiotic terms only, that the English word “intimately” can be seen rather as a literal substitute of the French « intimente », than an equivalent at a word level, as it is the case with the German „eng“ where both refer to the connotative meaning of ‘close’, or, to be exact, ‘tight’. Cf.

[II]
Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique. …
Le signe linguistique est donc une entité psychique à deux faces …
Ces deux éléments sont intimement unis et s’appellent l’un l’autre.
(Saussure 1922, 98–99)
Das sprachliche Zeichen vereinigt in sich nicht einen Namen und eine Sache, sondern eine Vorstellung und ein Lautbild. (Saussure 1931, 77)
Dieses beiden Bestandteile sind eng miteinander verbunden und entsprechen einander. (Saussure [1931, 78])

The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. …
The linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity. …
The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the other. (Saussure [1959, 65–66])

A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern. …
The linguistic sign is, then, a two-sided psychological entity. …
These two elements are intimately linked and each triggers the other. (Saussure [1983, 66])

Detecting Incongruous Renditions of Two Mental Sides of the Linguistic Sign

Having evaluated the selected quotations, an inquisitive semiotician—who refers to the distinction of Victor Huse Yngve (1996, 209–210) between the physical domain of observable concatenations of facts or processes and the logical domain of inferable associations linking related factual or processual phenomena—may find out that Baskin’s terms in English, signified and signifier, could be considered rather as standing quite close to the translational equivalents of Lommel’s terms in German. However, having compared Bezeichnetes and Bezeichnung (Bezeichnendes) from the translated text with Bezeichnetes and Bezeichnendes from the graphical depiction of the two-sided sign as presented in Model 11-2.2., he or she could expect also a word-for-word rendering of French signifié and signifiant by ‘signified’ and ‘signifying’ in English. They might also come to the conclusion that significant in French and Bezeichnendes in German represent a gerund form derived from the verb and functioning as a noun. As a matter of fact, signifier and signifying are two distinct word forms. The grammatical category, to which the word signifier belongs, is an ad-verbal noun composed of the word stem signifi- (from the word basis signify) and an inflectional affix -er. Accordingly, in confrontation with the French original
and Lommel’s translation into German, Baskin’s passage might have been formulated as follows: “I propose to retain the word sign to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image (acoustic image) respectively by signified and signifier (signifying) …”.

Nevertheless, against the background of semiotic tradition, one has to regard Harris’ replacement of Saussurean terms signifié and signifiant by signification and signal as epistemologically incommensurable. A potential reader, or participant of educational discourse, is to be made aware that the word signification connotes, without a doubt, an act of indicating an object in the domain of reference, that is, the process of referring to significance, content, importance, or sense, of a given sign; whereas signal implies a token of the concrete sign type which evokes feelings, reactions of sign-utilizers, or indicates either an observed or concluded representation of its object of reference in the extrasemiotic reality. Hence, the difference between signification and signal lies in their belonging to two divergent existence modes of the signifying and the signified parts of the sign; exactly saying, to the logical domain of rational associations and the physical domain of empirical observations. But the same cannot be said about the imputed meaning of ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’ (eventually ‘signifying’) as translational equivalents of signifié and signifiant. Compare quotations:

[III]
Nous proposons de conserver de mot signe pour désigner le total, et de remplacer concept et image acoustique respectivement par signifié et signifiant ; ces derniers termes ont l’avantage de marquer l’opposition qui les sépare soit entre eux, soit du total dont il font partie. (Saussure 1922, 99)

Model 11-2.1. Ferdinand de Saussure’s terms signifié and signifiant

Ich schlage also vor, daß man das Wort Z e i c h e n beibehält für das Ganze, und Vorstellung bzw. Lautbild durch Bezeichnetes und Bezeichnung (Bezeichnendes) ersetzt; die beiden letzteren Ausdrücke haben den Vorzug, den Gegensatz hervorzuheben, der sie voneinander trennt und von dem Ganzen, dessen Teile sie sind. (Saussure [1931, 78–79])
Model 11-2.2. Hermann Lommel’s translation of *signifié* and *signifiant*

I propose to retain the word *sign* [signe] to designate the whole and to replace *concept* and *sound-image* respectively by *signified* [signifié] and *signifier* [signifiant]; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts. (Saussure [1959, 67])

Model 11-2.3. Wade Baskin’s translation of *signifié* and *signifiant*

We propose to keep the term *sign* to designate the whole, but to replace *concept* and *sound pattern* respectively by *signification* and *signal*. The latter terms have the advantage of indicating the distinction which separates each from the other and both from the whole of which they are part. (Saussure [1983, 67])

Model 11-2.4. Roy Harris’ translation of *signifié* and *signifiant*
Postulating an Epistemological Ecumenism in Translation Studies

As concluding remarks, the necessity of an ecumenical translation is to be postulated, in which familiarity with the scholarly traditions and knowledge of the epistemological connotations of discipline-specific terms within the boundaries of competing schools of scientific thought might constitute the core of the translator’s attention.

Model 11-2.5. Possible rendering of Saussurean signifié and signifiant by “signified” and “signifying” after Wade Baskin’s translation

![Diagram]

signified

signifying

Model 11-2.6. Possible rendering of Saussurean signifié and signifiant by “signification” and “significate” as two mental sides of a bilateral sign after Roy Harris’ proposal

![Diagram]

signification

significate

Accordingly, critical approaches to the translational praxis with special reference to the problem of epistemological positions of educational semiotics against the background of scientific heritage appear to be useful. Bearing this postulate in mind it might be advisable to replace Baskin’s term “signifier” by “signifying” as a grammatical equivalent of signifiant and Bezeichnendes and Harris’ term “signal” by “significate” as a mental equivalent of the respective term signifier.
PART IV

THE SEMIOTIC SELF IN DISCURSIVE DOMAINS OF EVERYDAY LIFE
CHAPTER TWELVE

Modeling the Conceptual Types of Semiotic Objects

Epistemological Positions of Sign-and-Its-Referent Relationships and the Theories of Meaning

This chapter (basing on Wasik 2014, 111–126) assesses how to present the status of semiotic objects equalized with the sign as an entity, or the unity of the sign and its reference, and the nature of semiotic meaning. As has been summarized in search of historical roots, popular conceptions of the sign and/or meaning, that prevail in semiotic tradition are formulated either in terms of a unilateral sign, in which the objects playing the signifying and signified roles are detached as separate entities, or a bilateral sign, the constitutive sides of which, the signifier and the signified, comprise a twofold unit. Some semioticians adhere to the conception of a semantic triangle with three constituents forming separate entities, and some prefer the conception of a trilateral sign constituting a threefold unit as a oneness.

Bearing in mind that the existing varieties of sign conceptions exhibit not only differences in the usage of terminology but also in the formation of their visual representations, it is indispensable to find a parameter that contains features and constituents specific for particular approaches to their forms of being and manifestation. Having noticed that all constituents of hitherto existing sign conceptions are to be found within the structure of a semantic quadrangle, the author proposes to consider the usefulness of a typological matrix which respectively encompasses suitable explanatory and illustrative primitives.

In the search for descriptive parameters, the focus of this chapter is on validating the applicative value of a positivist’s sign conception in which the sign-vehicle as a meaning-bearer is detached from its referent as a meaning. In this instance, according to a functionalist principle of abstractive relevance, the unilateral sign conception is discussed as distinguishing between the sets of individual- and normal-usage features and the mass of
characteristic properties of the sign and its referent(s). And, in another instance, the emphasis is put on providing evidence about the usefulness of combined empiricist and rationalist perspectives for illustrating a multipolar character of semiotic objects with regard to their inferable essence and observable relevance.

An important epistemological distinction that has an impact upon the categorization of sign conceptions depends on answering the question whether the sign is to be viewed as a token or a type (an exemplar or a class, an item, or a kind). It is explicitly the distinction between tokens and types which pertains to the manifestation forms not only of signs, but also of designates they represent in extrasemiotic reality, i.e., to the objects which are called referents.

Having reviewed a plentiful assortment of all hitherto known sign conceptions brought to a common denominator within the framework of a semantic quadrangle, the following analysis demonstrates how its two main constituents, namely the broadly defined sign and its referent, as a token and type—with their collective and individual properties exclusively and inclusively and in their concrete and mental manifestation forms—may be modeled as oscillating between logical positivism, rational empiricism, empirical rationalism, and absolute rationalism.

Primary attention in semiotics is given not only to the manifestation forms of signs, but also to their referential meaning. However, the term meaning does not stand in one-to-one correspondence to various formulations of the notional scope of the sign as a basic category of semiotics. Hence, a representative of a particular semiotic discipline has to decide, which among various specifications of meaning deserves to be treated as a semiotic concept, and which should be labeled as a non-semiotic concept.

**Asking for the *Genus Proximum* of the Linguistic Sign**

To distinguish between a sign and a non-sign, one has to ask for its *genus proximum*. In this context, a well-known formula *aliquid stat pro aliquo*, ‘something stands for something else’, applied by Karl Bühler while defining the verbal sign as “the phenomenon susceptible of sense perception, normally an acoustic phenomenon” [„das sinnlich wahrnehmbare, gewöhnlich akustische Phänomen”] (see Bühler 1934/1982 [1990], 25, 40], 31, 47, cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 96, 2014, 112), does not appear to be advantageous for the aims of linguistics, because it requires elaborating an
extensive set of the *differentia specifica*. In order not to oscillate between various conceptions, one has to find a determining feature common for all notional scopes of the term *sign*. And such a proposal may be deduced from the classification of semiotic *phenomena*, specified as something that is recognized as it appears or as it is experienced by senses, or sensorial *stimuli*, understood as something that excites the body and activates the mind. In the first instance, definitional properties of the sign, as exposed in Model 12-1.1, may be determined by four positively marked levels of phenomena: (i) non-implicative vs. implicative, (ii) non-artificial vs. artificial, (iii) non-semantic vs. semantic, or (iv) non-arbitrary vs. arbitrary.

Model 12-1.1. A classificatory view of cognizable and apprehensible phenomena

```
phenomenon
  non-implicative  implicative
    non-artificial  artificial
      non-semantic  semantic
        non-arbitrary  arbitrary
```

Model 12-1.2. A classificatory view of sensorially perceivable and mentally apperceiveable stimuli

```
stimulus
  non-associated  associated
    non-intentional  intentional
      non-inferred  inferred
        non-conventional  conventional
```

An alternative explanation can be also made in terms of stimuli preferred by mind- and body-centered practitioners of semiotics. As illustrated in Model 12-1.2 (adapted from Wąsik, Z. 2009b, 126; 2010d, 561), one may in the second instance utilize distinctions between: (i) non-associated vs. associated, (ii) non-intentional vs. intentional, (iii) non-inferred vs. inferred, (iv) non-conventional stimuli vs. conventional. To be more precise, in the classificatory approach to associated stimuli, the term *conventional* is
often reduced, especially in linguistic writings, to the connotative meaning of the term arbitrary, i.e., free and non-motivated.

Model 12-2. Verbal and non-verbal signs among other types of semiotic objects

Taking into consideration that language is usually defined as a system of signs, one has to be aware that the sign as a semiotic object should occupy a lowest place in the hierarchy of experiencable phenomena or sensible stimuli (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 107; 2003; 97; 2005, 89; 2009b, 126; and 2010d, 561). As Model 12-2 illustrates, semiotic objects can appear in the role of:

— index as an implicative phenomenon or an associated stimulus,
— symptom as an implicative non-artificial phenomenon or an associated non-intentional stimulus,
— signal as an implicative artificial phenomenon or an associated intentional stimulus,
— appeal as an implicative artificial non-semantic phenomenon or an associated intentional non-inferred phenomenon,
— symbol as an implicative artificial semantic phenomenon or an associated intentional inferred stimulus,
— icon as an implicative artificial semantic non-arbitrary phenomenon or an associated intentional inferred non-conventional stimulus, and
— sign as an implicative artificial semantic arbitrary phenomenon or an associated intentional inferred conventional stimulus.

Thus, the linguistic sign may be viewed in the hierarchy of semiotic objects, such as a (1) non-implicative vs. implicative phenomenon or non-associated vs. associated stimulus, i.e., non-index vs. index, (2) non-artificial (natural) vs. artificial phenomenon or non-intentional vs. intentional stimulus, i.e., (indexical) symptom vs. signal, (3) non-inferred vs. inferred phenomenon or non-semantic vs. semantic stimulus, i.e., (signaling) appeal vs. symbol, (4) non-arbitrary vs. arbitrary stimulus or non-conventional vs. conventional phenomenon, i.e., (iconic) symbol vs. (signifying) symbol.
On the Ontological Typology of Sign Conceptions

Varieites of sign conceptions discussed in the previous chapter exhibit not only differences in the terminology, but also in the formation of their visual representations. With consideration of the need for their comparison, one has to elaborate a matrix that contains all features and constituents being specific for particular approaches to their ontological status (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1998, 48; 2003, 100; 2005, 90; 2009b, 128; and 2010d, 562).

Model 12-3. A matrix for the typology of sign conceptions with respect to their ontological status

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{the sign} & = & \text{as an entity, a unity, a relation or a relational network} \\
\text{the relation} & = & \text{---} \\
E & = & \text{extraorganismic (concrete, sensible)} \\
I & = & \text{intraorganismic (mental, intelligible)} \\
S & = & \text{stimulus (sign-vehicle, signifier, expression)} \\
R & = & \text{reaction (referent, signified, content)} \\
\end{array}
\]

Through the application of a unified scheme, as in Model 12-3, one can expose seven types of sign conceptions according to their ontological status (discussed from a historical perspective in Wąsik, Z. 1995, 209–217). An overview of semiotic thought (cf. Chart 12-1, adapted from Wąsik, Z. 1998, 49–50; 2003, 100; 2005, 90; 2009b, 127; and in particular 2010d, 563) has shown that the manifestation forms of the sign are expressed in the conception of: (I) a unilateral sign in which the sign-vehicle and the referent are treated as separate entities, (II) a bilateral sign where its signifier and its signified constitute a twofold mental unity, (III) a semantic triangle in which the sign-vehicle, the meaning as a thought or notion, and the referent form separate parts, and (III') a trilateral sign where the sign-vehicle, the meaning as an interpretant generating (an)other sign(s), and the object of reference constitute a threefold unity.

As separate varieties occur also (II') the sign as a dyadic relation and (III') the sign as a triadic relation. So far, the quadrilateral sign as an entity
or the sign as a tetradic relation (or a fourfold relation), i.e., a network of relationships between the four “sign-arguments”, has not been postulated at all. Anyway, such types as (IV’) and (IV’’’) are admissible (when the bilateral or trilateral sign, or the sign as a dyadic relation, or the sign as a triadic relation might be considered as theoretically justified). Some conceptions are distributed in semiotic writings, e.g., Iα (Karl Bühler, 1934), Iβ (Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis, c. 397–426), Iγ (Wiesław Łukaszewski, 1974), Iδ (Louis Trolle Hjelmslev, 1943), II (Ferdinand de Saussure, 1916), II’ (Sydney MacDonald Lamb, 1991), IIIα (William of Ockham, c. 1323/1951), IIIβ (Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards, 1923), IIIγ John Lyons, 1968), IIIδ, and IV (Pierre Guiraud, 1971). Some others are potential or occur as parts of other conceptions, as, e.g., I(δ) within II, and Iβ within IIIβ, Iγ within III(γ). However, the conceptions of (III’) the trilateral sign (Gottlob Frege, 1892, Charles Sanders Peirce, c. 1897, cf. Peirce 1931–1938), and (III’) the sign as a triadic relation (Charles Sanders Peirce, c. 1897) do not fit within the proposed framework, but may be explained in terms of accepted primitives.

Bringing the explanatory and illustrative primitives to a common denominator, as illustrated in Model 12-3, and Models 12-4a and 12-4b (after Wąsik, Z. 1996, 290; 1998, 51; 2003, 102; 2005, 91; and 2010d, 566), one may notice that all distinguished varieties of sign conceptions embrace the four elements of (IV) a semantic quadrangle, such as:

(1) an externalized repraesentans
(i.e., the externalized signifying object as a concrete sign),

(2) an internalized reflection of the repraesentans
(i.e., the internalized signifying object as a mental sign),

(3) an externalized repraesentatum
(i.e., the externalized signified object as a concrete referent), and

(4) an internalized reflection of the repraesentatum
(i.e., the internalized signified object as a mental referent).
Chart 12-1. Ontological varieties of sign conceptions

I. The unilateral sign

II. The bilateral sign

III. The semantic triangle

IV. The semantic quadrangle

III'. The trilateral sign

III''. The sign as a triadic relation

IV'. The quadrilateral sign

IV''. The sign as a tetradic relation
Model 12-4a. The sign and its referent as constituents of a semantic quadrangle

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\bigcirc & = & \text{individual properties of S as the sign or the sign as a token} \\
\square & = & \text{individual properties of R as the referent or the referent as a token}
\end{array}
\]

With respect to mutual relationships between the constituents of this semantic quadrangle in question, which have been illustrated in Chart 12-2a and furthermore Chart 12-2b, one may notice the four kinds of ontological implications in the observed and inferred reality, namely:

(A) a sensible extraorganismic sign implies its sensible extraorganismic referent
   (i.e., ES⇒ER, rendered as concrete sign and concrete referent),

(B) an intelligible intraorganismic sign implies its sensible extraorganismic referent
   (i.e., IS⇒ER, rendered as mental sign and concrete referent),

(C) a sensible extraorganismic sign implies its intelligible intraorganismic referent,
   (i.e., ES⇒IR, rendered as concrete sign and mental referent),

(D) an intelligible intraorganismic sign implies its intelligible intraorganismic referent
   (i.e., IS⇒IR, rendered as mental sign and mental referent).
Chart 12-2a. The sign and its referent in multipolar relationships

(A) Concrete sign stands for concrete referent = ES implies ER

(B) Concrete sign triggers mental referent = ES implies IR

(C) Mental sign is referred to concrete referent = IS implies ER

(D) Mental sign is linked to mental referent = IS implies IR

In the context of the sign functioning as a meaning-bearer belonging to the domain of semiotic objects, the notion of meaning appears to be heterogeneous; for that reason, it should be thus discussed separately.

The Sign and its Referent Within the Framework of a Semantic Quadrangle

Another kind of distinction that can have an impact upon a number of multipolar relationships between constituents of sign conceptions depends on the answer to the question whether the sign is to be regarded as a token
or a type (in the sense: a specimen or a class, an item or a kind). This distinction, however, between tokens and types concerns not only the manifestation forms of signs but also the objects of reality they stand for, refer to or signify, i.e., which they represent, evoke, or indicate, namely those objects which are named referents.

In a much-generalized way, it is assumed that the main task attributed to signs consists in representation. In order to state what the representation of a given sign is, one has to determine the status of the repraesentans to which it corresponds, i.e., whether it is localized on the levels of indication, signalization, symbolization, or signification. Specifying, for example, the concept of a verbal sign (a word, a name, a locution or a text element, and the like) for the needs of language sciences, one should rather opt for its narrow understanding on the level of signification, i.e., as an arbitrary semantic intentional associated stimulus.

It is a matter of epistemological preferences as to what names are ascribed to the constituents or the entities of the domain of signification. They may be specified either as signifier and signified, or as sign and referent, repraesentans and repraesentatum, significans and significatum. They may be also treated separately as sign and designate, sign and signify, or name and designate (nominatum, signum and significatum, signum and referent, designator and designatum, and the like).

Model 12-4b. The sign and its referent as a token and a type in a unified scheme of the semantic quadrangle

\[ IS \quad IR \]
\[ ES \quad ER \]

- \( \bigcirc \) = individual properties of \( S \) as the sign or the sign as a token
- \( \bigotimes \) = collective properties of \( S \) as the sign or the sign as a type
- \( \Box \) = individual properties of \( R \) as the referent or the referent as a token
- \( \bigotimes \bigotimes \) = collective properties of \( R \) as the sign or the referent as a type
To avoid any adherence to psychological or logical conceptions, it might be appropriate to use the term *referent* for a *repraesentatum* of the sign as relatively unmarked. In the logical-philosophical usage, the term designate entails the counterpart of a name considered under the aspect of truth, and the term signify connotes rather the meaning of an abstract correlate embodying the *raison d’être* of the sign.

Taking for granted that “signs” and their “referents”—either real or fictitious, sensible (corporeal) or intelligible, observed or concluded—make up objects in the theoretical sense, which manifest themselves as tokens and/or types, one may explain them within the framework of a unilateral sign conception following the definition of Karl Bühler (1934, 223–234) as constituents of a semantic quadrangle (cf. the respective terms in Model 12-4, adapted from Wąsik, Z. 1996, 290).

Model 12-5. The relationship between the *sign* and its *referent* as a token and a type, inclusively and exclusively

![Diagram](image)

However, the relationship between “signs” as tokens and types, as singular tokens, or as abstract types and their “referents” as tokens and types, as singular tokens, or as abstract types, are more complicated when they appear in 3 x 3 kinds of combinations (as shown in Model 12-5).

The potential relations: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i (which are illustrated in Model 12-5) may be multiplied by the four kinds of possible unilateral sign conceptions: A, B, C, D (cf. Chart 12-2a and 12-2b) and interpreted within the framework of a semantic quadrangle.

Thus, one can expose in reality 36 kinds of combinations between signs and their referents, as extraorganismic objective or intraorganismic subjective tokens and/or types, inclusively or exclusively, as one may deduce from Chart 12-2b presenting an epistemological overview of signs and their referents according to their multipolar relationships (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1996, 291–292).
Chart 12-2b. The *sign* and its *referent* in multipolar relationships

(A) Concrete *sign* stands for concrete *referent* = “ES ⇒ ER”

(B) Concrete *sign* triggers mental *referent* = “ES ⇒ IR”

(C) Mental *sign* is referred to concrete *referent* = “IS ⇒ ER”
(D) Mental *sign* is linked to mental *referent* = “IS ⇒ IR”

As one may figure out from Charts 12-2a and 12-2b in comparison with Chart 12-1 (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1998, 52–53; and 2003, 103), depending upon the choice of an epistemological position, the relationships between the constituents of the unilateral sign, selected as a matrix, namely, the *sign* and its *referent* may oscillate between: (A) logical positivism, referential antipsychologism = concretism, (B) rational empiricism, psychological logicism = moderate psychologism, (C) empirical rationalism, logical psychologism = moderate psychologism, and (D) absolute rationalism, extreme psychologism = mentalism.

**Semiotic and Non-Semiotic Conceptions of Meaning**

In view of the fact that the sum of sign conceptions does not correspond to the number of the definitions of meaning (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 121; and 2003, 104–105), semioticians often resign from using the term *meaning* while replacing it by other synonymous expressions, such as, for example, *sense, importance, reference, value,* or *significance.* They know, as a matter of fact, that how to specify the essence of meaning depends on the choice of answers given to the following instances of questions:

(1) whether the meaning exists as a process or a product, a token or a type, and whether it is approachable as a real or ideal, concrete or abstract, observed or concluded, intrinsic or intentional, objective or subjective phenomenon;
(2) whether the meaning resides in the signifier-side or the signified-side of the sign, or whether it constitutes a part or a whole, and furthermore, inherent or relational properties of the sign or its referent;

(3) whether the meaning is to be detected from extrospective or introspective observations of the effects the sign causes upon feelings, reactions or behavior of the sign users;

(4) whether the meaning should be concluded from the interrelationships among signs and/or between signs and their referents, signs and their users, signs and their contexts of use, and/or among the users of the signs (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 121; and 2003, 104–105).

To answer these questions, it is necessary to state the meaning of what kind of semiotic objects one is interested in, and for what particular aims. One should determine the context and domain in which the meaning manifests itself, i.e., in the realm of humans only, in the realm of all living systems, or in the universe of all possible sign processes, including extra-terrestrial and divine. Being, for example, interested in the meaning of verbal signs, one should be aware of the fact that to select this definition from a variety of proposals, it is necessary to commit oneself to a certain epistemological position regarding the ontology and gnoseology of the subject matter in question, which should be determined as having meaning “in itself” or “for someone”, or in “relation to something”, etc.

Classifying the Conceptions of Meaning Consistent with Epistemological Positions of Scientists

Semioticians of language have at their disposal an extensive list of conceptions related to meaning (for references to primary and secondary sources see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 105–106). This list may be summarized through the following ascertainments and enumerations.


(i) the mere name of an abstract idea or of a mental concept, or of a complex of common properties assigned to individual referents.
Followers of Plato working within the framework of idealistic realism believe that the meaning exists (cf. Holger van den Boom and Jadacki in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 1137, and 1139):

(ii) as an abstract idea independently of corporeal referents.

Conceptualists (adhering to the compromise between realism and nominalism and regarding universals as concepts), in turn, identify meaning with (cf. Jadacki in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 1139):

(iii) a set of common properties subjectively attributed to individual referents of the sign.

Similarly, some associationists, basing on the philosophy of John Locke (1969/1975), are convinced that meaning is (cf. Pelc 1982, 233):

(iv) an idea or an image of the referent which is formed in the thought of the users of a sign.

Adherents of classical logic favor, at a related point, the distinctions between connotations vs. denotations, intensions vs. extensions of the sign, derived from the logic of John Stuart Mill (1843), when opposing conformism to referentialism (cf., e.g., Pelc 1982, 240, Jadacki in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 1139; and Ogden & Richards 1923/1949, 10), according to which the meaning might be attributed to:

(v) a set of common properties of the type of referents, or
(vi) a set of referents belonging to the same type, qualified as a meaningful domain of reference.

Respectively, for the followers of either concretist or mentalist connectionism (cf. Weisgerber 1929, 34, 178–179, and Zinovyev 1973, 15–16) meaningful is:

(vii) a relation between the *sign* and its *referent*, between the signifier and the signified of a twofold mental sign, or the mere fact that such a relation exists where the sign represents (designates) certain objects, and the semiotician knows which ones.
Additionally, in the context of sign-processing and sign-interpreting activities of cognizing and communicating subjects, as one may deduce from the philosophical thought of Gottlob Frege (1892, 100), and Charles Sanders Peirce (c. 1897; cf. 1931–1938), discussed by Umberto Eco (1976/1979, 60–61) and commented by Joseph Ransdell in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 675–681, meaning is identified with:

(viii) the translatability of a sign into other signs,

Likewise, not to be omitted is the view of phenomenologists, following, *inter alia*, the works of Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1900/1913 [1970], 1901/1913 [1970], and 1913 [1931/1962]), or Roman Ingarden (1931 [1973]), discussed extensively by Jerzy Pelc (1982, 289–294) that meaning is:

(ix) a reference to all emotional and cognitional processes of sign users directed toward intersubjective and intentional objects.

Practitioners of communication studies endorse, after Wilfrid Stalker Sellars (1974), the concept of meaning, reviewed, among others, by Antonio Marras (1992, 713–716):

(x) as a “functional classification”, which aims at a functional specification of the system of rules, consisting of all permissible moves made at various levels and dimensions of conceptual activities of communicating individuals that govern the role of a verbal sign in the language and behavior of a given linguistic community.

Moreover, representatives working in the pragmatics of speech communication promote also the understandings of meaning:

(xi) as a mode of how to use the sign, following the proposal of Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1921 [1922], 1953 [1953]), or else (cf. Ranjit Chatterjee in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 1164), or

(xii) as a disposition how to react to the sign or to its designate with reference to logical behaviorism represented by Charles William Morris (1964, and 1938/1975; cf. also Pelc 1982, 235–240).
Representatives of connectionist contextualism, in the same way as Adam Schaff (1960, 321, 374; or 1961, 614), expose the relational view of meaning:

(xiii) as a structure or a reflection of the relations among signs in a given system, between signs and objective reality, sign users and signs, sign users and objective reality, and among sign users themselves.

Promising also for the followers of “multimodal logic” is a relativist conception of meaning, put forward by Richard Montague (1970/1974) along with the continuators of “truth-conditional semantics”, developed by Donald Herbert Davidson (1967/1984), and discussed, *inter alia*, by Daniel Vanderveken (1991, 374) while taking the reference to his earlier position (Vanderveken 1990–1991), where meaning is seen:

(xiv) as a set (or a class) of all possible worlds in which the given utterance of a verbal sign is true.

**Methodological Implications**

In the investigative domain of semiotics, one can encounter a variety of heterogeneous meaning-bearers, produced and interpreted by communicating subjects. Therefore, it is no wonder, that semiotics has the status of an interdisciplinary investigative perspective, utilizing the achievements of traditionally recognized disciplines, which place the notions of sign and meaning and, more broadly, means and processes of communication among their descriptive categories. What is more, verbal expressions as semiotic objects which bear certain meanings are to be considered from the perspective of their users, producers or receivers as correlates of certain functions, values, or contents deduced from the domains of their reference.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Semiotic Self in the Realm of Nature and Culture

Extending the Boundaries of Research on the Semiotic Self

This chapter aims at broadening the investigative domain devoted to the semiotic self—as a (non)animal organism, which subsumes the signals from its environment and emits them to its environment as significant—through the notion of the signifying and communicating self, who sends and receives the sensorially perceivable meaning-bearers, and who processes and interprets these mentally apprehensible meaning-bearers for the sake of collective understanding. This aim is fulfilled by putting together the conceptions of the subjective universe including all living systems, which are current in cultural anthropology and philosophy of biology. Accordingly, the communicative life-world, which results from the relationships between the outer selves of individuals, acting as producers and receivers of signs as meaning-bearers, is seen as a counterpart of the subjective universe of the inner selves formed by sensual knowledge, originating from their personal life experiences, and consensual knowledge, coming from the socially created contents of communication.

proach to culture as a collection of semiotic systems that fulfill communicative functions and Stanisław Pietraszko’s (1980; 1982) view of culture as an axiosemiotic sphere, against the background of biological concepts introduced by Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) including *Umwelt* and *Funktionskreise* (the latter being rendered in some contemporary translations as “functional circles” or “functional cycle”; cf. Cassirer 1944/1962, 24; Wąsik, Z. 1997c, 347; and Wąsik 2003, 114, footnote 21).

To be added is that the research material compiled for the tasks of the author’s first studies on the subject-centered semiotic paradigm of linguistics (Wąsik, Z. 1987) had to be extended especially with publications edited recently in the domain of non-linguistic sciences of sign and meaning. In the meantime, a new neuroscientific turn emerged unifying the frameworks of scholars in the domain of biology, psychology and anthropology, philosophy and even arts around the philosophy of mind and consciousness (cf. Andrade 1999; Brier 1999, 2000; Emmeche 1999; Stjernfelt 1999).

Abandoning a dualistic distinction between body and mind, biologically inclined scientists started to speak in favor of a monistic notion of the “embodied mind” (cf. the works of Emmeche 1992, Emmeche & Hoffmeyer 1991, Hoffmeyer & Emmeche 1991, and Hoffmeyer 1993 [1996]). Noticeable was the topic of the conference at Bennington College in Vermont in early November 1999, which focused on the embodied mind and the Baldwin effect. Philosophers of biology, semioticians, brain/mind specialists, and communication theoreticians convened there to evaluate the relevance of the suggestion of James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934), an American psychologist, concerning the idea of adaptive evolution (cf. Baldwin 1896), according to which “the ability of individuals to learn can guide the evolutionary process” (Kull 2000b, 46). A detailed account was provided by David Depew (2000, 7, quoted by Wąsik, Z. 2003, 108, footnote 4):

> The general idea of the Baldwin effect is that learned behaviors can affect both the direction and the speed of evolutionary change. If an organism chances during its lifetime to acquire habits or exhibit behaviors which permit more effective interaction with its environment, ... it will probably leave more offspring. If, moreover, by means of directed habituation, imitation, and other forms of learning it can pass that innovation along to offspring, relatives, and other organisms with which it is socially interactive, then descendants of such individuals or groups will on the whole do better reproductively in a given environment than individuals and groups not
possessing the forms of habituation and learning in question. If protracted over transgenerational time, ... this process will shift the phenotypic trait distribution in the population toward a preferred, but from the perspective of inherited factors, only permissible plasticity of behavior in the face of environmental change.

It also seems relevant to expose the biological concept of “embodied semantics” derived from interactions between organisms and their environments, i.e., subjective knowledge gained through sensory actions in cognition “embodied in the lived histories of organisms, their communicative, cultural and linguistic practices” (Foley 1997, 177). Enactionism as a perspective related to the subjective enactment of the world in sensory cognition or “the meaning as enaction”, has been developed by William A. Foley (1997) in anthropological linguistics, within the framework of biological and cognitive studies on man. It is based on the theory of embodied cognition and knowledge, having been popularized by Humberto Romen Maturana (1970/1980) with Francisco Javier Varela (Garcia) (1973/1980, 1987), Chilean biologists, and continued later in the works of Francisco Javier Varela, Evan Thomson, and Eleanor Rosch (1991).

Besides, exploring the bridges between biological and cultural sciences within the framework of semiotics, researchers (cf., inter alia, Biltz 1981, Ingold 1996/1999, and Kull 2000b) have opted for paying more attention to comparative studies of habits and behavior of humans and animals. Still other subjects have evoked the interest of several practitioners of semiotic disciplines (e.g., Ingold 1992, 1989; Teherani-Kröner 1996; Kull 1998b; Nöth 1996, 1998; and Coletta 1999) within the span of the last two decades: social behavior in animals, animal and human ecology, cross-cultural studies, agricultural ecology, environmental policy, etc.

Respecting the fact that over fifty years ago Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1952), in their book on *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, compiled a list of 164 different definitions of culture, equalized either with the process of civilization or with the cultivation of uniquely human faculties of taste, reason, values, and intellect, this chapter will expose only these anthropocentric conceptions which regard culture as an integrated system of human activity or institutions that satisfy human needs and fulfill social requirements, or a system of patterns and norms of behavior, which is respected by individuals or groups participating in social interactions.

Not to be forgotten are here also the proposals advocating another existence form of sign and meaning which can be concluded from the view
of culture as a final effect of learning. As such, the semiotics of culture is assumed to consist in the knowledge of people, i.e., in a directly unobservable ideational order. Being called the culture proper, this ideational order is to be distinguished from a phenomenal order of perceivable events along with their concluded regulations. In other words, the latter are subsumed under a behavioral manifestation of culture. However, the system- and structure-oriented semioticians of culture, who have adhered to the heritage of instrumentalist linguistics, prefer to devote their primary attention to the rules generating the sphere of the so-called cultural texts and their (significative) functions.31

In search of the subject-centered semiotics, the respective theories of sign and meaning that originate from an anthroposemiotic view of culture (cf. Eco 1979, 22–29, and 177 as well as Pietraszko 1980; and 1982, 139) have been confronted with a biosemiotic approach to nature of Jakob von Uexküll (1940 [1982]) and the son of Jakob, Thure von Uexküll (1970, 1979a, 1979b, 1982a 1982b, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1993), bridged by a framework in which the observable sign is regarded as a type of object of nature or culture, and where the inferable meaning tends to be seen as a relational property attached to this object by a subject. In such conceptions, the emphasis is put on the interpretative activity of a human subject, who subsumes the objects as significant, firstly, when they fulfill certain functions with respect to his or her aims, goals or purposes and, secondly, because they possess certain values for satisfying his or her needs, desires and/or expectations (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 124–131; and 2003, 110).

**Anthropological and Cultural Foundations of Subject-Centered Semiotics**

**Semiotic-Communicational View of Culture**

While introducing the readers to his theory of semiotics, Umberto Eco (1979) takes for granted that culture as a whole should be investigated as a communicational phenomenon based on systems of signification. Accordingly, he explains how the subject-oriented meanings develop in human culture in terms of the creation of tools and the exchange of commodities.

For Eco, there was no culture initially, even when an Australopithecus transformed a stone into a tool for the purpose of splitting the skull of a
baboon. As he maintains (Eco 1979, 22), culture was born just when a human being (I) determined the function of the stone, (II) started to call it “a stone that serves for something”, and (III) recognized it as that kind of stone that corresponds to the Function $F$ and that has the Name $Y$ (cf. Model 13-1, adapted from Eco 1979, 23).

Having encountered the particular stone $S$-Token 1, and having used it as a means for performing a certain Function $F$, the Australopithecus comes some days later upon a second stone $S$-Token 2, which he recognizes as a representation of the same type. The ability of subsuming $S$-Token 2 along with $S$-Token 1 into an abstract model $S$-Type standing for the same Function $F$ is a semiotic activity of ascribing meanings to encountered functional forms, i.e., sign-vehicles.

Model 13-1. The stone as a useful tool which has a certain function and a certain name in the semiotics of culture

In Eco’s depiction, a new semiotic dimension will be then added to this process of cultural meaning-creation when the possibility exists of giving a name to that general type of object, i.e., the stone as a tool. The Name $Y$ denotes the stone-type as its signified meaning and connotes the Function $F$ in particular that is performed by stone-tokens as signifiers.

Whoever uses the object called $S$-Token 1 for the first time must consider how to transfer a new acquired meaning, the new type of information, namely that it stands for $F$, from this time to the next day. Thus, a name given to it seems to be an appropriately elaborated mnemonic device, which mediates between cultural objects and their possible functions.

Thanks to the exchangeability of sender-and-receiver roles, the cultural object may also become the content of potential intrapersonal communica-
The transmission of knowledge from an individual of today to the same individual of tomorrow and to other individuals of the same human kind contributes to the fact that, within a society, every function of an object becomes transformed into the sign of its virtual use.

In a similar way, Eco has applied semiotic concepts to the analysis of economic relationships that govern the exchange of commodities. What Eco has assumed is that the same cultural objects which are discussed as functional types in Model 13-1 may be considered as commodities $C$-Token 1 and $C$-Token 2 in accordance with their Exchange Value $EV$ (a process shown respectively in Model 13-2, adapted from Eco 1979, 25).

In accordance with Eco’s reasoning, the economic relationship between the objects exchanged in the culture as commodities (belonging at the same time to different types) becomes significant in reality when the value of these commodities is expressed within the same exchange parameters elaborated in a particular culture.

Based on the distinction used by Karl (Heinrich) Marx (1818–1883) in *Das Kapital* (Marx 1867, 1885, 1894)³², the exchange value parameter $EV$ may refer back, in Eco’s view (1979, 25–26), to Human Labor $HL$ as being indispensable for the production of both $C$-Token 1 and $C$-Token 2. All commodities can be correlated through the more sophisticated cultural device of Money $C$-Type, i.e., another type of commodity, which functions as a universal sign of $EV$ expressed in quantities.

The objects, stones and commodities, illustrated schematically in Models 13-1 and 13-2, have been analyzed only with respect to their singular function. However, within the representation of culture in its totality, one should take into account every possible function of a given object, its possible semantic content, and its particular meaning, thus registering every kind of functional synonymy and/or homonymy.

According to Eco (1979, 26–28), every cultural aspect should be considered as a separate semantic entity. The systems of cultural signification should be analyzed in terms of semantic fields established for the structures of sign-vehicles in their multidimensional semantic analysis.
Model 13-2. The signifying relationship between human labor, money as a commodity-type and the exchange value of commodities

Accordingly, Eco illustrates the multidimensionality of semantic analyses of cultural objects with the example of “automobile”. “Automobile” is to be analyzed not only as a semantic entity which is connected with the sign-vehicle, e.g., /automobile/ in English. “Automobile” becomes a full semantic unit having many aspects when it is placed on the axis of oppositions and relations with other units. It can be opposed to “carriage” or “bicycle” or “feet” when one distinguishes between different kinds of transportation, e.g., “by car” vs. “on foot”, etc.

“Automobile”, as such, can be analyzed from different perspectives or considered on differed levels, for example, on physical, mechanical, economic, social or linguistic-semantic levels, etc. Thus, in Eco’s view, semiotics is interested in such levels on which the car is treated as a sign-vehicle of a certain value, e.g., exchange, utility, and symbolic value when they designate the social status and/or prestige of its owner, when they co-determine the comfort, speed of ride, etc.

Similarly, as in the verbal communication where the sign-vehicle of the type /automobile/ can become the meaning of another sign-vehicle of the type /car/, the exchange value of one cultural good can become the meaning of some other goods that are to be also found in the code of cultural semiotics.
On the Origins of Axiosemiotics as a Study of Signs Dealing with Values of Objects in the Domain of Human Culture

In addition to the depiction of culture as a class of rules generating the sphere of so-called cultural texts with their significative and communicative functions, one should also highlight an occurrence of two orders in the system of culture, namely a semiotic order and an axiotic order, which were postulated under the label of axiosemiotics by Stanisław Pietraszko (1928–2010), the founder of cultural studies in Poland.

In the light of Pietraszko’s (1982, 139) distinction, culture is seen as a system of axiosemiotic regularities occurring between subjective values and meanings which condition and determine the modes of human life, and which become realized (materialized) in the sphere of products and the behaviors of people. Pietraszko regards the axiosemiotic activity of humans as an ascription of new values and meanings to objects hitherto known as cultural or natural. The ascription of new values to objects by subjects of culture contributes to the creation of new things in an epistemological sense and transferring them to another class of reality. In the case of the acquisition of new meanings, a new value-related situation takes place in their relation to cultural subjects. The “axiosemiotic nomination” of things, resulting in the transfer of products and behaviors of people to the realm of cultural objects, is not always taking into consideration their utilitarian role. An object can possess, apart from its functionality, an axiological significance given to it through the ascription of a certain value. Accordingly, an “axiotic” act (Pietraszko’s term) may be accompanied by a semiotic act when a cultural object enters into a new relation with the subject of culture (see Pietraszko 1980, 60, and 66–69, discussed and quoted by Wąsik, Z. 1987, 130–131).

A Need-Oriented Conception of Meaning in the Umwelt of Organisms

Viewing semiotic approaches to culture from function-oriented and value-oriented perspectives, one can see, in consequence, the necessity of finding a superior frame of reference. It appears that the ascription of meaning to objects having certain functions or values is not only a modus operandi that might be regarded as exclusively characteristic of human subjects.
The semiotics of culture might be also highlighted, using terminological distinctions of the semiotics of nature, in accordance with the representatives of the so-called Umwelt-research program who adhered to the Uexküllian concept of meaning. Jakob von Uexküll investigated how living organisms perceived their environment and how this perception determined their behavior (cf. Deely 2004). He called his investigative method Umwelt-Forschung. In 1926, Uexküll founded the Institut für Umweltforschung at the University in Hamburg. The term Umwelt, in the sense of the subjective world of an organism, was coined in Uexküll’s book of 1909, Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, and the term Funktionskreis (translated either as “functional circle” or “functional cycle”) was added in the 2nd edition of it in 1921 (cf. Model 13-3, after Uexküll, J. 1909/1921).

Model 13-3. Jakob von Uexküll’s functional circle in the Umwelt of an organism as a clue to the biological understanding of meaning (adapted from Torsten Rüting 2004, 53, following the translation of Urmas Sutrop 2001)

As Kull has pointed out: “... in his article of 1907 he still uses the term ‘Milieu’, as different from ‘Außenwelt’” (1999b, 390). Worth mentioning
here is the term die Eigenwelt des Menschen proposed by Hans Petersen (1937). Interesting is also the comparison of Umwelt(en) to “soap bubble(s)” (Uexküll, T. 1982, 3) in the context of Umwelt(pip)en ‘environmental pipe(s)’ introduced by Jakob von Uexküll in his Theoretische Biologie (see 1920/1928, 70, and 108; cf. also 1920 [1926]). The first one refers to the circular environment of a living organism at a given moment as a functional circle (Funktionskreis), and the latter is meant to illustrate the sequence of all environmental circles (cycles) that a subject has to pass throughout its whole life being understood as a determined journey.


According to an investigative attitude of the so-called biosemiotism—in conformity with the term specified by Thomas A. Sebeok (1974, 1976) and extended by Martin Krampen (1981, 1992), popularized by Sebeok 1979/1989), as well as Myrdene Anderson et al. (1984) and Marcel Danesi (2000)—all living systems take part in the process of creating and utilizing meanings: (1) even the simplest forms of life, the unicellular systems, have the ability to respond to external impulses through species-specific reactions characteristic of each individual being; (2) as opposed to products and commodities, all living organisms, because of the capability of meaning-creation and meaning-utilization, are to be treated as autonomous systems (cf. Uexküll, T. 1982, 7); (3) plants and animals share the capacity to sort stimuli translating them as signs of organismic needs; (4) self-regulating processes, called homeostasis, play an important role in their individual development, which ends in death; and (5) living systems tend to maintain their internal stability through interactions with the environment, owing to the coordinated response of their parts to any situation or stimulus that might disturb their normal condition or function. In this way, within the framework of biosemiotics, according to Thure von Uexküll (1984, 188): “A sign is something that signifies to the activity of a living system something that has significance for the maintenance of the struc-
ture, the homeostasis of this system (its system needs)”. This view is also supported by the following explanatory statement of T. von Uexküll (1984, 188):

In order to realize my purpose of translating Peirce’s formula into a concept of biological relationship, I shall have to consider two factors: (1) When a living system is the “somebody”, the subject, for whom signs and their significates have a meaning, it is materially an open system … It retains its structure, its homeostasis, in open exchange with its environment. (2) Living systems are active system. They maintain their homeostasis by their own activity.

The structure of semiotic processes looks different in the realm of plants, described by phytosemiotics, from the way it looks in the realm of animals, which belongs to the descriptive domain of zoosemiotics. In comparison to animals, plants do not have a nervous system for processing signifiers, and they have no specialized effectors for acting on something that is signified. So, the structure of phytosemiotic processes should be described, as T. von Uexküll (1984, 188–189) points out, in terms of cybernetic relations. In accordance with these relations, a change in the homeostasis of the system, caused by its environment, or its own metabolism, which deviates from the reference value, means for the system a need for activity to restore the substances necessary to maintain its homeostasis. In the realm of zoosemiotics, living systems have specialized receptors for receiving signs, a nervous system that processes them, and specialized effectors which exert an influence upon something that is signified. Hence, within the functional circle of animals “[a] perceptual sign (e.g., a smell of food)” can be defined as “something that signifies to the living system the need for an activity—its behavior—that has significance for its hunger-needs (e.g., obtaining a food object)” (quoted from Uexküll, T. 1984, 189).

According to Thure von Uexküll (1984), the organisms of animals possess such a level of complexity that simple phytosemiotic sign processes are included in the zoosemiotic ones. This means that when a food object appears within the subjective universes of animals, it only creates the conditions for phytosemiotic processes within their bodies. The grasping and eating of a food object create, in the gastrointestinal tract, the conditions for the activation of the phytosemiotic processes that signify to the intestinal cells that they must absorb the needed substances. The object “food” contains carbohydrates, fats, and proteins—the signified “something” for these phytosemiotic signs.
Discussing the biosemiotic conception of meaning in its relation to the anthroposemiotic theory of culture, it is essential to restrict the interest of this chapter to the *Umwelttheorie* of Jakob von Uexküll (1940 [1982]), in the light of which certain objects can be said to possess an “ego-quality”. In this biological theory, the understanding of what the subject-oriented meaning is, with reference to the role of a meaning-receiver and/or meaning-utilizer, receives primary attention.

In the realm of biosemiotics, the sign is described as something that has a meaning for someone because of something. Certain objects from the environment can become and function as meaning-carriers when they possess the qualities which are significant for the fulfillment of subject-related needs, as, e.g., “drinking-quality”, “eating-quality”, “sitting-quality”, “obstacle-quality”, “climbing-quality”, etc. (cf. Uexküll, J. [1982, 28–29]).

In view of several examples provided by J. von Uexküll, it is worth starting with the use of the stone in the following situation:

Let us suppose that an angry dog barks at me on a country road. In order to drive it off, I pick up a stone and frighten it off with an adept throw. Nobody who observes this process and afterwards picks up the stone would doubt that it was the same object ‘stone’, which first lay on the road and then was thrown at the dog ([1982, 27]).

Analyzing the position of the stone in relation to the man and the dog, he notices that its physical and chemical properties have remained the same but the object in itself has been transformed into another kind of object, because it has changed its extrinsic meaning. As long as it was part of the country road, the stone served as support for the walker’s feet.

In his second example, J. von Uexküll ([1982, 28–29]) notices that what possesses certain meanings for people happens to be neutral objects in the subjective universe of dogs. Utilized under certain circumstances, for the dog, as a house-occupant, many things in the kitchen have only a sitting-quality, a climbing-quality, or perhaps only an obstacle-quality—especially chairs and cupboards, which may contain books or washing. All the small household effects, such as spoons, forks, matches, and the like, do not exist in the world of a dog because they are not meaning-carriers. However, a great number of things will exist for the dog as far as they have an eating-quality or a drinking-quality (cf. Uexküll, J. [1982, 29]).

The third example, analyzed by Jakob von Uexküll ([1982, 29–31] to explain his subject-oriented understanding of meaning, is the blooming meadow. Even for different subjects who are in it, the meadow is not the
same; one can consider the role of the stem in a blooming meadow-flower, which functions as the meaning-carrier in four kinds of subjective universes, i.e., in the Umwelt of:

(1) a girl picking flowers, who gathers herself a bunch of colorful flowers that she uses to adorn her bodice;
(2) an ant, which uses the regular design of the stem surface as the ideal path in order to reach its food-area in the flower petals;
(3) a cicada-larva, which bores into the sap-path of the stem and uses it to extract the sap in order to construct the liquid walls of its airy house;
(4) a cow, which grasps the stems and the flowers in order to push them into its wide mouth and utilizes them as fodder.

In Jakob von Uexküll’s explanation ([1982, 31]), each Umwelt forms a closed unit, for example,

(1) The color of the blossom serves as an optical perceptual cue in the girl’s Umwelt;
(2) The ridged surface of the stem functions as a feeling perceptual cue in the Umwelt of the ant;
(3) The extraction point presumably makes itself known to the cicada as a smell perceptual cue;
(4) The effector cues are mostly imprinted upon other properties of the meaning-carrier by the subject,

where respectively:

— The thinnest point of the stem is torn apart by the girl as she picks the flower;
— The unevenness of the stern’s surface serves the ant both as a touch perceptual cue for its feelers and as an effector cue-carrier for its feet;
— The suitable extraction-point that is made known by its smell is pierced by the cicada, and the sap that flows out serves as building material for its house of air;
— The taste perceptual cue of the stem causes the grazing cow to take more and more stems into its chewing mouth. Every act of perception and operation imprints its additional meaning on the meaningless object and thereby makes it into a subject-related meaning-carrier in the subjective universe.
That is, following Uexküll’s reasoning:

[T]he picking of the flower transforms it into an ornamental object in the girl’s world. Walking along the stem changes the stem into a path in the ant’s world, and when the cicada-larva pierces the stem, it is transformed into a source for building material. By grazing, the cow transforms the flower stem into wholesome fodder” (quoted from Uexküll, J. [1982, 31]).

In the analyzed *Umwelten*, the flower stem, acting as a meaning-carrier, has been in each instance confronted with a new meaning-receiver that could also be described as a meaning-utilizer. The four meaning-utilizers, the girl, the ant, the cicada larva, and the cow, have used the flower stem: as a decoration, as a path, as a supplier of material for the building of a house, and as food, respectively. To the selected subjects, for which the stem is the carrier of meaning, one should add the whole plant. The stem is part of the plant. Thus, the whole plant should be treated as its subject. However, the whole plant cannot be considered as a meaning-utilizer when forced to receive the meaning of other subjects, which is not in its own interest. The extrinsic meaning of the flower stem within the plant is its place in the homeostasis of the organism as a system, but the plant as a subject finds itself in relation to other utilizers of its stem in a position of “tolerance of meaning” (Germ. *Bedeutungsverduldung*). The tolerance of meaning for other subjects can be inconvenient for the plant in different measures, e.g., when it is picked, torn to pieces, perforated or chewed by another subject. As Jakob von Uexküll ([1982, 59–60, especially 71]; see also Uexküll, J. [1982, 83–87, Glossary]) has pointed out, one may encounter many situations of that kind in nature, when subjects and their parts become meaningful objects for other subjects, when they find themselves within “functional circles” (*Funktionskreise*) of: medium, food, enemy, and sex.

Appreciating a solipsistic paradigm, which bridges the semiotics of culture with the semiotics of nature against the background of language-centered sign and meaning studies, it will be argued, in the next chapter, that the so-called “humanistic turn to the subject” has paved the way to the semiotic self, who ascribes significance to objects being useful or valuable for the fulfillment of his/her purposes or satisfaction of his/her needs.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Significance as a Subjective Construct in Human Semiotics

Delimiting the Investigative Domain of Human Semiotics

As the research findings on semiotic universals of language in communication have shown, the following pair of oppositions might be isolated among the most relevant species-specific properties of humans in relation to animals: interchangeability vs. immutability of sender-receiver roles, experientiality vs. innateness in generational acquisition and transmission; conventionality in origin vs. naturalness of signaling means, variability or constancy and changeability or stability of language; displacement facility vs. boundedness in time and space; intentionality vs. instinctiveness; segmentability vs. globality or and discreteness of patterning continuity.

In this chapter, departing from the survey of individual and social existence modes of human self as opposed to the non-human self, a nature- and culture-centered conception of subjective significance is coupled with the conception of intersubjective understanding. It is assumed that, in the investigative field of subject-centered human semiotics, the focal point of a scientist’s interest should encompass the typology of sign- and meaning-related properties of signifying and communicating individuals, as the real selves and as participants in social communication, which are relevant for the fulfillment of their purposes, or the satisfaction of their needs.

Considered against anthropological and biological conceptions of meaning, the problems of function, or value, of significant objects and the needs, or purposes, of living subjects are considered as constituting a link between the semiotics of culture and nature. In consequence, the subject matter of human semiotics is specified here in terms of those relevant properties of cultural objects which are distinguished in sign- and meaning-processing and sign- and meaning-interpreting activities of communicating individuals as functional tools or valuable goods.
To come to the point, it has to be noted that there are some semiotic properties of signifying and communicating selves realized in signs as observable meaning-bearers which belong to the physical domain of empirical investigations. However, there also some other semiotic proprieties of signifying and communicating selves, which are inaccessible to observation, standing in relation to the referential meaning understood in terms of conceptual and propositional contents of communication, which should be treated as belonging to the logical domain of associated mental objects. As far as they cannot be directly tested, they may be only inferred through the intersubjective knowledge of communication participants.

In reference to empirical approachability of semiotic properties of the selves, this chapter ends with the theories of personal-subjective constructs and social construction of reality, devoting special attention to radical constructivism. Constructivist theories are discussed, firstly, to elucidate the concept of the broadly understood semiotic self as a social being whose contacts with external environments are mediated by the verbal and nonverbal means of signification and communication, and, secondly, to expose the fact that it is the language which “objectivates” the shared experiences of signifying and communicating selves making them available to all members belonging to a determined linguistic community, who become in such a way both the source and the tool of interpersonal communication and intersubjectively comprehensive knowledge.

Meaning as Nomination and Subsumption of Significant Objects

In exposing the anthropological and biological conceptions of subjective significance uniting the semiotics of culture and nature, elaborated by the author of this chapter (cf. inter alia Wąsik, Z. 2003, 107–125, especially 119–120; and 2009, 131–132; as well as Wąsik, E. & Wąsik, Z. 2012, 329–331), special attention is paid to communicational practices and patterns of meaning-creation and meaning-utilization in social interactions. Consequently, the subject matter of human-centered semiotics is specified here in the conceptions sign and meaning that are rooted in the concepts of utility and interest, or validity and obligation, pertaining to function and purpose-oriented, or value- and need-oriented, views of culture.
Between Purpose-Oriented Functions and Need-Oriented Values in the Personal and Subjective Realization of Culture

To examine the semiotic activity of human selves who are engaged, as concrete persons in the processes of sending and receiving of meaning-bearers, or as mental subjects in the processes of meaning-creation and meaning-interpretation, the author of this research enterprise has distinguished in coincidence with the proposals made primarily by Umberto Eco (1976/1979) and Stanisław Pietraszko (1980) against the background of Jakob von Uexküll’s (1940 [1982]) scaffold, two semiotic manifestation forms of natural and/or cultural objects, on the one hand, in the investigative domain of praxeology, and on the other, in the investigative domain axiology. Departing from the conception of subjective meaning, he has defined culture, in a concise approach, as a set of as types of praxeosemiotic and/or axiosemiotic regularities occurring between the signs of functions or the signs of values, which become realized in the nonverbal and verbal products of the activity and attitudes of human beings and co-determine and condition the existential modes of their everyday life. With reference to the outline of the subject-oriented investigations of praxeological semiotics and axiological semiotics conducted on the bordering zones between cultural sciences and linguistics, he has postulated to search for their roots in the essentialist and organicist functionalism originating in the epistemology of culture, sociology and biology. Accordingly, taking both positions separately, researchers can investigate from a functionalist perspective all objects found in the domain of culture according to their serviceable role they fulfill in the satisfaction of communicational needs of the subjects of culture, and as regards the value-oriented approaches, one can tend, in the first place, to the classification of all subjective needs of people, aiming at discovering, how they are satisfied through selected semiotic objects, or one can also check which respective needs can be satisfied by concrete kinds of semiotic objects.

Exposed in such a human-centered theory of culture is the role of a signifying subject who is engaged in the activity of nomination and subsumption of cultural, or natural, objects with regard to their praxeological, i.e., function-related, or axiological, i.e., value-related, significance for the fulfillment of his/her purposes or the satisfaction of his/her needs. Hence, the praxeosemiotic nominations and subsumptions are regarded as involving the ascription of functions to the objects hitherto being not useful for certain purposes. In turn, the axiosemiotic nominations and subsumptions
are interpreted as resulting in the transfer of products and behavior of people to the realm of cultural objects, which are not necessarily connected with their usefulness.

In consequence, the particular nominations and subsumptions of natural and/or cultural objects from the viewpoint of praxeosemiotics\textsuperscript{35} are seen as connected with the ascription of functions to the objects hitherto being not useful for certain purposes. On the opposite side, the nominations and subsumptions from the viewpoint of axiosemiotics\textsuperscript{36} are placed as resulting in the transfer of products and behavior of people to the realm of cultural objects, which begin from that time on to be utilized as valuable devices for satisfying someone’s needs.

Model 14-1. Praxeological, or axiological, nominations and subsumptions of objects under the signs of functions or values

Thus, in a praxeosemiotic and/or axiosemiotic conception of culture, as visualized in Model 14-1, the emphasis is placed on the activity of a Signifying Subject who subsumes the cognized objects of nature and culture (Object-Token 1 and Object-Token 2) as significant, firstly, when they fulfill a certain Function with respect to his or her Purpose and, secondly, because they possess a certain utilitarian Value for satisfying his or her Need (meant as a signaled systemic lack), desire or expectation.

An object of cognition, found in the surroundings of social life-world, can possess, apart from its praxeological Significance also an axiological Significance. For the aims of their specific interpretation, the particular

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\textsuperscript{35} Significance as a Subjective Construct in Human Semiotics

\textsuperscript{36} Significance as a Subjective Construct in Human Semiotics
terms from Model 14-1 (modified after the proposals made by Wąsik, Z. 2003, 120; 2005, 94; and 2009, 132) have been defined here as follows:

— *Object* is a perceivable thing, or event, in a praxeosemiotic, or an axio-semiotic, sphere of culture;

— *Signifying Subject* is a meaning-utilizer (meaning-creator, meaning-receiver), to be understood as a living system with an ego-quality, who subsumes and/or utilizes objects of culture (Object-Token 1 and Object-Token 2) under the Object-Type of either a Praxeosignificate or Axiosignificate;

— *Praxeosignificate* is a functional object of culture, regarded as a significant Tool, i.e., the sign of a Function;

— *Axiosignificate* is a valuable object of culture, regarded as a significant good, i.e., the sign of a Value;

— *Tool* is an object of culture which serves a certain function enabling the fulfillment of a subjective Purpose of a meaning-utilizer;

— *Good* is an object of culture which possesses a certain Value enabling the satisfaction of a subjective Need of a meaning-utilizer;

— *Significance* is the extrinsic meaning of an object of culture for the Signifying Subject of culture with respect to its relevance for being subsumed under the sign of a Function, i.e., a Praxeosignificate, or the sign of a Value, i.e., an Axiosignificate);

— *Function* is a role which is played by a Tool while serving a goal-oriented Purpose intended by a Signifying Subject of culture;

— *Value* is a relational property of an object of culture that satisfies a subjective Need of a Signifying Subject of culture;

— *Purpose* is an aim to be fulfilled, or a goal to be reached, an end to be gained, or an objective to be attained, which means for the activity of a Signifying Subject of culture an impulse to utilize a Tool for performing a serviceable Function;

— *Need* is a systemic lack of an organism to be satisfied which means for the activity of a Signifying Subject an impulse to restore a disturbed equilibrium in his or her biological urges, psychological wants, desires, or social expectations;

— *Fulfillment/Satisfaction* is the utilization of a Tool or a Good, which is significant for a certain Purpose, or a Need, of the Signifying Subject of culture with respect to its Function or Value;
— Nomination/Subsumption is a semiotic detection and/or recognition of the Object-Token 1 with Object-Token 2 as identical with the general properties of the Object-Type.

As it comes out from the interpretation of individual constituents included in Model 14-1, an object of culture can possess, apart from its “functionality”, or “utility”, also a praxeological significance, or an axiological significance for the signifying subject of culture. In the same (or similar) communicational context, a “praxeotic”, or an “axiotic”, act may be accompanied by a semiotic act when a cognizing subject enters into a new relation with a cognized object. It is concluded that the ascription of significance to objects, known before as natural or cultural, with regard to their functions or values, contributes, from the logical point of view, to the creation of entirely new types of semiotic objects, called respectively, either as “Praxeosignificates” or as “Axiosignificates”, while transferring them from one kind to another kind of reality.

A careful reader may notice that there is no contradiction between a function-and-purpose-oriented approach and a value-and-need-oriented approach to language and culture. Both praxeological and axiological formulations of sign and meaning (as subjective significance), as one may deduce from the constituents of the action-oriented model of human culture, reveal only an aspectual difference between the same cultural objects which are significant for the subjects of culture either from the viewpoint of their function or value.

Having in view the analytical applicability of the praxeology- and /or axiology-oriented model of cultural semiospheres, practitioners of semiotic studies may investigate all semiotic systems of culture either from the viewpoint of instrumental function they execute in fulfilling communicational purposes of the subjects of culture or from the viewpoint of utilitarian value they exhibit for satisfying their respective needs.

Physical and Logical Domains of Human Semiotics

As it has been stated, the subject matter of human semiotics encompasses the sign- and meaning-related properties of communicating individuals considered on the one level as the real selves and on the other as participants in social communication that come into being in the realization of their communicational purposes or the satisfaction of their needs. From
such a viewpoint, the actual sign-vehicles of semiotic objects evidently belong to the physical domain of observable relational properties of communicating selves as concrete persons, according to the distinctions made by Victor H. Yngve (1996, 209–210).

However, when the concrete objects found in the physical domain, is subsumed by signifying subjects under potential tools or goods as signs of functions, or values, they are immediately placed within the boundaries of the logical domain of mentally associated facts. In view of that, the concept of the physical domain must be counterpoised to that of the logical domain. It seems obvious that, in the investigative field of human-centered semiotics, scientists are not in a position to study the semiotic properties of communicating selves as inferred subjects, which are unobservable. The logical domain as a counterpart of the physical domain appears to be indispensable, as far as the content of intentional communication cannot be directly tested. It may be only inferred through the intersubjective knowledge of communication participants as a set of dispositional properties that can be activated in observable products and behavior of people.

Model 14-2. Subsumptions of observable objects under the signs of inferable functions or values in nature and culture

So, the subject matter of a scientist’s interest in human semiotics encompasses those inferable properties of cultural objects that are relevant for the realization of communicational purposes or the satisfaction of needs of cultural subjects. As shown in Model 14-2, Object-Token 1 and Object-Token 2, which belong to the physical domain of concrete facts, are sub-
Significance as a Subjective Construct in Human Semiotics

Assumed under the scope of Object-Type into the logical domain of rational associations with regard to their praxeological, or axiological, significance as either a tool or a good when they fulfill the purpose, or satisfy the need, of a signifying subject.

**Personal-Subjective Constructs and Social Constructions of Reality**

Cognitive models may be, in the span of human life, replaced by others based on inferential, slightly altered, or entirely innovative, constructs when the experiential domain of a cognizing subject expands as a result of his and/or her subsequent searching explorations. Replacement of models depends on human expressions of meaning, which are changeable. Taking into account the conception of meaning as a subjective and intersubjective subsumption of significant objects occurring in human communication, one should expose the praxeological semiotics and the axiological semiotics within the framework of constructivism.

**Considering the Subject-Related Conception of Meaning from a Constructivist Perspective**

Constructivism, taking the notion of construct as its point of departure within the framework of epistemology, is a cognitive attitude of a knowing subject, which manifests in a certain semiotic system understood in terms of behaviors and products of communicating individuals who transmit and interpret pre-constructed meanings. In the present from, highly developed under the influence of cognitive sciences, constructivism is founded upon a generalized assumption that people create their own view of the world they live in on the basis of reflections of their individual experiences. That’s why contemporary constructivists expose the role of the individual self as a cognizer and maker of meanings. In this particular context of solipsistic constructivism, each individual is regarded as generating his or her own mental model which allows them to understand (or to make sense of) the world by selecting and transforming information, formulating hypotheses, and coming to decisions that rely on their personal cognitive structures. Cognitive structures provide the basis for meaning-creation and meaning-deciphering through mental schemata, or models, organizing the
experience of human individuals, which allow going beyond the information provided to them by sent and received meaning-bearers.

From the position of epistemological constructivism, the meaning-bearers constituting semiotic means of communication are detached from the meaning belonging to extrasemiotic reality. Reality, in turn, is defined either as observable data or as inferable constructs. Being independent from the cognizing subject, data usually appear as immediate objects of perception accessible in direct, or indirect, experience, i.e., through senses or their instrumental extensions. Contrariwise, constructs are considered as sets of cognized, or assumed, properties of the objects as they appear in the mind of the knowing subjects; as such they result from mental activities of individuals who form new concepts or generate new ideas, based on inductive, or deductive, reasoning.

**Personal Constructs in the Perception of Reality**

The term *personal construct* has been coined by George Alexander Kelly in his book *The Psychology of Personal Constructs* (PCP) of 1955, who has suggested that “man looks at his world through transparent patterns or templates which he creates and then attempts to fit over the realities of which the world is composed” (Kelly 1955, 8–9). The main point of PCP deals with the person’s perception of the world, which depends on his mental frame of reference. Thus, a construct is a subjective depiction of some event in the person’s environment, a way of looking at something which is then tested against the reality of the environment. 37

Among the most crucial consequences taking place in the application of constructs to the interpretation of the world in human communication to be mentioned are:

— **Patterns**: People anticipate future facts and/or events according to their own interpretations of recurrent reality.

— **Individuality**: People have different experiences and therefore construe facts and/or events in different ways (i.e., persons differ from each other in their constructs).

— **Range**: Constructs are limited to a particular range of appropriateness, called the focus of convenience (i.e., they are not relevant to all situations).
— **Comparability**: To the extent that people have had experiences similar to others, their personal constructs tend to be similar to the construction systems of those other people.

— **Commonality**: People are able to communicate with others because they can construe typical constructions.

Understood as a mental scheme for the interpretation of reality, the notion of personal construct suggests that each individual person is engaged in the cognitive activities while taxonomically classifying experienced objects with respect to their extrinsic meaning.

Bearing in mind the personal-constructivist’s assumption that the process of cognition is based solely on the individual interpretation of cognized phenomena, and that the ascription of meanings to the experienced objects is manifested in the mind of an individual human being, one should, more precisely taken, speak here about the formation of personal-subjective constructs. It is true that any person’s semantic interpretation of any event is subjective in nature even when it is based on typical frames of reference elaborated through interpersonal communication, which can supposedly lead to the creation of intersubjectively similar constructs in the minds of individual persons interacting within the same culture.

### Subjectivity of Solipsistic Signification and Intersubjectivity of Collective Communication

Personal-subjective constructs form the basis not only for a similar perception of the world but also for unified behaviors against the objects evaluated with respect to their utility. Personal constructs, expressing subjectively defined referential meanings, constitute the most important factors which determine all forms of social behavior, including the verbal form of communication.

For researchers of communication, it is obvious that, as a result of frequent interactions, particular members of a determined linguistic community may develop analogous schematic constructs, which find reflections in the commonalities of expression contents in their mental spaces. They are aware of the fact that people usually integrate with each both on the basis of perceptible meaning-bearers and in conformity with assumable knowledge of meaning-bearers.
Elaborated in the domain of sociology, the idea of social constructivism is rooted in the philosophical theories which deal with the relationships between the inner world and outer world of man. Social constructivists develop their theory of cognition while explaining the way in which human individuals accumulate their knowledge about the outer world and formulate the investigative questions which are focused around the theory of perception. The foundation of sociological constructivism constitutes an assumption that social reality is shaped by information gained by particular human beings as organisms in the interaction with their environment.

As pointed out by Peter Ludwig Berger and Thomas Luckmann, the authors of *The Social Construction of Reality*, originally published in 1966, man as a social being is mediated by symbols in his contacts with external environments. In the estimation of Berger and Luckmann, knowledge, related in a certain way to reality, is incessantly connected with certain contexts and social situations, insofar as it is always created by society and transmitted among its actual members. However, apart from social factors, this knowledge is determined by historical, psychological as well as biological factors. In society, which constitutes a sphere of objective facts consisting of externalized products of human activity, the cognized phenomena and states of affair become internalized and thus personified through subjective meanings; Hence, it is the language which “objectivates the shared experiences and makes them available to all within linguistic community, thus becoming both the basis and the instrument of the collective stock of knowledge” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 68).

Following the conviction of social constructivists, the society is the creator of knowledge, although an individual human being, as an organism, experiences, *de facto*, the reality while receiving various kinds of information from the environment. The stock of everyday knowledge is created due to social interactions; this knowledge is—as one can say after Berger and Luckmann—negotiated and approved among particular members of society (cf. 1966, 19–46).

A certain kind of a social construct is the reality of everyday life, or the world of life, which comes into being as a result of communicational activities. The reality of everyday life, or the world of life, is considered as one of many realities, albeit a basic one. But it is not identical with the really-existing objective world. As a result of interactions, it becomes an intersubjective world, that is, the world which is shared by an individual with other individuals. As Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966, 23) state:
The reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an inter-subjective world, a world that I share with others. This intersubjectivity sharply differentiates everyday life from other realities of which I am conscious. I am alone in the world of everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with others as it is to myself. Indeed, I cannot exist in everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with others.

An individual can have access to the subjectivity of other individuals only through his/her own subjectivity. According to Berger and Luckmann: “Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to other men as element of a common world. Such objectivations serve as more or less enduring indices of the subjective process of their producers, allowing their availability to extend beyond the face to-face situation in which they can be directly apprehended” (1966, 34).

In the communication by voice, the sound waves are objectivated as elements of common world: “A special but crucially important case of objectivation is signification, that is, the human production of signs. A sign may be distinguished from other objectivations by its explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meanings. To be sure, all objectivations are susceptible of utilization as signs, even though they were not originally produced with this intention” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 35).

Thus, one can say that human expressivity manifests itself in products accessible both to their creators and to other people: These real objects, which are observable, and which become symptoms of actions or their meaning-bearers, Berger and Luckmann consider as elements of the common world. Noteworthy, among such elements are, e.g., bodily symptoms, gestures, postures, certain movements of hands legs, etc., which are accessible to communicating individuals in immediate contacts.

**Sociology of Knowledge on Subjective Constructs and Intersubjective Comprehension**

One of the examples of social constructivism constitutes the so-called sociology of knowledge in the domain of science and education, having been conceptually applied inter alia by James Moffett (1983, 1987), Margaret D. Roblyer, Jack Edwards, Mary Anne Havriluk (1997), claiming that:
(1) The personal-subjective constructs of communicating individuals are distributed in the form of reported speech and may contribute to common understanding processes only as types of intersubjectively shared experiences;

(2) Mutual comprehension belief is based on the assumption that when one communicator employs a mental construction reflecting his/her own experience, which is similar to that employed by another, then they both may understand each other effectively;

(3) Supposing that his or her construction processes appear as mentally similar to those of the other communicator, then he or she may play a role involving that particular individual in the social process as communication participant.

Departing from the cognitivist constructivism as an investigative perspective, the views of sociologists of knowledge and theorist of education are founded on the premise that people construct their own view of the world they live in by reflecting on their individual experiences. Each cognizing subject is seen as generating his or her own “rules” and “mental models” in search of the ways of making sense of the world.

Thus, constructivists place the main emphasis on the individual self as a “maker of meanings”, who selects and transforms information, formulates hypotheses, and who comes to decisions relying on his or her personal cognitive structures. Cognitive structures, i.e., mental schemes, or models, provide a subjective meaning and organize the experiences of individuals allowing them to go beyond the information given to them previously. To sum up, learning, discovering and communicating are therefore considered in different varieties of constructivists’ theories as searches for meaning that consist of adjusting subjective mental models to accommodate new personal experiences, in which individuals construct new ideas, or concepts, based upon previously acquired knowledge. Consequently, embedded in social contexts, individuals are viewed as lifelong learners, discoverers and/or communicators.

While cognitive constructivists emphasize the “individual as a personal scientist”, i.e., an individual subject of science who creates and understands the meaning of phenomena organized in his or her mental world, social constructivists postulate how best to consider the manner in which personal-subjective meanings and understandings grow out of social encounters, as far as sociality is defined in terms of meaning-negotiating activities within the framework of social interactions. An example of so-
cial constructivism is the sociology of knowledge and education dealing with how subjective constructs of communicating individuals may be distributed effectively in form of reported and shared experiences.

The mere notion of subjective construct, understood as a frame of reference, or a scheme for the interpretation of reality, suggests that every individual person, as a cognizing subject, subsumes concrete objects to certain classes of objects with regard to their extrinsic meaning, i.e., as having the properties of subjective significance. It is supposed that interpersonal communication can lead to creating intersubjectively similar constructs in the minds of people interacting within the same culture.

In a schematized opinion, the personal-subjective constructivist’s stance is reduced to the assumption that the process of cognition is based on the interpretation of cognized phenomena and the ascription of meanings to them in steadily changing contexts and situations of social, physical and psychical world manifested in the mind of an individual human being. Any interpretation of any event is relative; as a consequence; there are no absolute, correct, or preferential frames. In this way, subjective constructs form the basis not only for a similar personal perception of the world but also for unified behaviors against the objects evaluated with respect to their utility. Moreover, subjective constructs, expressing individually defined referential meanings, constitute the most important factors which determine all forms of social behavior, including the verbal form of communication.

When similar schematic constructs come into being in the minds of members of a determined linguistic community, as a result of recurring interactions, it is understandable that they find reflections in the commonalities of the expressions of meaning-bearers. People integrate with each other individually on the basis of observable verbal means of expression and in accordance with inferable comprehension of meaning-bearers.

Knowledge of Meaning in the Light of Radical Constructivism

For radical constructivists, Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995, 1988, and 2001), Alexander Riegler (2001), Markus Peschl and Astrid von Stein (cf. Riegler, et al. 1999), working in the fields of science and education, it is useless to think about knowledge as representing external reality independently of a knowing subject. In their view, knowledge depends upon the activity of cognizing individuals who strive towards a subjective organization of their
experiential domains and not to the discovery of an objective world that exists beyond their capacities of cognition.

Perceived as a mind-depended entity, the cognizing subject appears as an epistemological solipsist being unable to transcend the domain of his or her individual experience. The scientific and/or unscientific theories, he or she encounters, or construes, on their way to apprehending knowledge as sets of propositional contents, appear only as conceptual models that help them only to manage their experiential domain.

From a human-centered perspective, constructs are considered as sets of both cognized and assumed properties of the objects as they appear in the mind of the knowing subjects. Constructs are conceived, or generated, on the basis of mental inductive abstractions and deductive compositions. The heritage of constructivists’ positions to the personal-subjective property of meaning as significance, which result from a collective character of culture realized in human signification and communication systems, may be summarized in the following statements:

(1) Meaning is a personal-subjective construct that depends upon an individual who makes it;
(2) Meaning does not reside in non-verbal or verbal means which individuals produce and transmit for communicating about their emotional and conceptual contents, and, for that reason,
(3) Meaning cannot be passed on as an entity in the same manner as meaning-bearers; hence,
(4) Language and culture as semiotic systems have to be regarded as composed of meaning-bearers which trigger communicating activities within the cognitive domains of particular communicating individuals; and
(5) Communicating in a given semiotic system is based on the continuous mental processing and interpreting of meaning-bearers, which are being produced and received; whereas mutually shared meanings happen only to be assumed.

In the span of years, the personal-subjective constructs, as cognitive schemata, may be replaced by other modelling devices based on inferences, altering abstractions, or innovative creativity, when the experiences of a cognizing subject increase as a result of his or her subsequent explorative activity. The replacement of such personal-subjective constructs depends on interpersonal and intersubjective relationships in the human life-world, in which they function as communicating and experiencing individuals.
Conclusion

To sum up, one can notice that there is a link between a subjective universe of meaning developed in the biosemiotic *Umwelt* theory and the personal-subjective construct theory elaborated by representatives of modern cognitivism and radical constructivism. What has to be extended, in the approach to the solipsistic view of the inner self, is the theory of the social construction of reality. Human individuals develop through the perception of the things and states of affairs being reflected in their mental spheres as images of iconic nature. Another kind of solipsistic knowledge is related to the concept formation on the basis of collective communication. Important is here to bear in mind “the distinction between an imaginationist psychology, which pertains to the mental activity of visualizing the shape of cognized and perceived phenomena and events as individual tokens, and a conceptualist psychology, which exposes the mental recollections of characteristic (or similar) features of phenomena and events formed and concluded as general types (i.e., containing the minimal mass of differential features)” (see Chapter Eleven, pp. 189–190). As far as the only empirically accessible object of cognition is the communicating individual, the whole life-world of communicating groups is to be viewed in the light of collective solipsism.

From a constructivist perspective, against the background of the distinction between the praxeological and axiological subsumption of semiotic objects in the realm of human culture, any ego- and group-specific meaning may be viewed as a constructive self-determination, or self-awareness, of individuals in their belonging to different communicative collectivities. Thus, one can conclude, while making reference to the distinctions introduced by Bethan Benwell and Elizabeth Stokoe (2006), that a function- or value-oriented identification of an individual self with purposes and/or needs, shared by members of a given social group, is manifested through his or her adoption of discursive practices and discursive genres characterizing the semiotic inventory of determined collectivities.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN

A Solipsistic Paradigm in Cognitive and Existential Semiotics

Introduction

The point of departure in this chapter is the individual human being considered as a monolingual self who is embedded into a collective multilingual world. From this viewpoint, the epistemological perspective of solipsism, which stands as a rule in opposition to collectivism, is consequently discussed under the label of collective solipsism. In connection with the cognitive theory of language, a phenomenological stance is adopted that objective reality does not exist independently of cognition and that language is only partly accessible in speech, being embedded as a whole within the consciousness of a speaking individual. However, this stance is supported also with a belief that the mental contents of the monolingual self, assumed as a principal object of study of linguistic semiotics, are accessible solely through concrete texts sent and received in interpersonal communication. In such a panmentalist conception, texts are considered as extensions of the minds of human individuals, which thus constitute parts of a general human mind exposed through speech. Investigating language as a mental system located within the brain of individuals by describing their speaking activities, practitioners of cognitive studies are interested to find out how this overall human mind in question works.

However, what is accessible to sign- and meaning-oriented scholars studying human knowledge constitutes the investigative domain of descriptive semiotics, which deals with the ways of how the extraorganismic information structures are processed when they involve signs of facts and events of the real world. Nevertheless, the sensory experience of the so-called external world is introspectively filtered through conceptual and perceptual systems of semiotic means which are united into the networks of relations and sign-processing activities within the cognitive systems of experiencing individuals as their only direct source of knowledge.
The chapter ends with a solipsistic understanding of the investigative object of neosemiotics, which merges existential phenomenology with transcendental phenomenology within the framework of so-called existential semiotics. The objects of interest constitute here verbal exponents of the distinction between the existence of organismic forms of being “in itself” and “for itself”, realized in particular languages discussed by respective philosophers. Hence, the opposition between the two parts of “I” and “Me” in the individual “Self” and the “Other” as an observer’s part of the social “Self” appears to be applicable in the study of existential aspects of human individuals as members of society. Subsequently, followers of existential semiotics are made aware that human individuals manifest in two existence modes as real persons with sensible qualities and rational subjects with intelligible qualities.

**The Monolingual Self in a Multilingual Reality of Everyday Life**

In pursuit of the empirical accessibility of the object of subject-centered semiotics, it is worthwhile to examine the epistemological positions of Sydney MacDonald Lamb’s cognitive theory of language, as expressed in some of his representative works (cf. Lamb 1984, 1991, as well as Halliday, Lamb, & Regan 1988, and Regan, Lamb, Cobb, Jr., Griffin, & Basu 1982/1987). Primary attention is given to the cognitive aspect of the monolingual self in addition to the views of Lamb, which have been just confronted in Chapter Seven (pp. 124–129) with the conceptions of those linguists who adhere to the positions of individualism vs. collectivism and monolingualism vs. multilingualism in their theoretical modeling of language.

**The Minds of Individuals as Parts of a General Human Mind**

Lamb’s theory of language is formulated against the background of a subjectivist view that reality does not exist independently of cognition, and that only some parts of language localized inside of the human brain are available to outside observers through the speaking activities of individuals. However, his subjectivism is flavored also with a solipsist belief, assuming that the mental contents of the “self”, which are considered to exist
really, constitute an empirical object of study. At the same time, Lamb speaks in favor of panmentalism, being convinced that the minds of individuals constitute parts of a general human mind, which is exposed through communication. The followers of Lamb advocate this attitude, labeled as “collective solipsism” (cf. Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1987, 12 and 18–19). They propose to study language as a semiotic system located in the minds of individual selves by describing their speech acts in order to reveal one part of the work performed by this overall human mind. Lamb’s solipsist approach to language along with his collective view of Mind, God and the individual Self is especially manifest in his extensive discussion with Thomas A. Sebeok (see Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1987, 19):

The only thing we experience directly is mental activity. Anything else is hearsay, it is faith. There are hardheaded scientists who do not want to believe in God, because we do not have direct evidence. But they do want to believe in the world, because they think they do have direct evidence of that. They really only have direct evidence of their own mental activity. In what I consider the more sophisticated religious views, God is nothing but Mind. The only thing that we have direct evidence of, therefore, is God. Anything other than that is hearsay. That is one way to look at it.

Now I am going to go as far as Professor Sebeok and say I am a solipsist and proud of it. From my point of view, my own mind is more directly present than his, and yet if you take the religious point of view I was just referring to, that there is nothing but Mind, then Tom’s mind and my mind are parts of the overall Mind in which we all share. This view might perhaps be called collective solipsism, if that term is not self-contradictory.

How to appreciate Lamb’s contribution to the subject-centered object of human semiotics, one has to ask for the ontological status of his conceptual and methodological apparatus with reference to the multidimensionality of language manifested in concrete speech products in relation to its mental existence modes.

Formalist Connectionism in the Domain of Cognitive Semiotics

Lamb’s theory of language has been developed within the broader context of the sign- and meaning-oriented theory of cognition. David R. Griffin points out that Lamb is, in the first instance, interested in the mind, i.e., “how the mind interacts with the brain, and with the rest of the body, and
how meanings are structured within those levels” (see Regan, Lamb, Cobb, Jr., Griffin, & Basu 1982/1987, 12). For Lamb assumes that (see Regan, Lamb, Cobb, Jr., Griffin & Basu 1982/1987, 6):

… our thinking about the world is based upon our internalized models of that world. We all go around with these cognitive systems, these mental relational networks, that mediate between us and the world. When we think we are dealing directly with the “world” that appears to be out there, we are deceiving ourselves. We are dealing directly only with our internal microcosms, the mental representations that we have of the world. … We find the view that the most direct source of knowledge we have in sensory experience is mistaken. That experience is not direct at all; it is indirect. There is something more basic than sensory experience, namely, our mental experience. What we think of as our direct sensory experience of the world has actually been filtered through our conceptual and perceptual systems, which are networks of relations and it is the processing that goes on within these cognitive networks, which we call our minds, that is, the only direct experience. Indeed, to a large extent, what we naïvely think of as our knowledge of the world gained through perception actually turns out to be false, that is, out of correspondence with reality, because the filtering process of our conceptual system has distorted the information as it filters through.

Thus, the objects to be investigated by cognitive linguistics belong in Lamb’s specification to the domain of cognitive semiotics. And the domain of semiotic objects, as he maintains, encompasses the whole sphere of human knowledge and the network of relationships between language and other means with which humans memorize, think, learn and make meaning.

Such a sign- and meaning-oriented discipline studying human knowledge is to be divided, according to Lamb, into descriptive semiotics, which deals with the processing of extraorganismic information structures as they involve signs of facts and events of the world and cognitive semiotics, which focuses upon the mental information structures developed within individuals in the form of connections between the exponents of signs and their conceptual counterparts. Introducing his students into a semiotic view of the world as made of information and not of things, “the essence of information being relationships”, Lamb (see Sebeok, Lamb & Regan, 1987, 10) argues in the first instance that “[t]he knowledge that individuals have in their processing systems about social institutions, the world, and the ways of behaving makes up a culture, an information system”. In the second
instance, Lamb makes them aware of the educational modifiability of cognitive structures in the minds of the billions of people in our planet stating that (see Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1987, 11–12):

In cognitive semiotics, we study the individual semiotic systems people have that are their internal representations of the world. It is these we are most concerned with in the field of education. They are constantly changing especially during childhood. Any adult who reads a book is getting new information, and, thus modifying his or her information system. ... So, an important principle of cognitive semiotics is that every cognitive system is constantly changing. In education we are concerned with trying to make those changes as effective as possible. We would like those who are being educated to build internal information structures that are more or less in correspondence with reality.

In an attempt to figure out how the human mind works by investigating the extensions of verbal capabilities of individuals, Lamb defines his subject matter as a continuous mental phenomenon. Accordingly, one can agree that language as a cognitive system exists within the brain as one of the extensions of man in conformity with Marshal Mcluhan’s view (1964).

**Observable Texts as Extensions of an Inferable Language**

To sum up, the first subpart of this chapter, discussing the solipsistic paradigm of cognitive semiotics, has presented a subject-centered theory of language located within the consciousness of signifying and communicating individuals which constitutes a particular part of a general human mind. Specially exposed is here the monolingual self as a principal object of linguistic semiotics.

According to the monolingualist and panmentalist attitude in question, which accepts a phenomenological stance that the reality of everyday life is cognized and constructed through communication, language has been illustrated as only partly accessible to cognition when it is realized in spoken texts. Empirically observable texts, as semiotic devices, have been specified, within the conceptual and methodological framework of cognitive and descriptive semiotics, as extensions of the rationally inferable language situated in the mind of speaking selves that allow one to reveal how the assumed overall human mind in the terrestrial world works.
Phenomenology of the Self in the Humanistic Turn of Neosemiotics

This subchapter will take as a point of departure the idea of existential semiotics which has been launched by Eero Aarne Pekka Tarasti (born 1948), in 2000. Related to the former, Tarasti’s (2011) “Existential Semiotics and Cultural Psychology” published in *The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology*, will be pondered as a more comprehensive for the subject matter in question. Attention will be paid also to his recent books, namely, *Semiotics of Classical Music: How Mozart, Brahms and Wagner Talk to Us* (Tarasti 2012), and *Sein und Schein. Explorations in Existential Semiotics* (Tarasti 2015).

The objects of an analytical approach will comprise here verbal exponents of the distinction between the existence in itself and for itself, expressed in the personal languages of discussed authors, German and French in particular. What is relevant for the existential aspects of humans as individuals and as members of society is the opposition between “I” and “Me” and the “Self” in group encounters. That’s why one has to bear in mind that the so-called “turn to subject” does in reality mean the “turn to man” if one considers that human individuals appear in two existence modes as real persons with sensible qualities and rational subjects with intelligible qualities. In this context, special attention will be paid to the influence of Jacques Fontanille (2004) upon Tarasti’s distinction between *Moi* and *Soi* as a first person and a third person existence of the individual and social “Self”.

Historical Roots and the Development of World Semiotics in Postmodern Times

To begin with, the heritage of semiotics should be considered in a historical presentation as oscillating between the Old-World semiotics and the Modern-World semiotics. The concept of Old-World semiotics pertains to the first inquiry into the resources, which the practitioners of sign- and meaning-oriented disciplines have inherited from the periods of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Romanticism and Positivism, including the movements of Phenomenology, Functionalism, and Structuralism, especially from Plato (427–347 B.C.) Aristotle, (384–322 B.C.),

To recent times of earlier semiotics belong: William James (1842–1910), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), Charles William Morris (1901–1979), Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), Louis Trolle Hjelmslev (1899–1965), Jakob Johann von Uexküll (1864–1944), and others. Not to be omitted are also the phenomenological existentialist philosophers of earlier times, influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, such as, Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre (1905–1980) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961).

In turn, the second query is related to the scope of Modern-World semiotics that has been given by three main representatives who proposed their own philosophical frameworks: Thomas Albert Sebeok (1920–2001), the originator of biosemiotics, Yuri Mihailovich (Jurij Mihailovič) Lotman (1922–1993), the promoter of a textual view of culture as a semiosphere, Algirdas Julien Greimas (1917–1992), the originator of the semiotic square as an analytical tool for semantic analyses, and Eero Tarasti, the founder of existential semiotics. To be added is that the epistemological background of semiotics of our times has been formed by postmodern and post-structuralist philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists who came to the forefront of the 1960s and 1970s, such as, inter alia, Jacques Marie Émile Lacan (1901–1981), Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), Michel Foucault (1926–1984), Pierre-Félix Bourdieu (1930–2002), Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007), Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), and Julia Kristeva (born 1941).

Among modern semioticians mostly acknowledged are Roman Osipovich (Osipovič) Jakobson (1896–1982), Émile Benveniste (1902–1976), André Martinet (1908–1999), Roland Gérard Barthes (1915–1980), Umberto Eco (born 1932), Roland Posner (born 1942), John Deely (born 1942), Winfried Nöth (born 1944), Göran Sonesson (born 1951), Kalevi Kull (born 1952), Peeter Torop (born 1950) and others. Within the scope of inherited riches, separately discussed and evaluated should be the international world of publications, encyclopedias, anthologies, monographs and journals.
Phenomenology as a Background of Existential Semiotics

To speak about the emergence of the philosophical tradition called *phenomenology*, it is unavoidable to have a word about Kant’s distinction between *phenomenon* as the appearance of reality in human consciousness and *noumenon* as the being of reality in itself, i.e., the reality being cognized and existing independently of cognition. Although Kant did not develop phenomenology in its modern sense, his *Critik der reinen Vernunft* of 1781 (trans. *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1838) recognizes scientific knowledge as derived only from *phenomena* and not at all from *noumena*, his critical approach may be treated as phenomenological (cf. Kant 1838 [1781]). Whatever is known is phenomenon. To be known is to appear in consciousness in a special way by the mediation of senses. Conversely, what does not in any way appear is not known. Hence, it is obvious that any description of what is observable is phenomenological in nature.

The first philosopher who characterized his approach to reality as phenomenology with reference to Kant was the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). But this reality was for him spiritual or mental, as one may learn from two translations of his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* of 1807 which appeared in 1910 as *Phenomenology of Mind* and subsequently in 1977 as *Phenomenology of Spirit* (cf. Hegel 1910/1977 [1807/1952]). Unlike Kant, Hegel expressed his conviction that phenomena constitute a sufficient basis for a universal science of being. They reveal all that is necessary to be revealed, not necessarily “in themselves” but through the dialectical process which is typical of human thought. This process begins with the simplest form of consciousness, connected with a sense perception, and arrives through the consciousness of an individual human self, reflecting the historical and social nature of knowledge, to reason, constituting an ultimate unity of the Absolute Idea, Absolute Spirit, or Absolute Mind, which permeates, and is all of, reality.

Among those who have contributed to transcendental phenomenology, being frequently identified with the work of Husserl (1900/1913 [1970], 1901/1913 [1970], 1901/1921, 1913 [1931/1962], and 1952 [1989]), and his collaborators and interpreters, are Eugen Fink (1905–1975), Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (1923–2014), and Hermann Van Breda (1911–1974, born as Leo Marie Karel), as well as Edith Stein (1891–1942, known also as Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross). Existential phenomenology is associated with the names of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone
de Beauvoir (1908–1986, born as Simone Lucie Ernestine Marie Bertrand de Beauvoir), Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gabriel Honoré Marcel. (1889–1973)

The concept of mundane phenomenology (the phenomenology of everyday life), in turn, is related mainly to the works of Alfred Schütz (1932), continued (cf. Schütz & 1975 [1973]) later (Berger & Luckmann 1966) in the works of social constructivists, Thomas Luckmann (born 1927), and lately also Peter Ludwig Berger (born 1929). However, there are some other kinds of designations or orientations, as one may learn from Phenomenology Online. A Resource from Phenomenological Inquiry, above all, transcendental phenomenology, existential phenomenology, hermeneutical phenomenology, linguistical phenomenology, ethical phenomenology and phenomenology of praxis.

Interestingly is that among phenomenologists of linguistics such names are included as the French-language-oriented works of Maurice Blanchot (1907–2003), Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, despite the fact the latter has denied that he is a phenomenologist. Considering the postulate of Richard L. Lanigan (born 1943) of 1984, popularized by Jacqueline M. Martinez (born 1950) in 2006 and 2008, semiotic phenomenology in relation to discourse studies ought to be added here too.

**The Existence Modes of Human Individuals in Themselves and for Themselves**

What Husserl (1900/1913, 1901/1913, 1901/1921), 1913 and 1952), and his continuators have elaborated regarding the conception of phenomenology as the study of “phenomena”, i.e., of things, or things as they appear in human experience, or the ways how human individuals experience things and the meanings of things, are three kinds of phenomenology, namely, transcendental phenomenology, existential phenomenology, and mundane (Germ. Lebenswelt ‘the life-world’) phenomenology (As to the origins of the term Lebenswelt, see Husserl, 1970 [{1935–1936} 1956/2012]: § 34–37). Husserl’s phenomenological method concentrated on the assumption that consciousness is intentional, i.e., it is always the consciousness of an object, even if the object does not exist at all. At this point, if one argues that the subject’s capacities for being conscious of something and behaving or acting intentionally toward the object of consciousness are manifest in those acts which might be called acts of transcendence, special attention
should be paid to polemics with Edmund Husserl regarding the conception of the subject as the transcendental ego.

In keeping thus with Husserl’s phenomenology (1900/1913, 1901/1913, 1901/1921, 1913 and 1952), it is worthwhile to confront the existentialist stance of Martin Heidegger (1927 [1962]), with its respective understanding by Jean-Paul Sartre (1936–1937 [1960/1991: 37], as well as 1943 [1956]). Interesting is that Sartre, while disagreeing with Heidegger, has interpreted Hegel’s distinctions of “being-in-itself” (An-sich-sein) and “being-for-itself” (Für-sich-sein) as an opposition between empirical existence vs. rational transcendence. Besides, in line with Sartre, but contrary to Heidegger as relevant for the observation of the corporeal existence mode of humans appears to be here Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception, 1944 [trans. Phenomenology of Perception, 1956] (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1944/1945 [1962])

Referring however to their achievements, it should be remembered that, in Phänomenologie des Geistes (see chapter IV. Die Wahrheit der Gewißheit seiner selbst, as well as chapter V. Gewißheit und Wahrheit der Vernunft), published in 1807 as the first part of his System der Wissenschaft, Hegel interprets An-sich-sein as an absolute notion, denoting „das Jenseits seiner selbst” ‘on the other side of himself’, which is for him the same as Für-ein-anderes-sein ‘being-for-another’, and Für-sich-sein ‘for itself/himself/herself sein’ in turn, which might be equated also with Für uns sein ‘being-for-us’, Für-mich-sein ‘being-for-me’, as a second kind of subjective relationship.

The ontological and gnoseological positions of Sartre (1936–1937 [1960/1991]), against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, are related to the exposure of the difference between an empirical ego and transcendental ego. In this position, while rejecting the claim that the subject’s capacities for being conscious of something, and behaving or acting intentionally toward the object of consciousness, are manifest in the acts, which might be called acts of transcendence, Sartre proposed to study the human individual, viewed as psycho-physical person in its own right, as both a mental subject and a concrete object.

Disagreeing with the assumptions of phenomenology as the study of intentional objects or products of the activity of a transcendental ego, Sartre has been interested in man with his psycho-physical properties as a person existing in the world. Therefore, he has rejected the understanding of the transcendental ego Husserl opted for in his work Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologischen Philosophie, namely the “Ego” standing
behind consciousness whose rays (German *Ichstrahlen*) supposedly throw light upon phenomena presenting themselves in the field of the individual’s attention (cf. Sartre ([1991, 37]). It has to be remembered that already in his earlier work *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserl determined the “Me” as the synthetic and transcendent product of consciousness.

Sartre ([1991, 37–38]) has managed thus to establish inconsistencies in Husserl’s phenomenological thought when he states that consciousness does not need to refer to an “I” which is unifying and individualizing (and is therefore a condition of consciousness). According to Sartre ([1991, 39]), consciousness is the perceptual syntheses of past consciousnesses and present consciousness, and it (i.e., consciousness) unifies itself by itself, so that the transcendental “I” has simply no *raison d’être*, or pointedly, if there were a transcendental “I”, it would mean the death of consciousness (cf. Sartre [1991, 40–41]).

In the context of Sartre’s position to the existential work of Hegel, the study *An-sich-Sein, Für-sich-Sein und der Andere bei Sartre und seine Bezüge auf Hegel* by Christian Walter (born 1957) appears to be worth noting. The worth of this inquiry (cf. Walter 2009) lies in the account of Sartre’s understanding of “being-in-itself” (*être-en-soi*) and “being-for-itself” (*être-pour-soi*) against the background of Hegel’s view of Für-sich-sein ‘being-for-itself’ (interpreted as Für-sich-selbst-sein ‘being-for-itself-alone’). Besides, Walter has confronted Hegel’s “being-for-others” (*Für-andere-sein*), with its critical reception by Sartre (*être-pour-autrui*). In conclusion, while acknowledging the idea of non-existence, Walter’s study has shown where Sartre’s point of view in the domain negation appears to be logical, and where his intersubjective criticism of Hegel is sufficiently grounded.

With reference to further discussions on existentialism, it has to be added that Sartre proposed to differentiate between existence of things and persons, i.e., non-conscious and conscious forms of being, on the one hand, and between objective and subjective existence modes of human beings as such, on the other hand. This topic demands, however, a more thorough insight while evaluating the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger (1927 [1962]) in confrontation with its idealist understanding by Jean-Paul Sartre (1943 [1956]) and realist position of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1944 [1962]) against the background of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology in general along with his opinion on Immanuel Kant’s (1781 [1838]) view of the object-subject problem in particular (cf. also Azeri 2010).
Individual and Social Existence of the Self in Neosemiotics

Foundations for a human-centered paradigm of existential semiotics have been laid by Eero Tarast at the 9th Congress of the IASS/AIS – Helsinki–Imatra, 11–17 June 2007 (cf. Tarasti 2007, 2009). To understand the contribution of Eero Tarasti (2007, 2009, 2011, 2012) one should specially expose the relationship and difference between the understanding of existentialism in the works of Heidegger and those of Sartre. The sources and direction of reasoning of the former and the latter are completely unrelated. The way of Heidegger is leading from Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813–1855) and Karl Theodor Jaspers (1883–1969) (cf. Kierkegaard 1846 [1941], and Jaspers 1913/1946 [1962].) and that of Sartre from the speculative philosophy of Kant and Hegel.

Having departed from phenomenology as the study of human experience being consciously realized by the senses (or lived through) from a subjective or first person point of view, Tarasti concentrated on rethinking the layouts of human-centered semiotics in the light of selected philosophers who paid attention to such notions as, inter alia, “subject”, “existence”, “transcendence”, and “value”. These selected concepts grounded on semiotics were placed against the philosophical background of such notional categories of existential phenomenology as Umwelt, Lebenswelt and Dasein. In search of the roots of existential semiotics, the founder of neosemiotics went back to the logics of Hegel, the first philosopher who characterized his approach to reality as phenomenology with reference to Kant, but who, unlike Kant, expressed his conviction that phenomena constitute a sufficient basis for a universal science of being.

The primary point of reference in Tarasti’s inquiry consisted of Hegel’s categories of An-sich-sein ‘being-in-itself’ and Für-sich-sein ‘being-for-itself’. These categories subsequently turned into subjective and objective being in the philosophy of Kierkegaard (1846 [1941]) when he spoke about an individual as an observer of him- or herself or the observed one, ‘who was said to be a subject or such an individual who was what he/she was because he/she had become like it’.

Sartre, an attentive reader of Hegel and Kierkegaard in line, has referred to Hegelian concepts using French terms, être-en-soi and être-pour-soi. For Sartre (1943, 124–125), the being as such becomes aware of itself through an act of negation, and when becoming an observer of itself, it shifts its interest into the position of being for itself. Having noticed a lack
in its reality, the being begins with the first act of transcendence as far as it strives to fulfill what it lacks.

In his studies on Hegel, Tarasti has been influenced by Jacques Fontanille (born 1948), one of the main representatives of the Paris School of Semiotics. Following Fontanille’s corporeal semiotics, *Soma et séma. Figures du corps* (2004, 22–23), Hegelian categories *An-sich-sein* and *Für-sich-sein*, have been further extended in Tarasti’s existential semiotics (2011, 327–329) through *An-mir-sein* and *Für-mich-sein* (être-en-moi ‘being-in-myself’ and *être-pour-moi* ‘being-for-myself’).

In the reconstruction of Hegelian categories, Fontanille presents a distinction between individual and social being forms of human body (*soma*) in an entirely new phenomenological sense (*séma*). Accordingly, he proposes to detach two kinds of body-related meanings for human agents (*actants*) while separating the body experienced inside of their organism as flesh, which forms the center of all physiological and semiotic processes, from the body observed outside of their organism, which shapes their uniqueness and behavioral characteristics.

In fact, Fontanille deals with corporeal semiotics but presents a distinction between *Moi* and *Soi* as two categories referring to the same acting individual. According to Fontanille (2004, 22), the body as flesh constitutes the totality of the material resistance or impulse to semiotic processes. The body is thus a sensorial driving support of all semiotic experiences. Hence, on the one hand, in Fontanille’s view (2004, 22–23), there is a body that constitutes the identity and directional principle of the flesh, being the carrier of the personal “me” (*Moi*), and on the other hand the body that supports the “self” (*Soi*) while constructing itself in a discursive activity. As Fontanille reasons, the *Soi* is that part of ourselves which me, *Moi*, projects out of itself to create itself in its activity. Likewise, the *Moi* is that part of ourselves to which the *Soi* refers when establishing itself. In Tarasti’s (2015, 23) interpretation: “The *Moi* provides the *Soi* with impulse and resistance whereby it can become something. In turn, the *Soi* furnishes the *Moi* with the reflexivity that it needs to stay within its limits when it changes. The *Moi* resists and forces the *Soi* to meet its own alterity.” Hence, *Moi* and *Soi* are to be seen as inseparable.

Although Fontanille departs from the viewpoint of semiotics, his reasoning fits well with the phenomenological categories of Hegel. In accordance with his proposal, a new interpretation of *an sich* and *für sich* is to be applied, the first corresponding to bodily ego and the second its stability and identity and its aspiration outward, or the Sartrean negation. The *Soi*
functions as a kind of memory of the body or Moi; it yields the form to those traces of tensions and needs that have been inserted into the flesh of the Moi. Anyhow, before pondering what consequences this distinction has for existential semiotics, it is necessary to scrutinize the principles of Moi and Soi as such. Consequently, anything belonging to the category of Mich, ‘me’, concerns the subject as an individual entity, whereas the concept of Sich ‘him-/her-/it-self’ has to be reserved for the social aspect of this subject.

When one thinks about the identity and individuality of an organism, one can distinguish in it two aspects: Moi and Soi. In “me,” the subject appears as such, as a bundle of sensations, and in “himself”, “herself” or “itself”, the subject appears as observed by others or socially determined. These labels, Moi and Soi connote the existential and social aspects of the subject or, rather, the individual and communitarian sides of the whole self as an investigative object of neosemiotics.

**Human Individual as a Person and a Subject**

Summarizing the existential aspects of a human individual, one can refer to the following interpretation of Eero Tarasti’s view of the investigative object of neosemiotics, who treats de facto the corporeal and mental “self” in his writings as a synonym for a human “subject”.

1. **Being-in-myself—An-mir-sein—être-en-moi** expresses the human individual’s bodily self-worth, which appears in his, hers or its verbal and nonverbal behavior. I represents bodily ego of human self, which appears as kinetic energy, expressions of needs, wants or desires through gestures and intonations.

2. **Being-for-myself—Für-mich-sein—être-pour-moi** reflects the attitude of an “observer” shifting, for the lack of his, her or its existence, to the awareness of transcendence. This way of thinking corresponds to transcendental acts of an ego discovering his, her or its existential identity, reaching a certain kind of stability through permanent corporeality in habitual activities.

3. **Being-in-itself—An-sich-sein—être-en-soi**, in turn, is a transcendental category referring to norms, ideas, and values, which are purely conceptual and virtual. As such they are the potentialities of an individual, which he can either actualize or not actualize.
(4) Being-for-itself—Für-sich-sein—être-pour-soi means the aforementioned norms, ideas, and values as realized by the conduct of our subject in his/hers/its world of existence. Those abstract entities appear here as distinctions, applied values, choices, and realizations that often will be far away from original transcendental entities.

Conclusion

To conclude, the followers of a self-oriented view of the object of new semiotics, recently discussed as the main topic at the 12th World Congress of Semiotics: New Semiotics Between Tradition and Innovation, Sofia, 16–20 September 2014, should be made aware that the image of the human self, treated as a social “subject”, is to be supplemented through the corporeal counterpart of the human subject (hitherto limited to the mental sphere of the human organism). As a matter of fact, the entry word soi functions in French, firstly, as a reflexive personal pronoun of the third verb form, secondly, as an emphatic pronoun used for unspecified persons, and thirdly, as a translational equivalent of the psychological term self in English. To say more precisely, subject-centered semioticians should take into consideration also the concept of a (physical) person manifested in an empirically accessible form representing a concrete existence mode of the human self.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
Discursive Life-World of Communicating Selves

Towards a Poststructuralist Understanding of Discourse

This chapter deals with the notion of discourse connected with the theoretical framework of discourse analysis which has been developed in anthropological linguistics, foreign language pedagogy, social psychology, sociology of communication, philosophy of science, geography and area studies, cultural studies, political sciences, cognitive studies, and translation studies, starting from the 1960s. It concentrates on the methodological assessment of discursivism as an investigative perspective from the viewpoint of its applicability to the context of human competence. With reference to the semiotic-communicational aspects of human competence, it proposes to restrict the understanding of discourse to the realization of language and culture in human interactions which are responsible for the formation of ecologically determined systems of communication (cf. Wąsik 2014, 156–168). Accordingly, the definition of discourse has been developed at this point in terms of relational properties of meaning-bearers or meaning-processing activities embedded into the social roles of communication participants depending upon the rules of language and culture. Considered in conformity with the proposals made by philologists, the notion of discourse has been thus applied to a broader context of social sciences.

Discourse as a Textual Construction
Above the Level of the Sentence

In view of the human-centered semiotics of language and culture, a sharp caesura must be introduced for separating the conception of discourse analysis as such from that of which has been defined by the theoretician of structural linguistics Zellig Sabbettai Harris (1909–1992). In his works of
1952, Harris (1952a, 1952b, 1952c) proposed to extend the limits of sentence grammar by introducing grammar on the textual level. He considered discourse as the next level in the hierarchy of morphemes, clauses and sentences. Having applied purely structural methods to separate discourse on a higher level of text, he worked out such principles for the distinction of language units of a lower level of sentence analysis, as segmentation, classification and distribution. These methods were based on formal procedures of breaking a text down into relationships, such as equivalence or substitution, and revealing the structural role of text-elements among its lower-level constituents without considering their referential meaning. In Harris’ order of text analysis, the initial step constituted the selection of individual text-elements or groups of text-elements, which usually appeared in identical or equivalent contextual surroundings. The next step was devoted to the examination of rules how the selected elements were combined into particular classes of equivalence. In conclusion, the question had to be answered how the consecutive combination of these classes of equivalences made up the whole of the text.

Internal and External Criteria for Qualifying the Textual Stretch of Language as a Discourse

The grammatical endowing of text linguistics has been internationally pioneered by Teun Adrianus van Dijk (born 1943) in his version of “text grammar” from 1972. This fact has been emphasized by Robert-Alain de Beaugrande (1946–2008) and Wolfgang Ulrich Dressler (born 1939) in their historical account of 1981: “An important notion which sets van Dijk’s work apart from studies of sentence sequences is that of MACRO-STRUCTURE: a large-scale statement of the content of a text. Van Dijk has reasoned that the generating of a text must begin with a main idea which gradually evolves into the detailed meanings that enter individual sentence-length stretches” (1981 [1981, 26]). Hereto belongs also the work of Text and Context, in which van Dijk (1977) describes the basic operational steps that need to be undertaken when a text is presented, such as deletion—connected with an elimination of the textual material, generalization—modification of material in a more broadest sense, and construction —creation of new material to subsume the whole of presentation.

Anyhow, it is the concept of text and its composition, rather than discourse, which constitutes the true heart of text linguistics, as indicated by
Beaugrande in his book *Text, Discourse and Process: Toward a Multidisciplinary Science of Texts* (1980), repeated then in *Text Production: Toward a Science of Composition* (1984). One step forward in the direction of a discursive view of human communication exposing the properties of text in relation to their producers has been made by Beaugrande and Dressler in their *Introduction to Text Linguistics* (1981 [1981]). With reference to their earlier works on text grammar (Dressler 1972) and text production as the science of discourse composition (Beaugrande 1980, 1984), they have elaborated seven criteria that must be fulfilled by the spoken or written text to be qualified as a discourse. These criteria, specified as standards of textuality, include: cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativeness, situationality, and intertextuality.

In detail, the term *cohesion* pertains to a grammatical connection between sentence parts, which give the participants in discourse communication a feeling that a stretch of language they produce or receive has a unity essential for its interpretation. Cohesion is the basis that forms the text elements and categories, such as conjunction, ellipsis, anaphora, cataphora or recurrence, by means of which the syntactic interconnection is achieved. *Coherence*, in turn, is the order of statements which relates one to another by sense. It entails also presuppositions and implications connected with general knowledge of reality or with cognitive structures that do not have a linguistic realization, but are implied by the language itself, and thus influence the reception of a given message. Beaugrande and Dressler (1981, 84) have defined coherence as a “continuity of senses … being the mutual access and relevance within a configuration of concepts and relations”.

The principle of *intentionality* relates to the position and purpose of a text producer, demanding that a message has to be conveyed deliberately and consciously. It involves the text-producer's attitude that the set of respective text-constituents form a cohesive and coherent discourse type useful in fulfilling the producer's purposes or satisfying his/her needs, for example, to distribute or to acquire knowledge and/or to attain a certain communicative goal. *Acceptability* might be determined as a mirror of intentionality since it is audience-oriented. It means that the communicative product has to be satisfactory so that the addressees can approve it. The listeners or readers must recognize a given text in a particular context and be prepared to estimate its content whether it is suitable or relevant.

The next criterion, *informativeness*, means that some material evidence of new knowledge has to be included in the discourse. It refers to the quantity and quality of new or expected data in accordance with the prin-
ciple that every text should be informative. *Situationality* points to the fact that the circumstances in which the text is produced play a decisive role in the production and reception of the communicational message. This criterion leads to the description of discourse as a “text in context”. Finally, there is *intertextuality*, which refers to two things. Firstly, a text is always related to some previous or simultaneous discourse types and secondly, texts are always linked and grouped in particular text varieties or genres (e.g., narrative, argumentative, descriptive, etc.) by formal criteria.

In fact, it is only *cohesion* and *coherence* that make up the inherent properties of the text. *Informativeness, situationality* and *intertextuality* refer to extratextual reality, their contextual arrangement, and their relationships to other text types. What thus constitutes the relational properties of their producers and recipients forms the *intentionality* and *acceptability* of texts.

Less known in the English West was discourse analysis from France, which arose on the philological tradition of stylistics, applying grammatical methods to the detection of linguistic phenomena as an obligatory step in the interpretation of texts. In the 1970s the most influential in the development of the French school was Michel Pêcheux (1938–1983) who proposed an automatic decomposition of discourse (cf. Pêcheux 1969).

**Discourse as the Use of a Text in the Context of Situation**

Another tradition of discourse analysis evolved both in France and in other West European countries. It was connected with the rise of the ordinary-language philosophy directed by John Langshaw Austin (1911–1960), John Rogers Searle (born 1932) and Herbert Paul Grice (1913–1988), which was extensively discussed and enriched by Geoffrey Neil Leech (1936–2014). What they introduced into the study of language-in-use, called pragmatic linguistics or pragmalinguistics, and subsequently to interpersonal rhetoric as opposed to textual rhetoric, called sociological pragmatics or sociopragmatics, were the distinctions, *inter alia*, between: direct and indirect speech acts; propositions and concepts; utterances or statements and locutions; locutionary meaning, illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects; performative (doing things with words) and assertive (stating the true existence of things) utterances, introduced by Austin (1962/1975) and continued by Searle (1969), conversational implicatures, principles of cooperation and linguistic politeness, natural and conventional meaning proposed by Grice (1975), which was advanced to a higher
level of critics and extensions by Leech (1983/1990) and a pleiad of their followers in the last three decades. Among other intellectual directions of study, the linguistic analysis of texts above the level of the sentence was largely influenced by the ethnography of speaking and, subsequently, ethnography of communication, initiated by Dell Hathaway Hymes (1962, 1971a) and revived by Muriel Saville-Troike (1982).

On the basis of these new trends in the development of pragmatics, interpersonal rhetoric and conversational analysis, the domain of discourse analysis was fertilized by fresh terms and methodological tools. Hereto belonged mainly the early work of Teun Adrianus van Dijk Studies in the Pragmatics of Discourse (1981) who specialized initially in text linguistics and pragmatic discourse analysis, and then switched to critical discourse analysis (CDA) starting from the late 1990s.

The logical and philosophical aspects of pragmatics were visible especially in the theoretical output of Michel Foucault (1966 [1970], 1969 [1972]), a French philosopher and historian of humanistic ideas. Foucault’s approach benefited both from the language-in-use and utterance-centered turn (called in France pragmatique énonciative “enunciative pragmatics”), which took place in post-structuralist linguistics and social sciences.

To understand the importance of a discursive-analytic approach to verbal texts and text-formation acts of verbal communication implemented by social scientists, it is essential, in allusion to the enquiry of Sara Mills (1997, 40, and 55–67) to discuss in the first instance Foucault’s Archaeology of knowledge (1972). In the second, one should cite the understanding of discourse from his book History of Sexuality (1976 [1978]) and subsequently his lecture “The Order of Discourse” (1971 [1981]).

Foucault departs from a summarizing description of discourse that allows him to treat “it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (1972, 80). In the individualized sense, a discourse can be also analyzed according to some linguistic rules governing all the utterances of a determined language in terms of a specific formation that groups the enunciation of statements similar in kind. In this sense “discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be assigned particular modalities of existence” (Foucault 1972, 107).

What constitutes a statement, Foucault (1972, 107–108) labels a group of signs which exist in a materialized way within various verbal performances referred in relation to the same domain of objects and possible
subjects creating a specified discursive formation. Advocating a philosophical perspective Foucault sharply distinguishes between the facts, which belong to the domains of discourse studies, on the one hand, and the domain of linguistics and logic, on the other, in the following declaration:

A statement belongs to a discursive formation as a sentence belongs to a text, and a proposition to a deductive whole. But whereas the regularity of a sentence is defined by the laws of a language (langue), and that of a proposition by the laws of logic, the regularity of statements is defined by the discursive formation itself. (Foucault 1972, 116).

Under the term *discursive formation* Foucault means, in general, the enunciative principle that governs a group of verbal performances and, in particular, the historical, thematic or institutional distribution of limited groups of statements that share the same patterns of concerns, perspectives, concepts, or themes. In other words, the discursive formation is an abstract set of conditions that should guide language use within such aspects as topics, originators of the linguistic performance, interrelation and inter-changeability with other linguistic acts. When these conditions are fulfilled, one may speak of various kinds of discourses, such as economic, medical, academic, etc. Cf. his concise definition:

We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable, whose appearance or use in history might be indicated (and if necessary explained), it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. (Foucault 1972, 117).

Thus, a *discursive practice* may be characterized as regulating the enunciation of statements by imposing upon an enunciating subject “a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in a time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the condition of operation of the enunciative function” (Foucault 1972, 117). Though there is a plurality of discourses at any given time, a single discourse is limited to the definite number of possible statements.

In addition to *Archéologie du savoir* of 1969, in his Inaugural Lecture delivered at the Collège de France given on December 2, 1970, titled *L’ordre du discours*, which was translated ten years after its first French publi-
In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, select-
ed, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose
role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance
events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (Foucault 1981, 52). In this way, he proposed to think of discourse as existing in the form
of a complex set of practices which are kept in circulation and other prac-
tices which are contested and kept out of circulation.

Having exposed the methodological requirements for the existence of
discourses, Foucault contends that: “Discourses must be treated as discon-
tinuous practices, which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with
one another, but can just exclude or be unaware of each other” (1981, 67).
In his further arguments, he states: “We must conceive of discourse as a
violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we
impose on them; and it is in this practice that the events of discourse find
the principle of their regularity” (Foucault 1981, 67). As to regularities
that experiencing subjects might observe, Foucault argues that discourse is
to be seen as something which constrains the perceptions of reality. Alt-
ough discourse seems to encompass almost everything, there does exist
the field of non-discursive practices (Foucault 1972, 68).

The reason that sociologists have found Foucault’s theory attractive is
that he stresses that discourse is associated with the interrelationships
between power, ideas or ideology. However, the notion of discourse ap-
ppears to be more sophisticated than the notion of ideology in the political
sense. In the first volume of his Histoire de la sexualité, 1976 [trans. His-
tory of Sexuality, 1978], Foucault asserts even that “discourse can be both
an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy.
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also under-
mines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart
it” (1978, 100–101).

In sum, when theorizing about the notion of discourse and its related
terms, Foucault has used in addition to statement, discursive formation,
discursive practices also some other terms, like épistèmé (1966 [1970]),
archive or historical a priori (1972, 127), discursive event, discursive
series (1981, 68), discursive regularities (1981, 72), which have formed
points of reference to his work and which have helped scholars to outline
the terminology of discourse studies as a whole.
To the well-known scholars in France who have associated a pragmatic outlook on discourse with linguistic theories of “enunciation” and Michel Foucault’s concept of “archaeology of knowledge” belongs Dominique Maingueneau (born 1950). For Maingueneau (1976, 1984), discourse analysis is interested in: (1) discursive genres of social activity which play a decisive role in the construction of social reality; (2) discursive interactions between communicational settings and of the “enunciative scenes”, being determined by social nature of communicational events; (3) the description of discursive practices with the application of concepts and methods, which are borrowed from systemic linguistics and from the sociology of communication. Worth noting is that since the end of the 1990s Maingueneau (1999) has propagated the idea of “self-constituting discourses”, being interested in the legitimation of the entire discursive production in the domains of the human life-world, such as philosophy, religion, science, art, politics, literature, etc.

Among discourse analysts of the 1980s, it was Michael Stubbs (born 1947) who distinguished himself by uniting in his study *Discourse Analysis: The Sociolinguistic Analysis of Natural Language* (1983) several domains of language-in-use-oriented discursive studies, such as, *inter alia*, natural and recorded conversations, fieldwork observations, narrative organization of texts, data collection from spoken and written texts, ethnographic data, communicative problems in the classrooms, language variation, language functions, descriptive rules of language use, medium as message, object language and metalanguage, language-systemic level, language-pragmatic level, tests for speech acts, well-formedness and grammaticality, predictability and idealization, truth and certainty, knowledge and beliefs, surface cohesion and underlying coherence, utterances as actions, discourse acts and speech acts, indirection in speech acts, social roles, formulating turns of talk, the propositional analysis of texts, narrative structures, stories and plots, entailments of propositions and presuppositions, jokes and lies, conversational maxims and implicatures, and the like.

What subsequently has given an impetus for doing discourse analysis, in the opinion of Stubbs (1983, 1), is the recognition that language, action and knowledge are inseparable. Stubbs observes that when thinking about discourse, one should take language into consideration, and at the same time he points out that “language, action and knowledge are inseparable” (1983, 1). Additionally, for Stubbs (1983, 1) communication between people would be impossible if they did not share common knowledge and assumptions about the surrounding world, while interacting with others dur-
ing different social occasions. According to Stubbs, language used by an individual is highly contextualized by the situation in which a person participates. In Stubbs’ assessment “[a]ny choice of words creates a mini-world or universe of discourse, and makes predictions about what is also likely to occur in the same context” (1983, 2). As he observes, it is quite normal for people to have some expectations concerning the language that is used in one context, but will not be recognized as appropriate in another. Thus, Stubbs maintains that there is a great variety of social roles and “[w]e can talk about intuitively recognizable social roles such as ‘teacher’ and ‘doctor’” (1983, 8). Moreover, by this point Stubbs clarifies that when a person is a participant of a given discourse, for instance a teacher, there is a specific discursive behavior that is expected of this person, which at the same time is different from the discourse of a doctor or a lawyer. As he adds, “there is no use of language which is not embedded in the culture; on the other hand, there are no large-scale relationships between language and society which are not realized, at least partly, through verbal interaction” (Stubbs 1983, 8). In his view, every human action, even non-verbal, communicates something to the surroundings. What is more, a member of a society is always a part of a determined culture being aware of social conventions which are represented through discourse.

Discourse as a Communicative Praxis in Social Interactions

To the most prominent founders of critical approaches to discourse as a communicative praxis belong Norman Fairclough (born 1941) and Teun Adrianus van Dijk, mentioned above in the context of text grammar and the pragmatic use of language. This topic, announced by Fairclough in his article “Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis” at the Journal of Pragmatics (1985), has been continued and elaborated in his subsequent books, especially of 1989 and 1995.

What is relevant for Fairclough’s (1989, 22–24) theory is the differentiation between discourse and text; text is a product of discourse, a singular, specific realization of discourse, while discourse comprises the entire process of social interaction of which the text production is just a part. More specifically, discourse has three dimensions simultaneously: text, discursive practice (including the production and interpretation of texts, that is the interactive dimension), and sociocultural practice (broadly understood context), which make up a discursive event. According to Fair-
clough (1989, 22), a discursive approach to language, which entails the perception of language as a form of social practice, has a threefold implication: firstly, language is a part of society; secondly, language is a social process; and, thirdly, language is a socially conditioned process.

For Fairclough (1995, 6), language is socially constitutive, but at the same time it is socially conditioned. Texts are thus social spaces which can accommodate two fundamental processes simultaneously: cognition and representation of the world, as well as social interaction. In Fairclough’s (1995, 73) view “language is a material form of ideology, and language is invested by ideology.” Postulating a critical-discursive view of language “as social practice”, he assumes “that it is a mode of action”, which is “historically and socially situated”, and which is not only “socially shaped but it is also socially shaping.” (Fairclough 1995, 131).

To sum up, accepting the view of Fairclough that language in use is subjected to social conventions, the discourse-analyst may investigate, for example, how speaking, writing and reading are performed in the way prescribed by society and how they have a social effect. Since discourse is a system, those who speak or write in a determined language can realize various communicative functions by means of this system. Hence, work within a functional paradigm should focus on characterizing the patterns of speaking or writing which are used for certain purposes in particular contexts, aiming at discovering in what way they result from the application of communicational strategies.

Van Dijk announced his first view on “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis” in his article of 1993, formulated then by a programmatic title “Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis” of 1995. Mostly cited, however, are his two consequent articles published in 1997 (van Dijk 1997a and 1997b). Nonetheless, it is already in his book of 1988 where the attention switched to the ideology as the primary object of his study from a multidisciplinary perspective (cf. van Dijk 1988).

Teun van Dijk has treated discourse as a form of social action, i.e., an intentional, controlled, purposeful human activity. Assuming that the production or comprehension of sentences, words, styles, rhetoric, or argumentation should also be understood as action, van Dijk suggests to perceive those who assign meanings to discourses as social actors (1997b, 8). Studying action presuppose analyzing intentions, plans and purposes of speakers or writers in a specific context to which they “adapt what they say—and how they say it, and how they interpret what others say—to at least some of their roles or identities, and to the roles of other participants”
(van Dijk 1997b, 12). With respect to the assumption that social discourses are means by which ideologies are persuasively communicated in society, and which usually help to reproduce and legitimate the power or domination of specific groups or classes, van Dijk argues that (1997b, 26):

[Po]eople develop ideologies in order to solve a specific problem: ideologies thus serve to manage the problem of the coordination of the acts or practices of individual social members of a group. Once shared, ideologies make sure that members of a group will generally act in similar ways in similar situations, are able to cooperate in joint tasks, and will thus contribute to group cohesion, solidarity and successful reproduction of the group.

A more precise description of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a form of “social practice” dealing with “language use in speech and writing” has been put forward by Fairclough and Wodak (1997, 258):

Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned—it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people.

The main characteristics of CDA have been summarized by Fairclough and Wodak (1997, 271–280), as follows: CDA addresses social problems; power relations are discursive; discourse constitutes society and culture; discourse does ideological work; discourse is historical; The link between the text and society is mediated; discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory; and discourse is a form of social action.

**Discursivism as an Epistemological Perspective in the Assessment of Interacting Communities**

To begin with, discursivism is regarded here as an epistemological position of scientists who analyze their investigative object from a discourse-oriented perspective. To determine the scope of a selected perspective, discourse is defined in terms of the relational properties of *meaning-bearers* or
meaning-processing activities embedded into the social roles of communication participants depending upon the rules of language and culture.\textsuperscript{39}

Thus, against the background of the distinctions made by philologists, the notion of discourse is usually placed in a broader context of social sciences. Practitioners of philological studies, linguists and theoreticians of literature, refer the term discourse above all to socially and culturally determined properties of the types of texts or text-processing activities characterizing the domains of language use in human communication. But those who aim at studying the semiotics of human communication see discourse as a material manifestation of language and culture in sensible meaning-bearers, which are equated with text-like objects, performing the semiotic functions of indicating, signaling, appealing, symbolic, iconic, i.e., pictorial or mimetic signs in the nonverbal and verbal behavior of communication participants.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{Discursive Ecosystems as Temporary and Long-Lasting Aggregations of Communicating Selves}

Seen from the perspective of cultural and communicational sciences, discourse is specified in terms of semiotic codes and processes that link individual communicating selves, taking part in group interactions as observable persons and inferable subjects, into interpersonal and intersubjective collectivities when they create and interpret the inferable meanings, which are embodied in material bearers forming the nonverbal or verbal means and modes of human understanding. Correspondingly, semiotic objects are regarded as the realization of language and culture in various domains of human communication, determined by the functional circles, interest spheres, or thematic preferences of people, etc., such as, e.g., family, neighborhood, market, festival or carnival, magazine, school, church, funeral home, cemetery, office, bank, parliament, army, law, courtroom, prison, hospital, communication roads, media, and information centers, feminism, anticolonialism, green peace movements, and the like.\textsuperscript{41}

To establish a typology of discursive communities\textsuperscript{42} as aggregations of communicating selves into discursive communities who interact in temporary or long-lasting encounters, it will be necessary to specify the common tasks that they realize for the satisfaction of their survival needs and cultural values, as well as the fulfillment of public requirements and environmental conditionings. Accordingly, various occupational domains of
social services create the basis for the distinction of discursive communities, such as administering, governing, municipality service, food and utility supply, commodity and public transportation; manufacturing, industrialization; advertising, marketing, trading, banking, taxation; canalization, sanitation, waste removal; road and shelter building, designing, renovation, housing, hostelling, education, health-caretaking, hospitalization, interment, relaxation, recreation, gardening; defense, execution of penalties, controlling of morality or standard conduct, exclusion, elimination, inclusion, incorporation, custody, arrest; civic gathering, public corporation, tourisms, and the like.

Having in view the role of language and culture in the realization of communicational tasks, one may take into consideration a number of the so-called functions of speech communication, functions of texts or functions of signs, such as argumentative, cognitive, collaborative, communicative, competitive, conative, conflictive, controlling, convivial, deceptive, deferential, degrading, delimitative, diacritic, discriminating, distortive, emotional, enculturating, evocative, excluding, experimental, expressive, heuristic, ideational, identifying, imaginative; impressive, including, informational, informative, instrumental, interactional, intrapersonal, interpersonal, logical, ludic, manipulative, metalingual, persuasive, phatic, poetic, pragmatic, prevaricating, regulatory, representative, ritual, semantic, separating, significative, stimulative, symbolizing, textual, transactional, unifying, etc.

Moreover, both linguistic pragmatics and the pragmatics of social communication expose the interactive goals, realized by communication participants through the content of verbal and nonverbal meaning-bearers, such, inter alia, as asking for, giving and/or receiving help, advice, opinion, suggestion; showing tension or tension release, solidarity, unity, commonality or discord, conflict or accommodation, cooperation or competition, contempt, disrespect or admiration, appreciation, approval, disapproval; exercising authority, power, control, influence, supremacy, pressure, etc.

Bearing in mind the classificatory approach to speech acts, extended in a broader context of culture to communicational events, one might take into consideration the semiotic properties of communicators that are determined by task- or purpose-, or goal- or aim-in-view-oriented acts, such as, e.g., accepting, accusing, admiring, advising, agreeing, announcing, appealing, applauding, approving, arguing, asking, asserting, begging, calming, cheering, claiming, clarifying, complying, confirming, congratulating, counseling, consoling, cursing, defending, demanding, denying, disagreeing, emphasizing, encouraging, evaluating, falsifying, flattering,
greeting, illuminating, informing, instructing, inviting, joking, laughing, maintaining, mocking, noticing, notifying, obeying, observing, offering, ordering, pleasing, praising, promising, pronouncing, proposing, quarreling, reassuring, recommending, refusing, rejecting, repeating, reporting, reprimanding, scorning, stating, suggesting, thanking, threatening, verifying, warning, welcoming, etc. Insofar as semiotic-communicational systems are constituents of human culture, one can expose their properties in the light of disciplines that study the ecological factors influencing the life of human individuals as meaning-creators and meaning-utilizers.

While focusing on communicating selves who group into particular ecosystems located at various levels of social stratifications, one may study their behavior as semiotic properties of individuals and collectivities determined by the interrelationships of affinity, ethnicity, occupation, religious conviction, political or economic status, etc. Thus, on account of various forms of interactions, the societal ecosystems in question might be examined within the scope of the so-called ecology of discursive communities in relation to their constitutive elements as parts of communicational systems, individuals playing certain roles of participants in group communication, nonverbal and verbal means, channels and communicational settings.

One should stress, however, that the ecological collectivities, as constituents of larger communities united through common tasks, develop due to the interactions between its members. The occurrence of interaction can be noticed when the products of human behavior and environmental props are observable as semantically relevant objects linking participants in communication with each other. Nonetheless, the interpretation of observable facts, that is, the ascription of meaning to them in terms of referential semiotics, either by communication participants or by researchers, can only be based on subjective inferences.

Investigating a semiotic network formed within an ecosystem of communicating selves and their aggregations into communicating collectivities, one may notice that the manifestation forms of nonverbal and verbal meaning-bearers, which are unequally put into use, appear to be polymorphous when they are formed in dependence on their environments. As such, in relation to the sources and/or destination of information, these meaning-bearers occur on various strata of society in a twofold manner, namely, as relatively changeable practices, and also as stabilizing patterns of interpreted discourses.
Dimensions and Autonomy of Linguistic and Discursive Groupings

Against the background of the terminological apparatus of language-centered communicational sciences, it is important to consider a distinction between two kinds of linguistic and discursive groupings, namely linguistic collectivities and linguistic communities, and discursive collectivities and discursive communities. The difference between these groupings is based on the range of participants taking part in interindividual communication in dependence upon the modular view of language as embedded in the culture, or the holistic view of culture as including language as one of the systems of meaning-bearers belonging to the realm of human semiotics. The boundaries of linguistic communities are determined by the use of one and the same language. Discursive communities, however, may exist even if communication participants use different varieties of the same language or even different languages functioning as mutually translatable for the tasks of communicating selves. Common discourse types are decisive for the mutual understanding between individuals and groups taking part in more or less organized communities, such as professional or confessional, national or international, which are linked by various types of bonds, such as, e.g., artistic, banking, commercial, industrial, legal, military, monetary, religious, standardized, and the like.

The use of a human-centered framework enables researchers to treat discursive communities in terms of dynamic systems with core and periphery, because individual communicating selves as parts of constantly changing collective groupings are dependent upon ecological variables which determine the modes of their existence and formation into relatively self-governing entities. As far as the lower-order communities are often subsumed within those of a higher order, any ecologically determined community may be described as developing and becoming more or less autonomous from any point of view, independently of whether it is incomplete or complete with respect to its physical constituents. For example, a typology of discursive communities on the basis of their ecological embedding might consider both hierarchy and inclusiveness of their distance; stronger discursive communities allow for those which are further from the core of society and develop into “autonomous agents”. One could examine the direction in which long-lasting discursive communities develop from heterogeneous discursive selves into homogeneous discursive communities with stable bonds. As a result, one could observe what types of inter-
acting subordinate groups (along with their particular spheres of influence) evolve in time and space, eventually becoming ethnic, national, religious, professional or natural and cultural ecosystems.

Semiotic properties of communicating selves as persons participating in discursive communities and as members of communicative collectivity are changeable, depending on biological, psychical, social, cultural, and other ecological conditionings, which co-determine the modes of their functioning and the direction of their development. Because the discursive communities of a lower order are situated within the communities of a higher order, the autonomy principle refers here to the self-government of a small-group, applying its own laws, and functioning within the larger structures of a particular discursive community.

In real life, any ecologically determined community might be observed as developing and becoming more or less autonomous from any point of view independently of whether it is partial or complete in character. Interpreted and described in terms of sign- and meaning-oriented disciplines, the relations between communicating selves, as persons and subjects, can serve as a basis for the distinction of various types or kinds of interacting groups in terms of semiotic properties.

As a consequence, a typology of ecologically determined discursive communities may consider at least six qualifiers positioned under the three stages of their autonomy, as: (1) discreteness and peculiarity; (2) separateness and independence; (3) self-existence and self-reliance. In accordance with these qualifiers of autonomy, one may notice that some autonomous communities are stronger and some are weaker and that stronger communities may include those which are weaker; similarly, some autonomous collectivities may be considered as less distant or more distant from the core of a united discursive community.

One may examine the conditionings under which heterogeneous communities with temporary bonds become more or less homogeneous communities with permanent bonds. This means, one can find out what types of subordinate groups interacting with each other evolve and establish themselves in time and space into autonomous ecosystems on ethnic, national, international as well as confessional, professional or natural and cultural levels. Considered in another dimension, primary discursive communities may merge into discursive communities of secondary, superordinate or subordinate, active or passive, short-lasting or long-lasting, durable or non-durable, and loose or compact types. Hence, each individual might be seen as a member of various smaller discursive communities and larger
discursive communities determined by their communicative domains of life, and thematic cynosures or ecological niches in which they are formed. In the latter case, each discursive community is externally determined by communicational factors depending on ecological conditionings of an environment, in which the communicating selves as members of group collectivities live.

When the theorists of linguistics agree that a determined language and a determined culture have autonomized themselves by establishing a unified system of meaning-bearers, they should bear in mind that it is only a relative autonomy. While acquiring a state of autonomy, a determined language and a determined culture, or rather their standard varieties, as opposed to sublanguages and subcultures, become independent from their individual members as shared means of (inter)lingual and (inter)cultural communication. What has been recognized and shared as a standard state in a determined language or in a determined culture is imposed upon the members of linguistic or cultural communities by virtue of social sanctions. The pressure of society expressed, for instance, in rejection and acceptance, punishment and reward, or stigma and charisma, makes individual participants in communication adjust themselves to common rules without being authorized to introduce any changes in the collective character of the semiotic system formed by conventions of discursive communities.

The factor of relativity explains the occurrence of multilingualism and multiculturalism while contributing to the differentiation of linguistic and cultural communities into minorities and majorities and while indicating that a particular language and a particular culture are subjected, in their genesis and functioning, to collective customs and conventions. It depends upon the agreement of individuals and communities, situated hierarchically on various societal strata, who contribute to the development of a shared means of signification and communication in the domain of language and culture proportionally to the degree of their standardization and codification. Language and culture as communicational systems must be detached from individuals, in order to provide patterns of standard realizations, which have to be followed by descendants of those participants in linguistic or interlingual and cultural or intercultural communication, who have given rise to its origins and development. The facts that some discursive communities get rid, or are deprived of, their own vernaculars or of their local cultures, or that a determined foreign language or a determined culture can become the property of many discursive communities, speaks also
in favor of the idea of separating languages and cultures from individuals and social groups.

Existence Modes and Manifestation Forms of Linguistic and Cultural Discourses

In determining the autonomous status of language and culture as human-centered discourses, the most important problem lies in the selection of an appropriate perspective concerning their existence modes. On account of concrete and mental, static and dynamic, substantial and relational manifestations, the semiotics of language and culture may be subsumed under at least one of the six existence modes of discourses:

(1) Discourses manifest themselves in collectively accepted patterns of sensible meaning-bearers which are transmitted by source meaning-creators and received by target meaning-utilizers as the nonverbal and verbal means of intersubjective signification and interpersonal communication;

(2) Discourses sustain themselves in the individual consciousness of source meaning-creators and target meaning-utilizers as the mental equivalents of sensible meaning-bearers, being processed and interpreted as nonverbal and verbal means of intersubjective signification and interpersonal communication;

(3) Discourses recur in the concrete sign-transmitting and sign-receiving activities of communicating persons, who possess physiological endowments for the production and reception of sensible meaning-bearers as the significative means of interpersonal communication;

(4) Discourses endure in the mental sign-processing and sign-interpreting activities of communicating persons, who possess communicational abilities which allows them to create and recognize sensible meaning-bearers as significative means of interpersonal communication being distinguishable from each other, formally correct, semantically true and pragmatically adjusted to respective contexts and situations;

(5) Discourses are deducible from the socially abstracted networks of the relational values of significative means which are externalized by individual communicators in their concrete sign-transmitting and sign-receiving activities;
(6) Discourses are assumable from networks of associations between the mental equivalents of significative means and their relational values which are internalized by individual communicators in their sign-processing and sign-interpreting activities.

It has to be noticed that all the enumerated six existence modes of language and culture—in the products of nonverbal and verbal meaning-creation and meaning-utilization, in the processes of sign-transmission and sign-reception, in the processing and interpreting of nonverbal and verbal products as meaning-bearers, in the relational values of nonverbal and verbal products being realized in communicative performance and memorized through associations in communicative competence—constitute extraorganismic and intraorganismic properties of communicating selves as observable persons and inferable subjects.

In opposition to communicative performance, communicative competence or networks of associations, which depend upon the physiological and mental capabilities of individual communicators, only the sets of externalized patterns of nonverbal and verbal products, as well as their relational properties, become independent from the will of particular members of determined collectivities when they function as a means of social communication. But in the real world, language and culture, as properties of collectivity, do not constitute sets of observable data; they may be only imagined as consisting of the means and contents of interpersonal communication and intersubjective signification that are typified from observable changes in individuals when they are engaged in communicating activities. What can concretely be singled out are no more than referential behaviors of communicators, and their interpretational practices have to be mentally inferred from the shared knowledge of communication participants. Thus, in the physical dimension, communicating selves are linked with each other as persons through sensible meaning-bearers carried out in their sending and receiving activities. In the logical dimension, intersubjective links come into being through the mutual understanding of people when the communication participants negotiate and confirm the extrinsic meaning of nonverbal and verbal means through interpretative practices and referential behavior on the basis of internally concluded commonalities of experience or knowledge about the same domain of reference.

Considering the role of semiotic means in the formation of discursive communities, on the basis of observable and inferable similarities in the referential behavior of human beings and their interpretational activities,
one can, in consequence, subsume language and culture under two additional existence modes of discourse, where:

(7) Discourses unite the communicating selves into concretely observable, dynamic interpersonal groupings that become realized between members of discursive communities when they produce, emit, perceive and receive sensible meaning-bearers through a respective physical channel;
(8) Discourses can be deduced from the intersubjective groupings that arise between members of discursive communities when they understand or interpret received meaning-bearers in the same way, referring them to the common extrasemiotic reality known to each communicating individual separately.

In keeping with the assumption that there are also interorganismic links due to not only linguistic faculties but also cultural faculties inherited genetically, according to the ascertainments of biologically and anthropologically inclined semioticians, one may be entitled to assume that discourses exists also in the generational memory of human organisms in the form of mental memes or biosemiotic texts (cf. Dawkins 1976/1989 and 1982, or 2006), Dennett 1995 and 1996), Blackmore 1998 and 1999, with special reference to Kull 2000a). As far as this viewpoint is concerned:

(9) Discourses are possible due to an innate semiotic faculty localized in genetically specialized neuronal centers of human brains to communicate by using both nonverbal and verbal means of signification through the implementation of physiological techniques based on five main senses, as sound, sight, touch, smell, and taste.
(10) Discourses have emerged as a result of evolutionary changes of animal organisms adapting to their natural and artificial surroundings through the extension of their communicational abilities preexisting in their genetic memory as a set of primitive and more developed nonverbal and verbal means.

**Postulating the Concept of (Inter)Discursive Competence**

Investigating the semiotic properties of humans in the domain of linguistic communication, one can distinguish the skills and knowledge and/or abili-
ties and expectations of communicators, labeled as their linguistic competences, which enable them to communicate with others while creating, distinguishing, delimiting, recognizing, interpreting and ascribing appropriate semantic and pragmatic values to verbal means of communication, produced as utterances in respective acts of speech.

As it has been pointed out in Chapter Five the term *competence* owes its initial justification through reference to linguistic-grammatical correctness of verbal means used by an ideal speaker and/or listener in a homogeneous linguistic community. After some time, with the inclusion of phoneme-distinguishing aptitudes, semantic-interpretational knowledge and pragmatic-inferential skills of typical speakers and listeners, the notion of linguistic competence has been extended to the scope encompassing the totality of human abilities and habits of how to effectively function in a communicative community which is not necessarily ideal or homogenous with regard to commonly known and used language. At first, a competent communicator is seen as being able to comprehend all possible textual realizations of language used in social practice. Then, in the eyes of sociologically trained linguists, it is not enough for competent communicators to know the particular language, but to possess such cultural knowledge, which enables them to use and interpret not only linguistic means but also semiotic means of expression in different situational contexts.

Introduced herewith, the notion of semiotic competence as such encompasses not only the notion of communicative competence, but is also embedded into the notion of cultural competence. Semiotic competence includes the total set of human skills and knowledge which communicating individuals employ in certain surroundings, or situations of language- and culture-related communication. Due to these skills and knowledge, communicating selves, as observable persons and inferable subjects, are bound through nonverbal and verbal domain of signification with the extralinguistic and extrasemiotic domain of reference being conditioned by physical, biological, psychical and social reality of the human life-world.

In general, one can say that semiotic properties of communicating selves develop through their participation in different linguistic acts or in different cultural events, as members of different discursive communities. Developing their linguistic and semiotic competences, they can acquire, among others, the abilities to choose appropriate verbal and nonverbal means determined by their desired or expected aims in a specific situation. Accordingly, competent participants in communication have to know how to lead and foster a talk, to conduct a debate or discussion in order to con-
vince someone of something, to persuade someone of something, to diminish the impact of an imposition or to mitigate a conflict.

One can encounter, for example, some recipients of academic education who are able to write a popular or scientific article as well as to give a formal lecture. But a special talent is undoubtedly needed to compose a poem, a novel or an artistic essay. It is, nevertheless, a matter of special training to learn how to formulate a report, to prepare an advertisement, a slogan and/or to choose a motto for a particular topic.

Participants in social communication who function in the role of clients or customers have to possess or acquire practical skills and knowledge of how to use professional advice or services of others, for example, of a lawyer, a priest, a bank counselor, a therapist or an architect, etc. Successful applicants must possess respective competences, for example, how to receive benefits, subsidies from an institution, for example, from a social agency, governmental bureau, etc., or how to seek sponsorship or patronage from a financial endowment while filling out a special request form or writing an applicative letter of intention, and the like.

Skilled conversationalists usually know how to choose appropriate introductory hedges for certain context-dependent types of utterances. Similarly, special aptitudes should be possessed by those individuals who are expected to give a ceremonial speech, to make an occasional toast in a festive ritual in which a drink is offered as an expression of honor or goodwill, or to deliver a sermon during specific kinds of religious services, etc.

To sum up, the conceptual content of a general semiotic competence—introduced to the domain of discourse studies—could be specified in terms of dispositional properties of individuals, which enables them to effectively communicate with other individuals as “the significant others” in task- and role-oriented speech acts under the pressure of collective sanctions.

As it appears, such attributes of communication participants as efficiency and acceptability are, as a matter of fact, connected with the modeling processes of personality traits in the development of their multi-discursive and inter-discursive competence, governed by the rules of generationally transmitted traditions and socially construed norms. In search of the genus proximum of this human property of being competent, which implies possessing a capacity of personal skills and subjective knowledge, the original concept of idealized linguistic competence is to be confronted with an extended scope of intercultural communicative competence.49

Borrowed to the domain of language pedagogy, psychology and sociology, and developed as a pre-constructed set of individual qualities, from
the neighboring disciplines of linguistics, such as, psycho- and sociolinguistics, linguistic pragmatics, discourse studies or semiotics of communication, the notion of communicative competence might be broadened, for example, through managerial, occupational, instructional, organizational, and/or expert competences. Moreover, the general term *metacompetence* appears also to be useful for encompassing the referential characteristics of particular types of competences along with their cognitive, affective, ethical, functional, personal or behavioral aspects.

**The Communicating Individual as a Cultural Polyglot**

To conclude, it could be assumed that a participant of social communication as such must be able to simultaneously and interchangeably function in various discursive environments. While paraphrasing the metaphor of polyglotism applied to culture, one could finally state that the communicating individual as a “cultural polyglot” must be able to cope with texts coming from different cultures, i.e., he must know how to communicate in and understand a “multiplicity of cultural languages”. Hence, he must be described as possessing so-called intercultural competence.

Bearing in mind the principles of effective communication, one has to realize that the adequacy of general human competence is also connected with the developmental formation of an ego- and group-specific identity, considered in terms of collective solipsism, i.e., as the self-determination or self-awareness of individuals and groups in their belonging to occupational, organizational, ethnic, national, or international collectivities, and the like. To end with, one can say that explorations in the domain of communicative properties and subsumptive attitudes of people may provide evidence that both the competence and identity of individuals and groups can be judged and measured, pre-defined and designed, rejected and abandoned, imposed and controlled, etc.
The term *metadesignation* has a long history. Going back to the antiquity it is related to the idea of *metalanguage*. As Christoph Hubig (in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 529–531, entry: *meta-*) and Jacek Juliusz Jadacki (in *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, ed. Sebeok 1986, 445; entry: *metalanguage*) point out, it comes from Stanisław Lesniewski (1886–1939), a Polish logician and philosopher who has introduced for the first time in the history of modern semiotics the distinction between *język*—*metajęzyk* ‘language’—‘metalanguage’. This distinction has been popularized (in oral presentations of 1931 and widely accessible publications of 1935 and then 1956) by Alfred Tarski (1902–1983) with reference to the area of the theory of truth (cf. Tarski 1935 [1956]). A separate study to “The Problem of Metalanguage in Linguistic Historiography” has been devoted by Ernst Friderik Konrad Koerner (born 1939). For the discussion and bibliography see: Koerner 1993.

*Entelechy*, recorded in English (1595–1605), according to Random House (1992/1995/1997) *Webster’s College Dictionary*, is derived from Late Latin *entelechia* based on Greek *entonelècheia* = en- ‘to cause’ + téI (os) ‘goal’ + éch (ein) ‘to have’ + -eia = y ‘suffix used in the formation of action verbs from nouns’.

Worth mentioning is here the position of Jan Toland (1670–1722), an Irish philosopher, freethinker and theist, known under the title, *Socinianism truly Stated, Being An Example of fair Dealing in all Theological Controversys. To which is prefix’d, Indifference in Disputes: Recommended by a Pantheist to an Orthodox Friend. Tota ruuit Babylon; disjecit Tecta Lutherus, Calvinus Muros, et Fundamenta Socinus*. London, 1705.

Sources of this original quotation are provided and discussed *inter alia* by Hans Aarsleff (2007, 197), an American historiographer, referring to the translated edition of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work (1836, 41 [1988, 48–49]) and collected publication of works (1903–1936, 45–46) with modern spelling.

Some of the ideas presented in this chapter are borrowed from the Polish paper: Zdzisław Wąsik, “O wyjaśnianiu pojęcia formy i substancji w dyskursie akademickim z lingwistyki (On the explanation of form and substance in the academic discourse of linguistics)”. Międzynarodowa konferencja: *Dyskurs naukowy—tradycja i zmiana*, organizowana przez Instytut Filologii Polskiej

6 The author’s sources of inspiration are here the works of a postmodern philosopher Michel Foucault (1966 [1970], and 1969 [1972]) and a semiotician Umberto Eco (1979/1976/).

7 The changeability of language, as a relational property of mankind, is presented with popular exemplification in the book Words: An Illustrated History of Western Languages, edited by Victor Stevenson (1983).

8 Worth quoting is the famous slogan title of Leo Weisgerber’s article (1955): „Das Worten der Welt als sprachliche Aufgabe der Menschheit“ (‘The wording of the world as a task of humanity’); cf. also Weisgerber 1953.

9 Among the founders of a general theory of terminology to be mentioned is Eugen Wüster, an Austrian engineer and lexicographer, one of the pioneers in the standardization of scientific terminology. Worth noting are the titles of his two books: Einführung in die Allgemeine Terminologielehre und terminologische Lexikographie (Wüster 1979) and Internationale Sprachnormung in der Technik. Besonders in der Elektrotechnik (Die nationale Sprachnormung und ihre Verallgemeinerung) (Wüster 1931).


11 Representative is here a cross-linguistic study of Ian Davies (2005) on “Colour terms”.

12 The term meme has been coined in 1976 by Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene aimed at extending the principles of the theory of evolution in order to explain the spread of ideas and cultural phenomena (cf. Dawkins 1976/1989, and 1982, as well as 2006). This topic has been elaborated also by Susan J. Blackmore (1998, 1999).

13 Lexicostatistics is a statistical technique used in glottochronology for estimating how long ago different languages have evolved from a common source language. Glottochronology refers to historical-comparative methods being interested in the time at which particular languages start to differentiate in lexical and grammatical form, departing from the assumption that the basic (core) vocabulary of a language, the so-called Grundwortschatz in German, changes at a constant average rate. This assumption has been submitted by Morris Swadesh (1955, 1972), against the background of an earlier work of Robert Lees (1953).
The term *substrate* has been introduced to the domain of linguistic studies by Graziadio Isaia Ascoli in 1876, and elaborated more thoroughly in the first of his glottological letters edited in 1881; cf. Ascoli 1876 and 1881/1881–1882. The first letter and the two others of Ascoli (1881 and 1886), have been known to the international world of science a year later due to the translation of Bruno Güterbock, authorized by the author himself; cf. Ascoli 1887.

The term *superstrate* has been introduced by Walther von Wartburg in 1932; see Wartburg 1932, cf. also Wartburg 1936/1978.

The term *adstrate* comes from the works of Marius Valkhoff in 1932; see Valkhoff 1932.

The notification about phenomenon of verbal interference is a heritage of Uriel Weinreich’s work of 1953, entitled as *Languages in Contact*; see Weinreich 1953/1974. It was Robert Lado (1957) who popularized the notion of interference in the context of applied linguistics.

In the view H. Douglas Brown (1994, 90), *linguistic transfer* is a superordinate term for *interference*.

It is Leonard Bloomfield (1933, 42) who has proposed the term *speech community* for the groups of people interacting with each other by means of speech. Exposing the notion *density of communication* (Bloomfield 1933, 46), he has delineated sub-groups of people within a speech community, the members of which “speak much more to each other than to persons outside their sub-group” (Bloomfield 1933, 47) from “[o]ccupational groups, such as fishermen, dairy workers, bakers, brewers, and so on, have, at any rate, their own technical language” Bloomfield (1933, 50).

The term *Verkehrsgemeinschaften* used by Adolf Bach in *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* (1938) undoubtedly originates from the term *Verkehr* encountered in the writings of Hugo Mario Schuchardt; cf. Sachregister in Leo Spitzer’s edition of, Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier (1921/1928).

One should mention here also the Polish term *współnoty komunikatywne* ‘communicative collectivities’ which Ludwik Zabrocki (1963) has introduced for describing the origin and the development of Germanic languages. In a more detailed article of 1970 he also uses the German term *kommunikative Gemeinschaft* ‘communicative community’ as opposed to *Sprachgemeinschaft* ‘speech community’; cf. Zabrocki (1970/1980, 147). For Zabrocki it is the family which forms the smallest natural communicative community. However, as he adds subsequently, there are also some other kinds of communicative communities which are formed by the school class, factory staff, church commune, scientists, medical doctors, inhabitants of a village, a town’s ideological block, inhabitants of a state and, in the end, the inhabitants of the whole world (Zabrocki 1970/1980, 147). For relevant quotations and discussions see Chruszczewski 2006, 52–53.

The term *discourse community*, introduced into the scientific usage by Martin Nystrand (1982), has been thoroughly elaborated by John M. Swales (1990,
25–27) who proposes six characteristics identifying, in his view, a group of individuals as a discourse community, i.e., sharing public goals, mechanisms of intercommunication, information and feedback, one or more genres of speech, and a specific lexis.

The tendency of humans to expend at least effort in a frequent communication has been noticed by George Kingsley Zipf (1929, 1949) with regard to the applicability of statistics in linguistic studies. Zipf has discovered that in all languages of the world: (1) the sounds which are easy in pronunciation are more frequent than the difficult ones, (2) the most frequent words are hence short words, (3) all words become shortened with time, and that (4) the frequency of newly appearing words increases in accordance with the increase of the degree of their abstractness.

The term archeology of knowledge, proposed by Michel Foucault (1969 [1972]), refers to a preceptor oriented study of human discourse.

As an author who sees secondary texts as palimpsests, one has to mention Gérard Genette (1982 [1997]).


To be mentioned is here the metaphor of “the city as the text”, to which the term palimpsest has been referred by Vessela Lozanova and Roland Posner (1999). Worth quoting, in this context, is their statement: „In the 20th century entire cities were deliberately wiped out. Wars were waged to decide who should re-write the areas erased. But everyone could have known from the start. Wiped out cities cannot be rebuild by wiping out further cities. Texts that have grown over the centuries cannot be re-written in decades. Even the most magnificent reconstruction programs are worth less than the lives of those who were sacrificed for them” (Lozanova & Posner 1999, 2). An extensive work pertaining also to palimpsests as texts in the philosophy of the postmodern city represents the monograph of Ewa Rewers (2005).

Notes

Nouvelle impression en facsimilé, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog (Grammatica Universalis, 1), 1966.

A valuable contribution to the discussed topic constitutes here the article of Stephen F. Brown (1997), “Sign Conceptions of Logic in the Latin Middle”.

Contemporary views of what cognitive semiotics is are best summarized in an exhaustive paper of Jordan Zlatev (2011).


The origins of the distinction between human labor and exchange value can be traced back to Karl Marx's 1857 Grundrisse manuscript, where in “The Chapter on Money (Part II)” he has already distinguished between particular labor and general labor, contrasting communal production with production for exchange (see Marx 1857/1953 [1973]).

The term praxeology has been first used in 1890 by Alfred Victor Espinas (1844–1922), in his article « Les origines de la technologie », and, later on, in his book published in Paris in 1897, under a similar title Les origines de la technologie : étude sociologique. This information is available in the footnotes provided by Ludwig Heinrich Edler von Mises in Nationalökonomie: Theorie des Handelns und Wirtschaftens of 1940, p. 3 as well as in Human Action: A Treatise on Economics of 1949, on page 3. For Mises, praxeology, as a general theory of human action, deals with a purposeful action of an individual human being. It is concerned with an acting man who strives towards the attainment of desired ends with the implementation of selected means. Against the background of Mises, another understanding of praxeology (or praxiology) provides Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his book of 1955 written in Polish under the title Traktat o dobrej robocie (A treatise on a good work), which has been edited in an English translation as Praxiology: An Introduction to the Sciences of Efficient Action in 1965.

The term axiology (from the Greek axiā + logia) comes from the end of the nineteenth century, introduced by Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906) in his article of 1890 (L’axiologie et ses divisions). Subsequently, it has been popularized in two publications, in French by Paul Lapie in the book of 1902 entitled as Logique de la volonté and in German by Hartmann in the book, Grundriß der Axiologie oder Wertwägungslehre. System der Philosophie im Grundriß.

Praxeosemiotics, as a new term, has been used for the first time in the title of the Polish book of Tadeusz Wójcik (1969), devoted to the theory of the optimal sign. Its roots are to be found in Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s (1955 [1965]) con-
ception of praxeology (praxiology in his terminology) as a theory of an efficient action. Nevertheless, the notional content of the term praxeosemiotics, utilized by the author of this book (Wąsik, Z. 1997, 348; 1998, 58 and, subsequently, 2003, 119), as a parallel term to axiosemiotics, has been merely referred to a theory of a purpose-oriented action.


One has to expose that “constructs”, in Kelly’s framework (1955, 15–20. 46–77, 95–98; cf. also 1970). are not seen as abstracted from existing realities; rather, they are imposed upon real events. According to Kelly, all constructs are bipolar and dichotomous, and when a construct is used to construe an event, only one pole is being activated. Examples of dichotomous constructs include: good vs. bad, just vs. unjust, stable vs. unstable, constant vs. changeable, honest vs. dishonest, liberal vs. conservative, healthy vs. sick, flexible vs. dogmatic, warm vs. aloof, heavy vs. light, religious vs. not religious, normal vs. abnormal, etc. There are always some alternative constructions available to choose among in dealing with the world—even, as measurements will vary depending on which inertial frame it is taken from. Constructive alternativism means that a person is capable of applying alternative constructs to any events in the past, present or future. This is analogous to different measurements that the persons in different frames of reference usually make.

A representative introduction to current trends in discourse studies is provided by Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau and Ruth Wodak in their editorial collection The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis (2014). Theories and methods pertaining to discourse analysis unifying linguistic, pragmatic and philosophical approaches have been summarized by Patrick Charaudeau and Dominique Maingueneau (2002) in Dictionnaire d’analyse du discours.

Against the etymological roots, from antiquity to modern times, of the term discourse, contemporary researchers have adjusted its understanding to the contemporary usage of philosophers and philologists, as well as communicatively oriented sociologists and politicians. Discourse, namely, coming from the Latin (Middle Latin) discursus, with the meaning in the Late Latin period ‘conversation’, derives its etymology from the Latin discur (rere), i.e., ‘to run about or ‘running to and fro’ (where dis- as a prefix from Latin with the sense ‘apart, asunder’ is combined with the Latin verb currere ‘to run’ and the Latin suffix of verbal action –sus, a variant for –tus), has always been applied for connoting rather a highly formalized discussion of a subject in speech or writing, as a treatise, debate, dispute, or official address (cf. Random House 1992/1995/1997; Speake & LaFlaur 1999). The notions of discourse, in the
context of philological and sociological studies and discursivism as an investigative perspective, have been discussed more extensively by the author (Wąsik, Z. 2010) in his article “On the Discursive Nature of Human Interactions in Linguistic and Cultural Ecosystems”.

Cf. the program of the workshop “Unfolding the Semiotic Web in Urban Discourse” which have been formulated by Richard L. Lanigan, Roland Posner, Daina Teters and Zdzisław Wąsik (2009).

The following subparts constitute a slightly modified version of some text-passages, adapted from the earlier publication of the author under the title “On the Discursive Nature of Human Interactions in Linguistic and Cultural Ecosystems” (Wąsik, Z. 2010, 36–45, and 47–49), which have been additionally adapted for the purpose of the article “Towards an Idea of Urbanity as a Discursive Way of Human Life in the City—Developing a Conceptual Framework” (Wąsik, Z. 2011).

The term collectivity has been introduced here with an intention to cover only social ties between communicating individuals. As such, it replaces a much broader term linkage adopted from Victor H. Yngve (1996,) and elaborated by Z. Wąsik (2000) as well as E. Wąsik (2007, and 2010) as a result of subsequent workshops conducted during the Societas Linguistica Europaea Annual Meetings between 2000 and 2004. Participants in these workshops have published their contributions in a collective book Hard Science Linguistics edited by V. H. Yngve and Z. Wąsik in 2004. The theoretical constituents of the so-called linkage includes apart from persons functioning as participants in group interactions also channels, props and settings. As a matter of fact, within the framework of Yngve’s human linguistics: channels are understood as representations of energy and means of energy flow that are linguistically important for communicating activities of more than two persons, props are considered as material representations of real objects related to the tools of reference-making and interpreting activities of communicating individuals, and settings are representations of elements of the physical surrounding of a group embedded in an assemblage of observable objects that are indispensable for the understanding of communicational contexts.

The enumeration of “of the so-called language functions, which reflect in fact the satisfaction of individual needs or the social requirements of people through the realization of communicational tasks”, is provided by E. Wąsik (2010, 52–53) in Chapter Two, “An Inquiry Into the Functional View of Language as a Tool of Communication or a Property of Task-Realizing Communities”, of her book Coping with an Idea of Ecological Grammar.

As an inspiration source for a functional approach to speech acts, the author has exploited, in the first instance, the works initiating the investigative domain of pragmatics, as *How to Do Things with Words* by John Langshaw Austin (1962/1975), and developing the goal-oriented classification of performative utterances, as, for example, *Principles of Pragmatics* by Geoffrey Neil Leech (1983/1990).


Some of the ideas regarding the understanding of autonomy, which might characterize communicative collectivities, have been initiated in the abstract of Z. Wąsik (2000), “On the Heteronomous Nature of Language and its Autonomization from the Properties of Communicating Individuals and Linkages”. They have found, in turn, their extensions and creative elaborations, including also respective bibliographical references, in the book of E. Wąsik, *Coping with an Idea of Ecological Grammar* (2010, 85–86).

A historical survey of the development and understanding of the term *competence* is provided by E. Wąsik (2007, 167–175) in her book *Język—narzędzie, czy właściwość człowieka?* (Language—a tool or a property of man?).

Worth reading is the summarizing article of Franz Emanuel Weinert (2001), “Concept of Competence: A Conceptual Classification”.

The term *polyglot* (from the Greek *polyglottos* denoting ‘many-tongued’, where *poly-* is a combining form—a stem of *polys* with the sense of ‘much’ or ‘many’ and *glottos* with the sense of ‘tongued’—an adnominal adjective of *glotta* ‘tongue’) is referred to a person who speaks, writes, or reads several languages (cf. Random House 1992/1995/1997; Speake & LaFlaur 1999). Under *polyglotism*, one can understand the competence of an individual who is able to speak or write several languages; or the situation in which the same text is contained in several languages, similarly as in the *polyglossia* where multiple languages coexist as means of communication and signification in the same area. While matching the idea of cultural polyglotism, which is derived from the notion of cultural text, along with the notions of semisphere introduced to the semiotics of culture by Yuri M. Lotman (1984 [1989/2005]) against the background of the notions of biosphere and noosphere pertaining to the life and activity of human individuals as organisms and members of communicative collectivities, one could ponder the usefulness of term *polydiscursivism* for characterizing the linguistic and semiotic discursivism of social life within the framework of a terminological distinction between *discourse—text—language*. 
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INDEX

Names of Authors from the Main Text

A
Aarsleff Hans 284
Ajdukiewicz Kazimierz 177
Altmann Stuart A. 151–154, 156
Amsterdamski Stefan 51
Anderson Myrdene 225
Andrade Perez Luis Eugenio 217
Angermuller Johannes 289
anthropocentrism 58, 74
Aristotle (of Stageria) 12, 72, 112, 251
Arnauld Antoine 168
Ascoli Graziadio Isaia 286
Augustinus Aurelius Hipponensis (= St. Augustine) 176, 204, 252
Austin John Langshaw) 24, 264, 285, 290
Azeri Siyaves 256

B
Bach Adolf 286
Bachmann Lyle F. 107–108
Baker Mona 184
Baldwin effect 217
Baldwin James Mark 217
Bales Robert Freed 290
Baron Naomi Sus(usan) 23
Barthes Roland Gérard 24, 252
Bartley William Warren) 225
Baskin Wade 188, 190–196
Basu Arabinda 247, 249
Baudrillard Jean 252
Beaugrande Robert-Alain de 262–263
Beauvoir Simone de (alias Simone Lucie Ernestine Marie Bertrand de Beauvoir) 253–254
Benveniste Émile 252
Benwell Bethan 245
Berger Peter L(udwig) 230–241, 252
Bergson Henri-Louis 72
Bilz Rudolf 218
Blackmore Susan J. 280, 285
Blanchot Maurice 254
Bloch Bernard 127–128
Bloomfield Leonard 48, 286
Blumenberg Richard M. VIII
Boethian 177
Boethius (Boëthius) Anicius Manlius Severinus 177
Bopp Franz 43–45, 135
Bourdieu Pierre-Félix 252
Bourquin Jacques 168
Brekle Herbert E. 287
Brier Søren 217, 224
Brown H. Douglas 23, 286
Brown Stephen F. 288
Brugmann Karl 136
Bühler Karl (Ludwig) VIII, 83, 96, 98, 178–180, 200, 204, 209, 252
Byram Michael 106, 109

C
Canale Michael 107
Carnap Rudolf 177
Cartesian 11, 168
Cartesianism 11, 166
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartesius, see Descartes 168, 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassirer Ernst 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>causalism 58, 63, 71–72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charaudeau Patrick 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chomsky Noam A(vram) 43, 45–50, 52, 86, 96–97, 104, 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chomskyanism 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chruszczewski Piotr P(aweł) 286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysippos 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cimatti Felice 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobb, Jr., John B 247, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognitive, ~ attitude(s) 60–61, 64, Coletta W. John 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coletti W. John 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copernicus Nicolaus (Mikolaj Kopernik) 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coseriu Eugenio 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtés Joseph 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crystal David 168, 287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eco Umberto 24–25, 65, 120, 216, 219–222, 232, 252, 283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards Jack 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einstein Albert 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmeche Claus 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espinas Alfred Victor 288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evans Nicholas 164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairclough Norman 269–271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feyerabend Paul K(arl) 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fink Eugen 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisch Max H(arold) IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisiak Jacek (Izydor) XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitch W. Tecumseh 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foley William 61, 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fontanille Jacques 258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foucault Michel 252, 254, 265–268, 284, 287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fought John 41, 47–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frege Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob 204, 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furadal Antoni VIII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garvin Paul L(ucian) IX, 23, 56–57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gawroński Andrzej 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genette Gérard 287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilliéron Jules 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasersfeld Ernst von 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman Nelson 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenberg Joseph H(arold) 137, 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregg Robert 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greimas Algirdas Julien 24–25, 56, 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grice, H(erbert) Paul 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffin David R., 247–249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grimm Ludwig Karl Jakob 43, 45, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gruca Franciszek 87, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiraud Pierre 174–175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Names of Authors from the Main Text

H
Haeckel Ernst (Heinrich Philipp August) 44
Halliday M(ichael) A(lexander) K(irkwood) 23, 247
Harris Roy 188, 190–192, 194–196
Harris Zellig S(abbetttai) 261
Hartmann (Karl Robert) Eduard von 288
Haugen Einar (Ingvald) 88, 289
Hauser Marc D. 86
Haaviulu Mary Anne 241
Hawley Amos H(enry) 291
Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 48, 253, 255–258
Heidegger Martin 252–257
Heinz Adam 98, 111
Helbig Gerhard 103
Hervey Sándor 25, 59
Hipocrates 23
Hjelmslev Louis (Trolle) 24, 111, 115–119, 168–169, 204, 252
Hjelmslevian 116–117, 119, 169
Hockett Charles F(rancis) 128, 151–154, 156, 158
Hoffmann Ernst 167
Hoffmeyer Jesper 217, 225
Holówka Teresa E. 120, 169, 176, 178
Honderich Ted 58
House Juliane 184
Hubig Christoph 284
Hudson Richard A. 128
Humboldt (Friedrich) Wilhelm (Christian Karl Ferdinand) von 46, 96, 103, 179, 284
Husserl Edmund (Gustav Albrecht) 169, 214, 216, 252–255
Huxley Julian S(orell) 225
Hymes Dell H(athaway) 41, 43–44, 47–51, 105, 151, 265

I
imaginationist psychology 189–191, 243
Ingarden Roman 214
Ingold Tim 61, 218, 289
Isaac Newton 38
Ivanov, Vjačeslav Vsevolodovič (Ivanov, Vyacheslav Vsevolodovitch; Иванов, Вячеслав Всеволодович) 288

J
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz 59, 177–178, 212, 213, 284
Jakobson Roman Osipovich (Osipovič) 48–49, 184, 252
James William 252
Jaspers Karl Theodor 257
Jaszczolt Katarzyna 47, 49
Julia Didier 56

K
Kant Immanuel 112, 252–253, 256–257
Kelly George Alexander 238, 289
Kelly Louis G(erard) 177
Kenny Dorothy 184
Kierkegaard Søren Aabye 257
Kiparsky Paul 41, 43–44
Kluckhohn Clyde 218
Koerner E(rnst) F(rideryk) Konrad 41, 44–47, 49, 52, 284
Komorowska Hanna 108
Kotarbiński Tadeusz 288
Koyré Alexandre 166
Kramen Martin 225
Kretschmer Paul 136
Kristeva Julia 252
Kriszat Georg 225
Kroeber Alfred Louis 218
Kuhn Thomas S(amuel) 36–45, 48, 51–53
Kull Kalevi 217–218, 224, 252, 280
Index

L
Lacan Jacques Marie Émile 252
Lado Robert 286
LaFlaur Mark 287, 289, 291
Lakatos Imre 36, 37, 52
Lamb Sydney M(acDonald) XI, 23–24, 73, 95, 120, 124–127, 135, 204, 247–250
Langacker Ronald W. 48
Lanigan Richard L(eo) VIII–IX, XIII 254, 290
Lapie Paul 288
Lavoisier Antoine Laurent 38
Leech Geoffrey (Neil) 264–265, 291
Lees Robert 285
Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm 252
Leśniewski Stanisław 284
Levinson Stephen C(urtis) 164
Lieb Hans-Heinrich IX, 125–136, 137
Linnaeus Carolus (Carl von Linné, alias Carl Nilsson Linnaeus) 46
Locke John 23, 213, 252
Lommel Hermann 187–188, 192–195
Lotman, Jurij Mihailovič (Lotman, Yuri Mikhailovich; Лотман, Юрий Михайлович) 252, 288, 291
Lozanova Vessela 287
Luckmann Thomas 240–241, 254
Lyons John 173–175
Ł
Łukaszewski Wiesław 204
M
Maingueneau Dominique 268, 289
Malkiel Yakov 44
Mannheim Karl 51
Marcel Gabriel Honoré 254
Marras Antonio 214
Martinet André 128, 252
Martinez Jacqueline M. 254
Marty Anton 45
Maruszewski Mariusz 99–100
Marx Karl (Heinrich) 221, 288
Maslow Abraham H(arold)
Masterman Margaret 38
Mathews, Paul H. 47
Maturana Humberto R(omesín) 218
McLuhan (Herbert) Marshall 250
Meetham A. R., 128
Merleau-Ponty Maurice 252–256
Merton Robert King 50
Metz Christian 25
Mill John Stuart 213
Mills Sara 265
Mises Ludwig (Heinrich Edler) von 288
Moffett James 242
Montague Richard 214
Morris Charles (William) 24, 171, 214, 252
Morris Halle (originally Pinkowitz) 49
Müller Friedrich 94
Musgrave Alan 36, 39
N
Nagel Ernest 39, 52
neosemiotics, ~ 251, 257, 259, object of ~ 16, 247, 259
Nida Eugene A(lbert) 184
Noreen (Gotthard) Adolf 47
Nöth Winfried XII, 23, 218, 252
Nowakowska Maria 51
Nystrand Martin 286
O
Ockham (alias Occam) William of 170, 172, 177, 204
Oertel Hanns 136
Ogden Charles K(ay) VIII, 172, 174, 204, 213
Oksaar Els 127
Names of Authors from the Main Text

Osgood Charles E(gerton) 151–152, 154–158

P
Palmer Adrian S. 107–108
Paul Hermann Otto Theodor 47
Pazukhin Rostislav 167, 170, 176–177
Pêcheux Michel 264
Peirce Charles Sanders 24–25, 171, 204, 213, 252
Pelc Jerzy 23–24, 26, 213–214
Peschl Markus 243–244
Petersen Hans 216, 225
Phillipson Robert 129
Pietraszko Stanislaw VIII, 65, 217, 219, 223, 232, 289
Pilch Herbert XI
Piatigorskij Aleksandr Moiseevič (Piatigorsky, Aleksandr Moiseevich; Пятигорский, Александр Моисеевич) 288
Plato 12, 112, 120, 167, 212, 251
Platonic 11, 112, 119, 167–169
Platonism 11, 166
Platonist 112, 120, 168–170, 176
Podsiad Antoni 58, 112
Popper Karl Raimund 39, 52
Posner Roland XII, 57, 252, 287, 290
Prodi Giorgio 23
Pythagoras (of Samos) 120
Quine Willard Van Orman 95

R
Ransdell Joseph 171
Rask Rasmus Kristian 43, 45
Regan John C. 23–24, 66, 73, 247–250
Reiter Norbert 129

Research Center for Language and Semiotic Studies at Bloomington, Indiana IX
Rewers Ewa 287
Richards Ivor A(rmstrong) 172, 174, 204, 213
Riegler Alexander 243
Roberts Colin Henderson
Roblyer Margaret D. 241
Rollin Bernard E. 176
Rosch Eleanor 218
Rüting Torsten 224

S
Sapir Edward 170
Sapir Edward 86, 170
Sapir–Whorf hypothesis 170
Sartre Jean-Paul 252–257
Sartrean 259
Savan David 59
Saville-Troike Muriel 105, 265
Schaff Adam 212, 214
Schlegel (Karl Wilhelm) Friedrich von 45
Schlegel August Wilhelm von 45, 135
Schleicher August 43, 45–46, 49, 52, 135
Schmidt Johannes 135
Schuchardt Hugo (Ernst Mario) 124–125, 135–136, 286
Schütz Alfred 252, 253
Searle John R(ogers) 24, 49, 264
Sellars Wilfrid Stalker 214
Sextus Empiricus 175
Short Thomas L. 59
Siertsema Bertha 111, 114, 116–119
Simone Raffaele 177
Skutnabb-Kangas Tove 129
Solomon J(ack) Fisher 59
Sonesson Göran 252
Speake Jennifer 287, 289, 291
Spitzer Leo 286
Stein Astrid von 243–244
Stein Edith (Saint Teresia Benedicta of the Cross) 253
Steinthal Chajim Heymann 167
Stern (Nils) Gustaf 173
Stevenson Victor 285
Stjernfelt, Frederik 217
Stoic(s) 11–12, 175–176
Stoicism 11, 166
Stokei Elizabeth 245
Strauss Claude Lévi-250
Stubbs Michael 268–269
Swadesh Morris 65, 171, 285
Swain Merill 107
Swales John M. 286

T
Taber Charles R(ussel) 184
Tarasti Eero (Aarne Pekka) X 151, 251–252, 257–259
Tarski Alfred 189, 284
Teherani-Kröner Parto 218
Teters Daina XIII, 290
Thomson Evan 218
Toland Jan 284
Toporov Vladimir Nikolaevič 288
Torop Peeter 252, 288
Trąbka Jan 120
Tuchańska Barbara 51
Turgot Anne Robert Jacques 41
Tymieniecka Anna-Teresa 253

U
Uexküll Thure von 218, 224–226, 229
Ullmann Stephen 173
Uspenskij Boris Andreevič (Uspensky, Boris Andreevich; Успенский, Борис Андреевич) 288

V
Valkhoff Marius 286
Van Breda Hermann (alias Leo Marie Karel) 253
van den Boom Holger 212
Van Dijk Teun Adrianus 262, 265, 269–271
Vanderveken Daniel 214
Varela (Garcia) Francisco J(avier) 218
Vendryes Joseph 99
Verburg Peter A. 41–42
Vetik Raivo 59
Vinay Jean-Paul 184

W
Walras Léon 47
Walter Christian 256
Wartburg Walter von 286
Wąsik Elżbieta (Magdalena) 85, 107, 109, 133, 178, 232, 290–291
Weil Simone 120
Weinert Franz Emanuel 291
Weiνreich Uriel 151, 286
Weisgerber (Johann) Leo 103–104, 213, 285
Wenker Georg 135
Whitehead Alfred North 66
Whorf Benjamin Lee 86
Wierzbicka Anna 86
Więckowski Zbigniew 58, 112
Wittgenstein Ludwig (Josef Johann) 177, 214
Wodak Ruth 271, 289
Wójcik Tadeusz 288
Wunderli Peter 25–26
Wüster Eugen 285

Y
Yngve Victor H(use) 84, 193, 236, 290

Z
Zabrocki Ludwik 286
Zawadowski Leon VIII, 83, 88, 180–181
Zellig (Sabbetai) Harris 49
Zinovyev Alexandr
A(lexandrowitch) [Зиновьев, Александр Александрович] 214
Zipf George Kingsley 287
Zlatev Jordan 288
Zwirner Eberhard X, 125
INDEX

Selected Terms from the Main Text

A
anthropocentrism 58, 74
anthropological, ~ and biological conception(s) of subjective significance 14; ~ and phenomenological model of human life-world 13; ~ foundation(s) of subject-centered semiotics 13, 219; ~cultural and biological-philosophical conception(s) of subjective universe 216
anthroposemiotic, ~ view(s) of culture(s) 219; ~ theory (theories) of culture(s) 227
Aristotelian 112, 168–171, 176–177
Aristotelianism 11, 166
axiological, ~ 14; ~ formulations of sign and meaning 235; ~ means 2; ~ nomination(s) and subsumption(s) of (an) object(s) 233; ~ semiotics 232, 237; ~ significance 233, 235, 237; ~ spheres(s) of culture 232; ~ subsumption(s) of (a) semiotic object(s) 245; ~, i.e., value and need-oriented view(s) of culture 14; ~, i.e., value-related, significance 232
axiology, ~ 14, 231–232, ~-oriented model(s) of (a) cultural semiosphere(s) 235
axiosemiotic, ~ conception(s) of culture(s) 233; ~ nomination(s) and subsumption(s) 14, 232–233; ~ regularity (regularities) 14, 232; sphere(s) (of culture(s)) 234
axiosemiotics 233
axiosignificate(s) 234–235
axiotic, ~ act(s) 235; ~ order 223
B
biological, ~ 60; ~ and (a) cognitive study (studies) on man 218; ~ and (a) cultural science(s) 218; ~ and cultural endowment(s) 83; ~ and psychological conditioning(s) 87–88; ~ characteristics 160; ~ concept(s) of “embodied semantics” 218; ~ concept(s) of “Umwelt” 217; ~ conception(s) of meaning 232; ~ conception(s) of subjective significance 230; ~ factor(s) 240; ~ naturalism 46; ~ nature of human organism 155; ~ need-oriented conception(s) of meaning 13; ~ perspective(s), 61; ~ process(es) 63; ~ relationship(s) 226; science(s) 232; ~ term(s) 225; ~ urge(s) 234; ~, psychical, social, cultural, and other ecological conditionings 276; ~-philosophical conceptions of subjective universe in the realm of living systems 216; ~-semiotic text(s) 86
biologism 58, 60–62
biosemiotic, ~ approach(es) to
nature 219; ~ conception(s) of
meaning 227; ~ text(s) 280; ~
Umwelt theory (theories) 245;
biosemiotics, ~ X, 226–227; ~ and
ecosemiotics 224
biosemiotism, ~ 225
C
Chomskyanism 59
cognitive, ~ attitude(s) 60–61, 64,
71; ~ belief(s) 63; ~ function(s)
61; ~ interest(s) and orientation(s) 50; ~ model(s) 57; ~ perspective(s) 53–54; ~ psychology
62; ~ standpoint(s) 60, 64, ~
tool(s) 71; ~ methodological assumption(s) 54
collective, ~ solipsism 73
collectivism 58, 63, 73–74
collectivity (collectivities), ~ 284,
288–289; ~ and individuality
101; autonomous ~ 276; communicating ~ 274; communicative ~ 245, 276, 286, 291; determined ~ 245, 279; discursive
~ 17, 275; ecological ~ 274,
group ~ 277; individual(s) and ~
274; interpersonal and intersubjective ~ 17, 272; linguistic ~
17, 275; occupational, organizational, ethnic, national, or international ~ 283; particular ~ 245;
property (properties) of ~ 279;
the term ~ 290
communicating, ~ activity (activities) 85, 244, 290; ~ agent(s)
148; ~ collectivity (collectivities) 274; ~ group(s) 245; ~ individual(s) 5, 9, 83, 85, 97, 108–
109, 136, 141–144, 154, 160,
166, 232, 237, 241–245, 280–
281, 283, 290–291; ~ person(s)
14, 278; ~ self (selves) 1, 13–
15, 17, 138, 216, 230–232, 235–
236, 261, 272, 274–277, 279–
281; ~ subject 216
communication(s), ~ VIII, 15, 127,
175, 246; (inter)lingual and (in
ter)cultural ~ 275; ~ among bees
and apes, 155; ~ and culture(s)
VIII; ~ and semiotics VIII; ~ be
tween people 268; ~ by voice
241; cognition and ~ channel(s)
10, 154–155, 157; ~ constituent(s) 21; ~ content(s) 14, 85,
127, 229; ~ engineer(s) 130; ~
environment(s) 106; ~ in the realm(s) of all species 154, 156–
157; ~ matrix 4; ~ participant(s)
14, 16–17, 21, 85–86, 95, 144,
231, 236, 242, 261, 272–275,
279, 282, 289; ~ process(es) 24;
~ road(s) 272; ~ science(s) VIII,
97; ~ study (studies) 214; ~ system(s) 244; ~ theoretician(s)
217; ~ theory (theories) 22; ani
timal ~ 153–154; barrier(s) of ~
130; channel(s) of ~ 21, 32,
159–160; cognition and ~ 24;
collective ~ 13, 216, 239, 245;
conditioning(s) of 33, 141; con
tents of ~ 231; cultural or inter
cultural ~ 275; culture-related ~
279; density (densities) of ~
286; domain(s) of ~ 132, 134;
dyadic, small group, public or
mass ~ 22; effective ~ 283; ethno
graphy of ~ 265; event(s) of ~
272; everyday ~ 133; exposed through ~ 246, 248, 250; face
to-face ~ 143; form(s) of ~ 28,
239; frequent ~ 287; group ~
274; human ~ 16, 18, 21–22, 24,
32, 80, 99, 102, 122, 138, 141,
145, 151, 237–238, 263, 272;
human and non-human means of ~ 10; (inter)lingual and (inter)cultural ~ 277; instrument(s) of ~ 128; intentional ~ 236; interindividual ~ 84, 102, 129, 275; international ~ 91, 130; interpersonal ~ (and intersubjective signification) 2, 6, 8–9, 14–15, 31–32, 87, 91, 97, 106, 130, 135, 138, 141–142, 162, 164, 229, 239, 243, 278, 279; interpersonal ~ and intersubjectively comprehensive knowledge 231; interpersonal signification and ~ 22, 24; intersubjective signification and interpersonal ~ 278; intrapersonal (solipsistic) ~ 135, 220; language- and culture-related ~ 281; linguistic ~ 280; linguistic or interlingual and cultural or intercultural ~ 277; mass 22, 25, 135; means of (signification and) ~ VIII, 3, 6, 8, 10, 22, 53, 95, 97, 100, 104, 123, 126–127, 129, 132, 141, 231, 238, 277, 281; means used in ~ 158; media ~ 21; participants of ~ 274, 277, 281; physical-acoustic nature of ~ 154; pragmatics of ~ 159; private ~ 135; process(es) of ~ 32, 178; product(s) of ~ 101; public and mass ~ 135; purpose(s) of ~ 24, 97, 116, 131; semiotic ~ VIII; semiotics of ~ 17, 283; signification and ~ 14, 24, 79, 88, 94–95, 124, 136, 162, 229, 277; small group ~ 135; social ~ 14–15, 80, 85, 104, 133, 158–159, 230, 235, 273, 279, 282–283; sociology of ~ 261, 268; speech ~ 4, 115, 129, 140, 214, 273; subject matter of ~ 254; successful ~ 107; system(s) of ~ 16, 22, 151, 154, 261; tactile ~ 24–25, 151, 153; theory of ~ 26, 30; tool(s) of ~ 8, 123, 178, 290; type(s) of ~ 32; verbal ~ 265; verbal (and non-verbal) ~ 28, 136, 222; verbal and non-verbal means of ~ 10, 151; verbal form(s) of ~ 158, 239, 243, 263, 271; verbal means of ~ 161, 164, 281; visual ~ 25, way(s) of ~ 28

communicational, ~ ability (abilities) ~ 10, 84, 86, 137, 159, 278, 280; ~ activity (activities) 9, 139, 240; ~ aspect(s) 16; ~ collectivity 265; ~ context(s) 235, 290; ~ custom(s) 10, 141; ~ effort(s) 9, 138, 144; ~ event(s) 21, 101–103, 161, 268, 273; ~ factor(s) 277; ~ feature(s) 148; ~ goal(s) 95, 114; ~ impact 102; ~ message 264; ~ need(s); ~ perspective(s) 27; ~ phenomenon (phenomena) 217; ~ practice(s) (and pattern(s) of meaning-creation and meaning-utilization 14, 230; ~ process(es) 122; ~ proficiency (proficiencies) 9; ~ purpose(s) 10, 22, 235–236; ~ reality (realities) 140; ~ requirement(s) 132, 136; ~ science(s) 16–17, 272, 275; ~ setting(s) 89, 95, 104, 134, 268, 274; ~ situation(s) 114; ~ strategy (strategies) 107, 270; ~ system(s) 75, 131, 277; ~ tactics 107; ~ task(s) 22, 143–144, 273, 290; ~ usage 97; linguistic~ activity (activities) 9; semiotic~ aspect(s) 261; semiotic~ system(s) 274; sign~ role(s) of language(s) 31
communicative, ~ 273, 275; ~, social, and cultural competence(s) 98; ~ act(s) 154; ~ approach(es) 107; ~ behavior 61, 153; ~ collectivity (collectivities) 245, 276, 286, 291; ~ community (communities) 7, 85, 109, 122, 143, 161, 243, 281, 286; ~ competence(s) 17–18, 97, 105–109, 151, 279, 281–283; ~ dimension(s) 105; ~ entity (entities) 97; ~ function(s) 91, 102, 161, 178–179, 216, 223, 270; ~ goal 263; ~ impact(s) 185; ~ interaction(s) 107; ~ linguistic performance 97, 106; ~ means 7, 21, 104, 120, 125–126, 129, 131, 137; ~ performance 108, 279; ~ praxis 269; ~ problem(s) 268; ~ product(s) 263; ~ property (properties) 283; ~ sense(s) 161; ~, cultural and linguistic practices 218; ~, social, and cultural character 106; linguistic and ~ performance(s) 138, 151, 279 communicativism 107 community (communities), ~ and individual(s) 61; ~ and nation(s) 103; ~ of (a) higher order(s) 276; ~ of knowers or believers 141; ~ of scholars 3, 38, 45, 53; ~ structure 291; regional ~ 7, 104; aggregated discursive ~ 276; autonomous ~ 276; communicative ~ 6, 8, 85, 108, 122, 128, 130, 143, 154, 161, 276, 279, 281, 286; cultural ~ 277; different ~ 41; discourse ~ 144–145, 286–287; discursive ~ 1, 17, 143–145, 272–277, 279–281; discursive collectivity (collectivities) and discursive ~ 17, 275; ecologically determined ~ 6, 104, 275–276; heterogeneous ~ 276; homogeneous ~ 276; individual(s) and ~ 277; interacting ~ 271; intercourse ~ 136, 143–144; international ~ 83, 90; interpersonal and intersubjective ~ 9–10, 141; larger ~ 274; linguistic ~ 17, 214, 231, 239–240, 243, 275, 281; linguistic and cultural ~ 109, 277; linguistic collectivity (collectivities) and linguistic ~ 17, 136, 275; lower-order ~ 275; means- and purpose-oriented; national ~ 131; organized ~ 275; particular ~ 3; requirements of ~ 129; scientific ~ 3, 37, 39, 42, 50–51, 53–54; speech ~ 6, 9, 15, 83, 100–102, 104–106, 132–133, 135, 144, 214, 286; stronger ~ 276; task-realizing ~ 290 competence(s), (inter)discursive ~ 17, 280; ~ and identity (identities) 283; ~ and immersion(s) in the generally available knowledge and cultural heritage(s) 144; ~ and performance(s) 104; ~ as a linguistic ability 6; ~ as knowledge of a language 96; acquisitional ~ 107; communicative ~ 17–18, 97, 105–109, 151, 279, 281–283; cultural ~ 10, 98; discursive ~ 107; existential ~ 108–109; expert ~ 283; general ~ 18, 106, 108; grammatical ~ 107; human ~ 1, 16–17, 261, 283; intercultural ~ 283; intercultural communicative ~ 106; linguistic ~ 18, 97, 104–108, 281, 283; linguistic and communicative ~ 107; linguistic and semiotic ~
281; linguistic, communicative, social, and cultural ~ 98; managerial, occupational, instructional, organizational, and/or expert ~ 283; meta~ 18, 283; respective ~ 282; semiotic ~ 281–282; social ~ 105; sociolinguistic ~ 109; strategic ~ 107; the term ~ 104, 281; type(s) of ~ 283

conventional, ~ psychology 189–191, 245

concrete, ~ 5, 161; ~ activity (activities) of speaking and hearing 96; ~ and mental 11, 84, 278; ~ and mental nature of language 11, 167; ~ element(s) 115; ~ entity (entities) 11, 115, 166; ~ existence model(s), 260; ~ fact(s) 165; ~ form(s) of being; ~ hitherto existing language(s) 94; ~ manifestation form(s) 87, 200; ~ manifestation(s) of the sign(s) and its (their) referent 12; ~ nature of language(s); ~ object(s) 5, 71, 236–237, 243; ~ observational shape(s) 101; ~ or (an) ideal entity (entities) 11; ~ or abstract 11, 33, 165, 185, 211; ~ part(s) 175; ~ person(s) 236; ~ problem-solution(s) 39; ~ product(s) 116; ~ proposal(s) 40; ~ reality (realities), 166; ~ realization(s) 18, 100; ~ referent(s) 166, 204, 206, 210; ~ sign(s) 13, 166, 194, 204, 206–207, 210; ~ sign-transmitting and sign-receiving activity (activities) 278; ~ speaking and hearing activity (activities) 84; ~ speech product(s) 248; ~ texts 101, 246; ~ type(s) of (verbal means / the sign) 83, 194

concretism 58–59, 211

concretist, ~ 213; ~ or mentalist connectionism 213

constructivism, ~ 58, 231, 237; ~ cognitivist 242; ~ epistemological 238; ~ personal; ~ social 240–241, 243; ~ sociological 240; ~ solipsistic 237; the framework(s) of ~ 237; radical ~ 15, 231, 243, 245

cultural, (inter)~ communication 277; ~ 235, 276; ~ and communicational science(s) 272; ~ and educational domain(s) 17; ~ and linguistic practice(s) 218; ~ and social trace(s) 142; ~ anthropology 65, 160; ~ aspect(s) 221; ~ character 106; ~ community (communities) 109, 277; ~ competence(s) 98, 105, 281; ~ context(s) 21, 32; ~ custom(s) 142; ~ device of money 221; ~ discourse(s) 278; ~ distinctiveness 160; ~ domain(s) of life 277; ~ ecosystem(s) 276, 289–290; ~ endowments 83; ~ environment(s) 106; ~ environment(s) 15, 218; ~ event(s) 281; ~ faculty (faculties) 280; ~ good(s) 14, 222; ~ heritage(s) 138, 144; inter~ competence 283; inter~ communicative competence 282; ~ knowledge 105–106, 281; ~ language(s) 283; ~ language(s); ~ level(s); ~ levels 276; ~ life 108; ~ meaning-creation(s) 220; natural or ~ object(s) 14, 22, 140, 220–223, 231–232, 235–236; ~ or inter~ communication 277; ~ or natural 223, ~ or natural objects 233; ~ phenomenon (phenomena) 285; ~ polyglot(s) 291; ~ polyglotism 291; ~ practice(s) 107;
~ psychology 251; ~ reality (realities); ~ reference(s) 108; ~ sciences 93, 218, 228, 230; ~ semiosphere(s) 235; ~ semiotics 15, 27, 222; ~ sign process(es) 27; ~ sign(s) 27; ~ signification(s) 221; ~ sphere(s) 145; ~ study (studies) VIII, 1, 261; ~ subject(s) 14, 223, 234, 237; ~ text(s) 219, 223, 291; ~ tradition(s) 9, 132, 144; ~ trait(s) 155; ~ transfer(s) 142–143; ~ transmission(s) 109, 124, 152, 159–160; ~ value(s) 17, 109, 272; ~, and (an) other ecological conditioning(s) 274; ~, political, and/or matrimonial 143; anthropological–216; communicative and ~ code(s) 25; cross–study (studies) 218, 223; ethnic–manifestations 81; inter–communicative competence 282–283; phenomenon (phenomena) 285; social, ~, natural and personal conditioning(s) of communication 33

culture(s), ~ 14, 133, 219, 221, 223, 232; ~ and nature 14, 216, 230, 232; ~ as an integrated system of human activity… 218; ~ of communicative community (communities) 109; ~ as a class of rules generating the sphere of so-called cultural texts with their significative and communicative functions 223; ~ as a whole 219; ~ as final effect of learning 218; ~-centered conception 13, 15; ~-centered conception of subjective significance 13, 230; ~-creative nature 179; ~ of the first and second language(s) 109; ~-proper 219; ~-scientific faculty XII; academy (academies) of ~ XIII; across ~ 10, 159; alien ~ 106; anthropologist(s) of ~ 186; applied to ~ 283; approach(es) to ~ 216, 223; book on ~ 218; collective character of ~ 244; conception of ~ 233; communication and ~ VIII; context(s) of ~ 273; definition(s) of ~ 218; depiction of ~ 223; determined ~ 269, 277; different ~ 109, 144, 283; distinctive ~ 132; domain of ~ 17; embedded in the ~ 17, 269, 275; epistemology (epistemologies) of ~ 230; evolution of ~ 291; foreign ~ 106–107; function- and purpose-oriented view(s) of ~ 14; good(s) of ~ 14, 230, 232; human ~ 219, 223, 235, 245, 274; human-centered theory (theories) of ~ 14; language- and ~-related communication 281; language(s) and ~ 1, 16–17, 97, 185, 232, 235, 244, 261, 278; local ~ 277; manifestation(s) of ~ 219; nature and ~ 2, 216, 233, 236; nature or ~ 219, 233, 236; no ~ 219; object(s) of ~ 14, 231, 234–235; participation in ~ 124, 159; particular ~ 221, 277; past and ~ 132; proper ~ 219; real world and ~ 108; realm of ~ 216; representation(s) of ~ 221, 228; science(s) of ~; sign and ~ 235; semiotician(s) of ~ 219; semiotic approach(es) to ~ 223; semiotics of ~ XII–XIII, 14, 218, 220, 224, 229, 232, 291; social role(s) and ~ 148; society (societies) and ~ 109, 144, 271; sphere(s) of ~ 14, 232, 234;
study (studies) of ~ X, 288; subject(s) of ~ 223, 234–235; system(s) of ~ 14, 223, 231, 235; the same ~ 239, 243; theoretician(s) of ~; theory (theories) of ~ XI, 14, 227, 231, 235; value-and need-oriented view(s) of ~14, 230, 232; view(s) of ~14, 217–219, 230, 232, 275
culturology, institute(s) of ~ VII

E
ecosemiotic, ~ system(s) of (a) communicating self (selves) 1 ecosemiotics, biosemiotics and ~ 224
epistemological, ~ and vocational awareness 109; ~ analysis (analyses) 4, 56, 184; ~ approach(es) 4, 57; ~ assessment(s) 4; ~ attitude(s) 106; ~ awareness 5, 32, 79, 183; ~ commitment(s) 35, 64, 82, 185; ~ connotation(s) 12, 183, 196; ~ constructivism; ~ controversy (controversies); ~ distinction(s) 190; ~ equivalence(s) 12, 183–184; ~ formation(s) 136; ~ foundation(s) 34, 59, 75; ~, i.e. ontological and gnoseological (awareness/commitment) 35, 183; ~ frame(s) of reference(s) 3, 54; ~ equivalence(s) 183; ~ modeling 1; ~ or gnoseological sense(s) 69; ~ orientation(s) 56; ~ overview(s) of signs and their referents; ~ paradigm(s) 1; ~ perspective(s) XII, 2, 15; ~ position(s) 4, 22, 34, 56–57, 60, 62–63, 67, 165, 188, 191, 196; ~ status(es) of linguistics 31; ~ substitute(s) 172; ~ viewpoint 38
epistemologically, ~ incommensurable 194
epistemology (epistemologies), ~ 56, 184; ~ as (a) branch(es) of philosophy 4; ~ as (a) set(s) of investigative perspective(s) X; ~ as (a) theory (theories) of knowledge 1, 35; ~ of culture(s) 228; ~ of linguistic semiotics 53; ~ of linguistics XI, 55, 158; ~ of science(s) 58; ~ of semiotics XII, 4, 35–36, 58–59; aim(s) of ~ 4, 56; conception of ~ X; domain(s) of ~ 56; framework(s) of ~ 1, 237; in the light of ~ 33; metascientific status(es) of ~ 56; notion(s) of ~ 4; task(s) of ~ 56; the term ~ 56; view(s) on ~ IX
existence mode(s), ~ of language 79–80, 84–86, 95; ~ of discourse 278, 280

I
imaginationist psychology 189–191, 243
intercultural, ~ borrowings 147; ~ communicative competence 106, 280; ~ communication 275; ~ competence(s) 281; ~ difference(s) 109; ~ relationships 109

K
Kuhnian, ~ conception(s) 36; concept(s) 51; ~ distinction(s) 42; non~ dimension(s) 53; ~ one 49; ~ paradigm(s) 51; non~ point(s) of view(s) 49; ~ sense(s) 37, 43, 49, 51; ~ tenet 42; ~ terms 42; ~ theory (theories) 37, 41, 52; ~ understanding 48; ~ vantage point(s) 51
Selected Terms from the Main Text

L
language(s), ~ 6, 8, 15, 46, 60–61, 84–86, 89, 91, 93, 98–100, 102–105, 110, 113–115, 124–129, 132, 138, 143, 153–156, 158, 160–162, 164, 169, 190, 202, 231, 240, 246–250, 254, 266, 268–270, 284; ~ ability (abilities) 89, 107; ~ acquisition(s) 10, 159; ~ action(s) 268; ~ among design features of human communication systems 151; ~ among other semiotic facts 29; ~ among the other semiotic systems 162; ~ among the other systems of meaning bearers 17; ~ and behavior 214; ~ and culture(s) 16, 97, 185, 232, 235, 244, 261, 272–273, 277–280; -- and culture-centered conception(s) 1; ~ and its (their) individual speaker(s)/listener(s) 125; ~ and other means with which humans memorize, think, learn and make meaning 249; semiotics of ~ 27; ~ and society (societies) 269, 291; ~ and speech 98–99; ~ and text(s) 98; ~ and the game(s) of chess 114; ~ among some animals 154; ~ as (a) semiotic system(s) 77; ~ as (a) trace(s) 142; ~ at the (inter)national level; ~ attrition(s) 10, 144, 159; ~ change(s) 81, 135; ~ commission(s); ~ communication; ~ in contact 286; ~ contact situation(s) 137, 142; ~ doer(s) 124, 135, 160; ~ ecology (ecologies) 291; ~ element(s) 163; ~ exploration(s); ~ faculty (faculties) 61, 82; ~ family (families) 135; ~ form(s) 127; ~ function(s) 120, 164, 268, 290; ~ in a triadic sequence; ~ in contact(s) 88; ~ in particular 90, 95; ~ in relation to thought(s); ~ in use 10, 90, 264, 270; ~ itself 112, 263; ~ in-use and utterance-centered turn 265; ~ in-use-oriented discursive studies; ~ knower(s) 124; ~ knowledge 107; ~ loyalty 88; ~ majority (majorities) and minority (minorities) 129; ~ teaching 106–107; ~ of (an) ecologically determined community (communities) 104; ~ of (an) ethnic minority (minorities) 132; ~ of (an) invader(s) 142; ~ of Europe 43; ~ of indigenous population 142; ~ of mankind 145; ~ of official communication 132–133; ~ of painting, music, sculpture, … 29; ~ of the state 132; ~ of the world 43, 80, 82, 88, 90, 95, 125, 129–130, 131, 135, 137, 151, 156, 287; ~ or speech 97; ~ pedagogy 17, 108, 261, 283; ~ phenomenon (phenomena) 8, 82, 101, 123, 137; ~ planning 90; ~ policy 90, ~ politics 91; ~ potential; ~ program(s); ~ property (properties) 95–96; ~ science(s) XI, 5, 10, 31, 36–37, 41, 45, 51–52, 81, 91, 93, 105–106, 110, 158, 208; ~ sign(s) 12, 27, 46; ~ sign-process(es) 27; ~ skill(s) 107; ~ source(s); ~ speaker(s) 9–10; ~ speaker(s) and listener(s) 100, 105, 108, 144; ~ standardization(s) 91; ~ structures 90; ~ study (studies) 28, 43, 48, 82, 93; ~ system(s) 81, 92, 99, 106, 123, 128, 136; ~ target(s); ~ teaching 91, 106, 108; ~ test(s) 107; ~ text(s) 32,
Index

184; ~ understanding(s) 94; ~ unit(s) 262; ~ universal(s) 154, 156; ~ use(s) 16, 82, 105, 108, 134, 137, 266, 268, 271–272; ~ user(s) 108, 124, 126, 135, 160; ~ utterance(s); ~ variability 126, 137; ~ variation(s) 106, 268; ~ variety (varieties) 108, 135–136; ~ with universal lexis 129; ~ within the species; ~ wording(s) 185; ~ action and knowledge 268; ~ thought(s) and reality (realities) 171; ~ and culture-related communication 281; ~ and-context-specific 148; ~ centered communicational science(s) 17; ~centered communicational science(s) 275; ~ centered sign and meaning study (studies) 229; ~distinguishing peculiarity (peculiarities) 128; ~oriented work(s) 254; ~ related concept(s) of (an) individual monolingual self (selves) 15; ~pragmatic level 268; ~related sciences 160; ~specific 88, 114; ~systemic level 268; actual ~ 125; adjacent ~ 143; all ~ 80, 116; another (other) ~ 118, 144; anthropology of ~ 91–92, 160; any ~ 83, 156, 177; approach(es) to ~ 3, 42, 46, 50–49, 53, 61, 64, 80, 121, 178, 248, 270; approachability of ~; artificial ~ 28; aspect(s) of ~ 6, 63, 67, 96, 123, 247; assumption(s) about ~ 60; attitude(s) toward ~ 88, 177; body ~ 109; borrowing ~ 131; center(s) for ~ IX; changeability and variability of ~ 9, 122; changeability of ~ 142, 285; character of ~ 46; cognitive approach(es) to ~ 55, 248; common ~ 134; conception(s) of ~ 11, 97, 124–125; conceptual level(s) of ~ 5; concrete and mental, static and dynamic, substantial and relational manifestation(s) of ~ 84; construction(s) of ~ 136; content in ~ 117; cultural ~ 283; defining characteristics of ~ 10, 124, 152, 154–157; defining property (properties) of ~ 158; defining set(s) for ~ 153; definition(s) of ~ 181; definitional and abstract property (properties) of ~ 90; definitional model(s) of ~ 29, 91; design-feature(s) of ~ 5, 154, 156; described ~ 131; description of ~ 123; determined ~ 6, 8–10, 61, 86, 88, 128, 133, 135, 144, 156, 161, 265, 270, 277; different ~ 116–118, 123–124, 143–144, 161, 275, 285; differentiation of ~ 8, 132; differentia specifica of ~ 164; discourse—text——~ 291; discursive approach to ~ 270; distant ~ 8; diverse ~ 7; diversity (diversities) of ~ 81; domain(s) of ~ 65, 277; duality of ~ 168; each ~ 117; ecologically determined ~ 29, 90, 118; ecological history (histories) of ~ 90; ecological property (properties) of ~ 90; ecological-relational property (properties) of ~ 88; ecological typology (typologies) of ~ 90; ecology of ~ 132; educational discourse on ~ 110; element(s) of ~ 7, 101; English ~ XIII; entity (entities) of ~ 47; environment(s) of ~ 82; every ~ 119, 124; essence(s) of ~ 61; ethnic ~ 28; every ~ 153, 161; evolution of ~ 136; exist-
ence mode(s) of ~ 5, 79–80, 84–86, 95–96, 279; existence mode(s) of ~ and culture 279; existence of ~ 154; existing ~ 125; expression(s) in ~ 128; external fact(s) of ~; extension(s) of ~ 157; extralinguistic fact(s) of ~ 87–88; extrasyntactic property (properties) of ~ 80, 154, 159, 158–160; every ~ 124, 161; faculty (faculties) of ~ 86; familiar ~ 118; feature(s) of ~ 9, 79, 103, 142, 164; foreign ~ 91, 106, 109, 277;; foreign-~ learner(s) 143; formalized ~ 25; form(s) of ~ 114, 117; function(s) of ~ VIII, 9, 50, 61, 116–117, 141, 179; functional environment(s) of ~ 82; functional nature of ~ 83; future ~ 95, 125; general study (studies) in ~ 82; geography of ~ 93; genetically related ~ 131; Germanic ~ 286; group(s) of ~ 128; heteronomy (heteronomies) of ~ 5, 30, 80, 89, 95; historical ~ 125; history (histories) of ~ 90; human ~ 87, 153–154, 156; individual ~ 129; inferable ~ 250; indigenous ~ 133; Indo-European ~ VIII, 46; interpretations in ~ 185; intellectual property (properties) of ~ 160; instrumental model(s) of ~ 179–180; instrumentalist view(s) of ~ 178; intralinguistic facts(s) of ~ 88; intrasyntactic property (properties) of ~ 154, 158–160, 162; interest in ~ 50; investigated ~ 82; key property (properties) of ~ 152–153, 156; knowledge of ~ 91, 96, 108; learnability of ~ 157; level(s) of ~ 8, 123; lexical-inherent prop-
erties of ~ 159; lexical-relational properties of ~ 159; linguistic theory (theories) of ~ VII, 83, 180–181; major (and small) ~ 129–130; manifestation form(s) of ~ 102, 247; manifestation(s) of ~ 81, 84, 100, 272; mastering(s) of ~ 90; mediated through ~ 15; meta-~ 268, 284; metadesignational nature of ~ 28; minority (minorities) ~ 132; mixed ~ 131, 136, 161; model(s) of ~ 82, 91–92; modelling of ~ 247; modular view(s) of ~ 275; monolingualist conception(s) of ~ 124; multiaspectuality of ~ 88; multidimensionality of ~ 248; multiple ~ 130, 291; national ~ 81, 132–133; native ~ 108, 132, 143, 146, 177; nature of ~ 2, 8, 11, 22, 28, 31, 47, 55, 81–82, 122–124, 127, 167, 176, 285, 291; natural ~ 25, 28, 48–49, 80, 83, 87, 92, 101, 125–126, 268; neighboring ~ 131; neighboring science(s) of ~ 88; non-defining characteristics of ~ 156–157; non-~-like object(s) 29–30; non-~-like semiotic system(s) 28; non-~-specific 88; non-linguistic science(s) of ~ 30, 88, 91, 99, 164; non-systemic fact(s) of ~ 87; non-systemic property (properties) of ~ 88, 122; object ~ 268; objectification(s) of ~ 9, 138, 141; observational ~ 71; ordinary ~ 134; ordinary-~ philosophy 264; origin(s) of ~ 99; other ~ 9; output(s) of ~ 103; overall ~ 137; overall human ~ 87, 95; own ~ 132; parental ~ 135; particular ~ 5, 80, 81–82, 87, 95, 100–102,
104, 109, 114, 117–118–119, 123–124, 126, 130–132, 136–137, 143, 161, 247, 277, 281, 285; part(s) of ~ 247; performance(s) of ~ 179; personal ~ 8, 126, 128, 251; philosopher(s) of ~ 158; philosophy of ~ 82–83, 160, 170; phonological and semantic plane(s) in ~ 110; private ~ 134; Polish ~ 285; potential ~ 190; property (properties) of ~ 5, 8, 10, 79, 81, 87–88, 90–93, 123, 136, 141, 152–154, 156–160, 162, 164; proto ~ 44; proprietorship of ~ 6, 104, 128; psychology of ~ 61, 92, 160; quality (qualities) of ~ 112; reality (realities), thought(s) and ~ 171; realization(s) of ~ 16, 96–97, 100–101, 126, 168–169, 272, 281; reference(s) for ~ 108; relational property (properties) of ~ 154; relational and inherent property (properties) of ~ 88; relational feature(s) of ~; role(s) of ~ 31, 85, 112, 273; rule(s) of ~ 100, 114, 272; Scandinavian ~ 147; science(s) of ~ VIII, XI–XII, 11, 30, 43, 49, 52, 55, 61, 62, 65, 87–91, 93–94, 99, 134, 164, 185, 208; semiotic approach(es) to ~ 178; semiotic nature of ~ 176; semiotic property (properties) of ~ XI, 8, 10, 122, 158, 162, 164; semiotician(s) of ~ 212; semiotics of ~ 30, 261, 278; separate ~ 131; several ~ 104, 291; sign–communicational role(s) of ~ 31; similar ~ 131; social ~ 127; social character of ~ 83; sociology of ~ 89, 92, 134; source ~ 184, 285; speech and ~ 99–100; speaking vs. ~ 96; spoken ~ 8, 133; standard ~ 133–134; state(s) of ~ 91; stretch(es) of ~ 263; structure(s) of ~ 10, 81, 125, 158–159; study (studies) of ~ 29, 99, 122, 124, 264; subset(s) of ~ 137; substance(s) of ~ 120, 169; substrate(s) ~ 131; superimposed ~ 142; superposed ~ 131; system(s) of ~ 88, 101, 117, 123, 125, 131, 143; systemic fact(s) of ~ 87, 106; systemic property (properties) of ~ 11, 81, 91–92; systemic and structural property (properties) of ~ 90; target ~ 184; technical ~ 286; text(s) of ~ 104; the same ~ 7–8, 104, 126, 131, 135, 144, 146, 172, 275; theoretical ~ 71; theoretical modelling(s) of ~ 247; theory (theories) of ~ XI, 15, 31–32, 45, 125–126, 180–181, 246–248, 250; theory (theories) about ~ 125; translatability of ~ 157; two ~ 118; typology (typologies) of ~ 90; understanding(s) of ~ 94; universal(s) of ~ 1, 10–11, 151, 164; used ~ 281; use(s) of ~ 6, 86, 99, 104–105, 269; user(s) of ~ 8, 122; variability of ~ 129–130; variants of ~ 132; variety (varieties) of ~ 126, 133–134, 137; various 125; vehicular ~ 91, 130; Western ~ 285; view(s) of ~ 17, 178, 275; view(s) about ~ 125; vocabulary (vocabularies) of ~ 285; written ~ 25

language, ~ as a carving pattern 113; ~ as a codified system of verbal signs used for cognitive and communicational purposes 10; ~ as a correlation between
thought and sound in “parole”; ~ as a dialectal continuum in the collective sense 9; ~ as a domain of articulation 113; ~ as a defined object; ~ as a definitional model 87, 90, 94; ~ as a (created) structure 6, 96, 98; ~ as a domain of articulation 113; as a functional unity 112; ~ as a form of social practice 270; ~ as a form, realized substantially in individual acts and products of communicational processes 122; ~ as a game of chess 114; ~ as a heteronomous idiolect 80; ~ as a mental system located within the brain of individuals 15, 246; ~ as a natural organism 45; ~ as a principal investigative object mainly in relation to its significative properties 30; ~ as a principal object solely with regards to its systemic structural properties 30; ~ as a property of collectivity 85; ~ as a property of human beings 84; ~ as a relational property of (other) objects (studied by other disciplines) 5, 80, 89; ~ as a semiotic system 2, 21–22, 67, 77, 91; ~ as a semiotic system with grammar and universal lexicon 181; ~ as a set of inborn lexical ideas and grammatical rules 97; ~ as a set of intraorganismic and extraorganismic properties of its speakers and learners 79; ~ as a socially actualized system of symbols having a certain meaning 99; ~ as a social feature of human speech 6; ~ as a social aspect of human speech 104; ~ as a social means of communication; ~ as a synonym of the faculty or power of speaking 98; ~ as a system of associated types of mental signs consisting of two parts, the concepts of word meanings and sound patterns of word forms that mutually imply each other 97; ~ as a personal property of him- or herself 6; ~ as a semiotic system located in the minds of individual selves 248; ~ as a system of pure values 7–8, 113, 122; ~ as a system of shared means of communication 95; ~ as a system of signs having both an abstract and a social character 100; ~ as a system of signs VII, 11, 165; ~ as a system of values 120; ~ as a system of vocal signs 6; ~ as a oneness 135; ~ as a principal object 89; ~ as a real object 94; ~ as a theoretical construct 80, 94; ~ as a tool of communication 8, 123, 290; ~ as a tool of communication or a property of task-realizing communities 290; ~ as a verbal means of signification 30; ~ as a whole 126, 135; ~ as an autonomous object of study in abstraction from its external conditionings 83; ~ as an autonomous sociolect 80; ~ as an inductive generalization 80; ~ as an ecologically determined specimen 87; ~ as an extraorganismic system of verbal means of signification and communication 124; ~ as an object of study (is indivisible) 5, 80–81, 89, 92; ~ as one of the
systems of meaning bearers belonging to the realm of human semiotics 275; ~ as obiectum formale 86–87; ~ as obiectum reale 86–87; ~ as work 6, 96, 98; ~ ex definitione 80, 95; ~ exists also in the generational memory of organisms in form of mental memes or biological-semiotic texts 86; ~ exists even in the form of a capability 6; ~ exists only as an organized system in the consciousness of its individual users 8; ~ in a triadic sequence or a unified triangle 11, 170; ~ in abstracto 80, 95; ~ in concreto 80, 95; ~ in general 80, 95, 101–102, 126, 137; ~ in its entirety; ~ in the light of sign conceptions; ~ in the collective sense is an illusory object 124; ~ is a form and not a substance 112, 114, 120, 169; ~ is a phonic and articulated form of the psychic interior of an individual 127; ~ is a material form of ideology 270; ~ is a spiritual force 103; ~ is energeia and not ergon 103; ~ is a process or a product 103; ~ is both a social activity and a social fact 96; ~ is located within the broadly understood systems of communication 22; ~ is not a ready-made product but an uninterrupted process 6, 96; ~ is on-
elements 7; ~ endowment 97; ~ ethnosystems(s) 135; “extension(s)” of (a) monolingual self (selves) 95; ~ fact(s) 90–91, 102, 115; ~ faculty (faculties) 6, 86, 96, 104, 278; ~ form(s) 7, 105, 111, 121, 169; ~ functionalism 178; ~ geography 135; ~ historiography 52–53, 122, 284; ~ in provenance; ~ idea(s) 37, 41, 45, 52, 55; ~ idiosystem(s) 94, 127, 135, 137; ~ inquiry (inquiries) 144; ~ interference(s) 142–143; ~ investigation(s) 15, 30; ~ knowledge 45, 47, 49, 105; ~ labor(s) 79; ~ means 145; 281; ~ meeting(s) 285; ~ method(s) 29; ~ model(s); ~ natiostems(s) 135; ~ object(s) 6, 62, 81, 87, 96; ~ observation(s) 126, 129; ~ or interlingual and cultural or intercultural communication 277; ~ or logical and philosophical 26; ~ paradigm(s) 42; ~ performance(s) 107, 138, 144, 266; ~ phenomenon (phenomenon) 264; ~ point(s) of view 99; ~ politeness 264; ~ polysystems(s) 135; ~ practice(s) 217; ~ pragmatics 273, 283; ~ problem 99; ~ property (properties) 108; ~ realization(s) 263; ~ regularity (regularities) 156; ~ rule(s) 265; ~ science(s) 81; ~ semiotics XII–XIII, 1, 11, 21, 30–32, 55, 63, 164, 174, 184–185, 246, 250, 291; ~ sign process(es); ~ sign(s) XII, 12, 113–114, 116, 129, 164, 167–168, 179–180, 186, 188, 191–193, 200, 202; ~ skill(s) 106; ~ sociosystems(s) 135; ~ sound(s) 187; ~ structure(s) 113, 115; ~ study (studies) XI, 2, 29–30, 50, 80, 82–83, 87, 89, 95, 125–126, 137, 169, 285–287; ~ subdiscipline(s); ~ substance(s) 7, 111; ~ sub- strate(s), superstrate(s) or adstrate(s) 142; ~ system(s) 10, 28, 81, 87, 124–125, 130–131, 133, 135–137, 141, 161; ~ term(s) and category (categories) 29; ~ text(s) 94, 102; ~ theory (theories) VII, 43, 83, 92, 104–105, 268, 285; ~ theory (theories) of language 180–181; ~ thought(s) 3, 36, 42, 50–51, 53, 55, 62–63, 79–80; ~ transfer(s) 286; ~ trend(s) 50; ~ unit(s) 113; ~ usage(s) 98; ~ utterance(s) 99, 105, 151, 161; ~ value(s), 112, 168; ~ variety (varieties) 135, 137; ~ viewpoint(s) 92; ~ writing(s) 7, 98, 110, 202, 286; ~, communicative, social, and cultural 98, 106; ~, philosophical, logical and anthropological (inquiry) inquiries into the sign- and meaning-related issue(s) 1; ~, pragmatic and philosophical approach(es) 289; ~-communicational activity (activities) 9, 138; ~ grammatical correctness 281; ~-semantic level(s) 222; communicative-~ performance(s) 97, 106; “eco~” discipline(s) 89; “extra”~ fact(s) 87; “intra”~ fact(s) 87; extra~ 87–88; extra~ fact(s) 127; extra~ reality (realities) 83, 101; extra~ and extrasemiotic domain of reference 281; inter~ contact(s) 124; intra~ 87–88; meta~ level 79; meta~ reflexivity 159, 161; non~
by nature 29; non-~ discipline(s) 5, 80, 83; non-~ matter 7, 111; non-~ or non-language-like semiotic system(s) 28; non-~ science(s) of language 11, 30, 61, 88–91, 99, 130, 164; non-~ science(s) of sign and meaning 217; psycho-~ performance principle(s) 156; socio-~ analysis (analyses) 268; socio-~ competence(s) 107, 109; socio-~ knowledge 108

linguistics, ~ 27–30, 32, 35, 37, 42, 47, 49, 51–52, 55, 81–82, 87, 93, 113–114, 137; ~ among other sciences 55; ~ among the other sciences of language VIII; ~ and literary study (studies); ~ and other sciences of language(s) XI; ~ and semiotics VII, XI–XII, 2, 27, 29–31; ~ and the non-linguistic science(s) of language 88, 90, 130, 164; ~ and the theory (theories) of literature (… etc.) 25; ~ as (a) science(s) of (verbal) signs 28; ~ as a “pilot science” 28; ~ as an investigative object 93; ~ chair colloquium(s) VII; ~ in the broadest sense; ~ or psychology 65; ~ proper 10–11, 30, 82, 89, 92–93, 137, 158, 160; ~, semiotics and communicology 2; ~, sociology, psychology, anthropology, biology, and the like 26; adjacent to ~ 61; aim(s) of ~ 200; academic discourse(s) of ~ 284; anthropo-~ 89, 92; anthropological ~ 218; applied ~ 17, 107, 286; aspect(s) of ~ 92; autonomous ~ 90–92, 164; chair(s) of ~ XI; change(s) in ~ 45, 52; commission(s) of ~ 285; comparative ~ 44, 82, 90, 136; cognitive ~ 249; conference(s) in ~ XIII; context(s) of ~ 31, 64; cultural science(s) and ~ 232; department(s) of ~ IX; descriptive ~ 82; development(s) of ~ 3, 42, 44, 50; diachronic ~ 123; discipline(s) of ~ 62, 91, 129; disciplinary-specific perspective(s) of ~ 181; domain(s) of ~ 5, 30, 61, 80, 89, 91, 266; empirical ~ 61, 181; epistemology (epistemologies) of ~ XI 96, 100, 158; “external” ~ 87–88; functional ~ 100; general ~ VII–VIII, 82, 90, 124–125, 136, 178; hard-science ~ 84, 290; heteronomous ~ 89–92, 164; historian(s) of ~ 3, 44; historical ~ 90, 123, 133; historiography (historiographies) of ~ 47; history (histories) of ~ 3, 35, 41–42, 51, 53, 93; human ~ 290; innovator(s) in ~ 44; institute(s) for ~ XII; instrumentalist ~ 219; instrumentalist functionalism in ~ 178; integrational ~ IX, 125; interest sphere(s) of ~; “internal” ~ 87–88; leading role(s) of ~ 28; logic of ~ 93; meaning in ~ XI; meta~ 92–93; methodology (methodologies) of ~ 93; modern ~ 37, 51; neighboring discipline(s) of ~ 62, 91, 129, 283; neighboring science(s) of ~ 99; object(s) of ~ 45, 86; para~ 25; paradigm(s) of ~ X, 217; particular ~ 90; particular kind(s) of ~ 125; period(s) in ~ 43; phenomenologist(s) of ~ 254; philosophy of ~ 93; position(s) of ~ XII, 62; post-Saussurean ~ 125; post-structuralist ~ 265; practice-
er(s) of ~ 8, 10, 126, 132, 151; pragmatic ~ 106, 264; pre-1800 ~ 44; psycho~ 61, 89, 92; psychology of ~ 93; science(s) of ~ 93; scope(s) of ~; revolution(s) in ~ 46; semiotic(s) of ~ 29–30; semiotic paradigm(s) of ~ X, 217; semiotics and ~ 21, 30–31; sociological ~ 89, 92, 283; sociology of ~ 93; science(s) of ~ 93; state(s) of ~ 37, 42, 51; status(es) of ~ IX; structural ~ 127, 154, 158, 261; subject matter(s) of ~ 5, 79, 88, 92, 124; synchronous ~ 123; systemic ~ 268; text ~ 17, 262–263, 265; textual ~ 180; typological ~ 90

logical domain(s), ~ as (a) counter-part(s) of the physical domain(s) 236; ~ being rationally concluded through shared knowledge of social communication 15; ~ of (a) rational association(s) 194, 237; ~ of (an) inererable association(s) linking related factual or processual phenomena 193; ~ of associated mental facts 231; ~ of inference 15; ~ of mentally associated facts 236; boundaries of ~ 236; feature(s) of ~ 15; physical and ~ of human semiotics 235

M

meaning(s), ~ 211–214, 244, 249; ~ and manifestation 170; ~ and use 79–80; ~ as (a) signified(s) 181; ~ as (a) subjective and intersubjective subsumption(s) of (a) significant object(s) 237; ~ as (a) subjective construct(s); ~ as (a) thought(s) of (a) thing(s) 177; ~ as (a) thought(s) or notion(s) 166, 204; ~ as (an) interpretant(s) 166; ~ as enaction 218; ~ as nomination(s) and subsumption(s) of significant objects 231; ~ as significance 244; ~ as significance or value(s) 65; ~ belonging to extrasemiotic reality (realities) 238; ~ conception(s) 33, 212; ~ for someone 227; ~ of (a) function(s) 14; ~ of (a) given sign(s) 172, 176; ~ of (a) phenomenon (phenomena) 242; ~ of (a) thing(s) 253; ~ of (a) value(s) 14; ~ of (a) verbal sign(s) 212; ~ of (an) abstract correlate(s) 209; ~ of another (other) sign-vehicle(s) 222; ~ of another (other) subject(s) 229; ~ of another (some other) good(s) 222; ~ of verbal mean(s) 85, 161; ~ or reference 1; ~-bearer(s) 9, 13, 15–17, 21–22, 32, 79, 84–85, 143, 182, 199, 215–216, 231–232, 238–241, 243–244, 261, 271–275, 277–280; ~-bearing fact(s) 9; ~-bearing process(es) and product(s) 14; ~-carrier(s) 138, 140, 143, 148, 227–229; ~-carrying fact(s) 140; ~-creating activity (activities) 9, 140; ~-creation(s) 14, 21, 225, 231–232, 238, 279; ~-creator(s) 93, 33, 234, 274, 278; ~-evaluator(s) 14; ~-deciphering 238; ~-indicating function(s) 3, 22; ~-interpretation(s) 21, 232; ~-interpreting activity (activities) 14; ~-negotiating activity (activities) 242; ~-nomination(s) 14; ~-processing activity (activities)
14, 16, 261, 271; ~receiver(s) 227, 229, 234; ~related property (properties) 10, 13; ~related domain(s) 23; ~signaling form(s) 156–157; ~subsumption(s) 14; ~utilization(s) 14, 225, 231, 279; ~utilizer(s) 14, 33, 227, 229, 234, 274, 278; acquired ~ 220; activity (activities) of ascribing ~ 220; additional ~ 229; ascription(s) of ~ 223, 239, 243, 274; assign ~ 270; bear certain ~ 32; bearer(s) of ~ 32, 100; bearer(s), producer(s) or utilizer(s) of ~ 74; biological understanding of ~ 225; biosemiotic conception(s) of ~ 227; body-related ~ 258; carrier(s) of ~ 229; certain ~ 227; cognizer(s) and maker(s) of ~ 237; conceive, memorize and make ~ 22; concept(s) of ~ 65, 214; conception(s) of ~ 13, 211, 230, 237; connotative ~ 107, 134, 170, 189, 192, 202; convey ~ 65; create and interpret ~ 17; creating and utilizing ~ 225; definition(s) of ~ 211; denotative ~ 188; detailed ~ 262; derivational ~ 162; different ~ 40, 156; distinguish ~ 155, 157; distorted ~ 134; essence of ~ 211; expression(s) of ~ 237; extrinsic ~ 227, 229, 234, 239, 243, 279; form(s) and ~ 126, 155, 157, 175; form—<WORD>—... meaning (concept)—... referent 173; function(s) or ~ 7, 65, 110, 112; fundamental ~ 182; generation(s) of ~ 65; global ~ 164; group-specific ~ 245; have ~ 226; having ~ 212; historical and con-

<WORD>—... meaning (concept)—... referent 173; function(s) or ~ 7, 65, 110, 112; fundamental ~ 182; generation(s) of ~ 65; global ~ 164; group-specific ~ 245; have ~ 226; having ~ 212; historical and con-

temporary ~; imputed ~ 194; inferable ~ 170, 219, 272; intentional act(s) of ~ 170; interpretations of ~ 171; knowledge of ~ 13, 243; locutionary ~ 161–162, 264; maker(s) of ~ 242; memorize, think, learn and make ~ 24, 249; minimum differential ~ 182; mental ~ 175; natural and conventional ~ 264; nature of ~ 177; negotiate and confirm ~ 85; need-oriented conception(s) of ~ 223; new ~ 223; notion(s) of ~ 207; partial ~ 164; particular ~ 221; personal-subjective ~ 242; pre-constructed ~ 237; reference(s) or ~ 199; referent(s) R as ~ 181; referent(s) as (a) ~ 199; referential ~ 182, 185, 200, 131, 239, 243, 262; relativist conception(s) of ~ 214; search(es) for ~ 242; semiotic ~ 199; semiotic and non-semiotic conception(s) of ~ 211; sense(s) or ~ 110; sign(s) and ~ X–XI, 1, 14, 22, 27, 32, 176, 199, 215, 217–219, 229, 231; sign- and ~oriented discipline(s) 64, 167, 249, 251, 275; sign- and ~oriented scholar(s) 246; sign-

and ~oriented theory (theories) of cognition 248; sign- and ~processing and sign- and ~interpreting activity (activities) 14, 230; sign- and ~related approach(es) 65; sign- and ~related domain(s) 23; sign- and ~related nature of language 31; sign- and ~related object(s) 2; sign- and ~related property (properties) 10, 14, 230, 235; sign- and ~related issues(s) 1; sign(s) and its (their) ~ 1–2; sign
and/or ~ conception(s) 33; sign-
and/or ~ related issue(s) 34;
sign-and/or ~ related property
(properties) 23; sign(s) or ~ 21;
signified ~ 220; sign process(es)
and/or ~ 63; sense(s) or ~ 7;
shared ~ 244; something that
has ~ for someone because of
something 227; specification(s)
of ~ 200; specific ~ 99; subject-
tive ~ 232, 240–242; subjective
value(s) and ~ 223; subjective
oriented ~ 21, 227; subject-
oriented understanding of ~ 228;
subject-related conception(s) of
~ 237; synonym(s) of ~ 65; the
same ~ 53; the term ~ 200, 211;
tolerance of ~ 229; transferred
~; Uexküllian concept of ~ 224;
universe(s) of ~ 9, 141, 245; uti-
lizer(s) of ~ 74; value(s) and ~
74, 223; word ~ 97; word-for-
word ~ 102; word—... ~... referent 173
mental, ~ 33, 84, 278; ~ act(s) 170;
~ activity (activities) 189, 238,
245, 248; ~ association(s) 80,
162, 190; ~ capability (capabili-
ties) 85, 279; concrete and ~ na-
ture of language 11, 167; ~ con-
cept 212; concrete or ~ entity
(unities) 11, 166; ~ constituent(s)
187; ~ configuration(s) 190; ~ construction 242; ~ con-
tent(s) 15, 246–247; ~ counter-
part(s) 175, 177; ~ entity (ent-
ties) 11, 166; ~ equivalent(s) 84,
189–190, 196, 278–279; ~ ex-
istence mode(s) 127, 248; ~ ex-
perience(s) 249; ~ fact(s) 120,
169, 187; ~ fact(s) and event(s);
~ faculty (faculties) 79; ~
form(s) 170; ~ frame(s) of ref-
erence 238; ~ idea(s) 188; ~ im-
age(s) 175, 177, 188; ~ imagina-
tion(s) 1; ~ inductive abstrac-
tion(s) 244; ~ information struc-
ture(s) 249; ~ intuitionism 68; ~
manifestation form(s) 200; ~
mem(ies) 86, 280; ~ meaning(s)
175; ~ model(s) 237, 242; ~ na-
ture of language 11, 167; ~
part(s) 183; ~ pattern(s) of; ~
meaning-bearer(s); object(s)
231; ~ oneness 168; ~ pattern(s)
143; ~ phenomenon (phenomen-
a) 124, 250; ~ product(s); ~
processing and interpreting of
(a) meaning-bearer(s) 244; ~ rea-
ality (realities); ~ recollection(s)
189, 245; ~ referent(s) 204, 206,
210–211; ~ reflection(s) 166,
175, 190; ~ relational net-
work(s) 249; ~ representation(s)
12, 186, 249, 253; ~ scheme
(schemata) 238–239; ~ sen-
tence(s) 177; ~ self (selves) 259;
~ side(s) 168, 186–188, 193,
196; ~ sign(s) 83, 97, 177, 204,
206–207, 210–211, 213; ~ sign-
processing and sign-interpreting
activity (activities) 16, 84; ~
space(s) 142–143, 278; ~
sphere(s) 245, 260; ~ subject(s)
232; ~ system(s) 15, 246; ~
thinking 96; ~ transfer(s) 142; ~
world(s) 242; sign(s) as ~ unity
(unities) 11, 167, 203; physio-
logical~ faculty (faculties) 97
mentalism, ~ 63, 211, pan~ 7, 248
mentalism, ~ concept 3; 246~ con-
nectionism 213; ~ direction(s)
112; pan~ 15, pan~ concep-
tion(s) 245, pan~ attitude 250
metacompetence 18, 283
metadesignation, ~ (metalinguistic reflexivity) 159, 161; ~ i.e., the ability to speak in signs about other signs, as the main characteristics of human beings 177; the term ~ 284
metadesignational, ~ nature of language(s) 28
metalinguistics, ~ 92–93, ~ in particular 93
metascience, ~ 34, ~ in general 93
metascientific, ~ account of the research 1; ~ basis 58; ~ investigation(s) 22, 34; ~ level 2, 56, 75; ~ or metadisciplinary foundation(s) 4; ~ status(es) of epistemology (epistemologies) 56; ~ status(es) of semiotics (semiotic disciplines) 2; ~ status(es) of semiotic disciplines 19; ~ study (studies) 34, 92; ~ subdiscipline(s) 59; ~ premise(s) 92
metasemiotic, ~ discourse(s) 31
metasemiotics, ~ as a network of epistemological paradigms 1

N
neosemiotics, ~ 251, 257, 259, object of ~ 16, 247, 259

P
performance(s), ~ as realization of language 96, ~ of language 179; ~ of verbal ability (abilities) 108; actual ~ 105; communicative ~ 108, 279; communicative-linguistic ~ 97, 106; competence(s) and ~ 104; linguistic ~ 107, 138, 144, 266; linguistic and communicative ~ 138, 151, 279; psycholinguistic ~ 156; speech ~ 107; verbal ~ 106; verbal and non-verbal ~ 97
physical domain(s), ~ being empirically tested with experimental methods 15; ~ of (a) concrete fact(s) 237; ~ of empirical investigations 231; ~ of empirical observations 194; ~ of observable concatenations of facts or processes 193; ~ of observable relational properties of communicating selves as concrete persons 236; feature(s) of ~ 15; logical domain as a counterpart of ~ appears to be indispensable 236; the concept of ~ must be counterpoised to that of the logical domain 236
phytosemiotic, ~ processes 226; ~ sign-processes 226, ~ sign(s) 227
phytosemiotics 226
Platonic 11, 112, 119, 167–169
Platonism 11, 166
Platonist 112, 120, 168–170, 176
praxeological, ~ and axiological formulation(s) of sign and meaning 235; ~ and axiological subsumption of (a) semiotic object(s) 245; ~ i.e., function- and purpose-oriented view of culture 14; ~ i.e., function-related 232; ~ or axiological nomination(s) and subsumption(s) of (an) object(s) under the sign(s) of function(s) or value(s) 233; ~ or axiological significance as either a tool or a good 237; ~ semiotics 232, 237; ~ significance 2, 233, 235
praxeology 14, 232; ~ and/or
axiology-oriented model(s) of
(a) cultural semiosphere(s) 235
praxeosemiotic, ~ and/or axiosemi-
otic regularity (regularities) 14, 232; ~ and (an) axiosemiotic
sphere(s) of culture(s) 234; ~
and/or conception(s) of cul-
ture(s) 233; ~ nomination(s) and
subsumption(s) 14, 232
praxeosemiotics 233
praxeosignificate(s) 234–235
praxeotic act(s) 235

R

Research Center for Language and
Semiotic Studies at Bloomington, Indiana IX

S

Sartrean 259
Saussurean, ~ 11; ~ approach 114;
post~ structuralism 49; post~
linguistics 125; three ~ terms
(langage—langue—parole) 98;
~ distinction(s) 98; ~ term lan-
gage 99; parole in ~ terms 102;
speech is specified in ~ terms as
“the linguistic faculty proper”
104; Platonic logos and Sauss-
urean parole 187; ~ concept
and image acoustique as ‘con-
cept’ and ‘sound pattern’ in Roy
Harris’ translation 168; ~ bilat-
eral sign within the scheme of a
semantic triangle 174; bilateral
sign in ~ outlining 175
Saussureanism 59
semeion (semeia) 23
semiocentrism 74

semiotic, ~ act(s) 223, 235; ~ activi-
ty (activities) 220, 232; ~ and
linguistic study (studies) 2; ~
ability (abilities) 97; ~ and non-
~ conception(s) of meaning 211;
~ and non-semiotic aspect(s) 31;
~ and non-semiotic concept(s);
~ and non-semiotic viewpoint(s)
58; ~ and structural study (studies)
X, 151; ~ study (studies)
XII; ~ approach(es) 178, 223; ~
category (categories) 28; ~
codes 17, 272; ~ collectivity
(collectivities); ~ communica-
tion(s) VIII; ~ competence(s)
281; ~ competence(s) 281–282;
~ concept(s) 200, 221; ~ con-
ception(s) of subjective uni-
verse(s) 13; ~ conference(s)
VIII; ~ congress(es), confer-
ence(s) and symposium (sympo-
sia) X; ~ consciousness; ~ defi-
nition(s) 164; ~ deliberation(s)
31; ~ detection(s) 235; ~ de-
vice(s) 250; ~ dimension(s) 220;
~ discipline(s) 11, 19, 58–59,
166, 200, 218; ~ discursivism
291; ~ domain(s) 22, 75; ~ eco-
system(s); ~ experience(s) 258;
~ fact(s) 28–29; faculty (facul-
ties) 289; ~ function(s) 16, 272;
~ functionality (functionalities)
30; ~ inventory (inventories); ~
investigation(s) 2, 30–31; ~ lin-
guistics 21, 30, 158; ~ manifest-
ation form(s) 232; ~ meaning(s)
199; ~ means 238, 247, 279–
280; ~ network(s) 274; ~ nature
of language 2, 176; ~ niche 224;
~ nomination(s); ~ object(s) 1–
3, 9, 12, 21–22, 23–24, 26–27,
30–34, 65, 67–69, 71, 73–75,
138–140, 149, 164, 185, 199–
200, 202, 207, 212, 215, 232,
235, 245, 249, 272; ~ order(s)
223; ~ paradigm(s) of linguistics
X, 217; ~ perspective(s) 151; ~ phenomenology 254; ~ phenomenon (phenomena) 201; ~ practice(s); ~ process(es) 226, 258; promotor of ~ IX; ~ property (properties) XI, 8, 10, 14, 122, 158, 162, 164, 231, 236, 273–274, 276, 280–281; ~ reality (realities); ~ self (selves) 2, 13, 15, 197, 216, 229, 231; ~ seminar(s); ~ situation(s); ~ social-semiotic sphere(s); ~ society (societies) IX; ~ sphere(s) 14, 216; ~ square 252; ~ structuralism 186; ~ study (studies) IX, 21–22, 24, 30, 57, 141, 167, 235, 288; ~ subdiscipline(s) 34; ~ substantiation(s) 138; ~ subsumption(s); ~ symposium (symposia) VIII; ~ system(s) 2, 21–22, 28, 67, 77, 91, 130, 162, 217, 235, 237, 244, 248, 250, 277; ~ term(s) 25, 31, 192; ~ thought(s) 75, 166, 203; ~ threshold(s) 24, 75; ~ trace(s) 145; ~ tradition(s) 194, 199; ~ universal(s) 1, 10–11, 151, 157–158, 162, 164, 230; ~ variable(s); ~ view(s) of the world 249; ~ web(s) 290; ~ writing(s) 25, 204; ~ communicational aspect(s) 261; ~ communicational study (studies) 32; ~ communicational system(s) 274; ~ communicational view(s) 219; biological ~ text(s) 86; in ~ term(s) 14; non ~ concept(s) 200; semiology and ~ communication VIII; social ~ sphere(s) 142; subject-centered ~ 13; praxeological and axiological subsumption of (a) ~ object(s) 21, 245

semiotics, ~ 21–22, 24–25, 27–30, 32, 56, 59, 65, 67, 73, 75, 201, 215, 222, 257; ~ among the other scientific disciplines 4, 57; ~ and communicology XIII; ~ and linguistics 21; ~ and/or (and) semiology 25–26, 64; ~ as a scientific discipline 2; ~ as (an) investigative domain(s); ~ constituent(s); ~ institute(s) X; of classical music 251; ~ of human communication 141, 272; ~ of belonging; ~ of communication 17, 283; ~ of culture and nature 14, 230–231; ~ of culture XII–XIII, 14, 218, 220, 224, 229, 232, 291; ~ of human communication 16; ~ of language(s) 27, 30, 261, 278; ~ of language; ~ of nature XII–XIII, 27, 224, 229; ~ (a) related discipline(s) 63; ~ related presentation(s) XI; anthropological foundation(s) of subject-centered ~ 13, 219; association(s) of ~ XIII, attention in ~ 200; axiological ~ 232, 237; background(s) of ~ 252; boundary (boundaries) of ~ 60, 67, 74; category (categories) of ~ 200; center(s) for ~ XII; cognitive ~ XI, 248–250, 288; communication and ~ VIII; constituent(s) of ~ 65; corporeal ~ 258; cultural ~ 15, 27, 222; cultural ~ 27; descriptive ~ 16, 246, 249–250; dictionary (dictionaries) of ~ 120, 169–171, 176, 178, 212–214, 284; discipline(s) of ~ 5, 33, 65; domain(s) of ~ 2, 4, 22, 24, 26, 28–29, 32, 58, 215; educational ~ 196; educational discourse(s) in ~ 11, 183; empirical and rational ~ 193; epistemolo-
gy (epistemologies) of ~ XII, 4, 35–36, 58–59; epistemology (epistemologies) of linguistic ~ 53; existential ~ 246–247, 251–253, 257, 259; foundation(s) of ~ 74, 176; framework(s) of ~ 218; general ~ 3, 22–23, 31, 33–34, 64; general linguistics and ~ VII; global ~ 151; heritage(s) of ~ 251; human ~ 14, 17, 151, 230, 235, 248, 275; human-centered ~ 14, 231, 235, 257; 261; in terms of ~ 65; linguistic ~ and semiotic linguistics 30; linguistic ~ XII–XIII, 1, 11, 21, 30–32, 55, 63, 164, 174, 184–185, 246, 250, 291; linguistics and ~ VII, XI–XII 2, 27, 29–31; linguistics and logical ~; linguistics, ~ and communicology 2; links to ~ IX; medical ~ 25; metaphysical and physical ~ 23; methodological tool(s) of ~ 32; modern ~ 23, 284; Modern-World ~ 251–252; neighboring discipline(s) of ~ 65; new ~ X, 260; objective ~ 74; object(s) of ~; older ~ 252; Old-World ~ 251; physical ~ 23; position(s) of ~ 56, 74; praxeological ~ 232, 237; promoter(s) of ~ 29; referential ~ 274; school(s) of ~ X, 5, 258; scope(s) of ~ 24; society (societies) XIII; solipsistic paradigm(s) of ~ 1; specific discipline(s) of ~ 5; status(es) of ~ 2, 31; student(s) in ~ XI; subdivision(s) of ~ 34; subject matter(s) of ~ 23, 64, 171; subject-centered ~ 216, 219, 247; task(s) of general ~ 31; the term ~ 23; theory (theories) of ~ 219; world ~ 251

semiotiké / semieiotiké 23

semiotism, ~ called also semiotic-cism 62

sign- and meaning-, ~ or sign-processes-related terms 22; ~ or sign-product- and sign-process(es)-related terms; ~ interpreting activity (activities) 14, 230; ~oriented discipline(s) 64, 167, 249, 251, 275; ~ oriented scholar(s) 246; ~ oriented theory (theories) of cognition 248; ~processing activity (activities); ~processing and ~interpreting activity (activities) 14, 230; ~related ability (abilities); ~related approach(es) 65; ~related domain(s) 23; ~related issue(s) 1; ~related nature of language 31; ~related object(s) 2; ~related property (properties) 10, 14, 230, 235

sign(s), ~ 11, 13, 46, 116, 120, 166, 169, 172, 175–180, 185, 205–207, 209, 213–214, 226–227; ~ action(s) 171; ~ among other types of semiotic objects; ~ among things 176; ~ and ~ processing activity (activities); ~ and culture(s); ~ and its (their) contexts of use 212; ~ and its (their) meaning(s) 1–2; ~ and its (their) object(s) 171; ~ and its (their) object(s) of reference 162, 166; ~ and its (their) physical realization(s) 180; ~ and its (their) referent(s) 12–13, 182, 199–200, 206–209, 210–211, 213; ~ and non-~ 200; ~ and meaning(s) X–XI, 1, 14, 22, 27, 32, 176, 199, 215, 217–219, 229, 231; ~ and/or meaning
conception(s) 33; ~ and/or meaning-related issue(s) 34; ~ and/or meaning-related property (properties) 23; ~ as (a) cognizable, phenomenon (phenomena); ~ classification(s); ~ as (a) corporeal phenomenon (phenomena) 12, 176; ~ as (a) dyadic relation(s) 13, 204–205; ~ as (a) meaning-bearer(s) 216; ~ as (a) oneness 11, 167; ~ as (a) relation(s) 120; ~ as (a) tetradic relation(s) 204–205; ~ as (a) text-element(s); ~ as (a) three-fold representamen(s) 171; ~ as (a) token and (a) type 209; ~ as (a) token(s) 181; ~ as (a) triadic relation(s) 12–13, 204–205; ~ as (a) twofold entity (entities) 183; ~ as (a) twofold mental unity (unities) 167; ~ as (a) two-sided entity (entities) 11; ~ as (a) unity (unities); ~ as (an) entity (entities) 12, 199; ~ as (an) investigative object(s) 26, 30; ~ as (an) object of two sides 120; ~ as existing materially 176; ~ as (an) implicative artificial semantic arbitrary phenomenon (phenomena) or (an) associated intentional inferred conventional stimulus (stimuli) 202; ~ as (an) observable meaning-bearer(s) 231; ~ as the main object of study 30; ~ concept(s); ~ conception(s) X, 13, 175, 178, 180, 199–200, 203–205, 207, 209, 211; ~ constituents 191; ~ domain(s); ~ for (an) idea(s) 113; ~ for more than one signifié 120; ~ function(s) 116–117, 169; ~ in general 2, 22; ~ in itself 74; ~ in particular 120; ~ in relation to value(s) 223; ~ inventory (inventories) 129; ~ itself 116, 169, 175, 179; ~ knower(s) 129; ~ model(s); ~ of (an) organismic need(s); ~ of (a) human need(s) XII; ~ of (a) fact(s) and (an) event(s) 16, 246, 248; ~ of (an) idea(s); ~ of (an) idea(s) 113; ~ of another (other) individual(s) 160; ~ of (a) function(s) 232; ~ of (a) value(s) 232; ~ of (a) function(s) or (a) value(s) 233, 236; ~ of (an) inferable function(s) or value(s) 236; ~ of God’s creation 74; ~ of his/her purpose(s) or need(s) 14; ~ of its (their) virtual use(s) 221; ~ or ~ processes 65; ~ process(es) 22, 24, 27, 63, 65, 212, 226; ~ process(es) and/or meaning 63; ~ or meaning 21; ~ production(s) 172; ~ property (properties); ~ reservoir(s) 129; ~ science(s); ~ system(s) XIII; ~ theory (theories) 177; ~ sense, indication 172; ~ user(s) 190, 212, 214; ~and-its-referent relationships, 1, 199; ~centered discipline(s) 63; ~ communicational aspect(s); ~ communicational domain(s); ~ communicational perspective(s) 27; ~communicational role(s) of language(s) 31; ~ communicational science(s) 17; ~communicational system(s) 272; ~interpreting activity (activities) 16, 84, 213; ~ processes-related terms 22; ~ processing activity (activities) 84, 213, 246, 278–279; ~ processing and ~related domain(s) 26; ~related term(s)
361

12–13, 27, 183; ¬-structures
113; ¬-system(s) 22; ¬-
transmission(s) and ¬-
reception(s) 279; ¬-transmitting
and ¬-receiving activity (activi-
ties) 278; ¬-vehicle(s) 12, 166,
171, 190, 220–222, 235; all ¬
25; another (other) ¬ 117, 171–
172, 176–177; approachability
(approachabilities) of ¬; bi-
ilateral ¬ VII, 11–13, 166, 173–
175, 185–188, 190–191, 196,
199, 203; categorial ¬ 119; cat-
egory (categories) of ¬ 11, 65,
166; characteristic feature(s) of ¬;
class(es) of ¬ 163; classifica-
tion(s) (typology /typologies/)
of ¬ VIII; complex ¬; composed ¬
164; concept(s) of ¬ XI; con-
ception(s) of ¬ X, 1, 12, 14,
166; conception(s) of ¬ and
meaning 231; conceptual fea-
ture(s) of ¬; concrete ¬ 13, 166,
194, 204, 206–207, 210; conno-
tation(s) vs. denotation(s), in-
tensions vs. extension(s) of ¬
213; constituent(s) of ¬ 117;
conventional ¬ 25, 178; conven-
tionalized ¬ 25–26; cultural ¬
27; cultural ¬ process(es) 27;
definition(s) of ¬ 11, 168, 177;
detachment(s) of ¬ from its
(their) referent(s) 12, 176; doc-
trine(s) of ¬ 23; domain(s) of ¬
26; duality (dualities) of ¬ 116,
169; effect(s) of ¬ 212; embod-
ied ¬ X; entitative ¬ 119; epist-
temological foundation(s) of ¬;
extraorganismic ¬ 206; every ¬
171; feature(s) of ¬ 178, 182,
190; function(s) of ¬ 273; for-
eign ¬ 160; generating one or
more ¬ 166; genus proximum of
(linguistic) ¬; given ¬ 171–172,
176, 194, 208; group(s) of ¬
265; how to react to ¬ 214; how
to use ¬ 214; iconic, i.e., picto-
rial or mimetic ¬ 272; implica-
tional nature of ¬ 176; indicat-
ing ¬ 140; indicating, signaling,
appealing, symbolic, iconic, i.e.,
pictorial or mimetic ¬ 16; in-
finite number(s) of ¬ 164; intelli-
gible ¬ 175; intelligible intraor-
ganismic ¬ 206; intermediating
¬ 171; interpretant of ¬ 171; in-
traorganismic ¬ 206; language ¬
12, 27, 46; language ¬
process(es) 27; language-
centered ¬ and meaning study
(studies) 229; linguistic ¬ XII,
12, 113–114, 116, 129, 164,
167–168, 179–180, 186, 188,
191–193, 200, 202; manifesta-
tion form(s) of ¬ 11, 185, 200,
203, 208; manifestation(s) of ¬
12; material ¬ 111; mental ¬ 83,
97, 177, 204, 206–207, 210–
211, 213; mental image(s) of ¬
175; mental reflection(s) of ¬
166; model(s) of ¬ 183, 185;
natural ¬ 25, 27, 177; natural
and conventional ¬ 178; natural
¬ process(es) 27; nature of ¬
176; non-linguistic science(s) of
sign and meaning 217; non-
verbal ¬ 163, 202, 208; non-
verbal and verbal ¬; notion(s) of
¬ VIII, 207, 215; notional
scope(s) of ¬; observable ¬ 218;
olfactory ¬ 24; ontological sta-
tus(es) of ¬ 65; own ¬ 160; par-
ticular ¬ 117; part(s) of ¬ 11,
167; perceptual ¬ 226; perfused
with ¬ 74; philosophy of ¬ IX;
phytosemiotic ¬ 227; phytose-
miotic ~ processes 226; potential ~ 23, 28; prior ~ 171; producer(s) and receiver(s) of ~ 216; process(es) of creating ~, called semiosis (semioses) 65; property (properties) of ~ 201; quadrilateral ~ 204–205; rationalistic presentation(s) of ~ 168; referent(s) of ~ 166, 213; root(s) of ~ 165; science(s) of ~ VII, X; scope(s) of ~ 200; sensible ~ 175; sensible extraorganismic ~ 206; sequence(s) of ~ 265; simple~ 163–164, 181–182; spoken or written ~ 6; status(es) of ~ 65, 166; study (studies) of ~; subsumption(s) of (an) observable object(s) under the ~ of (an) inferable function(s) or value(s) in nature and culture 236; system(s) of ~ VII, 11, 28, 97, 165; the term ~ 23, 195, 201; the word ~ 194–195; text(s) and ~; theory (theories) of ~ 30–31, 63; token(s) and type(s) of ~ 190; translatability of (a) sign into another (other) sign(s) 213; triadic ~ 213; trilateral ~ 12–13, 166, 171, 199, 204–205; two classes of ~ 163; two sides of ~ 186; twofold mental ~ 213; two-sided ~ 189, 193; type(s) of ~; ultimate interpretant(s) of ~ 171; unilateral ~ VII–VIII, 12, 166, 175, 199, 203, 205, 209, 211; unity (unities) of ~ 2; universal ~ 221; various ~ 171; user(s) of ~ 212–213; utilization(s) as ~ 241; verbal ~ 10, 21, 28, 31–32, 97, 114, 116, 124–125, 130–131, 137, 140, 158, 160–162–163, 170, 200, 212, 214; verbal ~ in particular 2, 22; view of ~ 119, 169; vocal ~ 6; written ~ 6; zero~ 111

significance, anthropological and biological conception(s) of subjective ~ 14; axiological ~ 233; biological conception(s) of subjective ~ 230; culture-centered conception of subjective ~ 13, 230; meaning as ~ 65, 244; praxeological ~ 2, 233, 235; praxeological or axiological ~ as either a tool or a good 237

signification, ~ and communication 22, 24, 79, 88, 94–95, 104, 124, 136, 140, 158–159, 162, 231, 277; ~ and indication 178; ~ and signal(s) 167, 194–195; ~ and signify(s) 196; ~, that is, the human production of (a) sign(s) 241; cultural ~ 221; domain of ~ 208; human ~ 79; human ~ and communication system(s) 244; individual ~ 84; interpersonal ~ and communication 22, 24; interpersonal communication and intersubjective ~ 279; intersubjective ~ 2, 97, 162, 164; level(s) of ~ 208; level(s) of indication, signalization, symbolization, or ~ 208; means of ~ 30, 80, 83, 94, 280; means of ~ and communication 104, 124, 140, 158–159, 162, 231; means of individual ~ and interindividual communication 84; means of intersubjective ~ and interpersonal communication 278; means of verbal ~ and communication 94–95, 136; non-verbal and verbal domain of ~ 281; non-verbal and verbal means of ~ 280; purpose(s) of ~ and communication 162; solipsistic ~ 239; subjectiv-
ity of solipsistic ~ and intersubjectivity of collective communication 239; system(s) of ~ 24, 88, 135, 219; system(s) of ~ and communication 88; system(s) of cultural ~ 221; the word ~ 194
Stoic(s) 11–12, 175–176
Stoicism 11, 166

Z
zoosemiotic, ~ sign-process(es)
zoosemiotics 226
Zwirner Eberhard X, 125
STRESZCZENIE

Od gramatyki do dyskursu.
W stronę solipsystycznego paradygmatu semiotyki

Od gramatyki do dyskursu. W stronę solipsystycznego paradygmatu semiotyki jest pierwszą monografią akademicką, która umiejscawia semiotykę lingwistyczną w ramach teoretycznych i metodologicznych epistemologii jako teorii wiedzy jak przedmioty badań naukowych istnieją i jak mogą one być poznawane w podejśćach badawczych. Wykorzystywany jako podręcznik może zaoferować co najmniej trzy korzyści, które każdy pracownik nauki prowadzący seminaria specjalizacyjne lub student zgłębiający tajniki lingwistyki, semiotyki i komunikologii może przyjąć z aksamitną jako własne źródła inspiracji: po pierwsze, że obiekty semiotyczne są wieloaspektowe, po drugie, że właściwości przedmiotu badań semiotycznych można wydobyć poprzez wybór perspektyw epistemologicznych i po trzecie, że wszystkie podejścia ontologiczne i gnozeologiczne są równorzędne do przedmiotu badań na poziomie metanaukowej. Łącząc poszukiwania odnoszące się do istoty znaku i znaczenia (czyli odniesienia poza-znakowego) prowadzonych przez przedstawicieli lingwistyki, filozofii czy logiki, autor postuluje, aby zjednoczyć domeny badań biologicznych i antropologicznych, zajmujących się naturą i kulturą człowieka, w jeden wspólny paradygmat naukowy badań nad językiem.

Niniejsza książka składa się z sześciu rozdziałów podzielonych na cztery części dotyczące statusu semiotyki wśród nauk o nauce, aspektów języka jako system semiotycznego, badań nad naturą obiektów semiotycznych, i semiotycznej jaźni w dyskursywnych domenach życia codziennego. Oddzielnie części stanowią bibliografię prac omawianych i konsultowanych, uwagi odnoszące się do zagadnień omawianych w wybranych rozdziałach oraz indeksy odnoszące się do autorów i wybranych terminów z tekstu głównego. Jako taka stanowi przyczynek do pięciu dziedzin, takich jak (1) epistemologia jako sioć perspektyw badawczych, (2) semio-
Od gramatyki do dyskursu

tyczne uniwersalia języka, (3) modelowanie relacji między znakami a ich desygnatami, (4) solipsystyczna koncepcja znaczenia subiektywnego oraz (5) społeczny dyskursywizm w relacji do kompetencji jednostkowej. Główną uwagę zwraca się tu na rolę jednostki ludzkiej biorącej udział w kształtowaniu społeczności dyskursywnych poprzez interpersonalną transmisję przekazów i intersubiektywne rozumienie przekazów.

Rozdział Pierwszy rozważa, jak oddzielić domeny badawcze lingwistyki i semiotyki. Dla uchwycenia semiotycznej natury języka wyjaśnia relację dyscypliny, której obiektem są znaki w ogóle, do jednej z dyscyplin lingwistycznych, której obiektem są znaki werbalne w szczególności. Celem Rozdziału Drugiego jest rozważenie możliwości zastosowania pojęcia paradygmatu jako następstwa przekonań poznawczych i metodologicznych ludzi nauki wynikających z rewolucji naukowych wywołanych przez nadzwyczajne osiągnięcia wyjątkowych jednostek do minionego i obecnego stanu myśli lingwistycznej. Rozdział ten kończy się stwierdzeniem, że historycy językoznawstwa są w stanie wyróżnić jedynie heterogeniczne tradycje zróżnicowanych podejść do języka z ich własnymi zapisami dokumentacyjnymi, przerwami and powrotami. Rozdział Trzeci wychodzi od epistemologii jako gałęzi wiedzy, która studiuje naturę i podstawy wiedzy w odniesieniu do granic i funkcjonalnej istotności różnych podejść badawczych używanych w poszczególnych dyscyplinach naukowych dla określenia ich przedmiotu badań. Istotą dociekań jest, jak dalece aktualnie wyznawane poglądy badaczy co do natury przedmiotu odpowiadają ich dostępności badawczej. Uwaga Rozdziału Czwartego skupia się na języku jako głównym obiekcie badań naukowych i jako aspekcie obiektów sąsiedujących będących rozpatrywanych z interdyscyplinarnych punktów widzenia. Jego celem jest wyeksponowanie świadomości dyscyplinowej uczonych w podziale ich pracy badawczej na styku podejść izolacionistycznych i integracyjnych. W obrębie ramy odniesienia wprowadzonej w Rozdziale Piątym właściwości języka omawia się w kontekście uwarunkowań fizjologicznych i psychologicznych mowy jednostek komunikujących się jako członków społeczności. Ośrodkiem takich rozróżnień jest pojęcie języka jako systemu i realizacji języka w tekstach w konfrontacji z pojęciami kompetencji i wykonania. Rozdział Szósty zajmuje się kwestią, jak wyjaśnić pojęcie formy w korelacji z pojęciem substancji. W gramatyce opisowej forma bowiem jest albo przeciwwstawiana albo umieszczana w relacji do funkcji lub znaczenia. Jednakowoż, w odniesieniu do tekstowej realizacji języka zakłada się, że forma jest czymś, co działa jako wzorzec wykrwawający na bezpostaciowej materii substancję, dając w ten sposób sieć
Streszczenie

relacji. Przedmiot Rozdziału Siódmego dotyczy zmienności i zróżnicowania języka wynikających z charakteru jego środowisk, związanego z czasem i przestrzenią, w którym funkcjonuje jako generacyjnie przekazywany środek komunikacji interpersonalnej. Te poglądy biorą pod uwagę takie właściwości języka jako konwencjonalność, możliwość nauczenia się i podatność na zapominanie. Rozdział Ósmy zwraca uwagę na metamorfozy w świecie życia człowieka wynikające z działalności komunikacyjnej pojedynczych jednostek, które w nim funkcjonują. Te metamorfozy nabierają kształtu w postaci „uwyrządzania świata” poprzez nazywanie i porządkowanie rzeczywistości, i poprzez urzeczywistnienie języka, gdzie mówiący nim wiedzą „jak uczynić rzeczy z wyrazów”. Rozdział Dziewiąty podnosi kwestię semiotycznych właściwości języka. Jego przedmiotem są badania nad tzw. uniwersaliami języka, jeśli chodzi o właściwości znajdowane albo we wszystkich języka świata, albo w komunikatywnych kompetencjach jego mówców i/lub słuchaczy, albo też w cechach definiacyjnych mowy wyprowadzanych z werbalnych i niewerbalnych środków komunikacji używanych w świecie człowieka i zwierząt. Zagadnienia poruszane w Rozdziale Dziesiątym są związane z pochodzeniem koncepcji języka jako systemu znaków. W szczególności odnoszą się one do różnych interpretacji sposobów jego istnienia w subiektywnych i obiektywnych formach przejawiania się. Najwięcej uwagi poświęca się tu źródłom różnorodnym od starożytności do współczesności w rozumieniu koncepcji znaku jako bytu jednostronnego, dwu- i trójstronnego. Rozdział Jedenasty eksponuje na tle różnych rodzajów ekwiwalencji translacyjnych również ideę ekwiwalencji epistemologicznej, która winna być osiągana w praktyce przekładowej. Mając na względzie świadomość ontologiczną i gnozeologiczną tłumaczy, przedkłada pod rozwagę sprawdzanie, jak równe konotacje terminów odnoszących się do znaków wyekscerpowanych z Kursu językoznawstwa ogólnego Ferdinanda de Saussure’a mogą wywierać wpływ na odbiorców dyskursu edukacyjnego z semiotyki. Sfera zainteresowań Rozdziału Dwunastego obejmuje analizę epistemologicznych heterogenicznych koncepcji znaku i ich przedmiotu odniesienia, które wydobywają różnice w użyciu ich terminologii i wizualizacji. Stąd przedkłada się propozycję, aby wypracować taką matrycję parametryczną, która zawierałaby cechy i składniki specyficznej dla poszczególnych podejść do sposobów ich bycia i środków wyrażania. Rozdział Trzynasty rozszerza koncepcję jaźni semiotycznej, odnoszonej wyjątkowo do organizmu, który rozpoznaje i wytwarza sygnały z otoczenia jako znaczące dla swojego funkcjonowania, poprzez pojęcie jaźni sygnifi-
kującej i komunikującej, która wysyła i odbiera jako osoba obserwowalna zmysłowo-postrzegalne nośniki znaczenia i która kształtuje i interpretuje jako podmiot wnioskowany owe mentalnie pojmowalne nośniki znaczenia na potrzeby komunikacji intersubiektywnej. W ramach Rozdziału Czternastej eksponującego koncepcję znaczącości subiektywnej w świecie otaczającym organizmy ludzkie i zwierzęce w połączeniu z koncepcją tworzenia intersubiektywnego świata życia ludzi poprzez komunikację codzienną, domena semiotyki człowieka jest zakreślona poprzez procesy tworzenia znaków i czynności interpretacyjne podmiotów kultury, którzy spożytkowują obiekty natury i kultury napotykane w ich uniwersum subiektywnym jako funkcjonalne narzędzia i wartościowe dobra kultury. Rozdział ten wieńczą teorie konstruktów osobisto-subiektywnych i społecznego tworzenia rzeczywistości, podkreślające fakt, że język obiektywizuje doświadczenia jednostek, stając się własnością społeczności komunikatywnych. Rozdział Piętnasty jest poświęcony solipsystycznemu rozumieniu przedmiotu semiotyki egzystencjalnej. Punktem odniesienia, mającym swoje źródła w fenomenologii, są tutaj werbalne wykladniki istnienia form organizmów jako „bytów samych w sobie” i „bytów dla siebie”, wyrażone w odnośnych językach omawianych autorów. Rozdział Szesnasty skupia się na metodologicznej ocenie dyskursywizmu jako perspektywy badawczej z punktu widzenia jej potencjalnego zastosowania w kontekście kompetencji człowieka. Badając znakowo-komunikacyjne aspekty kompetencji człowieka, wydobywa rozumienie dyskursu jako realizacji języka i kultury w interakcjach międzyludzkich, które przyczyniają się do tworzenia systemów porozumiewania się zdeterminowanych ekologicznie.
Professor Ordinarius Zdzisław Wąsik (born 1947) teaches in Wrocław and Poznań. As author of individual publications, editor of collective series, frequent participant of conferences and guest lecturer abroad, he was elected fellow of the International Communicology Institute in Washington, DC. Subsequently, he became also nominated regular member of the Romanian Association of Semiotic Studies, Semiotic Studies of America as well as honorary member of the Semiotic Society of Finland.

“The outcome of Professor Zdzisław Wąsik’s research activity is always an event of highest scientific value, which provides the domain of semiotics with a particular splendor. In his new monograph, a profound European erudition is combined with original insights into the roots of various investigative paradigms, such as linguistic semiotics, existential phenomenology, epistemology, philosophy and psychology of language.” Eero Tarasti, Honorary President of the International Association for Semiotic Studies.

“From Grammar to Discourse traces the human capacity for sign use from its linguistic and cultural context. Such scholarship suggests the foundation of a discursive paradigm for semiotics stuck in mundane phenomenology, associated inter alia with the contributions of Leo Zawadowski and Ernst Cassirer drawing their inspiration from Karl Bühler. Serious scholars will find it a “must read” volume!” Richard L. Lanigan, Director and Fellow, International Communicology Institute, Washington, DC.

“What has been originated here is an extraordinarily mature academic handbook, not only with regard to methodological awareness and epistemological knowledge that may be of interest both for learners, doctoral students and researchers in various social disciplines who out of necessity stand before discursive aspects of subject-oriented references and communication between participating subjects forced to consider advanced tools, analytical perspectives, and critical confrontation, but also in respect to the care for the quality of various cultural practices.” Lech Witkowski, Professor of the Philosophy of Education, Culture and Epistemology, Pomeranian Academy in Śluφsk.