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The welfare state and the future of European integration according to Tony Judt¹

Abstract: The article aims at describing selected aspects of the views expressed by British historian and prominent intellectual, Tony Judt, concerning European welfare states in the context of political and economic integration in the EU. Judt's scholarly writings include, among others, books about the history of the French left and the role and responsibility of intellectuals. The article explores Judt's views on the European social model and postwar welfare state, as well as globalization and the unique project of supranational political and economic integration. These issues were crucial to Tony Judt's vision of Europe. The text indicates that Tony Judt was a huge proponent of the European social model and the institutions of postwar welfare states. It is also argued that his views on the European integration fundamentally changed. In the 1990s he was highly doubtful about the future direction of the EU. After some time, however, he became certain that the EU would play a vital role in the international politics in the 21st century because of the cross-border template upon which contemporary Europe is being constructed.

Key words: Tony Judt, Europe, European Union, welfare state, European social model, political integration

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to present selected themes of Tony Judt's considerations on the European model of the welfare state in the context of globalization processes, including supranational political integration inside the European Union. Tony Judt was an outstanding historian². Born

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² Although some disagree (Riley, 2011).

in 1948 in London, he studied at King's College in Cambridge and École Normale Supérieure in Paris. He was a university lecturer, among others, in the United Kingdom and the United States, where he moved in the mid-1990s. He authored scholarly studies dealing with, among other things, the history of the French left, the public role and responsibility of intellectuals, and a monumental work on the history of Europe, entitled *Postwar* (Judt, 2013). He was a contributor to *The New Republic*, *The New York Review of Books* and *The Nation*, among others, where he wrote about a wide selection of topics ranging from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, through US foreign policy and the importance of the nation-state, to the future of social democracy and the model of welfare state.

Tony Judt's primary interest involved the postwar history of Europe. This was the subject of his most extensive and renowned book, published in 2005, *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945* – the result of over a dozen years of study, travel and contemplation. Europe was interesting for him, not only with reference to the 20th century and the most important events in this period. Judt examined Europe also from a Social Democrat's point of view. He defended the active role of the state in citizens' lives and professed Enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality. He believed that the characteristically European social model and the lifestyle it produced were both highly valuable and appealing, and very different from the values his other motherland, the United States, valued. Initially somewhat skeptical, but increasingly hopeful as time went by, he closely watched the emergence of a united Europe and successive steps taken along the path to the close political integration of the continent.

The subject of this paper is Tony Judt's reflections on the postwar model of the welfare state in the context of the future of European unification.

European welfare state

Tony Judt was a great advocate of the European social model. In his opinion, it stemmed directly from the postwar welfare state, which responded to the tragedy of recurrent economic crises and global wars in the first half of the 20th century by making the task of designing and forming institutions that would mitigate economic uncertainty its paramount goal (Judt, 2013; Castles et al., 2012; Garfinkel et al. 2010; Pierson, 2001). The experience of the unsettled free market dominating the political community

at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, which eventually resulted in the Great Depression of the 1930s, evidenced the fact that capitalism, by its very nature, generates too much economic uncertainty (Polanyi, 2011; Lindblom, 1977). Judt referred to the example of the European social model to describe the holistic concept of the individual and the value of human life characteristic of the Old Continent. This concept can be seen in a number of institutional solutions which make up the ‘semantic core’ of the welfare state concept, such as the network of social care, pension system and healthcare. Public services are the main tools for implementing a welfare state program.

A definite majority of the national models of welfare state in Europe developed their modern shape and were consolidated in the time of the post-war consensus and the Golden Age of Capitalism in 1945–1973 (Chang, 2015). Despite this temporal coincidence, socio-economic models developed in Europe differ from one another profoundly (Palier, 2010). Different models emerged in different economic conditions, their social legitimacy stems from different sources and they enjoy different comparative advantages (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Judt emphasized that welfare states in Europe do not share a defined set of benefits and economic practice, or a specific level of state commitment (Judt, 2013). Their common denominator is rather a broad international and all-class consent that it is the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens from risk, misfortune and the markets; they also share a sense of the equilibrium of social rights, civil solidarity and shared responsibility as appropriate and conceivable in a modern state.

In his book *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945*, Judt presented the historical roots of many of the essential solutions of the European social model which have been institutionalized at the level of common EU policies. This may be exemplified, among many others, by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which encompasses a comprehensive system to guard the EU’s internal agricultural market by means of a strict protectionist policy (Jones et al., 2012). The CAP consumes enormous financial resources from the EU budget (ranging from over 70% of the total EU budget in the 1980s to ca. 40% at present) and distorts the mechanism of free market competition, arousing strong criticism for years (Daugbjerg, Swinbang, 2016).

Tony Judt (2013) noted that it was no coincidence that the Common Agricultural Policy was historically the first common socio-economic policy of the European Community. He emphasized the sources of this

mechanism in his works where he pointed to the fact that in the 1930s the living conditions of European peasants had been consistently deteriorating for nearly three generations. They were forced to barely survive five decades of continuously falling prices for agricultural products. Prices for their produce had been dropping since the 1870s. Initially, it was an outcome of cheap grain and, then, of meat imported from both the Americas and British colonies. After WWII, the prevailing view was that fascism exceptionally appealed to these distraught farmers. There were also considerable concerns that fascist sentiments could possibly be revived in rural areas. This laid the ground for the policy of institutional support for agriculture. Judt used this example to illustrate that certain solutions that seem incomprehensible today have complicated historical reasons and profound political justification.

Judt's studies picture a postwar Europe where economic growth was not a goal in itself, but rather a measure to achieve more important objectives. Increases in productivity and efficiency, economic competitiveness, technical innovations, scientific and technological progress, and even the free market itself and the capitalist system were the means by which other socially desired goals could be achieved. These goals encompassed social well-being, social and economic security, harmonious social co-existence and interpersonal communication, the ability to shape oneself as an individual and the right to define and pursue one's individual path in life and, ultimately, also personal happiness and satisfaction with one's own life.

This approach is reminiscent of that of Stanisław Brzozowski, a Polish philosopher and intellectual from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. He repeatedly stressed that the processes triggered by man, the forces he unleashed and mechanisms he established should always work for his benefit. People must not be allowed to become passive objects subjected to forces they had set in motion in order to pursue a better life. "Man is not a moment in the history of things, but things are a moment in man's history" Brzozowski wrote in his *Legenda Młodej Polski* [The legend of Young Poland] (2001). By this token, he reminded readers how dangerous it is to set people free from responsibility for the social order surrounding them and to entrust human fate in the future, as if the future were determined in advance and independent of human activity. Judt emphasized that, after WWII, Europeans did not want to put their fate in the hands of objective historical processes or an impersonal force majeure. In the second half of the 20th century, the future was seen as an awaited gift, and opposing ideologies competed over its desired form (Snyder, 2015). In

the spirit of the age, Europeans approached the future as both a promise and a task. They believed that the future might be an improvement on the present, but that it needed to be forged through hard and consistent work.

The necessity to rethink the postwar model of the welfare state and profoundly analyze the historical circumstances it stems from has recently been stressed. Numerous authors primarily emphasize the historically unprecedented culmination of the exceptionally favorable factors that facilitated the development of the welfare state and led to the incredible socio-economic prosperity of the Golden Age of Capitalism (Piketty, 2013; Galbraith, 2014; Marody, 2014). The postwar period marked a time of unprecedented egalitarianization in Western societies, which was an outcome of a unique combination of wars, crises, hyperinflation and highly progressive tax rates (Wade, 2014). The postwar baby boom provided a growing supply of highly qualified workers who filled attractive jobs ensured by economies recovering from wartime damage (Goldin, Katz, 2008). The workforce resulting from the pre-war crisis and postwar demobilization was virtually depleted, and farmers, migrants and female workers entered the labor market (Hobsbawm, 1996). Before and during the war, the army and armaments industry demanded the development of numerous capital-intensive technologies, including jet engines, synthetic rubber, microwave or the Internet, which found numerous commercial applications in the years of peace (Bush, 1945; Atkinson, Ezell, 2012; Erixon, Weigel, 2016).

The idea of the welfare state could be translated into practical political activity because postwar economic growth rates reached a historic high (Schmelzer, 2016). Welfare states were operationalized through extensive pension systems, public higher education institutions, generous social benefits and unemployment insurance, which was all possible on account of stable economic growth of several percent annually. In the years 1950–1973, income *per capita* grew by 4.1% a year in Western Europe, whereas it was 2.5% in the US (Chang, 2015). Another important factor was related to the young age of Western societies, which shaped a specific hierarchy of priorities in public spending and did not burden state budgets with excessive pension expenses (Taylor, 2014; Orenstein, 2008).

At present, reality is shaped by radically different, often directly opposite processes than those witnessed during the golden age of the welfare state. Asking whether it is feasible to sustain solutions developed under completely different circumstances is therefore understandable. One of

the most renowned researchers into European socio-economic models, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (2001) rightfully observed that presently welfare states are increasingly burdened with tasks they were not originally designed to perform. In the latest literature on the topic of international comparative welfare research it is commonly agreed that, at present, European states are renegotiating the postwar social agreement and seeking a new shape for their welfare states (Kwiek, 2015). Essential changes are going to occur in the triangle which forms the core of this model, namely higher education – pension systems – healthcare systems (Sześciło, 2015). Changes are most likely to go in the direction of increased public outlays on pension systems, thereby reflecting the changed priorities for public spending due to population aging, whereas the resources allocated to higher education systems will dwindle. It is certain today that welfare states in developed Western societies are undergoing a thorough transformation whose long-term consequences are still unknown.

Tony Judt was aware of the above-described new historical circumstances which are forcing far-reaching transformations in welfare states. As a politically committed intellectual, he was far from defending the *status quo* and the currently determined level of public spending allocated to different parts of public sector at all costs. What he wanted to protect was the idea of state-government partnership, which produced a *mixed economy* and turned out to be one of the greatest social achievements in history. Tony Judt would probably agree with the American scholars who noted that whereas public discourse sets ‘free entrepreneurship’ against ‘extended government,’ and presents them as playing a zero-sum game (where one party can gain only when the other one loses), the modern partnership between private and public sectors may constitute one of the most impressive examples of a win-win situation, where both parties gain (Hacker, Pierson, 2016). Additionally, such modern challenges as secular stagnation (Mączyńska, 2015; Summers, 2014) and low economic growth (Gordon, 2016), growing economic disparities (Atkinson, 2015; Piketty, 2013; Stiglitz, 2013), shrinking numbers of breakthrough innovations (Mazzucato, 2013; Phelps, 2013) and climate change (Klein, 2015; Welzer, 2012) all call for active governments. Tony Judt tried to convince his readers that, in the face of new challenges, the welfare state should not be abandoned but thoroughly reconsidered, so as to come up with a desirable form of constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation between the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of government.

Postwar compromise

Tony Judt repeatedly returned in his writings to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. He paid particular attention to the individuals who made this community happen. He emphasized that it is extremely rare in history for the individual personalities and biographies of the participants in events to have such profound importance as in the case of the establishment of the ECSC in 1951. This British historian reminded his readers that each of the six foreign affairs ministers who signed the Paris Treaty was a member of a Christian-Democratic party.³ Each of the six ministers who signed this treaty had been formed by specific personal experiences which translated into the very similar sensitivities and outlooks they all shared. That is what he wrote about them: “The three dominant statesmen in the main member states – Alcide De Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman – were all from the margins of their countries: De Gasperi from the Trentino, in north-east Italy; Adenauer from the Rhineland; Schuman from Lorraine. When De Gasperi was born – and well into his adult life – the Trentino was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and he studied in Vienna. Schuman grew up in a Lorraine that had been incorporated into the German Empire. As a young man, like Adenauer, he joined Catholic associations – indeed the same ones that the Rhinelanders had belonged to ten years earlier. When they met, the three men conversed in German, their common language. For all three, as for their Christian Democrat colleagues from bi-lingual Luxembourg, bi-lingual and bi-cultural Belgium, and the Netherlands, a project for European cooperation made cultural as well as economic sense: they could reasonably see it as a contribution to overcoming the crisis of civilization that had shattered the cosmopolitan Europe of their youth” (Judt, 2005, pp. 157–158).

Tony Judt saw a united Europe as the achievement of the generation of children of WWII,⁴ who had utterly unique individual experiences. The

³ The post-war period marked a time of unprecedented electoral successes of Christian Democrats. Their parties founded their political position on the votes of two exceptionally important electorate groups: Catholics and women. Their ideology stressed the importance of stability and moderation, which corresponded well with social sentiments after the years of wartime turmoil.

⁴ This is reminiscent of a personal confession made by Tony Judt, who was much younger than Europe’s founding fathers, that the world of his youth was bequeathed to his generation by Hitler (Judt, 2013).

geographic peripheries the three founding fathers of a united Europe came from resulted in their having been mentally formed by a specific borderland experience where many cultures, languages and religions permeate and influence one another. This perspective provided a highly convenient starting point for establishing the first bonds of institutional cooperation across national borders.

From doubts to Euro-enthusiasm

Apart from looking at Europe as a historian who examined the postwar transformation of the continent, Judt was also a politically committed intellectual whose initial skepticism towards the European Union project was gradually replaced by his deep conviction that a united Europe was of enormous value, and probably the best response to the challenges posed by the new century. The foremost expression of Judt's doubts concerning the future of the EU is a short study titled *A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe* (Judt, 2011). He penned it during his stay at the Vienna Institute for Human Sciences (German: *Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen*) where he was invited by its director, Polish philosopher Krzysztof Michalski. The essay was published in 1996, just after the 'European twelve' expanded into the 'European fifteen' having incorporated Austria, Sweden and Finland. In the introduction Judt declared that he was far from being an enemy of a united Europe: "no informed person could seriously wish to return to the embattled, mutually antagonistic circle of suspicious and introverted nations that was the European continent in the quite recent past" (Judt, 2011, p. viii). Yet he stated firmly that, however commendable the purpose is, it does not mean that it is conceivable: "a truly united Europe is sufficiently unlikely for it to be unwise and self-defeating to insist upon it" (ibid.).

In his essay, Judt appealed not to encourage such poorer peripheral countries as Poland and Slovenia to hope that they would become members of the exclusive European club in the foreseeable future. In his opinion, despite Euro-enthusiasts talking about free movement of peoples, the abolition of borders and the mixing of nations, "since 1989 [Europe] has been steadily if somewhat furtively engaged in closing in upon itself" (Judt, 2011, p. 122). He stressed that "the unique combination of circumstances that prevailed in the Community's early years has passed and will not come again" and the possibility "that this same Union will open it-

self to new and poorer members on anything like the terms hitherto accorded” seemed next to impossible. Judt clearly stated that it was absurd to envisage Poland or Slovakia ever qualifying for the exclusive circle of European countries moving at full speed toward integration. This was evidenced, among other things, by sober economic calculation: “offensive as it sounds, for the foreseeable future it would be an act of charity, economically speaking, for the EU to absorb the countries to the east on such terms” (Judt, 2011, p. 130).

Judt’s calls for keeping promises reasonable and maintaining moderation when raising the hopes of poorer states outside the EU were complemented by his plea for the relegitimation of nation-states. The historian was convinced that “it is not, after all, as though the ‘nation-state’ were an ancient form that has had its day” (ibid., p. 121). He believed that it was actually the reverse, and that the state was “the most modern of political institutions.” Judt wrote that the “nation-state is peculiarly well adapted to the modern need for civic responsibility and active and effective political participation.” In his opinion, the nation-state was a happy medium between smaller organisms, which stand a permanent risk of being swallowed up by their bigger, more aggressive and expansive neighbors on the one hand, and overgrown supranational entities suffering from a chronic democracy deficit on the other. One “should recognize the reality of nations and states, and note the risk that, when neglected, they become an electoral resource of virulent nationalists” (ibid., pp. 129–130).

Tony Judt presented a looming vision of inevitable German domination: “From now on, Europe will be German-dominated in one of three possible ways: the original (pre-1989) western Europe, but under German leadership – which would be the reluctant preference of most French and Mediterranean-European politicians; pro-German central Europe, with Germany playing the benign role in an expanded Union envisaged for it by its present leadership; anti-German central Europe with Germany regarded by its neighbors to the south and east as more of a burden and a threat than a benefit” (ibid., p. 134). The major political message of *A Grand Illusion* is enclosed in these three dimensions: the appeal not to raise the hopes of poorer EU non-members to rapidly join the EU, the plea to reestablish nation-states, and the possible scenarios of German domination on the continent. The book is concluded with the statement that “Europe is more than a geographical notion but less than an answer” (ibid., p. 141).

Read today, *An Essay on Europe* presents a surprising mix of inaccurate forecasts and accurate intuitions. Judt was genuinely wrong with

respect to the first theme of his book, namely the eastern enlargement of the EU. The vision of Western Europe closing in and walling itself off turned out to be erroneous. In fact, many EU citizens migrated, seeking jobs, studying abroad or merely enjoying the lack of border controls when going on holiday. Successive countries opened their labor markets to citizens from other European countries. The fundamental forecast Judt made when talking about poorer eastern European countries, for which joining the European club was allegedly unattainable, was wrong. Not only did the Union expand eastwards, but it did so sooner than expected. 2004 marked the historic, largest-ever enlargement, by as many as ten states. Contrary to Judt's concerns, the hopes of poorer eastern countries seeking to join the EU soon, were not aroused in vain, and their EU membership was soon a fact.

Another theme of Judt's book, where he addresses the issue of the state being the most modern political institution, calls for interpretation. Tony Judt pleaded for the reestablishment of nation-states, which seems somewhat surprising as they have never been refused recognition in the EU. This opinion should not be viewed as an expression of his Euroskeptical concerns that the national sovereignty might be lost, or as his refusal to accept that a part of state competences and powers be transferred to a supra-national level. It is rather the concern of a Social Democrat who believes that the solutions typical of welfare states cannot be reproduced at a European level. Therefore, the state has to retain prerogatives whereby it can ensure the economic security and social welfare of its citizens. This is manifested when Judt notes that "the old-fashioned nation-state is a better form in which to secure collective loyalties, protect the disadvantaged, enforce a fairer distribution of resources, and compensate for disruptive transnational economic patterns" (Judt, 2011, p. 130). Notably, Tony Judt was not the only intellectual voicing such concerns. He was joined, among others, by German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, who proposed a new social agreement in his latest book whereby social democratic solutions should be moved from the national to the supranational level (Beck, 2013).

Tony Judt reiterated his views later on, for instance in *The World We Have Lost*, which opens a series of his essays *Reappraisals. Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century*⁵ (Judt, 2008). Tony Judt wrote about

⁵ The book was published in Polish by Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego as *Zapomniany wiek dwudziesty. Retrospekcje*. This text was elaborated on the basis of the English original.

the blithe prophets of neoliberal globalization, who celebrate the arrival of a “flat world” of common happiness, without borders to the flow of capital, and who believe in capitalism devoid of business cycles and economic crunches. By this token, he referred to such authors as Thomas L. Friedman, Michael Mandelbaum and Peter Schwartz, whose journalistic and popularizing writings shaped the globalization discourse at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, which abounded in euphoria and historiosophical optimism (Rosenberg, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2000). Judt warned that they might be in for quite a surprise, when people in search of economic and physical security would soon turn back to the political symbols, legal resources, and physical barriers that only the state could provide (Judt, 2008).

The third issue addressed by Tony Judt, the prospect for German domination in Europe, is currently hotly debated in a majority of European countries as well as in many academic debates (Matthijs, 2016). This is what he says about the threat of German domination in *A Grand Illusion*: “the trauma of Nazism cannot continue to weigh upon the German public conscience indefinitely, and there must come a point when German politicians and their electors will be less inhibited about behaving like any other power: sending soldiers abroad, using force or the threat of force to achieve national goals” (Judt, 2011, p. 137). Recent developments seem to confirm at least part of Judt’s intuition. Numerous scholars stress that, since reunification, Germany has not viewed further European integration in terms of an existential imperative, as was the case before (Kundnani, 2014). Some political scientists note that German European policy has recently undergone a profound transformation, whereby national interest and own trade benefits have become the main point of reference (Guérot, Leonard, 2011). For fear of impairing the competitiveness of German exports, in the time of the eurozone crisis Germany opposed a moderate growth in inflation which would have enabled southern states to execute the necessary structural adjustments (Blyth, Matthijs, 2018). Germany urged for austerity measures to be implemented in the eurozone instead (Blyth, 2013) even though such radical measures stifled economic growth in the southern countries of the eurozone and undermined cohesion across the entire EU (De Grauwe, Ji, 2013). In July 2015, Germany made Greece accept the third aid package against the postulates of the Greek government and advice from many economists (Flassbeck et al., 2015), which triggered another wave of debates on the role of Germany in modern Europe. The alleged German hegemony in the EU is also discussed in the

German press (Blome et al., 2015). German scholars publish books which criticize the looming vision of a “German Europe” (Beck, 2013). Even if this change is not an outcome of the internal logic of European integration, or of a political strategy purposefully implemented by Berlin, but rather a consequence of the global economic crisis of 2008 and eurozone crisis, it indirectly confirms that the British historian was right.

A Grand Illusion should therefore be viewed as a mix of concerns, doubts and hopes expressing the author’s state of mind when he was writing his essay in 1996. Both the content and tone of this work are markedly different from the texts Judt penned later on. In 1996, the European Union was less than an answer to Judt. Ten years later it became something much more – maybe the best solution to the dilemmas and challenges of the future. A decade on, in 2006, Judt wrote an essay *The Good Society: Europe vs. America*, which is most representative of his late views on Europe and the Union and, by this token, a valuable proof of his changed outlook. He defined the contemporary Union there as “the largely unintended product of decades of negotiations by West European politicians seeking to uphold and advance their national and sectoral interests” (Judt, 2008, p. 399). He presented the Union as an outcome of numerous clashing interests, and thus as a unique compromise on a continental scale, designed in the course of hundreds of ministerial summits, negotiating rounds and sessions of committees. The historian concludes his consideration on modern European Union in an optimistic vein: “To their own surprise and occasional consternation, Europeans have begun to do this: to create a bond between human beings that transcends older boundaries and to make out of these new institutional forms something that really is a community. They don’t always do it very well and there is still considerable nostalgia in certain quarters for those old frontier posts. But something is better than nothing: and nothing is just what we shall be left with if the fragile international accords, treaties, agencies, laws, and institutions that we have erected since 1945 are allowed to rot and decline – or, worse, are deliberately brought low. As things now stand, boundary-breaking and community-making is something that Europeans are doing better than anyone else” (Judt, 2008, p. 407).

Tony Judt believed that such a precise structure may be the most accurate response to the manifold challenges of the approaching century. He forecasted that in the new century the European Union would play a prominent role in the global arena precisely because of the model of supranational cooperation lying at its foundation.

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Państwo dobrobytu a przyszłość integracji europejskiej według Tony'ego Judta

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wybranych wątków refleksji wybitnego brytyjskiego historyka i intelektualisty Tony'ego Judta nad modelem państwa dobrobytu

w kontekście procesu ponadnarodowej integracji politycznej w ramach UE. Tony Judt był autorem prac poświęconych m.in. historii francuskiej lewicy, roli i odpowiedzialności intelektualistów, a także wielu esejów i tekstów publicystycznych. Przedmiot niniejszego artykułu stanowią rozważania historyka nad europejskim modelem społecznym, powojennym państwem dobrobytu, globalizacją a także unikatowym projektem ponadnarodowej integracji politycznej i gospodarczej w ramach UE. Te trzy wątki wyznaczają główne wymiary obecności Europy w pisarstwie historyka. W tekście stwierdzono, że Tony Judt był wielkim zwolennikiem europejskiego modelu społecznego oraz rozwiązań charakterystycznych dla powojennego państwa dobrobytu. Zauważono również, że badacz stopniowo zmieniał swoje poglądy na integrację europejską w ramach UE. Wyrażane w latach 90. XX wieku wątpliwości wobec przyszłości i kierunku integracji z czasem ustąpiły miejsca silnemu przekonaniu, że w XXI wieku UE odegra jedną z pierwszoplanowych ról na arenie międzynarodowej z powodu wzorca ponadnarodowej współpracy w oparciu o który jest skonstruowana.

Słowa kluczowe: Tony Judt, Europa, Unia Europejska, państwo dobrobytu, europejski model społeczny, integracja europejska.

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