THE NOTION OF COMPLETION IN MODERN GREEK: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ASPECTIVELY ADVERSATIVE SENTENCES

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While numerous words of a language reflect a fragment of its world, the grammatical structure of this language affords an insight into the structure of the thought […]

[…] translations, if they concern grammatical forms, are almost always incorrect and determine completely different grammatical relations than the ones the speaker had in mind.

To learn a foreign language should therefore be to acquire a new standpoint in the world-view hitherto possessed […]. But because we always carry over, more or less, our own world-view, and even our own language-view, this outcome is not purely and completely experienced.

Wilhelm von Humboldt
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Co – Corollary
Ex – Example
Exm – Explanandum
Gs – General Statement
Po – Postulate
PP – Prepositional Phrase
Qs – Question
Ss – Singular Statement
VP – Verb Phrase
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Introduction

The research objectives and motivation

The subject of this dissertation revolves around the notion of completion in Modern Greek. It is explored by analysing aspectively adversative sentences. Current research of Modern Greek aspect concentrates on its acquisition by native and non-native speakers of the studied language and the interaction between the grammatical aspect, lexical aspect, and telicity. Other approaches to aspect seem less popular in Modern Greek linguistics. At the same time, little attention is paid to completion *per se*. This work is the first known to the author that focuses on the meaning of completion and its signification (i.e. conveyance of meanings) in Modern Greek. Additionally, for the first time, a fragment of the Modern Greek aspective reality will be described with a postulational method and then explained by applying Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) deductive model of explanation.

For Mackridge (1985: 102), aspect is the most difficult part of Modern Greek grammar to master for non-native speakers of this language. Nonetheless, relatively few linguists are interested in this phenomenon. In the author’s opinion, among the most influential scholars exploring Modern Greek aspect are Horrocks, Moser, Papadopoulou, Rivero, Sioupi, Stavrou, Tsangalidis, Tsimpili, Xydopoulos.

Some scholars (e.g. Klein 1995: 672f., 2009: 52, Dahl 1999a: 33) characterise the distinction between the perfective and imperfective aspect with the help of notions such as totality, termination (or temporal boundedness), or completion (cf. Tsimpili & Papadopoulou 2009: 189). Analogously, Modern Greek perfective lingual units are conceived of as:

- Presenting the denoted event as a single whole (e.g. Alexiadou 1994, Xydopoulos 1999, Tsimpili & Papadopoulou 2006),
- Expressing the termination of the denoted event (e.g. Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006, Tsimpili & Papadopoulou 2009), or
- Expressing the completion of the denoted event (e.g. Hatzisavvidis 2010, Tsangalidis 2014, Roumpea 2017).

Interestingly, totality, termination (or temporal boundedness), and completion are considered primitive notions – that is undefined but sufficiently intuitive concepts. None of these notions,
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however, are comprehensively explained in the aspectological literature on Modern Greek aspect.

Bearing that in mind, it should be noted that the author of this dissertation is a native speaker of Polish. Furthermore, although the present work deals with the notion of completion in Modern Greek, it is written in English. Hence, it seems reasonable to expect that three different conceptualisations of extra-lingual reality come into play. The fact that completion is considered in the aspectological literature on Modern Greek aspect as a primitive notion might suggest that it remains vague and further study on this subject is still required. With that in mind, to ensure the lucidity of the thoughts expressed in this work, the author will attempt to define completion.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that only the last of the aforementioned approaches to the (im)perfective aspect (see the previous page) involves the notion of completion. The followers of the first two approaches either do not take the meaning of completion into consideration at all or they explore it in a rather cursory manner. As regards the last approach, some scholars (e.g. Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a, Sioupi 2009) claim that completion is conveyed solely by perfective lingual units denoting telic events. For them, perfective lingual units which denote atelic events convey the meaning of termination but not completion.

In the present research, however, it will be argued that completion is not obligatorily signified by perfective lingual units, regardless of whether a telic or an atelic event is denoted (see also Trąba 2017, Bielecki & Trąba in press). Consequently, the existing theories on Modern Greek aspect do not suffice to answer questions such as:

Qs1: How the meaning of completion is lingually expressed in Modern Greek? And
Qs2: Why a certain lingual unit signifies or does not signify completion?

Hence, the objective of this dissertation is to answer (at least partially) the above questions. To achieve this goal, fragments of the Modern Greek aspective reality will, for the first time, be precisely described in the form of postulates and corollaries deduced from these postulates.

Methodology

In the dissertation, it is assumed that events are denoted, among others, by sentences or texts (i.e. sequences of sentences). The properties of an event are lingually conceptualised as meanings, which in turn are conveyed by sentences denoting this event. In other words, a sentence denotes an event. At the same time, the structure of the sentence reflects (some)
properties of this event. This study will focus on the signification (i.e. conveyance) of the meaning of completion.

As mentioned above, the central notion of this study is completion. It will be conceived of as a complex meaning combining two simpler meanings: termination and holicity (i.e. the property of being whole). This means that a lingual unit conveys completion on condition that it conveys simultaneously the meanings of termination and holicity.

Furthermore, a clear distinction will be made between meanings, lingual units, and relations binding them together. Consequently, aspect will be conceived of as a system composed of:

- The dimension of aspect – a set of three aspective meanings (completion, incompletion, and aspective neutrality),
- The category of aspect – a set of all lingual units conveying aspective meanings, and
- Relations binding lingual units with the aspective meanings signified by these lingual units.

To ascertain whether a lingual unit conveys the meaning of completion, the correctness of aspectively adversative sentences will be examined. An aspectively adversative sentence is, for instance, *Peter was writing a letter, but he didn’t write it completely*. Additionally, a sentence is considered as correct if it is simultaneously grammatical (i.e. violates no grammatical rule of a language) and sensical (i.e. the meanings conveyed by its constituents are not mutually exclusive).

**The structure of the research**

The dissertation will consist of six chapters:

In **Chapter 1**, the main focus will be put on general aspectology. Consequently, among the subjects discussed in this chapter will be the development of the linguistic thought on aspect from antiquity to the present day, the distinction between aspect and tense, and the origin of the term *aspect*. Furthermore, selected contemporary approaches to time, tense, and aspect will be discussed, to create a background for the next chapter.

**Chapter 2** will be oriented towards Modern Greek aspectology (i.e. the field of linguistics devoted to Modern Greek aspect). Therefore, some words will be devoted to the tense and aspect in the studied language. Attention will be paid to classifications of verb forms and to
interactions between the grammatical and lexical aspect. Moreover, in this chapter, some
selected approaches to the aspectual meanings signified by imperfective and perfective lingual
units will be discussed.

Next, in Chapter 3, the notions most fundamental to the purposes of this dissertation will be
proposed, elucidated, and exemplified. Thus, some words will be devoted to the notions such
as event, meaning, signification (and some of its modes), semantic dimension, category, system,
the imperfect, the aorist, and the perfect tenses, negative and negated clauses, etc. Additionally,
the definitions of completion, aspectively adversative sentences, correct syntagmata, etc. will
be introduced. This chapter will be closed with a class of postulates regarding grammaticality,
sensicality, and correctness of (aspectively) adversative sentences.

Chapter 4 will be devoted to the question of how the research has been conducted.
Consequently, in this chapter, the creation of a corpus will be approached. Moreover, it will
discuss the restrictions imposed on the studied material and how the aspectively adversative
sentences belonging to the corpus will be examined.

In Chapter 5, the results of the research will be presented. For this purpose, a class of postulates
and corollaries regarding the signification of termination, holicity, and completion in Modern
Greek will be elucidated, and exemplified. Some problematic issues, which emerged during the
research, will also be addressed.

Finally, the objective of Chapter 6 will be to answer the question of why a particular lingual
unit of Modern Greek signifies or does not signify termination, holicity, or completion.
Furthermore, the author will attempt to explain why some aspectively adversative sentences are
incorrect. For this purpose, Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive model of explanation will be
applied.

The dissertation ends with conclusions in which final remarks are made.
Chapter 1

Aspect: setting the scene

This chapter will introduce the topic to be tackled in the entire dissertation – namely aspect. It will describe the diachronic development of linguistic thought on aspect from antiquity to the present day, and will briefly review a variety of modern approaches to the concept. However, due to the immensity of the aspectological literature (see Sasse 2001: 2), this chapter should not be regarded as comprehensive, but rather as presenting only some selected approaches.

Before we proceed, it should be noted that aspectology\(^1\) (the subdiscipline of linguistics devoted to aspect and aspect-related notions like Aktionsart, lexical aspect, telicity, etc.; see also Chapter 3.5.2) lacks a uniform and generally agreed upon terminological apparatus. For this reason, in order to offer the reader a clear and coherent overview of approaches to aspect, some terminological clarifications must first be made.

To begin with, we distinguish two adjectives: lingual and linguistic. The former refers to language\(^2\), whereas the latter refers to linguistics – a scientific discipline concerned with language. Therefore, a lingual means is, for instance, a word, a phrase, a sentence, a text, etc., which is used to communicate. A linguistic means, on the other hand, is for instance a method used to study a language. Analogously, lingual knowledge is the atheoretical or intuitive knowledge of a language possessed mostly by native speakers, whereas linguistic knowledge is the knowledge of a linguistic theory regarding language (cf. Itkonen 1976: 186–8). Furthermore, we use the term designate (and its derivatives) as synonymous with denote. That is to say, designation is the relation which binds lingual units (e.g. words, phrases, sentences, etc.) with particular fragments of extra-lingual reality. On the other hand, we shall use the term signify (and its derivatives) to refer to the meanings conveyed by a lingual unit. Therefore,

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\(^1\) Cf. Binnick (1991: 170ff.).

signification is the relation which binds lingual units with their meanings. For instance, the expression *yesterday* signifies the meaning of pastness. A more detailed explanation of the relations of designation and signification is proposed in Chapter 3.1. Finally, we shall employ such terms as *fragment of extra-lingual reality, temporal, aspectual, verb, event*, etc. which (we hope) are sufficiently intuitive that their usage should not cause confusion.

It should be noted that, due to the aforementioned standardisation, we do not always follow the original terminological apparatus used in the aspectological approach being discussed. Consequently, although we do our utmost to retain the essentials of the assumptions made in the presented approach, some deviations from the original thoughts may occur. We take that risk consciously, because the absence of such terminological standardisation would significantly impair this chapter’s clarity and coherence.

1.1 From antiquity to modern era

Although aspectology as a subdiscipline of linguistics begins to emerge no earlier than the late 19th century (Binnick 1991: 135f.), the concept of aspect may be traced back to antiquity. To be more specific, the first references to the notion may be found in Ancient Greek philosophical and grammatical texts. In this section, we shall briefly review the development of theories on aspect over the centuries.

1.1.1 Antiquity

The first, although implicit (Binnick 1991: 142), reference to an aspectual opposition of two verb forms is claimed to appear in Plato’s *Ion* (530A). In this dialogue, Socrates contrasts the imperfect and the aoristic forms of the verb *agónizomai* ‘I contend’, pointing out the difference in their meanings. This idea was further explored by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* (Θ1048b: 18–37), resulting in the distinction of two classes of verbs: *kinēsis* ‘movement’ and *enérgeia* ‘actuality’. He explains these classes as follows:


3 Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities. For every movement is incomplete – making thin, learning, walking, building; these are movements, and incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is coming
There are two observations to be made with respect to the above quotation. Firstly, it seems that the criterion by which verbs are classified as *kínēsis* ‘movement’ and *enérgeia* ‘activity’ is the meaning signified by the present verb form. Thus, if it signifies incompletion, then the verb to whose paradigm this verb form belongs is a *kínēsis*. Otherwise, it is an *enérgeia*. Secondly, in view of the methodology used in this research (see Chapter 3.7 and 3.8), special attention must be given to Aristotle’s method of ascertaining to which class a verb belongs. It can be seen that he juxtaposes the present verb form with its perfect counterpart. If the resulting statement is true, then the verb is an *enérgeia*. If it is false, then it is a *kínēsis*. For instance, the verb *badízō* ‘I (am) walk(ing)’ is a *kínēsis* because *u gár háma badízei kai bebádiken* (Aristotle *Metaphysics*: Θ1048b 30–1) ‘[it is] not [true that] at the same time one is walking and one has walked’⁴. In contrast, the verb *horō* ‘I (am) see(ing)’ is an *enérgeia*, because *heōrake dè kai horā háma tò autò* (Aristotle *Metaphysics*: Θ1048b 33–4) ‘it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing’⁴ (Aristotle 1988: 328).

We find this method interesting, because it seems as if Aristotle has bound together the present and the perfect verb forms by the relation of implication (cf. Ryle 2009 [1949]: 131–5). Consequently, a verb is an *enérgeia* if its present verb forms imply perfect verb forms. On the other hand, a verb is a *kínēsis* if its present verb forms do not imply perfect verb forms. Hence the verb *think* is an *enérgeia*, because it is true that if John *is thinking*, then John *has thought*. But the verb *build* is *kínēsis*, because it is not true that if John *is building* a house, then John *has built* a house. Aristotle’s method significantly resembles the tests for telicity proposed by, for instance, Ryle (2009 [1949]: 131–5), Garey (1957: 106), Taylor (1977: 205), Borik (2002: 15) and Trąba (2017: 694) – see section 1.4.2. Unfortunately, Aristotle’s classification of verbs into *kínēsis* and *enérgeia* was not developed by his successors until the second half of the 20th century.

To continue, regular studies of language and time are conducted by the Stoics, who not only analyse the category of time with respect to the category of truth, but also distinguish six (grammatical) tenses. Interestingly, it seems as if the Stoics perceived tenses as combining temporal (*enestós* ‘present’, *parelthón* ‘past’ and *mēllōn* ‘future’) and aspectual (*paratatikós* to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved, but what is being moved is different from what has been moved, and what is moving from what has moved. But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement’ (Aristotle 1988: 328).

⁴ The emphases are our own.

⁵ Here we use our own translation of the analysed quotation, as we believe that it better presents the issue under discussion.
‘extensive’ or *atelēs* ‘incomplete’ and *syntelikós* ‘completed’ or *téleios* ‘perfect/completed’) meanings. Consequently, some researchers believe that it was the Stoics who distinguished aspect from tense (Robins 1993: 71). The opposite view is expressed by Algra (1999: 191), who believes that ‘there is no indication that next to tense the Stoics distinguish a separate category of aspect’ and goes on to explain that ‘to the Stoics time is an incorporeal continuum which can be indefinitely divided’. Algra’s reservations are further supported by the fact that the Stoics’ successors perceived *completedness* and *incompleteness* as temporal meanings (cf. Dyscolus 2.2.355–6). Nonetheless, it must be noted that the Stoics’ concepts of completedness and incompleteness are strikingly similar to those of contemporary aspectual theories (Binnick 1991: 215ff.).

Later, about two centuries after Aristotle, Dionysius Thrax composed the first European grammar (Heinz 1983: 46, Katsouda 2002: 130, Milewski 1967: 32, Robins 1993: 28) entitled *Téchnē Grammatikē*6 (Art of Grammar). In this work, he distinguishes eight parts of speech: noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, preposition, adverb and conjunction. According to his account, a verb is:


\[
\ldots \text{λέξις ἄπτωτος, ἐπιδικτική χρόνων τε καὶ προσώπων καὶ ἀριθμῶν,}
\text{ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθος παραστάσα, παρέπεται δὲ τῷ ρύθμῳ ὁκτώ, ἐγκλίσεις,}
\text{διαθέσεις, εἴδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοὶ, πρόσωπα, χρόνοι, συζυγίαι} \ldots \]

(Thrax *Téchnē Grammatikē*: 638b 4–7).

As shown above, Dionysius Thrax differentiates eight ‘accidents’, one of which is *eĩdos* ‘species’. This term is of great importance for modern aspectology, for, as we mention later in this chapter, it constitutes the origin of the linguistic term *aspect*. It must be emphasised, however, that *eĩdos* in Dionysius Thrax’s grammar refers rather to word formation than to what is nowadays known as ‘aspect’ (Dahl 1999a: 30, Krifka & Hock 2002/2003: 1–2). This is supported by the fact that Dionysius Thrax distinguishes two *eĩdos*: *protótypon* (primitive) and *parágogon* (derivative)8. The former is represented by the verb *árdo* ‘I water’ and the latter by the verb *ardeúo* ‘I irrigate’. Additionally, Thrax’s *eĩdos* is not purely a verb category, but it is also found in the part devoted to nouns (see Thrax *Téchnē Grammatikē*: 634b 21–24). It should

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6 The question of whether Dionysius Thrax is the author of *Téchnē Grammatikē* is not addressed in this dissertation. More detailed information on this matter can be found, for instance, in Di Benedetto (1958), Wouters (1979) and Pagani (2010).

7 ‘[…] an indeclinable word, indicating time, person and number, and showing activity or passivity. The verb has eight accidents: Moods, Dispositions (voices!), Species, Forms, Numbers, Tenses, Persons, Conjugations […]’ (Davidson 1874: 334–5).

8 ‘εἴδη δὲ δίοι, προτότυπων καὶ παράγων: προτότυποι μὲν οὖν ἄρδο, παράγων δὲ οὖν ἀρδεύοι’ (Thrax *Téchnē Grammatikē*: 638b 13–14) (‘[…] There are two Species: Primitive and Derivative – Primitive, as ἄρδος; Derivative, as ἀρδεύοι’ (Davidson 1874: 335)).
be noted, however, that the terms used in Dionysius Thrax’s grammar are imprecise, leaving room for speculation (Heinz 1983: 50).

Dionysius Thrax identifies three tenses: present, past and, future. The past is further divided into four sub-species (following Davidson’s (1874: 335) translation): Imperfect, Perfect, Pluperfect and Aorist (Thrax Ῥβήνη Γραμματική: 638b 22–26), which are connected to other tenses and grouped into ‘three respective relations: the Present is related to the Imperfect, the Perfect to the Pluperfect and the Aorist to the Future’ (Davidson 1874: 335). These relations seem to be based on the similarities between the verb stems, as Present and Imperfect are based on the present stem, Perfect and Pluperfect on the perfect stem and Future and Aorist on the future stem (cf. Robins 1993: 71–4). Moreover, it is noteworthy that, unlike the Stoics (Algra 1999: 190f.), Dionysius Thrax does not perceive the Perfect as a sub-species of the present, but of the past tense (Robins 1993: 71).

Dionysius Thrax’s Ῥβήνη Γραμματική was well known and elaborated in the Roman Empire. Among his successors are Marcus Terentius Varro, Aelius Donatus, and Priscianus Caesariensis. Their grammatical works provided the foundations of Latin grammars and language studies in the Middle Ages (Heinz 1983: 71, Robins 1993: 27–8, 71). However, for the purposes of the present dissertation, we shall restrict our attention to Aelius Donatus’ Ars Maior, in which the grammatical concepts characterising this period are exhaustively presented.

Aelius Donatus continues the Greek grammatical legacy in distinguishing eight parts of speech, one of which is the verb. Furthermore, similarly to Dionysius Thrax, he distinguishes future, present and past, the last being further divided into three sub-species (following the term used earlier in this section): imperfectum, perfectum and plusquamperfectum. Consequently, Donatus distinguishes praesens, praeteritum imperfectum, praeteritum perfectum, praeteritum plusquamperfectum and futurum (Donatus Ars Maior: 0638). Furthermore, Donatus (Ars Maior: 0637) distinguishes two types of verbs (figurae verborum): simplex (primitive) and composita (derivative)⁹. However, in contrast to Dionysius Thrax, the Roman grammarian also takes into consideration the semantics of the verb. As a result, Donatus distinguished four forms of verbs (formae verborum): perfectum (e.g. lego ‘I’m reading’), meditativum (e.g. lecturio ‘I want to read’), frequentativum (e.g. lectito ‘I read often’) and inchoativum (e.g. fervesco ‘I begin to boil’) (Donatus Ars Maior: 0633). It must be noted that Donatus uses the term perfectum to refer to two different things. Firstly, it is a sub-species of the past (i.e. praeteritum perfectum), and secondly it is one of the four forms of verbs (figure verborum). It is worth

⁹ Following the terms used in earlier parts of this section.
noting that Donatus’ *formae verborum* greatly resemble Agrell’s (1908) *Aktionsart* (cf. Binnick 1991: 139–49, Dahl 1999a: 30, Młynarczyk 2004: 35–46, Filip 2012: 721–6). However, some linguists believe that Donatus’ *formae verborum* should not be identified with *Aktionsart*, which is an aspectual subdomain, for it is strictly associated with derivation – that is, word formation (Colombat 2007: 4). There is at least one reason to disagree. Donatus does not relate the *formae verborum* solely to the morphological structure of the verb, but analyses its semantic properties as well. Consequently, as he points out, ‘*verba inchoativa similia, quae inchoativa non esse temporum consideratione pernoscimus*’\(^{10}\) (Donatus *Ars Maior*: 0633). In other words, although some verbs resemble inchoatives from the morphological perspective, they signify different meanings.

*Formae verborum* (which are sometimes called *qualitas* (Diomedes 1857: 342–46) or *species* (Priscian 1855: 427–34)) are also distinguished by other grammarians of this period. They do not, however, develop Donatus’ ideas. On the contrary, they considered *formae verborum* as belonging to:

- mood, or
- word formation.

The former approach can be found in, for instance, *Ars Grammatica* by Diomedes, who states that: ‘*qualitates uerborum sunt hae, absoluta siue perfecta, inchoatiua, iteratiua siue frequentatiua, meditatiua, transgressiua, defectiua, supina, ambigua*’\(^{11}\) (Diomedes *Ars Grammatica*: 0342). This being the case, although this approach to some degree resembles that of Donatus (in respect of terminology, for instance), Diomedes does not distinguish aspect from mood. On the other hand, the latter approach can be found in Priscian’s *Institutiones Grammaticae*, in which perfective, inchoative, frequentative, etc. verbs are accompanied by verbs derived from nouns, nouns derived from verbs, and verbs derived from adjectives.

### 1.1.2 Middle Ages

In the Middle Ages, grammatical studies were based to a great extent on the works of Roman grammarians like Donatus and Priscian. Consequently, scholars of this period not only continued Thrax’s distinction of eight parts of speech, but they also adopted his concept of tense

\(^{10}\) Verbs which are similar in form to inchoatives, but, in fact, are not inchoative verbs, can be identified by examination of their tenses. [translations are our own unless noted otherwise]

\(^{11}\) Verbs may have the following properties: absolute or perfect, inchoative, iterative or frequentative, meditative, transgressive, defective, supine, and ambiguous.
(cf. Chrysoloras 1517, Gaza 1525, Adelphotes 1973 [1591], Sophianos 1870\textsuperscript{12}, Aelfric 1880\textsuperscript{13}). Nevertheless, it must be observed that in this period the aspectological thought initiated by, for instance, Aristotle and the Stoics was forgotten. Consequently, one can find hardly any significant development with respect to the distinguishing of aspect from other verb categories. Moreover, in the Middle Ages formae verborum are considered as purely derivative verb forms. Consequently, Donatus’ distinction between, for instance, inchoative and quasi-inchoative verbs in respect of their temporal features is not explored any further.

1.1.3 Modern era

It is generally agreed among aspectologists (e.g. Binnick 1991: 136, Krifka & Hock 2002/2003: 1, Młynarczyk 2004: 35) that the modern linguistic term \textit{aspect} originates from the Ancient Greek \textit{eĩdos} ‘species’. In order to trace the evolution of this term through the centuries, we must return for a moment to antiquity. As we have mentioned, Dionysius Thrax distinguishes in his \textit{Téchnē Grammatikē} a category which he calls \textit{eĩdos} (p. 17). This category is also commonly distinguished by his ancient and medieval successors. Consequently, it is found in medieval grammars of Greek written by, for instance, Chrysoloras (1517), Sophianos (around 1550), Adelphotes (1973) [1591], and others. It is commonly believed (Binnick 1991: 139, Krifka & Hock 2002/2003: 1) that \textit{eĩdos} was translated for the first time into Church Slavonic as \textit{vidъ} by Meletij Smotričkyj in his \textit{Hrammatiki Slavenskija Pravilnoe Syntagma} (1619). We have, however, found instances of this term in a Modern Greek grammar almost thirty years older than Smotričkyj’s work. Specifically, the term \textit{vidъ} is used as a translation of the Greek \textit{eĩdos} in Adelphotes’ \textit{Gramatiki tis kinis ton Elinon Glosis} (1591). This work is interesting for several reasons. For instance, it is one of the first grammars of Modern Greek. Additionally, it is bilingual, in the sense that each fragment written in Modern Greek has been translated into Church Slavonic. However, what interests us most is the subchapter entitled \textit{péri ìcos}\textsuperscript{14}, which is translated as \textit{o ’vidja}. The origins of \textit{vidъ} as a linguistic term should therefore be dated not to the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, as is commonly done, but to the 16\textsuperscript{th}. Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that neither Adelphotes nor Smotričkyi developed the idea of aspect any further than the Ancient Greek and Roman philologists. That is to say, they distinguish two \textit{vidъ}: primitive and

\textsuperscript{12} Sophianos’ \textit{Gramatiki tis kinis ton Elinon glosa} [Grammar of Greeks’ Common Language] is dated to the first half of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century (Stoppie 2007: 320). For a comparison of Sophianos’, Thrax’s, and Langaris’ grammars see Katsouda (2002).

\textsuperscript{13} Aelfric’s \textit{Grammar} is dated to the 12\textsuperscript{th} or even 11\textsuperscript{th} century AD (Menzer 2004: 106, Phillipps 1838: preface).

\textsuperscript{14} This transcription corresponds to the pronunciation of Modern Greek as presented in Adelphotes’ (1973) [1591] grammar.
derivative (cf. Dionysius Thrax). Moreover, Smotričkyj divides the latter into inchoative and frequentative verbs (cf. Donatus). To continue, in the 19th century, the Slavonic term *vidъ* is translated into French as *aspect*, which is further borrowed in other languages such as English (*aspect*) and German (*Aspekt*) (Krifka & Hock 2002/2003: 1, Binnick 1991: 136). Interestingly, Greek linguists have also translated the French term *aspect* into Modern Greek as *apopsi* or [rimatiki] *opsi* (Klairis & Mpampiniotis 2005, Mackridge 1985, Moser 1994a, and others) and do not employ the original Greek term *eĩdos*/*í∂os*.

It is at the beginning of the 19th century when the term *aspect* gradually begins to acquire its contemporary meaning. For instance, it is distinguished from the category of tense for the first time by Nikolaj Greč in *Prostranna ruskaja grammatika* published in 1827 (Binnick 1991: 140, Krifka & Hock 2002/2003: 1), and the imperfective vs. perfective opposition is proposed in Miklosisch’s *Vergleichende Grammatik der slavischen Sprachen* in 1868–74 (Binnick 1991: 139f.). Moreover, Curtius proposes in *Das Verbum der griechischen Sprache seinem Baue nach dargestellt* a category which he calls *Zeitart* (lit. ‘kind of tense’). According to Curtius, there are three *kinds of tense*: continuous, momentary, and completed. Similarly, in *Das altindische Verbum aus den Hymnen des Ṛigveda seinem Baue nach dargestellt* (1874) Delbrück speaks of the *Aktionsart* (‘kind of action’), which he correlates with the properties of the verbal stem (imperfective, aoristic and perfect) (Krifka & Hock 2002/2003: 2). About one decade later, in 1885, Brugmann adopts the term *Aktionsart*15, which he defines as *Art und Weise, wie die Handlung vor sich geht* ‘the way an activity is realised’ (Binnick 1991: 140, Krifka & Hock 2002/2003: 2). Although Brugmann’s division takes into consideration the properties of some specific roots, it is mostly based on verb morphology (affixes).

At the beginning of the 20th century the category of aspect was divided into two groups: (grammatical) aspect and *Aktionsart*. This division was proposed in 1908 by the Swedish Slavist Sigurd Agrell in *Aspektänderung und Aktionsartbildung beim polnischen Zeitworte*. In his view, the former constitutes the opposition of incompletion vs. completion, while the latter expresses the course of the event through time (Comrie 1976: 7, Dahl 1999a: 30, Krifka & Hock 2002/2003: 3, Młynarczyk 2004: 34, and others). It must be noted that Agrell’s *Aktionsart* is based rather on verb derivation (affixes attached to the verb) than on aspecual meanings. Consequently, until the second half of the 20th century, it was believed to exist solely in inflectional languages such as Polish and Russian, but to be lacking, for instance, in English (Filip 2012: 725).

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15 Binnick (1991:140) used the term ‘aspect’ instead of ‘Aktionsart’ when referring to Brugmann’s work.
The relationship between tense and aspect is further explored by linguists such as Jespersen (1924), who proposes a three-point structure analysis of tenses, and Reichenbach (1947), who bases his theories on the relation between the ‘speech point’ (S), i.e. the moment of the utterance, the ‘reference point’ (R), i.e. the point or temporal interval the speaker is referring to, and the ‘event point’ (E), i.e. the moment at which the event referred to by the speaker occurs. Some linguists believe that the first clear distinction and definition of tense and aspect is that proposed by Guillaume in 1933 in *Immanence et transcendance dans la catégorie du verbe: Esquisse d’une théorie psychologique de l’aspect*. In his approach, aspect refers to internal time, whereas tense refers to the external time of the event (Hewson 2012: 511).

Around the mid-twentieth century, linguists come to perceive aspect not as a purely morphological category, but begin studying it from a semantic perspective. As a result, the so-called *grammatical aspect* (which refers to a grammatical category – mainly a verb category) is gradually distinguished from the so-called *lexical aspect* (i.e. types of events) (see Ryle 2009 [1949], Garey 1957, Vendler 1957, Kenny 1963, Lackoff 1966, and others). It should be mentioned that at that time aspectologists were both rediscovering and gaining inspiration from Aristotle’s works, including his distinction of *kínēsis* and *enérgeia* (see Section 1.1.1). The first attempt to distinguish lexical aspect is undertaken by Ryle in *The Concept of Mind* (2009 [1949]: 113f., 131–5), in which activities are distinguished from achievements. Almost one decade later, Vendler (1957: 146ff.) proposes a classification of verbs into four classes: states, activities, accomplishments and achievements. On the other hand, Kenny in *Action, Emotion and Will* (1963: 120–30) discusses in detail Aristotle’s concept of *kínēsis* and *enérgeia* verbs, which leads him to distinguish three verb classes: states, activities and performances. Interestingly, although the first two classes correspond to Vendler’s states and activities, the last merges Vendler’s accomplishments and achievements into a single verb class. The last class of verbs distinguished within lexical aspect is called semelfactives and represents an extension of Vendler’s classification (Comrie 1976: 42). A slightly different approach towards lexical aspect is proposed by Garey in *Verbal Aspect in French* (1957), where he focuses on aspectral meanings signified by particular verb forms. On this basis, Garey distinguishes two classes of verbs, which he calls *telic* (from the Greek word télos ‘aim’) and *atelic*. The former consists of verbs ‘tend[ing] towards a goal – envisaged as realised in a perfective tense, but as

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16 This must not be confused with the derivational category also called *semelfactive*, which has been present in Slavic linguistics since the mid-eighteenth century (Binnick 1991: 140).
contingent in an imperfective tense’, whereas the latter is comprised of verbs which ‘do not wait for a goal for their realisation, but are realised as soon as they begin’ (Garey 1957: 106).

1.2 Time and tense

It is generally agreed among aspectologists that aspect is related to time. It is sometimes called the ‘situation-internal’ time and it is contrasted with tense, which is called the ‘situation-external’ time (Comrie 1976: 5). Furthermore, aspect may also be perceived as a component of the TAM (tense-aspect-mood) (see Dahl 1985: 1, Givón 1984: 285) or TAMV (tense-aspect-mood-voice) (see Paprotté 1988: 447) system. Consequently, in the aspectological literature aspect is often accompanied by references to time, tense, temporality, etc., which should not, however, be confused with each other.

To begin with, time is an abstract concept which is often called a fourth and bidirectional dimension, to which three attributes are assigned:

i) linearity,
ii) durational infiniteness, and
iii) divisibility into infinitely many intervals of various magnitude (Bull 1968: 4).

It must be emphasised that conceptions of time may differ between scientific disciplines. For instance, the approach to time adopted in physics may differ from that of linguistics (Bull 1968: 4–6; cf. Augustyn 1979). Bearing this in mind, in the linguistic literature time is perceived as comprised of an infinite number of moments17 – i.e. minimal, instantaneous and indivisible temporal units (Ajdukiewicz 1985: 385, Bach 1981: 66; cf. Batóg 1967: 23, Taylor 1977: 201) – which are further arranged into temporal intervals (Borik 2002: 13ff., Bull 1968: 4ff., Dowty 1979: 138ff.) or periods (Taylor 1977: 201). Moreover, temporal intervals may be of various sizes, they are durative (possess temporal duration), delimited (possess temporal boundaries) and temporally ordered (standing in relations of simultaneity, anteriority, or posteriority) (cf. Augustyn 1979: 27–9, Kleine 2009: 43, Taylor 1977: 201).

A different approach to time was proposed in 1929 in Temps et verbe: théorie des aspects, des modes et des temps by Guillaume, who focuses on the conceptualisation of time (Binnick 1991: 197f.). Consequently, Guillaume introduces chronogenesis – a three-level process in which the verbal image of time is developed. These levels are:

17 It should be noted that initially Reichenbach (1947) believed that time consists of time points which have no duration. However, this approach is not followed by his successors (see Borik 2002, Bach 1981, Bull 1968, Taylor 1977, Vikner 1985, and others).
i) the quasi-nominal level,
ii) the subjunctive level, and
iii) the indicative level.

It may be observed that in Guillaume’s theory tense, aspectuality, and modality form a uniform verb category (cf. the TAM system discussed later in this section). Each of them, however, is developed at different levels of chronogenesis and for different purposes. Guillaume’s concept of chronogenesis has been further developed by such scholars as Valin (1975), Hewson, Nurse, and Muzala (2000), Hewson and Nurse (2005), Bubenik (2011), and Hewson (2012).

Guillaume speaks of three kinds of time, which Valin (1995: 133) calls mental time, universe time and event time. Mental time is developed on the quasi-nominal level of chronogenesis and refers to people’s apprehension of time and, therefore, to their consciousness. Consequently, mental time constitutes an image of time created in the mind of an individual based on their sensory experience of time, on the one hand, and the interplay of this experience with immediate memory and immediate imagination, on the other. Furthermore, at this level of chronogenesis the experiencer (i.e. the speaker) is considered ‘passive’ – the speaker is a non-moving observer of the flow of time – in the case of immediate memory, and active – the experiencer ‘enters’ the future – in the case of immediate imagination (Hewson & Bubenik 1997: 6).

Universe time is developed at the subjunctive level of chronogenesis, and is divided into descending time and ascending time. In the former, the speaker is considered merely as a non-moving observer of the events, whereas time flows from the future towards the past. As a result, descending time is sometimes compared to the tape of a movie which is being projected, and the speaker to the (non-moving) viewer. Descending time is characteristic of Slavic languages and Ancient Greek. On the other hand, in ascending time it is the speaker moving towards the future, whereas time constitutes merely a motionless background. Ascending time is characteristic of Germanic languages. Moreover, some languages (e.g. Romance languages) distinguish ascending from descending time morphologically, using present and imperfect subjunctives (Hewson & Bubenik 1997: 7–8). Descending time may be graphically represented as a time axis pointing in the left direction, and ascending time as a time axis pointing in the right direction (Hewson & Bubenik 1997: 8):
To close our presentation of Guillaume’s approach, a few words must be devoted to the difference between event time and universe time. According to Hewson and Bubenik (1997), they are differentiated by a relation which may be referred to as the relation of ‘being contained in’. Therefore, the universe time ‘contains the event’ (Hewson & Bubenik 1997: 7), whereas the event time is contained in the event. Furthermore, universe time is grammaticalised in the language as tense, whereas event time is grammaticalised as aspect.

As regards tense, it is generally agreed among linguists (e.g. Comrie 1976: 2, Lyons 1977: 677, Dahl 1985: 25, Binnick 1991: 128, Klein 2009: 40, and others) that tense is a deictic category, which locates an event or a moment in time (i.e. on the time axis) relative to the moment of speaking (in the case of absolute tenses) or to another moment or event (in the case of relative tenses) (Reichenbach 1947: 71ff., Comrie 1976: 2, Dahl 1985: 25, Michaelis 2006: 220). Additionally, tenses may refer to the temporal distance between moments or events. In such a case, they signify remoteness or nearness in time (Dahl 1985: 121–8, Comrie 1999: 364–8). Furthermore, tense is commonly considered a grammatical category and mostly a verb category (Comrie 1999: 363). However, as Lyons (1977: 678) argues, although in many languages tense is an inflectional category of the verb, semantically it is a category of the sentence.

Importantly, the grammatical category of tense must not be confused with the meanings associated with it. Consequently, Jespersen (1924: 255–6) claims that ‘it would be best to have two separate sets of terms, one for the notional or natural divisions of time and one for the grammatical (syntactic) tense-distinctions’. He therefore uses the term (e.g. present, past, future) time when referring to meanings, and the term (e.g. present, preterit, future) tense when referring to verb forms. Jespersen’s notion of time is also known in the linguistic literature as a
time with reference to another time (Reichenbach 1947: 71), temporal reference (Lyons 1977: 578), time reference (Comrie 1976: 6), temporal relation between any pair of time points (Dahl 1985: 25, Givón 2001: 285, Klein 2009: 42), a location in time (Comrie 1999: 363, Klein 2009: 40), the temporal relation between times of events with the moment “now” (Binnick 1991: 128), and others. Although each of the above expressions represents different ways of referring to the same notion, we find the one proposed by Dahl, Givón, and Klein to be the clearest. Consequently, we shall adopt it to explain the term temporal meaning as a temporal relation binding moments or events together.

Interestingly, depending on which temporal meanings are taken into consideration, the number of distinguished tenses varies from linguist to linguist. For instance, Lyons (1977: 678) claims that English has a binary opposition of the past and non-past. A similar conclusion is drawn by Hewson and Bubenik (1997: 8) (see also Hewson 2012: 513), who argue that most of the Indo-European languages (except for Baltic, Celtic, Modern Greek, and Italic) have only two tenses: the past tense and the non-past tense. In contrast, Comrie (1999: 363) and Klein (2009: 43) distinguish three tenses in English: past, present, and future. On the other hand, Reichenbach identified thirteen possible temporal meanings, only six of which are grammaticalised in English (Reichenbach 1947: 76). Analogously, Bull (1968: 23) mentions twelve hypothetical tenses, whereas Vikner (1985: 85) distinguishes eight tenses.

It should be noted that the above proposals concerning the English tense system may be divided into two groups. The approaches belonging to the first group distinguish solely two or three tenses in English, whereas those in the second group distinguish six, eight, or more tenses. What characterises the approaches in the first group is that they use the term tense to refer solely to temporal relations binding two moments, one of which is necessarily the moment of speaking (Binnick 1991: 128, Michaelis 2006: 220, Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006: 324f., Klein 2009: 40). In the approaches of the second group other kinds of temporal relations are taken into consideration as well.

To continue, it must be mentioned that tense constitutes one of many possible verb categories. Consequently, it is worth considering how it is related to other verb categories. This issue appears usually to be approached from one of two perspectives. Firstly, tense is considered as an independent grammatical category, which may be effectively separated from other grammatical categories such as aspect, mood, or voice (Borik & González & Verkuyl 2003: 13, Michaelis 2006: 221f.). On the other hand, tense may be perceived as merely a part of the tense-aspect (Klein 2009: 40), TAM (i.e. tense-aspect-mood) (Dahl 1985: 1, Makropoulos 2009: 9), or TAMV (tense-aspect-mood-voice) (Paprotté 1988: 447) system. According to this
approach, none of the constituent categories (i.e. tense, aspect, mood, voice) may be systematically separated from each other. This is due to their mutual interdependence and extensive interaction. Dahl (1985: 3) speaks of the ‘impreciseness’ of these verb categories, in the sense that a single verb form signifies simultaneously a temporal meaning, an aspeckual meaning, a modal meaning, and a voice meaning.

Before closing our brief review of approaches to tense, we must mention one more conception regarding this notion. According to Bańczerowski and Oueslati (2017: 10), tense (or, more exactly, a family of tenses) is ‘a set of sets of verb paradigms sharing certain definite properties’. Consequently, they propose a classification of verb forms into paradigms, which are further classified into tenses. Importantly, two verb paradigms belong to the same tense on condition that they are bound by the relations of homotemporality and homomodality and are sufficiently similar aspectually or structurally. This approach to tense in a way resembles Dahl’s (1985) TAM system, because it refers simultaneously to temporality, aspectuality, and modality. Additionally, it should be mentioned that Bańczerowski and Oueslati draw a clear line between meanings (i.e. temporal, aspectual, modal) and the lingual units signifying those meanings. The sets of temporal, aspectual and modal meanings are called Temporality, Aspectuality and Modality respectively. Moreover, ‘each temporal meaning will specify the corresponding tempus’ (Bańczerowski & Oueslati 2017: 25). In other words, tempus is a set of sets of verb paradigms which are bound by the relation of homotemporality. It must be emphasised that their term tempus seems to correspond to some degree to the term tense as used by, for instance, Comrie (1976, 1999), Dahl (1985), Hewson and Bubenik (1997), Borik (2002), Michaelis (2006), Klein (2009), Hewson (2012), and others, although these terms are defined based on different criteria.

To end this (brief and far from comprehensive) discussion regarding time and tense, a few words must be devoted to the term tensology proposed by Bańczerowski and Oueslati (2017: 10). This is conceived of as a subdiscipline of linguistics which explores, describes and explains tense reality. In other words, tensology is a class of linguistic theories oriented towards the category of verb viewed simultaneously from the perspectives of temporality, aspectuality, and modality.

To close the current section, a few clarifications need to be made regarding the terminology to be used hereafter in this chapter. Firstly, following Ajdukiewicz (1985), we assume that the most fundamental unit of time is a moment – that is, a minimal, instantaneous, and indivisible temporal unit (cf. Batóg 1967: 23). Consequently, every (temporal) interval is considered a
temporal unit composed of moments. Additionally, since temporal intervals consist of moments, they must necessarily be durative and, therefore, possess a temporal structure. Furthermore, *time* shall be understood as a dimension which may be assigned properties such as linearity, durational infiniteness, divisibility into an infinite number of temporal intervals of various magnitudes (lengths), and others. Going further, temporal properties of events are lingually conceptualised in the form of *temporal meanings* (e.g. present, past, future temporal meanings). The set of temporal meanings, the set of significators of these meanings, and the relations binding temporal meanings with their significators will be referred to as *temporality*.

As regards *tense*, it shall be understood as a family (a set of sets) of verb paradigms which are bound by relations such as homotemporality and homomodality and are sufficiently similar in respect of aspectuality or morphological structure. Further, a *paradigm* is conceived of as a family of verb forms. Consequently, verb forms of paradigms belonging to the same tense are homotemporal, homomodal, and sufficiently similar aspectually or structurally. Consequently, we shall speak of past simple, past continuous, past perfect, past perfect continuous, future in the past, etc. tenses.

Finally, for the purposes of the present dissertation, we shall employ the term *tempus* (pl. *tempora*) to denote a family of paradigms which are bound by the relation of homotemporality. Therefore, we may distinguish present, past, non-past, etc. tempora.

### 1.3 Aspect

In view of the objectives of this dissertation, some words must be said on the subject of aspect. In the aspectological literature, this concept is approached from a variety of different perspectives. Consequently, the term *aspect* acquires different meanings – sometimes even contradicting one another (cf. Verkuyl 1993, Hewson & Bubenik 1997, Smith 1997, Bogusławski 2003, Karolak 2005) – depending on the aspectual theory. Some of these approaches are discussed in the current section.

One way of conceiving aspect is that it does not refer to the location of an event in time (see previous section), but to the mode of its course through time (Bańczerowski 2015: 168)\textsuperscript{18}. Consequently, it is sometimes referred to as situation-internal time (Comrie 1976: 5) or event

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\textsuperscript{18} Another approach to aspect is proposed within the so-called *Reference Time Movement*. It assumes that aspect encodes the temporal ordering of two or more events given in a sentence or in a sequence of sentences. Since the conceptions of the Reference Time Movement deviate significantly from the objectives of the present dissertation, it is not considered. The reader may find more information on this class of aspectological theories in, for instance, Kamp and Rohrer (1983), Partee (1984), Reinhart (1984), (2000), Dowty (1986), Hornstein (1990), Kamp and Reyle (1993), Hatov (1997), de Swart and Molendijk (1999), Borik (2002).
time (Valin 1975: 133) and contrasted with situation-external time (Comrie 1976: 5) or universe
time (Valin 1975: 133). However, we have some reservations regarding the latter pairs of terms
(i.e. situation-internal time vs. situation-external time and event time vs. universe time), because
they seem to entail the existence of two different notions of time. One of them is deemed to be
‘contained in’ (Hewson & Bubenik 1997: 7) the event, whereas the other contains the event.
We find this distinction vague, because it does not specify whether or not the time ‘contained
in’ the event should be understood as the temporal duration of the event. If these are two
different notions, then what differentiates them?

It should be noted that in the aspectological literature aspect has acquired two senses: a
narrow and a broad sense. According to Dahl (1999a: 30), in the case of the former, aspect is
considered as a grammatical category and is contrasted with the semantic category of aspect
(the so-called lexical aspect, Aktionsart, etc.). On the other hand, aspect in its broad sense refers
to the system comprising the grammatical and the semantic category of aspect (cf.
Bańczerowski & Oh 2013: 43). Furthermore, aspect in the broad sense may be perceived as
consisting of various aspectual categories. For instance, Dahl (1999a: 33ff.) distinguishes three
aspectual categories: i) grammatical aspect, ii) derivational aspect, and iii) lexical aspect.
Similarly, Borik (2002: 12ff.) distinguishes i) grammatical aspect, ii) lexical aspect, and iii)
telicity aspect, whereas Filip (2012: 724–6) distinguishes i) grammatical aspect, ii) lexical
aspect, and iii) aspectual classes.

To begin with, according to Comrie (1976) aspect is a grammatical category which encodes
‘different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation’ (Comrie 1976: 3).
Importantly, Comrie (in contrast to Klein 1974: 76) takes into account lingual units which
grammaticalise aspectual meanings to various degrees. Thus, he analyses aspectually synthetic
verb forms (e.g. Polish czytał ‘he was reading’, przeczytał ‘he read [entirely]’, czytywał ‘he
used to read’, etc.) as well as periphrastic constructions (e.g. English was reading, will be
reading, has been reading, etc.). Furthermore, aspect is (at least to some extent)
language-specific. This means that different languages may have different ‘semantic
distinctions’ grammaticalised (Comrie 1976: 6). Secondly, languages may vary in respect of
the number of grammaticalised aspects. Thus, some languages may have no aspect (i.e. no
aspectual semantic opposition grammaticalised), other languages have two aspects (e.g.
perfective and imperfective aspects), or more aspects (e.g. perfective, imperfective, habitual,
etc. aspects).

According to Dahl (1999a: 32), the aspectual meanings most frequently grammaticalised
in the languages of the world are what are called the progressive, habitual, completive,
imperfective and perfective. However, it seems that the grammaticalised distinction between imperfective and perfective is a central aspectual grammatical category in many languages all over the world. Furthermore, aspatial meanings may be encoded either synthetically (with affixes) or analytically (with periphrases). Interestingly, Dahl (1999a: 32) observes that only imperfective and perfective aspatial meanings tend to be encoded synthetically rather than analytically. As regards the other aspatial meanings, the number of languages encoding them synthetically is more or less equal to the number of languages encoding them analytically.

It is noteworthy that Dahl (1999a: 33ff.) makes a distinction between grammatical and derivational aspect. For him, the former is an inflectional category of the verb, whereas the latter is oriented towards derivational morphemes as means of signification of aspatial meanings. Dahl (1999a: 31) follows Isačenko and distinguishes seventeen aspatial meanings related to derivational aspect (cf. Karolak 2005: 73): ingressive, evaluative, delimitative, terminative, perdurative, finitive, total, culminative proper, attentuative, momentaneous, etc. These may be further organised into four groups: phasal meanings, quantitative meanings, iterative meanings, and distributive meanings.

To continue, aspect may also be considered a semantic category (cf. Bogusławski 2003: 28), which seems to be cross-lingually universal (Bańczerowski and Oh 2013: 43). This means that languages of the world signify aspatial meanings regardless of whether or not they are grammaticalised. Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that considerations regarding aspect as a semantic category vary in their assumptions. To give an example, Bańczerowski and Oh (2013: 44) distinguish three aspective dimensions:

- The dimension of the state of completion (termination),
- The dimension of object prehension, and
- The dimension of the significators diversity.

The first aspective dimension is comprised of three meanings: completion, incompletion, and completive indeterminacy. The second aspective dimension is comprised of two meanings: partitivity and totivity. The last aspective dimension ‘enables one to account for the diversity of the coding of aspective meanings in corresponding significators’ (Bańczerowski & Oh 2013: 44). Aspective meanings are considered to reflect lingual conceptualisations of aspective properties possessed by events. Importantly, aspective meanings may be signified in a language with significators (i.e. markers) of various kind and size (Bańczerowski 2015: 167).
In contrast, for Karolak (2005, 2008) aspect is a semantic category which refers to the extension (i.e. duration) in time of an event. Based on this assumption, he claims that there are solely two fundamental aspectual meanings:

- Continuous aspect or simple imperfective aspect, which signifies the unbounded extension in time of an event, and
- Non-continuous aspect or simple perfective aspect, which neglects the extension in time of an event (Karolak 2005: 15).

Other aspectual meanings (e.g. iteration, habituality, semelfactivity, etc.) are perceived as complex meanings, in the sense that they are a combination of two or more ‘simple’ (i.e. simple (im)perfective) aspectual meanings. For instance, inchoative meaning is conceived of as a combination of the simple perfective aspect and the simple imperfective aspect (Karolak 2005: 82). It should be noted that Karolak (2005: 18) raises objections against the traditional approach towards aspect as a grammatical category, arguing that aspectual meanings are signified primarily by lexical morphemes and only secondarily by grammatical morphemes. Consequently, he focuses on aspectual meanings signified by *semantemes* (Polish: *semantemy*) – that is, minimal morphological units signifying lexical meanings (e.g. *love* - is the semanteme of the verb forms *love*, *loves*, *loving*, *loved*). The aspectual meaning of the semanteme must necessarily correspond to the temporal property (i.e. duration in time) of its designatum. Consequently, Karolak (2005: 15) claims that the aspectual meaning signified by a semanteme may be neither cancelled nor modified by context. Furthermore, he assumes that aspect is a classifying category, which classifies, for instance, semantemes into continuous and non-continuous.

To proceed to lexical aspect (also known as situation-type aspect, *Aktionsart*, aspectual classes, etc.) and telicity (also known as an Aristotelian category), they are conceived of as taxonomies (following Dahl 1999a: 31). The former consists of classes such as states, activities (or processes), accomplishments (or developments), achievements (or punctual occurrences), etc., whereas the latter is comprised of telic and atelic classes. Unfortunately, hardly any consensus has been reached as to what lingual objects are classified. Consequently, they may be considered as taxonomies of lingual units such as verbs, verb phrases, predicates, sentences (see e.g. Vendler 1957: 146ff., Dowty 1979: 51ff., Hinrichs 1985: 10ff., Verkuyl 1989: 39ff., Miller 1999: 37, Sasse 2001: 8) as well as taxonomies of events (known also as situations, eventualities, states of affairs, etc.) (see e.g. Smith 1997: 3ff., Dahl 1999a: 31, Tenny &
Pustejovsky 2000: 5ff.). Since we believe that both lexical aspect and telicity require a closer look, we discuss them in more detail later in this chapter (see 1.4.2 and 1.4.3).

Given the above considerations, it is worth noting that some aspectologists consider grammatical aspect and lexical aspect to be two independent categories, which nonetheless interact with each other (see Sasse 2001: 6). Furthermore, since they are independent, these categories may be determined at different levels of the syntactic tree. For instance, it is believed that telicity is determined lower, and grammatical aspect higher in the tree (van Hout, de Swart & Verkuyl 2005: 10). On the other hand, some aspectologists consider aspect to be a non-autonomous category (cf. Karolak 2005: 17) or that ‘aspectual distinctions reflect, not precisely characterizable semantic representation (let alone intersubjectively verifiable propositions), but some sort of vague, inchoate mode in which events are viewed’ (Newton 1979: 165). It follows that the internal temporal structure of an event may be specified by the context or, in some cases, even by prosodic features (Newton 1979: 165).

Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous section, aspect may be conceived of as a constituent of the so-called TAM(V) system (see p. 26). The question arises of what kind of relationship binds the constituents of this system and whether some of them may be considered superior to others. Initially, aspect was considered subordinate to temporality (Clifford 1975: 53). Objections against such a hierarchy were raised by Galton (1984: 2), who claimed that it is in fact the other way round. That is to say, temporality ought to be considered subordinate to aspect. He supports his claim by analysing the following sentences:

(1.3.1)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. I was writing a book.
  \item b. I am writing a book.
  \item c. I shall be writing a book.
\end{itemize}

(1.3.2)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. I wrote a book.
  \item b. I write a book.
  \item c. I shall write a book.
\end{itemize}

There are two sets of sentences. What characterises the sentences in (1.3.1) is that their constituent verb forms belong to the so-called progressive tenses (i.e. the progressive past tense, the progressive present tense, and the progressive future tense). Furthermore, Galton argues that these sentences differ solely in respect of their temporal meanings (past, present and future respectively). To paraphrase Galton (1984: 2): the sentences in (1.3.1a.) and (1.3.1c.) assign to the past and future times just what sentence in (1.3.1b.) assigns to the present. On the other hand, the constituent verb forms in (1.3.2) belong to the so-called simple tenses (i.e. the simple
past tense, the simple present tense, and the simple future tense). However, as Galton notes, although the sentences in (1.3.2a.) and (1.3.2c.) designate respectively a past and a future event, the sentence in (1.3.2b.) ‘does not say anything about the present moment’ (Galton 1984: 3). He concludes that the aspectual meaning signified by a sentence restricts the signification of temporal meanings by that sentence. Galton’s observations agree with the conclusions reached by other linguists – for instance, Thelin (1978: 12) and Mirambel (following Paprotté 1988: 448), who propose the following hierarchy of verb categories: the category of aspect > the category of voice > the category of mood > the category of temporality (where the category of aspect is superior to the others and the category of temporality is subordinate to the others).


A few words must be devoted to the question of subjectivity of aspect. Debate over this matter has led to the distinction of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspect. The former refers to grammatical aspect, whereas the latter refers to lexical aspect. Grammatical aspect is considered a grammatical category of the verb. On the other hand, lexical aspect is believed to constitute an inherent property of a verb or verb phrase (Comrie 1976: 41–51, Sasse 2001: 9, Filip 2012: 723; cf. Smith 1997: 3). Interestingly, according to Verkuyl (1993: 11), the opposition subjective vs. objective aspect does not play any significant role in aspectological theory. Moreover, Karolak (2005: 19–20) believes that it is impossible to present any event in a subjective way if it is to be consistent with the extra-lingual reality, whereas Forsyth (1970) argues against perceiving aspect as a subjective category, because:

> ‘It is true that there frequently is freedom for the individual’s “subjective choice” of aspectual form in Russian [...] but the importance of this feature has been greatly exaggerated. There is a logical basis underlying the choice of aspect. A Russian selects one or other form for some (albeit unconscious) reason, and the relationship between the aspects depends upon an opposition of meanings and grammatical functions which constitutes part of the system of the Russian verb’ (Forsyth 1970: 2).

Finally, it must be emphasised that there is hardly any agreement among aspectologists with respect to the terminological apparatus to be used in aspectology. Consequently, one may
find a range of terms referring to the same aspectual notion or one term referring to essentially different notions (see Binnick 1991: 207ff., Tenny & Pustejovsky 2000: 5, Sasse 2001: 6). To give an example, grammatical aspect is also known as viewpoint aspect, whereas lexical aspect is known as situation type aspect (Smith 1997: 1ff.) or Aktionsart (Bach 2005: 169). On the other hand, Borik’s (2002: 12) telicity aspect corresponds to Filip’s (2012: 724–6) lexical aspect, whereas Borik’s lexical aspect corresponds to Filip’s aspectual classes. Furthermore, in the aspectological literature much discussion is devoted to one of the major (at least in our opinion) questions regarding aspect; that is, whether aspect is a grammatical or semantic category. Additionally, justified questions arise as to whether aspect is a simple or a complex category and what kind of relationship exists between grammatical aspect, derivational aspect (following Dahl’s (1999a: 31–2) term), lexical aspect, and telicity.

To summarise, aspect (also known as aspectuality) may be conceived of as referring to the mode of the course of an event through time. On the other hand, it is still disputed whether aspect is subjective or objective, whether it is a grammatical or a semantic category, and whether it is a simple or a complex category. Furthermore, aspect may be perceived as a single and independent category, as a system composed of two, three or more (e.g. inflectional, derivational, or semantic) categories, as a subsystem of Aspectuality, or as a component of a TAM system or tense. Moreover, no consensus has been reached as to whether aspect should be explored by the analysis of morphemes, verb forms, verb phrases, predicates, or sentences (cf. Verkuyl 1972, Comrie 1976, Paprotté 1988, Smith 1997, Karolak 2005, 2008). However, according to van Hout, de Swart and Verkuyl (2005: 1), it is the last approach that is coming to dominate in present-day aspectology.

Finally, in order to maintain the clarity of the present chapter, we shall use the term aspectuality (see also Chapter 3.5.2) to refer to a system comprising grammatical aspect, derivational aspect, lexical aspect, telicity, etc. (compare Dahl’s (1999a: 30) broad sense of aspect).

1.4 Grammatical aspect, telicity, and lexical aspect

As has been shown above, aspect is related to such notions as, for instance, grammatical aspect, lexical aspect, and telicity. Interestingly, although these categories are argued to interact extensively with each other, they are considered independent categories. Keeping this in mind, in this section we shall take a closer look at each of them.
1.4.1 Grammatical aspect

We shall begin with grammatical aspect. As has already been mentioned, grammatical aspect is considered to be a grammatical category of the verb. Furthermore, according to Dahl (1999a), there are four main kinds of grammatical aspect, which he calls progressive, habitual, completive, and (im)perfective. Each of them is distinguished on a semantic basis (Dahl 1999a: 32f.). Interestingly, Dahl (1999a: 33) claims that ‘the perfectivity/imperfection distinction is a central aspectual category in many verb systems, and is the one most frequently expressed by morphological means’ (see also Gvozdanović 2012: 784). As regards the perfect, its aspectual status remains controversial (Klein 2009: 53f., Ritz 2012: 885–8).

It must be emphasised that the terms imperfective and perfective are ambiguous in the aspectological literature. This is because they may refer to two different lingual objects:

- They may refer to aspectual meanings – i.e. imperfective meaning and perfective meaning; or
- They may refer to lingual (mostly morphological) units which signify these meanings – e.g. imperfective verb forms, perfective verb phrases, etc.

The need for a clear distinction between these two references appears to be generally agreed amongst aspectologists. The lack of such disambiguation may cause confusion and misunderstanding. Consequently, linguists propose a variety of methods to distinguish aspectual meanings from their significators (i.e. markers). For instance, Comrie (1976: 10) adheres to the orthographic rule that terms referring to a grammatical category are capitalised (e.g. Imperfectivity, Perfectivity, Habituality, etc.), whereas terms which refer to aspectual meanings are uncapsulised (e.g. imperfectivity, perfectivity, habituality, etc.). Applying Comrie’s rule, it makes perfect sense to say that Perfectivity (i.e. the grammatical category of Perfectivity) refers to perfectivity (i.e. the aspectual meaning of perfectivity).

In our opinion, Comrie’s solution has two major disadvantages. Firstly, due to the orthographic rules of English, the distinction is neutralised if terms are used sentence-initially. Consequently, one must not use terms like ‘Perfective’ and ‘perfective’ or ‘Imperfective’ and ‘imperfective’ as the first word of a sentence; otherwise the graphical distinction between (e.g. Perfective) form and (e.g. perfective) meaning would be lost. Secondly, this method of distinguishing between the grammatical category and the meaning seems inadequate in the case of oral presentations, lectures and discussions, as lower-case and capital letters are graphic and not phonetic signs.
A different method of resolving the aforementioned terminological confusion is to employ complete phrases indicating whether the morphological unit or the meaning is being referred to. For instance, Forsyth (1970: 3ff) uses phrases like \textit{(im)perfective verb}, \textit{(im)perfective form} when referring to lingual units, and \textit{(im)perfective meaning} when referring to aspectual meanings. Alternatively, the notions may be distinguished by the use of different sets of terms (cf. Jespersen’s (1924: 255f.) distinction between \textit{time} and \textit{tense}). For example, Bańczerowski and Oh (2013: 44) use the terms \textit{perfective}, \textit{imperfective}, and \textit{neutral} when referring to sentences and predicate phrases, whereas the terms \textit{completion}, \textit{incompletion}, and \textit{completive indeterminacy} refer to the meanings signified by, for instance, predicate phrases or sentences.

It must be kept in mind that the grammaticalised distinction between perfective meaning and imperfective meaning is not considered to be cross-lingually universal. For instance, some linguists claim that in English the aspectual opposition is not of imperfective and perfective (cf. Smith 1997: 62ff.), but of progressive and non-progressive (Howeson & Bubenik 1997: 339–41, Borik 2002: 3, de Swart 2012: 753). Furthermore, the English Past Simple tense may be perceived as aspectually undetermined (de Swart 1998: 365). On the other hand, some languages (e.g. Mandarin Chinese) may possess more diverse grammatical aspect than a simple opposition of perfective and imperfective significators (de Swart 2012: 763f.).

From the semantic perspective, grammatical aspect may be conceived of as either aspectually monosemous or aspectually polysemous (see Bogusławski 2003: 72–5). As these terms suggest, it is assumed within the monosemous approaches that the diversity of aspectual usages of a lingual unit may be reduced to the signification of the same aspectual meaning. As is shown below, the question of what this ‘aspectual meaning’ remains a matter of controversy. On the other hand, according to the polysemous approaches a lingual unit may signify a variety of different aspectual meanings. Which aspectual meaning is signified depends on, for instance, the context. For example, in some languages the imperfective verb form may signify progression, incompletion, habituality, iterativity, etc. It is noteworthy that polysemous approaches to grammatical aspect are dominant in contemporary aspectology (Bogusławski 2003: 73).

To begin with the monosemous approach, Klein (1995: 672ff., 2009: 52) distinguishes three main characterisations of the distinction between imperfective and perfective. These characterisations are:

i. The distinction is based on the notion of totality;

ii. The distinction is based on the notion of completion; and
iii. The distinction is based on the notion of internal temporal boundary (boundedness). A different approach is proposed by Galton (1976), who states that Slavic perfective verb forms signify the temporal succession of events, whereas imperfective verb forms signify the temporal ‘immutability’ of an event (Galton 1976: 11). Moreover, according to Gasparov (1990: 195), perfective verb forms designate events from the perspective of an ‘external observer’ who is not involved directly in those events, whereas imperfective verb forms designate events from the perspective of an ‘internal’ observer who is involved in the course of the events.

Furthermore, Karolak (2005: 15) claims that the fundamental aspectual property of an event is its duration in time. Consequently, he distinguishes only two (so-called) simple aspectual meanings: continuous and non-continuous. It must be emphasised that for Karolak, significators of the simple aspectual meanings may be combined with each other, to form significators of complex aspectual meanings (e.g. inchoativity, semelfactivity, etc.) – see previous section (p. 31).

To proceed to the polysemous approaches, it is assumed that aspectually relevant lingual units are aspectually polysemous. That is to say, a lingual unit may signify different aspectual meanings in different contexts. For instance, a perfective verb form may designate a completed, a semelfactive, or a temporally bounded event (Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a: 310f., 2003b: 292f.). On the other hand, an imperfective verb form may signify aspectual meanings such as incompletion, progression, habituality, iterativity, or genericity. Consequently, Comrie (1976) divides the Imperfective Aspect into Habitual and Continuous, whereas the latter is divided into Progressive and Nonprogressive. This division is presented in the following figure:

![Fig. 1.4.1.1 Classification of aspectual oppositions (Comrie 1976: 25)](image)

It must be noted that Comrie’s division does not distinguish Habituality from Iterativity or Genericity (Omnitemporality). Furthermore, following Comrie’s approach, de Swart (2012: 760) states that English ‘has a Progressive, which only grammaticalises a subpart of the meaning of the imperfective’ (cf. Dahl 1985: 92–3). At this point, it is also worthwhile to
mention Dahl’s (1999a: 32) observation that the grammatical category of progressivity tends to develop into the grammatical category of imperfectivity.

A different polysemous approach towards grammatical aspect is related to the concept of phases (cf. Bogusławski 2003: 64). It is believed that the first linguist to carry out detailed study of the concept of phase and to introduce the fundamental notions associated with it was Guillaume (Binnick 1991: 197, Hewson 2012: 508). For him, the event consists of two phases: the beginning and the end phases. This idea has been developed further by Hewson and Bubenik (1997: 14), who included three additional points. Consequently, they proposed the following phasic structure of events:

\[ \text{A} [\text{B} \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \text{C} \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \text{D}] \text{E} \]

**Fig. 1.4.1.2** Event time (Hewson & Bubenik 1997: 14)

The above figure consists of five points (A, B, C, D, and E), which represent the position of the subject (Hewson & Bubenik 1997: 14). Furthermore, the square brackets represent the boundaries of the event. It should be noted that two points (A and E) are located outside the brackets. Point A is located *before* the event, whereas point E is located *after* the event. According to Hewson and Bubenik (1997: 14) the former point illustrates the so-called *Prospective* aspect, for the event has not happened yet – it is still a ‘prospect’. On the other hand, the latter point represents the *Retrospective* aspect, as the event has already terminated.

The remaining three points are located inside the square brackets and represent different phases of the event. Point B represents the beginning phase of the event, point C stands for the middle phase of the event, whereas point D represents the final phase of the event (i.e. completion). These three phases are lingually referred to by means of the *inceptive, imperfective, and perfective* aspects respectively.

A similar structure of an event has been proposed by Stawnicka (2007: 32), who also distinguishes two external phases, which she calls *przedinicjalna* ‘preinitial’ (being anterior to the beginning point of the event) and *postterminalna* ‘postterminal’ (being posterior to the endpoint of the event), and three internal phases: *inicjalna* ‘initial’, *intraterminalna* ‘intraterminal’, and *finalna* ‘final’ phases (see also Binnick 1991, Bubenik 2011, McDonald 2011, Lisczyk-Kubina 2015).

As regards the polysemous approaches, it should be noted that some linguists distinguish two kinds of functions (Kuryłowicz 1964: 14, Hewson 2012: 512) or meanings (see Stawnicka 2007: 31, Bańczerowski & Oueslati 2017: 24). They call them:
Primary meanings/functions, and

Secondary meanings/functions.

The former are explained as system-conditioned (Kuryłowicz 1964: 14), as the least context-dependent (Stawnicka 2007: 31), or as textually unconditioned (Bańczerowski & Oueslati 2017: 18). They are contrasted with the latter, which are conceived of as textually or contextually conditioned. Interestingly, Hewson (2012: 512) argues that a lingual unit should be assigned to a (grammatical) category based on its primary (and never on its secondary) function. To support his claim he says that ‘if I use a kitchen knife as a screwdriver, I still return it to the kitchen drawer with the cutlery; I do not describe it as a screwdriver and put it in the toolkit. It is still a knife; it has not changed category because of a secondary function.’

To close this section, a few words must be devoted to the perfect. As has already been mentioned, the question of whether perfect is an aspectual category, a temporal category, an immediate (tense) category or something unclassifiable (Dahl 1999b: 290) remains controversial and open (Ritz 2012: 885–8). Consequently, although it is traditionally conceived of as a grammatical aspect, it is emphasised that the meanings signified by perfect verb forms differ essentially in their nature from the aspectual meanings signified by imperfective and perfective verb forms (Comrie 1976: 52). Nonetheless, since our research focuses on the signification of completion in Modern Greek, we shall leave the question regarding the status of the perfect unanswered. More detailed information can be found, for instance, in Comrie (1976), McCoard (1978), Dahl (1985, 1999b), Huddleston (1988), Klein (1992, 2009), Vlach (1993), Kiparsky (2008), Katz (2003), Portner (2003), Ritz (2007), de Swart (2007), Mittwoch (2008), and others.

1.4.2 Telicity

Having discussed grammatical aspect, the next aspectually relevant concepts to be tackled are telicity (see below) and lexical aspect (see the next section). First, however, a few clarifications regarding the notion of event must be made.

In aspectological tradition the term event is used with two senses: a broad and a narrow one. In the broad sense, an event is perceived as any fragment of extra-lingual reality (regardless of whether it is a state or a non-state). Consequently, every sentence designates an event. Furthermore, it must be observed that the term in its broad sense is used differently than in the ordinary language (Bogusławski 2003: 41f.). According to this approach, states are considered events as well. The notion of event in its broad sense is also known as situation (e.g. Comrie 1976, Barwise & Perry 1983, Binnick 1991, Sahoo 2012) or eventuality (e.g. Bach 1981, Borik
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2002, Rothstein 2008). On the other hand, event in its narrow sense refers solely to these fragments of extra-lingual reality which involve change of state – are dynamic (non-static). The notion of event in its narrow sense is also known in aspectology as performance (Kenny 1963, Mourelatos 1978) or transition (Pustejovsky 1991, Koseska-Toszewa & Mazurkiewicz 1994).

Going further, one must distinguish between an ontological event – i.e. the fragment of extra-lingual reality – and a lingual event – i.e. the lingual conceptualisation of such fragment of extra-lingual reality. It is the latter which is designated by the sentence. For the purposes of this dissertation we shall use the term event in its broad sense. Moreover, it will be used when referring to a lingual event (i.e. the lingual conceptualisation of a fragment of extra-lingual reality). Ontological events will be referred to as fragments of extra-lingual reality.

There are two main approaches to events, called model theory and event-based theory (which includes a radical form called Situation Semantics) (Binnick 1991: 320). However, these theories are not discussed in the present dissertation. More information relating to events may be found in, for instance, Davidson (1967), Mourelatos (1978), Bach (1986, 2005), Binnick (1991), Tenny & Pustejovsky (2000), Ruotsalo & Hyvönen (2007), and Filip (2012).

To proceed to the crux of this section, that is telicity, it is generally agreed among linguists that telicity is distinguished for the first time in antiquity by Aristotle in his Metaphysics (see section 1.1.1). The philosopher classifies verbs into kinesis and energeia based on their semantic properties. Unfortunately, since Aristotle’s classification of verbs was not developed by his successors, telicity was distinguished again no earlier than the 19th century, by Diez in Grammatik der Romanischen Sprachen, published in 1876. Based on diachronic studies of the passive voice in Modern Romance languages, Diez distinguished two verb classes: i) perfective verbs, which either designate a momentous event or possess a final aim (e.g. to catch, to surprise, to end, to kill, to make, to bring about, to beat), and ii) imperfective verbs, which do not possess any final aim or endpoint (e.g. to love, to hate, to blame, to see) (Jespersen 1924: 272f.). Diez’s classification was further elaborated in 1906 in Om adjectivering af particip by Lindroth, who divided perfective verbs into terminative and resultative (Jespersen 1924: 273). Nonetheless, it must be observed that telicity did not gain popularity among linguists until 1957, when Garey’s article Verbal aspect in French was published. Interestingly, Garey does not refer in his work to any of his predecessors.

In the aspectological literature, telicity is approached from two perspectives. The first perspective involves Aristotle’s notion of telos ‘goal’ (see section 1.1.1) and, therefore, it will be called the goal-oriented approach. It is assumed in this approach that verbs, verb phrases and sentences are telic if they ‘express an action tending towards a goal’, whereas they are
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atelic if they ‘do not have to wait for a goal for their realisation, but are realised as soon as they begin’ (Garey 1957: 106). It is thus assumed that telicity is related to the possession of a goal, aim, endpoint, termination point, culmination point, etc. (see also Jespersen 1924, Comrie 1976, Dahl 1985, Krifka 1989, Binnick 1991, Smith 1997, Filip 1999, and others). For Borik (2002: 37–47), one of the drawbacks of the goal-oriented approach is the lack of a precise definition of notions such as goal, endpoint, culmination or termination point, etc.

The second approach towards telicity was initiated by Vendler (1957: 146), who observed that atelic actions (e.g. running or driving) ‘go on in time in a homogeneous way; any part of a process in question is of the same nature as the whole’. Vendler’s idea was further developed by Bennet and Partee (2004: 14) who define homogeneity based on subinterval properties. According to their account, if a sentence is true at some temporal interval $I$ and, simultaneously, it is true at every temporal subinterval of $I$, the sentence is atelic. Furthermore, it is sometimes assumed within this approach that atelic events are divisible, on the one hand, and cumulative, on the other (see Hinrichs 1985: 33f.; cf. Borik 2002: 49–51). One of the issues under this approach is the question of whether each of the subevents of an atelic event is itself homogeneous. For instance, the event of running includes subevents such as moving the right foot upward and moving the right foot downward. Based on the assumptions made in this approach, both subevents should be considered homogeneous, which seems to go against common sense (see Verkuyl 1993, Filip 1999).

To continue, it is generally agreed among aspectologists that telicity is a semantic category (Borik & Reinhart 2004: 13, Filip 2012: 721) which is not typically grammaticalised in the languages of the world (van Hout & de Swart & Verkuyl 2005: 11). That is to say, it is not a morphological category. Furthermore, telicity is a classifying category. Unfortunately, the question of what kind of lingual objects is classified remains controversial. Initially telicity was considered a semantic property of a verb. This means that verbs were classified as telic or atelic depending on whether or not their imperfective verb forms signify the realisation or completeness of an action (see Garey 1957: 106). On the other hand, it has been observed that some atelic verbs may be transformed into telic verbs by the addition of a direct object. Therefore, although the verb read is atelic, the verb phrase read the book is telic. On the other hand, not all atelic verbs can be made telic. For instance, both the verb push and the verb phrase push a cart are atelic (Dowty 1979: 58, Borik & Reinhart 2004: 13; see also Vendler 1957:
Furthermore, Verkuyl (1993: 5ff.) observes that telicity⁹ is sensitive to quantity. That is to say, the quantitative properties of arguments taken by the verb determine whether a verb phrase is telic or atelic. Consequently, as he argues, in order to classify verb phrases properly, one must not focus solely on the semantic properties of the verb, but should also consider the quantitative properties of its arguments (i.e. of its subject, direct object, and (more rarely) indirect object). If any of the arguments taken by the verb is quantitatively unspecified, then the verb phrase is atelic. Finally, according to Smith (1997: 3ff.) telicity is a property of the event and not of the verb, verb phrase, predicate phrase, or sentence (see also Borik 2002: 25). This property, however, is reflected in the structure of the sentence designating the event.

Since telicity is a semantic category which seems not to be typically grammaticalised in the languages of the world, linguists propose a range of tests for telicity. Three major kinds of tests for telicity may be distinguished:

- prepositional tests,
- implicational tests, and
- quantitative tests.

The first kind (i.e. the prepositional test) was introduced by Vendler (1957), who observed that a group of verbs or verb phrases may be followed by temporal phrases with the preposition *in* (i.e. *in*-PPs) – e.g. *in an hour, in two days*, etc. – but are marginally acceptable with temporal phrases with the preposition *for* (i.e. *for*-PPs) – e.g. *for an hour, for two days*, etc. Simultaneously, other verbs or verb phrases are compatible with the *for*-PPs, but are marginally acceptable with the *in*-PPs. The former are considered telic, whereas the latter are considered atelic (see also Dowty 1979: 56f., Hinrichs 1985: 15f., Binnick 1991: 190, Filip 2012: 737, and others). For instance:

(1.4.2.1)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. John ran for an hour/??in an hour.} & \quad \text{[ATELIC]} \\
\text{b. John ran a mile ??for an hour/in an hour.} & \quad \text{[TELIC]}
\end{align*}

The second kind of test for telicity is based on logical implication (\(p \rightarrow q\)). Interestingly, although the origins of this kind of test for telicity may be traced back to Aristotle (see p. 15), it was introduced into modern linguistics no earlier than the second half of the 20th century by Kenny (1963: 121). It must be noted that Kenny’s test was originally proposed to distinguish

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⁹ Which he calls *(inner)* aspect. Additionally, Verkuyl’s *terminative* and *durative* correspond to *telic* and *atelic* respectively (1972, 1993, 1999).
activities from performances (see the next section). However, as has been argued (e.g. by Smith 1997: 20), activities differ from performances (i.e. accomplishments and achievements) in respect of their telic and atelic properties. Consequently, Kenny’s test may be adopted as a test for telicity (e.g. Taylor 1977: 205, Borik 2002: 24f.). An implicational test may have the following form, for instance:

\[ (1.4.2.2) \]
\[ \text{a. A verb phrase is atelic iff “A is } \theta \text{-ing” implies “A has } \theta \text{-ed”}. } \]
\[ \text{b. “John is running” implies “John has run” } \]
\[ \text{ergo: the verb phrase run is atelic} \]

\[ (1.4.2.3) \]
\[ \text{a. A verb phrase is telic iff “A is } \theta \text{-ing” implies “A has not } \theta \text{-ed”}. } \]
\[ \text{b. “John is running a mile” implies “John has not run a mile” } \]
\[ \text{ergo: the verb phrase run a mile is telic} \]

It should be noted that, although implicational tests may differ one from another (cf. Garey 1957, Taylor 1977, Dowty 1979, Borik 2002, Trąba 2017, and others), each of them seems to originate from logical implication.

The third kind of test for telicity is proposed by Mourelatos (1978: 424ff.), who observes that atelic verbs do not combine easily with quantifying phrases like \textit{three times}, whereas telic verbs are hardly compatible with quantifying phrases like \textit{a lot}. Consequently, Mourelatos arrived at the conclusion that atelic verbs resemble uncountable nouns, whereas telic verbs resemble countable nouns:

\[ (1.4.2.4) \]
\[ \text{a. Vesuvius erupted three times/*a lot. } \]
\[ \text{b. John slept *three times/a lot last night.} \]

At this point, it must be observed that the above-proposed tests for telicity seem not to be cross-lingually valid. This may be because, for instance, the fixed structure of a test makes it difficult to adapt to other languages, or that the results are simply invalid for a specific language (see, for instance, Borik (2002: 27–30) for Russian and Sioupi (2009) for Modern Greek).

1.4.3 Lexical aspect

The notion of lexical aspect (also known as \textit{Aktionsart}, aspectual classes, types of events, situation-type aspect, etc.) was introduced into modern linguistics in the mid-20th century by three scholars: Gilbert Ryle (2009 [1949]), Zenon Vendler (1957), and Anthony Kenny (1963). From that time onwards, linguists have generally agreed to conceive of lexical aspect as a set of classes. However, there are two widely discussed issues:
Chapter 1 – Aspect: setting the scene

- What kind of lingual objects (i.e. lingual units or events) are classified; and
- How many classes of lexical aspect are to be distinguished.

Notably, the former issue is shared by both lexical aspect and telicity (see p. 41). Initially, Ryle, Vendler, and Kenny classified verbs and verb phrases based on, among others, their morphological and syntactic features. For instance, Vendler (1957: 144ff.) claims that stative verbs do not typically have progressive forms (e.g. *I am knowing), activities are hardly compatible with temporal in-PPs (e.g. *I was running in two hours), whereas accomplishments and achievements are hardly compatible with temporal for-PPs (e.g. *I found for two hours). Other linguists who conceive of lexical aspect as a set of verb classes include Potts and Taylor (1965: 65), Taylor (1977: 205), and Dowty (1979: 51ff.).

On the other hand, lexical aspect may be perceived as a set of classes composed of events (e.g. Tenny & Pustejovsky 2000: 5ff.). Interestingly, Smith (1997: 16f.) does not draw a clear line between the classification of lingual units (mostly sentences) and the classification of events. In her view, a fragment of extra-lingual reality is conceptualised by the speaker as an event possessing certain properties. These properties are reflected in the structure of the sentence. Therefore, if an event possesses a particular combination of temporal properties, then the sentence designating that event should signify the identical combination of temporal properties. Thus, an activity sentence signifies the temporal properties of an activity event, whereas the temporal properties of a stative event are signified by a stative sentence.

To proceed to the other issue, the number of classes of lexical aspect seems to vary between aspectologists. Consequently, one may find approaches in which only two classes are distinguished (e.g. Koseska-Toszewa and Mazurkiewicz 1994). Other linguists speak of three classes (e.g. Kenny 1963), four classes (e.g. Vendler 1957, Mourelatos 1978), five classes (Sasse 1991, Smith 1997), or seven classes (Laskowski 1998). A few selected approaches are presented below.

To begin with Koseska-Toszewa and Mazurkiewicz’s (1994) approach, they base their analysis on the Petri Net, invented in 1962 by Carl Adam Petri. The Petri Net was initially a graphical schema for design issues in communication and computer studies, but it soon turned out to be a useful model for other scientific fields such as biology, physics, astronomy and sociology (Butt & Tantos 2004: 128). Returning to Koseska-Toszewa and Mazurkiewicz’s approach, they assumed that extra-lingual reality must resemble the Petri Net. Thus, since the Petri Net constitutes a bipartite graph (there are nodes of only two kinds), extra-lingual reality must be bipartite as well. This means that there are only two types of events: states and
transitions. Additionally, it is assumed that two adjacent states are bound by the relation of contradiction. The boundary between adjacent states is called transition. On this basis, Koseska-Toszewa and Mazurkiewicz consider transitions to be truly non-durative events (cf. Bogusławski 2003: 20).

The most influential approach towards lexical aspect would appear to be that proposed by Vendler (1957). He distinguishes four verb classes: states, activities, accomplishments, and achievements (cf. Kenny 1963: 120–2). Vendler’s classification is sometimes complemented by a fifth class – the so-called semelfactives (Comrie 1976: 42, Smith 1997: 3). According to this approach, the distinction of states and non-states (which we call actions) is considered the most fundamental (Binnick 1991: 183, Tenny & Pustejovsky 2000: 5). States are perceived as static and homogeneous events which do not involve any change throughout their duration (Binnick 1991: 183). Furthermore, they are persistent, non-volitional and non-agentive. This means that states do not require maintenance or a continuous input of energy (Comrie 1976: 49). Moreover, states typically do not consist of gaps or phases (Binnick 1991: 184–194). On the other hand, actions are volitional (cf. Davidson 1968: 86), agentive and dynamic, because they require a continuous input of energy in order to continue (Comrie 1976: 49). Additionally, they may (although not necessarily) consist of phases, and they may involve a change of state. Activities are sometimes perceived as gap-ridden (Binnick 1991: 185).

Going further, actions (i.e. non-states) are divided into activities (also known as processes) and performances (also known as transitions or events). The former are perceived as events ‘consisting of successive phases following one another in time’ (Vendler 1957: 144). Furthermore, they are durative and their time extent is inherently indefinite (Mourelatos 1978: 416). Additionally, activities are considered atelic. Consequently, on the one hand they do not involve any goal (termination point, endpoint, etc.), and on the other they are perceived as homogeneous. As regards performances, Dowty (1979: 62) asserts that, in contrast to activities, they are resultative – that is, they involve a change of state (see also Filip 2012: 729). Moreover, they may (although not obligatorily) be durative. Furthermore, since they are telic, performances entail a fixed goal (termination point, endpoint, etc.) (Filip 2012: 729). A weakness of any claim that performances should be heterogeneous is that momentous events (which represent performances) may not be conceived of as a sequence of subevents and, therefore, can hardly be perceived as heterogeneous.

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20 We have some reservations about the ‘gap-riddenness’ of actions, since momentous (sometimes also called instantaneous or punctual) events are also classified as actions, although they do not allow gaps.
Furthermore, performances are divided into accomplishments and achievements, based on their durational properties. The former are perceived as referring to the final stage of telic events. Furthermore, since they are durative, they achieve their goal gradually (in phases). On the other hand, achievements are momentous (instantaneous or punctual). This means that they have a minimal duration. Mourelatos states that achievements ‘can be dated, or they can be indefinitely placed within a temporal stretch, but they cannot in themselves occur over or through a temporal stretch. (They do, however, “take” time [...]’ Accomplishments, by contrast, have duration intrinsically’ (1978: 416).

Finally, semelfactives are perceived as the simplest type of events, which consist of a single phase. Consequently, they are momentous, atelic and do not involve any change of state other than their occurrence (Smith 1997: 29). Moreover, semelfactive events occur once and only once. Examples of semelfactive events are a single cough, a single knock on the door, a single blink of an eye. It must be noticed that some languages have developed affixes signifying semelfactivity – e.g. Polish -ń- in kichnąć ‘to cough once’ (cf. kichać ‘to cough more than once’), Russian -nu- in kaśłjnut’ ‘to cough once’ (cf. kaśljat’ ‘cough more than once’) (Comrie 1976: 43, Dahl 1999a: 31, Dickey 2001, Kreja 1956).

As regards tests for Vendler’s lexical aspect, some of them are presented by Dowty (1979: 60) in the form of the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Accomplishments</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. meets non-stative tests:</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. has habitual interpretation in simple present tense:</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ø for an hour, spend an hour øing</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ø in an hour, take an hour to ø.</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ø for an hour entails ø at all times in the hour:</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>d.n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. x is øing entails x has øed</td>
<td>d.n.a.</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>d.n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. complement of stop:</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. complement of finish:</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ambiguity with almost:</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 The table contains the original terms used by Dowty.

22 According to some non-stative tests, achievements resemble states, while according to other non-stative tests, they resemble non-states (Dowty 1979: 130).
10. *x øed in an hour* entails *x was øing during that hour.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. occurs with studiously, attentively, carefully, etc.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d.n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OK = the sentence is grammatical, semantically normal  
d.n.a = the sentence is ungrammatical, semantically anomalous  
bad = the test does not apply to verbs of this class.

**Table 1.4.3.1.** Example tests and their results for each type of events (Dowty 1979: 60)

The last classification we shall discuss is that of Sasse (1991), who assumes that every event must necessarily consist of three phases (cf. Hewson & Bubenik 1997): beginning, middle and end. Verbs may be classified according to which phase or phases of the event they may signify. As a result, Sasse distinguishes five classes: total statives, inchoative statives, activities, gradual terminatives and total terminatives. Total statives may refer solely to the middle phase of the event (e.g. *to have*), whereas inchoative statives may refer to the beginning and to the middle phases of the event (e.g. *to sit*). Furthermore, activities may refer to all three phases of the event (e.g. *to run*); gradual terminatives may refer to the middle and to the end phases of the event (e.g. *to freeze*). Finally, total terminatives may refer solely to the end phase of the event (e.g. *to find*). Sasse’s classes are presented in Table 1.4.3.3, where SV\(_1\) represents the first phase, S the middle phase and SV\(_2\) the end phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total statives</th>
<th>SV(_1)</th>
<th>[S]</th>
<th>SV(_2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inchoative statives</td>
<td>[SV(_1)]</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>SV(_2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>[SV(_1)]</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>SV(_2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradual terminatives</td>
<td>SV(_1)</td>
<td>[S]</td>
<td>SV(_2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total terminatives</td>
<td>SV(_1)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>[SV(_2)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.4.3.2.** Sasse’s phasic classification (Sasse 1991: 5)

To summarise, it should be recalled that the first considerations regarding time, tense, and aspect may be traced back to antiquity. Nonetheless, intense linguistic study of these concepts began no earlier than the late 19\(^{th}\) century. From that time on, linguists have proposed a great number of theories concerning tense and aspect, as well as their relationship with other verb categories (e.g. modality, voice). The purpose of this chapter was briefly to review some of these theories and to present selected trends in contemporary linguistics. It is noteworthy that
these approaches are also found in Greek linguistics, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 2

Approaches towards aspect in Modern Greek

Having presented selected approaches to tense and aspect in general linguistics, some words should be said about these concepts in Modern Greek linguistics\(^1\). We will begin with some remarks on Modern Greek terminology. Next, several approaches to Modern Greek tense and aspect will be briefly reviewed. In the case of aspect, focus will be given to the classification of lingual units and the signification of aspectual meanings.

2.1 A remark on terminology

To begin with, it should be noted that Modern Greek linguistics lacks a uniform and generally agreed upon terminological apparatus regarding notions such as time, tense, and aspect. This claim is supported on the one hand by the polysemy and on the other hand by the diversity of the Modern Greek terms related to these notions.

To give an example, the Modern Greek term *hronos* may refer to *time* and *tense* (see Chapter 1). Moreover, it may be conceived of as a family of sets (i.e. a set of sets) of verb forms being classified based on their morphological or semantic features. Additionally, *hronos* may refer to a set of temporal meanings (e.g. present, past, and future).

In order to avoid the aforementioned polysemy of the term *hronos*, Klairis and Mpampiniotis (2005: 448f.) distinguish the following:

- *pragmatikos hronos* (`real time`), which seems to correspond to the English term *time*;

\(^1\) By *Modern Greek linguistics* we understand a class of linguistic theories on the Modern Greek language.
• *rimatikos hronos* (‘verb time’), which is used to refer to a family of sets of verb forms classified in respect to their morphological or semantic features; and
• *gramatikos hronos*\(^2\) (‘grammatical time’), which is considered as the act of locating events at a certain point on the time axis by the verb form\(^3\) (see later in this chapter).

Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, Klairis and Mpampiniotis tend to use in their grammar of Modern Greek the ‘bare’ term *hronos*. Consequently, it is not always clear to which kind of *hronos* the authors refer. Furthermore, Klairis and Mpampiniotis distinguish three *hronikes vathmìdes* (‘temporal grades’) (cf. Tzartzanos 1963a, Moser 2009), which seem to correspond to the notion that we call temporal meanings (see Chapter 1.2). These *hronikies vathmìdes* are *paron* ‘present’, *parelthon* ‘past’, and *melon* ‘future’ (see also Katsouda 2008: 166).

As regards the diversity of Modern Greek aspectological terminology, one should take a look at *aspect* itself. For instance, Tzartzanos (1963a: 256) refers to this notion as *tropos tis emfaniseos* (‘way of occurrence’), Klairis and Mpampiniotis (2005: 435ff.), Katsouda (2008: 165ff.) use the term *pion energias* (‘type of action’), Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis (2006: 322ff.) prefer the term *rimatiki apopsi* (‘verb aspect’), Moser (2009: 44ff.) the term *apopsi* (‘aspect’), whereas Dosi (2016: 1ff.) employs the term *gramatiki opsi* (‘grammatical aspect’).

Similarly, *perfective* and *imperfective* are referred to with pairs of terms such as:
• *telio* and *ateles* (Klairis & Mpampiniotis 2005: 435ff.);
• *sinoptiko* and *mi sinoptiko* (Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006: 328ff., Kastouda 2008: 166, Moser 2009: 63ff., Dosi 2016: 5ff.);
• *oriothetimeno* and *mi oriothetimeno* (Horrocks & Stavrou 2003b: 289ff.\(^4\));
• and others.

Since the present thesis is written in English, the ambiguity of the Modern Greek terms is of secondary significance. Consequently, this subject is not discussed further. A more detailed review of Modern Greek aspectological terminology may be found in, for instance, Tsangalidis (2014).

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\(^2\) cf. Moser’s (2009: 44-61) *gramatikos hronos* (‘grammatical time’).

\(^3\) ‘η τοποθέτηση των γεγονότων σε κάποιο σημείο του χρονικού αξόνα μέσω των ρηματικών τύπων ονομάζεται γραμματικός χρόνος’ (Klairis & Mpampiniotis 2005: 448).

\(^4\) It should be emphasised that Horrocks and Stavrou (2003b) restrict the terms (mi) *sinoptikos* to verb forms and (mi) *oriothetimeno* to meanings.
It should be kept in mind that the objective of the present chapter is to familiarise the reader with various approaches to time, tense, and aspect proposed within Modern Greek linguistics. However, due to the aforementioned ambiguity and diversity of terms related to these notions, a unification of the terminological apparatus seems necessary as a lack of this may cause a significant decline in the clarity of the presented thoughts. Certainly, some concepts or thoughts on time, tense, and aspect in Modern Greek may be misconceived due to the lack of unification, especially given that adequate and possibly equivalent English translations of the Modern Greek terms have to be found. Nonetheless, we will do our best to present the selected approaches as close to their original form as possible.

2.2 Tenses in Modern Greek

The approaches to time and tense proposed within Modern Greek linguistics seem to be consistent with the concepts described in the previous chapter. That is to say, time is conceived of as the fourth dimension. Moreover, it is comprised of smaller units, which are called temporal intervals (Psaltou-Joycey 1991: 9).

Time, as the fourth dimension, is conceptualised in people’s mind as:

- a line or
- a circle.

In the case of the former, time is conceived of as a straight line called the time axis. This time axis points right or left, and it stretches infinitely in both directions. Time can also be conceived of as a circle. Consequently, it has neither beginning nor endpoint\(^5\) (Moser 2013: 103f.). To the best of our knowledge, it is the linear concept of time which dominates in Modern Greek linguistics (see Psaltou-Joycey 1991, Moser 1994a, 2009, 2014, Hewson & Bubenik 1997, Klairis & Mpampiniotis 2005, and others).

As regards tense in Modern Greek, it seems to be approached from three different perspectives. The first of these may be referred to as a traditional approach (cf. Chapter 1.1). According to this approach:

\[\text{ΟΙ χρόνοι του ρήματος είναι τύποι ρηματικοί ή περιφράσεις ρηματικές, που φανερώνουν πρώτα τη χρονική βαθμίδα, [...], ήτοι τύποι που φανερώνουν τo παρελθόν, τo παρόν, τo μέλλον [...] και δεύτερο τον τρόπο της εμφανήσεως}\]

\(^5\) Cf. Boguslawski’s (2003: 64/65) concept of the spherical nature of events.
Following the above extract, tenses of the verb are conceived of as verb forms or verb phrases signifying certain temporal meanings (i.e. *hronikes vathmiées* ‘temporal grades’) and aspectual meanings (i.e. *tropus emfaniseos* ‘ways of occurrence’) (see also Katsouda 2008: 165). Importantly, according to this approach the term *tense* may refer solely to indicative verb forms or verb phrases and never to verb forms or verb phrases of other moods (e.g. imperative, conjunctive, etc.) (Katsouda 2008: 167). At the same time, however, tenses may be used to form verb forms and verb phrases of moods other than indicative. For instance, the verb form belonging to the imperfect tense *egrafa* ‘I was reading’ is used to form the modal verb form *tha egrafa* ‘I would write’. Noticeably, although the morphological unit *egrafa* is shared by both the indicative and modal forms, they signify different temporal and aspectual meanings (Tzartzanos 1963a: 257f.).

Based on these assumptions, Tzartzanos (1963a: 256) distinguishes eight Modern Greek tenses of the verb (cf. Hedin 1995: 233):

- **enestotas** (Præsens), e.g. *grafo* ‘I write’, *erhome* ‘I come’;
- **paratatikos** (Imperfect), e.g. *egrafa* ‘I was writing’, *erhomuna* ‘I was coming’;
- **aoristos** (Aorist), e.g. *egrapsa* ‘I wrote’, *irtha* ‘I came’;
- **parakimenos** (Perfect), e.g. *eho grapsi* ‘I have written’, *eho erthi* ‘I have come’;
- **ipersindelikos** (Pluperfect), e.g. *iha grapsi* ‘I had written’, *iha erthi* ‘I had come’;
- **aplos melondas I** (Futurum primum), e.g. *tha graf* ‘I will be writing/I will write’, *tha erhome* ‘I will be coming/I will come’;
- **aplos melondas II** (Futurum exactum), e.g. *tha grapso* ‘I will write’, *tha ertho* ‘I will come’; and
- **tetelezmenos melondas** (Futurum perfecti), e.g. *tha eho grapsi* ‘I will have written’, *tha eho erthi* ‘I will have come’.

In our opinion, the strongest advantage of this approach is that it makes a clear terminological distinction between morphological units (i.e. verb forms and verb phrases) and semantic units (i.e. temporal and aspectual meanings). Consequently, temporal meanings are referred to with the terms: *paron* (present), *parelthon* (past), and *melon* (future), whereas

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6 Tenses of the verb are verb forms or verb phrases that firstly show temporal grade, […], that is forms which show past, present, and future […], and secondly the way of the occurrence of an action […], that is development or duration, restriction or wholeness (completion) of the action.
aspectual meanings are referred to with the terms *ekselisomenos/diarkis* (progressive/durative), *sinoptikos* (perfective), and *tetelezmenos* (perfect). On the other hand, if one wants to refer to verb forms or verb phrases, then he or she uses the terms listed above. This being said, the verb form *grafo* ‘I write’ may be characterized as *enestotas* in respect to tense, as *paron* in respect to its temporal meaning, and as *ekselisomenos* in respect to its aspectual meaning.

On this basis, Tzartzanos proposes the following table of Modern Greek verb tenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenses</th>
<th>Temporal grade in which the action is placed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imperfect</td>
<td><em>Imperfect</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>egrafa</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfect</td>
<td><em>Aorist</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>egrapsa</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfect</td>
<td><em>Pluperfect</em></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfect</td>
<td><em>Perfect</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.2.1.** Tenses in Modern Greek (based on Tzartzanos 1963a: 258).

At this very moment, Tzartzanos’s concept of tense has been presented as clearly distinguishing between morphological and semantic objects. Consequently, it seems that the scholar classifies verb forms and verb phrases of a verb into tenses based on their temporal and aspectual meanings. This claim is supported by the observation that Tzartzanos considers verb forms like *eho grapsi* ‘I have written’ and *eho grameno* ‘I have written’ as the same tense. The differences in their morphological structure is ignored. Additionally, these verb forms are claimed to signify simultaneously the past and present temporal meanings (see Table 2.2.1).

On the other hand, it should be noted that Tzartzanos distinguishes two types of *Praesens* (i.e. *Enestotas*): one that is formed on the basis of the imperfective stem (see *pijeno* ‘I go’) and one that is formed based on the perfective stem (see *pao* ‘I go’). However, to the best of our
knowledge, *pijeno* ‘I go’ and *pao* ‘I go’ are synonymous in Standard Modern Greek\(^7\). That is to say, they may be used interchangeably in a sentence. Consequently, it appears that Tzartzanos’s classification of verb forms and verb phrases into tenses is not based solely on the temporal and the aspectual meanings signified by them. Their morphological structure is also taken into consideration.

Given the above, the classification in question seems to be inconsistent. On the one hand, *eho grapsi* ‘I have written’ and *eho grameno* ‘I have written’ are conceived of as the perfect tense of the verb *grafo* ‘I write’. The differences in their morphological structure is of lesser significance. On the other hand, *pijeno* ‘I go’ and *pao* ‘I go’ are different tenses due to the differences in their morphological structure. The similarity in respect to the temporal and the aspectual meanings signified by them is ignored. This being said, the following questions arise:

- Why are these verb forms and verb phrases treated differently?
- Why is the difference in morphological structure sometimes sufficient for a distinction of two or more tenses and sometimes not?

Unfortunately, Tzartzanos offers no answers to these questions.

To close, approaches similar to the one presented above may be found in a range of descriptions of Modern Greek grammar (see Tsangalidis 2014). In such descriptions, Tzartzanos’s term *tenses* (gr. *hronos* – understood as verb forms or verb phrases signifying particular temporal and aspectual meanings) corresponds to other linguists’ *verb tenses* (gr. *rimatiki hroni*) (e.g. Klairis & Mpampiniotis 2005: 449, Pappafiliopou 2017: 895) or *tense aspect forms/categories* (Hedin 1995: 233). Furthermore, it is generally agreed that eight traditional tenses are distinguished. The list of these tenses has already been given (see p. 52). However, this list is sometimes complemented with two additional tenses: Past Future and Past Future Perfect, giving as a result a set of ten ‘*indicative tense aspect categories*’ (Hedin 1995: 233).

A different approach to tense focuses on the temporal and never the aspectual properties of an event. Consequently, the number of tenses distinguished within this approach varies between two (i.e. past and non-past) and three (i.e. present, past, and future) (cf. Howeson and Bubenik 1997: 249–64). To the best of our knowledge, this approach to tense dominates in contemporary Modern Greek linguistics.

As regards the conception of tense in the second approach, for Klairis and Mpampiniotis (2005: 447) ‘*χρόνο* ονομάζουμε την τοποθέτηση του κάθε γεγονότος (ενέργειας ή κατάστασης)\(^7\) Dialectical uses of these forms and their etymology are not considered.
σε ένα σημείο του χρονικού άξονα (παρελθόν, παρόν, μέλλον). That is to say, tense is an act of assigning to an event a temporal property of being present, past, or future. Such a temporal property assigned to an event may then be expressed lingually with the usage of an appropriate verb form. The expression of temporal properties of an event by the verb form is called grammatical tense (gr. gramatikos hronos) (cf. Moser 2009: 56). Importantly, Klairis and Mpampiniotis (2005: 448) believe that grammatical tense is restricted mostly to indicative verb forms.

On the basis of the above extract, tense seems to be conceived of as a relation that binds an event with its temporal property. In other words, according to Klairis and Mpampiniotis (2005: 448), tense temporalises an event. Following this train of thought, for them, grammatical tense is a ternary relation that binds verb forms, events, and temporal properties of this event in such a way that the verb form assigns to the event a temporal property. Thus, grammatical tense is understood as a temporalisation of an event by a verb form. Nonetheless, we have some reservations about whether temporal properties may be assigned to an event by a verb form. For us, it goes the other way around – verb forms reflect the temporal properties (already) possessed by the designated event.

A different approach is adopted by, for instance, Moser (2013: 104). According to her, tense is a grammatical category of the verb that expresses the location (mostly in respect to the moment of speaking) of an event on the time axis. Therefore, tense is a grammatical category of the verb that expresses temporal meanings.

It should be kept in mind that temporal meanings may be signified not only via grammatical but also via lexical means (Psaltou-Joycey 1991: 18, Moser 2009: 46ff.). Moreover, these meanings may be signified by lingual units of various sizes and kinds. At the same time, it is claimed by Panitsa (2010: 37) that not every temporal meaning is morphologically marked. She mentions as an example the temporal meaning of present, which she claims is signified by no independent morpheme of Modern Greek. This is because Panitsa does not consider in her research the existence of zero morphemes.

As regards the number of tenses distinguished within the non-traditional approach, linguists mention either two tenses: past and non-past (e.g. Psaltou-Joycey 1991, Alexiadou 1994, Xydopoulos 1996, Kitis & Tsangalidis 2005) or three tenses: past, present, and future (e.g. Rivero 1992, Klairis & Mpampiniotis 2005, Moser 2009, Tsangalidis 2014). Interestingly

---

8 What we call tense is the act of locating every event (state or activity) on some point of the time axis (past, present, future).
enough, Hewson and Bubenik (1997: 249-64) also distinguish three Modern Greek tenses – namely, past, non-past, and future. Their distinction seems to be based on the morphological structure of verb forms. However, the question arises whether the term present tense would be more appropriate than non-past tense. Otherwise, the difference between the non-past and future is not clear: are they two completely different tenses, or should the future be considered merely as a special kind of non-past?

One of the consequences of the non-traditional approach is that the term tense is used in two senses. Firstly, it may refer to temporal meanings. Secondly, it may refer to a grammatical category. These senses are usually graphically distinguished from one another. If a term refers to the grammatical category of tense, then it is capitalised (e.g. Future Tense, Non-Past Tense). However, if a term refers to a temporal meaning, then it is not capitalised (e.g. future tense, non-past tense) (see Rivero 1992, Hewson & Bubenik 1997, Makropoulos 2009). Nonetheless, as discussed in the previous chapter (see 1.4.1), such a graphic distinction between Tense and tense may be found to be insufficient, because its use is by default restricted to written texts and can hardly be employed in oral presentations.

Finally, the third approach is proposed by Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis (2006: 328ff.), who adapt Reinhart’s method of analysing tenses. As a result, they analyse verb forms based on the relation of simultaneity, anteriority, and posteriority. These relations may bind together three temporal intervals: the speech time (S), the event time (E) and the reference time (R). Furthermore, they distinguish temporal interpretation (gr. hroniki erminia) from morphological tense (gr. morfologikos hronos). The former is explained as the relation of simultaneity, anteriority, or posteriority that binds two temporal intervals: S and E. Therefore, if S and E overlap (S ∩ E ≠ Ø), then the verb form is considered as expressing present temporal interpretation. If S is posterior to E (E < S), then the verb is interpreted as past. If S is anterior to E (S < E), then the verb is interpreted as future. Consequently, three temporal interpretations are distinguished: present (paron), past (parelthon), and future (melon). On the other hand, morphological tense is explained as the relation of simultaneity, anteriority, or posteriority that binds two temporal intervals: S and R. On this basis, Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis draw the conclusion that in Modern Greek, only two morphological tenses should be distinguished. These tenses are past (parelthondikos hronos) (R < S) and non-past (mi parelthondikos hronos) (S ∩ R ≠ Ø).

---

9 The formal representation of the relations between S, R, and E is taken from Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis (2006: 328ff.).
Among the disadvantages of this approach, Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis mention that this method is incapable of analysing historical present. Analogously, we have some reservations as to whether this method is sufficient to deal with, for instance, the aorist tense in its non-past use (e.g. *figame, pedìa* ‘off we go’) (see Katsouda 2008: 171). This being said, we believe that the fundamental assumption of this method should be the distinction between the primary and the secondary functions/meanings (see 1.4.1). This way, it would be possible to assign to a verb form more than one temporal interpretation and morphological tense without diminishing the clarity of the analysis.

To sum up this section, it should be noted that in Modern Greek linguistics, the term *tense* has acquired at least three different senses. Firstly, it may refer to indicative forms of the verb. In such a case, eight tenses are usually distinguished. Secondly, it may refer to the relation that binds an event and temporal property. In other words, tense temporalises an event. Thirdly, tense may be conceived of as a grammatical category expressing temporal meanings. Within the last two approaches, only two (past and non-past) or three (past, present and future) tenses tend to be distinguished.

To close this section, for the sake of clarity, we will hereinafter use the Latin-based names of tenses – see the list of the Modern Greek tenses on page 52. On the other hand, the terms *present, past and future* will refer solely to temporal meanings.

### 2.3 Aspect

Now we proceed to aspect, which is sometimes considered as the most difficult part of Modern Greek grammar (Mackridge 1985: 102). Despite that, one may get the impression that this subject is of lesser interest among the linguists studying the Modern Greek language. This claim is supported by the fact that little study has been conducted for the purpose of developing an original and Modern-Greek-oriented theory on aspect. The tendency, however, seems to be the opposite. That is to say, linguists adopt and adapt the already existing aspectological theories on aspect. Interestingly enough, the vast Slavic aspectological tradition seems to be overlooked by Modern Greek linguists. Consequently, the question arises why they do not explore the theories proposed within Slavic linguistics. Unfortunately, we do not know the answer to this question. Finally, it is worth mentioning that currently, the most frequently undertaken research on aspect in Modern Greek concerns its acquisition by Greek and non-Greek speakers.

Given the above, it is not surprising that the term *aspect* is used in the aspectological literature on Modern Greek in two senses: a narrow and a broad one (see 1.3). According to the
former, aspect is a grammatical category of the verb (e.g. Rivero 1992, Alexiadou 1994, Malagardi 1994, Tsimpli & Papadopoulou 2009). On the other hand, aspect (in its broad sense) is comprised of grammatical (or viewpoint) aspect and lexical aspect (or Aktionsart) (e.g. Kitis & Tsangalidis 2005, Tsimpli & Papadopoulou 2006, Mozer 2009, Alexiadou 2010, Panitsa 2010, Chasioti 2015, Papafilippou 2017, and others). Grammatical aspect is a grammatical category and lexical aspect is a semantic category. This list is sometimes complemented with a third category called telicity (e.g. Horrocks and Stavrou 2003b: 289), known also as inner aspect (Sioupi 2009: 223). Therefore:

![Fig. 2.3.1 Aspect and its kinds.](image)

It should also be noted that the term grammatical aspect is sometimes used in two senses (see Matthaioudaki & Kitsou & Tzimokas 2011: 318). On the one hand, it may refer to a grammatical category, and on the other, to a cognitive category (gr. gnostiki katigoria). The latter is sensitive to properties such as the lexical meanings signified by a verb, the transitivity of the verb, the definiteness of the direct object, prepositional phrases, etc.

Finally, Paprotté (1988: 457) conceives of aspect as a predicate of ‘event-situations’ and introduces the concept of sentential aspect. Consequently, according to Paprotté, aspect is a property not solely of a verb or a verb phrase, but of the whole sentence. Moreover, he argues that lexical aspect is of lesser importance in Modern Greek, for it does not affect the aspectual meaning of the sentence (cf. Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a, 2003b, Tsimpli & Papadopoulou 2006, Sioupi 2009, Tzevelekou 2009 and others).

### 2.4 Grammatical aspect, telicity, and lexical aspect

As discussed above, Modern Greek linguists distinguish between grammatical aspect, lexical aspect, and sometimes also telicity. Each of these may be conceived of as a classifying category, in the sense that they may be conceived of as a family of classes of lingual objects (i.e. lingual units or events – see Chapter 1.4). The objective of this section is to take a closer look at these families of classes.

58
2.4.1 Grammatical aspect

According to Xydopoulos (1996: 118), grammatical aspect “concerns the grammaticalisation of the distinction between perfective and imperfective aspect”. It should be noted that this explanation involves simultaneously lingual objects of two kinds:

- morphological objects – i.e. lingual units (e.g. morphemes, verb forms, etc.); and
- semantic objects – i.e. aspectual meanings (e.g. imperfective and perfective).

This being said, the term grammatical aspect refers to the lingual units on which the aspectual meaning of either perfectivity or imperfectivity is grammaticalised (see also Tsimpli & Papadopoulou 2006: 1597, Panitsa 2010: 223).

Given the above, grammatical aspect may be conceived of as a classifying category, meaning that it concerns the classification of lingual units (e.g. verb forms) into, for instance, two classes:

- Perfective Aspect and
- Imperfective Aspect\(^{10}\).

As the name of the above classes suggest, lingual units belonging to the former class signify the meaning of perfectivity. Therefore, they signify that an event is ‘a single, complete whole with external ‘bounds’ (beginnings and ends), but without specification of any internal temporal ‘contour’ (in Comrie’s 1976 terminology) characterized in terms of properties like continuousness or progressiveness’ (Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a: 309). On the other hand, the lingual units belonging to the latter class signify the meaning of imperfectivity. Consequently, by the use of these lingual units, one focuses on ‘part of the situation’ (Alexiadou 1994: 146) or they ‘present’ an event ‘from within’ (Hedin 1995: 235).

As regards the number of grammatical aspects in Modern Greek, this question is still being discussed. Some linguists (e.g. Hedin 1987, Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006, Panitsa 2010, Tsangalidis 2014) distinguish only two grammatical aspects – namely Imperfective Aspect and Perfective Aspect. According to this approach, Perfect Aspect is conceived of as a grammatical category combining Imperfective forms of the auxiliary verb eho ‘have’ or ime ‘be’ with a Perfective form of the main verb. In other words, Perfect Aspect is a combination of Imperfective Aspect and Perfective Aspect (Xydopoulos 1996, Panitsa 2010).

\(^{10}\) It should be mentioned that once again, morphological objects are distinguished from semantic objects by the capitalisation of the former. Therefore, the Imperfective Aspect refers to lingual units signifying imperfective aspect (i.e. meaning), whereas the Perfective Aspect refers to lingual units signifying perfective aspect.
On the other hand, Mackridge (1985), Hewson and Bubenik (1997), Katsouda (2008), Moser (2009), and Mparouni (2012) consider the Perfect as the third and autonomous grammatical aspect. Despite that, the significance of its distinction is sometimes questioned. For instance, Mackridge (1985: 102) claims that ‘the perfect is not as crucial to the distinctions of aspect as are the imperfective and perfective’.

The classes of grammatical aspect in Modern Greek may be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grammatical Aspect</th>
<th>Perfective</th>
<th>Imperfective</th>
<th>(Perfect)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Fig. 2.4.1.1 Grammatical aspect.**

As shown, Perfective Aspect and Imperfective Aspect are commonly distinguished by linguists as grammatical aspects. Perfect Aspect, however, is put in brackets because its status remains disputable.

### 2.4.2 Telicity

Proceeding to telicity, it should be noted that the approaches to this concept present in Modern Greek aspectology do not differ significantly from the approaches discussed in Chapter 1.4.2. Consequently, the fundamental terms and assumption connected to it will not be explained for a second time. Additionally, it is worth recalling that telicity is not typically grammaticalised in the languages of the world (including Modern Greek). This means that there is no grammatical category of telicity in the studied language and, therefore, the classification into telic and atelic may not be based on morphological analysis of lingual units (e.g. verb forms, verb phrases, predicate phrases, etc.). Their syntactic and semantic properties need to be considered as well. Bearing this in mind, aspectologists classify lingual units as atelic or telic with the help of various tests (see e.g. Borik 2002, Trąba 2017).

This being said, in this part of the dissertation, the main focus is given to the tests for telicity proposed or adapted for Modern Greek. These tests are of two kinds:

- the prepositional test and
- the implication-based test.

The first of these tests constitutes an adaptation of Vendler’s *in*-for-PP test (see p. 42). Therefore, a lingual unit (e.g. verb form, verb phrase, predicate phrase) is examined to determine whether it is compatible with prepositional phrases of two kinds:
• temporal phrases with the preposition epi ‘for’ (epi-PP) – e.g. epi ðjo ores ‘for two hours’
  and
• temporal phrases with the preposition se ‘in’ (se-PP) – e.g. se ðjo ores ‘in two hours’.

If the examined lingual unit is freely compatible with epi-PPs and, at the same time, can hardly be followed by se-PPs, then it is atelic (or it designates an atelic event\(^{11}\)). On the other hand, if the examined lingual unit is hardly compatible with epi-PPs but it may be followed by se-PPs (cf. Sioupi 2009: 225ff.), then it is telic (or it designates a telic event). The compatibility of lingual units with epi-PPs and se-PPs is shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>epi-PPs</th>
<th>se-PPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATELIC</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELIC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.4.2.1** Compatibility of atelic and telic lingual units with epi-PPs and se-PPs

Let us also consider the following examples:

\[(2.4.2.1)\]

\[a.\] O Kostas ðjavaze(imperfv.) epi/*se tris ores.  \[ATELIC\]

‘Kostas was reading for/*in three hours.’

\[b.\] O Kostas ðjavaze(imperfv.) to vivlio epi/*se tris ores.  \[ATELIC\]

‘Kostas was reading the book for/*in three hours.’

\[c.\] O Kostas ðjavase(perfv.) to vivlio *epi/se tris ores.  \[TELIC\]

‘Kostas read the book *for/in three hours.’

As shown, the sentences in (2.4.2.1a.) and (2.4.2.1b.) are atelic, because they are compatible with epi-PP (i.e. epi tris ores ‘for three hours’). At the same time, these sentences can hardly be followed with se-PP (i.e. se tris ores ‘in three hours’). On the other hand, the sentence in (2.4.2.1c.) is telic, for it is compatible with se-PP, but it can hardly be followed by epi-PP.

---
\(^{11}\) As mentioned in Chapter 1.4.2, linguists have not reached a consensus on what kind of objects (lingual units or events) should be classified as telic and atelic. On the one hand, telicity and atelicity may be conceived of as classes of lingual units (e.g. verb forms, verbs phrases, predicate phrases, etc.). On the other hand, they may be considered as classes of events. We believe that these two approaches are not necessarily contradictory to each other, as it seems reasonable to characterise telic lingual units as designating telic events and atelic lingual units as designating atelic events.
It should be mentioned that according to Sioupi (2009: 225), διαβάζω το βιβλίο ‘[s]he read the book’ (see (2.4.2.1b.)) is compatible with both epi-PPs and se-PPs. The latter designates necessarily a habitual or an iterative event.

There are some observations to be made regarding the prepositional test. Firstly, it is noteworthy that the sentences in (2.4.2.1), whose verbal predicate is the imperfect verb form διαβάζω ‘[s]he was reading’, are atelic. On the other hand, the sentence whose verbal predicate is the aoristic verb form διαβάσε ‘[s]he read’ is telic. This might suggest that telicity in Modern Greek is (at least to some degree) tense-sensitive. That is to say, the change of a tense may (but not necessarily has to) cause an atelic-telic shift – compare the sentences in (2.4.2.1b.) and (2.4.2.1c.).

Secondly, it should be borne in mind that each verbal predicate of the above sentences is a form of the verb διαβάζω ‘read’. Consequently, as it is shown above, this verb (or, to be more specific, the forms of this verb) may be found in both telic and atelic phrases or sentences. In compliance with this observation, Horrocks and Stavrou (2003a: 302–6) distinguish three kinds of verbs:

- terminative verbs (e.g. λίγω ‘to melt’, καταστρέφω ‘to destroy’);
- non-terminative verbs (e.g. ἠτίπτω ‘to hit’, ‘to beat’); and
- neutral verbs (e.g. κυπίζω ‘to wipe’).

For them, terminative verb forms are ‘intrinsically (causative-)resultative’ (Horrocks and Stavrou 2003a: 298), meaning that they signify necessarily a change of state. Furthermore, since they are considered as inherently telic, they designate telic events (Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a: 310). On the other hand, non-terminative verbs are non-resultative, in the sense that they do not typically signify a change of state. Consequently, Horrocks and Stavrou conceive of them as inherently atelic. Finally, neutral verbs are resultatively ambiguous. That is to say, in some contexts they are (causative-)resultative and designate telic events, whereas in other contexts they are non-resultative and designate atelic events. Therefore, neutral verbs are found in both telic and atelic phrases or sentences (see the sentences in (2.4.2.1)). An example of a neutral verb is ἠτίπτω ‘hit/beat’:

(2.4.2.2)  a. Ἑτίπτωσε τα αυγά για μία ώρα/*σε μία ώρα.
‘[s]he beat the eggs for an hour/*in an hour.’

b. Ἑτίπτισε τα αυγά για μία ώρα/*σε μία ώρα.’
‘[s]he was beating the eggs for an hour/*in an hour.’
As the above example shows, neither the aoristic verb form \textit{htipise} ‘(s)he beat’ nor the imperfect verb form \textit{htipuse} ‘(s)he was beating’ is combinable with \textit{se-PP}. Consequently, bearing in mind Table 2.4.2.1, the sentences in (2.4.2.2) are atelic.

To proceed, there are two implicational tests proposed for Modern Greek. The first of them is proposed by Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis (2006: 326f.), who have adopted what is known as the ‘progressive test’ (Borik 2002: 15). According to this test, if the Imperfective sentence entails its Perfective counterpart, then both of these sentences are atelic. If, however, the Imperfective sentence does not entail its Perfective counterpart, then the sentences are telic. Let us consider the following examples (Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006: 326):

(2.4.2.3) \textit{I Ana perpatuse (imperf.)} \Rightarrow \textit{I Ana perpatise (perf.)}. \quad \textbf{[ATELIC]}
\begin{quote}
‘Anne was walking.’ \Rightarrow ‘Anne walked.’
\end{quote}

(2.4.2.4) \textit{I Ana perpatuse (imperf.)} \textit{ena mili} \Rightarrow /* \Rightarrow \textit{I Ana perpatise (perf.)} \textit{ena mili}.
\begin{quote}
‘Anne was walking a mile.’ \Rightarrow /* \Rightarrow ‘Anne walked a mile.’ \quad \textbf{[TELIC]}
\end{quote}

As shown, the sentences in (2.4.2.3) are atelic, because the Imperfective sentence \textit{I Ana perpatuse} ‘Anne was walking’ entails its Perfective counterpart \textit{I Ana perpatise} ‘Anne walked’. At the same time, the sentences in (2.4.2.4) are telic, because the Imperfective sentence \textit{I Ana perpatuse ena mili} ‘Anne was walking a mile’ does not entail its Perfective counterpart \textit{I Ana perpatise ena mili} ‘Anne walked a mile’.

It should be mentioned that the validity of the test at hand can hardly be lingually verified in Modern Greek. This is because one may not form an acceptable conditional sentence illustrating the above claims. Consider the following sentences:

(2.4.2.5) \begin{itemize}
\item a. *\textit{Ean i Ana perpatuse, tote i Ana perpatise}.
\begin{quote}
*‘If Anne was walking, then Anne walked.’
\end{quote}
\item b. *\textit{Ean i Ana perpatuse ena mili, tote i Ana perpatise ena mili}.
\begin{quote}
*‘If Anne was walking a mile, then she walked a mile.’
\end{quote}
\end{itemize}

As shown, the above Modern Greek conditional sentences are unacceptable. Therefore, either their antecedents do not imply their succedents (which is in contradiction to Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis’s claims), or it is simply impossible in Modern Greek to form acceptable conditional sentences like the ones above due to the modal meanings their Imperfective and Perfective clauses acquire.
The second implicational test has been proposed by Trąba (2017; cf. Mourelatos 1981: 198). This test is based on the acceptability of adversative sentences whose structure may be presented as follows:

\[ p \text{ ala telika } \partial \text{en } q \]

‘\( p \) but finally not \( q \)’

In this structure, \( p \) stands for an Imperfective simple sentence, whereas \( q \) is its Perfective counterpart. If such an adversative sentence is acceptable, then both \( p \) and \( q \) are telic. However, if it is unacceptable, then both \( p \) and \( q \) are atelic.

Importantly enough, this test is considered as implication-based, because (from the perspective of classical logics) a negated implication may be transformed into an adversative sentence. Such transformation may be presented symbolically as follows:

\[ \sim(p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow (p \land \neg q) \]

In order to illustrate this test, let us consider the following adversative sentences:

(2.4.2.6) a. *O Kostas stekotan(imperfv.), ala telika \( \partial \text{en stathike} \text{(perfv.)} \). \[ \left[ \text{ATELIC} \right] \]

*‘O Kostas was standing, but finally he didn’t stand (up).’

b. *O Kostas \( \partial \text{javaze} \text{(imperfv.)}, ala telika } \partial \text{en } \partial \text{javase(perfv.)} \).

*‘Kostas was reading, but finally he didn’t read.’

c. ?O Kostas \( \partial \text{javaze(imperfv.) ena vivlio, ala telika } \partial \text{en to } \partial \text{javase(perfv.)}. \)

?‘Kostas was reading a book, but finally he didn’t read it. \[ \left[ \text{TELIC} \right] \]

Noticeably, only the last adversative sentence is acceptable (though awkward), meaning that the Imperfective sentence \( o \text{ Kostas } \partial \text{javaze ena vivlio ‘Kostas was reading a book’ and its Perfective counterpart are telic. The constituent clauses of the other adversative sentences are atelic.} \]

2.4.3 Lexical aspect

Considerations regarding lexical aspect (also known as Aktionsart or situation type) will begin with the question of how many classes should be distinguished. According to Moser (2009: 50), the approach to lexical aspect most frequently adopted by Modern Greek aspectologists is the one proposed by Vendler (1957). According to this approach, there are four classes of lexical aspect: states, activities, accomplishments, and achievements (see Chapter 1.4.3). However, Paprotté (1988: 455) argues that this number should be reduced in Standard Modern Greek to
three by merging states and activities (see also Alexiadou 2010). On the other hand, Horrocks and Stavrou (2003a: 302) distinguish achievements and pseudo-accomplishments. What characterises the former is that they exclude the processual prelude of the event, whereas the latter do not. For instance, pseudo-accomplishment events are designated by the sentences:

(2.4.3.1) a. *I Maria eftane*(imperf.) *stin korifi tu vunu.*
   ‘Mary was reaching the top of the mountain.’

   b. *I Maria pethene*(imperf.) *apo tin pina.*
   ‘Mary was dying of hunger.’

A similar observation is made by Moser (2009: 80). She claims that Imperfective forms of the verb *vrisko* ‘find’ may signify duration instead of iteration or habituality if used in specific contexts. She supports this claim with the following example:

(2.4.3.2) *Ti stigmi pu evriska*(imperf.) *to molivi mu, kopike*(perf.) *to fos.*
   ‘The moment I was finding my pencil, the lights went out.’

Another approach, which in our opinion is equally or almost equally popular among Modern Greek aspectologists, has been proposed by Smith (1997). She modified Vendler’s classification by adding a fifth class, which she calls *semelfactives* (see Chapter 1.4.3). Therefore, Modern Greek verbs and verb phrases may be conceived of as designating the following kinds of events (cf. Panitsa 2010: 45–6):

- states (designated by e.g. *ksero* ‘know’, *thelo* ‘want’, *kimame* ‘sleep’);
- activities (designated by e.g. *jelo* ‘laugh’, *treho* ‘run’);
- accomplishments (designated by e.g. *htizo ena spiti* ‘build a house’);
- achievements (designated by e.g. *anagnorizo mia fili* ‘recognise a friend’, *ftano stin korifi* ‘reach the top’); and
- semelfactives (designated by e.g. *viho* ‘cough’, *htipo* ‘heat’).

As regards the classification of events into classes of lexical aspect, this is often specified by the *temporal features* possessed by the event. This method of classification has been proposed by Smith (1997), who characterises the class of lexical aspect with the help of three parameters: [+/- STATIC], [+/- DURATIVE], and [+/- TELIC]. This characterisation may be presented in the form of the following table:
Chapter 2 – Approaches towards the Modern Greek aspect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Static</th>
<th>Durative</th>
<th>Telic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>[+]</td>
<td>[+]</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>[+]</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accomplishment</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>[+]</td>
<td>[+]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>[+]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semelfactive</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4.3.1. Temporal features of the types of situation (Smith 1997: 20; cf. Kitis & Tsangalidis 2005: 149)

It follows from the above table that an event is considered a state iff it is simultaneously static, durative, and atelic. It is conceived of as an activity iff it is dynamic (i.e. non-static), durative, and atelic. Furthermore, an event is an accomplishment iff it is dynamic, durative, and telic, but it is an achievement iff it is dynamic, telic, and non-durative. And finally, a semelfactive event is dynamic, non-durative, and atelic.

It should be noted that Modern Greek linguists have proposed hardly any test for stativity and durativity. Consequently, the above classification seems to be based on one’s lingual intuition. Such a gap in aspectological theory may cause confusion or even lead to inconsistency of the assumptions set. For instance, as has been noted by Horrocks and Stavrou (2003a; see also Panitsa 2010: 47), the verbs *ftano* ‘reach’ and *petheno* ‘die’ are found in sentences designating durative events – see the sentences in (2.4.3.1). Despite that, these verbs are commonly considered by Modern Greek aspectologists as designating achievements – that is, non-durative events (e.g. Kitis & Tsangalidis 2005: 149ff., Moser 2009: 50–3, Panitsa 2010: 47).

To close, a different approach to lexical aspect in Modern Greek is proposed by Moser (1994a: 62–7; see also 1994b: 139ff.). She adopts Sasse’s (1991) phasic analysis of verb semantics, on the basis of which five groups of verbs are distinguished:

- total statives (e.g. *eho* ‘have’, *ime* ‘be’, *kostizo* ‘cost’, *lipo* ‘be missing’, *perieho* ‘contain’);
- inchoative statives (e.g. *iðrono* ‘sweat’, *anthizo* ‘blossom’, *arosteno* ‘get ill’, *parusiao* ‘display’, *thimono* ‘get angry’);
- activities (e.g. *ðulevo* ‘work’, *treho* ‘run’, *ðjavazo* ‘read’, *troo* ‘eat’, *kleo* ‘cry’);
- gradual terminatives (e.g. *petheno* ‘die’, *argo* ‘be late’, *pagono* ‘freeze’, *teliono* ‘finish’);
- and
• total terminatives (e.g. *vrisko* ‘find’).

Importantly, Moser observes that some Modern Greek stative verbs are ambiguous, in the sense that they may be grouped as total statives or inchoative statives depending on the context. Consequently, she distinguishes one more group of verbs. We will refer to it as *ambiguous statives*. This group is comprised of verbs such as *agapo* ‘love’, ‘be in love’, *stekome* ‘stand’, *fenome* ‘seem’, *vriskome* ‘be located’).

At this point, it must be observed that Sasse (1991) proposed an entirely semantic classification of verbs. However, given that Imperfective and Perfective verb forms may signify different aspectual meanings (i.e. they may refer to different phases), the question arises as to which verb forms should be taken into consideration: Imperfective, Perfective, or both. One may get the impression that Moser groups verbs based on the meanings signified by the Perfective verb forms, that is, by the forms signifying terminative or inchoative aspectual meanings. On the other hand, the group of total statives includes verbs like *eho* ‘have’ and *ime* ‘be’, which do not have Perfective forms. Given that, we assume that aspectual meanings signified by both Perfective and Imperfective verb forms are taken into consideration.

### 2.4.4 Interaction between grammatical and lexical aspect

As mentioned above, grammatical and lexical aspect should be conceived of as two independent categories that interact with each other. This interaction may go in two directions. Therefore,

i. grammatical aspect may affect lexical aspect, and

ii. lexical aspect may affect grammatical aspect.

To begin with the former, Paprotté (1988: 451–3) argues that Imperfective predicates transform accomplishments into states or activities. To give an example, let us consider the following sentences:

(2.4.4.1) a. *Mas ḍjavase*(perfv.) *ena vivlio*. ‘(S)he *read* us a book.’

b. *Mas ḍjavaze*(imperf.) *ena vivlio*. ‘(S)he *was reading* us a book.’

Importantly, the sentence in (2.4.4.1a.) designates an accomplishment – that is, a dynamic, durative, and telic event. In the light of the above assumption, if the Perfective verbal predicate ḍjavase ‘(s)he read’ is replaced with its Imperfective counterpart ḍjavaze ‘(s)he was reading’, then the new sentence should designate either a state or an activity. In compliance with this assumption, the sentence in (2.4.4.1b.) designates an activity – that is, a dynamic, durative, and atelic event.
Furthermore, according to Paprotté, Perfective predicates transform states and activities into accomplishments or achievements (cf. Moser 1994a: 65). In order to illustrate this assumption, let us consider the following example:

(2.4.4.2) \textit{Tin agapuse} (imperfv.). ‘(S)he loved her.’

It goes without saying that the above sentence designates a state – that is, a static, durative, and atelic event. But, on the strength of the above assumption, if the Imperfective verbal predicate \textit{agapuse} ‘(s)he loved’ is replaced with its Perfective counterpart \textit{agapise} ‘(s)he fell in love’, then the obtained sentence should designate either accomplishment or achievement. Noticeably, the sentence:

(2.4.4.3) \textit{Tin agapise} (perfv.). ‘He fell in love with her.’

designates an inchoative event – that is, an achievement (Paprotté 1988: 452). Moreover, if the Imperfective verbal predicate of the sentence in (2.4.4.1b.) is replaced with its Perfective counterpart (see the sentence in (2.4.4.1a.)), then the activity event is transformed into an accomplishment event.

Finally, Paprotté (1988: 453) notices that achievements can hardly be transformed into states by Imperfective predicates. In order to explain this phenomenon, Kitis and Tsangalidis (2005: 151) indicate that achievements are non-durative events, which means that they are conceptualised as possessing minimal duration. In other words, their internal temporal structure is lingually irrelevant. At the same time, Kitis and Tsangalidis (2005: 148) claim that Imperfective Aspect signifies the duration or continuousness of the event. Therefore, the difficulties in transforming achievements into states by Imperfective predicates seem justifiable.

As regards lexical aspect and its influence on grammatical aspect, linguists observe that the inherent properties possessed by the designated event may restrict (if not determine) the aspectual meaning signified by a Perfective or an Imperfective lingual unit. For instance, Kitis and Tsangalidis (2005) claim that Imperfective predicates designating achievements should necessarily signify the meaning of iteration, habituality, or genericity. Simultaneously, they should be incompatible with the meaning of duration and continuousness, the signification of which is considered ‘as violation of the predictable licensed configurations’ (Kitis & Tsangalidis 2005: 146; cf. Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a: 302, Moser 2009: 80).
On the other hand, Sioupi (2009: 223; see also Horrocks and Stavrou 2003a: 310f., 2003b: 292f.) claims that Perfective verb forms may signify completion solely if they are used in telic propositions. However, if they are used in atelic propositions, then the meaning of termination is signified. The signification of aspectual meanings by Imperfective and Perfective lingual units is discussed in more detail in the next section.

### 2.5 Aspectual meanings signified by imperfective and perfective lingual units

As mentioned in Chapter 2.4.1, the distinction between Perfective and Imperfective Aspect is based on two aspectual meanings: perfective and imperfective, respectively. This distinction, however, is more complex than it might seem at first glance. Consequently, these two aspectual meanings are by no means sufficient for reflecting the diversity of uses of Imperfective and Perfective lingual units (e.g. verb forms). Furthermore, we find the explanation of Perfective Aspect as ‘presenting’ an event from outside as a complete whole to be unclear. This explanation becomes even more confusing given that some Perfective verb forms (e.g. agapisa ‘I fell in love’, arostisa ‘I got sick’, thimosa ‘I got angry’, pinasa ‘I got/am hungry’, etc.) designate inchoative events. That is to say, they do not refer to the whole event, but solely to its initial phase.

Keeping that in mind, linguists explain the distinction between Perfective and Imperfective Aspect with the help of other aspectual meanings. For instance, Tsimpli and Papadopoulou (2009: 189) assume that the distinction between imperfective and perfective is based on three parameters (semantic dimensions): [+/- bounded], [+/- iterative], and [+/- habitual]. Consequently, it involves at least six aspectual meanings: boundedness and unboundedness, iteration and non-iteration, and habitual and non-habitual. Furthermore, Sioupi (2009: 222) complements this list with the meaning of genericity signified by Imperfective lingual units, whereas Kitis and Tsangalidis (2005: 145) add the meanings of continuousness and progressivity. On the other hand, according to Horrocks and Stavrou (2003a: 310f., 2003b: 292f.), Perfective verb forms signify that an event is completed, complete, or punctual/semelfactive. Similarly, Sioupi (2009: 222) claims that telic and, simultaneously, Perfective verb phrases signify the attainment of a goal (gr. epitefksi tu stohu) – i.e., completion, whereas atelic and Perfective verb phrases signify termination (gr. termatizmos).

Given the above, some approaches to the uses of Imperfective and Perfective Aspect and to the aspectual meanings signified by them will be presented in this section. Importantly, for
the sake of clarity, the terms *perfective* and *imperfective* (regardless of whether they are
capitalised or not) will hereinafter refer solely to lingual units and never to aspectual
meanings (see the discussion in Chapter 1.4.1).

2.5.1 ‘Scenario’ approach

The first approach to be discussed has been proposed by Newton (1979: 139ff.) and Mackridge
(1985: 113–6), who call perfective aspect *zero aspect* or *scenario expressions*. According to
them, perfective forms are used if there is no explicit or implicit indication of durativity,
progressivity, iterativity or habituality. Mackridge (1985: 106) even claims that perfective
aspect ‘*is the natural aspect for the verb to be in*’. Consequently, the Modern Greek perfective
aspect should be considered as semantically less marked than imperfective aspect and,
therefore, it may be ‘*defined negatively as non-imperfective*’ (Hedin 1995: 235). Importantly,
these assumptions are supported by the predominant use of perfective verb forms (Mackridge
2004: 176). Additionally, the diachronic research on the development of the Modern Greek
verb system conducted by Ebbesen (1979: 5f.) and Mirambel (1988: 125-7) made some scholars
believe that the perfective stem is the basic verbal stem in the studied language.

Following this train of thought, imperfective verb forms are used provided that durativity,
progressivity, iterativity, or habituality is explicitly expressed in the utterance, or they are
determined by context. Consequently, Mackridge (1985: 106) says that perfective verb forms
are used ‘*unless there are clear grounds for using the imperfective (i.e. that the action is*
*considered as durative or repeated)*’.

One of the disadvantages of this approach is that it does not consider secondary uses of
imperfective and perfective verb forms, which are not always related to the distinctions between
continuous and non-continuous, habitual and non-habitual, or iterative and non-iterative. Some
exemplary ‘special’ uses of imperfective and perfective verb forms in Modern Greek are
mentioned later in this section.

A counterargument to Newton’s and Mackridge’s approach towards imperfective and
perfective aspect is given by Tzevelekou (2009: 240). She claims that, regardless of whether
any indication of durativity, progressivity, iterativity, or habituality is made or not, imperfective
(and not perfective) verb forms of stative verbs (e.g. *zilevo* ‘to envy’, *nomizo* ‘to think’, etc.)
are preferred in imperative mood. She supports her claim with the sentences:

(2.5.1.1)  a. **Zilepse**(perfv.)/**zileve**(imperfv.)*imperative ti Maria.*
   ‘Envy Mary.’
b. *Nomise(perfv.)/nomize(imperfv.) imperative oti tha vreksi.
   ‘Think that it will rain.’

As shown, the perfective imperatives are not acceptable in the above sentences, even though no reference to durativity, progressivity, iterativity, or habituality is made.

2.5.2 E-R-S approach

A different attempt to explain the distinction between imperfective and perfective aspect in Modern Greek is undertaken by Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis (2006: 323f.). For this purpose, they apply Reinhart’s tense theory and characterise perfective propositions as $E \subseteq R$ (‘$E$ is a subset of $R$’ or ‘$E$ is included in $R$’). In practice, this means that the temporal extension of the event (i.e. $E$) is shorter or equal to the temporal extension of the reference time (i.e. $R$). To illustrate this concept, let us consider the following examples:

(2.5.2.1) a. I Maria spudase(perfv.) tria hronia.
   ‘Mary studied for three years.’

b. Ta pečia horepsan(perfv.) mehri to proi.
   ‘The children danced until morning.’

c. I sinelefsi diirkese(perfv.) apo tis 10 to proi os tis 4 to apojevma.
   ‘The meeting lasted from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.’

Therefore, in (2.5.2.1a.), the temporal extension of the event designated by the perfective phrase i Maria spudase ‘Mary studied’ does not exceed the reference time – that is, three years. Analogously, in (2.5.2.1b.), the event designated by the perfective phrase ta pečia horepsan ‘the children danced’ lasts no longer than mehri to proi ‘until morning’, and in (2.5.2.1c.), the event designated by the perfective phrase i sinelefsi diirkese ‘the meeting lasted’ does not exceed the temporal interval between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m.

On the other hand, imperfective propositions are characterised as $R \subseteq E$ (‘$R$ is a subset of $E$’ or ‘$R$ is included in $E$’) (Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006: 326). This means that the temporal extension of the reference time (i.e. $R$) is shorter or equal to the temporal extension of the event time (i.e. $E$). Therefore, an imperfective proposition does not necessarily refer to the whole event but may refer solely to its part. At the same time, however, the proposition does not clarify whether the event began before the reference time or whether it continued after it. Let us consider the following sentences:
(2.5.2.2)  a. *I Maria ējavaze*(imperfv.) *ja 3 ores.*
   ‘Mary *was reading* for 3 hours.’

   b. *I Maria horeve*(imperfv.) *mehri to proi.*
   ‘Mary *was dancing* until morning.

   c. *I Maria miluse*(imperfv.) *me ti fili tis apo tis 10 to proi mehri tis 4 to apojevma.*
   ‘Mary *was talking* with a friend of hers from 10 a.m. till 4 p.m.’

In the light of the above considerations, the sentence in (2.5.2.2a.) designates an event of reading, which lasted for at least three hours. The sentence does not clarify whether the action of reading extended beyond this time stretch or not. Analogously, the sentence in (2.5.2.2b.) designates an event of dancing, which did not stop until morning at the earliest. And finally, the sentence in (2.5.2.2c.) designates an event of talking, which began no later than at 10 a.m. and continued until 4 p.m. or longer.

As mentioned above, perfective propositions signify that the event time is included in the reference time. On this basis, it may be inferred that perfective propositions designate terminated events. On the other hand, imperfective propositions signify that the reference time is included in the event time. Consequently, such propositions are terminatively ambiguous, in the sense that the designated event is terminated or non-terminated. Following this train of thought, Xydopoulos and Tsangalidis’s distinction between imperfective and perfective aspect is based on the notion of termination. They do not, however, distinguish termination from the completion of the event. It even seems that the assumptions set within this approach do not suffice to make such a distinction. This is because both a terminated and a completed event would be formally represented by the formula $E \subseteq R$ (‘$E$ is included in $R$’). Moreover, it should be noted that this approach does not take into consideration iterative, habitual, and generic events.

**2.5.3 Parametric approach**

To continue, it is noteworthy that iterativity and habituality are sometimes approached in isolation from other aspectual meanings or they are completely excluded from analysis (e.g. Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a, 2003b, 2007, Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006). In contrast, the parameters of [+/- iterative] and [+/- habitual] are fundamental for a description of imperfective and perfective aspect in the parametric approach proposed by Tsimpli and Papadopoulou (2009: 189). For them, imperfective aspect should be characterised as [– bounded, – iterative, – habitual] or [+ bounded, + iterative, + habitual], whereas perfective
aspect may be characterised as [+ bounded, – iterative, – habitual] or [+ bounded, + iterative, - habitual]. Consider the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BOUNDED</th>
<th>ITERATIVE</th>
<th>HABITUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPERFECTIVE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFECTIVE</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5.3.1 Properties of imperfective and perfective aspect according to Tsimpli and Papadopoulou (2009: 189)

Interestingly, Tsimpli and Papadopoulou (2009: 189) state that ‘iteration in the imperfective is equivalent to the habitual, whereas iteration in the perfective blocks the habitual reading’. Consequently, habituality (next to boundedness, but contrary to iteration) becomes the distinguishing feature of imperfective and perfective aspects.

We have some reservations whether iteration and habituality may be conceived of as equivalent to each other in either imperfective or perfective aspect. On the contrary, we shall argue that the imperfective sentence may designate an iterative and, at the same time, habitual event as well as an iterative but non-habitual event. Let us consider the following examples:

(2.5.3.1) a. O Kostas panda htipuse(imperfv.) tin porta prin na bi mesa.

‘Kostas used to knock on the door before going in.’

b. O Kostas htipuse(imperfv.) tin porta ja ores hthes.

‘Kostas was knocking on the door for hours yesterday.’

To begin with the former sentence, it may designate an iterative and a habitual event. The event is habitual, because the sentence signifies that Kostas knocked on the door each time he wished to get inside. Simultaneously, the designated event may be iterative, because it is reasonable to expect that on each occasion, Kostas carried out a sequence of (e.g. three) knocks/taps at the door.

On the other hand, the latter sentence designates a non-habitual event, because the designated event did not occur on a regular basis. In fact, the sentence refers solely to a single occurrence of this event. Furthermore, this event is iterative, because it consists of a sequence of knocks/taps at the door rather than a single knock/tap lasting for hours.
As regards perfective sentences, they may designate iteration of two kinds. On the one hand, the designated event may be composed of a sequence of homogenous subevents. Consider the following example:

(2.5.3.2) *O astinomikos tus *htipise*(perfv.) *me to glop.*

‘The police officer *beat* them with a baton.’

Noticeably, the above sentence designates a sequence of repeated (i.e. iterative) subevents, each of which may be referred to as ‘a hit’. Therefore, it follows from the sentence in (2.5.3.2) that the police officer did not carry out a single hit but rather a sequence of hits.

As regards the second kind of iteration, perfective sentences may signify repetition (i.e. iteration) of the whole event and not of its subevents. Consider the following example:

(2.5.3.4) *O Kostas *dvavase*(perfv.) *to vivlio tris fores.*

‘Kostas *read* the book three times.’

Noticeably, the above sentence signifies that Kostas read the book three times. To put it differently, this sentence signifies that the event of Kostas reading the book has occurred three times. Consequently, this sentence does not designate a semelfactive but an iterative event.

Given the above considerations, it seems that Tsimpli and Papadopoulou’s parameter [+/– iterative] is not sufficient for reflecting on the diversity of events designated by imperfective and perfective sentences. For this purpose, the distinction between ‘iteration of subevents’ and ‘iteration of events’ seems justified.

### 2.5.4 Other uses of imperfective and perfective aspect

As regards the uses of imperfective and perfective lingual units that have not been mentioned above, it is noteworthy that the Modern Greek aorist (i.e. perfective past) tense may signify the meaning of genericity. This use is known as *gnomic* and it is characteristic for proverbs and sayings (Kontos & Mpampiniotis 1967: 162, Katsouda 2008: 171). The ‘gnomic aorist tense’ is found in, for instance, the proverb:

(2.5.4.1) *Opjos *kaike*(perfv.) *sto kurkuti, fisai ke to jaurti.*

‘The burnt child dreads the fire.’

(*lit.* ‘Whoever *burnt himself* in batter, blows also yogurt’)

Furthermore, imperfective and perfective aspect may be used to indicate the temporal ordering of two or more events. In such a case, imperfective aspect signifies that the designated
event is simultaneous with another event, whereas perfective aspect may signify that an event is anterior or posterior to another event (Tzartzanos 1963a, Mackridge 1985, Paprotté 1988, Holton & Mackridge & Philippaki-Warburton 1998, Kitis & Tsangalidis 2005, Klairis & Mpampiniotis 2005, and others). This use of imperfective and perfective aspect is illustrated by the following examples:

(2.5.4.2)  
a. *I Maria efaje* (perfv.) *proino ki efije* (perfv.).  
'Mary ate breakfast and left.'

b. *I Maria ďjavaze* (imperfv.) *ki o Petros etroje* (imperfv.).
'Mary was reading while Peter was eating.'

c. *I Maria ďjavaze* (imperfv.) *otan jirisa* (perfv.) *spiti*.
'Mary was reading when I came home.'

To begin with the sentence in (2.5.4.2a.), it designates two events. Importantly, these events are not simultaneous, but they occur one after another. This temporal ordering of the events is signified by the use of perfective verbal predicates. As regards the other two sentences, they designate pairs of simultaneous events. Therefore, the event of Mary reading is simultaneous with the event of Peter eating in (5.2.4.2b.) and with the event of my homecoming in (2.5.4.2c.).

Furthermore, the last two sentences reveal other meanings signified by imperfective and perfective aspect. These meanings are durativity and non-durativity (cf. shortness and longness in Bielecki & Traba, in press; cf. Katsouda 2008: 171). Therefore, the use of the imperfective verbal predicates in (5.2.4.2b.) indicates that the designated events are durative. On the other hand, the use of the perfective verbal predicate in (5.2.4.2c.) signifies that the event of my homecoming has a shorter temporal stretch than the event designated by the imperfective clause.

Interestingly enough, imperfective and perfective aspects may not only indicate the temporal ordering of events, but they may also indicate the *agens* of the action. This use of grammatical aspect in Modern Greek has been noted by Seiler (following Kahane & Kahane 1954: 199), and this claim is supported by the following sentences:

(2.5.4.3)  
a. *Vrike* (perfv.) *tin kori ki eklapse* (perfv.).
'He found the daughter and wept.'

b. *Vrike* (perfv.) *tin kori ki ekleje* (imperfv.).
'He found the daughter [when she was] weeping.'
From the morphological perspective, the only difference between the above sentences is the verbal predicate of the second clause. In the former sentence, the perfective verb form εκλάψε ‘(s)he wept’ is used, whereas in the latter sentence its imperfective counterpart is used – i.e. εκλέψε ‘(s)he was weeping’. Importantly, depending on the tense, the verbal predicates of a sentence determine this same or different subjects. If the aoristic verb form is used, then the predicate phrases of both clauses determine this same subject – see the sentence in (2.5.4.3a.). Therefore, the one who found the daughter and the one who wept was the same person. On the other hand, if the imperfect verb form is used, then the constituent clauses of the sentence have different subjects. The subject of the first clause is a male who found the daughter, whereas the subject of the second clause is the daughter herself.

To close this section, it is noteworthy that in Modern Greek, imperfective sentences may signify completed and, simultaneously, habitual events (Sioupi 2009: 226). This means that such sentences signify a (regular) repetition of a completed event. Consider the following sentence:

(2.5.4.4) Επί τρις μινές ο Κώστας κσηρίζοταν (imperfv.) se pende lepta.

‘Kostas shaved in five minutes for three months.’

The above sentence refers to Kostas’s habit that lasted for three months. This habit was shaving in just five minutes. Importantly, each designated shaving by Kostas is conceptualised as a completed event.

### 2.6 Aktionsart and aspectual-sensitive adverbs

Finally, some words should be said about adverbs. For instance, Rivero (1992), Alexiadou (1994), and Xydopoulos (1996) devoted their works to the question of which adverbs co-occur with imperfective, which with perfective, and which with both verb forms. On the basis of their results, they distinguished two types of adverbs:

- **Aktionsart adverbs** and
- **aspectual-sensitive adverbs**.

To begin with the former, Rivero (1992: 307–9) observes that adverbs such as κσανα ‘again’, παλι ‘again’, σθνα ‘often’, and διπλα ‘twice’ may occur as adverbs in both postverbal and sentence-final position. Additionally, these adverbs may be incorporated into the verb affecting the inherent structure of the designated event. As a result, it is possible to derive in
Modern Greek verbs like ksanavlepo ‘to see [sb/sth] again’, palilogo ‘to repeat/say again’, sihnovlepo ‘to meet often [with sb]’, etc. Furthermore, according to Rivero, Aktionsart adverbs are aspect-insensitive. This means that they may occur with both imperfective and perfective verb forms. Additionally, the verbs derived through incorporation possess both imperfective and perfective forms. On this basis, Rivero infers that Aktionsart adverbs should behave similarly to verbal complements, because they are aspect-insensitive and because they may be incorporated into the verb. That is to say, they are internal to the VP in syntactic representation (Rivero 1992: 308).

Some remarks regarding Rivero’s Aktionsart adverbs have been made by Xydopoulos (1996: 157-64). He observed that the adverb sihna ‘often’ is aspect-sensitive and can co-occur solely with imperfective verbs. Furthermore, the verbs derived with the prefix sixno- ‘often’ tend to form solely the present (i.e. imperfective) tense. Similar restrictions are not found in respect to the verbs derived with the other three adverbs. Additionally, the adverbs pali ‘again’, sihna ‘often’, and diplo ‘twice’ can be used to form no more than a handful of compound verbs. For instance, Leksiko tis Kinis Neoellinikis [Dictionary of Modern Greek] by Iakov et al. (1998) lists only five compound verbs with the component pali-, five with sihno-, and ten with diplo-. On this basis, Xydopoulos arrives at the conclusion that only ksana can be considered as a productively combinable adverb. This conclusion is supported by the fact that this adverb may be incorporated into most Modern Greek verbs – except for stative verbs (e.g. ksero ‘to know’, ime ‘to be’) and what Rivero (1992: 301) calls Psych Verbs (e.g. tromazo ‘to frighten’).

A similar conclusion is drawn by Smirniotopoulos and Joseph (1997, 1998). They noted that in Modern Greek, solely the adverb ksana ‘again’ can easily and freely be attached to the verb. As regards other adverbs (regardless of their type), there is ‘no principle for the Adverb + Verb composites which predicts exactly which adverb should be combinable with which verbs, beyond the requirement that the adverbs are VP- or, in McConnell-Ginet’s treatment, V-adverbs’ (Smirniotopoulos & Joseph 1998: 45). The authors, however, have some reservations regarding the nature of the ksana + Verb composites. For them, the adverb in question resembles the productive prefix para-, which belongs to the domain of word-formation and not to the domain of syntax. Keeping that in mind, they admit that the status of the prefix ksana- is arbitrary.

To continue, it has already been mentioned that for Rivero (1992: 301), stative verbs do not generally allow for incorporation. However, it is worth noting that one may find in Modern Greek compound stative verbs such as ksanakathome ‘sit (down) again’, ksanakimame ‘fall asleep again’, ksanapatheno ‘suffer again’, and others. Interestingly, if Sasse’s (1991) verbal
classification is applied, then inchoative stative verbs (but not only) freely combine with the prefix _ksana_- ‘again’.

To proceed to aspect-sensitive adverbs, these are compatible either with imperfective or perfective verb forms. Alexiadou (1994: 146-7) distinguishes between two types of aspect-sensitive adverbs:

- **durative, frequency adverbs**, which co-occur solely with imperfective verb forms (e.g. _sinithos_ ‘usually’, _panda_ ‘always’, _taktika_ ‘regularly’, _ðiarkos_ ‘constantly’, _sinehia_ ‘constantly’) and
- **cardinal count, point adverbs**, which co-occur solely with perfective verb forms (e.g. _mia fora_ ‘once’, _ðjo fores_ ‘twice’, _amesos_ ‘instantly’).

Interestingly enough, the adverbs compatible with imperfective verb forms signify duration, frequency, or habituality. This observation is consistent with the aspectual meanings signified by imperfective aspect (see the previous section).

Due to the aforementioned aspect-sensitivity of the adverb, some scholars have reached the conclusion that the use of Modern Greek imperfective and perfective verb forms is dependent on the adverb, which is given implicitly or explicitly (see Kahane & Kahane 1954: 118), the temporal clause, or even intonation (Newton 1979: 161ff.). Among the counterarguments to this approach, one may find pairs of sentences such as the following (Kahane & Kahane 1954: 118):

(2.6.1) a. _Tha sas akuo_ (imperf.), _otan thelete_.
   ‘I’ll always listen to you, whenever you want.’

b. _Tha sas akuso_ (perf.), _otan thelete_.
   ‘I’ll listen to you, just say when.’

To explain this counterargument, Kahane and Kahane (1954: 118) argue that in the above sentences, two different (although homophonous) conjunctions _otan_ are used. The first one requires the use of an imperfective verb form, whereas the second one requires the use of the perfective verb form. To support their claim, they observe that these two conjunctions not only signify different meanings, but they also differ in respect to intonation. Furthermore, in the latter sentence, the imperfective verb form _thelete_ ‘you want’ may be replaced with its perfective counterpart _thelisete_ ‘you want’ without changing the meaning of the sentence. The same may not be done in the case of the former.
The question of whether the form of the verb depends on the adverb (as argued by Kahane and Kahane) or not (as claimed by Seiler (following Kahane & Kahane 1954)) is not dealt with in the present dissertation. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that not every Modern Greek adverb is aspect-sensitive. For instance, the adverb *pote* ‘never’ is compatible with both imperfective and perfective verb forms. But, depending on the form of the verb, a different meaning is signified. Consider the following examples:

(2.6.2)  

a. *I Maria pote ēn htípise(perfv.) tin porta.*  
   ‘Mary has never knocked on the door.’

b. *I Maria pote ēn htípuse(imperfv.) tin porta.*  
   ‘Mary never used to knock on the door.’

The former sentence (that is the one with the perfective verb form) signifies that Mary has never knocked on the door. To put it differently, the event of knocking on the door by Mary has never occurred. On the other hand, the latter sentence signifies that Mary never had the habit of knocking on the door. Nonetheless, it seems probable that she has knocked on the door during her lifetime.

To summarise, it is worth noting that the approaches to tense and aspect in Modern Greek vary in their assumptions. For instance, tense may be conceived of as a family of classes of indicative verb forms in respect to their temporal and aspectual (but not modal) meanings. On the other hand, tense may be conceived of as a grammatical category of the verb. In the case of the former, eight (or even ten) tenses are distinguished, whereas within the latter approach, only two or three tenses are distinguished. Furthermore, the distinction between grammatical and lexical aspect seems to be generally agreed among the Modern Greek linguists. Despite that, telicity is considered as either a component of lexical aspect or an independent semantic category (next to grammatical and lexical aspect). Additionally, the number of grammatical aspects varies between two and three. This is because the status of perfect remains disputable.
Chapter 3

Methodological clarifications

Since the approach to Modern Greek aspect proposed in this dissertation differs in several respects from the approaches presented in Chapters 1 and 2, some methodological clarifications will be made in this chapter. Firstly, fundamental concepts such as event, meaning, syntagma, dimension, etc. will be explained. Secondly, attention will be paid to the systems of delimitativity, holicity, and aspect. Thirdly, some words will be said about verb forms and sentences. Importantly, in this part of the chapter the notion of aspectively adversative sentence is introduced. Finally, some assumptions regarding the grammaticality, sensicality, and correctness of sentences (and especially of aspectively adversative sentences) are set out.

3.1 Events, meanings and relations

For the purposes of this research, we assume that fragments of extra-lingual reality are conceptualised in the mind of the speaker as events (cf. Davidson 1967, Augustynék 1979, Tenny & Pustejovsky 2000, Karolak 2005, etc.). Importantly, the same fragment of extra-lingual reality may be conceptualised in more than one way. In other words, different events may constitute conceptualisations of the same fragment of extra-lingual reality.

Moreover, in the present research, we distinguish momentous and non-momentous events. The former term is used to refer to events which are conceptualised as possessing minimal duration. That is to say, the internal structure of a momentous event is lingually irrelevant. Momentous events are designated by, for instance, the verbs find, hit, wink, etc. The second term is used to refer to events consisting of subevents which are bound by the relation of posteriority, the relation of anteriority, or the relation of simultaneity. Non-momentous events are designated by, for instance, the verbs dance, walk, laze. We assume that each non-momentous event possesses necessarily at least two subevents: the initial and final subevents. What characterises the initial subevent of a non-momentous event e is that it is
bound to all other subevents of \( e \) by the relation of anteriority. In other words, there is no subevent of \( e \) which is anterior to the initial subevent. Analogously, the final subevent of \( e \) is a subevent which is bound to all other subevents of \( e \) by the relation of posteriority. That is to say, there is no subevent of \( e \) which is posterior to the final subevent.

Events may be lingually referred to by means of sentences, or texts (sequences of sentences). This means that sentences and texts designate (i.e. denote) events, or in other words, sentences and events are bound by the relation of designation. In the present dissertation, sentences are referred to as designators, and designated events as designata (Bańczerowski 1997: 16). Additionally, we will restrict our considerations to events which are designated by sentences, although we do not exclude the possibility that events are designated by other lingual expressions such as clauses, nominalised or participialised phrases, etc., which are derived from corresponding sentences (e.g. his drinking of the beer or having drunk his beer).

Moreover, the structure of the sentence reflects the structure of the event (Bańczerowski 2006: 8). This means that the event-relevant properties are lingually conceptualised as meanings, and as such they are expressed by the sentence.

The relation binding lingual units and meanings is called the relation of signification. Its antecedent will be called the significator, and its succedent the significatum. The former term refers to the lingual unit which signifies a meaning, whereas the latter refers to the meaning which is signified (Bańczerowski 1997: 16).

A few words must be devoted to the meanings signified by predicate phrases and sentences. The meanings signified by a predicate phrase become the meanings of the sentence of which that predicate phrase is a constitutive component. That is to say, the meanings signified by a sentence correspond to the meanings signified by the predicate phrase of that sentence. Furthermore, the meanings signified by the verbal predicate are the constitutive meanings of the meanings signified by the sentence (Kuryłowicz 1987: 93–102). It should also be emphasised that the set of meanings signified by the sentence is richer than the set of meanings signified by its predicate phrase. In other words, there are meanings signified by the sentence which are not signified by its predicate phrase. To give an example, let us consider the sentence:

\[(3.1.1) \quad \text{A young girl was walking to school.}\]

This sentence is composed of the subject phrase a young girl and the predicate phrase was walking to school. The latter signifies meanings such as pastness, progressiveness, the notion towards somewhere, etc. In accordance with the above considerations, these meanings are also signified by the sentence in (3.1.1). At the same time, the sentence signifies meanings such as
being a girl and being young, which are not signified by its predicate phrase. Therefore, the meanings signified by a sentence may go beyond the meanings signified by its predicate phrase.

It must be noted that it is possible for context to modify the primary meanings (see Chapter 1.4.1) signified by a sentence or predicate phrase. However, for the time being we do not deal with this problem in this dissertation. For that reason, in the current research we focus on contextually unconditioned sentences. Moreover, the sentences analysed here have the form of either simple sentences or adversative sentences. Other types of compound and complex sentences are not considered.

To continue, four modes of signification will be distinguished:

- lexification;
- semification;
- autosignification; and
- cosignification.

Beginning with the first two modes, the relation of lexification binds a lingual unit $x$ and a meaning $\sigma$ if $\sigma$ is signified by the lexical morpheme of $x$. In such a case, we will say that $x$ lexifies $\sigma$. For instance, the meaning of holicity is lexified by expressions such as whole, entire, complete, full, comprehensive, etc., and the meaning of pastness is lexified by expressions such as yesterday, last year, former, previous, ago, etc. The lingual unit lexifying a meaning $\sigma$ will be hereinafter called the lexificator. On the other hand, the relation of semification binds a lingual unit $x$ and a meaning $\sigma$ if $\sigma$ is signified by the delexicalised morpheme of $x$. In such a case, $x$ semifies $\sigma$. For instance, the meaning of plurality is semified by expressions like rooms, chairs, houses, books, windows, etc., and the meaning of inessivity is semified by expressions such as in the room, on the bus, within the text, etc. The lingual unit semifying a meaning $\sigma$ will be called the semificator. It must be noted that some lingual units may lexify, whereas other lingual units may semify the same meaning $\sigma$. For instance, we have presented above some expressions lexifying the meaning of pastness. This meaning, however, is also semified by expressions like I ate, I was eating, I had eaten, having eaten, etc. (Bańczerowski 1997: 17f.).

Let us now proceed to autosignification and cosignification. If a lingual unit $x$ autosignifies a meaning $\sigma$, then $x$ is a sufficient significator of $\sigma$ and no additional significator is necessary. In such a case, $x$ and $\sigma$ are bound by the relation of autosignification. Moreover, the lingual unit $x$ which autosignifies a meaning $\sigma$ will be called an autosignificator. An example of an autosignificator in English is the suffix -(e)s [-s/-z/-iz], which autosignifies plurality in expressions such as rooms, groups, books, roads, houses, etc. On the other hand, if a lingual
unit $x$ cosignifies a meaning $\sigma$, then $x$ does not signify $\sigma$ sufficiently and requires at least one additional cosignificator in order to signify $\sigma$. In other words, the relation of cosignification binds at least two cosignificators $x$ and $y$ with the meaning $\sigma$. For instance, in English the meaning of third person singular in the Present Simple tense is cosignified (i.e. is signified redundantly) by the personal pronouns he, she, it and the suffix -(e)s [-sl/-zl/-lz], as in he works, she watches, it comes, etc.

Furthermore, by the term homolexicality we will refer to a reflexive, transitive, and symmetric relation binding two lingual units $x_i$ and $x_j$, that lexify identical meanings. Therefore, the sentences Tom ate an apple and Tom was eating an apple should be considered homolexical, as they lexify identical meanings. On the other hand, the sentences Tom ate an apple and John ate an orange are not homolexical, because they differ in respect of the meanings that they lexify. Analogously, the sentences Tom ate an apple and Tom ate two apples are heterolexical (i.e. not homolexical), because they lexify different meanings.

To turn to the relation of determination, we will say that a lingual unit $x$ determines a lingual unit $y$ if the designatum of $x$ becomes the significatum of the syntagma $xy$. In other words, the designatum of $x$ becomes a property of the object designated by $y$, narrowing in consequence the set of objects designated by $y$. For instance, if interesting determines a book, then the expression an interesting book designates such an extra-lingual object ‘book’ that possesses the property of being interesting. In such a case, the binary, asymmetric, irreflexive, and intransitive relation binding $x$ and $y$ will be hereinafter called the relation of determination. Its antecedent will be referred to as the determiner, and its succedent as the determinatum. It must be emphasised that in the present research, for simplicity’s sake, the relation of determination may bind lingual units of various sizes and kinds (cf. Bańczerowski 1980: 70ff., Asher 1994: 878–81, Crystal 2005: 140, 309f.). Consequently, for three hours may determine walking, so that the expression walking for three hours designates an action of walking which lasts for three hours. Analogously, was walking for three hours may determine Anne, so that the expression Anne was walking for three hours designates a person called Anne who has the property of having walked for a period of three hours. A more comprehensive theory of determination, which distinguishes direct and indirect determination, may be found in Bańczerowski (1980).

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1 Idiomatic expressions such as kick the bucket, etc. are not considered.
3.2 Word forms, phrases, clauses, syntagmata, and sentences

In the present study we shall be using terms such as word forms, phrases, clauses, syntagmata, and sentences. Each of these terms refers to lingual units of different size. It must be emphasised that these terms refer to abstract and not actual (that is, concrete individual) lingual units. Consequently, it is necessary to draw a clear line between actual lingual units and the sets of such units. For this purpose, we distinguish:

- actual word forms and word forms;
- actual phrases and phrases;
- actual clauses and clauses;
- actual syntagmata and syntagmata; and
- actual sentences and sentences.

Actual word forms, actual phrases, actual clauses, actual syntagmata, and actual sentences are concrete, one-time-existing lingual units, and may be considered units of the zero level of abstraction. On the other hand, since each word form, each phrase, each clause, each syntagma, and each sentence is respectively a set of the corresponding actual units, they constitute the first level of abstraction (cf. Bańcerzewski & Oueslati 2017: 4). Additionally, it should be noted that a necessary component of each actual sentence is an actual phrase, whereas a necessary component of each actual phrase is an actual word form. Consequently, for every actual sentence \( s \) there is an actual phrase \( p \) such that \( p \) is a part of \( s \). Analogously, for every actual phrase \( p \) there is an actual word form \( w \) which is a part of \( p \).

To illustrate the above, let us imagine that a native speaker of Modern Greek utters on various occasions: «to mathima arhizi stis ∂eka\(_1\)», «to mathima arhizi stis ∂eka\(_2\)», «to mathima arhizi stis ∂eka\(_3\)», ..., «to mathima arhizi stis ∂eka\(_n\)». Each of these constitutes a concrete lingual unit – namely, an actual sentence. Moreover, since these actual sentences are homophonous and homosignificative, they may be grouped together into a set, which we call the sentence to mathima arhizi stis ∂eka ‘the class starts at 10 o’clock’. This means that each actual sentence «to mathima arhizi stis ∂eka\(_i\)» belongs to (and thereby represents) the sentence to mathima arhizi stis ∂eka ‘the class starts at 10 o’clock’. Additionally, on each occasion, the native speaker of Modern Greek utters the actual phrases «arhizi stis ∂eka\(_1\)», «arhizi stis ∂eka\(_2\)», «arhizi stis ∂eka\(_3\)», ..., «arhizi stis ∂eka\(_n\)». Since such phrases are homophonous and homosignificative, they may be grouped together into the set which we call the phrase arhizi stis ∂eka ‘starts at 10 o’clock’. Analogously, the actual word forms «arhizii», «arhiziz»,
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«arhizi», ..., «arhizi» may be grouped together into the set called the word form arhizi ‘he/she/it starts’.

It is appropriate at this point to devote some words to clauses and simple sentences. According to Crystal (2005: 78), the term clause ‘refer[s] to a unit of grammatical organization smaller than the sentence, but larger than phrases, words or morphemes’. This means that an actual clause should be conceived of as a constituent of an actual sentence. However, in view of the purpose of this research, we are more interested in the relation binding actual simple sentences (i.e. actual sentences with only one actual predicate phrase) with actual clauses of actual compound sentences. Consider the following examples:

(3.2.1)   a. «Mary was lying in bed.»
        b. «She wasn’t sleeping.»
        c. «Mary was lying in bed, but she wasn’t sleeping.»

There are three actual sentences in (3.2.1): two actual simple sentences and one actual compound sentence. The actual compound sentence is composed of two actual clauses: «Mary was lying» and «she wasn’t sleeping». Importantly, these actual clauses correspond to the actual simple sentences in (3.2.1a.) and (3.2.1b.). In other words, the actual simple sentences are homophonous and homosignificative with the actual clauses of the compound sentence, although they are lingual units of a different kind.

Given the above observation, simple sentences and clauses of compound sentences will be hereinafter conceived of as two sides of the same coin. Consequently, it is assumed that each clause of a compound sentence should have a homosignificative counterpart which is a simple sentence. Mutatis mutandis, each simple sentence should have a homosignificative counterpart which is a clause of a compound sentence.

An actual syntagma is a lingual unit which consists of at least two actual (syntactic) word forms, but is not larger than an actual sentence. An actual syntagma must not be conceived of as a sequence of random actual word forms (Bańczerowski 1980: 38). For instance, although English expressions such as «a beautiful girl», «nice view», «going home», «at the end of the road», «I don’t like coffee» are actual syntagmata, expressions like «he coffee», «the end the road», «don’t coffee», «me I» are not actual syntagmata.
Fig. 3.2.1 Word forms, phrases, clauses, syntagmata, and sentences.

A set of actual syntagmata which are indistinguishable in respect of their paratactic and hypotactic structure will be called a syntagma. Consequently, the actual syntagmata «the father and the son», «the father and the son», «the son and the father» belong to the same syntagma. On the other hand, the expressions «the father and the son» and «the father or the son» belong to two different syntagmata (Bańczerowski & Pogonowski & Zgółka 1982: 246f.). Furthermore, it should be noted that (in accordance with the above considerations) the family (i.e. the set of sets) of syntagmata may be conceived of as the union of the families of phrases, clauses, and sentences. That is to say, every phrase, every clause, and every sentence is a syntagma – see the above figure.

It is worth mentioning that there exist a variety of kinds of word forms (e.g. word forms of nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, etc.), phrases (e.g. predicate phrases, temporal phrases, noun phrases, etc.), and sentences (e.g. simple sentences, compound sentences, etc.). Furthermore, such sets of concrete lingual units may be further classified depending on chosen criteria. For instance, word forms of verbs, which we hereinafter call verb forms, may be grouped together to form paradigms. Next, such paradigms may be grouped together to form tenses (see Chapters 1.2 and 3.6).

3.3 Dimensions, categories and systems

One way of classifying meanings is to group them into semantic dimensions (or parameters). By a semantic dimension (we will hereinafter call it dimension) we understand a set of
meanings which are bound by the relation of homogeneity (i.e. being of the same kind). That is to say, a dimension $D$ includes only those meanings $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3, \ldots, \sigma_n$, which are homogeneous. For instance, the dimension of totivity includes meanings like holicity (the property of being whole), partitivity and totive neutrality, whereas the dimension of delimitativity comprises meanings like termination, non-termination and delimitative neutrality (see the next section).

Importantly, two heterogeneous meanings do not belong to the same dimension. Moreover, it is assumed that no lingual expression may lexify simultaneously two or more meanings belonging to the same dimension. Therefore, for instance, a word form $X$ may not lexify simultaneously termination and non-termination. Analogously, two or more meanings belonging to the same dimension may not be simultaneously semified by one and the same lingual unit. Nonetheless, lingual units may convey meanings belonging to various dimensions. For instance, the English expression he worked signifies pastness, termination, active voice, etc.

Furthermore, the set of all significators signifying meanings from the dimension $D$ will be called the category specified by $D$. Therefore, the category of delimitativity is the set of all significators which signify termination, non-termination, or delimitative neutrality. It must be emphasised that significators belonging to the category specified by $D$ may be of various kinds and sizes. By ‘various kinds’ we understand various degrees of grammaticalisation of the significators.

Finally, in the present work, a system will be conceived of as a set of objects and of at least one relation defined on that set. For instance, the set of meanings (i.e. dimension), the set of significators (i.e. category), and the relation(s) of signification form a system of $A$. In such a case, the expression the system of $A$ refers to the dimension of $A$, the category of $A$, and the relations that bind meanings belonging to the dimension of $A$ with their significators.

## 3.4 Delimitativity and totivity

In view of the objectives of this dissertation, a few words must be devoted to the system of delimitativity and the system of totivity, which are necessary for defining the notion of completion.

### 3.4.1 The system of delimitativity

To begin with, the system of delimitativity (or, simply, delimitativity) consists of:
• **the dimension of delimitativity** – that is, a set of delimitative meanings (termination, non-termination, and delimitative neutrality);

• **the category of delimitativity** – that is, a set of lingual units signifying delimitative meanings; and

• the relations binding delimitative meanings with their significators (e.g. the relation of lexification, the relation of semification, the relation of autosignification, etc.).

The dimension of delimitativity consists of three homogeneous meanings: termination, non-termination, and delimitative neutrality. The first of these (*termination*) constitutes a lingually conceptualised property of being terminated – that is, of not being in progress/ongoing. For instance, the event designated by the sentence *he read the book yesterday* possesses the property of being terminated. Importantly, as was assumed earlier in this chapter (see 3.1), the structure of the event is reflected in the structure of the sentence. Consequently, the property of being terminated is lingually conceptualised as the meaning of termination, which is subsequently signified by the sentence designating the event.

On the other hand, the meaning of *non-termination* is a lingually conceptualised property of being in progress/ongoing. Therefore, given that the event designated by the sentence *he was still reading the book* possesses the property of being in progress at the time of reference, this property is lingually conceptualised as the meaning of non-termination, and signified by the aforementioned sentence.

Finally, the meaning of *delimitative neutrality* is signified by lingual units which are compatible with neither termination nor non-termination. For instance, the designatum of the expression *the book* is neither an ongoing nor a terminated object (the spatial boundaries are irrelevant here). Consequently, this expression is delimitatively neutral.

We believe that the above notions are sufficiently intuitive and no further explanation is required.

3.4.2 The system of totivity

To continue, *the system of totivity* (or simply *totivity*) is conceived of as a system closely related to quantitative properties of the designated object. It consists of:

• **the dimension of totivity** – that is, a set of totive meanings (holicity\(^2\), partitivity, totive neutrality);

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\(^2\) As this term is based on the Ancient Greek stem ὅλος- [holo-] ‘whole’, it is spelled with ‘h’ instead of ‘wh’ (wholicity). Any resemblance to the English word *holy* and the suffix *-holic* is coincidental.
• **the category of totivity** – that is, a set of lingual units signifying totive meanings; and

- the relations binding totive meanings with their significators (e.g. the relation of lexification, the relation of semification, the relation of autosignification, etc.).

The dimension of totivity consists of three meanings: holicity, partitivity, and totive neutrality. By **holicity** (adj. *holic*) we understand a lingually conceptualised property of being whole. It is signified by expressions such as *entire, comprehensive, the whole book, in its entirety, all night long, he completed the task,* etc. On the other hand, **partitivity** is conceived of as a lingually conceptualised property of being partial. Thus, this meaning is signified by expressions like *a fragment, a fraction, partially, half-naked,* etc. Finally, **totive neutrality** is a lingually conceptualised property of being incompatible with the totive meanings of holicity and partitivity.

In this research, it has been observed that the distinction between partitivity and holicity is not entirely clear, because these meanings are not always mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it seems that the property of being partial turns gradually into the property of being whole. Consequently, the meanings of partitivity and holicity are lingual conceptualisations of the degree to which an event is whole. Following this train of thought, it is possible to conceive of partitivity as the lingual conceptualisation of the property of being partially whole. To illustrate this concept, let us consider the following example:

(3.4.2.1) John has read this book almost completely.

From the above sentence two conclusions are to be drawn:

- John has not yet read this book completely (i.e. from beginning to end), but
- The greatest part of the book has already been read by John.

The first conclusion implies that the sentence in (3.4.2.1) signifies partitivity, as John has not read the whole book. In other words, there is still a small part of the book which he has not yet read. At the same time, following the second conclusion, the sentence in question signifies that there exists a part of the book that has been read by John completely. That is to say, John must have completed the reading of the greatest part of the book. All things considered, the sentence in (5.4.2.1) signifies the partial holicity of the designated event.

In the present dissertation, the term **totive ambiguity** (and its derivatives) will be used to refer to lingual units being sufficient significators of neither partitivity nor holicity. This means that totively ambiguous lingual units are ambiguous between the signification of partitivity and
the signification of holicity. What characterises lingual units of this kind is that they signify at least partial holicity. Let us consider the following example:

\[(3.4.2.2) \text{ Htes o Akis ĉjavase ena vivlio. ‘Akis read a book yesterday.’} \]

As we will argue in Chapter 5.2.2, the above sentence is totively ambiguous, because it does not suffice to ascertain whether or not Akis read the book completely. It simply expresses the fact that Akis read no less than some part of the book. It is equally possible that he read only part of the book or that he read it completely.

To close this section, it should be mentioned that the system of totivity is only one of the quantitative systems. The set of all quantitative systems and the relations binding them will be called the hypersystem (i.e. the system of systems) of quantitativity.

3.5 Aspect

Having explained the system of delimitativity and the system of totivity, something should now be said about the system of aspect (or simply aspect). For this purpose, this section is devoted to the dimension of aspect (with the main focus placed on the notion of completion) and the category of aspect. Additionally, the distinction is made between aspect and aspectuality.

3.5.1 The dimension of aspect

The dimension of aspect is composed of three aspective meanings:

- completion;
- incompletion; and
- aspective neutrality.

These are lingually conceptualised aspective properties of, respectively: being completed, being incompleted, and being compatible with neither completion nor incompletion. For the purposes of this dissertation, the notion of completion is defined as follows:

3.5.1.1 The definition of completion

Po 3.5.1.1 Postulate of the dependency of completion upon termination

If a lingual unit \(X\) signifies completion, then \(X\) signifies termination.

Po 3.5.1.2 Postulate of the dependency of completion upon holicity

If a lingual unit \(X\) signifies completion, then \(X\) signifies holicity.
According to the above definition, completion is a complex meaning obligatorily combining termination with holicity. That is to say, by virtue of 3.5.1.1, every lingual unit signifying completion should simultaneously signify termination and holicity. It is noteworthy that, although the above postulates express necessary conditions (i.e. conditions which must be fulfilled) for the meaning of completion to be signified, there is a possibility that they do not suffice to define this concept precisely. We believe, however, that they are sufficient for the purposes of this study.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that completion does not necessarily refer to the holicity of a concrete object (e.g. a book, a table, a house, etc.), but may also refer to the entirety of a transition from initial state \( A \) into final state \( B \), where these states are contradictory to each other. Therefore, provided that the Modern Greek verb form *pethane* ‘(s)he died’ signifies completion, then on the strength of Po 3.5.1.2 it signifies holicity as well. This means that the transition from the initial state of being alive to the final state of being dead was complete.

Among the corollaries of the definition of completion are:

Co 3.5.1.1  *Incompatibility of completion with delimitative meanings other than termination*
If a lingual unit \( X \) does not signify termination, then \( X \) does not signify completion.

Co 3.5.1.2  *Incompatibility of completion with partitivity and totive neutrality*
If a lingual unit \( X \) does not signify holicity, then \( X \) does not signify completion.

Co 3.5.1.3  *Aspective ambiguity*
If a lingual unit \( X \) signifies termination and, at the same time, \( X \) is totively ambiguous, then \( X \) is asceptively ambiguous.

The first two corollaries express conditions which must be fulfilled so that any lingual unit \( X \) signifies completion. By virtue of Co 3.5.1.1, every significator of completion is simultaneously a significator of termination. Furthermore, according to Co 3.5.1.2, every significator of completion is also a significator of holicity. In other words, from the above corollaries it follows that a lingual unit which does not signify termination or holicity does not signify completion.

The last corollary, Co 3.5.1.3, states that a lingual unit which signifies termination but does not signify sufficiently either partitivity or holicity is asceptively ambiguous. Consequently, neither does it signify completion sufficiently. To give an example, let us consider the following sentences:

(3.5.1.1)  a. *O Pavlos anikse tin porta telios.* ‘Paul opened the door completely.’
           b. *O Pavlos anikse elafra tin porta.* ‘Paul opened the door slightly.’
Chapter 3 – Methodological clarifications

c. O Pavlos anikse tin porta. ‘Paul opened the door.’

The first remark regarding the above sentences is that each of them designates a terminated event. These events, however, differ in respect of their totive properties. The first sentence signifies holicity, meaning that Paul opened the door wide. Consequently, in the light of 3.5.1.1 this sentence signifies completion, as it signifies simultaneously termination and holicity. The second sentence signifies the meaning of partitivity, which means that Paul did not open the door entirely. Thus, on the strength of 3.5.1.1 it is inferred that the sentence in question does not signify completion, because it does not signify holicity. Importantly, by virtue of 3.5.1.1 the designated event is conceived of as incompleted regardless of whether or not it was Paul’s intention to open the door only slightly. Finally, the last sentence is totively ambiguous, and therefore it is also aspectively ambiguous. This means that the sentence in (3.5.1.1c.) does not clarify to what degree Paul opened the door. He might have opened it wide, or he might just as well have opened it slightly.

It should be noted that the aspective ambiguity of the sentence in (3.5.1.1c.) may seem contrary to lingual intuition. Such an interpretation, however, is forced by the definition of completion introduced at the beginning of this section. To illustrate this issue, let us consider for a moment an event of reading a book. It is reasonable to regard this event as completed on condition that the whole book (and not merely some part of it) has been read. If, however, the book has been read only to some degree (but not completely), then the event is incompleted. Analogously, the event of opening the door is conceived of as completed on condition that it has been opened entirely; if it has been opened only to some degree, then the event is incompleted. This matter is further discussed and explained in Chapters 5 and 6.

It is noteworthy that incompleteness and completion may be conceived of as aspective meanings which are lingual conceptualisations of the degree to which an event has been completed (cf. the property of being partially whole on p. 89). In this case, incompleteness is a lingual conceptualisation of the property of being partially completed, whereas completion constitutes a lingual conceptualisation of the property of being entirely completed. Let us consider the following example:

(3.5.1.2) Anne has read the book almost completely.

Based on the above sentence, the following conclusions are drawn:

• Anne has not yet read the book completely, and
• The greatest part of the book has already been read by Anne.
Following the first conclusion, the sentence in (3.5.1.2) signifies incompletion, as Anne has not read the book from beginning to end. Simultaneously, however, this sentence signifies that Anne should have already read the greatest part of the book. Therefore, the event of Anne’s reading the book designated by the sentence in (3.5.1.2) possesses the property of being partially completed.

As regards aspective neutrality, it is signified by lingual units compatible with neither the meaning of completion nor incompletion. Consequently, it is signified by lingual units such as table, white, colour, buzz, light, dark, etc.

To close, it should be emphasised that the above considerations constitute only one of many possible approaches to the meaning of completion and to the dimension of aspect in general. Consequently, although in this dissertation it is assumed that completion is a complex meaning obligatorily involving termination and holicity, this meaning may be approximated from many (sometimes completely different) angles. Moreover, it should be emphasised that rarely is completion defined in the Modern Greek aspectological literature. We believe that this is because completion is considered a primitive and, therefore, sufficiently intuitive concept. Nevertheless, the present research indicates that the concept of completion may be understood in a variety of (often significantly different) ways. For instance, our understanding of completion as native speakers of Polish does not always correspond to the understanding of the concept by native speakers of Modern Greek. Consequently, for the sake of clarity, some assumptions regarding completion needed to be made.

3.5.2 The category of aspect

To proceed to the category of aspect, it is conceived of as a set of lingual units signifying aspective meanings. Because this category is composed of lingual units of various size and kind, the lingual units belonging to it include morphemes, word forms, phrases, clauses, etc. To put it differently, the category of aspect is a set of all lingual units signifying completion, incompletion, or aspective neutrality. The elements of the category of aspect will hereinafter be called aspective significators.

Based on the relation of signification, the following classes of aspective significators are to be distinguished:

- The class of significators of completion;
- The class of significators of incompletion;
- The class of significators of aspective neutrality; and
- The class of aspectively ambiguous lingual units.
As is suggested by the names of the above classes, the first three are composed of lingual units signifying completion, incompletion, and aspective neutrality respectively. The last class, however, consists of lingual units that are ambiguous between completion and incompletion. That is to say, **they are sufficient significators of neither incompletion nor completion.** Thus, they signify completion or incompletion depending on context. Another way of putting it is that this class **is composed of lingual units signifying at least partial completion** of an event.

### 3.5.3 The completed event

According to the assumptions of Chapter 3.2, events may be lingually referred to by means of sentences. Furthermore, the structure of the sentence should reflect the structure of the designated event. This means that sentences convey meanings which are lingually conceptualised properties of the designated event. It should be emphasised that in this dissertation the term *sentence* refers solely to contextually unconditioned sentences. Therefore, any possible modification of a meaning by context is not taken into consideration.

This being said, the following corollaries regarding the designation of completed events are inferred:

**Co 3.5.3.1 The designation of completed events**
If a sentence $S$ signifies completion, then the event $e$ designated by $S$ is a completed event.

**Co 3.5.3.2 The designation of terminated and holic events**
If a sentence $S$ signifies completion, then the event $e$ designated by $S$ is a terminated and holic event.

**Co 3.5.3.3 The signification of an aspective meaning other than completion**
If a sentence $S$ does not designate a completed event $e$, then $S$ does not signify completion.

**Co 3.5.3.4 The signification of a meaning other than termination or holicity**
If a sentence $S$ does not designate a completed event $e$, then $S$ does not signify termination or holicity.

According to the first of the above corollaries, every sentence signifying completion designates necessarily a completed event. That is to say, by virtue of the definition of completion (see 3.5.1.1) every sentence signifying completion designates a terminated and a holic event. In other words, the completed event designated by such a sentence must necessarily possess the
properties of being terminated and of being whole. This statement is formally expressed in Co 3.5.3.2.

In Co 3.5.3.3 it is stated that an event which is not completed may not be designated by a sentence signifying completion. Therefore, for instance, an incompleted event may not be lingually referred to by a sentence signifying completion. Otherwise, the structure of the sentence would not reflect the structure of the designated event (which is contrary to the assumptions made at the beginning of this chapter). Moreover, on the strength of the definition of completion (see 3.5.1.1) it is inferred that a sentence which does not designate a completed event does not signify termination or holicity. In other words, a sentence which does not signify termination or holicity does not designate a completed event. This corollary is expressed in Co 3.5.3.4.

Finally, it is assumed in this dissertation that momentous events possess the property of being completed. This assumption is formally expressed as the postulate:

Po 3.5.3.1 Postulate of completedness of momentous events
If an event $e$ is momentous, then $e$ is completed.

This assumption may be illustrated with the use of the following example:

(3.5.3.1) $O$ Kostas vrike to vivlio tu pano sto grafio.
‘Kostas found his book on the desk.’

A characteristic feature of the above sentence is that it designates a momentous event – that is, an event with minimal duration. This being the case, by virtue of Po 3.5.3.1 it is inferred that the event designated by the above sentence is also completed. The relation between momentarity and completion is further discussed in Chapter 5.

3.5.4 Aspect, aspectuality, and aspectology
As noted in the previous sections, there are three aspective meanings: completion, incompletion, and aspective neutrality. These meanings are grouped together to form the dimension of aspect. Furthermore, these three aspective meanings specify a set of lingual units signifying them – the set of aspective significators. The set of all significators of aspective meanings is called the category of aspect. Furthermore, aspective meanings and their significators are bound by various kinds of the relation of signification (e.g. the relation of autosignification, the relation of cosignification, the relation of semification, etc.). The
dimension of aspect, the category of aspect, and the relations binding aspective meanings with aspective significators form the system of aspect or, simply, aspect.

The system of aspect should not be confused with aspectuality, which is a hypersystem (i.e. a system of systems). This means that in the present dissertation aspectuality is conceived of as a system of aspektual systems, each of which maps the fragments of aspektual reality. Therefore, aspectuality is a hypernym of systems such as aspect, habituality, plicativity, perdurativity, etc. Moreover, according to this approach, aspectuality consists of the set of aspektual dimensions (the dimension of aspect, the dimension of habituality, the dimension of plicativity, the dimension of perdurativity, etc.), the set of aspektual categories (the category of aspect, the category of habituality, the category of plicativity, the category of perdurativity, etc.), and relations which bind aspektual meanings belonging to aspektual dimensions with lingual units belonging to aspektual categories.

![Diagram](Fig. 3.5.4.1 [The hypersystem of] aspectuality.)

Finally, we use the term aspectology to refer to a class of theories oriented towards the aspektual realities of languages. The objectives of aspectology are to describe native speakers’ aspektual lingual knowledge. Keeping that in mind, aspectology may be considered a subdiscipline of linguistics which explores and describes aspectuality. Furthermore, aspectological theories may be oriented towards the aspektual lingual knowledge possessed by native speakers of a single language or by native speakers of various languages. In the former case, we will speak of particular aspectology, whereas in the latter case we will speak of general aspectology (Bańczerowski 2015: 169).

### 3.6 Imperfect, aorist and perfect

We restrict our research to three Modern Greek tenses: imperfect (paratatikos), aorist (aoristos) and perfect (parakimenos) (see Chapter 2.2). The term tense is understood as a set of sets of verb paradigms which are homotemporal, homomodal, and sufficiently similar in respect of
aspectuality (cf. Bańczerowski and Oueslati 2017: 10). In view of the objectives of this dissertation, we shall not be going into detail regarding the morphological properties of these tenses or how they are formed. More details on this subject may be found in Modern Greek grammars (e.g. Mackridge 1985, Triantafyllidis 1981, Holton & Mackridge & Philippaki-Warburton 1998, Klaris & Mpampiniotis 2005, Ralli 2005, Katsouda 2007, etc.). Moreover, we leave unanswered the question of whether or not all three constructions: eho grapsi ‘I have written’, [to] eho grameno ‘I have [it] written’ and ine grammeno ‘it is written’ belong to the perfect tense of Modern Greek (cf. Tzartzanos 1963a, Iatridou 1994, Hedin 1995).

For the purposes of our research, we shall extend the tensive classification of verbs into a classification of predicate phrases, clauses, and sentences. Therefore, we distinguish imperfect verb forms, imperfect predicate phrases, imperfect clauses, and imperfect sentences. Analogously, there are aoristic verb forms, aoristic predicate phrases, aoristic clauses, and aoristic sentences, as well as perfect verb forms, perfect predicate phrases, perfect clauses, and perfect sentences. By the term imperfect verb form we understand any verb form V being an element of a paradigm which belongs to the imperfect tense. That is to say, the imperfect tense consists of the paradigms which are sets of imperfect verb forms. Mutatis mutandis, we use the term aoristic verb form to refer to any verb form V which is an element of a paradigm belonging to the aorist tense, and the term perfect verb form to refer to any verb form V which is an element of a paradigm belonging to the perfect tense. Furthermore, imperfect verb forms are used in imperfect predicate phrases, imperfect clauses, and imperfect sentences. Aoristic verb forms are used in aoristic predicate phrases, aoristic clauses, and aoristic sentences, whereas perfect verb forms are used in perfect predicate phrases, perfect clauses, and perfect sentences.

3.7 Sentences

As is indicated by the title of this dissertation, the notion of completion in Modern Greek will be explored with the use of aspectively adversative sentences. Consequently, in this section the concepts of the adversative sentence and of a special kind of such sentence (the aspectively adversative sentence) are defined. Additionally, some essential concepts and assumptions which are directly connected to this kind of sentence are proposed and explained.

3.7.1 Negative and negated sentences and clauses

To begin with, some words should be said about sentences with negation. As we will argue in this section, these may be approached from two different perspectives. Firstly, they may be
conceived of as single units, of which negation is a constituent. Such sentences will be hereinafter referred to as **negative sentences**. The following are examples of negative sentences:

(3.7.1.1) a. John didn’t read the book.
   b. Anne bought no apple.
   c. Neither do I.

On the other hand, a negative sentence may be analysed as consisting of two components:

- **The negation**
- **The negated sentence** – that is, the argument of the negation.

This means that each negative sentence may be formally represented as \(~S\), which is read ‘it is not true that S’ or ‘sentence S is not true’. The symbol ‘\(~\)’ is used to represent negation, while \(S\) stands for the negated sentence. In the light of these considerations, the negative sentences in (3.7.1.1) may be analysed as:

(3.7.1.2) a. \(~(John\ read\ the\ book)\)
   b. \(~(Anne\ bought\ an\ apple)\)
   c. \(~(so\ do\ I)\)

As shown here, the first example is composed of negation and the negated sentence *John read the book*. In other words, the sentence *John read the book* is the argument of negation. Analogously, the second example is composed of negation and the negated sentence *Anne bought an apple*. In the last example the argument of negation is the sentence *so do I*.

An analogous distinction is to be made between **negative clause** and **negated clause**. The former should correspond to the negative sentence, whereas the latter should correspond to the negated sentence. Let us consider the following examples:

(3.7.1.3) a. John didn’t like books […] (e.g. when he was young)
   b. \(~(John\ liked\ books)\) […] (e.g. when he was young)

The clause in (3.7.1.3a.) constitutes a **negative clause** of a compound or a complex sentence, because negation is a constituent of this clause. On the other hand, in (3.7.1.3b.) the clause *John liked books* is conceived of as the argument of negation. Therefore, *John liked books* is a **negated clause**.
3.7.2 Adversative sentences

In order to explain the term adversative sentences, some words should first be said about the adversative conjunction. **Adversative conjunctions** are sometimes considered the most varied kind of conjunctions from the semanto-formal perspective (Bednarczuk 1965: 25, 1967: 68). For instance, Katsouda (2008: 205; cf. Klairis & Mpampiniotis Tzartzanos 2005: 981f., 1963b: 36–43) distinguish six Modern Greek adversative conjunctions (i.e. *ala*, *ma*, *mono*, *omos*, *para*, and *ostoso*) used for contrastive purposes. Since the subject of the current research is not the exploration of adversative constructions in general, we will restrict our attention to the Modern Greek adversative conjunction *ala* ‘but’.

Importantly, it is argued by linguists that the adversative conjunctions *ala* and *but* are polysemous (Tzartzanos 1963b: 36–9, Malchukov 2004: 178ff., Kapatsinski 2009: 158ff., and others). For instance, Tzartzanos (1963b: 36–9) distinguishes five uses of the Modern Greek conjunction *ala*. Firstly, it may link affirmative and negative clauses to form coordinate sentences – see (3.7.2.1a.–b.). Moreover, *ala* is used to express an agreement or deal – see (3.7.2.1c.) – as well as objections – see (3.7.2.1d.). Finally, it may be used for emphatic purposes to express surprise, admiration, delight, etc. – see (3.7.2.1e.).

(3.7.2.1) 

a. *Efkola beni kanis stin filaki, ala poli ∂iskola vjeni.*
   ‘It is easy to get to prison, but it is very difficult to get out of there.’

b. *Irtha na sas ipo kalos orisate, ala ďen sas evrika.*
   ‘I came to welcome you, but I didn’t find you.’

c. *Erhome ki ego, ala ego erhome me amaksi.*
   ‘I’ll also come, but I’ll come by car.’

d. *Ma to proi ďen mu ipe topote.*
   ‘But he didn’t say anything to me this morning.’

e. *Ma ti kima!*  
   What a [wonderful] wave!

(3.7.2.2) 

a. John has a yacht, but Bill is deep in debt.

b. John is tall, but he’s no good at basketball.

c. He wanted to leave, but he was detained.

On the other hand, Kapatsinski (2009: 158) follows Lakoff (1971) and Payne (1985) in distinguishing three basic meanings signified by the English adversative conjunction *but*. Firstly, it expresses semantic opposition – see the sentence in (3.7.2.2a.). Secondly, it expresses
denial of expectation – see the sentence in (3.7.2.2b.). And finally, it expresses prevention – see the sentence in (3.7.2.2c.).

It must be emphasised that in the present research the main focus is placed solely on compound sentences whose clauses are linked by the adversative conjunction *ala* ‘but’ (cf. Winter & Rimon 1994, Rudolph 1996, Haspelmath 2009). Moreover, most attention is given to sentences in which the adversative conjunction *ala* ‘but’ links one affirmative clause and one negative clause – see (3.7.2.1b.). Other kinds of compound sentences are excluded (see Katsouda 2008: 205–7). Consequently, the following definition introduces the set of adversative sentences:

### 3.7.2.1 The definition of the adversative sentence

**Postulate of linking of sentences to form an adversative sentence**

If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then $S$ is composed of two clauses: $S_i$ and $S_j$.

**Postulate of linking of clauses by an adversative conjunction**

If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then its constituent clauses are linked by an adversative conjunction.

**Postulate of linking of an affirmative and a negative sentence**

If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then exactly one of its clauses (either $S_i$ or $S_j$) is a negative clause.

According to the above definition, an adversative sentence is a compound sentence composed of exactly two clauses: one affirmative clause and one negative clause. Furthermore, these clauses are linked by an adversative conjunction. As has already been mentioned, the adversative conjunction considered in the present research is the Modern Greek conjunction *ala* ‘but’. Of course, this does not mean that the clauses of an adversative sentence may not be linked by means of other adversative conjunctions (e.g. *although*, *even though*, etc.), but adversative sentences of this kind are simply not explored in the present dissertation.

In the light of 3.7.2.1, the set of adversative sentences includes, for instance:

(3.7.2.1)  

a. *O Petros ine psilos, ala ∂en pezi basket.*  
‘Peter is tall, but he doesn’t play basketball.’

b. *I Marika ∂javase afto to vivlio, ala ∂en to teliose pote.*  
‘Marika read this book, but she has never finished it.’
c. Τα παιδιά εφύγαν αλλά δεν είχαν ήδη φτάσει εκεί ακόμη.

‘The children went to school, but they haven’t reached their destination yet.’

Each of the above sentences may be seen to be a compound sentence consisting of two clauses, exactly one of which is a negative clause. Additionally, these clauses are linked by the adversative conjunction ala ‘but’. This being the case, in the light of 3.7.2.1, the above sentences are adversative sentences.

To close this section, it must be noted that the definition of adversative sentences introduced here consists of three postulates. These postulates express conditions which must be necessarily fulfilled for a sentence to be an adversative sentence. It is by no means to be inferred that these three postulates suffice to define the concept precisely. More detailed study of this matter is needed in the future.

3.7.3 Aspectively adversative sentences

In view of the objectives of this dissertation, a special kind of adversative sentences needs to be distinguished – namely, aspectively adversative sentences. Nonetheless, before this concept is defined, some words should be said about sufficient homolexicality. This is understood as a reflexive, transitive, and symmetric relation binding two lingual units $X_i$ and $X_j$ that permits opposition in respect of the dimension of totivity (see Chapter 3.4.2). This means that two sufficiently homolexical lingual units may lexify different totive meanings, whereas other meanings lexified by those lingual units are obligatorily identical. For example, let us consider the following pairs of sentences:

(3.1.1) a. Tom ate the apple.

b. Tom ate the whole apple.

(3.1.2) a. Tom ate the apple.

b. Tom ate the whole orange.

The sentences of the first pair lexify identical meanings except for their totive meanings. This is because the sentence in (3.1.1b.) lexifies the meaning of holicity, whereas the sentence in (3.1.1a.) does not. It is inferred from this that the sentences in (3.1.1) are sufficiently homolexical. On the other hand, the sentences in (3.1.2) differ in more than just a totive meaning. This is because the sentence in (3.1.2a.) designates an apple (and, thereby, it lexifies the properties of the apple), whereas the sentence in (3.1.2b.) designates an orange (and,
therefore, it lexifies the properties of the orange). Consequently, the sentences in (3.1.2) are not sufficiently homolexical.

The set of **aspectively adversative sentences** is introduced by the following definition:

### 3.7.3.1 The definition of the aspectively adversative sentence

**Po 3.7.3.1 Postulate of being an adversative sentence**

If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then $S$ is an adversative sentence.

**Po 3.7.3.2 Postulate of sufficient homolexicality of the clauses**

If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then its constituent affirmative clause $S_i$ and negated clause $S_j$ are either homolexical or sufficiently homolexical.

**Po 3.7.3.3 Postulate of being homotemporal, homomodal, and homodiathetic**

If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then its constituent clauses are bound by the relations of homotemporality, homomodality, and homodiatheticity.

As follows from the first of the above postulates (Po 3.7.3.1), every aspectively adversative sentence is an adversative sentence. Consequently, by virtue of 3.7.2.1, aspectively adversative sentences are compound sentences composed of two clauses. These clauses are linked by means of an adversative conjunction. More specifically, in the present dissertation, these clauses are linked by the conjunction *ala* ‘but’. (As mentioned above, other adversative conjunctions are not taken into consideration in this research.) Furthermore, an aspectively adversative sentence is composed of exactly one affirmative and one negative clause.

To continue, according to Po 3.7.3.2, the affirmative clause and the negated clause\(^3\) being the constituents of an aspectively adversative sentence are either homolexical or sufficiently homolexical. This means that these clauses are either homolexical or sufficiently similar in respect of the meanings which they lexify (see Chapter 3.1), as the relation of being sufficiently homolexical binds lingual units which lexify identical meanings except for totive meanings. That is to say, two sufficiently homolexical lingual units may lexify different totive meanings.

It should be emphasised that Po 3.7.3.2 allows slight modifications of constituent clauses $S_i$ and $S_j$, such as the addition of a totificative determiner (e.g. *olos* ‘whole’, *olokliros* ‘entire’, *pliros* ‘completely’, *telika* ‘finally’, etc.), or replacement of a noun with an appropriate pronoun.

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\(^3\) As mentioned in Chapter 3.7.1, a negated clause is the argument of negation.
Consequently, the sentences *Tom ate the apple* and *Tom ate it* [apple] are homolexical. Analogously, the pairs of sentences *Tom ate the apple* and *Tom ate the whole apple*, as well as *Tom ate the apple* and *Tom finally ate the apple*, are considered sufficiently homolexical. On the other hand, neither the pair of sentences *Tom ate an apple* and *Tom beat his younger brother* nor the pair of sentences *Tom ate an apple* and *Tom ate an orange* is either homolexical or sufficiently homolexical.

As regards Po 3.7.3.3, it is assumed that the constituent clauses of an aspectively adversative sentence are bound by the relations of homotemporality, homomodality, and homodiatheticity. This means that the constituent clauses of an aspectively adversative sentence signify identical temporal meaning (therefore, they are homotemporal), they signify identical modal meaning (they are homomodal), and they signify identical diathetic meaning (they are homodiathetic). It is noteworthy that this postulate says nothing about the homoaspectivity of the constituent clauses of an aspectively adversative sentence. This is because they may signify different aspective meaning. In fact, as will be argued in the following section, one of the characteristics of correct aspectively adversative sentences is that their constituent clauses are bound by the relation of aspective opposition. In other words, the constituent clauses of these sentences are adversative in respect of their aspective meanings. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 3.8.2.

By virtue of 3.7.3.1, the class of aspectively adversative sentences includes, for instance:

(3.7.3.1)  

a. *I Maria ďjavaze to vivlio, ala ďen to ďjavase olo.*  
‘Mary was reading the book, but she didn’t read it all.’

b. *O Kostas anikse tin porta, ala ďen tin anikse orthanihta.*  
‘Kostas opened the door, but he didn’t open it wide.’

c. *To peđi pethene, ala sto telos ďen pethane.*  
‘The child was dying, but in the end it didn’t die.’

Before proceeding to the next section, it should be noted that the formation of aspectively adversative sentences by linking two homolexical or sufficiently homolexical simple sentences may cause the repetition of some parts of the sentence, such as subject or objects. As a result, the obtained aspectively adversative sentences may seem awkward. Consider the following examples:

(3.7.3.2)  

a. *I Maria ďjavaze to vivlio.* ‘Mary was reading the book.’

b. *I Maria ďen ďjavase olo to vivlio.* ‘Mary didn’t read the whole book.’
The above adversative sentence is formed by linking two sufficiently homolexical sentences: *i Maria ḏjavaze to vivlio* ‘Mary was reading the book’ and *i Maria ḏen ḏjavase olo to vivlio* ‘Mary didn’t read the whole book’. As a result, the subject *i Maria* and the direct object *to vivlio* are used twice in the resulting aspectively adversative sentence – see (3.7.3.2c.). This repetition may be avoided, however, because homolexicality is a symmetric relation. This means that the sentence in (3.7.3.2c.) may be modified by replacing the negative clause *i Maria ḏen ḏjavase olo to vivlio* ‘Mary didn’t read the whole book’ with its homolexical counterpart *[i Maria] ḏen to [to vivlio] ḏjavase olo* ‘She [Mary] didn’t read all of it [the book]’. As a result of this modification, the aspectively adversative sentence in (3.7.3.2c.) is transformed into the following sentence:

(3.7.3.3)  *I Maria ḏjavaze to vivlio, ala ḏen to ḏjavase olo.*

‘Mary was reading the book, but she didn’t read all of it.’

Importantly, since the aforementioned replacement of the negative clause with its homolexical counterpart affects neither the grammatical nor the semantic properties of the aspectively adversative sentence, the sentences in (3.7.3.2c.) and in (3.7.3.3) should be considered to be paratactically indistinguishable.

Finally, it should be emphasised that, because of the objectives of the present dissertation, the only aspectively adversative sentences considered in this research are those which are formed by linking imperfect, aorist, or perfect sentences. Sentences signifying other temporal, aspectual, or modal meanings are not included in the considerations.

### 3.8 Grammaticality, sensicality and correctness

As will be assumed later in this section (see 3.8.2), the constituent clauses of a correct aspectively adversative sentence are bound by the relation of aspective opposition. This assumption, however, requires a precise and clear apparatus for classifying sentences and other syntagmata as correct and incorrect. For this purpose, three dimensions are distinguished: well-formedness, meaningfulness and correctivity. Consequently, there are six classes of syntagmata:

- The class of grammatical syntagmata;
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- The class of ungrammatical syntagmata;
- The class of sensical syntagmata;
- The class of nonsensical syntagmata;
- The class of correct syntagmata; and
- The class of incorrect syntagmata.

It should be noted that the terms grammaticality and correctness are used ambiguously in the linguistic literature, causing their status to be insufficiently clear. For instance, grammaticality may refer, on the one hand, only to these syntagmata which violate neither morphological nor syntactic rules of the analysed language. In this case, the meanings signified by a syntagma are not considered (Chomsky 1965: 11f., Lyons 1981: 102f.). On the other hand, grammaticality may be taken to refer to syntagmata which are not only consistent with the morphological and syntactic rules of a language, but are also sensical (Polański et al. 1993: 182f.). Interestingly, Lyons (1981: 104) says that ‘sentences are, by definition, grammatical (i.e. grammatically well-formed)’. Consequently, in his view, ungrammatical ‘strings of words’ do not form sentences.

As regards correctness, this term is used within proscriptive linguistics to refer to utterances or syntagmata which are sensical and which do not violate the morphological or syntactic rules of a standardised grammar of a language (Asher 1994: 775–80). Importantly, following this approach, it is possible to distinguish expressions which are incorrect despite being commonly used by native speakers of a language. For instance, in Modern Greek the form eksiga ‘exported’ is commonly used by native speakers of Greek as a verb form representing both the imperfect and the aorist tense. However, according to the grammar of Standard Modern Greek, the correct form of the aorist tense is eksigaga (Mackridge 1985, Holton & Mackridge & Philippaki-Warburton 1998, Klairis & Mpampiniotis 2005, and others). On the other hand, Itkonen (1976: 186–8) focuses on native speakers’ intuitive (i.e. atheoretical) knowledge of a language and their ability to recognise correct and incorrect sentences. This ability is due to their intuitive knowledge of rules ‘which determine correct sentences as conceptual possibilities’ (Itkonen 1976: 188). Moreover, for him, correctness is a normative concept, and the rules by which sentences are recognised as correct or incorrect ‘are known with absolute certainty, which means that sentences referring to them are infalsifiable, or necessarily true’ (Itkonen 1976: 187). Nonetheless, it is possible that native speakers will be hesitant about the

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4 Based on the author’s observations.
correctness of a sentence. In such cases, statistical analysis may serve to identify relevant tendencies in the language.

Given the above considerations, in the present dissertation the term the dimension of well-formedness will be used to refer to the morphological and syntactic structure of a syntagma. Accordingly, any syntagma $S$ is grammatical if its morphological and syntactic structure does not violate any morphological or syntactic rules of the grammar of the analysed language. For instance, the syntagma *there is a lot of data about aspect* is grammatical, since it does not violate any morphological or syntactic rules of English. In contrast, the syntagma *#there is a lot of datums about aspect* is ungrammatical, for it violates morphological rules (#datums), whereas the syntagma *#there is about aspect a data lots of* is ungrammatical since it violates the syntactic rules of English. We will hereinafter employ the symbol “#” to mark ungrammaticality. Importantly, the dimension of well-formedness specifies the classification of syntagmata as grammatical and ungrammatical solely with respect to their morphological and syntactic structure. The meanings signified by a syntagma are not considered. Therefore, syntagmata may be classified as grammatical, even though they are nonsensical. For instance, the syntagma *the stone beat him restlessly* is grammatical, regardless of whether it makes sense or not.

The second dimension, that is the dimension of meaningfulness (cf. meaningfulness in Lyons 1971: 137ff. and zdanie semantyczne/semantycznie interpretowalne in Grochowski & Karolak & Topolińska 1984: 15), specifies the classification of syntagmata into sensical and nonsensical. To begin with the latter, any syntagma $S$ is nonsensical if the meanings signified by $S$ are not combinable with one another (cf. Grochowski & Karolak & Topolińska 1984: 15). Therefore, the syntagma *the stone beat him restlessly* is nonsensical, because the adverb restlessly signifies the meaning of animacy, whereas the subject (i.e. the stone) signifies the meaning of inanimacy. Of course, for the purposes of exemplification, we do not consider contexts in which the stone is personified for stylistic or any other reasons. In the present dissertation, the symbol “*” will be used to mark nonsensical syntagmata. On the other hand, if the meanings signified by the syntagma are combinable with one another, the syntagma is sensical. Consequently, the syntagma *Tom beat him restlessly* is sensical, as Tom is an animate being.

Finally, the dimension of correctivity serves to distinguish correct and incorrect syntagmata. For the purposes of this research, we define a correct syntagma as follows:
3.8.1 The definition of a correct syntagma

Po 3.8.1 Postulate of grammaticality of correct syntagmata
If a syntagma $S$ is correct, then $S$ is grammatical.

Po 3.8.2 Postulate of sensicality of correct syntagmata
If a syntagma $S$ is correct, then $S$ is sensical.

In accordance with the above definition, the expression *correct syntagma* refers to a syntagma which is simultaneously grammatical and sensical. Therefore, a syntagma $S$ is correct on condition that it does not violate either morphological or syntactic rules of the grammar of the analysed language and, simultaneously, it is not self-contradictory due to the meanings conveyed by its constituents.

Based on the above 3.8.1, *incorrect syntagmata* will be defined as follows:

3.8.2 The definition of an incorrect syntagma

A syntagma $S$ is incorrect iff $S$ is ungrammatical or nonsensical.

In the light of the above definition, any syntagma is incorrect under the condition that it is ungrammatical or nonsensical. Thus, it should be inferred that any ungrammatical syntagma is incorrect. Analogously, any nonsensical syntagma is also incorrect. These corollaries are formally expressed as follows:

Co 3.8.1 Incorrectness of ungrammatical syntagmata
If a syntagma $S$ is ungrammatical, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.2 Incorrectness of nonsensical syntagmata
If a syntagma $S$ is nonsensical, then $S$ is incorrect.

Incorrect syntagmata will be marked with the symbol “x” preceding them. Nevertheless, for purposes of clarity, this symbol will be used either with syntagmata which are simultaneously ungrammatical and nonsensical, or when it is unknown whether a syntagma is ungrammatical or nonsensical.

It is noteworthy that the above definition of correct syntagmata takes account of the properties of grammaticality and sensicality, but completely neglects the stylistic properties of a syntagma. Consequently, a correct syntagma may be stylistically awkward. This is an issue that requires further study in the future.

There are two more corollaries to be listed in this section:
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Co 3.8.3 Incorrectness of ungrammatical sentences
If a sentence $S$ is ungrammatical, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.4 Incorrectness of nonsensical sentences
If a sentence $S$ is nonsensical, then $S$ is incorrect.

As has been argued earlier, every ungrammatical or nonsensical syntagma is incorrect. Therefore, bearing in mind that a sentence is also a syntagma (see Table 3.2.1), it is inferred that ungrammatical sentences are also incorrect. *Mutatis mutandis*, it is inferred that every nonsensical sentence is also incorrect. These corollaries are expressed in Co 3.8.3 and Co 3.8.4 respectively.

To close, correctness should not be confused with the acceptability of a syntagma, since the latter (unlike the former) allows violations (at least to some extent) of grammatical rules (cf. Lyons 1981: 104, Borsley 1991: 5). However, in the present research, we focus on grammatical syntagmata, leaving the ungrammatical but acceptable syntagmata of Modern Greek for future study. It should also be kept in mind that the line between grammaticality, sensicality, and correctness may sometimes be fluid. Nonetheless, we believe that the above assumptions are sufficiently clear for the purposes of the present research.

3.8.1 Grammaticality, sensicality and correctness of adversative sentences

It is presumed in this research that aspectively adversative sentences are a reliable source of data regarding Modern Greek aspect. However, in order to reach and explore these data, there is a strong need for:

i. A reliable method of forming always grammatical adversative sentences of Modern Greek; and

ii. A reliable method of analysing adversative sentences in respect of the aspective meanings which they signify.

As is argued below, the achievement of the former should provide us with an insight into the sensicality of adversative sentences, which in turn should allow an analysis of the aspective meanings signified by Modern Greek aspestively adversative sentences. This is because, on the strength of 3.8.2, it is inferred that a grammatical sentence is incorrect if it is nonsensical. In other words, the incorrectness of a grammatical sentence is caused by its nonsensicality. *Mutatis mutandis*, by virtue of 3.8.1, a grammatical sentence is correct on condition that it is sensical (see also Chapter 4).
The following definitions of grammatical and ungrammatical adversative sentences are now introduced:

3.8.1.1 The definition of a grammatical adversative sentence
An adversative sentence $S$ is grammatical iff its constituent clauses ($S_i$ and $S_j$) are grammatical.

3.8.1.2 The definition of an ungrammatical adversative sentence
An adversative sentence $S$ is ungrammatical iff at least one of its constituent clauses ($S_i$ or $S_j$) is ungrammatical.

According to the former definition, it is assumed that an adversative sentence is grammatical on condition that it is composed of grammatical clauses. This means that the constituent clauses of a grammatical adversative sentence are obligatorily grammatical. On the other hand, if at least one of the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence is ungrammatical, then the adversative sentence is also ungrammatical – see 3.8.1.2. That is to say, none of the constituent clauses of a grammatical adversative sentence may be ungrammatical. Consider the following examples:

(3.8.1.1) a. O Αλέξανδρος ine ψιλός
‘Alexander is tall’
b. O Αλέξανδρος ďen pezi basket
‘Alexander doesn’t play basketball’
c. O Αλέξανδρος ine ψιλός, ala ďen pezi basket.’
‘Alexander is tall, but he doesn’t play basketball.’

(3.8.1.2) a. O Αλέξανδρος ine ψιλός
‘Alexander is tall’
b. #O Αλέξανδρος ďen pezun basket
#‘Alexander they-don’t play basketball’
c. # O Αλέξανδρος ine ψιλός, ala ďen pezun basket.’
#‘Alexander is tall, but he they-don’t play basketball.’

In (3.8.1.1) the adversative sentence is composed of two grammatical clauses, in the sense that they violate none of the morphological or syntactic rules of Modern Greek. Consequently, in the light of 3.8.1.1 the adversative sentence in (3.8.1.1c.) is also expected to be grammatical. As the above example shows, this conclusion is valid. On the other hand, the adversative
sentence in (3.8.1.2) is composed of one grammatical and one ungrammatical clause. In other words, one of these clauses violates at least one morphological or syntactic rule of Modern Greek. Therefore, as follows from 3.8.1.2, the adversative sentence in (3.8.1.2c.) is expected to be ungrammatical, because at least one of its constituent clauses is ungrammatical. The adversative sentence in question is indeed seen to be ungrammatical.

Among the corollaries of the above definition of a grammatical adversative sentence is:

Co 3.8.1.1 Grammaticality of adversative sentences formed by linking correct sentences
If the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ are correct, then $S$ is grammatical.

Following Po 3.8.1, every correct syntagma is grammatical. Therefore, if the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence are correct, then they are also grammatical. Furthermore, in the light of 3.8.1.1, if an adversative sentence is composed of two grammatical clauses, then it is itself grammatical. Thus, an adversative sentence whose constituent clauses are correct is grammatical. Let us illustrate this corollary with the following examples:

(3.8.1.3) a. *I Maria egrafe to vivlio
‘Mary was writing the book’
b. *den to teliose akomi
‘Mary hasn’t finished it yet’
c. *I Maria egrafe to vivlio, ala *den to teliose akomi.
‘Mary was writing the book, but she hasn’t finished it yet.’

The above adversative sentence is composed of two correct (and therefore grammatical) clauses: (3.8.1.3a.) and (3.8.1.3b.). Consequently, on the strength of Co 3.8.1.1, the adversative sentence in (3.8.1.3c.) is grammatical.

Importantly, grammaticality should not be confused with correctness (see the previous section). This is because, by virtue of 3.8.1, every correct sentence is grammatical, but the converse does not hold. That is to say, not every grammatical sentence is correct. To give an example, although the adversative sentence below is grammatical (and it is grammatical because its constituent clauses are correct), it is still nonsensical. Hence, it is incorrect:

(3.8.1.4) a. *I Maria misanikse tin porta, ala *den tin anikse
*‘Mary opened the door slightly, but she didn’t open it.’
b. *I Maria misanikse tin porta.*
   ‘Mary opened the door slightly.’

c. *[I Maria] ðen tin [tin porta] anikse.*
   ‘She [Mary] didn’t open it [the door].’

Given the above observation, the following assumption regarding the sensicality of adversative sentences is made:

**Po 3.8.1.1 Postulate of the non-implication of clauses**

If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of an adversative sentence $S$, $S_n$ is the negated clause of $S$, and $S$ is sensical, then $S_a$ does not imply $S_n$.

According to the above postulate, the negated clause of a sensical adversative sentence is not implied by the affirmative clause of that sentence (cf. Winter & Rimon 1994: 370). To illustrate, let us consider the following adversative sentence once again:

(3.8.1.5)  

a. *O Aleksanðros ine psilos, ala ðen pezi basket.*
   ‘Alexander is tall, but he doesn’t play basketball.’

b. *O Aleksanðros ine psilos* ‘Alexander is tall’

c. *[O Aleksanðros] ðen pezi basket* ‘[Alexander] doesn’t play basketball’

It should be noted that the adversative sentence in (3.8.1.5a.) is sensical; by virtue of Po 3.8.1.1 it is inferred that the affirmative clause *O Aleksanðros ine psilos* ‘Alexander is tall’ does not imply the negated clause *[O Aleksanðros] pezi basket.* ‘[Alexander] plays basketball’. In other words, one may not infer that Alexander plays basketball based solely on his height. In fact, the adversative sentence in question expresses that Alexander does not play basketball despite being tall. This observation is consistent with Po 3.8.1.1, for the negated clause of a sensical adversative sentence is not implied by the affirmative clause.

To continue, it is noteworthy that the linear order of the clauses of an adversative sentence is relatively flexible. In fact, we will argue that adversative sentences belong to the same syntagma regardless of the order of their constituent syntagmata, as they are indistinguishable in respect of their paratactic structure (see Chapter 3.2). To put it more simply, it is of lesser

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5 It should be mentioned that we use the term *implication* differently than it is used in semantics, as we follow the classical logic understanding of implication. Consequently, for us the formula $p \rightarrow q$ (which reads ‘$p$ implies $q$’) means that the truth of $p$ is always followed by the truth of $q$ (Bell & Machover 1977: 21, Batóg 2003: 13, cf. Winter & Rimon 1994: 375f.).
importance whether the affirmative clause constitutes the first or the second clause of an adversative sentence. To give an example, let us consider the following adversative sentences:

(3.8.1.6)  a.  *O Aleksanðros ine psilos, ala ðen pezi basket.*
            ‘Alexander is tall, but he doesn’t play basketball.’
   b.  *O Aleksanðros ðen pezi basket, ala ine psilos.*
            ‘Alexander does not play basketball, but he’s tall.’

It can be seen that the above adversative sentences are correct, meaning that they are simultaneously grammatical and sensical. Furthermore, they are homosignificative, in the sense that they signify identical meanings. Consequently, the order of the clauses does not affect the sensicality, the grammaticality, or the meanings signified by the adversative sentence. This is because these adversative sentences are composed of identical negative and identical affirmative clauses.

However, if the above adversative sentences are changed in such a way that the affirmative clause becomes the negated clause and the negated clause becomes the affirmative clause, then a new and significantly different sentence is formed. Compare the following adversative sentences:

(3.8.1.7)  a.  *O Aleksanðros ðen ine psilos, ala pezi basket.*
            ‘Alexander isn’t tall, but he plays basketball.’
   b.  *O Aleksanðros pezi basket, ala ðen ine psilos.*
            ‘Alexander plays basketball, but he’s not tall.’

It is clear that the adversative sentences in (3.8.1.6) and in (3.8.1.7) designate different events. In the case of the former, Alexander is a tall man who does not play basketball, while the latter sentences refer to a short man who does play basketball. Therefore, as the above examples show, by changing the argument of negation the meanings signified by an adversative sentence are significantly altered.

Moreover, it should be emphasised that transformations such as that presented in (3.8.1.7) do not always transform a sensical sentence into a sensical one. For instance:

(3.8.1.8)  a.  *I Maria anikse tin porta, ala ðen tin anikse orthanihta.*
            ‘Mary opened the door, but she didn’t open it wide.’
   b.  *I Maria anikse tin porta orthanihta, ala ðen tin anikse.*
            *‘Mary opened the door wide, but she didn’t open it.’*
The above example consists of two adversative sentences which differ with respect to which clause is negated. In other words, a clause which is affirmative in the former sentence corresponds to the negated clause of the latter sentence, while the negated clause of the former corresponds to the affirmative clause of the latter. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that both of the above adversative sentences are grammatical, because their constituent clauses are correct (see Co 3.8.1.1). Despite that, only the former (3.8.1.8a.) is sensical. Following Po 3.8.1.1, the latter adversative sentence is not sensical because its affirmative clause implies its negated clause. That is to say, based on the clause *I Maria anikse tin porta orthanihta* ‘Mary opened the door wide’ it is natural to infer that *I Maria anikse tin porta* ‘Mary opened the door’. It is hardly possible to open the door wide without opening it. This is formally expressed in the following corollary:

**Co 3.8.1.2  Nonsensicality of an adversative sentence**

If the affirmative clause $S_a$ and the negated clause $S_n$ are the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ implies $S_n$, then $S$ is nonsensical.

To close this subsection, the following corollaries of the above assumptions should also be mentioned:

**Co 3.8.1.3  Non-implication of the clauses of adversative sentences**

If an adversative sentence $S$ is correct, then its constituent affirmative clause does not imply the negated clause.

**Co 3.8.1.4  Implication of the clauses of adversative sentences**

If the affirmative clause $S_a$ and the negated clause $S_n$ are the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ implies $S_n$, then $S$ is incorrect.

To begin with Co 3.8.1.3, it states that the negated clause of a correct adversative sentence $S$ is not implied by the affirmative clause of $S$. To explain this corollary, it is worth recalling that correct sentences are simultaneously grammatical and sensical (see 3.8.1). Consequently, if an adversative sentence is correct, then it is sensical. Hence, it follows from Po 3.8.1.1 that the negated clause of a correct adversative sentence may not be implied by the affirmative clause of that sentence.

To illustrate Co 3.8.1.3, let us consider the following adversative sentence:

(3.8.1.9) a. *To peòi epline ta pjata, ala ëvn sfungarise to patoma.*

‘The child washed up the dishes, but (s)he didn’t sweep the floor.’
b. *To peði epline ta pjata* ‘The child washed up the dishes’

c. *[To peði] sfungarise to patoma* ‘(S)he [the child] swept the floor’

In accordance with Co 3.8.1.3, the affirmative clause of the analysed adversative sentence does not imply the negated clause. That is to say, on the basis of the affirmative clause *to peði epline ta pjata* ‘the child washed the dishes’ it cannot be inferred that *[to peði] sfungarise to patoma* ‘(s)he [the child] swept the floor’.

The last corollary (Co 3.8.1.4) states that an adversative sentence whose affirmative clause implies the negated clause is incorrect. That is to say, the affirmative clause of a correct adversative sentence may not imply the negated sentence. If it did, then we would have an incorrect adversative sentence. For instance:

(3.8.1.10) a. *I Ana misanikse tin porta*

‘Anne opened the door slightly’

b. *[I Ana] tin [tin porta] anikse*

‘She [Anne] opened it [the door]’

c. *‘I Ana misanikse tin porta, ala ðen tin anikse.‘*

‘Anne opened the door slightly, but she didn’t open it.’

The adversative sentence in (3.8.1.10c.) is composed of two clauses: an affirmative clause (3.8.1.10a.) and a negated clause (3.8.1.10b.). Each of these clauses is correct, meaning that they violate none of the morphological or syntactic rules of Modern Greek and, simultaneously, they are sensical. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the affirmative clause implies the negated clause. In other words, based on the clause *i Ana misanikse tin porta* ‘Anne opened the door slightly’ it can be inferred that *i Ana anikse tin porta* ‘Anne opened the door’. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which Anne opens the door slightly without opening it. Consequently, it follows from Co 3.8.1.2 that the adversative sentence in (3.8.1.10c.) is nonsensical and, therefore, incorrect.

To summarise, it must be noted that this subsection contains some assumptions and corollaries that are fundamental for the purposes of the present research. Most importantly, on the strength of Co 3.8.1.1, every adversative sentence whose constituent clauses are correct is grammatical. The reason why we consider Co 3.8.1.1 so significant is that it provides us with a reliable tool for verifying whether a Modern Greek adversative sentence is grammatical. Consequently, the corpus of sentences analysed in the present research will consist solely of grammatical adversative sentences. Furthermore, given that each of the analysed sentences is
grammatical, the main focus may be placed on the meaningfulness of a sentence (i.e. whether a sentence is sensical or nonsensical). This is because a grammatical but incorrect sentence must be incorrect due to its nonsensicality (see 3.8.2).

Moreover, the corollaries Co 3.8.1.3 and Co 3.8.1.4 provide us with an insight into the meaningfulness of adversative sentences. Namely, they indicate that the negated clause of a correct adversative sentence may not be implied by the affirmative clause. Otherwise, the adversative sentence would be incorrect.

3.8.2 Sensicality and correctness of aspectively adversative sentences
Above, some postulates and corollaries regarding the grammaticality, sensicality, and correctness of adversative sentences were proposed and elucidated. In the present research, however, most attention is paid to a special kind of adversative sentences – namely, aspectively adversative sentences (see 3.7.3.1). Consequently, a few additional postulates are necessary. Importantly, the postulates (and, therefore, also their corollaries) proposed in this section should by no means be considered to be cross-lingually universal. On the contrary, they should be regarded as Modern-Greek-specific. That is to say, the postulates below are proposed for Modern Greek only, and they may be invalid when applied to other languages.

Given the above, it is assumed that:

Po 3.8.2.1 Postulate of semelfactivity of aspectively adversative sentences
If $S_i$ is a constituent clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_i$ semifies neither habituality nor iteration.

Po 3.8.2.2 Postulate of the aspective meaning signified by the affirmative clause
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ does not imply the negated clause of $S$, then $S_a$ either signifies incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous.

Po 3.8.2.3 Postulate of the signification of completion by the negated clause
If $S_n$ is the negated clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_n$ is not implied by the affirmative clause of $S$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

Po 3.8.2.4 Postulate of aspective disambiguation
If $S$ is a correct aspectively adversative sentence whose constituent affirmative clause $S_a$ is aspectively ambiguous, then $S_a$ is determined by the negative clause in such a way that $S$ signifies incompletion.
It should be recalled that according to the aspectological literature regarding Modern Greek aspect (see Chapter 2), imperfect forms of verbs such as *vrisko* ‘I find’, *viho* ‘I cough’, *htipo* ‘I hit/knock’, etc. signify iteration or habituality. However, as has been noted by Moser (2009: 80), in some contexts these verb forms may semify semelfactivity instead of iteration or habituality. To support her claim she gives the following example:

(3.8.2.1) *Tin stigma pu i Maria evriske to vivlio tis, kopike to fos.*

??‘The very moment when Mary found her book, the light went out.’

In this sentence the verbal predicate *evriske* ‘(s)he found/was finding’ does not concern a sequence of subevents, each of which may be referred to as *Mary found the book*, but to a semelfactive event. This is because the temporal clause of the above sentence does not signify Mary’s habit, but it expresses the circumstances under which another event occurred.

Keeping the above considerations in mind, we assume that the meaning of habituality and iteration also should not be semified in the case of aspectively adversative sentences. In other words, neither of the clauses of an aspectively adversative sentence semifies iteration or habituality. This assumption is formally expressed in Po 3.8.2.1. To illustrate this assumption, consider the following example:

(3.8.2.2) a. *I Maria vrike to vivlio tis, ala ðen to evriske.*

*‘Mary found her book, but she wasn’t finding it.’*

b. *I Maria vrike to vivlio tis.* ‘Mary found her book.’

c. *I Maria evriske to vivlio tis.* ‘Mary used to find her book.’

The above adversative sentence is seen to consist of one aoristic and one imperfect clause. If these clauses are taken in isolation, then the former semifies semelfactivity, whereas the latter semifies habituality. Following this train of thought, the aoristic clause should not imply its imperfect counterpart, because if she found the book once, then it is not necessarily true that she found it more than once or regularly. Despite that, the Modern Greek aspectively adversative sentence in (3.8.2.2a.) is nonsensical. We believe that this is because the meaning of habituality semified by the imperfect verb form *evriske* ‘[Mary] used to find’ is blocked, which means that both the aorist and the imperfect clauses semify semelfactivity.

It should be emphasised that Po 3.8.2.1 refers to the semification and not the lexification of iteration or habituality. Consequently, an aspectively adversative sentence may signify iteration or habituality, but on condition that this meaning is lexified (i.e. conveyed by a lexical
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morpheme) and not semified (i.e. conveyed by a delexicalised morpheme). This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

To continue, in order to explain Po 3.8.2.2 and Po 3.8.2.3, let us consider a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$. Following 3.7.3.1, it consists of one affirmative and one negated clause. The former will be referred to as $S_a$ and the latter as $S_n$. Now, by Po 3.8.2.2, if $S_a$ does not imply $S_n$, then either $S_a$ is aspectively ambiguous or it signifies incompletion. In other words, $S_a$ signifies that the event is either at least partially completed or is just partially completed (see Chapter 3.5). Simultaneously, by virtue of Po 3.8.2.3, if $S_a$ does not imply $S_n$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

To illustrate these assumptions, let us consider the following examples:

(3.8.2.3) a. $O$ Kostas $\partial$javaze to vivlio, ala $\partial$en $\partial$javase eksolokliru.
   ‘Kostas was reading the book, but he didn’t read it completely.’

b. $O$ Kostas $\partial$javaze to vivlio.
   ‘Kostas was reading the book.’

c. $[O$ Kostas$]$ to $[to$ vivlio$]$ $\partial$javase eksolokliru.

(3.8.2.4) a. $I$ Gogo misanikse tin porta, ala $\partial$en tin anikse orthanihta.
   ‘Georgia opened the door slightly, but she didn’t open it wide.’

b. $I$ Gogo misanikse tin porta.
   ‘Georgia opened the door slightly.’

   ‘She [Georgia] opened it [the door] wide.’

The first thing to be noticed about the above aspectively adversative sentences is that they are both correct. Consequently, in the light of Co 3.8.1.3, their affirmative clauses do not imply their negated clauses. That is to say, given that Kostas was reading the book (see the imperfect sentence in (3.8.2.3b.)) one may not infer that he read the book completely (see the aoristic clause in (3.8.2.3c.)). Analogously, given that Georgia opened the door slightly (see the aoristic sentence in (3.8.2.4b.)) one may not infer that she opened the door wide (see the aoristic sentence in (3.8.2.4c.)).

Furthermore, by virtue of Po 3.8.2.3, the negated clause $o$ Kostas $\partial$javse to vivlio eksolokliru ‘Kostas read the book completely’ and the negated clause $i$ Gogo anikse tin porta orthanihta ‘Georgia opened the door wide’ signify completion. Therefore, the former signifies
that Kostas read the book from beginning to end, whereas the latter signifies that the door was fully opened by Georgia.

On the other hand, it follows from Po 3.8.2.2 that the affirmative clause *o Kostas *emplates to vivlio ‘Kostas was reading the book’ either signifies incompleteness or is aspectively ambiguous. In fact, keeping in mind the considerations from Chapter 3.5, this clause should be conceived of as aspectively ambiguous, as it does not clarify to what degree the event is completed. To put it differently, the imperfect clause in (3.8.2.3b.) signifies that Kostas read the book in some temporal interval \( t_1 \) – \( t_n \) and, consequently, he must have read some part of the book. This clause, however, does not suffice to ascertain whether Kostas read the book completely or not. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 5.

As regards the affirmative clause in (3.8.2.4b.), it should be recalled that according to 3.5.1.1 a clause signifies completion on condition that it signifies holicity. This condition, however, is not satisfied by the affirmative clause *i Gogo misanikse tin porta ‘Georgia opened the door slightly’, as it signifies partitivity. That is to say, this clause signifies that the door was not entirely but partly open.

Finally, Po 3.8.2.4 refers to an aspectively adversative sentence which is correct, and whose affirmative clause is aspectively ambiguous. If these two conditions are satisfied, then the negative clause should determine the affirmative clause in such a way that the whole aspectively adversative sentence signifies incompleteness. In other words, the negative clause *incompletes* the aspectively adversative sentence. Let us consider the following example:

\[(3.8.2.5)\]

\begin{enumerate}
\item *I Maria *emplates to vivlio, ala êen to *emplates olo.*
   
   ‘Mary was reading the book, but she didn’t read all of it.’
\item *I Maria anikse tin porta, ala êen tin anikse oloki.*
   
   ‘Mary opened the door, but she didn’t open it wide.’
\end{enumerate}

The above aspectively adversative sentences can be seen to be correct. Consequently, in the light of Co 3.8.1.3 and Po 3.8.2.3, their negated clauses signify completion. Additionally, following Co 3.8.1.3 and Po 3.8.2.2, their affirmative clauses either are aspectively ambiguous or signify incompleteness. In fact, as will be argued in detail in Chapter 5, these clauses are aspectively ambiguous. This means that they are sufficient signifiers of neither completion nor incompleteness. This being said, on the strength of Po 3.8.2.4, the negative clause (in which the meaning of completion is negated) disambiguates the affirmative clause in such a way that the whole aspectively adversative sentence signifies incompleteness. Thus, following the above
considerations, the aspectively adversative sentences in (3.8.2.5) signify incompleteness, meaning that Mary did not read the book completely, nor did she open the door wide.

Among the corollaries of the above definition and postulates are the following:

Co 3.8.2.1 *Correctness of aspectively adversative sentence due to the affirmative clause*
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_a$ signifies incompleteness or is aspectively ambiguous.

Co 3.8.2.2 *Correctness of aspectively adversative sentence due to the negated clause*
If $S_n$ is the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

Co 3.8.2.3 *Incorrectness of aspectively adversative sentence due to the negated clause*
If $S_n$ is the negated clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_n$ does not signify completion, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.2.4 *Incorrectness of aspectively adversative sentence due to the affirmative clause*
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ neither signifies incompleteness nor is aspectively ambiguous, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.2.5 *The non-completion of the negated clause*
If an incorrect aspectively adversative sentence $S$ is composed of two correct clauses and the affirmative clause signifies incompleteness or is aspectively ambiguous, then the negated clause does not signify completion.

Co 3.8.2.6 *The aspective meaning of the affirmative clause*
If an incorrect aspectively adversative sentence $S$ is composed of two correct clauses and the negated clause signifies completion, then the affirmative clause does not signify incompleteness, nor is it aspectively ambiguous.

Co 3.8.2.7 *Aspective ambiguity of a clause*
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ does not signify incompleteness, then $S_a$ is aspectively ambiguous.

Let us begin with an explanation of Co 3.8.2.1 and Co 3.8.2.2. It is worth recalling that according to Co 3.8.1.3, the affirmative clause of a correct adversative sentence does not imply the negated clause of that sentence. Thus, it is inferred based on Po 3.8.2.2 that the affirmative clause is aspectively ambiguous or signifies incompleteness. Furthermore, it follows from Po 3.8.2.3 that the negated clause of a correct sentence signifies completion. These conclusions are formally expressed as Co 3.8.2.1 and Co 3.8.2.2 respectively.

As an example, let us consider the following aspectively adversative sentence:
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(3.8.2.6)  *I Maria ᵇjavaze to «Hari Poter», ala ᵇen to ᵇjavase olo.*

‘Mary was reading “Harry Potter”, but she didn’t read it all.’

Two observations should be made regarding the above sentence. Firstly, it is correct, meaning that it is simultaneously grammatical and sensical. Secondly, its affirmative clause does not imply its negated clause. That is to say, from the statement *I Maria ᵇjavaze to «Hari Poter»* ‘Mary was reading “Harry Potter”’ it does not follow that [i Maria] to [to «Hari Poter»] ᵇjavase olo ‘she [Mary] read it [“Harry Potter”] all’.

Bearing that in mind, in the light of Co 3.8.2.1 the affirmative clause of the sentence in (3.8.2.6) should either signify incompletion or be aspectively ambiguous. In other words, this clause signifies either that Mary read the book at least partially or that she read it only partially. At the same time, it follows from Co 3.8.2.2 that the negated clause signifies completion. In other words, it signifies that Mary read the book in question completely.

As regards Co 3.8.2.3, it states that an aspectively adversative sentence is incorrect if its negated clause signifies an aspective meaning other than completion. In other words, if the negated clause signifies incompletion or aspective neutrality, or is aspectively ambiguous, then the adversative sentence is incorrect. Analogously, on the strength of Co 3.8.2.4, an aspectively adversative sentence is incorrect if its affirmative clause does not signify incompletion or if it is not aspectively ambiguous. That is to say, the signification of completion by the affirmative clause should result in the incorrectness of the aspectively adversative sentence.

The last two corollaries are of great significance for the purposes of the present dissertation. This is because, on the one hand, they provide us with a reliable method of ascertaining whether the negated clause of an aspectively adversative sentence signifies completion. On the other hand, they provide us with a reliable method of ascertaining whether the affirmative clause signifies incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous. More specifically, by virtue of Co 3.8.2.5, if the affirmative clause of an incorrect but grammatical aspectively adversative sentence is aspectively ambiguous, then the negated clause of that sentence does not signify completion. Analogously, by virtue of the same corollary, if the affirmative clause of an incorrect but grammatical aspectively adversative sentence signifies incompletion, then the negated clause of that sentence does not signify completion.

To exemplify this corollary, let us consider the following aspectively adversative sentence:

(3.8.2.7)  *I Maria ᵇjavaze to vivlio, ala ᵇen to ᵇjavase.*

*‘Mary was reading the book, but she didn’t read it.’*
As is shown, the above exemplary adversative sentence is incorrect. In the light of Co 3.8.2.3 and Co 3.8.2.4 this sentence is incorrect because its negated clause does not signify completion or because its affirmative clause is not aspectively ambiguous and does not signify incompletion. However, it should be noted that the affirmative clause *Maria ḏjavaze to vivlio* is aspectively ambiguous, because it does not clarify whether or not Mary read the book completely. Bearing that in mind, it follows from Co 3.8.2.5 that the negated clause *to ḏjavase* ‘[she] read it’ does not signify completion, because the aspectively adversative sentence in (3.8.2.7) is incorrect. In fact, it is argued in Chapter 5 and 6 that the aoristic clause *to ḏjavase* is aspectively ambiguous, as it signifies sufficiently neither incompleteness nor completion.

Similarly, Co 3.8.2.6 states that the affirmative clause of an incorrect aspectively adversative sentence is not aspectively ambiguous, nor does it signify incompleteness, if the negated clause signifies completion. For instance:

(3.8.2.8) *O Petros evriske to vivlio, ala telika ḏen to vrike.*

*‘Peter was finding the book, but in the end he didn’t find it.’*

It is noteworthy that the above negated clause [*o Petros] telika to [to vivlio] vrike ‘in the end he [Peter] found it [the book]’ signifies completion (see Chapters 5 and 6). That is to say, it signifies that the event of Peter’s finding the book is a completed event. Nonetheless, the aspectively adversative sentence at hand is grammatical but incorrect. Consequently, by virtue of Co 3.8.2.6, it is inferred that the affirmative clause *O Petros evriske to vivlio* ‘Peter was finding his book’ is not aspectively ambiguous and does not signify incompleteness.

Finally, Co 3.8.2.7 states that the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence is aspectively ambiguous if it does not signify incompleteness. This follows from Po 3.8.2.2 and *modus tollendo ponens*. According to the former, such an affirmative clause either signifies incompleteness or is aspectively ambiguous. Therefore, by ascertaining that the clause at hand does not signify incompleteness, we conclude that it is aspectively ambiguous.

To illustrate this corollary, let us consider the following correct aspectively adversative sentence:

(3.8.2.9) ḏjavasa to vivlio, ala ḏen to ḏjavasa olo.

‘I read the book, but I didn’t read it all.’

Although the above sentence is composed of two aoristic clauses, it is correct. Thus, in the light of Po 3.8.2.2, the affirmative clause ḏjavasa to vivlio ‘I read the book’ either signifies
incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous. If, however, it does not signify incompletion (and it is argued in Chapter 5.3.4 that this clause does not signify that aspective meaning), then it is aspectively ambiguous. More details regarding the aspective ambiguity of sentences are given in Chapter 5.3.

To summarise, we have proposed, elucidated and discussed terms, definitions, postulates, and their corollaries which are essential for the purposes of this research and which should be conceived of as the basis on which the Modern Greek aspactical – and especially aspective – system will be explored and described in the following chapters. There are three concepts central to the approach proposed in this work. Firstly, we distinguish grammaticality, sensicality, and correctness of sentences. Secondly, aspatically adversative sentences are composed of exactly two sufficiently homolexical, homotemporal, homomodal, and homodiathetic clauses which are further linked by means of the adversative conjunction *ala ‘but’. One of these clauses is affirmative and one is negative. Thirdly, in the light of Co 3.8.1.1, every aspatically adversative sentence whose constituent clauses are correct is necessarily grammatical. Consequently, if such an adversative sentence is incorrect, then this is due to its nonsensicality.

Furthermore, it is assumed (see Co 3.8.1.3) that a correct, and therefore sensical, aspatically ambiguous sentence is composed of such affirmative and negated clauses that the former does not imply the latter. Otherwise, the adversative sentence would be self-contradictory, making it nonsensical, and therefore incorrect. Given that all aspatically adversative sentences analysed in the present work are grammatical, we will focus on whether they are sensical or nonsensical. That is to say, we will focus on whether the affirmative clause of an aspatically adversative sentence implies the negated clause.

In the last subsection of this chapter, a handful of Modern-Greek-specific postulates and corollaries have been proposed. One of them should be emphasised, namely Po 3.8.2.1. According to this postulate, the constituent clauses of a Modern Greek aspatically adversative sentence do not semify iteration nor habituality. As was presented in (3.8.2.2), although the simple sentences (3.8.2.2b.) and (3.8.2.2c.) in isolation are bound by the opposition habituality vs. non-habituality, this opposition is neutralised the moment they are linked to form the aspatically adversative sentence (3.8.2.2a.).

Finally, in the light of Co 3.8.2.1 and Co 3.8.2.2, every correct aspatically adversative sentence S is composed of:
• The affirmative clause signifying incompletion or being aspectively ambiguous, and
• The negated clause signifying completion.

If at least one of these conditions is not fulfilled (that is to say, the affirmative clause signifies completion or the negated clause signifies incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous), then the aspectively adversative sentence will be incorrect.
Chapter 4

Structure of the research

The objective of this chapter is to familiarise the reader with the structure of the current research. For this purpose, the objective of the present dissertation is pronounced. The reasonability of some decisions and assumptions made within this research as well as their necessity to achieve the set goals is also discussed. Moreover, we will present the process of

• preparing the corpus of aspectively adversative sentences (i.e. the studied material),
• examining sentences belonging to this corpus, and
• the method of reasoning, which should contribute a great deal to our understanding of the Modern Greek system of aspect.

4.1 Introductory remarks

To begin, the objective of this research is to find an answer to the queries:

*How is the meaning of completion lingually expressed in Modern Greek?*

*Why does syntagma S signify or not signify completion?*

As mentioned in Chapter 2, for Horrocks and Stavrou (2003a: 310f.), and for Sioupi (2009: 222), completion is signified by telic syntagmata, but never by atelic syntagmata. Consequently, according to them, the telic sentence in (4.1.1a.) signifies completion, whereas the atelic sentence in (4.1.1b.) does not signify completion:

(4.1.1)  


b. *O Kostas ḍjavase.* ‘Kostas read.’

Nonetheless, the results obtained in the present study indicate that, in fact, like atelic sentences, telic sentences also do not necessarily signify completion. That is to say, the sentence

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in (4.1.1a.) does not signify that Kostas read the book completely. This claim is supported by the incorrectness of the following aspectively adversative sentence:

(4.1.2)  *O Kostas ďjavaze ena vivlio, ala [o Kostas] ďen to [to vivlio] ďjavase.

*‘Kostas was reading a book, but he [Kostas] didn’t read it [the book].’

The above sentence is nonsensical, because its constituent affirmative clause implies the negated clause. That is to say, if Kostas was reading the book, then he read it. The above incorrect sentence, however, may be transformed into a correct one with the addition of a lexificator of holicity. For instance:

(4.1.3)  O Kostas ďjavaze ena vivlio, ala [o Kostas] ďen to [to vivlio] ďjavase eksolokliru.

‘Kostas was reading a book, but he [Kostas] didn’t read it [the book] completely.’

Noticeably, the above sentence is correct. Therefore, its constituent affirmative clause does not imply the negated clause. In other words, it is not true that if Kostas was reading a book, then he definitely read it completely. Interestingly enough, the below aspectively adversative sentence is also correct:

(4.1.4)  O Kostas ďjavase ena vivlio, ala [o Kostas] ďen to [to vivlio] ďjavase eksolokliru.


What characterises the above sentence is that it consists of two aoristic clauses. Despite that, this sentence is correct, meaning that the aoristic affirmative clause does not imply the aoristic negated clause. Therefore, it is not true that if Kostas read a book, then he read it completely.

All things considered, the examination of aspectively adversative sentences shows that not every aoristic and telic syntagma is a sufficient significator of completion. On the contrary, for this purpose, an additional lexificator of holicity may be necessary. Consequently, the hitherto assumptions need to be verified because they do not satisfactorily explain the questions raised at the beginning of this section. It is believed that the examination of the sentences belonging to the corpus of aspectively adversative sentences created for the purposes of the present study will shed some new light on this issue. Despite that, some restrictions should be imposed on the studied material. This matter is discussed in detail in the next sections.
4.2 Why grammatical aspectively adversative sentences?

As the reader has certainly noted, the classification of aspectively adversative sentences into correct and incorrect is of fundamental importance for the purposes of this research. Consequently, following the assumptions set in Chapter 3.8, sentences can be characterised in respect to the dimension of well-formedness and the dimension of meaningfulness. Based on these dimensions, Modern Greek aspectively adversative sentences may be classified into

- the class of grammatical and sensical sentences,
- the class of grammatical and nonsensical sentences,
- the class of ungrammatical and sensical sentences, and
- the class of ungrammatical and nonsensical sentences.

Keeping in mind that correct sentences are simultaneously grammatical and sensical (see 3.8.1), each correct aspectively adversative sentence belongs to the first of the above classes. The other three classes are composed of incorrect sentences, because they are ungrammatical or nonsensical. The classification of aspectively adversative sentences in respect to the dimensions of well-formedness, meaningfulness, and correctivity is graphically presented in the following figure:

![Fig. 4.2.1 The classes of (un)grammatical, (non)sensical, and (in)correct sentences.](image)

Furthermore, it was mentioned in Chapter 3.8 that the distinguishing feature of native speakers of a language is their ability to decide whether a sentence is correct or incorrect in this particular language. It should be emphasised that their judgement is not made on the basis of their linguistic (i.e. theoretical or metalinguial) knowledge but on their lingual (i.e. atheoretical) knowledge or even lingual intuition (cf. Itkonen 1976: 186-8, Bańczewski 2015: 171f.). Of course, this does not mean that native speakers always know with certainty whether a sentence
is correct or incorrect. On the contrary, it has been noted during this research that native
speakers of Modern Greek tend to be hesitant about the correctness of some aspectively
adversative sentences and make their judgements in a rather uncertain manner. In our opinion,
the degree of native speakers’ certainty about the correctness of an aspectively adversative
sentence is directly proportional to the conspicuousness of the signification of aspective meanings
by the constituent clauses of this sentence. That is to say, the clearer the aspective meanings are
signified by the constituent clauses of a sentence, the more certain the native speaker is about
the (in)correctness of this sentence.

For the sake of exemplification, let us consider the following sentences:

(4.2.1)  a. *O Kostas pethene, ala sto telos ðen pethane.*
        ‘Kostas was dying, but in the end he didn’t die.’

   b. *?O Kostas pethene, ala ðen pethane.*
     ‘Kostas was dying, but he didn’t die.’

If we take a look at the above sentences, it should be noted that each of them designates the
same event. Despite that, they are slightly different in their signification. Interestingly enough,
native speakers of Modern Greek (or at least most of them) consider each of the sentences in
(4.2.1) as correct. The interesting observation is that, although native speakers were able to
immediately decide that the former is correct, they were more hesitant about the correctness of
the latter. On this basis, it is inferred that aspective meanings are signified more conspicuously
by the constituent clauses of the sentence in (4.2.1a.) than by the clauses of the sentence in
(4.2.1b.). In order to graphically mark this subtle difference, the symbol ‘?’ will be hereinafter
used in front of the sentences such as the one in (4.2.1b.).

Importantly, although the native speakers of a language are able to ascertain whether a
sentence is correct or incorrect, we believe that it would be naïve to expect them to recognise
whether a sentence is incorrect due to its ungrammaticality or nonsensicality. Bearing this in
mind, for the purposes of this dissertation, the studied material should be restricted to
grammatical sentences. This way, if an aspectively adversative sentence is incorrect, then it is
nonsensical. To illustrate this concept, let us consider the following figure:
As the above scheme shows, grammatical sentences are correct if they are simultaneously sensical. *Mutatis mutandis*, a grammatical sentence is incorrect if it is nonsensical. This being said, the restriction of the studied material to only grammatical aspectively adversative sentences means that each aspectively adversative sentence recognised by native speakers as incorrect is incorrect due to its nonsensicality. A method for always forming grammatical aspectively adversative sentences is discussed in Chapter 4.4.

### 4.3 The formation of aspectively adversative sentences

As the title of the dissertation suggests, the Modern Greek system of aspect is explored with the help of aspectively adversative sentences. This concept has already been discussed in Chapter 3.8. Despite that, some words should be said about the formation of aspectively adversative sentences employed in the present research.

There are three stages of forming an aspectively adversative sentence:

i. the formation of a pair of affirmative, (sufficiently) homolexical, homotemporal, homomodal, and homodiathetic simple sentences,

ii. the negation of exactly one of the simple sentences belonging to the pair, and

iii. the linking of the simple sentences belonging to this same pair with the adversative conjunction *ala* ‘but’.

In the first stage, one forms a pair of simple sentences that are simultaneously affirmative, (sufficiently) homolexical, homotemporal, homomodal, and homodiathetic. It should be kept in mind that in the dissertation at hand, only the imperfect, aorist, and perfect tenses are considered. Consequently, each simple sentence formed for the purposes of this research signifies pastness.
To give an example, the following pairs of sentences may be formed:

(4.3.1) a. *O Petros etroje proino.*
   ‘Peter was eating breakfast.’
   b. *O Petros efaje proino.*
   ‘Peter ate breakfast.’
(4.3.2) a. *I Maria evlepe mia tenia.*
   ‘Mary was watching a movie.’
   b. *I Maria iđe olokliri tin tenia.*
   ‘Mary watched a movie.’
(4.3.3) a. *To peði ďjavaze to vivlio.*
   ‘The child was reading the book.’
   b. *[To peđi] to [to vivlio] ďjavase eksolokliρu.*
   ‘(S)he [the child] read it [the book] completely.

Noticeably, each pair is comprised of two affirmative simple sentences. These sentences are either homolexical (the sentences in (4.3.1)) or sufficiently homolexical (the sentences in (4.3.2) and (4.3.3)). Furthermore, the sentences belonging to this same pair are homotemporal, homomodal, and homodiathetic, because they signify identical temporal, modal, and diathetic meanings.

In the second stage of forming an aspectively adversative sentence, one of the affirmative sentences belonging to a pair is negated, in the sense that it becomes the argument of the negation. In other words, one of the sentences is transformed into a negative sentence\(^1\). Consequently, the pairs of sentences in (4.3.1–3) are transformed, for instance, as follows:

(4.3.4) a. *O Petros etroje proino.*
   ‘Peter was eating breakfast.’
   b. ~(*O Petros efaje proino.*) ⇔ *O Petros ďen efaje proino.*
   ‘~(Peter ate breakfast.) ⇔ Peter didn’t eat breakfast.’
(4.3.5) a. *I Maria evlepe tin tenia.*
   ‘Mary was watching the movie.’

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\(^1\) It should be recalled that in the present dissertation, a distinction is made between the negative and the negated clause (see Chapter 3.7.1). The latter is understood as the argument of the negation – e.g. in ~(John read this book twice), ‘John read this book twice’ is the negated clause.
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b. \(~(I \text{ Maria} \ iđe \ olokliri \ tin \ tenia.) \iff I \text{ Maria} \ ćen \ iđe \ olokliri \ tin \ tenia.\)
   \(~(Mary \ watched \ the \ whole \ movie.) \iff Mary \ didn’t \ watch \ the \ whole \ movie.\)  
   \(\text{(4.3.6)}\)

a. \(~(To \ peći \ ćjavaze \ to \ vivlio.) \iff To \ peći \ ćen \ ćjavaze \ to \ vivlio.\)
   \(~(The \ child \ was \ reading \ the \ book.) \iff The \ child \ wasn’t \ reading \ the \ book.\)
   \(\text{(4.3.6)}\)
b. \[To \ peći \] to \[to \ vivlio] ćjavase eksolokliru.
   \‘(S)he [the child] read it [the book] completely.

It should be kept in mind that the transformation of an affirmative sentence into its negative counterpart may require changes beyond the addition of negation. For instance, the English sentences may require the addition of the auxiliary verb did (see sentences in (4.3.4b.) and (4.3.5b.)).

In the final stage, the sentences belonging to this same pair are linked together by means of the adversative conjunction ala ‘but’, so that an aspectively adversative sentence is formed. Consequently, the affirmative sentence transforms into an affirmative clause, whereas the negative sentence transforms into a negative clause. Some additional changes (e.g. replacement of a nominal phrase with an appropriate pronoun or removal of duplicated words – see Chapter 3.7.3) may be conducted for stylistic reasons. Based on the pairs of sentences considered above, the following aspectively adversative sentences may be formed:

\(\text{(4.3.7)}\)

*O Petros etroje proino, ala [o Petros] ćen to [proino] efaje.
   *‘Peter was eating breakfast, but he [Peter] didn’t eat it [breakfast].’

\(\text{(4.3.8)}\)

I Maria evlepe tin tenia, ala [i Maria] ćen tin [tin tenia] iđe olokliri.
   ‘Mary was watching the movie, but she [Mary] didn’t watch it [the movie] all.’

\(\text{(4.3.9)}\)

*To peći ćen ćjavaze to vivlio, ala [to peći] ćen to [to vivlio] ćjavase eksolokliru.
   *‘The child was reading the book, but (s)he [the child] didn’t read it [the book] completely.’

To close this section, it should be emphasized that the above method of forming aspectively adversative sentences does not ensure that each sentence formed is correct. For instance, the aspectively adversative sentences in (4.3.7) and in (4.3.9) are incorrect. As has already been mentioned in Chapter 4.2, these sentences are incorrect because they are nonsensical. This matter is also discussed in the next section.
4.4 Creating the corpus of aspectively adversative sentences

The objective of this dissertation is to explore the Modern Greek system of aspect with the main focus on the signification of completion. For this purpose, the corpus of sentences examined in the present research should be composed of such aspectively adversative sentences that allow for the efficient examination of the aspective meanings signified by their constituent clauses. In order to achieve this goal, some restrictions are imposed on aspectively adversative sentences belonging to the corpus of sentences examined in the present research. These restrictions are as follows:

1. Correctness of the constituent clauses

Each aspectively adversative sentence examined in the present research is formed by linking two correct simple sentences. Consequently, on the strength of Co 3.8.1.1, each aspectively adversative sentence included in the corpus is grammatical. For the purpose of exemplification, let us consider the following pairs of simple sentences:

(4.4.1)  

a. *O Kostas katharize to ðomatio tu.  
   ‘Kostas was cleaning his room.’

b. *(O Kostas) ðen to [to ðomatio tu] katharise.  
   ‘He [Kostas] didn’t clean it [his room].’

(4.4.2)  

a. *I Maria sfungarize to patoma.  
   ‘Mary was mopping the floor.’

b. *(I Maria) ðen to [to patoma] sfungarise olo.  
   ‘She [Mary] didn’t mop it [the floor] all.’

It goes without saying that the above pairs are comprised of correct simple sentences. That is to say, they are simultaneously grammatical and sensical, as they neither violate a morphosyntactic rule of Modern Greek nor are self-contradictory. Consequently, by virtue of Co 3.8.1.1, the aspectively adversative sentences formed by linking these sentences together are grammatical (although, as the below example shows, they are not necessarily sensical and, therefore, are not necessarily correct – see Chapters 3.8 and 4.2).

(4.4.3)  

a. *O Kostas katharize to ðomatio tu, ðen ðen to katharise.  
   *‘Kostas was cleaning his room, but he didn’t clean it.’

b. *I Maria sfungarize to patoma, ðen ðen to sfungarise olo.  
   *‘Mary was mopping the floor, but she didn’t mop it all.’
In order to justify the above restriction, it should be emphasised that the postulates proposed in this work are not sufficient for ascertaining whether an incorrect simple sentence is grammatical or not. As a consequence, they are also insufficient for ascertaining whether an aspectively adversative sentence is grammatical, given that at least one of its constituent clauses is incorrect. Following this train of thought, these kinds of aspectively adversative sentences are not considered in the present research, because they would not provide any information about the sensicality of this sentence. To put it differently, if an aspectively adversative sentence is incorrect and, at the same time, at least one of its constituent clauses is incorrect, then this aspectively adversative sentence is incorrect, because of it being ungrammatical or nonsensical.

2. The verbal predicates of the aspectively adversative sentence are homolexical

Next, the aspectively adversative sentences examined in this research are formed by linking simple sentences whose verbal predicates are homolexical. That is to say, they are indistinguishable in respect to the meanings that they lexify. Consequently, the verbal predicates of an aspectively adversative sentence may not form a pair similar to the ones given below:

| ŏjavaza ‘I was reading’ | misoôjavasa ‘I read partially/without understanding’ |
| ŏjavasa ‘I read’ | †apoôjavasa ‘I read over’ |
| etroga ‘I was eating’ | †apefaga ‘I ate up’ |

What characterizes the above pairs is that they consist of one non-prefixed and one prefixed verb form. Furthermore, due to this difference, the verb forms belonging to this same pair lexify different meanings. The non-prefixed verb forms are usually totively neutral, in the sense that they lexify neither holicity nor partitivity. On the other hand, the prefixed verb forms may lexify either holicity or partitivity.

On the basis of the above pairs of verb forms, it might be inferred that the meaning of holicity and partitivity may be signified by a prefix taken by a verb. It should be, however, noticed that this use of the prefix is either archaic and non-productive in contemporary Greek (e.g. ap(ø)- as a significator of holicity), or the prefix itself may be polysemous (e.g. mis(ø)- may signify partitivity as well as a modal meaning). Consequently, a proper analysis of this issue requires a more detailed analysis of the morphological structure of verb forms than the one conducted within this study. Furthermore, due to the specificity of this issue, a
The notion of completion in modern Greek: an analysis of aspectively adversative sentences

Modification of the method adopted in this research or even a different method may be needed. Due to this, we leave this issue for future study.

3 The use of non-verbal lexifiers of holicity in negated clauses

To continue, the aspectively adversative sentences examined in this dissertation never have a non-verbal lexifier of holicity in the affirmative clause. Consequently, the aspectively adversative sentences belonging to the corpus either have no non-verbal lexifier of holicity or it is used in the negated clause. For the purpose of exemplification, let us consider the following sentences:

(4.4.4)  

a. *To peði egrafe ena grama, ala ðen to egrapse.

*‘The child was writing a letter, but (s)he didn’t write it.’

b. O Kostas anikse tin porta, ala ðen tin anikse orthanihta.

‘Kostas opened the door, but he didn’t open it wide.’

c. ðen evapsa olo to ðomatio, ala to evafa.

‘I didn’t paint the whole room, but I was painting it.’

The above sentences may be divided into two groups. The first group constitutes the sentence in (4.4.4a.) in which a non-verbal lexifier of holicity is used in neither the affirmative nor the negated clause. In contrast, the other two sentences have the lexifiers of holicity orthanihta ‘wide/entirely’ and olo ‘whole’, respectively. These lexifiers, however, are used in the negated clauses. This being said, all three sentences in (4.4.4) may belong to the corpus of sentences examined in the present research, because none of the constituents of the affirmative clause is a non-verbal lexifier of holicity.

On the other hand, the corpus of sentences examined in this study does not include aspectively adversative sentences in which a non-verbal lexifier of holicity is part of the affirmative clause. Consider the following example:

(4.4.5)   *O Andreas ðjavaze olo to vivlio, ala ðen to ðjavase.

*‘Andrea was reading the whole book, but he didn’t read it.’

Noticeably, in the above aspectively adversative sentence, the lexifier of holicity olo ‘whole’ is a constituent of its affirmative clause. Consequently, this sentence will not be considered within this study.

The reason for the above restriction of the studied material follows from Co 3.8.2.5. To be more specific, in order to ascertain whether the negated clause signifies completion, the
affirmative clause must unquestionably either signify incompleteness or be aspectively ambiguous. It should be kept in mind that the meaning of holicity is the necessary component of completion. Thus, the use of a lexificator of this totive meaning in the affirmative clause goes against this necessity. Our reservations are supported by Soupi’s (2009: 226) observation that imperfective sentences of this kind may simultaneously signify completion and habituality or iteration. Therefore, such an aspectively adversative sentence is by no means *unquestionably incompletely or aspectively ambiguous.*

4 The use of non-verbal lexificators of partitivity in affirmative clauses

The next restriction is similar to the one explained above. Consequently, aspectively adversative sentences whose negated clause contains a non-verbal lexificator of partitivity are not examined in this research. To give an example, let us consider the following sentences:

\[(4.4.6)\]

a. *I Gogo etroje proino, ala ḏen to efaje olo.*
   ‘Georgia ate breakfast, but she didn’t eat it up.’

b. *O Kostas ipje ligo karasi, ala ḏen to ehi pij olo.*
   ‘Kostas drank some wine, but he hasn’t drunk it all.’

c. *I aḍerfi mu horepse ligo, ala ḏen horepse.*
   ‘My sister danced a bit, but she didn’t dance.’

To begin with the first of the above sentences, it should be noted that a non-verbal lexificator of partitivity is part of neither the affirmative nor the negated clause. In the case of the other two sentences, the lexificator of partitivity *ligo* ‘some/a bit’ is a constituent of the affirmative clause. Consequently, all the sentences in (4.4.6) may belong to the corpus of sentences examined in the present research. This is because no non-verbal lexificator of partitivity is used in their negated clause.

As regards the aspectively adversative sentences which do not belong to the corpus due to the restriction at hand, consider the following example:

\[(4.4.7)\]

*O Petros anikse tin porta, ala ḏen tin anikse elafra.*

*‘Peter opened the door, but he didn’t open it slightly.’*

What characterises the above aspectively adversative sentence is the lexificator of partitivity *elafra* ‘slightly’. Since it is used in the negated clause, this sentence is not examined in this research.
This restriction of the studied material is made due to Co 3.8.2.6. According to this corollary, the signification of incompleteness by an affirmative clause or its aspective ambiguity may be verified on the condition that the negated clause unquestionably signifies completion. However, the use of a lexificator of partitivity in the negated clause works against this objective. Consequently, sentences like the one in (4.4.7) are excluded from our considerations.

4.5 Classes of aspectively adversative sentences

In the light of Co 3.8.2.1 and Co 3.8.2.2, the correctness of an aspectively adversative sentence provides us with three aspectively-relevant pieces of information:

(i) The constituent clauses of the correct aspectively adversative sentence are bound together by the relation of aspective opposition,
(ii) The affirmative clause of the sentence signifies incompleteness or is aspectively ambiguous, and
(iii) The negated clause of this sentence signifies completion.

Nonetheless, it goes without saying that the classification of aspectively adversative sentences into correct and incorrect is not sufficient for identifying significators (both autosignificators and cosignificators) of completion. For this purpose, one should not only take a closer look at the morphosyntactic structure of the examined sentences, but also compare the morphosyntactic structure of various (both correct and incorrect) aspectively adversative sentences. On the basis of obtained results, it should be possible to identify the characteristic features of the clauses (and, therefore, also simple sentences) signifying completion. For instance, if it is observed that the addition of a particular determiner transforms incorrect aspectively adversative sentences into correct ones, then there is a high possibility that this determiner cosignifies completion.

Given the above, the aspectively adversative sentences examined in the research may be classified in respect to four criteria:

(i) Lexical similarity (homolexical vs. sufficiently homolexical),
(ii) Direct object (is taken vs. is not taken by the verbal predicate),
(iii) The non-verbal lexificator of holicity (is used vs. is not used in the sentence),
(iv) The non-verbal lexificator of partitivity (is used vs. is not used in the sentence).

The above criteria mean that Modern Greek aspectively adversative sentences can be classified into sixteen classes. However, due to the restrictions of the studied material described
in sections 4.3 and 4.4, the aspectively adversative sentences examined in this research belong only to eight of these classes. These may be presented graphically in the form of the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>Homolexicality</th>
<th>Direct object</th>
<th>Non-verbal lexificator of holicity</th>
<th>Non-verbal lexificator of partitivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>VIII</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5.1 Classes of aspectively adversative sentences considered in this research.

As the above table shows, there are two classes of aspectively adversative sentences whose constituent clauses are homolexical (i.e. classes I and II). What characterises the sentences belonging to these two classes is that they involve a non-verbal lexificator of neither holicity nor partitivity. Furthermore, the constituent clauses of the aspectively adversative sentences belonging to the other classes (i.e. classes III–VIII) are sufficiently homolexical but not completely homolexical. The aspectively adversative sentences whose verbal predicates take a direct object belong to classes I and III–V. The other classes (i.e. II and VI–VIII) consist of aspectively adversative sentences whose verbal predicates do not take a direct object. There are also four classes (i.e. classes III, IV, VI, and VII) consisting of aspectively adversative sentences in which a non-verbal lexificator of holicity is used. It is worth recalling that, due to the third restriction in the previous section (see p. 133), these lexificators are used always in the negated and never in the affirmative clause. Mutatis mutandis, there are four classes of aspectively adversative sentences (i.e. Classes III, V, VI, and VIII) in which a lexificator of partitivity is used. Due to the fourth restriction (see p. 134), these lexificators are always used in the affirmative, and never in the negated clause. Finally, it should be noted that there are two classes (i.e. class III and VI) in which a non-verbal lexificator of holicity and a non-verbal lexificator of partitivity are used simultaneously.

To these classes belong, for instance, the following:
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| CLASS I: | ?O Petros telíone to vivlio, ala ðen to telíose. |
| CLASS II: | O asthenis pethene, ala ðen ehi pethani. |
| CLASS III: | I Maria anikse ligo tin porta, ala ðen tin anikse orthanihta. |
| CLASS IV: | To peòi ðjavaze to vivlio, ala ðen to ehi ðjavasi pliros. |
| CLASS V: | *O Kostas katharise ligo to ðomatio, ala ðen to katharise. |
| CLASS VI: | *Horepsa ligo, ala telika ðen horepsa. |
| CLASS VII: | I porta anikse, ala ðen anikse olokliri. |
| CLASS VIII: | *Etrehe ligo, ala ðen etrekse. |

Table 4.5.2 Examples of aspectively adversative sentences

4.6 The class of inchoative verbs

Some words should be said about the class composed of verbs whose aoristic verb forms signify the beginning of a new state. Consequently, the verbs belonging to this class are, for instance, *arosteno* ‘I used to get sick’, *thimono* ‘I am angry’, *agapo* ‘I love/I am in love’, *gnorizo* ‘I know/am familiar with’. The verbs belonging to this class will be called *inchoative verbs*.

However, there is a group of Modern Greek verbs which are inchoatively ambiguous. This means that their aoristic verb forms signify the beginning of a new state or the termination of this state. For the purpose of exemplification, let us consider the following pairs of verbs:

\[
\text{Ex 4.6.1} \quad \text{kathomun} : \quad \text{kathisa}
\]

‘I was sitting’ : ‘I sat down’ or ‘I sat’

This pair is composed of an imperfect verb form *kathomun* ‘I was sitting’ and its aoristic counterpart *kathisa* ‘I sat (down)’. The former designates a state of having had my body in a sitting position at a certain temporal interval \(t_1 - t_n\). On the other hand, the latter designates
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either the completed event of sitting down (i.e. of placing my body in the sitting position) or the terminated event (state) of sitting. That is to say, it signifies either that I completed the action of sitting down or that I terminated the state of sitting.

It is noteworthy that when translating the aoristic verb form kathisa into English, one has to choose between the verb sit and the verb sit down. In contrast, the translation of the imperfective verb form kathomun involves solely the latter English verb. This is because the imperfect verb form in question does not designate the action of placing one’s body in the sitting position.

Bearing in mind the above considerations, the question arises as to whether the aoristic and the imperfect verb forms in question are fully homolexical. This question is of fundamental importance, because if they are not homolexical, then they may not be used as verbal predicates of aspectively adversative sentences (see the definition of aspectively adversative sentences in Df 3.7.3.1). Consequently, inchoative verbs are excluded from the present research.

The above doubts are strengthened by the imperfect and the aoristic forms of the verb arosteno ‘get/used to be sick’:

Ex 4.6.2

arostena : arositsa

‘I used to get/be sick’ : ‘I got sick’

To begin with the aoristic verb form arostisa ‘I got sick’, it signifies the beginning of a new state – namely the state of being sick. This state may be actual at the moment of speaking or not. On the other hand, its imperfect counterpart does not refer to the state of being ill at a certain temporal interval \( t_1 - t_n \) (this meaning is signified by the expression imun aristos/arosti ‘I was sick’), but it signifies that I was prone to sickness. Consequently, even if the verb forms in Ex 4.6.2 are considered homolexical, they strongly involve aspeсtual meanings other than aspec·tual meanings.

All things considered, the studied material will not suffice for a satisfactory exploration of the aforementioned issues regarding inchoative verbs. Consequently, inchoative verb forms are not considered in the present dissertation. It is very likely that such exploration would require not only a corpus of a different kind, but also a different method of analysis. This is because these issues go beyond the Modern Greek system of aspect.
4.7 Direct object: singular or plural

As is mentioned in Chapter 1.4.4, Verkuyl (1993: 6ff.) argues that the countability of the arguments taken by the verbal predicate is an aspectually relevant property. Interestingly enough, he has observed that in English and Dutch, the quantitative properties of the plural argument preceded with the zero article and a singular uncountable noun modify the aspectual meanings signified by the sentence in a similar way. He gives the following examples:

\[(4.7.1)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Judith ate a sandwich for an hour.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Judith ate a sandwich in an hour.}
\end{align*}\]

\[(4.7.2)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Judith ate sandwiches for an hour.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Judith ate sandwiches in an hour.}
\end{align*}\]

\[(4.7.3)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Judith ate bread for an hour.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Judith ate bread in a hour.}
\end{align*}\]

Given the above, we must take into consideration the possibility that in Modern Greek, the category of number in combination with the category of definiteness may also change the aspectual meaning signified by a sentence or a clause. Thus, it would be necessary to introduce in the current research additional assumptions satisfying these particular needs. Although we find this issue extremely interesting, because this is the first attempt at proposing such a comprehensive approach towards the aspective meaning of completion in Modern Greek, we shall examine possibly the simplest aspectively adversative sentences. Consequently, the verbal predicate of an aspective adversative sentence examined in the present research either does not take a direct object or it takes a singular (i.e. not plural) one.

4.8 Comparison of aspectively adversative sentences

Having created the corpus of aspectively adversative sentences, its content was analysed in two stages:

i. comparison of pairs of sentences whose verbal predicates are homolexical,

ii. comparison of pairs of sentences belonging to the same class (see Table 4.5.1).

The aforementioned comparisons of aspectively adversative sentences resulted in a set of statements regarding the Modern Greek aspective system, on the basis of which a set of postulates and their corollaries is proposed. These postulates and corollaries are presented, elucidated, and exemplified in Chapter 5.
First stage of comparing aspectively adversative sentences

In the first stage, two sentences are compared with each other on the condition that their verbal predicates are homolexical. In other words, a sentence whose verbal predicates are forms of the verb ājavazo ‘read’ is compared with sentences whose verbal predicates are forms of the verb ājavazo ‘read’ as well. Consequently, the following kinds of pairs of sentences are considered at this stage:

(4.8.1)  
a. *O Kostas ājavaze to vivlio, ala ēn ājavase.
   *‘Kostas was reading the book, but he didn’t read it.’

b. O Kostas ājavaze to vivlio, ala ēn ājavase olo.
   ‘Kostas was reading the book, but he didn’t read it all.’

(4.8.2)  
a. *O Kostas ājavaze to vivlio, ala ēn ājavase.
   *‘Kostas was reading the book, but he didn’t read it.’

b. O Kostas ājavaze to vivlio, ala ēn ājavase eksolokliru.
   ‘Kostas was reading the book, but he didn’t read it completely.’

(4.8.3)  
a. O Kostas ājavaze to vivlio, ala ēn ājavase olo.
   ‘Kostas was reading the book, but he didn’t read it all.’

b. O Kostas ājavase to vivlio, ala ēn ājavase olo.
   ‘Kostas read the book, but he didn’t read it all.’

It should be noted that the verbal predicates used in each of the above sentences is either the imperfect verb form ājavaze ‘(s)he was reading’ or the aoristic verb form ājavase ‘(s)he read’. That is to say, the verbal predicate of the sentences in (4.8.1–3) are forms of the verb ājavazo ‘read’, which means that they are homolexical. The sentences belonging to this same pair, however, do not necessarily belong to this same class of aspectively adversative sentences (see Table 4.5.1 on p. 136). For instance, the pair in (4.8.1) is comprised of sentences belonging to classes I and IV respectively.

By examining the first pair of aspectively adversative sentences, one should notice that it is composed of one incorrect and one correct sentence. What differentiates the correct sentence from the incorrect one is that the direct object of the former is determined by the lexificator of helicity olo ‘whole’. Consequently, it seems as if the addition of the adjective olos ‘whole’ transforms the incorrect aspectively adversative sentence into the correct one. To put it differently, it appears that the constituent clauses of these aspectively adversative sentences are not bound together by the relation of aspective opposition (see Co 3.8.2.1–4) unless a lexificator
of holicity (i.e. *oulos* ‘whole’) is used. These kinds of observations are further revised and suitably modified in the present and the next stage.

As regards the pair of sentences in (4.8.2), it consists of an incorrect and a correct sentence. Interestingly enough, in the case of the latter, the verbal predicate is determined by a lexificator of holicity *eksolokliru* ‘completely’. Thus, the addition of the adverb in question seems to transform the incorrect aspective adversative sentence in (4.8.2a) into a correct one. In other words, the constituent clauses of the examined pair of sentences are not bound together by the relation of aspective opposition unless the verbal predicate of the negated clause is determined by the lexificator of holicity *eksolokliru* ‘completely’.

Finally, the last pair of sentences is comprised of two correct aspective adversative sentences. The only difference in their morphosyntactic structure is the verbal predicate of their affirmative clauses. Consequently, the first sentence in (4.8.3) is composed of one imperfect and one aoristic clause, whereas the second sentence is comprised of two aoristic clauses. Bearing in mind that both sentences in (4.8.3) are correct, it is inferred that the constituent clauses of these sentences are bound together by the relation of aspective opposition regardless of whether the affirmative clause is imperfect or aoristic.

At the end of the first stage, the provisional sets of sufficient and insufficient significators of completion should be created. These sets should consist of lingual objects of various sizes and kinds. For instance, the aoristic verb forms of *djavazo* ‘read’ (e.g. *djavasa* ‘I read’) and *katharizo* ‘clean’ (e.g. *katharisa* ‘I cleaned’) are insufficient significators of completion. This means that completion is signified solely if the aoristic verb forms of these verbs co-occur/are combined with a lexificator of holicity (e.g. *oulos* ‘whole’, *olokliros* ‘complete’, *pliros* ‘fully’, *eksolokliru* ‘completely’, etc.). On the other hand, the aoristic verb forms of *petheno* ‘die’ (e.g. *pethana* ‘I died’) and *teliono* ‘finish’ (e.g. *teliosa* ‘I finished’) are sufficient significators of completion. That is to say, their aoristic verb forms autosignify this aspective meaning.

Additionally, it should be mentioned that during the first stage of comparing aspective adversative sentences, a group of verbs such as *htipo* ‘knock/hit’, *vrisko* ‘find’, *kimame* ‘sleep’, *odıgo* ‘drive’, etc. is distinguished. The characteristic feature of the verbs belonging to this group is that they are found in none of the correct aspective adversative sentences considered in the present research. In other words, the aspective adversative sentences in which these verbs are used are incorrect.

By the end of this stage, three new questions regarding aspect in Modern Greek arise:
(i) Why do the aoristic verb forms of some verbs signify completion sufficiently, whereas the aoristic verb forms of other verbs are not sufficient significators of this aspective meaning?

(ii) Why can forms of some verbs be used in correct aspective adversative sentences, whereas the usage of forms of other verbs results in the incorrectness of aspective adversative sentences?

(iii) To what extent is completion grammaticalised in Modern Greek (cf. Bielecki & Trąba, in press)?

Some light is shed on these issues by the results obtained in the second stage of comparing aspective adversative sentences.

Second stage of comparing aspective adversative sentences

What distinguishes the sentences belonging to a pair considered in the second stage is that these sentences belong to this same class of aspective adversative sentences (see Table 4.5.1). Therefore, in this stage, an aspective adversative sentence belonging to class I is compared solely with other aspective adversative sentences belonging to class I.

For the purpose of exemplification, let us consider the following pairs of sentences:

(4.8.4) a. O Kostas ḍjavaze to vivlio, ala ḍen to ḍjavase olo.
‘Kostas was reading the book, but he didn’t read all of it.’

b. Egraфа to grama, ala ḍen to egrapsa olo.
‘I was writing the book, but I didn’t write all of it.’

(4.8.5) a. Katharizame to spiti, ala ḍen to katharisame olo.
‘We were cleaning the house, but we didn’t clean all of it.’

b. I Maria etroje ena sandwits, ala ḍen to efaje olo.
‘Mary was eating a sandwich, but she didn’t eat all of it.’

(4.8.6) a. To peḗi egraфe ena grama, ala sto telos ḍen to egrapse.
The child was writing a letter, but in the end (s)he didn’t write it.’

b. *O Kostas htipuse ton mikro tu αδelfo, ala sto telos ḍen ton htipise.
**‘Kostas was hitting/beatng his younger brother, but in the end he didn’t hit/beat him.’

To begin with, it should be noted that each of the above sentences belongs to class IV, because

i. they are sufficiently homolexical, but not completely homolexical,

ii. their verbal predicates take a direct object,
iii. a non-verbal lexicator of holicity (namely *olo* ‘whole’ or *sto telos* ‘in the end’) is part of their negated clauses, and

iv. there is no non-verbal lexicator of partitivity used in these sentences.

Furthermore, as shown above, the aspectively adversative sentences belonging to class IV may be correct or incorrect. On the basis of the correct aspectively adversative sentences, it is inferred that there is a class of Modern Greek verbs (e.g. *ōjavazo* ‘read’, *grafo* ‘write’, *katharizo* ‘clean’, *troo* ‘eat’, etc.) whose aoristic verb forms may cosignify completion. This means that their aoristic verb forms are insufficient as significators of completion and need to be aided with another cosignificator of this aspective meaning – e.g. a lexificator of holicity. For instance, in the sentences (4.8.4) and (4.8.5), the aoristic verb forms co-occur with the lexificator of holicity *olos* ‘whole’, whereas in (4.8.6a.) the aoristic verb form co-occurs with the lexificator of holicity *sto telos* ‘in the end’. On the other hand, based on the incorrect aspectively adversative sentences from class IV, it is inferred that there is a class of Modern Greek verbs (e.g. *oōigo* ‘drive’, *pijeno* ‘walk’, *htipo* ‘knock/hit’, *vrisko* ‘find’, etc.), whose verb forms are *aspectively non-opposable*, in the sense that their verb forms may not be bound together by the relation of aspective opposition.

The second stage of comparing aspectively adversative sentences allows us to focus on the lexical and morphosyntactic properties of Modern Greek verbs and predicates. Consequently, at this stage of the current research, it is possible to establish which properties are aspect-relevant and affect the aspective meaning signified by a sentence or clause. If these findings are complemented with the results obtained at the previous stage, it should be possible to propose a set of general statements regarding aspect in Modern Greek. These statements are presented in the next chapter in the form of postulates and their corollaries. They are also elucidated and exemplified there.

We believe that the system of statements proposed in the present thesis reflects at least partially the logic of aspect in Modern Greek and the logic of Modern Greek adversative sentences. Consequently, this system may be conceived of as part of a more comprehensive theory of Modern Greek aspectuality and a theory of Modern Greek adversativity. Additionally, we believe that the proposed statements regarding aspect in Modern Greek may provide a possible answer to the questions raised earlier in this section (see p. 142).

To close, the objective of this dissertation is to answer the questions *how is the meaning of completion lingually expressed in Modern Greek?* and *why does syntagma S signify or not signify completion?* As argued at the beginning of this chapter, the hitherto proposed
assumptions do not provide a satisfactory answer to this question. At the same time, it is believed that analysis of aspectively adversative sentences will shed some new light on the signification of completion by Modern Greek lingual units. In order to achieve this goal, a corpus of aspectively adversative sentences has been created.
Chapter 5

Modern Greek Aspect

According to Df 3.5.1.1, every sentence signifying completion should necessarily signify termination and holicity. However, the question arises of what causes a sentence to signify these two meanings. In this chapter, an attempt is made to answer this question (at least partially). For this purpose, a number of postulates are proposed regarding the signification of termination, holicity and then completion in Modern Greek. Moreover, indication is given of a range of issues which may be addressed in future research.

5.1 The signification of termination

The first question to be considered in this chapter concerns the signification of termination. Consequently, some words will be said about both semification and lexification of this delimitative meaning.

5.1.1 The semification of termination

Po 5.1.1.1 Postulate of semification of termination by an aoristic verb form
If a verb form \( X \) belongs to the aorist tense, then \( X \) semifies termination.

Po 5.1.1.2 Postulate of semification of termination by a perfect verb form
If a verb form \( X \) belongs to the perfect tense, then \( X \) semifies termination.

As is easily noticed, the above postulates are analogous in form, in the sense that they are statements about two tenses (i.e. classes of verb forms) whose elements semify termination. On the strength of these postulates, every aoristic verb form and every perfect verb form semifies termination. Let us consider the following examples:
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Ex 5.1.1.1

\[\text{Ex 5.1.1.1}\]

- \(\partial\)javasa ‘I read’
- horepses ‘you danced’
- kimithike ‘(s)he slept’
- pigame ‘we went’
- graftikan ‘they were written’

Ex 5.1.1.2

- eho \(\partial\)javasi ‘I have read’
- ehis horepsi ‘you have danced’
- ehi kimithi ‘(s)he has slept’
- ehume pai ‘we have gone’
- ehun grafti ‘they have been written’

Ex 5.1.1.1 consists of five verb forms. Although these verb forms differ in respect of person, number, or voice, each of them is an aoristic verb form. In other words, all of them belong to the aorist tense. This being the case, in the light of Po 5.1.1.1, the verb forms listed in Ex 5.1.1.1 semify termination. Analogously, Ex 5.1.1.2 is composed solely of verb forms which belong to the perfect tense. Therefore, it follows from Po 5.1.1.2 that these verb forms also semify termination.

It should be noted that the above postulates allow us to ascertain the delimitative meaning of a verb form based on the tense to which it belongs, but not conversely. That is to say, although we assume that in Modern Greek every aoristic or perfect verb form semifies termination, it is not true that every verb form which semifies termination belongs to the aorist or the perfect tense. This is because the semification of termination should not be considered to be limited to only these two tenses. On the contrary, we are aware that other tenses (e.g. the pluperfect tense) may also semify the meaning of termination. Nonetheless, keeping in mind that in the present research only three tenses (the imperfect, the aorist, and the perfect tense) are considered, the totive meanings semified by verb forms belonging to other tenses of Modern Greek are not explored.

At this point, the question arises of which delimitative meaning is signified by verb forms belonging to the imperfect tense. It was presumed at the beginning of this research that imperfect verb forms should semify non-termination. Provided that this assumption is valid, imperfect verb forms should be bound by the relation of delimitative opposition with aoristic and perfect verb forms. In other words, imperfect verb forms should semify non-termination, whereas their corresponding aoristic and perfect verb forms should semify termination. Nonetheless, the results obtained suggest that this assumption may turn out to be invalid. Consequently, it should be reviewed. However, since the results obtained in the present research do not suffice for a reliable verification of the assumption, we leave this issue unanswered and open for future study.
5.1.2 The lexification of termination

As was mentioned in Chapter 3.1, an event is momentous if it is conceptualised as possessing minimal duration. For the purposes of the present research, this property will be called momentarity. One way of signifying this property is its lexification by a verb form. In the aspectological literature, verb forms lexifying momentarity are often called punctual verbs, semelfactive verbs, or even achievements (e.g. vrisko ‘find’, htipo ‘hit’, viho ‘cough’ – see Chapter 1.4.3 and Chapter 2.4.3). It should be emphasised that, although momentarity may be lingually signified by a variety of different lingual means, the main focus here is placed on verb forms. Also, the question of how and when a verb form lexifies this meaning is not raised. We are interested merely in the relation between momentarity and termination. Consequently, the following postulate is proposed:

Po 5.1.2.1  Postulate of lexification of termination

If a verb form \( X \) lexifies momentarity, then \( X \) lexifies termination.

It follows from the above postulate that every verb form lexifying momentarity also lexifies termination. This means that the designatum of such a verb form is conceived of as terminated. This statement is consistent with the approaches found in the aspectological literature, according to which verb forms of this kind signify minimal duration (see Chapters 1.4.3 and 2.4.3).

Given the above, something should be said about imperfect verb forms, which seem to be in contradiction to Po 5.1.2.1. In accordance with the aspectological literature (see Chapter 2.4.3, 2.4.4, and 2.5.3), an imperfect verb form lexifying momentarity tends to signify iteration or habituality. This means that its designatum is not conceived of by the speaker as uniform and indivisible (as in the case of a momentous event), but as a sequence of (sufficiently) homosignificative members. For instance, the designatum of the verb form evriska ‘I used to find’ may be illustrated as:

\[
evriska = [vrika_1, vrika_2, vrika_3, \ldots, vrika_k, \ldots]
\]

‘I used to find = [I found_1, I found_2, I found_3, \ldots, I found_k, \ldots]’

As is shown, the imperfect verb form evriska ‘I used to find’ does not express that I found something once and only once. On the contrary, it expresses that I found something an unspecified number of times. In other words, the designatum of this verb form is a sequence consisting of an unspecified number of members, which may be referred to as vrika; ‘I found’,
Now, returning to Po 5.1.2.1, it is assumed that the meaning of momentarity is obligatorily accompanied by the meaning of termination. We believe that this assumption is valid also in the case of imperfect verb forms, even if they signify iteration or habituality. In this case, however, momentarity and termination are not properties of the designated event as a whole, but are properties of its subevents taken individually. That is to say, the designatum of the imperfect verb form *evriska* ‘I used to find’ is a sequence of (sufficiently) homosignificative members (i.e. *vrika*; ‘I found’), each of which possesses the property of being momentous and terminated. Consequently, it is conceivable that an imperfect verb form which lexifies momentarity also lexifies termination.

### 5.1.3 Terminated simple sentences

As was mentioned in the previous sections, we focus on the semification and lexification of termination solely by verb forms. Other lingual means of signifying this particular meaning are not considered in this dissertation. Due to this restriction, it is also assumed that the delimitative meaning of a simple sentence is dependent on its constituent verbal predicate. Consequently, the following postulate is proposed:

**Po 5.1.3.1 Postulate of signification of termination by a simple sentence**

If a verb form $X$, being the verbal predicate of a simple sentence $S$, semifies termination, then $S$ signifies termination.

According to the above postulate, a simple sentence signifies termination if its verbal predicate semifies termination. In other words, the meaning of termination semified by the verb form which is the verbal predicate of a sentence is extended to the whole sentence. Let us consider the following examples:

(5.1.3.1) a. *O Iasonas kimithike.* ‘Jason slept.’

b. *Eho ėjavasi afto to vivlio.* ‘I have read this book.’

In the above simple sentences two verb forms are used: *kimithike* ‘[(s)he] slept’ and *ējavasi* ‘[I] have read’. These verb forms belong to the aorist and the perfect tense respectively. Consequently, in the light of Po 5.1.1.1 and Po 5.1.1.2, the analysed verb forms semify termination. Furthermore, it should be noted that these verb forms constitute the verbal predicates of the sentences in (5.1.3.1). Therefore, as follows from Po 5.1.3.1, the analysed sentences also signify termination. To put it more simply, the above simple sentences signify
termination because their constituent verbal predicates (i.e. *kimithike* ‘[(s)he] slept’ and *eho ďjavasi* ‘[I] have read’) semify termination.

Based on the above assumption, it is inferred that a sentence $S$ whose verbal predicate $X$ semifies termination is bound with $X$ by the *relation of terminativisation*. In other words, $X$ *terminativises* $S$, in the sense that the meaning of termination semified by the verbal predicate is extended to the whole sentence. Therefore, in (5.1.3.1a.) the verbal predicate *kimithike* ‘[(s)he] slept’ terminativises the sentence *O Iasonas kimithike* ‘Jason slept’. Analogously, the verbal predicate *eho ďjavasi* ‘I have read’ terminativises the sentence in (5.1.3.1b.). Since we believe that this conclusion is not controversial, we will not explain it further.

It should be emphasised that Po 5.1.3.1 refers to sentences whose verbal predicate semifies termination. This postulate says nothing about the delimitative meaning lexified by such a verbal predicate. This is because the delimitative meaning lexified by the verbal predicate may be contradictory to the meaning signified by the sentence. That is to say, a sentence may signify non-termination, even though its verbal predicate lexifies termination. For example, let us consider the following sentences:

(5.1.3.2) a. *O Kostas vrike to vivlio to ston kanape.*

‘Kostas *found* his book on the sofa.’

b. *To peĎi htipuse tin porta akomi.*

‘The child *was* still *knocking* on the door.’

In the above example, two verbal predicates are to be found: the aoristic verb form *vrike* ‘[(s)he] found’ and the imperfect verb form *htipuse* ‘[(s)he] was knocking’. As was mentioned in the previous section, each of these verb forms lexifies termination, because they lexify momentarity (see Po 5.1.2.1). Nevertheless, we shall argue that only one of the above sentences signifies termination.

Let us begin with the former sentence (5.1.3.2a.), in which the aoristic verb form *vrike* ‘[(s)he] found’ is used. On the strength of Po 5.1.3.1, this sentence signifies termination, because its verbal predicate semifies the meaning of termination. This verbal predicate semifies termination because it belongs to the aorist tense (see Po 5.1.1.1).

On the other hand, the sentence in (5.1.3.2b.) designates an iterative event. This means that this event is a sequence of repetitive subevents (i.e. a sequence of knocks/taps on the door). Importantly, each of these subevents is momentous and terminated if taken separately (see the previous section). Therefore, the event designated by the sentence in (5.1.3.2b.) is a sequence of knocks/taps, each of which is momentous and terminated. However, despite that fact, the
event itself possesses the property of being non-terminated. That is to say, this sentence expresses that the event was ongoing at the moment to which the speaker refers.

In conclusion, we assume that, although a verbal predicate semifying termination terminativises the sentence (see Po 5.1.3.1), the same cannot be said about a verbal predicate lexifying termination. Consequently, two justifiable questions arise:

- Why is the totive meaning semified by a verbal predicate extended to the whole sentence, whereas the totive meaning lexified by the verbal predicate is not?
- Is the totive meaning lexified by a verbal predicate never extended to the whole sentence?

Unfortunately, we are unable to offer an answer to the first of the above questions, because the results obtained in the present research are not sufficient. For this purpose, a larger body of research material is necessary. Furthermore, in order to answer this question, it may be necessary to modify the method applied in the present research or to use a different method. As regards the second question, it is argued in Chapter 5.4.1 that in certain circumstances the lexified meaning of termination may be extended to the whole sentence. This issue, however, is not considered here.

To close this section, it is inferred that:

Co 5.1.3.1 Signification of termination by an aoristic or perfect simple sentence

If a verb form $X$, being a verbal predicate of a simple sentence $S$, belongs to the aorist or the perfect tense, then $S$ signifies termination.

The above corollary follows from three postulates accepted earlier in this chapter, namely Po 5.1.1.1, Po 5.1.1.2, and Po 5.1.3.1. According to the first two of these postulates, every aoristic or perfect verb form semifies the meaning of termination. The last postulate states that every simple sentence whose verbal predicate semifies termination signifies termination. This being the case, a sentence whose verbal predicate $X$ belongs to the aorist or the perfect tense signifies termination, because $X$ semifies termination. Let us consider the following example:

(5.1.3.3) a. $I$ Vasiliki irthe sto Lonðino. ‘Vasiliki came to London.’
    b. $I$ Vasiliki ehi erthi sto Lonðino. ‘Vasiliki has come/came to London.’

In the above sentences, two verb forms are used: the aoristic verb form irthe ‘[(s)he] came’ and its perfect counterpart ehi erthi ‘[(s)he] came/has come’. Importantly, these verb forms are the verbal predicates of the analysed sentences. Thus, in the light of Co 5.1.3.1, these simple
sentences signify termination, because their verbal predicates are verb forms belonging to the aorist or the perfect tense.

5.2 The signification of holicity

As was noted in Chapters 1 and 2, there is a group of aspectologists who believe that quantity is (at least to some degree) related to aspectuality (see Verkuyl 1993, Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a, 2003b, 2007). The significance of quantity is also noticeable in the present dissertation. This is due to the definition of completion introduced in Chapter 3. According to that definition, the meaning of completion results from the obligatory combination of two meanings: termination and holicity. The latter meaning belongs to the dimension of totivity, a component of the system of totivity, which in turn belongs to the hypersystem (i.e. the system of systems) of quantitativity (see Chapter 3.4.2). Keeping that in mind, a few words should be said about the signification of totive meanings, and in particular about the signification of holicity in Modern Greek.

5.2.1 The mode of signification of totive meanings

We should begin our account of the signification of holicity in Modern Greek by considering two of its modes – namely, semification and lexification. As has been noted in previous sections, the meaning of termination may be both semified and lexified. We have, however, found no evidence of semification of holicity, partitivity, or totive neutrality in Modern Greek. Consequently, it is assumed that totive meanings are not semified in that language. This assumption is expressed formally by the following postulate:

Po 5.2.1.1 Postulate of non-semification of totive meanings

If a word form $X$ signifies a totive meaning $\sigma$, then $X$ does not semify $\sigma$.

There are two issues that must be mentioned in respect of the above postulate. Firstly, by no means should it be considered universal, in the sense of being cross-lingually valid. On the contrary, we consider it as Modern-Greek-specific. This means that some other languages (e.g. Polish or Russian\(^1\)) may semify totive meanings such as holicity or partitivity. Secondly, although it is assumed that totive meanings are not semified in the studied language, it does not mean that these meanings are not signified at all. For instance, the totive meaning of holicity is

\(^1\) See, for instance, Forsyth (1970: 22f.) and Thelin (1978: 21ff.). Furthermore, Grzegorczykowa, Laskowski, and Wróbel (1998: 82-4) give a brief review of a larger debate as to whether the prefixes used to form perfective stems of Polish verb forms should be considered as flectional or derivational.
lexified by the word forms *olos* ‘whole’, *oloklironi* ‘(s)he completes’, *pliros* ‘entirely’, *teliono* ‘I finish’, *orthanihta* ‘wide open’, etc., while the meaning of partitivity is lexified by *misaniksan* ‘they opened slightly’, *misoklistos* ‘almost closed’, *imijimnos* ‘half-naked’, *komati* ‘part’, etc. Thus, from now on we will use expressions like the *signification of holicity*, to signify holicity, etc. not to refer to the semification of this totive meaning, but to express that holicity is lexified or disambiguated by a lingual unit.

**5.2.2 Significators of totive meanings**

Keeping in mind the assumption made in the previous section, the relation of lexification determines the classification of Modern Greek word forms into four classes:

- The class of lexificators of holicity;
- The class of lexificators of partitivity;
- The class of totively ambiguous word forms; and
- The class of totively neutral word forms.

The first two of the above classes consist of lexificators of holicity and partitivity respectively. As is suggested by the names of these classes, the first of them consists of word forms lexifying holicity. Consequently, it contains word forms such as *oloklirotita* ‘entirety’, *olos* ‘whole’, *pliris* ‘full’, *endelos* ‘completely’, *orthanihta* ‘entirely’, *teliono* ‘I finish’, *petheno* ‘I die’ (see Chapter 3.5.1), *oloklirono* ‘I complete’, *peratono* ‘I finish’, and others.

Furthermore, it is assumed that momentarity is inseparably related to holicity. This assumption is formally expressed by the following postulate:

**Po 5.2.2.1 Postulate of signification of holicity by momentous lingual units**

If a lingual unit $X$ lexifies momentarity, then $X$ lexifies holicity.

It follows from the above postulate that every verb form lexifying momentarity also lexifies holicity. Thus, by virtue of this postulate, Modern Greek verb forms like *vrisko* ‘I find’, *htipo* ‘I hit’, *viho* ‘I cough’, etc., each of which lexifies momentarity, also lexify the meaning of holicity, and therefore belong to the class of lexificators of that totive meaning.

The second class consists of word forms signifying the meaning of partitivity. These include word forms such as *komati* ‘part’, *apospasma* ‘extract’, *merikos* ‘partially’, *misos* ‘half’, *imijimnos* ‘half-naked’, *miso∂javasmenos* ‘half-read’, *misoklistos* ‘pushed to’, and many others.

We believe that the reasons why the above examples are classified as lexificators of holicity or partitivity are sufficiently clear. More attention, however, should be given to the third class,
which seems to be less intuitive. What characterises word forms belonging to this class is that they signify at least partial holicity (see Chapter 3.4.2) of an object. To illustrate this concept, let us consider the Modern Greek verb form \( \partialjavasa \) ‘I read’. Based on the meanings signified by this verb form, it may be inferred that:

\[
\rightarrow \text{I must have been reading in some temporal interval } t_1 - t_n; \\
\rightarrow \text{I must have been reading some object } x \text{ (e.g. a book, newspaper, letter, pamphlet, etc.);} \\
\rightarrow \text{I must have read at least a little – that is to say, at least some part of } x \text{ must have been read by me.}
\]

At the same time, it must be emphasised that the meanings signified by this verb form do not suffice to ascertain whether \( x \) has been read entirely or not. It simply expresses that I have read at least some part of \( x \). Consequently, they are sufficient significators of neither partitivity nor holicity. Because of this, totively ambiguous verb forms may be found in various totive contexts. For instance:

\[(5.2.2.1) \ a. \ Ksaplosa \ sto \ krevati \ ke \ \partialjavasa \ \text{ligo.} \\
\quad \text{‘I lay down on the bed and read a little bit.’} \\
\quad \text{b.} \ Htes \ \partialjavasa \ ena \ \text{ołokliro} \ \text{vivlio.} \\
\quad \text{‘I read an entire book yesterday.’} \\
\quad \text{c.} \ \partialjavasa \ \text{to vivlio, ala} \ \partialen \ \partialjavasa \ \text{olo.} \\
\quad \text{‘I read the book, but I didn’t read it all.’}
\]

Analogous observations may be made for verb forms such as \( \text{egrafa} \) ‘I was writing’ (\( \rightarrow \) I must have written something), \( \text{horepsa} \) ‘I danced’ (\( \rightarrow \) I must have danced at least a little), \( \text{katharizes} \) ‘you were cleaning’ (\( \rightarrow \) you must have made something at least slightly cleaner), \( \text{perpatuse} \) ‘(s)he was walking’ (\( \rightarrow \) he or she must have covered some distance by walking), and others.

In accordance with the above considerations, totively ambiguous word forms include non-momentous verb forms such as \( \partialjavasa \) ‘I read’, \( \text{egrafa} \) ‘I was writing’, \( \text{anikse} \) ‘(s)he opened’, \( \text{skupisame} \) ‘we swept’, \( \text{katharizes} \) ‘you were cleaning’, \( \text{traguðusan} \) ‘they were singing’, etc. Furthermore, this class includes forms of motion verbs like \( \text{piga} \) ‘I went’, \( \text{perpatuse} \) ‘(s)he was walking’, \( \text{kolibisame} \) ‘we swam’, \( \text{esproksa} \) ‘I pushed’, \( \text{esires} \) ‘you pushed’, \( \text{traviksan} \) ‘they pulled’, \( \text{oðigusan} \) ‘they were driving’, \( \text{kuniete} \) ‘(s)he/it is swung’, and others. What these verb forms have in common is that none of them lexifies the meaning of holicity or partitivity.
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It should be pointed out that, in view of the objectives of this dissertation, every totively ambiguous word form considered in this research is a verb form. However, by no means should it be inferred that word forms representing other parts of speech (nouns, adjectives, adverbs, etc.) may not belong to this class.

Finally, the last class is the complement of the union of the other three classes – i.e. the grey area in the figure below:

![Fig. 5.2.2.1 Totively ambiguous word forms – grey colour.](image)

In practice, this means that the class of totively neutral word forms consists of lingual units which lexify neither holicity nor partitivity and which are not totively ambiguous. For example, this class includes verb forms of stative verbs like *evo* ‘I have’, *imuna* ‘I was’, *ithele* ‘(s)he wanted’, *thelisame* ‘we wanted’, etc.

5.2.3 The totive meaning of an affirmative sentence

Given the aforementioned classification, the question arises of which totive meaning is signified by a sentence. To answer this question, we adopt Kuryłowicz’s (1987: 93–102) assumption that the verbal predicate is a constitutive member of the sentence. On this basis, we propose the following postulate:

Po 5.2.3.1 Postulate of the totive meaning signified by a sentence

If a verb form $X$ which is the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence $S$ signifies the totive meaning $\sigma$, then $S$ also signifies $\sigma$. 

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According to the above postulate, the totive meanings signified by a verbal predicate of a simple, contextually unconditioned sentence is extended to the whole sentence. In other words, the totive meaning signified by the sentence corresponds to the totive meaning of its verbal predicate. Thus, if the verb form \( X \), being the verbal predicate of sentence \( S \), signifies holicity, then \( S \) also signifies holicity. Analogously, if \( X \) signifies partitvity, then \( S \) also signifies partitivity. To illustrate Po 5.2.3.1, let us consider the following examples:

(5.2.3.1) a. \( O \) Jorgos \textit{teliose} to vivlio tu. ‘George \textbf{finished} his book.’

b. \( I \) Maria \textit{misoklise} tin porta. ‘Mary \textbf{pushed} the door to.’

In the above sentences, two verbal predicates are found: \textit{teliose} ‘[(s)he] finished’ and \textit{misoklise} ‘[(s)he] pushed (sth) to’. These signify different totive meanings: the former signifies holicity, whereas the latter signifies partitivity. It follows from Po 5.2.3.1 that the above sentences should signify holicity and partitivity respectively. This statement is consistent with the properties possessed by the designated events, as the first sentence signifies that the book was fully read or written by George, whereas the second sentence signifies that Mary did not close the door entirely, but left it slightly open.

To continue, some words should be said about sentences whose verbal predicates are totively ambiguous verb forms (see the previous section). As is mentioned there, one of the characteristic features of such verb forms is that they may be used in various totive contexts. Thus, totively ambiguous verb forms, such as \( \partial javasa \) ‘I read’, may be found in sentences signifying partitivity – as in (5.2.3.2a.) – in sentences signifying holicity – as in (5.2.3.2b.) – or in totively ambiguous sentences – like the one in (5.2.3.2c.):

(5.2.3.2) a. \( O \) Janis \textit{\partial javase ligo} to vivlio prin pesi ja ipno.

‘John \textbf{read} the book \textbf{a bit} before he fell asleep.’

b. \( O \) Janis \textit{\partial javase ena olokliro} vivlio.

‘John \textbf{read} an \textbf{entire} book.’

c. \( O \) Janis \textit{\partial javase} to «Harry Potter» sto parko.

‘John \textbf{read} “Harry Potter” in the park.’

This observation might seem to be in contradiction to Po 5.2.3.1, because on the one hand it is stated that the totive meaning of the sentence corresponds to the totive meaning of its verbal predicate, and on the other hand it is observed that totively ambiguous verbal predicates are found in various totive contexts. We will argue, however, that these statements are perfectly
consistent with each other. For this purpose, it is worth recalling that totively ambiguous verb forms are not sufficient significators of partitivity and holicity. To put it differently, totively ambiguous verb forms designate objects possessing the property of being at least partial. Nonetheless, it is not specified whether the designated object is whole or merely partial. As a result, they may refer to both whole and partial objects.

Moreover, by virtue of Po 5.2.3.1, it is inferred that the property of being at least partial signified by the totively ambiguous verbal predicate is extended to the whole sentence. Therefore, a sentence with such a verbal predicate should signify at least partial holicity of the event. Bearing that in mind, each of the sentences in (5.2.3.2) signifies that John read no less than a little. This statement is not contradictory to the meaning of holicity, partitivity or even totive ambiguity.

Given the above considerations, it is worth emphasising once again that verb forms such as έργαζομαι ‘I read’, εγράφω ‘I was writing’, etc. are insufficient significators of both partitivity and holicity. That is to say, verb forms of this kind are totively ambiguous. This does not mean, however, that their totive meanings may not be disambiguated by determiners (adverbs, adjectives, etc.) signifying holicity or partitivity. Therefore, although these verb forms are intrinsically totively ambiguous, the same cannot be said about sentences whose verbal predicates are totively ambiguous. This is because the totive meaning signified by the verbal predicate of such a sentence may be disambiguated or specified by another member of the sentence, or even by context. This idea is formally expressed as the following postulate:

Po 5.2.3.2 Postulate of totive disambiguation

If a verbal predicate \( X \) being a constituent of a simple sentence \( S \) is totively ambiguous, then the totive meaning signified by \( X \) may be disambiguated by another member of \( S \) or by context.

The above postulate concerns sentences whose verbal predicate is totively ambiguous. That is to say, their verbal predicates signify sufficiently neither holicity nor partitivity. The totive meaning of such a sentence, however, may be disambiguated by another member of the sentence or even by context. Let us consider the following examples:

(5.2.3.3) a. \( I \) Μαρία ανίκεσε την πόρτα ‘Mary opened the door.’

b. \( I \) Μαρία ανόκσε την πόρτα \( \text{τελίος} \) ‘Mary opened the door completely.’

c. \( I \) Μαρία ανίκεσε \( \text{λίγο} \) την πόρτα. ‘Mary opened the door slightly.’

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The verbal predicate of the above sentences is the verb form *anikse* ‘[(s)he] opened’. This verbal predicate is totively ambiguous, because it does not specify to what degree the door became open (i.e. whether it was slightly or wide open). Keeping that in mind, it is inferred on the strength of Po 5.2.3.1 that each of the above sentences expresses that **the door became at least slightly open.** Despite that, it is worth noting that each of the sentences signifies a different totive meaning. The first of them is totively ambiguous, as it does not clarify to what degree the door was opened. It is equally possible that Mary opened it slightly or that she opened it wide. On the other hand, the second sentence signifies holicity, meaning that Mary opened the door entirely. This is due to the lexificator of holicity *telios* ‘completely’, which disambiguates the totive meaning signified by the verbal predicate *anikse* ‘[(s)he] opened’. Finally, the last sentence signifies partitivity, as it expresses that, although Mary did open the door, it was not wide open. This is because of the use of the lexificator of partitivity *ligo* ‘slightly’, clarifying to what degree the door became open.

To summarise, the verbal predicate is considered to be the constitutive member of the sentence. Consequently, as is assumed in Po 5.2.3.1, its totive meaning is extended to the whole sentence. Therefore, if the verbal predicate of a sentence:

- Signifies holicity, then the sentence also signifies holicity;
- Signifies partitivity, then the sentence also signifies partitivity;
- Is totively ambiguous, then the sentence signifies that the event is at least partially whole.

Importantly, as is assumed in Po 5.2.3.2, the totive meaning signified by a totively ambiguous verbal predicate may be disambiguated by another member of the sentence or by context – see the sentences in (5.2.3.2) and (5.2.3.3).

### 5.2.4 Disambiguation of the totive meaning

Given the above considerations, the justifiable question arises of which constituents of a sentence may disambiguate the totive meaning of a totively ambiguous verbal predicate. To answer this question, it is to be presumed that different verbal predicates are disambiguated in a variety of different ways and by lingual units of various kind and size. For instance, it seems reasonable to expect that the totive meaning of verbal predicates such as *kolimbisa* ‘I swam’, *perpatisa* ‘I walked’, *etreksa* ‘I ran’, etc. will be totively disambiguated by syntagmata like ôjo hiliometra ‘two kilometres’, *mehri to spiti* ‘until reaching home’, *oli tin apostasi* ‘all the distance’, and others. Let us consider the following example:

(5.2.4.1)  *O Kostas etrekse ôjo hiliometra.* ‘Kostas ran two kilometres.’
The verbal predicate *etrekse* ‘[(s)he] ran’ of the above sentence is totively ambiguous, as it signifies at least partial holicity of the event. To put it more simply, this verbal predicate by itself signifies that Kostas covered some distance by running. This distance, however, is expressed by the syntagma *dio hiliometra* ‘two kilometres’. Consequently, the sentence in (5.2.4.1) signifies that Kostas covered the distance of two kilometres by running. Importantly, since this sentence clearly indicates that the distance in question was fully covered, it signifies the meaning of holicity.

On the other hand, it seems justified to presume that verbal predicates like *aniksa* ‘I opened’, *djavasa* ‘I read’, *efaga* ‘I ate’, etc. are not totively disambiguated by the syntagmata mentioned above. This is because, for instance, the covering of the distance of two kilometres says nothing about the degree to which something was opened, read, or eaten. Therefore, these verbal predicates require a different kind of disambiguator. For instance:

(4.2.4.2)  

a. *Tin aniksa olokliri.* ‘I opened it wide.’  
b. *To djavasa eksolokliru.* ‘I read it completely.’  
c. *To efaga olo.* ‘I ate it up.’

This being said, it is evident that contextually unconditioned sentences whose verbal predicates are totively ambiguous need to be classified in respect of the constituents which totively disambiguate their verbal predicate. For instance, one may distinguish classes of:

- Sentences whose verbal predicates are totively disambiguated by direct-object phrases;
- Sentences whose verbal predicates are totively disambiguated by adverbials of degree;
- Sentences whose verbal predicates are totively disambiguated by predicative adjectives;
- Sentences whose verbal predicates are totively disambiguated by adverbials of (spatial) distance;
- …
- Totively ambiguous sentences.

The first class consists of sentences whose verbal predicates are totively disambiguated by direct-object phrases, such as *ena apospazma tu piimatos* ‘an extract from the poem’, *ena olokliro vivlio* ‘an entire book’, *sheon olo to domatio* ‘almost the whole room’. Consequently, the following sentences belong to this class:

(5.2.4.3)  
a. *I Keti djavase ena apospazma tu piimatos.*  
‘Kate read an extract from a poem.’
b. *I Keti egrapse ena olokliro vivlio.*
   ‘Kate wrote an entire book.’

c. *I Keti katharise shevon olo to domatio.*
   ‘Kate cleaned almost the whole room.’

The second class consists of sentences whose verbal predicates are totively disambiguated by adverbials of degree such as *orthanihta* ‘entirely/wide’, *telios* ‘completely’, *pliros* ‘fully’, *oloklirotika* ‘completely’, *eksolokliru* ‘completely’, *sto telos* ‘in the ned’, etc. Therefore, this class includes sentences such as:

(5.2.4.4) a. *O Andreas ğjavase to vivlio eksolokliru.*
   ‘Andreas read the book completely.’

b. *I klepsiđra ehi adjasi shevon telios.*
   ‘The hourglass has emptied almost completely.’

c. *O Andreas anikse orthanihta tin porta.*
   ‘Andreas opened the door wide.’

The next class is composed of sentences whose verbal predicates are totively disambiguated by significators of holicity or partitivity used as predicative adjectives. Consequently, although these significators are members of the predicative phrase, they might seem to determine directly either the subject or the direct object of the sentence, and not directly the verbal predicate itself. This is due to the gender and case agreement found within the sentence. To this class belong sentences such as:

(5.2.4.5) a. *I porta anikse olokliri.* ‘The door opened wide.’

b. *Tin anikse olokliri.* ‘(S)he opened it wide.’

The fourth class includes sentences whose verbal predicates are totively disambiguated by adverbials of (spatial) distance such as *đjo hiliometra* ‘(for) two kilometres’, *epi đekađes metra* ‘for tenths of metres’, *đeka milia* ‘ten miles’, etc. Consequently, this class consists of sentences such as:

(5.2.4.6) a. *O Kostas etrekse đjo hiliometra.*
   ‘Kostas ran two kilometres.’

b. *O Kostas esprokse to kalathi epi đekađes metra.*
   ‘Kostas pushed the basket for tenths metres.’
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c. O Kostas perpatise ἑκατον μιλια.
   ‘Kostas walked ten miles.’

Moreover, based on Horrocks and Stavrou’s (2007) observations, we arrive at the conclusion that Modern Greek totively ambiguous verbal predicates which are manner-of-motion verbs are not disambiguated by adverbials of direction (e.g. *sto parko* ‘in(to) the park’, *pros to nisi* ‘towards the island’, *ja Athina* ‘to Athens’, etc.). Consequently, sentences such as those given below do not specify whether an object reached its destination. In other words, it is unknown whether the distance between the initial location of the object and the destination point was fully covered. Sentences of this kind simply express that an object was moving in a particular direction or that an event happened at a particular location.

(5.2.4.7)  
a. O Petros oðigise to aftokinito pros to aeroðromio.  
   ‘Peter drove the car towards the airport.’  
b. O Petros perpatuse sto parko.  
   ‘Peter walked in the park.’

Finally, it is necessary to distinguish a class of sentences whose verbal predicates are not totively disambiguated by any of their constituents. Consequently, the totive meaning signified by a sentence belonging to this class is identical to the totive meaning of its verbal predicate, meaning that these sentences signify at least partial holicity of the event. Therefore, this class consists of sentences which are totively ambiguous, as they do not specify whether the designated event is entirely effected. This assumption is expressed formally in the following postulate:

Po 5.2.4.1 Postulate of a totively ambiguous sentence  
If a totively ambiguous verb form $X$ is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence $S$ and $X$ is not totively disambiguated by a significator of either holicity or partitivity, then $S$ is totively ambiguous.

Among the sentences belonging to this class are, for instance:

(5.2.4.8)  
a. *I Popi ējavase to vivlio.* ‘Poppy read the book.’  
b. *I Popi pije sholio.* ‘Poppy went to school.’  
c. *I Popi anikse to parathiro.* ‘Poppy opened the window.’
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The first of the above sentences is totively ambiguous as it does not specify whether Poppy read the book from beginning to end. It simply signifies that Poppy was reading it for some time and, therefore, she must have read at least some part of it. The second sentence states that Poppy set off for school. It is not specified whether she reached school or not. The last sentence expresses that Poppy opened the window. Nonetheless, it is left unclear whether she opened it slightly or entirely. Given the above, the sentences in (5.2.4.8) are totively ambiguous.

Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the present research, it is impossible to explore exhaustively the disambiguation of totively ambiguous verbal predicates. Consequently, by no means should the above list of classes be conceived of as comprehensive. It consists of merely a few exemplary classes of sentences that we have succeeded in distinguishing on the basis of the analysed material. Additionally, it should be noted that the above classification of sentences does not offer any explanation to why a verbal predicate \( X \) is disambiguated by one and not another constituent of the sentence (see the classes of sentences considered above). Neither does it answer the question of which totively ambiguous verb forms may be disambiguated by lingual units of which kind. These are issues that require further research.

5.2.5 The adverb telika ‘finally’

As has been shown in the previous sections, the totive meaning of a totively ambiguous verbal predicate may be disambiguated by a variety of lingual units (e.g. direct-object phrase, adverbials of degree, adverbials of distance, etc.). There is, however, an adverb – namely telika ‘finally’ – which seems to cause certain theoretical problems. This is because, on the one hand, this adverb may disambiguate the totive meaning of a verbal predicate, but on the other hand it is not always sufficient. To illustrate this, let us consider the following sentences:

(5.2.5.1) a. *O Aleksanđros ďavaze to vivlio.*
   ‘Alexander was reading the book.’

   b. *O Aleksanđros ďavase to vivlio.*
   ‘Alexander read the book.’

   c. *O Aleksađnros ehi ďavasi to vivlio.*
   ‘Alexander has read the book.’

In the above sentences, the following verb forms are used: the imperfective verb form ďavaze ‘[(s)he] was reading’, the aoristic verb form ďavase ‘[(s)he] read’, and the perfect verb form ehi ďavasi ‘[(s)he] has read’. As we argue in this dissertation, each of these is totively ambiguous, in the sense that it is a sufficient significator of neither partitivity nor holicity.
Consequently, regardless of the tense (i.e. whether they belong to the imperfect, the aorist, or the perfect tense) they merely express that at least some part of the book has been read. This is substantiated by the incorrectness of the following aspectively adversative sentences (see the assumptions and corollaries listed in Chapter 3.8.2):

(5.2.5.2) a. *O Aleksand̄ros ējavaze to vivlio, ala ēn to ējavase.
   *‘Alexander was reading the book, but he didn’t read it.’

b. *O Aleksand̄ros ējavaze to vivlio, ala ēn to ehi ējavasi.
   *‘Alexander was reading the book, but he hasn’t read it.’

The first thing to be said about the above sentences is that their affirmative clauses are totively ambiguous. This means that one cannot infer from the clause *O Aleksand̄ros ējavaze to vivlio ‘Alexander was reading the book’ whether or not Alexander read the book completely. Bearing that in mind, in the light of Co 3.8.2.5 the negated clauses *to ējavase ‘[(s)he] read it’ and *to ehi ējavasi ‘[(s)he] has read it’ cannot signify completion, because the above aspectively adversative sentences are incorrect. Next, given that these negated clauses do not signify completion, they cannot signify both termination and holicity simultaneously (see the definition of completion – Df 3.5.1.1). At the same time, it may be inferred on the basis of Co 5.1.3.1 that these negated clauses signify termination, because their verbal predicates belong to the aorist and the perfect tense respectively. All things considered, the above aspectively adversative sentences are incorrect because their negated clauses do not signify holicity.

Furthermore, it follows from Po 5.2.3.2 that the totive meaning of a verbal predicate may be disambiguated by another constituent of the sentence. Therefore, if the verbal predicates of the above negated clauses are disambiguated in such a way that the resulting negated clauses signify holicity, then the above aspectively ambiguous sentences should be transformed into correct ones. The validity of this statement is supported by the correctness of the following sentences:

(5.2.5.3) a. O Aleksan̄̄ros ējavase to vivlio, ala ēn to ējavase olo.
   ‘Alexander was reading the book, but he didn’t read all of it.’

b. O Aleksan̄̄ros ējavase to vivlio, ala ēn to ējavase olo.
   ‘Alexander read the book, but he didn’t read all of it.’

What distinguishes the above aspectively adversative sentences from those in (5.2.5.2) is the lexificator of holicity olo ‘whole’, which disambiguates the totive meaning of the negated
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clause. As the above examples show, the addition of such a lexificator transforms the incorrect aspectively adversative sentences in (5.2.5.2) into correct ones – see the above sentences.

Nonetheless, as regards the adverb telika ‘finally’, it does not always suffice to disambiguate the verbal predicate of the negated clause. Consequently, only one of the following sentences is correct:

(5.2.5.4) a. ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔβαψε τὸ βιβλίον, ἀλὰ τελικὰ ἐὰν τὸ ἔβαψε.
   ‘Alexander was reading the book, but finally he didn’t read it.’

b. *ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔβαψε τὸ βιβλίον, ἀλὰ τελικὰ ἐὰν τὸ ἔβαψε.
   *‘Alexander read the book, but in the end he didn’t read it.’

As is shown, only the first of the above sentences is correct (though awkward). Consequently, on the strength of Co 3.8.2.2, it is inferred that in (5.2.5.4a.) the negated clause telika to ἔβαψε ‘finally he read it’ signifies completion. Moreover, as follows from the definition of completion (see Df 3.5.1.1), this clause must signify holicity as well. At the same time, however, the second sentence is hardly correct. This means that the negated clause does not signify sufficiently the meaning of holicity, despite the use of the adverb telika ‘finally’. In fact, as has been suggested to us, this sentence is correct only if the negated clause is taken to convey a modal meaning of being satisfied with the result of the event.

Given the above, it is evident that the adverb telika disambiguates the totive meaning signified by the verbal predicate solely in certain sentences or contexts. Therefore, it must be concluded that this adverb is not a sufficient disambiguator of totive meanings. Unfortunately, based on the analysed material, it is impossible to answer the question of why this adverb disambiguates the totive meaning signified by the verbal predicate in certain contexts but not in others. Nevertheless, we find this to be an interesting problem that is worth exploring in the future.

5.3 The signification of completion

Having made some assumptions regarding the signification of termination and totive meanings in Modern Greek, it is time to proceed to the crux of this dissertation – namely, completion. As introduced in Df 3.5.1.1, in the present research completion is conceived of as a combination of two meanings: termination and holicity. Since these meanings may be signified conjointly by a lingual unit or separately by two or more lingual units, we distinguish two modes of signification of completion: the autosignification and the cosignification of completion (see
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Chapter 3.1). The former relation specifies a set of sufficient significators of completion (i.e. a set of lingual units signifying simultaneously termination and holicity), whereas the latter relation specifies a set of lingual units which signify completion conjointly with other lingual unit(s).

5.3.1 The autosignification of completion

As has been mentioned above, autosignification is a relation specifying a set of sufficient significators of a meaning $\sigma$, which belongs to a semantic dimension $D$. Therefore, if a verb form $X$ autosignifies completion, then it is a sufficient significator of this aspective meaning. Furthermore, by virtue of the definition of completion (see Df 3.5.1.1), it is reasonable to infer that $X$ signifies simultaneously termination and holicity. Of course, if a more detailed analysis of the verb form is made, it is possible to ascertain which meanings are lexified or semified by particular morphemes of the verb form. However, due to the objectives of the current research, we shall not be going into such details. We take word forms to be the smallest lingual units of interest.

Given the above considerations, the autosignification of completion may be defined as follows:

**Df 5.3.1.1** The definition of the autosignification of completion

A verb form $X$ autosignifies completion iff $X$ semifies termination and lexifies holicity.

According to the above definition, an autosignificator of completion is a lingual unit which is simultaneously a semificator of termination and a lexificator of holicity. Therefore, if the verb form teliosa ‘I finished’ autosignifies completion, then it semifies termination and, at the same time, it lexifies holicity.

A few clarifications should be made regarding Df 5.3.1.1. Firstly, since in this dissertation the morphological structure of verb forms is not explored, the above definition refers to the meanings signified (i.e. semified or lexified) by the whole verb form and not by its constituent morphemes. Secondly, Df 5.3.1.1 refers to the meanings signified by the contextually unconditioned verb form. Consequently, the meanings of termination and holicity signified by the autosignificator of completion are not determined by another lingual unit or by context. Thirdly, it should be noted that in Df 5.3.1.1 the terms *semify* and *lexify* are used, rather than their hypernym *signify*. This is because, as was argued in Chapter 5.1.2, the lexified meaning of termination is hardly extended to the whole sentence. In other words, the lexification of
termination is not always sufficient for a sentence to signify that delimitative meaning. As a consequence, not every momentous verb form autosignifies completion. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 5.4.1.

Among the corollaries of Df 5.3.1.1 are the following:

Co 5.3.1.1 The autosignification of completion by the aoristic and perfect verb form
If a verb form \( X \) lexifies holicity and \( X \) belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then \( X \) autosignifies completion.

Co 5.3.1.2 The autosignification of completion by momentous verbs
If a verb form \( X \) lexifies momentarity and \( X \) belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then \( X \) autosignifies completion.

According to the former corollary, aoristic and perfect verb forms lexifying holicity are autosignificators of completion. To explain this, it must be kept in mind that according to Df 5.3.1.1 a verb form autosignifies completion on condition that it simultaneously semifies termination and lexifies holicity. As is assumed in Po 5.1.1.1 and Po 5.1.1.2, verb forms belonging to the aoristic or perfect tenses semify termination. Therefore, given that these verb forms belong to the class of lexificators of holicity (and, therefore, they lexify the meaning of holicity), they satisfy all of the conditions given in Df 5.3.1.1. This is because they are simultaneously semificators of termination and lexificators of holicity.

Consider the following examples:

Ex 5.3.1.1
- \( \text{teliosa ‘I finished’} \)
- \( \text{olokliroses ‘you completed’} \)
- \( \text{pethane ‘(s)he died’} \)
- \( \text{∂javasame ‘we read’} \)

Ex 5.3.1.2
- \( \text{eho teliosi ‘I have finished’} \)
- \( \text{ehis oloklirosi ‘you have completed’} \)
- \( \text{ehi pethani ‘(s)he has died’} \)
- \( \text{ehume ∂javasi ‘we have read’} \)

To begin with Ex 5.3.1.1, it consists of four aoristic verb forms which differ in respect of person and number. As was mentioned above, on the strength of Po 5.1.1.1 each of these verb forms semifies the meaning of termination, as they belong to the aorist tense. Moreover, it can be noticed that the first three verb forms (i.e. \( \text{teliosa ‘I finished’} \), \( \text{olokliroses ‘you completed’} \), and \( \text{pethane ‘(s)he died’} \)) belong to the class of lexificators of holicity – see Chapter 5.2.2. Consequently, they lexify the meaning of holicity. This being the case, by virtue of Co 5.3.1.1 these verb forms autosignify completion.
As regards the last verb form (i.e. ἔλιβαντες ‘we read’), it semifies termination, because it belongs to the aorist tense (see Po 5.1.1.1). At the same time, it was argued in Chapter 5.2.2 that the forms of this verb are totively ambiguous, meaning that they signify sufficiently neither holicity nor partitivity. Keeping that in mind, the verb form in question does not autosignify completion, because it does not lexify holicity. It is argued in the following subsection that this aoristic verb form may cosignify (i.e. signify insufficiently) the meaning of completion.

Analogous observations are made for the verb forms in Ex 5.3.1.2. In the light of Po 5.1.1.2, all of them semify termination, as they belong to the perfect tense. Furthermore, the first three verb forms (ἐξω τέλιοι ‘I have finished’, εὐθυς ολοκλήρωσε ‘you have completed’, and εὐθυς πέθανε ‘(s)he has died’) autosignify completion, because they belong to the class of lexificators of holicity. Thus, they lexify the meaning of holicity. The exception is the last verb form (ἐξελέξαντες ἔλιβαντες ‘we have read’), which is not a sufficient significator of holicity (see Chapter 5.2.2) and therefore does not autosignify completion. It may, however, be a cosignificator of this aspective meaning – see the next section.

As regards Co 5.3.1.2, it should be recalled that according to Po 5.2.2.1 a lexificator of momentarity is simultaneously a lexificator of holicity. This being the case, by virtue of Co 5.3.1.1 an aoristic or a perfect verb form lexifying momentarity autosignifies completion, because it both semifies termination and lexifies holicity.

Let us consider the following example:

(5.3.1.1) O Kosta vrike to vivlio tu. ‘Kostas found his book.’

Two observations should be made regarding the above sentence. Firstly, its verbal predicate lexifies momentarity. Consequently, on the strength of Po 5.2.2.1 it is inferred that this verbal predicate also lexifies holicity. Secondly, this verbal predicate belongs to the aorist tense. Thus, in the light of Po 5.1.1.1, this verbal predicate semifies termination. Now, given that the aoristic verb form vrike ‘(s)he found’ semifies termination and, at the same time, it lexifies holicity, it follows from Df 5.3.1.1 that the verb form in question autosignifies completion.

To close this subsection, it has been observed during the present research that the autosignification of completion seems to be ‘weakening’ in Modern Greek. This means that aoristic verb forms such as τελιός ‘I finished’ or πέθανε ‘I died’ may in the future become insufficient significators of this aspective meaning. To illustrate this, let us consider the following aspectively adversative sentences:

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(5.3.1.2)  a. *Teliona to vivlio, ala ãen to teliosa.*
   ‘I was finishing the book, but I didn’t finish it.’

b. *Teliona to vivlio, ala sto telos ãen to teliosa.*
   ‘I was finishing the book, but in the end I didn’t finish it.’

As is shown, during the research both of the above sentences were judged by native speakers of Modern Greek as correct. However, they were hesitant about the correctness of the former. Sometimes, they even expressed a preference for the addition of a determiner such as telika ‘finally’, sto telos ‘in the end’, olo ‘whole’, etc. In other words, they felt the need for a strengthening of the aspective meaning signified by the verbal predicate teliosa ‘I finished’. This being the case, it is hypothesised that although the meaning of completion is still signified by the negated clause in (5.3.1.2a.), this aspective meaning is not signified as lucidly by this clause as by the negated clause in (5.3.1.2b.). This hypothesis, however, needs to be tested on a larger body of lingual material. Furthermore, it may require the use of a different methodological apparatus than that employed in the present research.

5.3.2 The cosignification of completion

The relation of cosignification specifies a set of insufficient significators of a meaning $\sigma$ belonging to a dimension $D$. Therefore, if a verb form $X$ cosignifies completion, then $X$ does not signify that aspective meaning sufficiently, but signifies completion conjointly with another cosignificator of completion.

For the purposes of the present research, we make the following assumptions regarding the cosignification of completion:

Po 5.3.2.1  *Postulate of insufficient signification of completion by verb forms*

If a totively ambiguous verb form $X$ belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then $X$ signifies completion insufficiently.

Po 5.3.2.2  *Postulate of cosignification of completion by the totive disambiguator*

If a totively ambiguous verbal predicate of a predicate phrase $P$ is totively disambiguated by a lexificator of holicity $X$, then $X$ cosignifies completion.

According to the first of the above postulates, a verb form is an insufficient significator of completion under two conditions. Firstly, it belongs to the class of totively ambiguous word forms. In other words, it is a sufficient significator of neither partitivity nor holicity. Secondly,
the verb form belongs to the aorist or the perfect tense. This being the case, Po 5.3.2.1 may also be conceived of as referring to the intersection of two sets (see also Fig. 5.3.2.1):

i) The set of totively ambiguous word forms, and

ii) The union of the aorist and the perfect tense.

![Fig. 5.3.2.1 Verb forms signifying completion insufficiently – grey colour.](image)

Consequently, the set of verb forms that signify completion insufficiently includes, for instance: ἄναρα ‘I read’, ἔνα ἄναρα ‘(s)he has read’, ἐπάρας ‘you painted’, ἕν ἁναρα ‘(s)he/it got swept’, τραύξε ‘they pulled’, ἕνσ πίπ ‘you have drunk’, and many others. What these verb forms have in common is that each of them is totively ambiguous (i.e. they signify sufficiently neither partitivity nor holicity) and, simultaneously, they belong to either the aorist or the perfect tense.

Before proceeding to the latter postulate, it must be emphasised that by no means should Po 5.3.2.1 be interpreted as specifying the class of all verb forms cosignifying completion. Therefore, it is expected that there also exist other verb forms cosignifying completion, which have not been considered in the present research. In order to specify the class of verbal cosignificators of completion in its entirety, further study is necessary.

As regards Po 5.3.2.2, if the totively ambiguous verbal predicate is totively disambiguated by a lexicificator of holicity, then this lexicificator cosignifies completion. Given that, among the cosignificators of completion are word forms such as ὀλο ‘whole’, ὀλοκλήρ ‘entire’, τέλος ‘completely’, ἐξολοκλήρ ‘completely’, ὀρθαδί ‘wide/entirely’, στό τέλος ‘in the end’, and others.
However, as is discussed in Chapter 5.2.4, the totive meaning signified by a verbal predicate may be disambiguated by a variety of lingual units. This issue becomes even more complex given that a lingual unit $X$ may disambiguate totively the verbal predicate of predicate phrase $P_1$ but not the verbal predicate of predicate phrase $P_2$. In other words, although $X$ is a cosignificator of completion in syntagma $S_1$, it does not necessarily cosignify completion in syntagma $S_2$.

To give an example, let us consider the following sentences:

(5.3.2.1)  

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td><em>O Kostas ḋjavase to vivlio eksolokliru.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>‘Kostas read the book completely.’</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>‘Kostas read completely.’</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is shown above, although the lexificator of holicity *eksolokliru* ‘completely’ totively disambiguates the verbal predicate of the sentence in (5.3.2.1a.), it hardly determines the verbal predicate of the sentence in (5.3.2.1b.).

Bearing that in mind, the identification of totive disambiguators should be performed cautiously, and probably for each predicate phrase separately. Unfortunately, as was signalled in Chapter 5.2.4, we are currently unable to provide the reader with a comprehensive list of cosignificators of completion in Modern Greek. For this purpose, exhaustive study of the disambiguation of totively ambiguous verbal predicates would be needed.

**5.3.3 Lexification of completion**

It has already been said that verb forms lexifying momentarity are lexificators of termination (Po 5.1.2.1) and holicity (Po 5.2.2.1). Consequently, it is inferred on the basis of the definition of completion (see Df 3.5.1.1) that verb forms of this kind lexify completion. This corollary is formally expressed as follows:

Co 5.3.3.1  

Lexification of completion by momentous verb forms

If a verb form $X$ lexifies momentarity, then $X$ lexifies completion.

Given the above corollary, every verb form lexifying momentarity also lexifies the meaning of completion.

It should be recalled that the meaning of termination lexified by a verb form does not refer to a property of being terminated possessed by the event as a whole, but to a property possessed by its subevents. In other words, if a verb form lexifies termination, then the designated event
consists of terminated subevents. The event itself, however, may still be non-terminated (see Chapter 5.1.2).

Analogously, we will argue that the meaning of completion lexified by a verb form refers not to a property of being completed possessed by the event as a whole, but a property of the subevents of that event. Therefore, if a verb form lexifies completion, this means that the designated event is composed of completed subevents; it does not necessarily mean that the whole event is completed.

The above considerations may be illustrated in the following way:

\[ evriska = [vrika_1, vrika_2, vrika_3, \ldots, vrika_k, \ldots] \]

‘I used to find = [I found_1, I found_2, I found_3, \ldots, I found_k, \ldots]’

As shown, the event designated by the verb form *evriska* ‘I used to find’ is conceived of as a sequence of subevents, each of which may be referred to as *vrika* ‘I found’. Moreover, by virtue of Co 5.3.3.1 each of these subevents is not only momentous (i.e. possesses minimal duration) but is also completed. That is to say, the imperfect verb form *evriska* ‘I used to find’ designates a sequence of completed subevents, each of which may be designated by the aoristic verb form *vrika* ‘I found’.

To close this section, it should be emphasised that momentous verb forms, which lexify the meaning of completion, designate an event composed of completed subevents (see the above considerations). This, however, does not mean that the event itself is completed as well. For example, let us consider the following sentence:

(5.3.3.1) *To peçi htipuse tin porta akomi.* ‘The child was still knocking on the door.’

In the above sentence, the verb form *htipouse* ‘[(s)he] was knocking’ is used. This verb form lexifies momentarity. Consequently, by virtue of Co 5.3.3.1 this verb form also lexifies the meaning of completion. Moreover, it is clear that the above sentence signifies iteration, in the sense that the designated event is composed of a sequence of homosignificative subevents. These subevents may be referred to as a child’s knock/tap on the door. As follows from our earlier considerations, each of these subevents is completed. Despite that, the sentence in (5.3.3.1) signifies an incompleted event, as it was non-terminated (i.e. ongoing) at the moment to which the speaker refers. To summarise, the above sentence designates an incompleted event, even though each of its subevents is completed.
5.3.4 The signification of completion by an affirmative sentence

Let us recall that in Chapters 5.1.3 and 5.2.3 the verbal predicate is conceived of as a constitutive member of a simple sentence. Consequently, by virtue of Po 5.1.3.1 and Po 5.2.3.1, the delimitative meaning semified and the totive meaning lexified by the verbal predicate is extended to the whole sentence. On this basis it is inferred that:

Co 5.3.4.1 The extension of the meaning of completion to a sentence
If the verbal predicate \( X \) of an affirmative sentence \( S \) autosignifies completion, then \( S \) signifies completion.

Co 5.3.4.2 The totive disambiguation of a verbal predicate by a significator of holicity
If a totively ambiguous verb form \( X \) belonging to either the aorist or the perfect tense is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence \( S \) and \( X \) is totively disambiguated by a significator of holicity \( Y \), then \( S \) signifies completion.

Co 5.3.4.3 Aspectively ambiguous sentences
If a verb form \( X \) being the verbal predicate of a totively ambiguous sentence \( S \) belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then \( S \) is aspectively ambiguous.

According to the first of the above corollaries, a sentence whose verbal predicate is an autosignificator of completion signifies the meaning of completion. To explain this corollary, it is worth recalling that the autosignificator of completion is simultaneously a semificator of termination and a lexificator of holicity. Importantly, in the light of Po 5.1.3.1, if a verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence semifies termination, then the sentence also conveys the meaning of termination. Analogously, following Po 5.2.3.1, if a verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence lexifies holicity, then the sentence also signifies holicity. With this in mind, it is inferred that the meaning of completion autosignified by the verbal predicate is extended to the whole sentence.

Let us consider the following examples:

(5.3.4.1) a. \( O \ papus tis \text{ pethane} \) apose. ‘Her grandfather \text{ died} \) tonight.’
b. \( O \ Kostas \text{ teliose} \) to vivlio tu. ‘Kostas \text{ finished} \) his book.’
c. \( I \ Maria \text{ oloklirose} \) tin erevna tis. ‘Mary \text{ completed} \) her research.’

In the above sentences, three verb forms are used as verbal predicates: \textit{pethane} ‘[(s)he] died’, \textit{teliose} ‘[(s)he] finished’, and \textit{oloklirose} ‘[(s)he] completed’. Firstly, it is worth noting that each of them belongs to the aorist tense. Consequently, on the strength of Po 5.1.1.1, they signify
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termination. Additionally, it should be noted that these verb forms belong to the class of lexificators of holicity (see Chapter 5.2.2). Thus, they lexify holicity. This being the case, by virtue of Df 5.3.1.1 it is inferred that the verb forms in question autosignify completion, as they semify the meaning of termination and also lexify the meaning of holicity. Secondly, in the light of Po 5.1.3.1 the above affirmative sentences signify termination, as their verbal predicates (pethane ‘[(s)he] died’, teliose ‘[(s)he] finished’, and oloklirose ‘[(s)he] completed’) belong to the aorist tense. Analogously, on the strength of Po 5.2.3.1 these sentences signify holicity, because this totive meaning is lexified by the verbal predicate. Therefore, the first sentence signifies the full transition from the initial state of being alive into the final state of being dead. The second sentence signifies that the book has been written or read completely by Kostas, whereas the last sentence signifies that Mary carried out her research completely.

Given the above, the sentences in (5.3.4.1) designate events which possess simultaneously the property of being terminated (i.e. not ongoing) and the property of being whole. Consequently, following the definition of completion introduced in Chapter 3.5.1, these sentences signify completion. This conclusion is consistent with Co 5.3.4.1, according to which an affirmative sentence signifies completion if its verbal predicate autosignifies that aspective meaning.

As regards Co 5.3.4.2, it refers to affirmative sentences which:

i. Signify termination, because their verbal predicates belong to either the aorist or the perfect tense (see Co 5.1.3.1), and

ii. Signify holicity, because their totively ambiguous verbal predicates are disambiguated by a lexificator of holicity (see Po 5.2.3.2 and Chapter 5.2.4).

This being the case, the sentences in question signify completion, as they signify simultaneously termination and holicity (see the definition of completion – Df 3.5.1.1).

Let us consider the following examples:

(5.3.4.2) a. *O Petros efaje olo to proino tu.* ‘Peter ate up his breakfast.’

b. *I Ana anikse orthanihta tin porta.* ‘Anne opened the door wide.’

In the above sentences two verb forms are used as verbal predicates: *efaje* ‘[(s)he] ate’ and *anikse* ‘[(s)he] opened’. Each of them belongs to the aorist tense. Consequently, on the strength of Po 5.1.1.1 they semify the meaning of termination. Moreover, based on Po 5.1.3.1, the above sentences also signify termination. That is to say, these sentences designate a terminated event. Proceeding to totivity, as is argued in Chapter 5.2.4, the verb forms used in the above sentences
belong to the class of totively ambiguous word forms, because they are sufficient significators of neither partitivity nor holicity. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the totive meaning signified by these verbal predicates (and, therefore, verb forms) is disambiguated by a lexificator of holicity. These lexificators are respectively \textit{olo} ‘whole’ and \textit{orthanihta} ‘wide’. As a consequence, each of the example sentences signifies holicity. Keeping that in mind, the sentences in (5.3.4.2) signify completion, as they signify simultaneously termination and holicity. This conclusion is consistent with Co 5.3.4.2.

At this point, the question arises of which aspective meaning is signified by a totively ambiguous sentence whose verbal predicate belongs to the aorist or the perfect tense. Some light is shed on this issue by Co 5.3.4.3, according to which sentences of this kind are aspectively ambiguous. In other words, such sentences designate events being at least partially completed (see the previous section). For instance:

(5.3.4.3) a. \textit{O Petros efaje proino}. ‘Peter \textbf{ate} breakfast.’

b. \textit{I Ana anikse tin porta}. ‘Anne \textbf{opened} the door.’

In the above sentences, one finds two verbal predicates: \textit{efaje} ‘(s)he ate’ and \textit{anikse} ‘(s)he opened’. Since they belong to the aorist tense, it is inferred on the basis of Co 5.1.3.1 that the sentences in (5.3.4.3) signify termination. Moreover, as has also been argued earlier, the verb forms in question are totively ambiguous, as they signify sufficiently neither partitivity nor holicity. What distinguishes the above sentences from those in (5.3.4.2) is that they belong to the class of totively ambiguous sentences. This means that the totive meanings signified by their verbal predicates are not disambiguated by any significator of holicity. As a result, although the sentences in (5.3.4.3) signify termination of the event (i.e. the designated events are terminated), it remains unspecified to what degree the designated events are completed. Therefore, the first sentence expresses simply that Peter ate some breakfast. It is not known whether Peter ate his breakfast completely. Analogously, the other sentence signifies that the initial state of the door has changed – it is no longer closed. The sentence does not specify to what degree it was opened – that is, whether it became slightly or wide open.

5.4 Momentous verbs

Before closing this chapter, some words should be said about aspectively adversative sentences whose verbal predicates lexify momentarity. This is because during the present research they turned out to be more problematic from the theoretical point of view than other classes of
Modern Greek verbs. By momentous verb forms we understand a class composed of verbs whose forms lexify momentarity. Consequently, this class contains verbs such as *vrisko* ‘find’, *htipo* ‘hit/knock’, *f坛nizome* ‘sneeze’, etc.

5.4.1 The completedness of momentous events

In the previous sections of this chapter, several assumptions have been made regarding verb forms lexifying momentarity. Firstly, a verb form lexifying momentarity is simultaneously a lexificator of termination and holicity. Consequently, by virtue of the definition of completion (see Df 3.5.1.1) it is also a lexificator of completion. Secondly, it has been observed that the lexification of termination, and thereby of completion, is not sufficient for a sentence to signify those meanings. That is to say, even if the verbal predicate of a sentence lexifies termination, the sentence may signify non-termination. *Mutatis mutandis*, a sentence may signify incompletion, even though its verbal predicate lexifies completion (see Chapter 5.3.3).

Given the above considerations, a justifiable question arises as to whether the lexified meaning of completion is always insufficient for a sentence to signify that aspective meaning. On the basis of the examined material, it is hypothesised that:

Hy 5.4.1.1  
Completedness of semelfactive events

If a lexificator of momentarity $X$ is the verbal predicate of a sentence or clause $S$ and $S$ signifies neither habituality nor iteration, then $S$ signifies completion.

According to the above hypothesis, a sentence or a clause whose verbal predicate lexifies momentarity signifies completion, on condition that the sentence or clause does not signify iteration or habituality. That is to say, it should signify semelfactivity.

To explain the above hypothesis, it should be recalled that a sentence whose verbal predicate lexifies momentarity designates an event composed of simultaneously momentous and completed subevents. For instance, *htipusa tin porta* ‘I was knocking on the door’ designates a sequence of knocks/taps at the door. Each of these knocks/taps is both momentous and completed. Following this train of thought, if the designated event is composed of exactly one subevent, which is momentous and completed, then it seems reasonable to hypothesise that the event is also momentous and completed.

To illustrate this hypothesis, let us consider the following sentence (cf. Moser 2009: 80):

(5.4.1.1) Otan *evriska* to vivlio, kopike to fos.

*‘When I was [just] finding the book, the light went out.’*
The above sentence consists of two clauses: a temporal clause with the conjunct *otan* ‘when’, and the main clause *kopike to fos* ‘the light went out’. The verbal predicate of the former is the imperfect verb form *eivriska* ‘I was finding’, which lexifies momentarity. Consequently, by virtue of Co 5.3.3.1 it lexifies completion. Furthermore (following Moser 2009: 80) the temporal clause in question signifies semelfactivity, meaning that the designated event is not comprehended as a sequence of momentous and homosignificative subevents of my finding the book, but is composed of exactly one subevent. Consequently, the structure of the event designated by this temporal clause may be presented as follows:

\[
evriska\ to\ vivlio = [vrika\ to\ vivlio_1]
\]

‘I was finding the book = [I found the book_1]’

Furthermore, it has been argued above that the subevents of the event designated by a sentence whose verbal predicate lexifies momentarity are momentous and completed. On this basis it is inferred that the subevent, which is referred to as *vrika to vivlio_1* ‘I found the book’, is completed. Given that this is the only subevent of the designated event, it seems reasonable to conclude that the imperfective clause in (5.4.1.1) signifies completion. In other words, this clause signifies that I succeeded in finding the book, which is consistent with Hy 5.4.1.1.

5.4.2 Implication of the negated clause by the affirmative clause

Let us now proceed to aspectively adversative sentences whose verbal predicates lexify momentarity. On the basis of the studied material, it is observed that verb forms lexifying momentarity were found in none of the correct aspectively adversative sentences considered in this research. Consequently, it is assumed that:

Po 5.4.2.1 *Postulate of the implication of the negated clause by the affirmative clause*

If an aspectively adversative sentence is composed of an affirmative clause *S_a* and a negated clause *S_n* whose verbal predicates lexify momentarity, then *S_a* implies *S_n*.

The above assumption concerns aspectively adversative sentences whose verbal predicates lexify momentarity. This means that the verbal predicate of the affirmative clause and the verbal predicate of the negated clause lexify momentarity. It is assumed in Po 5.4.2.1 that in such a case the affirmative clause implies the negated clause.

Let us consider the following example:
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(5.4.2.1) *O Kostas htipuse ton Petro, ala òen ton htipise.

*‘Kostas was hitting/beating Peter, but he didn’t hit/beat him.’

The above sentence is composed of an affirmative and a negated clause. The verbal predicate of the former is the imperfect verb from *htipuse ‘(s)he was hitting/beating’, whereas the verbal predicate of the latter is the aoristic verb form *htipise ‘(s)he hit/beat’. What these verb forms have in common is that they lexify momentarity. Bearing that in mind, by virtue of Po 5.4.2.1 the affirmative clause of the sentence should imply the negated clause. In other words, one may infer the negated clause [o Kostas] ton [ton Petro] htipise ‘he [Kostas] hit/beat him [Peter]’ from the affirmative clause *O Kostas htipuse ton Petro ‘Kostas was hitting/beating Peter’.

Let us consider one more example:

(5.4.2.2) *O Kostas htipise ton Petro, ala òen ton htipise.

*‘Kostas hit/beat Peter, but he wasn’t hitting/beating him.’

The above sentence is composed of identical imperfect and aoristic clauses as the sentence in (5.4.2.1). Consequently, the verbal predicates of this sentence again lexify momentarity. This being the case, in the light of Po 5.4.2.1 the aoristic clause *O Kostas htipise ton Petro ‘Kostas hit/beat Peter’ implies its imperfect counterpart [o Kostas] ton [ton Petro] htipise ‘he [Kostas] was hitting/beating him [Peter]’. That is to say, one may deduce the latter from the former.

To close this subsection, a corollary of Po 5.4.2.1 should be mentioned:

Co 5.4.2.1 Incorrectness of aspectively adversative sentences whose verbal predicates lexify momentarity

If the verbal predicates X and Y of an aspectively adversative sentence S lexify momentarity, then S is incorrect.

As is argued above, if the verbal predicates of an aspectively adversative sentence lexify momentarity, then its affirmative clause implies the negated clause. Consequently, on the strength of Co 3.8.1.4, the aspectively adversative sentence should be incorrect. In accordance with Co 5.4.2.1, the sentences in (5.4.2.1) and (5.4.2.2) are incorrect.

To summarise, in this chapter we have dealt with the signification of termination, the signification of totive meanings, and the signification of aspective meanings. Firstly, some words were said about the semification and lexification of termination. It is assumed that termination is semified by aoristic and perfect verb forms. On the other hand, this delimitative
meaning is lexified by verb forms lexifying momentarity. Importantly, it is argued that the meaning of termination semified by the verbal predicate is typically extended to the whole sentence. Therefore, if a verbal predicate of a sentence semifies termination, then that sentence signifies termination as well. The same, however, cannot be said about termination lexified by a verb form. This means that a sentence may signify non-termination, even though its verbal predicate lexifies termination.

Next, it has been assumed that totive meanings are not semified in Modern Greek. This means that holicity, partitivity, and totive neutrality are always lexified in that language. Furthermore, four classes of lexificators of totive meanings are distinguished. The first of them consists of lexificators of holicity, the second of lexificators of partitivity, the third of totively neutral word forms, and the fourth of totively ambiguous verb forms. What characterises the word forms belonging to the last class is that they are sufficient significators of neither holicity nor partitivity. Moreover, it is assumed that the totive meaning signified by the verbal predicate is extended to the whole sentence. Therefore, if the verbal predicate of a sentence signifies holicity, then this same totive meaning is signified by the sentence. As regards totively ambiguous verbal predicates, they may be totively disambiguated by another member of the sentence or by context.

Following the proposal of a set of postulates and corollaries regarding the Modern Greek system of delimitativity and totivity, some words are said about the signification of completion. It is assumed that completion is autosignified (i.e. signified sufficiently) by verb forms simultaneously semifying termination and lexifying holicity. Therefore, aoristic and perfect verb forms are autosignificators of completion on condition that they lexify holicity. If, however, an aoristic or a perfect verb form is totively ambiguous, then it is an insufficient significator of completion. This means that the verb form signifies completion jointly with a lexificator of holicity.

At the end of this chapter, some words are said about momentous verb forms, which have turned out to be more problematic from the theoretical perspective than the other classes of verbs. Consequently, it is hypothesised that each momentous event is also completed. Nonetheless, this does not mean that every sentence whose verbal predicate lexifies momentarity signifies completion. On the contrary, such sentences may designate an incompleted event, even though it consists of a sequence of momentous and, therefore, completed subevents. For instance, it is possible to imagine a non-terminated event of knocking at the door. Importantly, although this event is non-terminated, it consists of a sequence of knocks/taps at the door, each of which is momentous and completed. Furthermore, any
aspectively adversative sentence whose verbal predicates lexify momentarity is incorrect. Such a sentence is assumed to be incorrect because its affirmative clause must imply its negated clause.
Chapter 6

Explanation

In the previous chapters of this dissertation, a system of postulates and corollaries (i.e. consequences) regarding Modern Greek aspective reality has been proposed, elucidated, and exemplified. This system may be conceived of as a fragment of a theory of aspect in Modern Greek. Importantly, these postulates and the consequences deduced from them serve not only to describe the general aspective reality of the studied language, but also to explain the properties of singular (i.e. individual) phenomena in that reality. This being said, the objective of this chapter is to explain some examples of singular aspective phenomena of Modern Greek.

6.1 The deductive model of explanation

To achieve the aforementioned objective, Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948: 136–8) deductive model of explanation is adopted. This model is graphically presented in the following figure:

![Fig. 6.1.1 The deductive model proposed by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948: 138).](image)

As is shown, the deductive model of explanation is composed of two major constituents: the *explanandum* (Exm) and the *explanans* (pl. explanantia). The former is a statement describing a specific phenomenon, fact, or event which is going to be explained. The latter, on the other hand, is conceived of as a class of statements which jointly explain the explanandum. That is
to say, ‘an explanans explains a certain explanandum if it entails that explanandum’ (Bańczerowski & Matulewska 2012: 1229).

Explanantia may be further divided into two subclasses:

- The class of **general statements** (Gs) and
- The class of **singular statements** (Ss).

The former class is composed of general laws which have the form of implication (i.e. of conditional sentences “if $p$, then $q$”) and which concern the phenomenon, the fact, or the event which is going to be explained. The latter class consists of statements referring to the antecedent of a general statement or the initial conditions expressed by that general statement (Dilworth 2007: 5). Consequently, a singular statement should exemplify the antecedent of a general statement.

For the purposes of exemplification, let us consider the following explanandum:

**Exm₁:** The verb form *egrapsa* ‘I wrote’ ends in -a.

The procedure of explanation is activated by asking the following *why*-question:

**Qs₁:** Why does the verb form *egrapsa* ‘I wrote’ end in -a?

In order to answer this question, one applies such general statement $Gs_i$ and such singular statement $Ss_i$ exemplifying the antecedent of $Gs_i$ that the conjunction of $Gs_i$ and $Ss_i$ entails the explanandum. Bearing that in mind, Exm₁ may be explained with the use of the following general and singular statements:

**Gs₁:** If Modern Greek non-archaic verb form $X$ belongs to the aorist tense and, at the same time, it signifies first person singular, then $X$ ends in -a.

**Ss₁:** The Modern Greek non-archaic verb form *egrapsa* ‘I wrote’ belongs to the aorist tense and, at the same time, it signifies first person singular.

**Exm₁:** Ergo, the verb form *egrapsa* ‘I wrote’ ends in -a.

Given the above, the verb form *egrapsa* ‘I wrote’ ends in -a because it is a Modern Greek and non-archaic verb form belonging to the aorist tense and, simultaneously, it signifies the first person singular.

It should be noted that, although $Gs₁$ may be applied to explain why aoristic verb forms such as *sinelifthika* ‘I got arrested’ end in -a, it is **inapplicable to their archaic** counterparts,
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like *sinelifthin* ‘I got arrested’. This is because the latter is an archaic Greek verb form and, therefore, it does not satisfy every condition set by the antecedent of Gs1.

To close this section, some points should be noted. Firstly, the deductive model of explanation proposed by Hempel and Oppenheim is used to answer *why*- and not *what*-questions. Consequently, it is not used to describe a phenomenon, a fact or an event, but to explain and to predict it (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948: 138). Secondly, it should be noted that the adopted deductive model of explanation has a firmly fixed structure (see Fig. 6.1.1). Consequently, in order to explain an explanandum, a virtually identical explanatory scheme will be followed. Each time, however, it will be filled in with different content (e.g. a different general law or singular statement). Finally, from now on the deductive model of explanation will also be referred to by the term explanation scheme (Bańczerowski & Matulewska 2012: 1228).

### 6.2 The semification of termination by verb forms

To proceed to the main part of this chapter, one may ask *why*:

Exm1: The verb form *teliosa* ‘I finished’ semifies termination.
Exm2: The verb form *δ javasa* ‘I read’ semifies termination.
Exm3: The verb form *e hi ftarnisti* ‘(s)he has sneezed’ semifies termination.
Exm4: The verb form *eh o grapsi* ‘I have written’ semifies termination.

To begin with the first of the above explananda, one may explain it by employing Po 5.1.1.1 as general statement Gs1 and by exemplifying its antecedent with the (appropriate) singular statement Ss1. Consequently, the following explanation scheme is obtained:

Gs1: If a verb form X belongs to the aorist tense, then X semifies termination.
Ss1: The verb form *teliosa* ‘I finished’ belongs to the aorist tense.

Exm1: Ergo, the verb form *teliosa* ‘I finished’ semifies termination.

On the basis of the above explanation scheme, the verb form *teliosa* ‘I finished’ semifies termination because it belongs to the aorist tense.

Analogously, in order to explain Exm2, one may use Gs1 once again and exemplify its antecedent by the singular statement Ss2:
As the above explanation scheme shows, the verb form in question semifies termination because it belongs to the aorist tense.

As regards Exm3, it may be explained with the use of Po 5.1.1.2 employed as a general statement Gs2, which conjointly with a singular statement Ss3 entails that explanandum. Therefore:

Gs2: If a verb form X belongs to the perfect tense, then X semifies termination.
Ss3: The verb form ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he has sneezed’ belongs to the perfect tense.
Exm3: Ergo, the verb form ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he has sneezed’ semifies termination.

That is to say, the verb form ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he has sneezed’ semifies termination because it belongs to the perfect tense.

Finally, in order to explain the last explanandum, one may employ Gs2 and exemplify its antecedent with the singular statement Ss4. As a result, the following explanation scheme is obtained:

Gs2: If a verb form X belongs to the perfect tense, then X semifies termination.
Ss4: The verb form eho grapsi ‘I have written’ belongs to the perfect tense.
Exm4: Ergo, the verb form eho grapsi ‘I have written’ semifies termination.

As is shown, the verb form eho grapsi ‘I have written’ semifies termination because it belongs to the perfect tense.

**6.3 The signification of completion by verb forms**

Furthermore, it is worth recalling that in Chapter 5.3 two classes of Modern Greek verb forms were distinguished:

- The class of verb forms autosignifying completion; and
- The class of verb forms cosignifying completion.

The characteristic feature of the verb forms belonging to the former class is that they are sufficient significators of completion. To this class belong, for instance, teliosa ‘I finished’, ehi
pethani ‘(s)he has died’, vrika ‘I found’, and ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he has sneezed’. On the other hand, the verb forms belonging to the latter class are insufficient significators of completion. In this class one finds verb forms such as ējavasa ‘I read’, anikse ‘(s)he/it opened’, and eho grapsi ‘I have written’.

This being said, the following question arises:

Qs: Why are the aforementioned verb forms either autosignificators or cosignificators of completion?

An attempt to provide an answer to this question is undertaken below.

6.3.1 The autosignification of completion by non-momentous verb forms

Let us begin with the questions why:

Exm₁: The verb form teliosa ‘I finished’ autosignifies completion.
Exm₂: The verb form ehi pethani ‘(s)he has died’ autosignifies completion.

The above explananda may be deduced from the explanans composed of Co 5.3.1.1 used as general statement Gs₁ and a singular statement Ss₁ such that the conjunction of Gs₁ and Ss₁ entails these explananda. Therefore, in the case of the former explanandum, the following explanation scheme is formed:

Gs₁: If a verb form X lexifies holicity and X belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then X autosignifies completion.
Ss₁: The verb form teliosa ‘I finished’ lexifies holicity and it belongs to the aorist tense.
Exm₁: Ergo, the verb form teliosa ‘I finished’ autosignifies completion.

As regards the explanation of Exm₂, the antecedent of Gs₁ may be exemplified by the Ss₂ below, so that Gs₁ and Ss₂ jointly entail this explanandum:

Gs₁: If a verb form X lexifies holicity and X belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then X autosignifies completion.
Ss₂: The verb form ehi pethani ‘(s)he has died’ lexifies holicity and it belongs to the perfect tense.
Exm₂: Ergo, the verb form ehi pethani ‘(s)he has died’ autosignifies completion.
Given the above explanantia, the verb forms *teliosa* ‘I finished’ and *ehi pethani* ‘(s)he has died’ autosignify completion because they lexify holicity (see Chapter 5.2.2) and, simultaneously, they belong to the aorist and the perfect tense respectively.

### 6.3.2 The autosignification of completion by momentous verb forms

To continue, as was mentioned in Chapter 5.2.2, momentous verb forms are lexificators of holicity. Consequently, the questions arise why:

- **Exm1**: The verb form *vrika* ‘I found’ autosignifies completion.
- **Exm2**: The verb form *ehi ftarnisti* ‘(s)he has sneezed’ autosignifies completion.

In order to explain the first of the above explananda, one may apply Co 5.3.1.2 as general statement Gs₁, and at the same time exemplify its antecedent with the singular statement Ss₁ below. Consequently:

- **Gs₁**: If a verb form *X* lexifies momentarity and *X* belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then *X* autosignifies completion.
- **Ss₁**: The verb form *vrika* ‘I found’ lexifies momentarity and it belongs to the aorist tense.
- **Exm₁**: Ergo, the verb form *vrika* ‘I found’ autosignifies completion.

Analogously, in the case of the latter explanandum, the antecedent of Gs₁ may be exemplified by means of such Ss₂ that the following explanation scheme is obtained:

- **Gs₁**: If a verb form *X* lexifies momentarity and *X* belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then *X* autosignifies completion.
- **Ss₂**: The verb form *ehi ftarnisti* ‘(s)he has sneezed’ lexifies momentarity and it belongs to the perfect tense.
- **Exm₂**: Ergo, the verb form *ehi ftarnisti* ‘(s)he has sneezed’ autosignifies completion.

Following the above explanantia, the verb forms *vrika* ‘I found’ and *ehi ftarnisti* ‘(s)he has sneezed’ autosignify completion because they lexify momentarity and, at the same time, they belong to the aorist and the perfect tense respectively.

### 6.3.3 The insufficient signification of completion

As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, not every aoristic or perfect verb form is a sufficient significator of completion (see also Chapter 5.3.2), but it may signify completion conjointly with a lexificator of holicity. Thus, the questions to be asked are why:
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Exm₁: The verb form ὁφαυσά ‘I read’ signifies completion insufficiently.
Exm₂: The verb form ανικσε ‘(s)he/it opened’ signifies completion insufficiently.
Exm₃: The verb form εὕο γράψι ‘I have written’ signifies completion insufficiently.

It should be noted that each of the above explananda may be explained with the use of Po 5.3.2.1 used as Gs₁, and such Ssᵢ that the conjunction of Gs₁ and Ssᵢ entails that explanandum. Consequently, Exm₁ may be explained by the following explanation scheme:

Gs₁: If a totively ambiguous verb form X belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then X signifies completion insufficiently.
Ss₁: The totively ambiguous verb form ὁφαυσά ‘I read’ belongs to the aorist tense.
Exm₁: Ergo, the verb form ὁφαυσά ‘I read’ signifies completion insufficiently.

Per analogiam, in order to explain Exm₂, the following explanation scheme is employed:

Gs₂: If a totively ambiguous verb form X belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then X signifies completion insufficiently.
Ss₂: The totively ambiguous verb form ανικσε ‘(s)he/it opened’ belongs to the aorist tense.
Exm₂: Ergo, the verb form ανικσε ‘(s)he/it opened’ signifies completion insufficiently.

And finally, in order to explain the last of the above explananda, one may exemplify the antecedent of Gs₁ with the singular statement below:

Gs₃: If a totively ambiguous verb form X belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then X signifies completion insufficiently.
Ss₃: The totively ambiguous verb form εὕο γράψι ‘I have written’ belongs to the perfect tense.
Exm₃: Ergo, the verb form εὕο γράψι ‘I have written’ signifies completion insufficiently.

Therefore, it follows from the above explanantia that the verb forms ὁφαυσά ‘I read’, ανικσε ‘(s)he/it opened’, and εὕο γράψι ‘I have written’ are insufficient signifiers of completion because they satisfy two conditions: firstly, because each of them is totively ambiguous, in the sense that they signify sufficiently neither holicity nor partitivity (see Chapter 5.2.2); and secondly, because they belong to the aorist or the perfect tense.
6.4 The signification of completion by sentences

Having explained why some example verb forms semify termination and why they are sufficient or insufficient significators of completion, it is time to deal with the aspective meanings signified by sentences. For this purpose, the following sentences will be considered:

Ex 6.4.1 To teliosa. ‘I finished it.’
Ex 6.4.2 Sto telos ehi pethani. ‘In the end, (s)he has died.’
Ex 6.4.3 Vrika to vivlio. ‘I found the book.’
Ex 6.4.4 Kapjos ehi ftarnisti. ‘Someone has sneezed.’
Ex 6.4.5 To ďjavasa eksolokliru. ‘I read it entirely.’
Ex 6.4.6 I porta anikse telios. ‘The door opened completely.’
Ex 6.4.7 To eho grapsi to grama. ‘I have written the letter.’

Importantly, following the assumptions made in Chapter 5.3, the above sentences should signify completion. Therefore, the question arises:

Qs: Why do the sentences in Ex 6.4.1 – Ex 6.4.7 signify completion?

An attempt to answer this question is made below.

6.4.1 Sentences whose verbal predicate autosignifies completion

Let us begin with the questions why:

Exm₁: The sentence to teliosa ‘I finished it’ signifies completion.
Exm₂: The sentence sto telos ehi pethani ‘in the end, (s)he has died’ signifies completion.
Exm₃: The sentence vrika to vivlio ‘I found the book’ signifies completion.
Exm₄: The sentence kapjos ehi ftarnisti ‘someone has sneezed’ signifies completion.

It is noteworthy that each of the sentences contained in the above explananda possesses an autosignificator (i.e. a sufficient significator) of completion as the verbal predicate. The question of why their verbal predicates autosignify completion has already been answered – see p. 183 and p. 184. Keeping that in mind, in order to explain Exm₁–Exm₄, one may employ Co 5.3.4.1 as a general statement Gs₁, and exemplify its antecedent with an appropriate singular statement. Therefore, in order to explain Exm₁, the following explanation scheme is used:
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Gs1: If the verbal predicate $X$ of an affirmative sentence $S$ autosignifies completion, then $S$ signifies completion.

Ss1: The verbal predicate $teliosa$ ‘I finished’ of the affirmative sentence $to\thinspace teliosa$ ‘I finished it’ autosignifies completion.

Exm1: Ergo, the sentence $to\thinspace teliosa$ ‘I finished it’ signifies completion.

Given the above explanation scheme, the sentence in question signifies completion because its verbal predicate (i.e. $teliosa$ ‘I finished’) autosignifies completion. It is worth recalling that the question of why this verb form is an autosignificator of completion has already been answered (on p. 183).

Analogously, Exm2, Exm3, and Exm4 may be explained by employing the following explanation schemes:

Gs1: If the verbal predicate $X$ of an affirmative sentence $S$ autosignifies completion, then $S$ signifies completion.

Ss2: The verbal predicate $ehi\thinspace pethani$ ‘(s)he has died’ of the affirmative sentence $sto\thinspace telos\thinspace ehi\thinspace pethani$ ‘in the end, (s)he has died’ autosignifies completion.

Exm2: Ergo, the sentence $sto\thinspace telos\thinspace ehi\thinspace pethani$ ‘in the end, (s)he has died’ signifies completion.

Gs1: If the verbal predicate $X$ of an affirmative sentence $S$ autosignifies completion, then $S$ signifies completion.

Ss3: The verbal predicate $vrika$ ‘I found’ of the affirmative sentence $vrika\thinspace to\thinspace vivlio$ ‘I found the book’ autosignifies completion.

Exm3: Ergo, the sentence $vrika\thinspace to\thinspace vivlio$ ‘I found the book’ signifies completion.

and:

Gs1: If the verbal predicate $X$ of an affirmative sentence $S$ autosignifies completion, then $S$ signifies completion.

Ss4: The verbal predicate $ehi\thinspace ftarnisti$ ‘(s)he has sneezed’ of the affirmative sentence $kapjos\thinspace ehi\thinspace ftarnisti$ ‘someone has sneezed’ autosignifies completion.

Exm4: Ergo, the sentence $kapjos\thinspace ehi\thinspace ftarnisti$ ‘someone has sneezed’ signifies completion.
This being said, it follows from the above explanation schemes that the sentences to teliosa ‘I finished it’, sto telos ehi pethani ‘in the end, (s)he has died’, vrika to vivlio ‘I found the book’, and kapjos ehi ftarnisti ‘someone has sneezed’ signify completion because their verbal predicates (i.e. teliosa ‘I finished’, ehi pethani ‘(s)he has died’, vrika ‘I found’, and ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he has sneezed’ respectively) are autosignificators of completion – see p. 183 and p. 184.

It should be noticed that the above explanation schemes explain Exm1–Exm4 with minimal reference to empirical data. The first two of them (Exm1 and Exm2), however, may be explained more empirically by referring to the following aspectively adversative sentences:

Ex 6.4.1.1  
? Teliona to vivlio, ala ∂en to teliosa.
‘I was finishing the book, but I didn’t finish it.’

Ex 6.4.1.2  
O iroas tu vivliu pethene, ala sto telos ∂en ehi pethani.
‘The character of the book was dying, but in the end (s)he hasn’t died.’

Importantly, as was mentioned in Chapter 5, the autosignification of completion seems to be weakening in Modern Greek. Consequently, native speakers of that language feel a need to strengthen the signification of completion in aspectively adversative sentences by the addition of a lexificator of holicity, such as olos ‘whole’, sto telos ‘in the end’, eksolokliru ‘entirely’, and others. Despite that, the sentence in Ex 6.4.1.1 is still found to be acceptable, in the sense of being (marginally) correct.

This being said, Exm1 may be explained by applying Co 3.8.2.2 as a general statement Gs2 and, simultaneously, by exemplifying its antecedent with singular statement Ss5:

Gs2: If Sn is the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence S, then Sn signifies completion.

Ss5: The sentence to teliosa ‘I finished it’ is used as the negated clause of the correct aspectively adversative sentence ?teliona to vivlio, ala ∂en to teliosa ?‘I was finishing the book, but I didn’t finish it’.

Exm1: Ergo, the sentence to teliosa ‘I finished it’ signifies completion.

That is to say, the sentence to teliosa ‘I finished it’ signifies completion because it may be used as the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence. In the above explanation scheme this correct aspectively adversative sentence is ?teliona to vivlio, ala ∂en to teliosa ?‘I was finishing the book, but I didn’t finish it’.
Per analogiam, in order to explain Exm2, one may use Gs2 once again and exemplify its antecedent with an appropriate singular statement. Consequently, the following explanation scheme is obtained:

Gs2: If $S_n$ is the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

Ss6: The sentence *sto telos ehi pethani* ‘in the end (s)he has died’ is used as the negated clause of the correct aspectively adversative sentence *o iroas tu vivliu pethene, ala sto telos ēen ehi pethani* ‘the character of the book was dying, but in the end (s)he hasn’t died’.

Exm2: Ergo, the sentence *sto telos ehi pethani* ‘in the end, (s)he has died’ signifies completion.

On the basis of the above explanation scheme, the sentence *sto telos ehi pethani* ‘in the end (s)he has died’ signifies completion because it may be used as the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence. In this case, this aspectively adversative sentence is *o iroas tu vivliu pethene, ala sto telos ēen ehi pethani* ‘the character of the book was dying, but in the end (s)he hasn’t died’.

Interestingly, no similar explanation scheme may be applied to explain either Exm3 or Exm4. This is because aspectively adversative sentences such as:

Ex 6.4.1.3  *Evriska to vivlio, ala telika ēen to vrika.
*‘I was finding the book, but finally I didn’t find it.’

Ex 6.4.1.4  *Καπιος fiarnizotan, ala ēen ehi fiarnisti.
*‘Someone was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed.’

are incorrect. This being said, the question arises of why the above aspectively adversative sentences are incorrect. This question is dealt with later in this chapter.

6.4.2 Sentences whose verbal predicate signifies completion insufficiently

What distinguishes the explananda explained above is that they concern sentences whose verbal predicates are autosignificators of completion. However, not every sentence signifying completion has a sufficient significator of this aspective meaning as the verbal predicate. To give an example, the meaning of completion is not sufficiently signified by the verbal predicates of the sentences in Ex 6.4.5–6.4.7 (see p. 186). Still, these sentences signify completion. Consequently, the questions arise why:
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Exm1: The sentence to ċjavasa eksolokliru ‘I read it entirely’ signifies completion.

Exm2: The sentence i porta anikse telios ‘the door opened completely’ signifies completion.

Exm3: The sentence to ehi grapsi olo to gramma ‘I have written the whole letter’ signifies completion.

These questions may be answered by applying Co 5.3.4.2 as general statement Gs₁ and, simultaneously, by exemplifying its antecedent with an adequate singular statement. For instance, in the case of Exm₁, the explanation scheme may have the following form:

Gs₁: If a totively ambiguous verb form X belonging to either the aorist or the perfect tense is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence S and X is totively disambiguated by a significator of holicity Y, then S signifies completion.

Ss₁: The totively ambiguous verb form ċjavasa ‘I read’ belonging to the aorist tense is used as the verbal predicate of the affirmative sentence to ċjavasa eksolokliru ‘I read it entirely’ and it is totively disambiguated by the significator of holicity eksolokliru ‘entirely’.

Exm₁: Ergo, the sentence to ċjavasa eksolokliru ‘I read it entirely’ signifies completion.

Keeping in mind the considerations from p. 185, the verb form ċjavasa ‘I read’ is an insufficient significator of completion. Despite this fact, the sentence to ċjavasa eksolokliru ‘I read it entirely’ signifies completion. Following the above explanation scheme, this is because its verbal predicate (ćjavasa ‘I read’) is totively disambiguated by a lexificator of holicity – namely, by the adverbial of degree eksolokliru ‘entirely’.

Analogously, Exm₂ may be explained with the use of Gs₁, whose antecedent is exemplified by the singular statement Ss₂:

Gs₁: If a totively ambiguous verb form X belonging to either the aorist or the perfect tense is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence S and X is totively disambiguated by a significator of holicity Y, then S signifies completion.

Ss₂: The totively ambiguous verb form anikse ‘(s)he/it opened’ belonging to the aorist tense is used as the verbal predicate of the affirmative sentence I porta anikse telios ‘the door opened completely’ and it is totively disambiguated by the significator of holicity telios ‘completely’.
Exm₂: Ergo, the sentence *i porta anikse telios* ‘the door opened completely’ signifies completion.

In turn, to explain Exm₃, one may use Gs₁ and exemplify its antecedent with the use of the singular statement below:

Gs₁: If a totively ambiguous verb form *X* belonging to either the aorist or the perfect tense is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence *S* and *X* is totively disambiguated by a significator of holicity *Y*, then *S* signifies completion.

Ss₂: The totively ambiguous verb form *eho grapsi* ‘I have written’ belonging to the perfect tense is used as the verbal predicate of the affirmative sentence *to eho grapsi olo to grama* ‘I have written the whole letter’ and it is totively disambiguated by the significator of holicity *olo to grama* ‘the whole letter’.

Exm₃: Ergo, the sentence *to eho grapsi olo to grama* ‘I have written the whole letter’ signifies completion.

Given the above explanation schemes, the sentences *i porta anikse telios* ‘the door opened completely’ and *to eho grapsi olo to grama* ‘I have written the whole letter’ signify completion because their totively ambiguous verb forms belong to the aorist or the perfect tense and, simultaneously, they are totively disambiguated by a significator of holicity. These significators are the adverbia of degree *telios* ‘completely’ and the direct-object phrase *olo to grama* ‘the whole letter’ respectively.

It is worth mentioning that Exm₁–Exm₃ may be explained more empirically by referring to the correctness of aspectively adversative sentences such as:

Ex 6.4.2.1  ḍjavaza to vivlio, ala ḍen to ḍjavasa eksolokliru.
‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it entirely.’

Ex 6.4.2.2  *I porta anikse, ala [i porta] ḍen anikse telios.*
‘The door opened, but it [the door] didn’t open completely.’

Ex 6.4.2.3  *Egraфа to grama, ala ḍen to eho grapsi olo [to grama].*
‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it [the letter] all.’

To achieve this goal, one may apply Co 3.8.2.2 as a general statement and exemplify its antecedent with an appropriate singular statement or statements. Consequently, in the case of Exm₁ the following explanation scheme is obtained:
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Gs2: If $S_n$ is the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

Ss4: The sentence $to \, \partialjavasa \, eksolkliru$ ‘I read it entirely’ is used as the negated clause of the correct aspectively adversative sentence $\partialjavaza \, to \, vivlio, \, ala \, \partialen \, to \, \partialjavasa \, eksolkliru$ ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it entirely’.

Exm1: Ergo, the sentence $to \, \partialjavasa \, eksolkliru$ ‘I read it entirely’ signifies completion.

That is to say, the sentence $to \, \partialjavasa \, eksolkliru$ ‘I read it entirely’ signifies completion because it may be used as the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence. In the above explanation scheme, the aspectively adversative sentence considered is $\partialjavaza \, to \, vivlio, \, ala \, \partialen \, to \, \partialjavasa \, eksolkliru$ ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it entirely’.

In order to explain Exm2 and Exm3, the antecedent of Gs2 may be exemplified with Ss5 and Ss6 respectively. Consequently, the following explanation schemes are formed:

Gs2: If $S_n$ is the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

Ss5: The sentence $i \, porta \, anikse$ ‘the door opened’ is used as the negated clause of the correct aspectively adversative sentence $i \, porta \, anikse, \, ala \, [i \, porta] \, \partialen \, anikse \, telios$ ‘the door opened, but it [the door] didn’t open completely’.

Exm2: Ergo, the sentence $i \, porta \, anikse \, telios$ ‘the door opened completely’ signifies completion.

and:

Gs2: If $S_n$ is the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

Ss6: The sentence $to \, eho \, grapsi \, olo \, to \, grama$ ‘I have written the whole letter’ is used as the negated clause of the correct aspectively adversative sentence $egrafa \, to \, grama, \, ala \, \partialen \, to \, eho \, grapsi \, olo \, [to \, grama]$ ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it [the letter] all’.

Exm3: Ergo, the sentence $to \, ehi \, grapsi \, olo \, to \, gramma$ ‘I have written the whole letter’ signifies completion.

Given the above explanation schemes, the sentences $i \, porta \, anikse \, telios$ ‘the door opened completely’ and $to \, eho \, grapsi \, olo \, to \, grama$ ‘I have written the whole letter’ signify completion because they may be used as the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence.
The former is used as the negated clause of the aspectively adversative sentence in Ex 6.4.2.2, whereas the latter is used as the negated clause of the aspectively adversative sentence in Ex 6.4.2.3.

6.5 Aspectively ambiguous sentences

All of the sentences considered up to this point signify completion. However, as was mentioned in Chapter 5.3.4, there is a class of aspectively ambiguous sentences. What distinguishes the sentences belonging to this class is that they are sufficient signifiers of neither incompletion nor completion. This class includes, for instance:

Ex 6.5.1 ḍjavasa to vivlio. ‘I read the book.’  
Ex 6.5.2 I porta anikse. ‘The door opened.’  
Ex 6.5.3 Eho grapsi to grama. ‘I have written the letter.

Importantly, a common feature of the above sentences is that they are totively ambiguous, in the sense that they signify at least partial holicity. That is to say, the sentence in Ex 6.5.1 signifies that at least some part of the book was read by me. It does not, however, specify whether I read it completely. Similarly, the sentence in Ex 6.5.2 signifies that the door became open to some unspecified degree, but it is unknown whether the door was half-open or wide open.

This being said, the following two questions arise:

Qs1: Why are the above sentences totively ambiguous? and  
Qs2: Why are the above sentences aspectively ambiguous?

In this section, an attempt is made to answer these questions.

6.5.1 Totively ambiguous sentences

Let us begin by asking why:

Exm1: The sentence ḍjavasa to vivlio ‘I read the book’ is totively ambiguous.  
Exm2: The sentence i porta anikse ‘the door opened’ is totively ambiguous.  
Exm3: The sentence eho grapsi to grama ‘I have written the letter’ is totively ambiguous.
In order to answer these questions, one may apply Po 5.2.4.1 as a general statement and may exemplify its antecedent with an appropriate singular statement. Consequently, in order to answer the question why containing Exm₁, the following explanation scheme may be used:

Gs₁: If a totively ambiguous verb form $X$ is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence $S$ and $X$ is not totively disambiguated by a significator of either holicity or partitivity, then $S$ is totively ambiguous.

Ss₁: The totively ambiguous verb form $\partial javasa$ ‘I read’ is used as the verbal predicate of the affirmative sentence $\partial javasa$ to vivlio ‘I read the book’ and it is not totively disambiguated by a significator of either holicity or partitivity.

Exm₁: Ergo, the sentence $\partial javasa$ to vivlio ‘I read the book’ is totively ambiguous.

That is to say, the sentence in question is totively ambiguous because two conditions are satisfied: firstly, because the verbal predicate of the sentence ($\partial javasa$ ‘I read’) is totively ambiguous (see Chapter 5.2.2); and secondly, because there is no constituent of this sentence that signifies holicity or partitivity and, simultaneously, totively disambiguates the verbal predicate.

Analogously, Exm₂ and Exm₃ may be explained by employing Gs₁ and by exemplifying its antecedent with singular statements Ss₂ and Ss₃ respectively. Consequently, the following explanation schemes are formed:

Gs₁: If a totively ambiguous verb form $X$ is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence $S$ and $X$ is not totively disambiguated by a significator of either holicity or partitivity, then $S$ is totively ambiguous.

Ss₂: The totively ambiguous verb form $anikse$ ‘(s)he/it opened’ is used as the verbal predicate of the affirmative sentence $i$ porta $anikse$ ‘the door opened’ and it is not totively disambiguated by a significator of either holicity or partitivity.

Exm₂: Ergo, the sentence $i$ porta $anikse$ ‘the door opened’ is totively ambiguous.

and:

Gs₁: If a totively ambiguous verb form $X$ is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence $S$ and $X$ is not totively disambiguated by a significator of either holicity or partitivity, then $S$ is totively ambiguous.
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Ss3: The totally ambiguous verb form *eho grapsi* ‘I have written’ is used as the verbal predicate of the affirmative sentence *eho grapsi to grama* ‘I have written the letter’ and it is not totally disambiguated by a significator of either holicity or partitivity.

Exm3: Ergo, the sentence *eho grapsi to grama* ‘I have written the letter’ is totally ambiguous.

Bearing that in mind, the sentences *i porta anikse* ‘the door opened’ and *eho grapsi to grama* ‘I have written the letter’ are totally ambiguous because their verbal predicates are not sufficient significators of holicity nor partitivity. At the same time, these verbal predicates are not totally disambiguated by any significator of holicity or partitivity.

6.5.2 Aspectively ambiguous sentences

Having explained why the sentences in Ex 6.5.1.1 – Ex 6.5.1.3 are totally ambiguous, it is time to pose the questions *why*:

Exm1: The sentence *∂javasa to vivlio* ‘I read the book’ is aspectively ambiguous.

Exm2: The sentence *i porta anikse* ‘the door opened’ is aspectively ambiguous.

Exm3: The sentence *eho grapsi to grama* ‘I have written the letter’ is aspectively ambiguous.

The answer to the first of the above questions may be provided by applying Co 5.3.4.3 as general statement Gs1 and, simultaneously, by exemplifying its antecedent with the singular statement Ss1. Consequently:

Gs1: If a verb form *X* being the verbal predicate of a totally ambiguous sentence *S* belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then *S* is aspectively ambiguous.

Ss1: The verb form *∂javasa* ‘I read’ being the verbal predicate of the totally ambiguous sentence *∂javasa to vivlio* ‘I read the book’ belongs to the aorist tense.

Exm1: Ergo, the sentence *∂javasa to vivlio* ‘I read the book’ is aspectively ambiguous.

That is to say, the sentence in question is aspectively ambiguous because two conditions are satisfied: firstly, because the sentence *∂javasa to vivlio* ‘I read the book’ is totally ambiguous, in other words, it signifies sufficiently neither holicity nor partitivity (see p. 194); and secondly, because its verbal predicate (*∂javasa* ‘I read’) belongs to the aorist tense.

Similar explanation schemes may be used to explain Exm2 and Exm3. In these schemes, the antecedent of Gs1 is exemplified with singular statements Ss2 and Ss3 respectively.
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Gs1: If a verb form $X$ being the verbal predicate of a totively ambiguous sentence $S$ belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then $S$ is aspectively ambiguous.

Ss2: The verb form $anikse$ ‘(s)he/it opened’ being the verbal predicate of the totively ambiguous sentence $i \ porta \ anikse$ ‘the door opened’ belongs to the aorist tense.

Exm2: Ergo, the sentence $i \ porta \ anikse$ ‘the door opened’ is aspectively ambiguous.

and:

Gs1: If a verb form $X$ being the verbal predicate of a totively ambiguous sentence $S$ belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then $S$ is aspectively ambiguous.

Ss3: The perfect verb form $eho \ grapsi$ ‘I have written’ being the verbal predicate of the totively ambiguous sentence $eho \ grapsi \ to \ grama$ ‘I have written the letter’ belongs to the perfect tense.

Exm3: Ergo, the sentence $eho \ grapsi \ to \ grama$ ‘I have written the letter’ is aspectively ambiguous.

Given the above, the sentences $i \ porta \ anikse$ ‘the door opened’ and $eho \ grapsi \ to \ grama$ ‘I have written the letter’ are aspectively ambiguous because they are totively ambiguous and, simultaneously, their verbal predicates belong to the aorist and perfect tense respectively.

It is noteworthy that Exm1–Exm3 may be approached more empirically by considering the following correct aspectively adversative sentences:

Ex 6.5.2.1 $\partial javasa \ to \ vivlio, \ ala \ \partial en \ to \ \delta javasa \ eksolkliru$.  
‘I read the book, but I didn’t read it entirely.’

Ex 6.5.2.2 $i \ porta \ anikse, \ ala \ \partial en \ anikse \ telios$.  
‘The door opened, but it didn’t open completely.’

Ex 6.5.2.3 $eho \ grapsi \ to \ grama, \ ala \ \partial en \ to \ eho \ grapsi \ olo$.  
‘I have written the letter, but I haven’t written it all.’

This is done by the application of Co 3.8.2.7 as a general statement and, at the same time, by an appropriate exemplification of its antecedent. Consequently, as regards Exm1, the following alternative explanation scheme is obtained:

Gs2: If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ does not signify incompletion, then $S_a$ is aspectively ambiguous.
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Ss4: The sentence διαβάσα το βιβλίο ‘I read the book’ is used as the affirmative clause of the correct aspectively adversative sentence διαβάσα το βιβλίο, αλά δεν το διαβάσα εκσόλοκληρύ ‘I read the book, but I didn’t read it entirely’ and it does not signify incompletion.

Exm1: Ergo, the sentence διαβάσα το βιβλίο ‘I read the book’ is aspectively ambiguous.

It follows from the above explanation scheme that the sentence διαβάσα το βιβλίο ‘I read the book’ is aspectively ambiguous because it may be used as the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence and, at the same time, it does not signify incompletion. The aspectively adversative sentence used in the above explanation scheme is διαβάσα το βιβλίο, αλά δεν το διαβάσα εκσόλοκληρύ ‘I read the book, but I didn’t read it entirely’.

Analogously, Exm2 and Exm3 may be explained by employing Gs2 and exemplifying its antecedent with Ss5 and Ss6 respectively. Thus, the following explanation schemes are formed:

Gs2: If Sa is the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence S and Sa does not signify incompletion, then S is aspectively ambiguous.

Ss5: The sentence η δόρος ανικσέ ‘the door opened’ is used as the affirmative clause of the correct aspectively adversative sentence η δόρος ανικσέ, αλά δεν ανικσέ τελίος ‘the door opened, but it didn’t open completely’ and it does not signify incompletion.

Exm2: Ergo, the sentence η δόρος ανικσέ ‘the door opened’ is aspectively ambiguous.

and:

Gs2: If Sa is the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence S and Sa does not signify incompletion, then S is aspectively ambiguous.

Ss6: The sentence έχω γράψα το γράμμα ‘I have written the letter’ is used as the affirmative clause of the correct aspectively adversative sentence έχω γράψα το γράμμα, αλά δεν έχω γράψα όλο ‘I have written the letter, but I haven’t written it all’ and it does not signify incompletion.

Exm3: Ergo, the sentence έχω γράψα το γράμμα ‘I have written the letter’ is aspectively ambiguous.

Given the above explanation schemes, the sentences η δόρος ανικσέ ‘the door opened’ and έχω γράψα το γράμμα ‘I have written the letter’ are aspectively ambiguous because they do not signify incompletion and, at the same time, they may be used as the affirmative clause of correct
aspectively adversative sentences. The former sentence is used as the affirmative clause of the aspectively adversative sentence in Ex 6.5.2.2, whereas the latter is used as the affirmative clause of the aspectively adversative sentence in Ex 6.5.2.3.

6.6 Incorrect aspectively adversative sentences

To close this chapter, let us consider the following aspectively adversative sentences:

Ex 6.6.1 *djavaza to vivlio, ala ðen to djavasa.
‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it.’

Ex 6.6.2 *Egrafa to grama, ala ðen to eho grapsi.
‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it.’

Ex 6.6.3 *Evriska to vivlio, ala ðen to vrika.
‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it.’

Ex 6.6.4 *Ftarnizotan, ala ðen ehi ftarnisti.
‘(S)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed.’

These sentences are seen to be incorrect. In the light of 3.8.2, this means that they are ungrammatical or nonsensical. However, it should be recalled that every aspectively adversative sentence considered in this research is grammatical. Thus, the incorrectness of the above sentences should follow from their nonsensicality. This being said, the following questions arise:

Qs₁: Why are the aspectively adversative sentences in Ex 6.6.1 – Ex 6.6.4 grammatical?
Qs₂: Why are the aspectively adversative sentences in Ex 6.6.1 – Ex 6.6.4 nonsensical?
Qs₃: Why are the aspectively adversative sentences in Ex 6.6.1 – Ex 6.6.4 incorrect?

An attempt to answer these questions is undertaken below.

6.6.1 Grammaticality of aspectively adversative sentences

Given the above considerations, let us begin with the questions why:

Exm₁: The aspectively adversative sentence *djavaza to vivlio, ala ðen to djavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ is grammatical.

Exm₂: The aspectively adversative sentence *egrafa to grama, ala ðen to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ is grammatical.
Exm3: The aspectively adversative sentence *evriska to vivlio, ala ∂en to vrika ‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’ is grammatical.

Exm4: The aspectively adversative sentence *ftarnizotan, ala ∂en ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed’ is grammatical.

Each of these questions may be answered by means of Co 3.8.1.1 used as general statement Gs$_1$, and a singular statement Ss$_i$ exemplifying the antecedent of Gs$_1$ such that Gs$_1$ and Ss$_i$ jointly entail that explanandum. Keeping that in mind, Exm$_1$ may be explained by employing the following explanation scheme:

Gs$_1$: If the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ are correct, then $S$ is grammatical.

Ss$_1$: The constituent clauses έjavaza to vivlio ‘I was reading the book’ and ∂en to έjavasa ‘I didn’t read it’ are correct.

Exm$_1$: Ergo, the aspectively adversative sentence *έjavaza to vivlio, ala ∂en to έjavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ is grammatical.

That is to say, the aspectively adversative sentence in question is grammatical because its constituent clauses έjavaza to vivlio ‘I was reading the book’ and ∂en to έjavasa ‘I didn’t read it’ are correct, if taken separately.

Analogously, in order to explain Exm$_2$, Exm$_3$, and Exm$_4$, one may use Gs$_1$ once again and exemplify its antecedent with Ss$_2$, Ss$_3$, and Ss$_4$ respectively. Consequently, the following explanation schemes are used:

Gs$_1$: If the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ are correct, then $S$ is grammatical.

Ss$_2$: The constituent clauses egrafa to grama ‘I was writing the letter’ and ∂en to eho grapsi ‘I haven’t written it’ are correct.

Exm$_2$: Ergo, the aspectively adversative sentence *egrafta to grama, ala ∂en to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ is grammatical.

Gs$_1$: If the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ are correct, then $S$ is grammatical.
Ss3: The constituent clauses *evriska to vivlio* ‘I was finding the book’ and *den to vrika* ‘I didn’t find it’ are correct.

Exm3: Ergo, the aspectively adversative sentence *evriska to vivlio, ala den to vrika* ‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’ is grammatical.

Gs1: If the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence S are correct, then S is grammatical.

Ss4: The constituent clauses *ftarnizotan* ‘(s)he was sneezing’ and *den ehi ftarnisti* ‘(s)he hasn’t sneezed’ are correct.

Exm4: Ergo, the aspectively adversative sentence *ftarnizotan, ala den ehi ftarnisti* ‘(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed’ is grammatical.

As follows from the above explanation schemes, the aspectively adversative sentences in Ex 6.6.2 – Ex 6.6.4 are grammatical because they are composed of correct constituent clauses.

6.6.2 Nonsensicality of aspectively adversative sentences

As regards the nonsensicality of the aspectively adversative sentences in Ex 6.6.1 – Ex 6.6.4, the following explananda should be explained:

Exm1: The aspectively adversative sentence *djavaza to vivlio, ala den to djavasa* ‘*I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it*’ is nonsensical.

Exm2: The aspectively adversative sentence *egrafa to grama, ala den to eho grapsi* ‘*I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it*’ is nonsensical.

Exm3: The aspectively adversative sentence *evriska to vivlio, ala den to vrika* ‘*I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it*’ is nonsensical.

Exm4: The aspectively adversative sentence *ftarnizotan, ala den ehi ftarnisti* ‘*(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed*’ is nonsensical.

These explananda may be deduced from the explanantia comprised of Co 3.8.1.2 employed as general statement Gs1 and an appropriate singular statement exemplifying the antecedent of this general statement. For instance, Exm1 may be explained with the use of the following explanation scheme:

Gs1: If the affirmative clause Sa and the negated clause Sn are the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence S and Sa implies Sn, then S is nonsensical.
**Ss1:** The affirmative clauses Ḏjavaza to vivlio ‘I was reading the book’ and the negated clause to Ḏjavasa ‘I read it’ are the constituent clauses of the adversative sentence *

* Ḏjavaza to vivlio, ala ġen to Ḏjavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ and the former clause implies the latter clause.

**Exm1:** Ergo, the adversative sentence *

* Ḏjavaza to vivlio, ala ġen to Ḏjavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ is nonsensical.

This means that the aspectively adversative sentence in question is nonsensical because its affirmative clause Ḏjavaza to vivlio ‘I was reading the book’ implies its negated clause to Ḏjavasa ‘I read it’. In other words, one may infer the latter on the basis of the former.

Analogously, Exm2, Exm3, and Exm4 may be explained by taking Gs1 and by exemplifying its antecedent appropriately. Consequently:

**Gs1:** If the affirmative clause $S_a$ and the negated clause $S_n$ are the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ implies $S_n$, then $S$ is nonsensical.

**Ss2:** The affirmative clauses egrafa to grama ‘I was writing the letter’ and the negated clause to eho grapsi ‘I have written it’ are the constituent clauses of the adversative sentence *

* egrafa to grama, ala ġen to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ and the former clause implies the latter clause.

**Exm2:** Ergo, the adversative sentence *

* egrafa to grama, ala ġen to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ is nonsensical.

**Gs1:** If the affirmative clause $S_a$ and the negated clause $S_n$ are the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ implies $S_n$, then $S$ is nonsensical.

**Ss3:** The affirmative clauses evriska to vivlio ‘I was finding the book’ and the negated clause to vrika ‘I found it’ are the constituent clauses of the adversative sentence *

* evriska to vivlio, ala ġen to vrika ‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’ and the former clause implies the latter clause.

**Exm3:** Ergo, the adversative sentence *

* evriska to vivlio, ala ġen to vrika ‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’ is nonsensical.

and:

**Gs1:** If the affirmative clause $S_a$ and the negated clause $S_n$ are the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ implies $S_n$, then $S$ is nonsensical.
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Ss4: The affirmative clauses *ftarnizotan ‘(s)he was sneezing’ and the negated clause ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he has sneezed’ are the constituent clauses of the adversative sentence *ftarnizotan, ala ēn ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed’ and the former clause implies the latter clause.

Exm4: Ergo, the adversative sentence *ftarnizotan, ala ēn ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed’ is nonsensical.

Keeping that in mind, the aspectively adversative sentences in Ex 6.6.2 – Ex 6.6.4 are nonsensical because their affirmative clauses imply their negated clauses. This means that the clause egrafa to grama ‘I was writing the letter’ implies the clause to eho grapsi ‘I have written it’, the clause evriska to vivlio ‘I was finding the book’ implies the clause to vrika ‘I found it’, and the clause ftarnizotan ‘(s)he was sneezing’ implies ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he has sneezed’.

6.6.3 Incorrectness of aspectively adversative sentences

Finally, the questions arise why:

Exm1: The aspectively adversative sentence *djavaza to vivlio, ala ēn to djavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ is incorrect.

Exm2: The aspectively adversative sentence *egrapa to grama, ala ēn to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ is incorrect.

Exm3: The aspectively adversative sentence *evriska to vivlio, ala ēn to vrika ‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’ is incorrect.

Exm4: The aspectively adversative sentence *ftarnizotan, ala ēn ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed’ is incorrect.

In order to answer these questions, one may employ Co 3.8.4 (being a corollary of the definition of the incorrect syntagma – 3.8.2) as general statement Gs1. Simultaneously, its antecedent should be appropriately exemplified by a singular statement Ss1 such that the conjunction of Gs1 and Ss1 entails the explanandum. Therefore, the first of the above questions is answered by the following explanation scheme:

Gs1: If a sentence S is nonsensical, then S is incorrect.

Ss1: The aspectively adversative sentence *djavaza to vivlio, ala ēn to djavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ is nonsensical.

Exm1: Ergo, the aspectively adversative sentence *djavaza to vivlio, ala ēn to djavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ is incorrect.
This means that the aspectively adversative sentence in question is incorrect because it is nonsensical. As is explained on p. 201, this sentence is nonsensical because its constituent affirmative clause implies the negated clause.

As regards the other explananda, they may also be explained with the use of Gs₁ and an appropriate singular statement Ssᵢ exemplifying the antecedent of this general statement. Consequently, the following explanation schemes are formed:

Gs₁: If a sentence S is nonsensical, then S is incorrect.

Ss₂: The sentence *egrafa to grama, ala ḍen to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ is nonsensical.

Exm₂: The aspectively adversative sentence *egrafa to grama, ala ḍen to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ is incorrect.

Gs₁: If a sentence S is nonsensical, then S is incorrect.

Ss₃: The sentence *evriska to vivlio, ala ḍen to vrika ‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’ is nonsensical.

Exm₃: The aspectively adversative sentence *evriska to vivlio, ala ḍen to vrika ‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’ is incorrect.

and:

Gs₁: If a sentence S is nonsensical, then S is incorrect.

Ss₄: The sentence *ftarnizotan, ala ḍen ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed’ is nonsensical.

Exm₄: The aspectively adversative sentence *ftarnizotan, ala ḍen ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed’ is incorrect.

That is to say, the aspectively adversative sentences *egrafa to grama, ala ḍen to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’, *evriska to vivlio, ala ḍen to vrika ‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’, and *ftarnizotan, ala ḍen ehi ftarnisti ‘(s)he was sneezing, but (s)he hasn’t sneezed’ are incorrect because they are nonsensical.

To continue, Exm₁–Exm₄ may be explained more empirically by reference to properties of their constituents. For instance, the first two explananda may be deduced from the explanans composed of Co 3.8.2.3 used as a general statement and an appropriate singular statement
exemplifying the antecedent of this general statement. Consequently, the following explanation schemes are formed:

Gs2: If $S_n$ is the negated clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_n$ does not signify completion, then $S$ is incorrect.

Ss5: The sentence to ējavasa ‘I read it’ is used as the negated clause of the aspectively adversative sentence *ējavaza to vivlio, ala ēn to ējavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ and it is aspectively ambiguous (i.e. it does not signify completion sufficiently).

Exm1: Ergo, the aspectively adversative sentence *ējavaza to vivlio, ala ēn to ējavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ is incorrect.

Gs2: If $S_n$ is the negated clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_n$ does not signify completion, then $S$ is incorrect.

Ss6: The sentence to eho grapsi ‘I have written it’ is used as the negated clause of the aspectively adversative sentence *ēgrafo to grama, ala ēn to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ and it is aspectively ambiguous (i.e. it does not signify completion sufficiently).

Exm2: The aspectively adversative sentence *ēgrafo to grama, ala ēn to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ is incorrect.

As is shown, the aspectively adversative sentences *ējavaza to vivlio, ala ēn to ējavasa ‘I was reading the book, but I didn’t read it’ and *ēgrafo to grama, ala ēn to eho grapsi ‘I was writing the letter, but I haven’t written it’ are incorrect because their negated clauses do not signify completion. To be more specific, these sentences are incorrect because their negated clauses are aspectively ambiguous, meaning that they do not suffice to signify completion. The question of why these negated clauses are aspectively ambiguous has already been answered on p. 197.

As regards Exm3 and Exm4, they may be explained by employing Co 5.4.2.1 as general statement Gs3 and, simultaneously, by exemplifying its antecedent with singular statements Ss7 and Ss8 respectively. Consequently, the following explanation schemes are obtained:

Gs3: If the verbal predicates $X$ and $Y$ of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ lexify momentarity, then $S$ is incorrect.
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Ss7: The verbal predicates *evriska* ‘I was finding’ and *vrika* ‘I found’ of the aspectively adversative sentence *evriska to vivlio, ala ἓen to vrika* *‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’* lexify momentarity.

Exm3: Ergo, the aspectively adversative sentence *evriska to vivlio, ala ἓen to vrika* *‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’* is incorrect.

Gs3: If the verbal predicates *X* and *Y* of an aspectively adversative sentence *S* lexify momentarity, then *S* is incorrect.

Sss: The verbal predicates *ftarnizotan* ‘(s)he was sneezing’ and *ftarnistika* ‘I sneezed’ of the aspectively adversative sentence *ftarnizomun, ala ἓen ftarnistika* *‘I was sneezing, but I haven’t sneezed’* lexify momentarity.

Exm4: Ergo, the aspectively adversative sentence *ftarnizomun, ala ἓen ftarnistika* *‘I was sneezing, but I haven’t sneezed’* is incorrect.

Given the above, the aspectively adversative sentences *evriska to vivlio, ala ἓen to vrika* *‘I was finding the book, but I didn’t find it’* and *ftarnizomun, ala ἓen ftarnistika* *‘I was sneezing, but I haven’t sneezed’* are incorrect because their constituent verbal predicates are lexificators of momentarity.

To summarise, in this chapter a range of explananda has been formulated. In sections 6.2–6.4, the explananda concern the signification of the delimitative, totive, and aspective meanings by lingual units. These lingual units are of various size. They are, however, no smaller than a word form and no larger than a sentence. As regards the explananda formulated in the last section, they concern the grammaticality, nonsensicality, and incorrectness of example aspectively adversative sentences.

Furthermore, in order to explain the explananda formulated in the present chapter, Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) deductive model of explanation has been applied. This model (which is also referred to by the term explanation scheme) is composed of an explanans and an explanandum. The former consists of a general statement and a singular statement (which exemplifies the antecedent of the general statement). In a properly formed explanation scheme, the explanans (i.e. the conjunction of the general and singular statements) entails the explanandum.

Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive model of explanation has been employed in this research to verify the validity of the assumptions made in previous chapters. In other words, it
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is verified in this chapter whether certain phenomena of the Modern Greek aspective system are explainable with the use of the postulates and their corollaries set forth in Chapters 3 and 5.

As has been shown, the aforementioned postulates and corollaries are sufficient to explain the explananda formulated in this chapter. Nonetheless, this does not mean that they suffice to explain all (or even most) of the aspective phenomena in the studied language. Further exploration of Modern Greek aspect is needed.
Conclusions

The results

The objective of the present dissertation was to describe and explain the signification of completion in Modern Greek. For this purpose, completion has been defined as a complex meaning which combines obligatorily termination and holicity (see Df 3.5.1.1). Moreover, the aspectively adversative sentences belonging to the corpus have been analysed in respect to their morphosyntactic structure and sensicality.

On this basis, two classes of Modern Greek verb forms have been distinguished:

- The class of autosignificators of completion and
- The class of cosignificators of completion.

The former class is composed of verb forms simultaneously semifying termination and lexifying holicity, which makes them sufficient significators of completion (see Df 5.3.1.1). Consequently, to this class belong aoristic and perfect verb forms lexifying holicity (e.g. oloklirosa ‘I completed’, eho pethani ‘I have died’).

What characterises the verb forms belonging to the latter class is that they are aspectively ambiguous (i.e. the designated event is no less than partially completed). Consequently, they signify completion solely if they are totively disambiguated by another member of a syntagma or by context. Hence, to this class belong aoristic and perfect verb forms which are totively ambiguous (e.g. ċjavasa ‘I read’ or ehun vafti ‘they have been painted’).

It is noteworthy that in the dissertation each form of a momentous verb (e.g. vrīka ‘I found’, htipusa ‘I was knocking’) is conceived of as a lexificator of completion. Despite that, not every form of a momentous verb autosignifies this aspective meaning. For instance, if a verb form designates an event comprised of a sequence of momentous subevents, then it signifies the completion of each of the subevents separately, but not necessarily of the event as a whole.

1 Nonetheless, it does not mean that a distinction of more classes of Modern Greek verb forms is not possible.
Conclusions

Furthermore, the verbal predicate is conceived of as a constitutive member of a clause or a sentence. This means that the meanings signified by a verbal predicate become the meanings of the clause or the sentence. Therefore, a clause or a sentence whose verbal predicate autosignifies completion signifies completion as well. On the other hand, a clause or a sentence whose verbal predicate is aspectively ambiguous:

- Signifies completion if its verbal predicate is totively disambiguated by a lexificator of holicity\(^2\) or
- Is aspectively ambiguous if there is no such member of this clause/sentence that totively disambiguates the verbal predicate\(^3\).

The achievement of the goals

The author believes that the objectives of the dissertation have been partially achieved, as the aforementioned results answer the question of how completion is signified in Modern Greek. Additionally, the postulates proposed in Chapter 3 and 5, along with the corollaries deduced from them, explain why certain lingual objects signify or do not signify completion.

On the other hand, the objectives of the dissertation have been achieved only partially, due to the restrictions imposed on the studied material. For instance, only three tenses have been considered: the imperfect tense, the aorist tense, and the perfect tense. Furthermore, inchoative verbs (e.g. *kathisa* ‘I sat down’, *arostisa* ‘I got ill’) were not explored in the research. Consequently, the proposed postulates and the corollaries inferred from them in Chapter 5 do not suffice to ascertain whether and why forms of inchoative verbs signify completion. It is also presumed in Chapter 5.2.4 that aspectively ambiguous verbal predicates may be disambiguated by adverbials of (spatial) distance and others. This phenomenon, however, cannot be explored in detail on the basis of the studied material. It should be looked into in the future.

Contributions to knowledge

This dissertation is the only work known to the author that focuses on the notion of completion *per se* in Modern Greek and that makes such an extensive use of (aspectively) adversative sentences. Furthermore, for the first time the fragment of the Modern Greek aspective reality

\(^2\) Or if it is totively disambiguated by the context. This case, however, has not been explored in this dissertation.

\(^3\) Nor is it disambiguated by the context.
has been described with a postulational method and then explained with the help of Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) deductive model of explanation.

The postulates made in Sections 3.7 and 3.8 along with their consequences contribute to the general theory of adversative sentences. What distinguishes the approach proposed in this dissertation is the significance of implication used to explain why an adversative sentence is sensical or nonsensical. To put it differently, it has been shown that the affirmative clause of a sensical aspectively adversative sentence does not imply the negated clause.

Finally, the results obtained in the research constitute a contribution to the hitherto class of theories on Modern Greek aspect and to aspectology in general. It has been shown, among others, that there is a group of Modern Greek aoristic and perfect verb forms which do not signify completion sufficiently. What distinguishes this approach, however, is that the aforementioned statement is not substantiated by the reference to (a)telic properties of the designated event, but to the totive meanings signified by verbal predicates. Furthermore, the significance of non-verbal cosignificators of completion (e.g. adverbials of degree) has been indicated.

Research in prospect

On the basis of the results obtained in the dissertation, many questions, which require further study to be answered, have been raised. For instance, the research has focused solely on the signification of completion by the aoristic and the perfect verb forms. Verb forms belonging to other tenses have not been considered. Consequently, the question arises of whether and how completion is signified if a verb form belongs to a tense other than aorist and perfect. Moreover, the only aspective meaning explored in the dissertation is completion. Other aspective and (generally) aspectual meanings have been omitted. Therefore, the questions regarding the signification of incompleteness, but also semelfactivity, iteration, and many others remain open.

Furthermore, it has been raised in Chapter 4 that imperfect and aoristic forms of inchoative verbs may be conceived of as lexifying different meanings (e.g. *kathise* ‘(s)he sat (down)’ vs. *kethise* ‘(s)he was sitting’). Thus, depending on the approach, they may be conceived of as either homolexical or heterolexical. In each case, inchoative verbs would require a different aspectological description. This is an interesting observation which the author finds worthy of future study.

Finally, and most importantly, the results of the present dissertation may be applied to confrontative and contrastive studies. For instance, in author’s opinion, there is a strong need
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for Polish–Modern Greek comparative studies, the results of which would be applicable in fields of linguistics such as glottodidactics or translation studies.
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Appendix A: Definitions, postulates, hypotheses, and corollaries

Definitions:

Df 3.5.1.1  The definition of completion
Po 3.5.1.1  Postulate of the dependency of completion upon termination
If a lingual unit $X$ signifies completion, then $X$ signifies termination.

Po 3.5.1.2  Postulate of the dependency of completion upon holicity
If a lingual unit $X$ signifies completion, then $X$ signifies holicity.

Df 3.7.2.1  The definition of the adversative sentence
Po 3.7.2.1  Postulate of linking of sentences to form an adversative sentence
If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then $S$ is composed of two clauses: $S_i$ and $S_j$.

Po 3.7.2.2  Postulate of linking of clauses by an adversative conjunction
If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then its constituent clauses are linked by an adversative conjunction.

Po 3.7.2.3  Postulate of linking of an affirmative and a negative sentence
If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then exactly one of its clauses (either $S_i$ or $S_j$) is a negative clause.

Df 3.7.3.1  The definition of the aspectively adversative sentence
Po 3.7.3.1  Postulate of being an adversative sentence
If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then $S$ is an adversative sentence.
Po 3.7.3.2  Postulate of sufficient homolexicality of the clauses
If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then its constituent affirmative clause $S_i$ and negated clause $S_j$ are either homolexical or sufficiently homolexical.

Po 3.7.3.3  Postulate of being homotemporal, homomodal, and homodiathetic
If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then its constituent clauses are bound by the relations of homotemporality, homomodality, and homodiatheticity.

Df 3.8.1  The definition of a correct syntagma
Po 3.8.1  Postulate of grammaticality of correct syntagmata
If a syntagma $S$ is correct, then $S$ is grammatical.

Po 3.8.2  Postulate of sensicality of correct syntagmata
If a syntagma $S$ is correct, then $S$ is sensical.

Df 3.8.2  The definition of an incorrect syntagma
A syntagma $S$ is incorrect iff $S$ is ungrammatical or nonsensical.

Df 3.8.1.1  The definition of a grammatical adversative sentence
An adversative sentence $S$ is grammatical iff its constituent clauses ($S_i$ and $S_j$) are grammatical.

Df 3.8.1.2  The definition of an ungrammatical adversative sentence
An adversative sentence $S$ is ungrammatical iff at least one of its constituent clauses ($S_i$ or $S_j$) is ungrammatical.

Df 5.3.1.1  The definition of the autosignification of completion
A verb form $X$ autosignifies completion iff $X$ semifies termination and lexifies holicity.

Postulates:

Po 3.5.1.1  Postulate of the dependency of completion upon termination
If a lingual unit $X$ signifies completion, then $X$ signifies termination.
Po 3.5.1.2  *Postulate of the dependency of completion upon holicity*
If a lingual unit $X$ signifies completion, then $X$ signifies holicity.

Po 3.5.3.1  *Postulate of completedness of momentous events*
If an event $e$ is momentous, then $e$ is completed.

Po 3.7.2.1  *Postulate of linking of sentences to form an adversative sentence*
If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then $S$ is composed of two clauses: $S_i$ and $S_j$.

Po 3.7.2.2  *Postulate of linking of clauses by an adversative conjunction*
If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then its constituent clauses are linked by an adversative conjunction.

Po 3.7.2.3  *Postulate of linking of an affirmative and a negative sentence*
If a sentence $S$ is an adversative sentence, then exactly one of its clauses (either $S_i$ or $S_j$) is a negative clause.

Po 3.7.3.1  *Postulate of being an adversative sentence*
If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then $S$ is an adversative sentence.

Po 3.7.3.2  *Postulate of sufficient homolexicality of the clauses*
If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then its constituent affirmative clause $S_i$ and negated clause $S_j$ are either homolexical or sufficiently homolexical.

Po 3.7.3.3  *Postulate of being homotemporal, homomodal, and homodiathetic*
If a sentence $S$ is an aspectively adversative sentence, then its constituent clauses are bound by the relations of homotemporality, homomodality, and homodiatheticity.

Po 3.8.1  *Postulate of grammaticality of correct syntagmata*
If a syntagma $S$ is correct, then $S$ is grammatical.

Po 3.8.2  *Postulate of sensicality of correct syntagmata*
If a syntagma $S$ is correct, then $S$ is sensical.
Postulate of the non-implication of clauses
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of an adversative sentence $S$, $S_n$ is the negated clause of $S$, and $S$ is sensical, then $S_a$ does not imply $S_n$.

Postulate of semelfactivity of aspectively adversative sentences
If $S_i$ is a constituent clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_i$ semifies neither habituality nor iteration.

Postulate of the aspective meaning signified by the affirmative clause
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ does not imply the negated clause of $S$, then $S_a$ either signifies incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous.

Postulate of the significiation of completion by the negated clause
If $S_n$ is the negated clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_n$ is not implied by the affirmative clause of $S$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

Postulate of aspective disambiguation
If $S$ is a correct aspectively adversative sentence whose constituent affirmative clause $S_a$ is aspectively ambiguous, then $S_a$ is determined by the negative clause in such a way that $S$ signifies incompletion.

Postulate of semification of termination by an aoristic verb form
If a verb form $X$ belongs to the aorist tense, then $X$ semifies termination.

Postulate of semification of termination by a perfect verb form
If a verb form $X$ belongs to the perfect tense, then $X$ semifies termination.

Postulate of lexification of termination
If a verb form $X$ lexifies momentarity, then $X$ lexifies termination.

Postulate of significiation of termination by a simple sentence
If a verb form $X$, being the verbal predicate of a simple sentence $S$, semifies termination, then $S$ signifies termination.

Postulate of non-semification of totive meanings
If a word form $X$ signifies a totive meaning $\sigma$, then $X$ does not semify $\sigma$. 
Po 5.2.2.1 *Postulate of signification of holicity by momentous lingual units*
If a lingual unit $X$ lexifies momentarity, then $X$ lexifies holicity.

Po 5.2.3.1 *Postulate of the totive meaning signified by a sentence*
If a verb form $X$ which is the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence $S$ signifies the totive meaning $\sigma$, then $S$ also signifies $\sigma$.

Po 5.2.3.2 *Postulate of totive disambiguation*
If a verbal predicate $X$ being a constituent of a simple sentence $S$ is totively ambiguous, then the totive meaning signified by $X$ may be disambiguated by another member of $S$ or by context.

Po 5.2.4.1 *Postulate of a totively ambiguous sentence*
If a totively ambiguous verb form $X$ is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence $S$ and $X$ is not totively disambiguated by a significator of either holicity or partitivity, then $S$ is totively ambiguous.

Po 5.3.2.1 *Postulate of insufficient signification of completion by verb forms*
If a totively ambiguous verb form $X$ belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then $X$ signifies completion insufficiently.

Po 5.3.2.2 *Postulate of cosignification of completion by the totive disambiguator*
If a totively ambiguous verbal predicate of a predicate phrase $P$ is totively disambiguated by a lexificator of holicity $X$, then $X$ cosignifies completion.

Po 5.4.1 *Postulate of the implication of the negated clause by the affirmative clause*
If an aspectively adversative sentence is composed of an affirmative clause $S_a$ and a negated clause $S_n$ whose verbal predicates lexify momentarity, then $S_a$ implies $S_n$.

**Hypotheses:**

Hy 5.4.1.1 *Completedness of semelfactive events*
If a lexificator of momentarity $X$ is the verbal predicate of a sentence or clause $S$ and $S$ signifies neither habituality nor iteration, then $S$ signifies completion.
Corollaries:

Co 3.5.1.1 Incompatibility of completion with delimitative meanings other than termination
If a lingual unit $X$ does not signify termination, then $X$ does not signify completion.

Co 3.5.1.2 Incompatibility of completion with partitivity and totive neutrality
If a lingual unit $X$ does not signify holicity, then $X$ does not signify completion.

Co 3.5.1.3 Aspective ambiguity
If a lingual unit $X$ signifies termination and, at the same time, $X$ is totively ambiguous, then $X$ is aspectively ambiguous.

Co 3.5.3.1 The designation of completed events
If a sentence $S$ signifies completion, then the event $e$ designated by $S$ is a completed event.

Co 3.5.3.2 The designation of terminated and holic events
If a sentence $S$ signifies completion, then the event $e$ designated by $S$ is a terminated and holic event.

Co 3.5.3.3 The signification of an aspective meaning other than completion
If a sentence $S$ does not designate a completed event $e$, then $S$ does not signify completion.

Co 3.5.3.4 The signification of a meaning other than termination or holicity
If a sentence $S$ does not designate a completed event $e$, then $S$ does not signify termination or holicity.

Co 3.8.1 Incorrectness of ungrammatical syntagmata
If a syntagma $S$ is ungrammatical, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.2 Incorrectness of nonsensical syntagmata
If a syntagma $S$ is nonsensical, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.3 Incorrectness of ungrammatical sentences
If a sentence $S$ is ungrammatical, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.4 Incorrectness of nonsensical sentences
If a sentence $S$ is nonsensical, then $S$ is incorrect.
Definitions, postulates, hypotheses, and corollaries

Co 3.8.1.1 Grammaticality of adversative sentences formed by linking correct sentences
If the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ are correct, then $S$ is grammatical.

Co 3.8.1.2 Nonsensicality of an adversative sentence
If the affirmative clause $S_a$ and the negated clause $S_n$ are the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ implies $S_n$, then $S$ is nonsensical.

Co 3.8.1.3 Non-implication of the clauses of adversative sentences
If an adversative sentence $S$ is correct, then its constituent affirmative clause does not imply the negated clause.

Co 3.8.1.4 Implication of the clauses of adversative sentences
If the affirmative clause $S_a$ and the negated clause $S_n$ are the constituent clauses of an adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ implies $S_n$, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.2.1 Correctness of aspectively adversative sentence due to the affirmative clause
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_a$ signifies incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous.

Co 3.8.2.2 Correctness of aspectively adversative sentence due to the negated clause
If $S_a$ is the negated clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$, then $S_n$ signifies completion.

Co 3.8.2.3 Incorrectness of aspectively adversative sentence due to the negated clause
If $S_n$ is the negated clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_n$ does not signify completion, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.2.4 Incorrectness of aspectively adversative sentence due to the affirmative clause
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S_a$ neither signifies incompletion nor is aspectively ambiguous, then $S$ is incorrect.

Co 3.8.2.5 The non-completion of the negated clause
If an incorrect aspectively adversative sentence $S$ is composed of two correct clauses and the affirmative clause signifies incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous, then the negated clause does not signify completion.

Co 3.8.2.6 The aspective meaning of the affirmative clause
If an incorrect aspectively adversative sentence $S$ is composed of two correct clauses and the negated clause signifies completion, then the affirmative clause does not signify incompletion, nor is it aspectively ambiguous.
Co 3.8.2.7  Aspective ambiguity of a clause
If $S_a$ is the affirmative clause of a correct aspectively adversative sentence $S$ and $S$ does not signify incompleteness, then $S_a$ is asaspectively ambiguous.

Co 5.1.3.1  Signification of termination by an aoristic or perfect simple sentence
If a verb form $X$, being a verbal predicate of a simple sentence $S$, belongs to the aorist or the perfect tense, then $S$ signifies termination.

Co 5.3.1.1  The autosignification of completion by the aoristic and perfect verb form
If a verb form $X$ lexifies holicity and $X$ belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then $X$ autosignifies completion.

Co 5.3.1.2  The autosignification of completion by momentous verbs
If a verb form $X$ lexifies momentarity and $X$ belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then $X$ autosignifies completion.

Co 5.3.3.1  Lexification of completion by momentous verb forms
If a verb form $X$ lexifies momentarity, then $X$ lexifies completion.

Co 5.3.4.1  The extension of the meaning of completion to a sentence
If the verbal predicate $X$ of an affirmative sentence $S$ autosignifies completion, then $S$ signifies completion.

Co 5.3.4.2  The totive disambiguation of a verbal predicate by a significator of holicity
If a totively ambiguous verb form $X$ belonging to either the aorist or the perfect tense is used as the verbal predicate of an affirmative sentence $S$ and $X$ is totively disambiguated by a significator of holicity $Y$, then $S$ signifies completion.

Co 5.3.4.3  Aspectively ambiguous sentences
If a verb form $X$ being the verbal predicate of a totively ambiguous sentence $S$ belongs to either the aorist or the perfect tense, then $S$ is aspectively ambiguous.

Co 5.4.2.1  Incorrectness of aspectively adversative sentences whose verbal predicates lexify momentarity
If the verbal predicates $X$ and $Y$ of an aspectively adversative sentence $S$ lexify momentarity, then $S$ is incorrect.
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Streszczenie

Koncepcja dokonaności w języku nowogreckim:
Analiza zdań aspektywnie adwersatywnych

Przedmiotem niniejszej dysertacji jest koncepcja dokonaności oraz sposoby jej językowego wyrażania we współczesnym języku greckim (tj. w języku nowogreckim). Dokonaność rozumiana jest jako znaczenie złożone, które łączy ze sobą w sposób obligatoryjny dwa znaczenia prostsze (tj. mniej złożone). Są to terminatywność oraz holiczność. W konsekwencji, w pracy uwzględnione zostały (przynajmniej częściowo) trzy systemy: aspekt, delimitatywność (tj. ograniczoność w czasie) oraz totywność.

W pracach teoretycznych z zakresu aspektologii (tj. dziedziny językoznawstwa zajmującej się aspektem) stosunkowo rzadko podejmuje się kwestii aspektu w języku nowogreckim. Jeszcze mniej miejsca w literaturze aspektologicznej poświęconego jest kwestiom wyrażania dokonaności w tymże języku. Ostatnie stwierdzenie autor niniejszej dysertacji opiera m.in. na obserwacji, że nie znalazł w literaturze aspektologicznej dotyczącej języka nowogreckiego próby precyzyjnego zdefiniowania bądź chociażby wyczerpującego objaśnienia tej koncepcji. Ponadto w zdecydowanej większości prac znanych autorowi dokonaność jest albo w ogóle nieuwzględniana, albo opisywana w sposób pobieżny.


Niemniej jednak uzyskane wyniki badań stoją w opozycji do obu powyższych twierdzeń, ponieważ wskazują, że formy perfektywne licznej grupy czasowników nowogreckich nie niosą znaczenie dokonaności w sposób wystarczający niezależnie czy denotowane zdarzenie jest teliczne czy ateliczne. Konieczne jest natomiast „wzmocnienie” znaczenia dokonaności poprzez użycie odpowiedniego modyfikatora.
W świetle powyższego, celem niniejszej dysertacji jest udzielenie odpowiedzi (chociaż częściowej) na pytania: w jaki sposób dokonaność jest wyrażana w języku nowogreckim oraz dlaczego konkretne jednostki językowe badanego języka niosą lub nie niosą znaczenia dokonaności.

Niniejsza dysertacja zaczyna się od zwięzłego przeglądu literatury aspektologicznej. W pierwszym rozdziale przedstawiony został rozwój myśli aspektologicznej od starożytności po czasy współczesne oraz kilka wybranych przez autora ogólnych podejść do zagadnienia czasu i aspektu. Tymczasem drugi rozdział został poświęcony literaturze aspektologicznej dotyczącej języka nowogreckiego.


W dalszej części rozdziału autor niniejszej dysertacji próbuje pokazać różnorodność podejść do kategorii czasu oraz aspektu. Ma również nadzieję, że udało mu się zwrócić uwagę czytelnika nie tylko na brak jednolitego aparatu terminologicznego, lecz także na stosunkowo częste brak jasnego rozgraniczenia pomiędzy jednostkami językowymi (tj. jednostkami morfologicznymi) a znaczeniami. To drugie niejednokrotnie może wywołać dezorientację czy niejednoznaczność wyrażanych myśli. Autor odrzuca rozróżnienie kategorii gramatycznej aspektu od znaczeń aspektualnych poprzez zapisywanie tych pierwszych wielką literą (patrz Comrie 1976: 10). Jako argument podaje, że jest to czysto grafiiczne rozróżnienie, które nie jest równie skuteczne w przypadku konwersacji, wygłaszania wykładów czy referatów.


Następnie przedstawia się kilka wybranych podejść do aspektu imperfektywnego i perfektywnego. W jednym z nich (patrz Newton 1979, Mackridge 1985) zakładana się, że formy perfektywne czasowników są mniej nacechowane niż formy imperfektywne. To znaczy, że formy imperfektywne używana się w celu wyrażenia m.in. trwania (duratywności), powtarzalności (iteracji) czy regularności (habitualności). Zgodnie z tym ujęciem, jeśli nie istnieją przesłanki do użycia formy imperfektywnej, wówczas używana jest forma perfektywna. Według innego podejścia formy perfektywne zawsze sygnifikują znaczenie terminatywności (tj. zakończenia się; ang. termination), podczas gdy formy imperfektywne są pod tym względem niejednoznaczne – denotowane zdarzenie może być zakończone w czasie lub nie (Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006). W ostatnim podejściu podjęta jest próba wyjaśnienia różnicy pomiędzy aspektem imperfektywnym i perfektywnym poprzez wykorzystanie trzech

Pod koniec Rozdziału 2 wspominano parę przykładowych użyć form perfektywnych i imperfektywnych w języku nowogreckim, których nie można wyjaśnić za pomocą przedstawionych wcześniej podejść. Dodatkowo kilka słów poświęcono relacjom wiążącym przysłówki z formami imperfektywnymi i perfektywnymi czasownika.

Celem Rozdziału 3 jest wprowadzenie, objaśnienie oraz egzemplifikacja aparatu metodologicznego, niezbędnego do przeprowadzenia pracy badawczej. Aparat ten obejmuje szereg postulatów (tj. twierdzeń przyjmowanych bezdowodowo za prawdziwe) oraz konsekwencji z nich wynikających.


Wyróżniono cztery rodzaje sygnifikacji. Nazywane są kolejno relacjami:

- leksyfikacji,
- semifikacji,
- autosygnifikacji i
- kosygnifikacji.

Jeżeli jednostka językowa x leksyfikuje pewne znaczenie σ, oznacza to, że σ jest niesione przez morfem leksykalny tej jednostki. Innymi słowy, jest to inherentne znaczenie owej jednostki językowej. Dla przykładu, znaczenie przeszłości jest leksyfikowane przez wyrażenia takie jak wczoraj, rok temu, dawniej, itp. Z drugiej strony, jeżeli jednostka językowa x semifikuje pewne znaczenie σ, to owo znaczenie nie jest niesione przez morfem leksykalny tej jednostki, lecz przez afiks, przyimek, czasownik pomocniczy, itp. W języku polskim, na przykład, znaczenie przeszłości jest semifikowane przez wyrażenia takie jak poszedłem, czytałem, napisałem był, itp.

Kontynuując, jeżeli jednostka językowa x autosygnifikuje pewne znaczenie σ, oznacza to, że x jest wystarczającym sygnifikatorem tego znaczenia. Przykładowo w języku polskim morfem -(e)m autosygnifikuje pierwszą osobę liczby pojedynczej w wyrażeniach takich jak kochałem, umiem,alem się napracowałem. Z kolei, jeśli jednostka językowa x kosygnifikuje
znaczenie σ, to wówczas x nie sygnifikuje w sposób wystarczający σ. Wręcz przeciwnie, σ jest sygnifikowana wspólnie przez dwa lub więcej kosygnifikatory. Dla przykładu znaczenie inessywności (tj. znajdowania się wewnątrz czegoś) niesione jest w języku polskim wspólnie przez przedimek w oraz końcówkę miejscownika – np. w domu, w szufladzie, w książce. Należy przy tym zauważyć, że ani przedimek w (por. w dom, w szufladę, w książkę) ani rzeczownik w formie miejscownika (domu, szufladzie, książki) nie niosą znaczenia inessywności, jeżeli rozpatrywane są osobno. Żeby fraza niosła owo znaczenie, muszą być użyte łącznie (por. Kuryłowicz 1987: 182). A zatem w powyższych przykładach przedimek w oraz rzeczownik w formie miejscownika kosygnifikują inessywność.

Dla celów niniejszej pracy najbardziej fundamentalnymi pojęciami są dokonaność, zdanie aspektywnie adwersatywne oraz poprawna syntagma. Zaczynając od pierwszego z nich, dokonaność zdefiniowano z wykorzystaniem dwóch pojęć pierwotnych: terminatywności (czyli skończości/ograniczenia temporalnego) oraz holiczności (czyli całościowości). Zgodnie z definicją dokonaności (patrz Df 3.5.1.1) jednostka językowa sygnifikuje dokonaność pod warunkiem, że jednocześnie sygnifikuje terminatywność oraz holiczność.


Co się tyczy zdania aspektywnie adwersatywnych, jest to specjalny rodzaj zdań adwersatywnych, które (patrz Df 3.7.2.1 i Df 3.7.3.1):

- składają się z dokładnie dwóch zdań składowych, z czego jedno jest zdaniem twierdzącym a drugie przeczącym,
- zdania składowe połączone są spójnikiem adwersatywnym (w niniejszej pracy uwzględniony został wyłącznie nowogrecki spójnik āla „ale”),
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- zdania składowe są identyczne ze względu na niesione znaczenie temporalne, modalne i diatetyczne,
- zdania składowe są albo homoleksykalne albo wystarczająco homoleksykalne (tj. albo identyczne albo wystarczająco identyczne ze względu na leksyfikowane znaczenia).

Dwa zdania składowe uważane są za wystarczająco homoleksykalne, jeżeli różnią się wyłącznie ze względu na znaczenie totywne (tj. holiczność, częściowość, itp.).

Przykładami zdań aspektywnie adwersatywnych są:

(1) a. Janek czytał książkę, ale jej nie przeczytał.
   b. Dzieci jadły śniadanie, ale nie zjadły wszystkiego.
   c. Ktoś otworzył drzwi, ale nie otworzył ich na oścież.


Przechodząc do poprawności syntagmy, pojęcie to zdefiniowane jest z pomocą dwóch pojęć pierwotnych: gramatyczności oraz sensowności. Syntagmy pewnego języka uważana jest za gramatyczną, jeżeli nie narusza żadnej reguły morfologicznej lub syntaktycznej tego języka. Reguły stylistyczne nie zostały uwzględniane w niniejszej dysertacji. Z kolei, syntagma jest sensowna, jeżeli znaczenia niesione przez jej człony wzajemnie się nie wykluczają. To powiedziawszy, poprawna syntagma jest zdefiniowana jako jednocześnie gramatyczna i sensowna (patrz Df 3.8.1). Mutatis mutandis, zgodnie z definicją niepoprawności syntagmy (patrz Df 3.8.2) każda niepoprawna syntagma jest niegramatyczna lub bezsensowna.

Wyjaśniwszy niezbędny aparat terminologiczny, proponuje się szereg postulatów (tj. założeń) oraz ich konsekwencji dotyczących gramatyczności, sensowności a co za tym idzie również poprawności zdań (aspektywnie) adwersatywnych. Owe postulaty i ich konsekwencje są niezbędne do przeprowadzenia analizy materiału badawczego, którym jest korpus nowogreckich zdań aspektywnie adwersatywnych.

Wśród najważniejszych konsekwencji wyciągniętych w Rozdziale 3 jest Co 3.8.1.1. Zgodnie z nią, każde zdanie adwersatywne jest gramatyczne, jeżeli jego zdania składowe są
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poprawne. W oparciu o tę konsekwencję możliwe jest sformułowanie takiej dyrektywy, dzięki której każde utworzone zdanie adwersatywne jest gramatyczne. Mianowicie, jeżeli dwa poprawne zdania pojedyncze zostaną połączone spójnikiem adwersatywnym ale, to otrzymane zdanie adwersatywne będzie gramatyczne. Co za tym idzie, skoro utworzone w ten sposób zdanie adwersatywne jest gramatyczne, to jeśli jest ono niepoprawne, to jest niepoprawne, ponieważ jest nonsensowne (tj. znaczenia niesione przez jego człony wzajemnie się wykluczają).

W następnej kolejności należy wspomnieć o Co 3.8.1.4 oraz Co 3.8.1.6. Zaczynając od pierwszej z nich, każde poprawne zdanie (aspektywnie) adwersatywne składa się z takiego twierdzącego i zaprzeczonego zdania składowego, że to pierwsze nie implikuje tego drugiego. Na przykład (aspektywnie) adwersatywne zdanie:

(2) \textit{O Kostas ďjavaze to vivlio, ala ďen to ďjavase olo.}
\textit{‘Kostas czytał książkę, ale nie przeczytał jej całą.’}

jest poprawne. A zatem w świetle Co 3.8.1.4 twierdzące zdanie składowe \textit{o Kostas ďjavaze to vivlio ‘Kostas czytał książkę’ nie implikuje zaprzeczonego zdania składowego to ďjavase olo ‘przeczytał ją całą’}. Mówiąc inaczej, ze zdania twierdzącego nie wynika zdanie zaprzeczone, ponieważ ktoś kto czytał książkę, niekoniecznie przeczytał ją całą.

Z drugiej strony, zgodnie z Co 3.8.1.6 każde zdanie (aspektywnie) adwersatywne jest niepoprawne, jeżeli twierdzące zdanie składowe implikuje zaprzeczone zdanie składowe. Dla przykładu zdanie adwersatywne:

(3) \textit{*O Kostas epine nero, ala ďen to ipje.}
\textit{*‘Kostas pil wodę, ale się jej nie napil.’}

jest niepoprawne, ponieważ z twierdzącego zdania składowego \textit{o Kostas epine nero ‘Kostas pił wodę’ wynika zaprzeczone zdanie składowe to ipje ‘się jej napił’}. To znaczy, że jeśli Kostas pił wodę, to musiał się jej napić.

Dwema kolejnymi konsekwencjami, o których należy wspomnieć w tej części streszenia, są Co 3.8.2.1 i Co 3.8.2.2. Zgodnie z nimi twierdzi się, że każde poprawne nowogreckie zdanie aspektywnie adwersatywne składa się z:

- twierdzącego zdania składowego, które jest niedokonane albo aspektywnie dwuznaczne oraz
- zaprzeczonego zdania składowego sygnifikującego dokonaność.
Oznacza to, że jeżeli nowogreckie zdanie aspektywnie adwersatywne jest poprawne, to jego twierdzące zdanie składowe jest aspektywnie niejednoznaczne albo niesie znaczenie niedokonaności a jego zaprzeczone zdanie składowe niesie znaczenie dokonaności.

Powyższe twierdzenia można zobrazować przy pomocy następującego zdania aspektywnie adwersatywnego:

(4) \textit{O Kostas egrafe ena grama, ala ðen to egrapse olo.}

‘Kostas pisał list, ale nie napisał go całego.’

Jak widać, powyższe zdanie jest poprawne. A zatem z Co 3.8.2.1 wynika, że twierdzące zdanie składowe \textit{o Kostas egrafe ena grema ‘Kostas pisał list’} albo niesie znaczenie niedokonaności albo jest aspektywnie dwuznaczne. Ponadto z Co 3.8.2.2 wynika, że zaprzeczone zdanie składowe \textit{to egrapse olo ‘napisał go cały’} niesie znaczenie dokonaności.

Pod koniec rozdziału proponuje się również konsekwencje Co 3.8.2.5 i Co 3.8.2.6. Obie konsekwencje dotyczą niepoprawnych zdań aspektywnie adwersatywnych, których zdania składowe są poprawne. Zgodnie z Co 3.8.2.5, jeżeli ich twierdzące zdanie składowe niesie znaczenie niedokonaności albo jest aspektywnie niejednoznaczne, to zaprzeczone zdanie składowe nie niesie znaczenia dokonaności. I tak na przykład, zdanie aspektywnie adwersatywne:

(5) \textbf{*O Kostas ðjavaze ena vivlio, ala ðen to ðjavase.}

*‘Kostas czytał książkę, ale jej nie poczytał.’

jest niepoprawne, chociaż składa się z dwóch poprawnych zdań składowych. Ponadto jego twierdzące zdanie składowe \textit{o Kostas ðjavaze ena vivlio ‘Kostas czytał książkę’} jest aspektywnie dwuznaczne. To powiedziawszy, z Co 3.8.2.5 wynika, że zaprzeczone zdanie składowe \textit{to ðjavase ‘poczytał ją’} nie niesie znaczenia dokonaności.

\textit{Mutatis mutandis}, zgodnie z Co 3.8.2.6 jeśli zaprzeczone zdanie składowe niesie znaczenie dokonaności, to twierdzące zdanie składowe nie może być ani niedokonane ani aspektywnie dwuznaczne. Dla przykładu zdanie aspektywnie adwersatywne:

(6) \textbf{*O Kostas evriske to vivlio, ala ðen to vrike.}

*‘Kostas [właśnie] znajdował książkę, ale jej nie znalazł.’

jest niepoprawne, mimo że jego zdania składowe są poprawne. Jednocześnie, zaprzeczone zdanie składowe \textit{to vrike ‘znalazł ją’} niesie znaczenie dokonaności. W konsekwencji, na mocy
Co 3.8.2.6 twierdzące zdanie składowe o Kostas evriske to vivlio ‘?Kostas [właśnie] znajdował książkę’ nie jest ani aspektywnie dwuznaczne, ani niedokonane.

Tematem Rozdziału 4 jest opis przebiegu pracy badawczej. W związku z tym nie tylko zwerbalizowano w nim cele niniejszej dysertacji, lecz także opisano sposób w jaki skonstruowano korpus nowogreckich zdań aspektywnie adwersatywnych. Próbuje się tu również wskazać zasadność przyjętych ograniczeń materiału badawczego. Ponadto prezentuje się sposób analizowania zdań należących do korpusu oraz wyciągania i formułowania wniosków. W pierwszej kolejności zdań należące do korpusu podzielono na osiem klas ze względu na cztery heterogeniczne wymiary (por. str. 135), by następnie przeanalizować te zdania w dwóch etapach. W pierwszym etapie porównuje się zdania aspektywnie adwersatywne, których orzeczeniami są formy tego samego czasownika. W ten sposób ustala się, czy i kiedy dany czasownik może wystąpić w poprawnym zdaniu aspektywnie adwersatywnym. W drugim etapie, natomiast, porównuje się zdania należące do tej samej klasy zdań aspektywnie adwersatywnych. Dzięki temu możliwa jest weryfikacja wniosków wysuwanych w poprzednim etapie oraz sformułowanie postulatów (czyli ogólnych twierdzeń) dotyczących fragmentu nowogreckiej rzeczywistości aspektowej.

W Rozdziale 5 przedstawia się wyniki przeprowadzonych badań. A zatem proponuje się, objaśnia się oraz egzemplifikuje się szereg postulatów dotyczących fragmentu nowogreckiej rzeczywistości aspektowej oraz konsekwencji wynikających z owych postulatów. Postulaty i konsekwencje przedstawiane są tematycznie, począwszy od sygnifikacji terminatywności przez aorystyczne i perfektowe (tj. należące do perfectum) jednostki językowe a kończąc się na sygnifikacji dokonaności. W konsekwencji próbuje się udzielić odpowiedzi na pytanie jak wyrażane jest znaczenie dokonaności w języku nowogreckim. Na końcu rozdziału poświęcono nieco uwagi klasie czasowników momentalnych, które okazały się najtrudniejsze do opisania ze względu na niesione przez nie znaczenia dokonaności.

Dla celów niniejszej dysertacji wyodrębniono trzy grupy form czasowników nowogreckich. Są to grupy:

- autosygnifikatorów dokonaności,
- kosygnifikatorów dokonaności oraz
- leksyfikatorów dokonaności,

Jak sama nazwa wskazuje, pierwsza grupa składa się z takich form czasownikowych, które autosygnifikują dokonaność. Zgodnie z definicją autosygnifikatorów dokonaności Df 5.3.1.1 oznacza to, że formy czasowników nowogreckich należące do tej grupy jednocześnie
semifikują terminatywność (tj. zakończoność/ograniczoność temporalną) i leksyfikują holiczność. Przykładami form czasownikowych autosygnifikujących dokonaność są teliōse ‘skończył/a’, ehi pethani ‘umarł/a’, itp.


W skład ostatniej grupy wchodzą formy czasowników nowogreckich, które jednocześnie leksyfikują terminatywność i holiczność. Do grupy tej należą formy czasowników momentalnych (czyli takich, które leksyfikują minimalne trwanie zdarzenia) jak np. vrika ‘znalazłem’.

Ponadto w niniejszej pracy przyjmuje się kuryłowiczowską koncepcję orzeczenia jako konstytutycznego członu zdania (Kuryłowicz 1987: 93–102). To znaczy, że znaczenia niesione przez orzeczenie rozszerzane są na frazę predykatu a następnie na całe zdanie. W konsekwencji, twierdzi się, że jeżeli forma czasownikowa x autosygnifikuje dokonaność, to zdanie pojedyncze, którego x jest orzeczeniem, również niesie znaczenie dokonaności (patrz Co 5.3.4.1). Przykładowo, orzeczeniem zdania:

(7) O Kostas teliōse ena vivlio. ‘Kostas skończył książkę.’

jest forma czasownikowa teliōse ‘skończył’. Jak wspomniano wcześniej, forma ta należy do grupy autosygnifikatorów dokonaności. A zatem, z Co 5.3.4.1 wynika, że powyższe zdanie niesie znaczenie dokonaność.

Natomiast, jeżeli orzeczeniem zdania pojedynczego jest totywnie dwuznaczna forma czasownikowa semifikująca terminatywność, to zdanie niesie znaczenie dokonaności pod warunkiem, że jego orzeczenie jest totywnie ujednoznaczone przez leksyfikator holiczności (patrz Co 5.3.4.2). Zaś w przypadku, gdy orzeczenie nie jest ujednoznaczone przez żaden człon zdania, to zdanie jest aspektynie dwuznaczne (patrz Co 5.3.4.3).

Powyższe twierdzenia można zobrazować następującymi przykładami:

1 W niniejszej dysertacji nie uwzględnia się ujednoznacznienia zdania przez kontekst.
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(8) a. O Kostas 
'Kostas przeczytał książkę w całości.'

b. O Kostas 
‘Kostas (po/prze)czytał książkę.’

Warto zauważyć, że orzeczeniem obu powyższych zdań jest aorystycznna forma czasownikowa 
‘(po/prze)czytał’. Jak wspomniano na poprzedniej stronie, forma ta jest niewystarczającym sygnifikatorem dokonaności, ponieważ jest totywnie dwuznaczna. Niemniej jednak, w przypadku pierwszego zdania, orzeczenie jest totywnie ujednoznacznione przez leksyfikator holiczności 
‘całkowicie’. A zatem, zgodnie z Co 5.3.4.2, zdanie w (8a.) niesie znaczenie dokonaności. Z kolei w drugim zdaniu orzeczenie nie jest totywnie ujednoznaczniane przez żaden inny człon tego zdania. W konsekwencji, na mocy konsekwencji Co 5.3.4.3, zdanie w (8b.) jest aspektywnie dwuznaczne w tym sensie, że ze zdania jasno nie wynika czy Kostas przeczytał książkę całkowicie czy też nie. Sygnalizuje ono wyłącznie, że Kostas przeczytał przynajmniej jej fragment.

Warto wspomnieć, że leksyfikacja terminatywności przez orzeczenie zdania pojedynczego nie jest wystarczająca, żeby owo zdanie niosło znaczenie terminatywności (a w konsekwencji także dokonaności). Wręcz przeciwnie, istnieją zdania, które denotują zdarzenia niezakończone (ang. non-terminated), mimo iż ich orzeczenie leksyfikuje terminatywność. W celu wyjaśnienia tego zjawiska zakłada się, że leksyfikowane przez formę czasownika znaczenie terminatywności nie odnosi się do własności całego zdarzenia, lecz do własności jego podzdarzeń. Dla przykładu forma czasownika 
‘pukał’ denotuje zdarzenie składające się z serii pojedynczych puknięć. Chociaż każde z tych puknięć z osobna jest zakończone (ang. terminated), to całe zdarzenie może być niezakończone (np. w zdaniu otan jirisame spiti, o Kostas 
‘gdy wróciliśmy do domu, Kostas nadal 
do drzwi’). Analogicznie, jeżeli orzeczenie leksyfikuje dokonaność, to denotowane zdarzenie składa się z dokonanych podzdarzeń. Nie oznacza to jednak, że całe zdarzenie jest dokonane. Na przykład zdanie bez przerwy kichal denotuje zdarzenie będące serią kichnięć. Każde kichnięcie z osobna jest dokonane. Mimo to powyższe zdanie nie jest aspektywnie jednoznaczne, ponieważ nie precyzuje czy owa osoba się w pełni wykichała.

W ostatnim rozdziale próbuje się odpowiedzieć na postawione pytanie, dlaczego pewne nowogreckie jednostki językowe sygnifikują bądź nie sygnifikują dokonaności. W tym celu wykorzystuje się dedukcyjny model wyjaśniania zaproponowany przez Hempla i Oppenheima (1948). Odpowiedzi udzielane zostały stopniowo z wykorzystaniem postulatów i ich
konsekwencji zaproponowanych w Rozdziałach 3 i 5. Na początku wyjaśniono, dlaczego pewne (przykładowe) formy czasowników nowogreckich sygnifikują znaczenie terminatywności i dokonaności. Następnie wyjaśniono, dlaczego konkretne zdania nowogreckie sygnifikują znaczenie dokonaności oraz dlaczego inne przykładowe zdania są aspektywnie dwuznaczne. Na koniec, podjęto się próby wyjaśnienia, dlaczego część zdań aspektywnie adwersatywnych jest niepoprawna.

Podsumowując niniejszą dysertację, zauważa się, że jest ona pierwszą pracą badawcza koncentrująca się na dokonaności w języku nowogreckim. Jak dotąd, nieznane są autorowi niniejszej dysertacji inne prace opisujące nowogrecką rzeczywistość aspektową w formie postulatów oraz ich konsekwencji, które następnie wykorzystane byłyby do wyjaśnienia zjawiska tego języka z wykorzystaniem dedukcyjnego modelu wyjaśniania. Ponadto zwraca się uwagę, że postulaty i konsekwencje zaproponowane w sekcjach 3.7 i 3.8 wnoszą wkład do klasy teorii dotyczących zdań adwersatywnych.

Kończąc, autor uważa, że udało się w niniejszej pracy częściowo osiągnąć wyznaczone cele, ponieważ zaproponowane postulaty i konsekwencje odpowiadają częściowo zarówno na pytanie jak sygnifikowana jest dokonaność w języku nowogreckim oraz dlaczego pewne jednostki językowe tegoż języka sygnifikują dokonaność. W celu udzielenia pełnej odpowiedzi na niniejsze pytania konieczne jest rozszerzenie materiału badawczego o pozostałe klasy czasowników nowogreckich (np. czasowniki ruchy, czasowniki inchoatywne, itd.), o czasy gramatyczne inne niż aoryst i perfectum (np. czas zaprzeszły, czasy przyszłe, itd.) i tryby (np. tryb rozkazujący, łączny, przypuszczający, itd.). Niezbędne jest również uwzględnienie innych rodzajów totyfikatorów (jak np. totyfikatory temporalne, przestrzenne, itd.).

W świetle powyższego, uzyskane wyniki badań mogą z jednej strony okazać się użyteczne dla prac z zakresu językoznawstwa komputerowego czy automatycznego tłumaczenia, zaś z drugiej strony mogą stanowić podstawę do badań porównawczych. Przykładowo, autor twierdzi, że istnieje zapotrzebowanie na badania porównawcze języka nowogreckiego i polskiego, a otrzymane w nich wyniki można będzie wykorzystać w ramach glottodydaktyki, translatologii, czy komunikacji interkulturowej.
Summary

The Notion of Completion in Modern Greek: An Analysis of Aspectively Adversative Sentences

The present dissertation provides an insight into the notion of completion and how it is lingually expressed in Modern Greek. Completion is understood as a complex meaning, which obligatorily combines two simpler (i.e. less complex) meanings. These are termination and holicity (the property of being whole). Consequently, the work refers (at least to some extent) to three systems: aspect, delimitativity (temporal boundedness), and totivity.

Theoretical works on aspectology (a field of linguistics devoted to aspect) relatively rarely deal with the category of aspect in Modern Greek. Even less attention is paid to the question of how completion is lingually expressed in this language. The author's last statement is based on his observation that completion is not precisely defined (or at least comprehensively explained) in aspectological literature on Modern Greek. Furthermore, most works known to the author either do not consider completion at all or describe it in a rather cursory manner.

It is commonly agreed that the meaning of completion is conveyed by the so-called perfective (or aoristic) verb forms (e.g. Hatzisavvidis 2010, Tsangalidis 2014, Roumpea 2017). Some linguists (e.g. Horrocks & Stavrou 2003a, Sioupi 2009), however, argue that perfective verb forms express completion only when the denoted event is telic. If the denoted event is atelic, then the perfective verb form (which denotes this event) conveys the meaning of termination rather than completion.

Nonetheless, the obtained results are in opposition to both statements above. This is because they suggest that perfective forms of a numerous group of Modern Greek verbs do not convey the meaning of completion sufficiently, regardless whether the denoted event is telic or atelic. It is necessary, though, to ‘strengthen’ the meaning of completion by using an appropriate modifier.

In view of the above, the objective of this dissertation is to provide an answer (at least partial) to the questions of how completion is lingually expressed in Modern Greek and why certain lingual units of the examined language convey or do not convey the meaning of completion.
This dissertation starts with a brief review of aspectological literature. The first chapter presents the development of aspectological thought from antiquity to Modern times and several general approaches to the concept of time and aspect selected by the author. The second chapter covers the concept of aspectological literature on the Modern Greek language.

It has been noted in Chapter 1 that the Aristotelian division of verbs into \textit{kinēsis} and \textit{enérgeia} based on the relations binding the forms of the present tense and their perfect counterparts was not developed until the second half of the 20th century (see Ryle 2009 [1949], Garey 1957, Vendler 1957 and Kenny 1963). On the other hand, Dionysius Thex’s category of \textit{eĩdos} ‘species’ (which probably referred to a word-formation phenomenon) has had a major impact on later European grammarians. It was translated to Old Church Slavonic language as \textit{vidъ} and, several centuries later, to other European languages as: Fr. \textit{aspect}, Eng. \textit{aspect}, Pol. \textit{aspekt}, MG (ap)opsi, etc. It is commonly agreed that the term \textit{vidъ} has been proposed as a translation of Greek \textit{eĩdos} by Meletij Smotričkyj in \textit{Hrammatiki Slavenskija Pravilnoe Syntagma} (1619). However, research conducted as part of this work indicates that the Old Church Slavonic term \textit{vidъ} had been used in the previous century with that meaning. More specifically, it has been used in one of the first Modern Greek grammars \textit{Gramatiki tis kinis ton Elinon Glosis} (1591) by Adelphotes. The term \textit{aspekt} acquired its contemporary meaning in the 20th century.

The further part of the chapter is an attempt to present various approaches to time, tense, and aspect. The author hopes that he has managed to draw the reader’s attention not only to the lack of a uniform terminological apparatus, but also to the relatively frequent lack of a clear distinction between lingual units (i.e. morphological units) and meanings. The latter may frequently lead to confusion or ambiguity of expressed thoughts. The author rejects the distinction between the grammatical category of aspect and aspectual meanings by way of capitalising the former (see Comrie 1976: 10). He argues that this is a purely graphic differentiation, which is not equally effective in a conversation or a lecture.

Chapter 2 provides a focus on time, tense, and aspect in Modern Greek. It distinguishes two main perceptions of tense. The first is called a traditional approach as it dates back to the ancient times. In line with this approach, tenses are classes of indicative verb forms that convey a specific temporal and aspectual meaning. At the same time, modal and diathetic meanings are not considered. Consequently, Tzartzanos (1963a; see also Katsouda 2008) distinguishes eight tenses in Modern Greek (cf. Hedin 1995). As regards the second approach, it is assumed that the category of tense results from the grammaticalization of temporal meanings in a language. Thus, linguists distinguish only two (e.g. Alexiadou 1994, Xydopoulos 1996, Hewson &
Bubenik 1997, Kitis & Tsangalidis 2005, Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006) or three (e.g. Rivero 1992, Kleris & Mpampiniotis 2005, Moser 2009) tenses in Modern Greek. In the former case, these are past and non-past tenses, whereas in the latter case these are: past, present, and future or non-past tenses. If the category of tense is understood that way, it forms jointly with the category of aspect, mood, and voice the system called TAMV (Paprotté 1988: 447; cf. TAM in Dahl 1985: 1, Givón 1984: 285).

The further part of the second chapter focuses on the classification of Modern Greek lingual units (such as verb form, phrases, sentences, etc.) and the interactions between the classes distinguished. For instance, verb forms are classified based on their aspectual meanings into Imperfective, Perfective, and sometimes also Perfect verb forms. Similarly, lingual units may be divided based on the properties of the denoted event into states, actions, accomplishments, and achievements. In view of this, Chapter 2 provides a strong focus on telicity tests proposed for Modern Greek (Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006, Moser 2009, Trąba 2017).

Next, several selected approaches to imperfective and perfective aspect are presented. It is assumed in one of them (see Newton 1979, Mackridge 1985) that perfective verb forms are less marked than their imperfective counterparts. This means that imperfective verb forms are used to express continuousness (durativity), iterativity, or habituality. If there are no grounds for using the imperfective verb form, the perfective verb form is used. According to a different approach, perfective verb forms always convey the meaning of termination, whereas imperfective verb forms are ambiguous in that respect – the denoted event may be terminated or non-terminated (Xydopoulos & Tsangalidis 2006). Yet, some linguists (e.g. Tsimpli & Papadopoulou 2009: 189) try to explain the difference between the imperfective and perfective aspect with the help of three parameters: [+/–bounded], [+/–iterative], and [+/–habitual].

Finally, several examples of perfective and imperfective verb forms use in Modern Greek that cannot be explained using the aforementioned approaches have been presented at the end of Chapter 2. The chapter is closed with a short description of relations binding adverbs with imperfective and perfective verb forms.

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to introduce, explain, and exemplify the methodological apparatus necessary to conduct the research. The apparatus includes primitive notions, definitions, and a set of postulates (assumptions; statements taken to be true) and corollaries that are deduced from them.

Two relations are introduced at the beginning of the third chapter: designation and signification. The former binds lingual units (such as words and sentences) with objects (i.e. fragments of extra-lingual reality or events) to which these lingual units refer. For instance, the
The Notion of Completion in Modern Greek: An Analysis of Aspectively Adversative Sentences

word *table* designates the class of objects, each of which is a table. On the other hand, signification binds lingual units with the meanings that they convey. Hence, the word *yesterday* signifies the meaning of pastness.

Four types of signification have been distinguished. They have been named as follows:

- lexification,
- semification,
- autosignification, and
- cosignification.

If a lingual unit *x* lexifies a meaning *σ*, then *σ* is signified by the lexical morpheme of this lingual unit. In other words, this is the inherent meaning of *x*. For instance, the meaning of pastness is lexified by expressions such as *yesterday*, *one year ago*, *formerly*, etc. On the other hand, if a lingual unit *x* semifies a meaning *σ*, then this meaning is not signified by the lexical morpheme of this unit but by an affix, a preposition, an auxiliary verb, etc. For instance, in English the meaning of pastness is semified by expressions such as *I walked*, *we worked*, *she has eaten*, *they were reading*, etc.

To continue, if a lingual unit *x* autosignifies a meaning *σ*, then *x* is a sufficient significator of that meaning. For instance, in English the morpheme -(e)s [-sl-/-lz-] autosignifies the meaning of plurality in expressions such as *tables*, *books*, *computers*, *boxes*, etc. On the other hand, if a lingual unit *x* cosignifies a meaning *σ*, then *x* does not signify *σ* sufficiently. On the contrary, *σ* is jointly signified by two or more cosignificators. For instance, in English the third person singular is cosignified in the Present Simple tense jointly by a personal pronouns *he*, *she*, or *it* and the suffix -(e)s [-sl-/-lz-], as in the expressions *he likes*, *she walks*, *it sounds*, etc.

Among the most fundamental notions of this dissertation are completion, aspectively adversative sentence, and correct syntagma. Starting with the first one, completion has been defined using two primitive notions: termination and holicity (i.e. the property of being whole). According to the definition of completion (see Df 3.5.1.1), a lingual unit signifies completion provided that it signifies termination and holicity simultaneously. Consequently, completion is signified by expressions such as *I read a book completely*, *I have drunk an entire bottle of water*, etc. On the other hand, incompletion is understood as ‘partial completion’. It means that an action has been completed solely to some degree (but not entirely/fully/completely). In this sense, incompletion is signified, for instance, by phrase *he pushed the door to* (he closed the door to some degree, but not completely – it was still open). Moreover, lingual units may be aspectively ambiguous, which means that they do not specify to what extent an action has been
completed (whether it has been only partly or entirely completed). Among the examples of aspectively ambiguous phrases is, for instance, he opened the door, which signifies that the door was opened at least slightly (and it is not closed any more). The phrase does not indicate clearly whether someone has opened the door wide or just slightly. Kostas’s intention (that is whether he wanted to close the door or just to push it to) is irrelevant here.

As regards aspectively adversative sentences, they are a special type of adversative sentences, which (see Df 3.7.2.1 and Df 3.7.3.1):

- are composed of exactly two constituent clauses, of which one is affirmative and the other is negative,
- the constituent clauses are linked by an adversative conjunction (in this dissertation only the Modern Greek conjunction ala, ‘but’ has been taken into consideration),
- the constituent clauses are identical from the perspective of their temporal, modal, and diathetic meaning,
- the clauses are either homolexical or sufficiently homolexical (i.e. they are either identical, or sufficiently identical given the meanings lexified). Two clauses are deemed sufficiently homolexical if they differ solely in respect to their totive meanings (that is, holicity, partitivity, etc.).

Thus, aspectively adversative sentences are, for instance:

(1)  a. Johnny was reading a book, but he didn’t read it completely.
    b. Children were eating breakfast, but they haven’t eaten everything.
    c. Someone opened the door (slightly), but they haven’t opened it wide.

Moreover, Chapter 3 outlines the differences between negative and negated clauses. The following clause is negative: Johnny didn’t go to school today [e.g. because he is ill]. Each negative clause is comprised of a negation and an argument of that negation, that is a negated clause. Hence, the aforementioned negative clause may be conceived of as ~(Johnny went to school today) [that reads: it is not true that Johnny went to school today]. The symbol ‘~’ symbolises negation, whereas (Johnny went to school today) represents a negated clause, which is an argument of the negation.

Moving onto the correctness of a syntagma, it is defined by using two primitive terms: grammaticality and sensicality. A syntagma of a certain language is deemed grammatical if it does not violate any morphological or syntactic rules of this language. Stylistic rules have not been considered in this dissertation. A syntagma, on the other hand, is sensical if the meanings
conveyed by its constituents are not mutually exclusive. With that in mind, a **correct syntagma** is defined as simultaneously grammatical and sensical (see Df 3.8.1). **Mutatis mutandis**, according to the definition of an **incorrect syntagma** (see Df 3.8.2), each incorrect syntagma is either ungrammatical or non-sensical.

Having the concepts most fundamental to the purposes of the dissertation explained, some postulates (i.e. assumptions) concerning the grammaticality, sensicality and, consequently, correctness of (aspectively) adversative sentences have been proposed. These postulates and the corollaries that are inferred from them are necessary for analysing the research material, which is the corpus of Modern Greek aspectively adversative sentences.

One of the most important corollaries in Chapter 3 is Co 3.8.1.1. According to it, each adversative sentence is grammatical if its constituent clauses are correct. Based on that corollary, it is possible to formulate a directive, thanks to which each formed adversative sentence is grammatical. More specifically, if two correct simple sentences are linked by the adversative conjunction *ala* ‘but’, then the obtained adversative sentence is grammatical. As follows, if such a sentence is incorrect, this is because the sentence is nonsensical (the meanings conveyed by its constituents are mutually exclusive).

Other corollaries to be mentioned are Co 3.8.1.4 and Co 3.8.1.6. Starting with the first of these, each correct (aspectively) adversative sentence is composed of such affirmative clause and negated clause that the former does not imply the latter. For instance, the (aspectively) adversative sentence:

\[
(2) \quad O \ Kostas \ \partialjavaze \ \enda \ vivlio, \ \ala \ \den \ \partialjavase \ eksolokliru.
\]

‘Kostas was reading a book, but he didn’t read it completely.’

is correct. Therefore, in the light of Co 3.8.1.4, the affirmative clause *o Kostas *\partialjavaze \ *\enda \ *vivlio* ‘Kostas was reading a book’ does not imply the negated clause *to *\partialjavase \ *eksolokliru* ‘he read it completely’. In other words, the affirmative clause does not imply the negated clause - a person who was reading a book did not necessarily read the book completely.

On the other hand, in the light of Co 3.8.1.6, each (aspectively) adversative sentence is incorrect if its affirmative clause implies its negated clause. For instance, the adversative sentence:

\[
(3) \quad *O \ Kostas *\epine \ *nero, \ \ala \ \den \ \to *ipje.
\]

*‘Kostas was drinking water, but he didn’t drink it.’

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Summary

is incorrect, because the affirmative clause \textit{o Kostas epine nero} ‘Kostas was drinking water’ implies the negated clause \textit{to ipje} ‘he drank it’. This means: if Kostas was drinking water, then he must have drunk no less that a little.

In this part of the summary, corollaries Co 3.8.2.1 and Co 3.8.2.2 should be mentioned. According to them, every correct Modern Greek aspectively adversative sentence is composed of:

- an affirmative clause, which either signifies incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous, and
- a negated clause, which signifies completion.

This means that if a Modern Greek aspectively adversative sentence is correct, then its affirmative constituent clause is either aspectively ambiguous or conveys the meaning of incompletion. At the same time, its negated clause conveys the meaning of completion.

The aforementioned statements can be illustrated with the following aspectively adversative sentence:

(4) \textit{O Kostas egrafe ena grama, ala \textit{\ddot{e}}en to egrapse olo.}

‘Kostas was writing a letter, but he didn’t write it all.’

As can be seen, the sentence above is correct. Thus, it is inferred based on corollary Co 3.8.2.1 that the affirmative clause \textit{o Kostas egrafe ena grema} ‘Kostas was writing a letter’ either conveys the meaning of incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous. Moreover, it follows from corollary Co 3.8.2.2 that the negated clause \textit{to egrapse olo}, ‘he wrote it all’, conveys the meaning of completion.

At the end of Chapter 3, corollaries Co 3.8.2.5 and Co 3.8.2.6 are proposed. Both refer to incorrect aspectively adversative sentences, the constituent clauses of which are correct. In the light of Co 3.8.2.5, if their affirmative clause conveys the meaning of incompletion or is aspectively ambiguous, then the negated clause does not convey the meaning of completion.

For the sake of the explanation, let us consider the following adversative sentence:

(5) \textit{*O Kostas \ddot{e}javaze ena vivlio, ala \textit{\ddot{e}}en to \ddot{e}javase.}

*‘Kostas was reading a book, but he didn’t read it.’

Noticeably, although the constituent clauses of the sentence (5) are correct, the sentence is incorrect. Moreover, the constituent affirmative clause \textit{o Kostas \ddot{e}javaze ena vivlio} ‘Kostas was
reading a book’ is aspectively ambiguous. Consequently, it follows from Co 3.8.2.5 that the negated clause to ējave ‘he read it’ does not convey the meaning of completion.

*Mutatis mutandis*, according to Co 3.8.2.6, if a negated clause conveys the meaning of completion, the affirmative clause may neither signify incompletion nor be aspectively ambiguous. For instance, the following aspectively adversative sentence:

(6) *O Kostas evriske to vivlio, ala ðen to vrike.*

*‘Kostas was [just] finding the book, but he didn’t find it.’*

is incorrect, although its clauses are correct. At the same time, the negated clause to vrike, ‘he found it’, conveys the meaning of completion. Consequently, it is inferred based on Co 3.8.2.6 that the affirmative clause o Kostas evriske to vivlio ‘Kostas was [just] finding the book’ is neither aspectively ambiguous, nor does it signify incompletion.

**Chapter 4** describes the course of the research. Consequently, not only are the purposes of this dissertation verbalised there, but it is also described how the corpus of Modern Greek aspectively adversative sentences was constructed. Furthermore, the author attempts to indicate the validity of the restrictions put on the studied material. The chapter also presents how the sentences belonging to the corpus were analysed, how conclusions were drawn, and how the postulates were formulated. Firstly, the sentences belonging to the corpus were divided into eight classes based on four heterogeneous dimensions (see p. 135). Next, they were analysed in two stages. The first stage consists in comparing aspectively adversative sentences, the verbal predicates of which are forms of the same verb. This allows ascertaining whether and when the given verb may be used in a correct aspectively adversative sentence. At the second stage, sentences belonging to the same class of aspectively adversative sentences are compared. This allows verifying the conclusions drawn at the previous stage and formulating postulates (assumptions) related to the fragment of the Modern Greek aspective reality.

**Chapter 5** presents the results of the conducted research. In this chapter, a set of postulates and corollaries regarding the Modern Greek aspective reality is explained and exemplified. The postulates and corollaries are presented thematically, starting from the signification of termination by aoristic and perfect lingual units, and ending with the signification of completion. Consequently, the author attempts to answer the question of **how completion is lingually expressed in Modern Greek**. At the end of the chapter, some attention is devoted to the class of momentous verbs, which turned out to be among the most intellectually demanding, due to the meaning of completion lexified by them.
Summary

For the purpose of the dissertation, three groups of Modern Greek verbs have been distinguished. These are:

- autosignificators of completion,
- cosignificators of completion, and
- lexificators of completion.

As the name suggests, the first group is composed of verb forms which autosignify completion. By virtue of the definition of autosignificators of completion (see Df 5.3.1.1), Modern Greek verb forms belonging to this group semify termination and, simultaneously, lexify holicity (i.e. the property of being whole). Example verb forms autosignifying completion are: teliose ‘(s)he finished’, ehi pethani ‘(s)he has died’, etc.

Regarding the group of cosignificators of completion, it is comprised of Modern Greek verb forms which semify termination and, at the same time, are totively ambiguous. Consequently, the elements of this group do not signify completion sufficiently. On the contrary, they signify this aspective meaning only if combined with a lexificator of holicity. This group includes verb forms such as δjavase ‘(s)he read’, eho grapsi ‘I have written’, etc.

The last group is composed of Modern Greek verb forms which lexify termination and holicity simultaneously. This group includes forms of momentous verbs (which lexify minimal duration of an event) such as vrika, ‘I found’.

Moreover, this work adopts the Kuryłowicz’s concept, according to which the verbal predicate is a constitutive member of a sentence (Kuryłowicz 1987: 93–102). This means that the meanings conveyed by the verbal predicate are extended to the predicate phrase and then to the entire sentence. Consequently, it is claimed that if verb form \( x \) autosignifies completion, then a simple sentence, of which \( x \) is a verbal predicate, also conveys the meaning of completion (see Co 5.3.4.1). For instance, the verb form teliose, ‘(s)he finished’ is the verbal predicate of the sentence:

\[(7) \quad O \ Kostas \ teliose \ ena \ vivlio. \ ‘Kostas \ finished \ a \ book.’\]

As it has already been mentioned, this verb form belongs to the group of autosignificators of completion. Hence, it is inferred from Co 5.3.4.1 that the aforementioned sentence signifies the meaning of completion.

On the other hand, if a totively ambiguous verb form semifies termination and, at the same time, is the verbal predicate of a simple sentence, then the sentence conveys the meaning of completion provided that its verbal predicate is totively disambiguated by a lexificator of
holicity (see Co 5.3.4.2). If, however, the verbal predicate is not disambiguated by any member of the sentence, then the sentence is aspectively ambiguous (see Co 5.3.4.3).

The aforementioned statements may be illustrated using the following examples:

(8)a.  \( \text{O Kostas } \hat{\text{djavase } } \text{ena vivlio eksolokliru}. \)

   ‘Kostas read a book completely’.

b.  \( \text{O Kostas } \hat{\text{djavase } } \text{ena vivlio}. \)

   ‘Kostas read a book’.

It is worth noting that the verb form \( \hat{\text{djavase}} \) ‘(s)he read’ is the verbal predicate of both above sentences. As it has been mentioned on the previous page, this verb form is an insufficient significator of completion as it is totively ambiguous. Nevertheless, in case of the former sentence, the verbal predicate is totively disambiguated by the lexificator of holicity, \( \text{eksolokliru} \), ‘completely’. Hence, in the light of corollary Co 5.3.4.2, the sentence in (8a.) conveys the meaning of completion. On the other hand, the verbal predicate of the latter sentence is not totively disambiguated by any other member of the sentence. Consequently, it follows from corollary Co 5.3.4.3 that the sentence in (8b.) is aspectively ambiguous in the sense that it does not specify whether Kostas read a book completely or not. It solely expresses that Kostas read no less than a fragment of a book.

It is noteworthy that lexification of termination by a verbal predicate of a simple sentence is not sufficient to ensure that the sentence conveys the meaning of termination (and, consequently, completion). On the contrary, there are sentences that denote non-terminated events even though their verbal predicates lexify termination. To explain that phenomenon, it is assumed that the meaning of termination lexified by a verb form does not refer to the properties of the entire event but to the properties of its subevents. For instance, verb form \( \text{htipuse} \) ‘he was knocking’ denotes an event which includes a sequence of (individual) taps. Although each of the taps is terminated, the entire event may be non-terminated (e.g. in the sentence: \( \text{otan jirisame spiti, o Kostas } \text{htipuse } \text{in porta akomi} \) ‘when we came back home, Kostas was still knocking on the door’). Similarly, if a verbal predicate lexifies completion, then the denoted event is comprised of a sequence of completed subevents. This does not mean, however, that the entire event is completed. For instance, the sentence \( \text{he kept sneezing} \) denotes an event, which is a sequence of sneezes. Each individual sneeze is completed. Despite that,

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1This dissertation does not take into consideration the disambiguation of a sentence by the context.
the aforementioned sentence is not aspectively unambiguous, because it does not specify whether the person cleared his nose completely by sneezing.

The last chapter attempts to answer the question of why certain Modern Greek lingual units signify or do not signify completion. Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) deductive model of explanation is used for that purpose. Answers have been provided gradually, using the postulates and their corollaries explained and exemplified in Chapters 3 and 5. At the beginning, an explanation was provided as to why certain (example) Modern Greek verb forms signify the meaning of termination and completion. After that, it was explained why specific Modern Greek sentences signify the meaning of completion and why other example sentences are aspectively ambiguous. The last part of the chapter is an attempt to explain why some aspectively adversative sentences are incorrect.

To conclude this dissertation, it constitutes the first research focusing on the concept of completion in Modern Greek. The author of this dissertation does not know any other work which describes the Modern Greek aspective reality in the form of postulates and their corollaries, and which explains aspective phenomena of this language by employing the deductive model of explanation. Furthermore, please note that the proposed postulates and corollaries inferred from them in sections 3.7 and 3.8 constitute a contribution to the class of theories of adversative sentences.

In conclusion, the author believes that this work has partially attained the set objectives as the proposed postulates and the corollaries inferred from them partly answer both questions: how completion is lingually expressed in Modern Greek and why certain lingual units of the language in question signify completion. To provide a full answer to these questions, it is necessary to broaden the scope of the studied material by the remaining classes of Modern Greek verbs (e.g. verbs of motion, inchoative verbs, etc.), tenses other than aorist and perfect (e.g. pluperfect, future tenses, etc.), and moods (e.g. imperative, conjunctive, conditional, etc.). It is also necessary to include other types of totificators (e.g. temporal or spatial totificators, etc.)

In view of the foregoing, the results obtained may, on the one hand, be helpful for works conducted within the framework of computational linguistics or automatic translation and, on the other hand, may constitute a base for comparative research. For instance, the author claims that there is a strong demand for comparative research of Modern Greek and Polish. The results obtained would be applicable to glottodidactics, translation studies, and intercultural communication.