TERRORISM
THE ERA OF NETWORK TERRORISM.

The third wave of modern jihadism, with which we have to do now, is related to the activities of the global Salafi jihad movement. Most scholars of modern Islamic terrorism take the view that the above-mentioned phenomenon is a social movement involving a collection of terrorist organisations with different levels of centralised leadership structure, implementing different forms of interaction, cooperating with each other in relation to a number of common objectives and coordinating activities through a network of direct and indirect ties. The network structure of the movement, especially the nature of the nodes and connections between them, determines the scale of the threat of Islamic terrorism in the early twenty-first century. The identification of key nodes and characterisation of basic network links should contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism, identification of key evolutionary trends, and development of recommendations for reducing the threat of terrorism.

In the social sciences, the problem of the network nature of social movements has been subjected to thorough analysis since the nineteen-seventies. Systematic studies found in the works of Curtis, Zurcher, Zald, Caroll, Ratner, McCarthy, and many other researchers helped to find answers relating to, for example, the impact of the network position of individuals and organisations on their actions and behaviour in a social movement.¹

Among the key concepts used in analyses of network structures are: nodes, links between nodes, the essence of relationships, and network boundaries. Network nodes consist essentially of individual or collective actors (social groups). Links between nodes can be viewed on many levels. Direct and indirect links, or interpersonal and inter-organisational ones are those most often analysed. Direct links involve unmediated interaction between actors. They may arise from kinship, connections, information sharing, or joint participation in the activities of a social movement. Actors can share common norms by participating in a conflict on the same side. In terms of an organisation, it is a case of joint alliances, information sharing, provision of human resources, or

practical support (financial and organisational). In the matter of indirect links, the existence of interpersonal relationships cannot be accurately determined. However, mere participation in specific events, or sharing key forms of activity, may lead to a conviction of the existence of this type of relationship.

The question of the network nature of terrorist structures seems to have been, so far, addressed only occasionally. In the last few years, however, there have been a number of monographs and scientific articles dealing with many of the key aspects of this problem. These analyses have a foundation in game theory and mathematical tools. Among the authors involved in this issue are Marc Sageman, John Arquilla or David Ronfeldt.²

THE ESSENCE OF TERRORIST NETWORKS

Over the last few decades, the organisational structure of terrorist groups has undergone significant evolution. Back in the mid-eighties and early nineties, the vast majority of these groups had a hierarchical key structure. This method of organisation is also replicated today, but concerns only local structures. It is the increase in the range of terrorist activity that is one of the important factors affecting the organisation of these groups. This statement does not mean, however, that there are only hierarchical structures at the local level. It could be said that both hierarchical and network structures co-exist. A choice of either of them or their peculiar convergence depend on such external and internal factors as group size, the range of its activities, the choice of strategy and tactics, and the impact of the external environment (national, international) on its activities.

Mitch Strippling, in one of his articles about the organisation of terrorist network structures defined two levels of their analysis: local and global.³ Hence, he mentioned the existence of network structures that are direct and scale-free. With respect to the first level, citing the findings of Arquilla and Ronfeldt, he referred to three types of networks: linear, centrifugal, and multichannel (Fig. 1).⁴ In view of the above-mentioned levels of analysis, they can be called first-level types.

The first type most often applies to those groups that, in addition to terrorist activities, are involved in criminal activities (e.g., smuggling). Centrifugal networks develop wherever there is a need to coordinate terrorist activities through a central node (e.g., a local group leader). A multichannel network is the next stage of the structural evolution of terrorist networks and is characterised by the fact that each node generates relationships with others.

Given the empirical findings of science related to the discovery of the laws governing the proliferation of real networks in the physical world,⁵ and hence the law of

growth and preferred connections, M. Strippling pointed to the existence of the following two types of networks: chaotic and orderly. These are the so-called second-level networks. They are characterised by the development of more complex relationships between nodes in structures of potentially unlimited size. In orderly structures, much importance is given to the so-called primary nodes, by reference to which the most numerous and most important links are produced.

According to the theory by Barabasi, a special feature of today’s terrorist networks is their natural growth and adaptation. In other words, the structures can grow in any geo-

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graphical direction, in any social and cultural environment depending on the needs, and produce the most efficient connections between the nodes (and thus de facto multichannel and centrifugal subnetworks). In this approach, second-level networks consist of several first-level subnetworks.

**NATURE AND ORIGINS OF THE GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD MOVEMENT**

The name *global jihad Salafi movement* used in this article needs to be clarified. In the narrower sense, this term is to be understood as all the elements that were focused around the “founding fathers,” Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, or Ayman al-Zawahiri, that strengthened contacts and joined up with the group created by them under the name al-Qaeda. In its broad meaning, the jihadist movement, in addition to the above-mentioned elements, also includes independent organisations working to attain similar targets to al-Qaeda’s, but on their own account and using autonomous organisational and operational bases.⁷

An outline of the various components of the global Salafi jihad movement is shown in Figure 3.

![Figure 3. Outline of the relationships between the various components of the global Salafi jihad movement](image)

Source: Author’s own concept.

Assaf Moghadam identified four essential functions of the ideology of Salafi jihad. The first is an explanatory function. The main role of this ideology’s proponents is ac-

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⁷ In this work, the term *global jihad Salafi movement* (GJSM) is used in the narrower sense.
tion to raise awareness in the Muslim community related to the fact that Islam is in danger. They compare the challenges of the current period with the initial period of growth in its popularity, claiming that Islam is now being removed from religious, political and social life.\(^8\) The second is a diagnostic function. Proponents of the ideology identify specific causes of the current problems in the Muslim world. They argue that “Crusaders”, “Zionists”, and Muslim regimes accused of apostasy are responsible for the humiliation and oppression of Muslims.\(^9\) In the case of the third function, associated with the process of the formation of group identity, proponents of the ideology point out that for all Muslims lost in the modern world it is a source of self-determination and ensures adherence to a supranational structure which is the ummah. Finally, the fourth indicates specific targets and modes of action, especially of jihad (“holy war”), understood in military terms, associated with martyrdom (understood as the sacrifice of life for the cause of Islam).\(^10\) One of the characteristics of supporters of the ideology of Salafi jihad is also a dichotomous view of social reality. They divide the world into those who follow doctrinal guidelines and those who are accused of apostasy. The promoters of the reinterpretation of the above-mentioned ideology, promoting a vision of global Salafi jihad (thus extending its reach to the whole modern world), ignore on the one hand the recommendations made by moderate Salafi schools, prohibiting the killing of civilians, and on the other hand positive examples of the support of Western countries for Muslim states. In the case of the postulated modes of action, one of the most important is violence. Its legitimacy is associated with an indication of its ultimate objective, utopian in substance. This already came to the notice of Stephen Holmes, who suggested that the caliphate postulated by the ideologists of global jihad was “the religious equivalent of the Marxist utopia”.\(^11\)

A special feature of the global Salafi jihad movement, as Rohan Gunaratna rightly pointed out, is its concealed and difficult to penetrate structure and diversity of identity.\(^12\) The genesis of the root node of the global jihadist network, which adopted the name al-Qaeda, is closely related to two important events of 1979: the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One of the consequences of the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent policies of the new Iranian government was the creation of a number of Islamic groups in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and Western Europe.

Arab communities involved in the struggle against the aggressors in Afghanistan were led by many well-known Islamic activists. One of them was the Palestinian Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. He already in 1984, together with Osama bin Laden founded an Afghan Services Bureau. The cooperation between the two lasted until the end of the eighties. The bureau served as a channel of Islamic propaganda and a place for the recruitment of new members (through a network of offices, for example, several in the

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9 Ibidem.
10 Ibidem.
United States and at least 35 in other countries). Thanks to the organisation, many Islamic fighters were recruited, trained, and shifted to Afghanistan.

Abdullah Azzam was one of a few Islamic visionaries. When the struggle with the Russians in Afghanistan was coming to an end, A. Azzam drew the mujahideen’s attention to a new target, fearing that without it they could come to a bad end. As the spiritual leader of the international Islamic movement, Azzam formulated in the mid-eighties a number of training guidelines for \textit{al-Qaidah al-Sulbah} (which can be translated as “the solid base”), a “pious group and pioneering vanguard”. The organisation’s founding document, published in the \textit{al-Jihad} declared, “Tenacity and asservative decision to continue the journey are essential, however long it would take...”. In the above-mentioned paper it was also stated that every principle must have a vanguard that will carry it forward. [The vanguard] will pay a steep price and suffer many losses while paving the road for an [Islamic] society. There is no belief, either earthly or heavenly, that does not need such a vanguard, one that will give all it has for its belief to be victorious. This vanguard is the solid base (‘al-Qa‘idah al-Sulbah’) of the society we are awaiting.

At the end of the war in Afghanistan, a jihad backed by supporters of bin Laden and Azzam, was accelerated by rapid internationalisation. This happened due to a lot of young fighters who, having approved of Azzam’s ideology, wanted to implement it in the form of rapid and profound socio-political changes made where they came from and to where they return. They became members of religious movements, radical political parties, a broad anti-government opposition calling for an end to oppression by corrupt, pro-Western regimes. As the policy action did not bring any noticeable effects, the only, in their opinion, way to influence the current situation proved to be turning to violence. The Afghan Services Bureau was an asylum for them, offering them a safe haven.

Even before the end of the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan Services Bureau structure began to evolve at both the political and military levels. Both people and equipment began to be flipped between places in the world where local regimes were clearly hostile to Islamic movements and the fate of Muslim communities was at risk. This was the case in Kashmir, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Yemen, Algeria, and Egypt. The mujahideen, using both the Afghan Services Bureau and a number of charities cooperating with it, infiltrated local conflicts, which resulted in sending training staff and subsequent participation in these conflicts.

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16 Ibidem.
19 Ibidem, p. 7.
The fight for the highest goals of the global Salafi jihad was institutionalised thanks to Osama bin Laden probably at the end of 1989, after the death of Abdullah Azzam. At that time, at the al-Farouq training camp, next to the Afghan Khost, bin Laden asked a few trusted mujahideen to join him and began a new phase of the struggle aimed at the liberation of Muslims oppressed in other parts of the world. This camp had been used previously to indoctrinate new recruits sent later for military training to prepare them to fight with the Russians. Those who expressed their approval for the proposal of bin Laden were asked to take and sign an official oath before the leaders of the new movement. That oath was taken by Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi, the then emir of the group, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, and Mohammed Atef. Al-Banshiri two years later took over the function of al-Iraqi. In 1996, after the death of al-Banshiri, he was replaced by Atef. The meeting was also attended by bin Laden’s other trustees, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri (aka Abdel Moez), Fadhl al-Masry, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl (aka Abu Bakr Sudan), Abu Faraj al-Yemeni, and Abu Musab al-Saudi. Bin Laden significantly, but indirectly affected the group over the years. He controlled and inspired in this way both the vital organs and ordinary members of the movement. He had similar effects, but on a completely different scale on external entities (other groups, Islamic communities), which in the future would bear fruit.

Al-Qaeda was based first in Afghanistan, and then transferred to Pakistan (Peshawar) and Sudan (Khartoum). The most important shelter for members of al-Qaeda, however, was Afghanistan. Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri acknowledged the country as “the capital of jihad”, the main area of the struggle waged by Muslims in the world today.

The arduous construction of the network structure of al-Qaeda began in the early nineteen-nineties in Europe (mainly western and southern), Asia (especially southeast Asia, but also in the Middle East), Africa, and the Americas. During the nineties – in fact, until 1998 – the relations between al-Qaeda fighters and many terrorist and guerrilla organisations developed and evolved. Where there previously were no radical Islamic movements, autonomous cells developed, operating on behalf of al-Qaeda. This was the case in western and southern Europe. A different strategy was adopted in relation to those regions or countries where such movements took root. If they failed to be penetrated from the inside, then an informal cooperation was created with them using their operational capabilities when it turned out to be necessary. Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda was created with people prepared for armed struggle and taking the same views as the founders of the movement. This from the very beginning of its activity facilitated a highly efficient operation – in relation to variables such as the mobility of members, the breadth of their activity, and the scope of their action. Members of affiliated organisations were not so mobile, their scope of activity was more local, and the range of operational techniques used limited. It can therefore be seen that there was already pressure for the development of their own autonomous structures and sharing the

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20 Emir-Arabic: commander, general, or prince.
22 Ibidem.
23 As cited in ibidem, p. 132.
responsibility for strategic action taken by these structures. Al-Qaeda could count in the first half of the nineteen-nineties on the support of about 6–7 million radical Muslims around the world. The number of potential candidates and members of the movement was back then in the region of 120,000.24

The foundations of the movement’s global network, according to Rohan Gunaratna, were built between 1991 and 1996.25 The structure was based on the functioning of several key nodes that connected local networks, less and more complicated in terms of structure, in different regions of the world. In this period, the structures in Sudan, Turkey, and Spain should be recognised as key. Their members were responsible for, firstly, building networks in Western countries and, secondly, preparing and carrying out terrorist operations mainly in Europe and the United States. R. Gunaratna believed that this structure was highly decentralised, informal, and members of each key (in the operational sense) nodes did not have specific assignments (whether regional or functional). This meant that if antiterrorist services uncovered such structures in specific countries (as was the case with Germany in 1998), other cells replaced their activity. When it came to recruiting new members, friendship or family ties were very important from the very beginning. This allowed individual cells to ensure high efficiency. R. Gunaratna, however, analysed only the structure of second-level network, moving away from reflection on the meaning, essence, and evolution of the central nodes of the analysed network. Such an approach seems to be unjustified in the light of current knowledge about the functioning of the global jihadist network.

R. Gunaratna noticed, though, a pattern that is closely related to the above-mentioned theory of Barbasi. He stated that individual ethnic groups included in the jihadist movement specialised in a particular type of function. For example, Libyans were responsible for providing fake documents, Algerians for false credit cards, Egyptians for the operation of training camps around the world.26 However, operating cells did not have an ethnically homogeneous character. In Europe, a large part of them was more ethnically homogeneous, but not in the United States. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, these differences have seen a gradual blurring. A special feature of the process of the evolution of the movement in the movement towards a multiethnic nature of the operating cells of the jihadist movement.27 The conspiratorial model of their operation was based on proven principles tested in Europe (for example, by the Red Army Fraction) and beyond (e.g., in Egypt by the Islamic Group28 and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad). One of the key principles is to avoid direct contact between cell members and between those members and the central nodes of the movement. These contacts are often mediated (for this purpose agents are used). Members of al-Qaeda and, more broadly, the jihadist movement in general are proficient in Arabic.

24 Ibidem, p. 127.
26 Ibidem, p. 130.
27 Ibidem.
28 In the case of the Egyptian Islamic Group, its structure was divided according to a geographical key into individual cells called in Arabic ankuds (“bunch of grapes”) that were self-sufficient. The elimination any of them did not affect the functioning of the rest. See: ibidem; cf. J. K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*, London 1999, p. 40).
All official documents and the vast majority of propaganda materials are created in it. Non-Arab people who speak Arabic can join in the work of the movement. It is the knowledge of Arabic that predestined participants of the movement to fill key node positions. The scope of the activity of the jihadist movement is global and is in no way limited geographically.

STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE JIHADIST MOVEMENT

Over the past few years, the structure of the jihadist movement has changed significantly. Bearing in mind the aforementioned stages of its evolution, the focus should be placed on two main periods: before and after 1998. The date is provisional, associated with the evolution of both the organisation (including the creation of the World Islamic Front) and the operation of the jihadist movement (spectacular terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa). It was in the second half of the nineties of the twentieth century that the horizontal network structures of the jihadist movement began to take shape.

The starting point is, however, al-Qaeda, established in the late eighties. Its original organisational structure set up in the founding documents of the period is a hierarchical network. This is illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Original model of the structure of the main bodies of al-Qaeda


A significant position in the organisational structure can be attributed to the Advisory Council. It was the main, group decision-making body that oversaw the activities of the other bodies. A fundamental role in this structure also played a body coordinating the operating activities of the group, called the Military Committee.

Figure 5. Model of the relationship between the Military Committee and the structures it supervised (the first level network)

LEGEND: A – agents managing cells, B – fighters operating within individual cells.
Source: Author’s own concept.

The Military Committee was responsible for recruiting, training and transporting fighters; for the preparation of parts of operations (especially the largest); the formulation of tactical initiatives; and possibly the supply of the necessary weapons. The committee also oversees the so-called agents responsible for the management of individual cells (it would be more appropriate to call them local networks), scattered around the world. The cells were organised on the model of centrifugal or multichannel networks, and thus first-level networks.

Cells, the basic parts of the organisational structure of al-Qaeda, were assigned three different functions. In particular, managing cells were created, responsible for coordinating the activity of a network of cells on a given territory. Their additional tasks included propaganda and raising funds for operating activities. Such cells most often had a centrifugal network structure. A significant role can be assigned to the heads of these cells, and thus the agents of al-Qaida, planning and preparing the specific operational activities of the group. The second type of cells was operating cells. They are typically formed by 2–8 people, professionally prepared earlier in camps supervised by the Military Committee for terrorist activities. These cells were organised on the model of multichannel networks. The bigger the number of operational cells operating on a particular territory, the bigger the need to coordinate their actions. This need gradually
led to the creation of more complex network structures. Managing cells were beginning
to become key nodes in the second-level networks. The above network structurwas supported by backup cells. Their members were responsible, among other things, for the recruitment of new members of operational cells.

In the late nineties, the global Salafi jihad movement set out on a path of rapid organisational change. What contributed to it was, on the one hand, the need to adapt this structure to the changing strategy of operations and organisational absorption of new jihadist groups sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s activity, and on the other hand an objective necessity imposed by the large-scale and more effective antiterrorist activities of the United States and its allies. After the formation of the World Islamic Front, at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century, the growth in global jihadist movement structures began. In fact, the so-called second-level network structures were beginning to be established. Their schematic shape is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Model of the organisational network structure of the global jihad movement
(the second level network)

[Diagram showing the organisational network structure]

Source: Author’s own concept based on M. Sageman, Sieci terroru, Kraków 2008, p. 171.

The central node is today essentially “classical” al-Qaeda, which adopted the name Central Command of al-Qaeda. It was part of a structure under the name of the World Islamic Front. Others were: the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Assembly of Pakistani Clergy, and the Movement of Islamic Holy War in Bangladesh.
This is indeed one of the most important nodes of the global jihadist movement. The picture of the network structure of the movement is complemented by the so-called affiliated organisations, which in the structure of the movement currently number more than 30, the so-called local networks and autonomous operating cells present in dozens of countries. Affiliated organisations are independent terrorist groups, local or regional in scope, working independently of each other, but in relation to common goals, using similar measures, working toward the same strategic and tactical objectives. The most famous include the al-Shabaab, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and Abu Sayyaf groups. They have a hierarchical network key structure (first-level networks), which was the case for al-Qaeda in the early period of its existence. A breakdown of these structures (that is, the elimination of the key regional nodes) would facilitate the elimination or temporary limitation of the scope of the activity of the global jihadist movement. However, it would not eliminate the risk entirely, because of the fact that there are other organisational structures that under favourable circumstances could take over (unless they already are doing it now) the responsibility for the operation of a given area. Such examples are many. On one hand, you can point to the area of the Maghreb, where both Salafia Jihadia and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) were active. The latter group is an example of a local network of the jihadist movement. Currently, there are at least three such networks: in addition to AQIM, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Islamic State of Iraq. The last element of the jihadist network is local cells linked through agents to the central node of the jihadist movement. It is difficult to give, even approximately, the number of currently existing cells. This number in fact undergoes a dynamic changes (increases or decreases) depending on factors such as the effectiveness of propaganda and recruitment, the activity of agents of the jihadist movement, the quality and number of recruits, or the counterterrorism activities of modern states. They exist (although the vast majority are not active) in a number of developed states.

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In the nineteen-nineties, the increasing operational efficiency of al-Qaeda derived from the existence of first-level structures. With the formation of the World Islamic Front and the establishment of a number of local nodes, they blended in a complex network of relations based largely on authorities, and not just institutions. After the elimination, in the years 2001–2006, of a number of terrorist cells (both in Europe and North America), more emphasis in the jihadist movement was placed on the activities of affiliated organisations, much less infiltrated than the basic structures of the movement. They increasingly developed their operational capabilities by creating new networks and in particular recruiting Muslims who were citizens of the countries in which such activity was undertaken. After 2005, a number of new Islamic terrorist organisations were created, referring to the Salafi ideology of global jihad, that expressed a desire to affiliate with the “core” (the central node) of the movement.

The global Salafi jihad movement is now one of the most important examples of terrorist groups of the era of modern network terrorism. The main conclusion from the analysis of the evolution process of the organisational structure of the jihadist move-
ment is the statement that we are currently dealing with a very advanced network structure, and more precisely, with a second-level structured network.

The network structure of the jihadist movement has developed naturally as a result of reasonable changes in the organisational structure of the movement that began in the nineteen-nineties. It was a response to objective and subjective processes in the international environment and within individual states (globalisation, democratisation, centralisation of power, international community’s anti-terrorist activities). It was also a result of absorption as part of the jihadist movement of the most effective organisational solutions facilitating its rapid, global growth. This growth is very dynamic, which poses a serious threat to international security.

The organisational network structure of the global Salafi jihad movement thwarts its penetration by external entities. The existing local nodes and the central node in spite of the existing links (more mediated than direct), operate autonomously. Their elimination will not have any decisive influence on the functioning of the whole movement. A significant advantage that this movement utilises is the ability to replicate the nodes and the relationship between them and other elements of the structure discussed above. In this perspective, the elimination of the whole movement would be possible only if all the key nodes were wiped out simultaneously.

ABSTRACT

This article is an attempt to draw attention to the issue of the network nature of terrorist structures in the early twenty-first century. It analyses the essence of the so-called network terrorism from an Islamic perspective. The example of the global Salafi jihad movement (GSJM) is recognised as key. It is a social movement established at the turn of the century, referring to the Salafi ideology and promoting the so-called holy war with its enemies in the West. One of the principal manifestations of its activity is terrorism. The evolution of the movement has occurred on several levels, one of the more important of these being organisational. The proliferation of the terrorist threat posed by the GSJM is closely associated with the construction of the network structure of the organisation. Analysis of the available sources indicates that the current organisation of the GSJM has the form of the so-called second-level structured network.
płaszczyznach, z których jedną z ważniejszych jest płaszczyzna organizacyjna. Proliferacja zagrożenia terrorystycznego ze strony SRGD ściśle wiąże się z budową sieciowej struktury organizacyjnej. Analiza dostępnych materiałów źródłowych wskazuje, iż aktualny kształt organizacyjny SRGD przybrał postać tzw. uporządkowanej sieci drugiego poziomu.