Krzysztof Brzechczyn

ON THE APPLICATION OF NON-MARXIAN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM TO DEVELOPMENT OF NON-EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

1. Introduction

Non-Marxian historical materialism created in the late 1970s by Leszek Nowak (1983; 1991) is, on the one hand, a modification of Karl Marx’s historical materialism and, on the other hand, its extension. It can be seen to be a modification because Nowak in the “economic part” of his theory tries to explicate the relationship between two internal developmental mechanisms of historical materialism, namely, the mechanism of contradiction between the owners and direct producers with the mechanism of dependency of relations of production on the productive forces. The “political” and “cultural” parts of Nowak’s theory are, however, his original contributions to the philosophy of history which can not be read or interpreted in Karl Marx’s writings. The belief that class divisions spontaneously emerged in the other spheres of human activity, e.g. in politics and culture is one beyond Marx’s historical materialism. In Nowak’s view of social reality, the conflicts between the rulers and the citizens or the priests and the indoctrinated occur according to its own internal logic and hence, they are irreducible to economic contradictions.

The vision of historical development presented in non-Marxian historical materialism includes the history of class societies in the course of two and half thousands years from the societies of ancient Greece and Rome to the modern capitalist societies of Western and “real-soc” societies of Eastern Europe. However, the range of the application of Nowak’s theory is limited to the history of European societies. Hitherto, the problem of historical development of non-European societies was not analyzed in this respect. It would appear that only one paper has been devoted to the problem of colonization, decolonization and development of Third World societies. Its authors, Katarzyna Paprzycka and Leszek Nowak (1989) consider the development of two types of societies: class societies (capitalist) belonging to European civilization and supra-class societies, on the lower level of technological development — which belong to non-European civilizations.

In their considerations, the authors (1989, p. 302) try to answer the following questions:

(i) when did capitalist society became aggressive?
(ii) what are social consequences of colonization for the capitalist metropolis and the subordinated society?
(iii) when the conquered society is able to gain independence?
(iv) how does colonization influence the social structure of the independent, post-colonial society?

The base of the authors’ analysis is the model of capitalist society (Nowak 1989) and model I of the theory of (political) supra-class society (Nowak 1987, see also his 1991). In the model of capitalist society there are two sources of aggressiveness. The first comes from the relation of power, the second — from the relation of property. The social relations between the class of rulers and the class citizens in a given society are described by the bell-curve. This means that in the case of weak (state of class peace) as well as very intensive control (state of declassation) of the rulers over the citizens, political resistance is weak. When the political control reaches moderate level (state of revolution), civil resistance becomes revolutionary. Therefore, from the political side, the tendency of aggressiveness begins when power regulation goes beyond the threshold of class peace. Beyond this
point, the further maximization of power by the class of rulers intensifies civil resistance. Then, the maximization of power regulation at the cost of external societies becomes more profitable for the class of rulers.

Likewise, the social relations between the class of owners and the class of direct producers can be also described by the bell-curve. Therefore, in the case of weak (state of class peace) as well as very intensive exploitation (state of declassation) of direct producers by the owners, economic resistance is weak. When exploitation reaches moderate level (state of revolution), the resistance of the direct producers becomes revolutionary. Therefore from the economic side, the tendency of aggressiveness begins when the level of exploitation passes the threshold of class peace threatening the outbreak of the revolution. The resistance of direct producers impedes the appropriation of the surplus value by the owners in the society under analysis. External aggressiveness creates the possibility of extra-maximization of profits coming from the conquest of others societies (in the form of raw materials, markets, and access to cheap labor). Thus, answer to question (i) is following. The capitalist metropolis becomes aggressive when the level of exploitation and political control passes the threshold of class peace, but does not reach yet the interval of revolutionary perturbations. In the model of capitalist society this state of social affairs refers to the phase of cyclical development.

K. Paprzycka and L. Nowak also consider the social consequences of conquest for a capitalist metropolis and colonial country (answer to question ii). Generally speaking, efficient colonization prolongs the state of class peace in the economic and political sphere. Due to this:

- in the phase of cyclical development the periods of class peace become extended; the size of this modification depends on the number of aggressions and size of economic and political profits coming from successful conquest;
- the intensity of class conflict is reduced, diminishing the chances for a civil loop in the metropolis and consequently — the chances for capitalist society to become totalitarian;
- the phase of cyclical development is shortened, accelerating the phase of class peace.
As a result of the technological development in the phase of class peace, the aggressiveness of the capitalist metropolis diminishes the prospect of achieving the level of colonial désintéressement. The conditions of economic development cause backward colonial provinces to become the unequal partners of more advanced capitalist metropolis because the economic cooperation requires the existence of a highly developed infrastructure. Moreover, in the conditions of class peace, neither the ruling class, nor the people’s class has an interest in possessing colonies.

Furthermore, K. Paprzycka and L. Nowak analyze the consequences of colonialism for colonial societies. In the political dimension, all the inhabitants of a colony enslaved by metropolitan authorities are second rank citizens of the empire. The relations between the metropolitan power and citizens of the colony fall under the scheme of the model of purely political society composed of the phases of declassation, totalization and gradual revalorization of autonomous social relations leading to cyclical civil revolutions with a wider social base. This, it may be argued, answers the above question (iii). The colony initiates the fight for independence against the metropolis when the citizen movement becomes mass social phenomenon to threaten colonial rule.

Simultaneously, in the colony there occurs a process of social-economic development. The indicator of its advancement is the formation of private property. As a consequence of economic competition there is initially formed at first a petty (handicraft, peasantry), middle and grand bourgeoisie. Thus, the liberation of the colony, according to the authors, is a coincidence of two processes:

- the attainment colonial désintéressement by the metropolis;
- formation of enough momentum for a civil movement.

What happens after gaining political independence depends on the economic level of the colony’s development. In this respect the above authors distinguish three developmental variants what is answer to question (iv):

(i) The variant of the national liberating loop. If a colony gains political independence in the pre-capitalist phase of develop-
ment, the new revolutionary authorities seize the means of capitalist production possessed by foreign capital. Thus, subordinating the whole economy, they became the double class of rulers-owners.

(ii) The variant of premature liberation. When the gaining of independence occurs in the petty-capitalistic stage of development in a colonial society, a system develops which is neither class, nor totalitarian in nature. The state nationalizes the means of production, which was in the hands of foreign capital but it does not exclusively control the economy because a native bourgeoisie emerges. The authors characterize this mixed social system in the following way:

The natural ally, the ruler-owner, is the petty-bourgeoisie. Due to the alliance directed against the grand bourgeoisie, both the further economic growth of capitalism is being stopped (petty-ownership is supported by the state) and the limitation of the stratum of large owners normally imposed on the political power is weakened. Therefore, the latter develops to a great extent according to regularities of its own, as if it were a pure political system. Thus an increase of the control over the masses leads to incessant revolutions; in the case of victory a civil loop takes place, but it remains a civil one, i.e. it does not lead to totalitarianism whereas in the case of the defeat of the masses, their declassing does not occur as it is at variance with the interest of both grand and petty-bourgeoisie. The system closes thus both the possibility of totalitarisation “from below” and “from above,” simply reproducing itself. As long as such a system remains in the petty-capitalist stage of development, totalitarianism does not pose a danger. (Paprzycka and Nowak 1989, p. 307)

In this social system therefore, totalitarianism occurs when it transforms in a fully capitalist society.

(iii) The variant of capitalization. If gaining independence occurs in the capitalist stage of development, colonial society enters the path of standard capitalist development with separate classes of rulers, owners and the people class.

These three developmental variants can be referred to certain groups of countries in the Third World. The variant of the national-liberating loop approximates the development of black Africa, where after the collapse of colonial regimes, revolutionary power seized
control over the means of production. Thus the variant of capitalization would approximate the development of the Far East. The variant of premature liberation characterizes the countries of Latin America. These variants are, however, only local ramifications of the one universal line of development characterized for European societies:

The inclusion of these considerations into a more general framework of non-Marxian historical materialism reveals that the three variants of the development of the Third World are different roads to totalitarianization and then to socialism. If in a given colony there occurs a civil-national loop (variant i), it immediately reaches totalitarianism (or fascism). When a given country is liberated too early (variant ii), then the process of the totalitarianization of the country is delayed until the capitalization of the country appears which, in the normal way, leads from the final stage of capitalism to totalitarianism. Finally, when a country builds capitalism before political liberation, then totalitarianism comes in the normal way (variant iii). (Paprzycka and Nowak 1989, p. 310)

In non-Marxian historical materialism in the present configuration, the developmental mechanisms of societies being a part of European civilization gain universal status. Thus, colonization is seen as “a process of the transformation of supra-class societies in class societies” (Paprzycka and Nowak 1989, p. 309). Let us repeat, according to the developmental mechanism described in Nowak’s theory, these societies will be transformed into totalitarian systems and those in turn into socialist ones. However, against this conceptualization of colonization, one can raise some serious objections.

2. An Attempt at Critical Analysis

In this part of this paper I would like to test the presented model of colonization against the history of Latin America, and being more precise — the history of Mexico (more on this: Brzechczyn 2004b, abridged version: Brzechczyn 2004a). First and foremost, the Paprzycka and Nowak (1989) approach is not a good conceptualization of the so-called early colonial expansiveness initiated by the discovery of America and executed by the states of the Iberian Peninsula: Spain and Portugal. At the turn of the 16th century, Spain was not yet a capitalist
society.\footnote{This is emphasized by Kieniewicz (1986, pp. 79-84) writing about the pre-colonial feudal character of Iberian expansiveness, based on traditions of struggle with Arabs on American ground.} Latin America, liberated from the rule of Spain prior to this country, became capitalist (e.g. Vilar 1991, p. 57), and then prior to the Spanish metropolis, was able to enter into the phase of colonial désintéressement.\footnote{Łepekowski (1991, pp. 182-183) objects to the conceptualization of Latin American liberation in terms of decolonization processes (to be more precise their first phase), maintaining that it is an actualization from political reasons of these events.}

Furthermore, the conceptualization of conquered societies and their transformation during and after colonization is highly unconvincing. In the pre-Columbian Aztec society conquered by Spaniards there indeed occurred an accumulation of property and power in the hands of the one class but the emerging social system was totalitarian in economic, not in political version, as Paprzycka and Nowak presuppose. The class of owners-rulers dominated in the Aztec society, and this fact determined the nature of Aztec hegemony imposed all over Mezoamerica. This expansion was effected in the interest of the double class of owners-rulers, which maximized the surplus in the form of tribute, free labor and the seizure of land. The social interest satisfied at the time of expansion determined the formula of Aztec domination in Mezoamerica. The construction of a loose hegemony which preserved the native political structures instead of those imposed by the empire (like Incas in South America), in which native rule would have been abolished.

However, totalitarian structures (of the economic type) outlived the conquest. The class of encomenderos, originating from the first generation of conquistadors, was the source of a new class of owners-rulers. Conquistadors, possessing military power, assured their economic rule over the Indian peasant class in the Mexico Valley. The encomienda distributed among the first conquerors of Mexico was the institutional expression of an E-totalitarian system where political rule became the basis on which tribute was collected from Indian communities and their workforce administered. The E-totalitarian
system in the Spanish version led to devastating social results causing a drastic fall of the Indian population, experiencing economic exploitation and political subjugation. Upsetting the balance of population facilitated the interference of political authority from the Spanish metropolis with economic life, which as a result lessened the social impact of the encomenderos class competing with the Spanish Crown. Initially, the authorities curbed the rights of owners-rulers to supervise the workforce from Indian communities, and later, it completely deprived them of the right to administer Indian labor. Since the mid 17th century, the political authorities within the confines of repartimiento de trabajo became the exclusive administrator of the Indian workforce. The Encomenderos were transformed into a single class of owners, which used only the Indian tribute, paid first in kind and later in cash.

Still this does not mean that the E-totalitarian social system vanished. Simultaneously in the second half of the 16th century in Mexico, the hacienda came into existence — a huge latifundium breeding animals and producing food sold on the local market in Mexico City and in mining centers. The owners descending from the Creole people, who fulfilled the role of administrators in a bureaucratic pyramid of the Vice kingdom of New Spain, made the Indian peasant class settle in haciendas dependent on them. The main, but not the only, source of creating non-economic dependency was peonage — service for payment of a debt, which if not paid off, made people stay in a landed estate. The social system generated by the hacienda was based on the alliance between the class of owners and rulers.3

At the same time in Mexico a different supra-class structure, combining spiritual with economic rule, took shape. The spiritual rule of the Catholic Church was feasible thanks to the support of political authority and guaranteed in the encomienda system — since each encomendero was obliged to build a church, pay the priest for his

3 Kieniewicz (1986, p. 168) questions the thesis defended by adherents of the modern world capitalist system, which contend that capitalism in Latin America was introduced during the Spanish reign.
services and ensure that the Indian people participate in religious ceremonies. On the other hand, the Inquisition, whose decisions were carried out by political authority, provided the most visible prop for the political system of the Church. The supra-class alliance between the class of rulers and priests-owners took the shape of an accumulation of class divisions: 10 vice kings of New Spain were priests; also the clergy fulfilled functions at lower administrative tiers, for instance at the level of the audience. Because the alliance between political and spiritual power was the base of social order, the social might of the class of priests-owners was untouched throughout whole colonial periods.

The history of Mexican society in the first period after gaining independence also did not fall under the developmental variant (i), (ii) or (iii). There was no classical national-liberating loop in which power seized control over the means of coercion and production. There was also no rise of a mature capitalist society with the emergence of a grand bourgeoisie as a main social class. The social development of Mexico did not fall under variant (ii) because:

• the rulers did not seize “the main means of production,”
• the class of great owners in the first period of Mexican independence additionally transformed into the disposers of means of coercion which, among other factors, led to the anarchization of the political system in this country;
• the double class of priests-owners still exerted a great impact on the social life of the country;
• the main axis of social conflict in the first half of the XIXth century took place between the class of rulers and the class of priests-owners.

Therefore, in order to conceptualize the history of Mexican society it is not enough to make precise the model of colonialism but there is also the need to elaborate a theory of a new type of society initiating a new line of development.
3. An Outline of Scientific Research Programme

Now, I would like to consider how many separate types of societies initiating the separate lines of development are possible to distinguish in non-Marxian historical materialism. This typology will be based on the following criteria:

- what type of class interest dominates in a given society;
- what is the level of cumulation of class divisions, namely, whether the dominating class is single, double or triple;
- what is the relation between the dominated classes of social potentates.

Let us introduce these criteria in more detail. In the case of class (triple-moment) and supraclass societies (double- and single-moment) the application of the criterion (i) leads to distinguishing the dominant class of disposers of the material means of society. It can be a class of rulers maximizing power regulation or a class of owners maximizing profit or a class of priests, which maximizes spiritual domination. In the case of societies in which the one social class controlling the means of coercion, production and indoctrination is able to maximize these three class interests, this criterion leads to distinguishing the priority class interest of that class.

The domination of class A over class B means that in the case of conflict between them, in the long-run, the interest of class A is maximized. A social class, which dominates over the rest of society this way, is called the main class.

The priority of the class interest of type A over the class interest of type B means that in the situation in which the maximization of interest of B excludes the maximization of class interest of A, in the long-run the interest of A is maximized. In other words, the class interest of B is instrumentally subordinated to the maximization of interest of A. The main class interest in a given society realized by the triple class of disposers will be this class interest which has such understood priority over the remaining class interests. Depending on whether the class interest is maximization of power, profit or spiritual domination as an understood priority in a given society, one may
distinguish respectively a political, economic or hierocratical type of developmental line.

The one and the same class of social potentates can merge the disposition over the social means of two (e.g. means of production and means of coercion), or three (e.g. means of production, means of coercion and means of indoctrination) kinds of material means. In this respect it is possible to distinguish single (e.g. rulers), double (e.g. rulers-owners) and triple (e.g. rulers-owners-priests) social classes.

This is the second criterion of the constructed typology. Depending on the level of the accumulation of class divisions, one can distinguish single-, double- and triple-moment variant of each type of the developmental line. For example, the political type of a developmental line can be in triple-moment variant (the class of rulers is a single class), in double-moment variant (class of rulers seizes disposition of the means of production or mass communication) or single-moment variant (the class of rulers seizes disposition of means of production and mass communication).

The application of criterion (iii) with regards to class societies leads to the characterization of the relation between subordinated social classes dominated by the main class, with regard to single-moment societies — relations between derivative class interests realized by the triple class, with regards to double-moment societies — the relation between the maximization of the derivative class interest of the double class and maximization of class interest of the single class of potentates.

In case of class societies the domination of class $B$ over class $C$ means that in the long-run, the conflict between them will see the interest of class $B$ maximized. However, the main class of this society still subordinates both these social classes.

In single-moment societies, the priority of the class interest of $B$ over the class interest of $C$ means that in case of conflict between them, the interest of $B$ is maximized in the long-run. In other words, the class interest of $C$ is instrumentally subordinated to the maximization of the class interest of $B$ — and these two are instrumentally subordinated to the main interest of the triple class.
In case of double-moment societies, the priority of the derivative class interest of the double class over the social interest of the single class means that in the case of conflict between them, in the long-run, the perspective of the derivative interest of the double class is maximized in a given society.

Depending on the relationship between the subordinated classes (or class interests), one can distinguish different versions (political, hierocratical, economic) of each variant of each type of developmental lines. For example, the name of the version of a hierocratical triple-moment society characterizes the relations between the subordinated classes of rulers and owners. In the case of a political version of such a society, the rulers dominate the owners whereas in the case of an economic version — the owners dominate the rulers. It is worth reminding that both social classes are subordinated to the class of priests.

In summing up, depending on the class interest, the maximization of power regulation, surplus value or spiritual domination has priority in realization by each class of social potentates, one can respectively distinguish: political, economic and hierocratical types of a developmental line. Depending on the level of accumulation of class divisions, each type of developmental line can occur in a triple, double and one moment variant. Depending on the relationship between derivative class interests (or subordinated classes), one can distinguish different versions: political, economic and hierocratical of each variant of a given type of a developmental line.

Crossing these criteria, one can distinguish 18 types of societies, which initiate separate lines of development. Let us briefly characterize them.

1.1.1. Hierocratical triple-moment society in a political version (priests + rulers + owners). This type of developmental line is constituted by a society where the class of priests has priority over the other classes of social potentates. This variant of society consists of four social classes: of priests, rulers, owners and the people. In its political version the class of rulers dominates the class of owners.
1.1.2. Hierocratical triple-moment society in an economic version (priests + owners + rulers). In this type of society, the class of priests has priority over the other classes of social potentates. In this version of society a different relationship occurs between the subordinated classes because in this case the owners dominate the class of rulers.

1.2.1. Hierocratical double-moment society in a political version (priests-rulers + owners). This society consists of three classes: of priests-rulers, owners and the people. In this social system the class of priests having additionally control over the means of coercion, dominates the single class of owners.

1.2.2. Hierocratical double-moment society in an economic version (priests-owners + rulers). In this version of society, the class of priests having control over the means of production has still class priority in society. In this example of a social system the maximization of surplus value is subordinated to the maximization of spiritual domination.

1.3.1. Hierocratical single-moment society in a political version (priests-rulers-owners). This society consists of two classes: the triple class of the priests-rulers-owners and the people’s class. The main interest of the triple class is the maximization of spiritual domination. Furthermore, the maximization of the surplus value is subordinated to the maximization of the power regulation and both these derivative interests are subordinated to the enlargement of the spiritual domination over society.

1.3.2. Hierocratical single-moment society in an economic version (priests-owners-rulers). This version of a society still consists of two classes: the triple class of priests-owners-rulers and the people’s class. In this instance, a different relationship occurs between derivative class interests because the maximization of power regulation is instrumentally subordinated to the maximization of surplus value.

2.1.1. Economic triple-moment society in a political version (owners + rulers + priests). This type of developmental line is constituted by a society where the class of owners has priority over the other classes of social potentates. This variant of society consists of
four classes: owners, rulers, priests and the people. In its political version the rulers dominate the priests.

2.1.2. Economic triple-moment society in a hierocratical version (owners + priests + rulers). The main class of social potentates is the same as in the previous version of society. In this case, however, another relationship occurs between the subordinated classes because the priests dominate the rulers.

2.2.1. Economic double-moment society in a political version (owners-rulers + priests). This society consists of three classes: the double class of owners-rulers, the class of priests and the people class. In this version of a social system, the maximization of power regulation is instrumentally subordinated to the maximization of surplus value by the class of owners-rulers. This class dominates the single class of priests.

2.2.2. Economic double-moment society in a hierocratical version (owners-priests + rulers). This version of a double-moment society, the class of owners having control over the means of indoctrination dominates the single class of rulers. The enlargement of spiritual domination is instrumentally subordinated to the maximization of the surplus value by the owners-priests.

2.3.1. Economic single-moment society in a hierocratical version (owners-priests-rulers). This society consists of two classes: the triple class having control over the means of production, coercion, indoctrination and the people’s class. For the triple class, the maximization of the surplus value has priority over the maximization of other class interests: spiritual domination and political power. In this version of a society, maximization of power regulation is instrumentally subordinated to the maximization of spiritual domination.

2.3.2. Economic single-moment society in a political version (owners-rulers-priests). In this version of a single moment society, the maximization of surplus value still has priority over the other class interests but the enlargement of spiritual domination is instrumentally subordinated to the deepening of political power.
3.1.1. Political triple-moment society in an economic version (rulers + owners + priests). This type of developmental line is constituted by a society where the class of rulers has priority over the other classes of social potentates. This variant of society consists of four classes: rulers, owners, priests and the people. In the economic version of this society, the class of owner dominates over the class of priests.

3.1.2. Political triple-moment society in a hierocratical version (rulers + priests + owners). In comparison with the previous version of society there is a reverse relation between the subordinated social classes because in this case the class of priests dominates the class of owners.

3.2.1. Political double-moment society in an economic version (rulers-owners + priests). This society consists of three classes: the double class of rulers-owners, the class of priests and people; in this social system the maximization of value surplus is instrumentally subordinated to the maximization of power regulation by the class of rulers-owners.

3.2.2. Political double-moment society in a hierocratical version (rulers-priests + owners). In this version of society the maximization of spiritual domination is instrumentally subordinated to the maximization of power regulation by the class of rulers-priests. This class, it is worth reminding, dominates the class of owners.

3.3.1. Political single-moment society in an economic version (rulers-owners-priests). This society consists of two classes: the class of rulers-owners-priests and the people’s class. The priority interest for the triple class is the maximization of power regulation. In the economic version of this society the maximization of the spiritual domination is subordinated to the maximization of surplus value.

3.3.2. Political single-moment society in a hierocratical version (rulers-priests-owners). In this version of a political single-moment society there is a reverse relationship between derivative class interests. The maximization of surplus value is instrumentally subordinated to the deepening of the spiritual power and this
class interest, to repeat, is subordinated to the maximization of power regulation by the class of rulers-priests-owners.

Societies belonging to different types of lines of development evolve according to different mechanisms. Societies therefore belonging to the political type of developmental line evolve according to the regularities of the political moment and those of the economic type, according to the regularities of the economic moment. Societies belonged to the hierocratical type of developmental line thus evolve according to the regularities of the spiritual moment of society. These regularities are essentially changed in the case of each variant of society. In the single-moment societies a given class of the social potentates disposes also the other material means useful in the maximization of the main for this class, interest. In this variant of society, the main tendency of social development is the mechanism of people resistance. This is changed in the case of double-moment societies. The existence of single classes of social potentates, apart from the double class, brings about the rise of a new social tendency in social development — the mechanism of supra-class competition and supra-class alliance. This tendency becomes more important in triple-moment societies. In this kind of social system, the main barrier in the maximization of class interest by the dominating class is not only the people’s resistance but also the objections of other classes of social potentates. In certain developmental phases of this kind of societies, at least, the supra-class competition and supra-class alliance became the main developmental mechanism. So much is possible to be said on each developmental line at this level of concretization of non-Marxian historical materialism. One can gain fuller characteristics therefore, when one can elaborate the theories of the development of each type of society.

I would like to suggest that the developmental diversity of non-European civilizations could be interpreted with the aid of the above constructed typology of societies. The characteristic feature of societies belonged to European civilization was separation of class divisions. The accumulation of class division based on European civilization, when it took place, proved to be unstable (Brzechczyn 1993). In turn, different configurations of cumulated class divisions — which in the
conceptual framework of non-Marxian historical materialism is their distinctive feature — appeared in the history of other civilizations.

It is also worth recognizing that this typology is not exhaustive — it ignores, e.g. the existence of primitive societies, in which the class structure did not form. Moreover, some elements of this typology are not present because certain types of societies did not emerge from the primitive stage of history. Furthermore, some lines of development can lead up the “blind street” of the historical process, meaning that they will not transform further. This is exemplified in the philosophy of history where according to Francis Fukuyama (1992), modern capitalism leads to the end of social evolution.

In addition, the constitution of 18 separate lines of developments in the historical process depends on the compliance of many, implicitly accepted, conditions. I will consider one of them in more detail, namely, the condition of stability. In order to form a separate line of development, a given configuration of class domination has to be socially stable. This means that in subsequent periods of time, this same configuration of class domination is able to reproduce itself. In line with this intuitive definition it is worth recognizing that one of the conditions of social stability thus understood, it is growth or at least, maintaining this same population, which depends among other factors on the preservation of the ecological equilibrium in the relations between society and nature.

The social consequences of upsetting the ecological equilibrium are described by Jean Dorst (1987, pp. 58-62). The Yucatan peninsula inhabited by the Mayas during the classical period had lime soil with a fragile hydrological equilibrium. During the rain season its plains were covered by water but during the drought season, it changed into a region of cracked salt. The Mayas at that time cultivated maize as a basic foodstuff. However, this plant was harmful for the soil because the root system of maize and the means of cultivation exposed the soil to erosion. During the classical period the Maya population increased reaching the number of three million. Therefore, the Mayas were forced to enlarge the cultivation area from fertile plains to the mountainsides. Grubbing up slope forests, which protected soil, accelerated the erosion of the land and gradually clogged the system of
lakes and rivers. The soils lost their fertility according to a typical process: on the hills the naked rocks remained but on the plains infertile layers covered the soil. The fertility of soil was so low, that it could not provide food for the growing population. Furthermore, a bad water economy deteriorated the river communication and caused a lack of water. The disturbance of the ecological equilibrium contributed to the decline of this civilization in the 9th — 10th century — one which this civilization never recovered from.

4. The Perspectives of Non-Marxian Historical Materialism: A Summary

The above constructed typology of developmental lines serves as a “road map” of non-Marxian historical materialism. In the present shape this theory is a set of the following models:

- pure hierocratical society which can be the point of departure in the building of the theory of societies belonged to the hierocratical type of the developmental line;
- pure economic society and its further concretizations which can be the point of departure in building the theory of societies belonged to the economic type of the developmental line;
- pure political society and its further concretizations which can be the point of departure in building the theory of societies belonged to the political type of the developmental line;
- economic triple-moment society (2.1.1) transformed into a political triple-moment society (3.1.1); however, this model is not complete because the influence of the class of priests is still ignored.

Non-Marxian historical materialism still lacks:

- a complete theory of hierocratical (1.3.1; 1.3.2), economic (2.3.1; 2.3.2) and political (3.3.1; 3.3.2) society in single-moment versions; in the theory of this last type of society the control of the economy by the rulers was partially analyzed (Nowak 1991; Siegel 1997);
• a theory of hierocratical (1.2.1; 1.2.2.), economic (2.2.1; 2.2.2) and political (3.2.1; 3.2.2) society in the double-moment variant;
• a theory of hierocratical triple-moment society in a political (1.1.1) and economic version (1.1.2) and hierocratical versions of economic (2.1.2) and political (3.1.2) triple-moment societies;
• a complete theory of economic triple-moment society in a political version (2.1.1.) and political triple-moment society in an economic version (3.1.1).

In summing up, the above mentioned theoretical gaps form the developmental perspectives of non-Marxian historical materialism as a scientific research program. As one can see, a great deal of research is yet to be done. After fulfilling these theoretical gaps, non-Marxian historical materialism can become a theory of historical process in regard to the chronological and geographical range comparable to the historiosophy elaborated by Arnold Toynbee (1947/1957) or, let us mention a Polish example of this kind of the humanities, Feliks Koneczny (1962).

References


