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Style conventions

‘Concepts’ are marked with single quotation marks ‘’, e.g. ‘war’ and ‘peace’ are important concepts in any political theory.

DOMAINS, as understood within Conceptual Metaphor Theory are written in SMALL CAPS, e.g. the most important elements in the domain of WAR are the opponents and the conflict obtaining between them.

CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS, like domains are given in SMALL CAPS, e.g. NATION/STATE IS A PERSON.

Conceptual Mappings obtaining between the source and target domains are Capitalised, e.g. Stages of War are Acts of a Play.

Examples from the corpora are given in *italics*.

Key words in the examples are underlined.

Translations of Polish examples into English are given in single quotation marks, e.g. *wojna* ‘war’.

Introduction

The classical European approach to war is based on Clausewitz's famous saying that *War is a mere continuation of policy by other means* (1873: Book I, Chapter 1, part 24). Such a framing of war emphasizes its complex relation to politics. Historians and sociologists often see wars as sources of social change. Hassner, a contemporary philosopher and international relations expert, views war today as a dialectic conflict between bourgeois and barbarian, the conflict between Jominian idea of technological advantage and terrorism. Hassner believes that bourgeois is best represented by the American society and its war strategy, imbued with the human rights ideas, aimed at minimising self-losses, civilian losses and even the enemy losses. To achieve this aim they employ Rapid Decisive Operations strategy which is possible because of significant technological and information advantage. The barbarian, now equalled with the Muslim extremists, not having such an advantage, must turn to terrorism. Hassner also notices less spectacular exigencies of war, that is the necessity to trespass the taboo of taking another human life. The taboo creates an inherent conflict between the heroic myth of war and the necessity of killing other human beings resulting in the rhetoric of enemy vilification.

The contemporary understanding of war is heavily influenced by its media representation. This book analyses the discursive strategies used in the press war reports cross culturally and across the time span of 20 years. The primary focus is on the role of conceptual metaphors in these discursive construals.

Discourse analysis is understood in terms following van Dijk's (1997) characterisation of the discipline as a field combining an analysis of the interplay between cognition, language and social interaction. Within this framework, discourse analysis may refer to either talk or text analysis and differs in this respect from de Beaugrande – Dressler's (1981) distinction between the two. The present book concentrates on the written language, in particular on linguistic realisations of underlying conceptual metaphors in journalistic discourse. Language use is explained in terms of cognitive processes, i.e. conceptual metaphors. This language

use is also linked to its social function¹ in the particular context of the discourse of war reports. A brief presentation of such context elements as a characteristics of the newspapers which provide the data; a description of the military institutions that the countries, in which these newspapers have been published, belong to; and an account of the participants of the conflicts are given below.

The majority of the data for this conceptual-metaphor-informed discourse analysis of war reports come from two national newspapers: Polish *Trybuna Ludu* (*Trybuna* since 1990) and British *The Times*. The war reports from these two newspapers have been gathered in two small corpora.² Both corpora consist of articles from the 1980s and from 2001. They have been compiled specifically for the present study. The size of *The Times* corpus is larger than that of *Trybuna Ludu*. According to Seymour-Ure (1996: 149),³ in 1983 *The Times* consisted of 28 pages while in 1992 of 47 pages. My own count of the pagination of 11 issues of April 1st – April 14th 1982 gave the average of 25 pages per issue. As for 2001, *The Times Online Archive* was used and it was impossible to ascertain the number of pages of the newspaper. *Trybuna Ludu* of 1982 consisted of 8 pages on weekdays and 10 on weekends, while in 2001 it consisted of 16 pages Monday through Thursday, 20 on Friday and 16 on Saturday-Sunday, disregarding various additional materials, such as local or special supplements. It was thus almost three times smaller in the 1980s than *The Times*, which also showed in the length of the articles contributing to the two corpora. This is the reason why the Polish data for two out of three of the wars of the 1980s is supplanted with the articles from *Rzeczpospolita*.

Trybuna Ludu and *Rzeczpospolita* were the major national newspapers which were published in the 1980s and are still in circulation today. *Trybuna Ludu* was the organ of the Polish Socialist workers' Party; after the dissolution of the Party it continued to represent the leftist perspective on the political scene. *Rzeczpospolita* was first printed on Jan 14th 1982, and

¹ This social function again is pointed to, but not elaborated on, so that the present study is not engaged and committed ideologically as is the case with Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2003). It is, to an extent, conversant with discourse-historical method developed by Wodak (2001) in so far as in Chapter Three it presents the cultural context, i.e. the philosophical and sociological conceptualisation of war and in particular its literary representation – the context necessary for the analyses in Chapter Four.

² A detailed description of the structure and the compiling procedure of the corpora is given in Appendix 1.

³ I would like to thank Mr. Piotr Szyda for pointing this reference out to me.

was designed as a government newspaper. In 1990 as the formula for the newspaper became obsolete it was redesigned as a privately owned national newspaper. *The Times* has always boasted to be close to the government circles, expressing Britain's official position on world affairs.

The texts gathered in the corpora come from 1982, 1986, 1988-1989 and 2001. They concern such topics as the Britain-Argentina war over the Falklands (April 2nd-June 14th 1982), the American air raid on Libya (April 15th 1986), the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan (May 15th 1988-February 3rd 1989),⁴ and the first phase of the War on Terror – the overthrowing of the Taliban government in Afghanistan (October-December 2001). The choice is guided by the following rationale. It has been assumed that the war reports in the 1980s may differ between the Polish and the British newspapers as Poland and Britain belonged then to two conflicting military organizations, The Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On top of that, Britain was a participant of the Falklands War, while Poland only a distant viewer. In the Libyan conflict, Britain was an ally of the conflict participant, Poland an agitated and indignant viewer. In the case of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the roles were reversed. Poland was an ally of the participant, while Britain was an observer. In the 2001 war against the Taliban, both countries were on the same side of the conflict. I hoped that this choice of conflicts would ensure a wide range of disparate rhetorical strategies for describing conflicts from a variety of perspectives extending along a continuum starting from an active involvement – through alliance with the participant – to observation. As is shown in the analysis in Chapter Four, these expectations have been born out only to a certain extent. That is, although the edge of the tinted representation may have had an opposing direction, the rhetorical strategies and the conceptual metaphors motivating them have been quite similar in both Polish and British press, irrespective of the degree of involvement of the country.

The qualitative analysis of *The Times* War Reports Corpus has also led to a compilation of the lexemes characteristic of the lexical field of war as used in press reports. This list is later used as a starting point for the quantitative study investigating the frequencies of different senses of the words commonly considered as indicators of X IS WAR conceptual metaphor. This study is conducted on the data from the British National Corpus.

⁴ The dating of the events on the basis of Grant (1994).

Such development of qualitative into a quantitative study is in accord with Semino's (2007) suggestion that a detailed qualitative study of metaphorically motivated expressions in a small genre-specific corpus study should lead to a quantitative study in a large general language corpus. The large corpus study can then be used to formulate implications for Cognitive Metaphor Theory. Indeed, the present work develops a frequency related instrument showing which words from the semantic field of war are more likely to indicate X IS WAR conceptual metaphor and which are more likely to indicate the use of other Source Domains.

The book is structured in the following way.

Chapter One presents a short review of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). The cognitive school of linguistics started as a movement towards placing the language in a broader psychological perspective away from the concept of modularity. It emphasised the importance of real life data and criticised invented, artificial examples. In the 1980s its major theoretical and philosophical premises were formulated by Langacker (1987, 1991) and Lakoff – Johnson (1980, 1999). Lakoff stressed the metaphoric nature of the understanding of abstract concepts, such as emotions in contemporary American English (thoroughly researched by Kövecses 1993, 1998); and the radial structure of concepts (e.g. mother). In the 1990s the Lakoffian Conceptual Metaphor Theory was applied to a variety of new fields of study, such as literature and political discourse. It was also tested in psycholinguistic studies and applied to neural networks modelling. Today, we can witness a surge of studies applying CMT analyses to new areas of linguistic investigations such as historical linguistics (Tissari 2001, 2003, 2006; Fabiszak 2002, Fabiszak – Hebda In press), sociolinguistics (e.g. Kristiansen – Dirven In press) and discourse studies of the language of the media (Charteris-Black 2004, Koller 2004, Musolff 2004, Nerlich 2003, 2005a and b).

This work represents the latter trend in the development of cognitive linguistics, often called cognitive discourse analysis. Similarly to the studies mentioned above, the present one recognizes the links between structural and functional European linguistics and American cognitive linguistics. Both schools of linguistic thought see meaning as contextually motivated. Further, both functional and cognitive linguistics share a view of language production as an interactive process. Chapter One aims at placing the present investigation firmly within the conceptual metaphor framework and at showing that embodied and metaphorical nature of

meaning is relevant to the construction of any representation of socio-cultural reality.

The language of the media has attracted special attention for two major reasons. One, its relative availability and two, its significant influence on the public discourse. It is through the media that a social consensus on the conceptualisation of social institutions is negotiated and achieved.

The role of corpora in contemporary linguistic investigations and the distinctive position of the language of the media and its relations with cognitive discourse analysis are presented in Chapter Two.

Chapter Three provides a wider perspective on the conceptualisation of war in a variety of liberal arts and sciences. Attempts to reflect on the nature of war and its role in society as a driving force of change have been made since ancient times. A short review, based on Hassner (2002b), of the philosophical explorations of war starts the presentation of the contemporary approaches to the meaning of war. It is preceded by a brief discussion of the views of the two 19th century theoreticians of war and warfare, Clausewitz and Jomini, whose works are still read and taught in army academies and history seminars. Then, the social studies approach to war is discussed on the basis of a sociological analysis of the Second Gulf War. The representation of war in literature, and its scrutiny by literary critics is given in the next section. The discussion of the literary studies is narrowed down to Polish and British literature, as the texts analysed in Chapter Four were addressed to audiences brought up within these two cultures. A revision of a short history of war correspondents links the popular cultural image of war with media studies. One section is devoted to CMT based linguistic studies of the language used in reporting and talking about war. The chapter ends with an overview of different theories of war and recasts them as the expert and the folk model of the concept. This model forms a backdrop for the analyses in Chapter Four.

Chapter Four in an attempt to elucidate the meaning of political discourse focuses on what Koller (2004) calls secondary discourse, i.e. a representation of the primary political discourse of politicians as represented and mediated by the press. The analysis of the rhetorical strategies used in the war reports of the 1980s and 2001 is based on the newspapers mentioned before. This comparative study of political media discourse focuses on the linguistic representation of two conceptual patterns. One is the categorisation and the construal of the meaning of such concepts as war, politics and diplomacy. This is because 'politics' can both be a su-

perordinate term for 'war' and 'diplomacy', which in such a case may be considered antonymous, and 'politics' can be understood as a co-hyponym of the other two, synonymous to 'diplomacy'. This dual nature of the term, may and often does, increase the degree of ambiguity of the political texts. Another conceptual pattern coming to the fore in the analysis of war reports is the vilification of the enemy employing a range of linguistic strategies, which are uncovered in the analysis. This chapter then, concentrates on WAR as a target of metaphoric mappings within a particular discourse genre. The chronological presentation of the metaphorical discourse patterns in the Polish and British press was designed to show how much or, in fact, how little variation there was in these patterns over the span of 20 years and cross-culturally. In this way, Chapter Four reveals how stable the rhetorical patterns used in the construal of war in newspaper reports are.

In the last part of the book, a number of lexemes identified in the British corpus analysed in Chapter Four are selected and used to query in the British National Corpus (BNC). Chapter Four is focussed on WAR as a target of metaphors within a specific type of discourse: media political discourse, while Chapter Five considers WAR as a source of metaphors and takes the entire BNC as its data source. The reason for this is that the conclusions drawn from this part of the study are meant to apply to language in general, not to any specific genre. The aim of the investigations is to test if the words commonly considered as indicators of the X IS WAR metaphor are indeed most frequently used in the domain of war when used non-metaphorically. The conclusions from this study are to be taken with caution and can perhaps serve as a starting point for further research as frequency is not tantamount to salience and it is salience, not sheer frequency, that determines the indicator status. It is assumed, nevertheless, that if a given word-form is more often used in a primary sense other than war, it may more frequently bring its status as an indicator of the X IS WAR metaphor into question. These considerations focus on just one element of WAR as source of metaphors, i.e. on a preliminary attempt at developing an identification procedure for lexical expressions, which can be considered as indicators of the X IS WAR metaphor.

Chapter I

Conceptual metaphor and its implications for discourse

1. Introduction

Conceptual Metaphor Theory has developed within the so-called cognitive approach to language, which was a reaction to the Chomskyan paradigm.¹ As a result, it criticizes many of the philosophical assumptions underlying the early versions of the latter.² For instance, Langacker (2000: 1) writes:

Subsequently, in the paper titled “A Usage-Based Model” (Langacker 1988), I described the “maximalist”, “non-reductive”, “bottom-up” nature of Cognitive Grammar. In these respects it stood in contrast to the “minimalist”, “reductive”, “top-down” spirit of generative theory, at least in its original (archetypal) formulation.

Although cognitivists do not claim that people are born with a complete *tabula rasa*, they reject the hypothesis about the existence of *Universal Grammar* as an inborn language learning device. The human brain is born with a certain structure of nervous cells and connections between them. Connectionism discards logical symbols and the rules operating on them, as well as stable symbol addresses, in favour of the distributed model of

¹ Many non-linguists consider Chomsky’s theory as cognitive linguistics, because of its mentalist and computational characteristics. Langacker and Lakoff refer to Chomskyanism as generative theory and appropriate the name cognitive for their own approach. On the meaning of the adjective cognitive in linguistics see Krzeszowski (1997b).

² Generative linguistics has become the dominant linguistic paradigm in the US in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. In the late 1970s and the 1980s Langacker, Lakoff and others who all started within the generative paradigm (see e.g. Langacker 1968, Lakoff 1970) broke away from transformational rules and gave rise to a new trend in linguistics. At present the two approaches seem to converge on many issues (see, e.g. Jackendoff 2002 to be presented in more detail in Section 3.).

cognitive processing. It is considered to be the closest representation of the neurophysiological basis of language.

As Kemmer – Barlow (2000: xiii) describe it:

... linguistic units are seen as cognitive routines. During linguistic processing, linguistic units are part and parcel of the system's processing activity: they exist as activation patterns. When no processing is occurring, the information represented by such units simply resides in patterns of connectivity (including differential connection strengths) resulting from previous activations.

Taking into account the immense complexity of the human brain, cognitivists maintain that parsimony of a theoretical description of language is not a condition *sine qua non* of a well-formulated grammar. They believe that the neuronal networks responsible for certain functions can be accessed, and thus activated by many different nodes. Lists of forms as well as rules do not exclude each other – they can exist side by side. Complex concepts are created through partial compositionality, i.e. the resultant complex is not simply a sum of the values of its parts, but rather it inherits some of their qualities and, as a result of composition, creates a new value. This value is context-dependent and may vary with every usage event. Moreover, both the component parts and the complex can be available to reflection relative to their degree of the entrenchment³ of the complex.

The same processes which ensure cognitive development are also responsible for language acquisition. It is the experience between a human organism and the environment as well as the growing awareness of the body which facilitate this learning. This is a basic assumption of cognitivism. Linguistic abilities are not a separate module of cognition, but are akin to other cognitive abilities, such as categorization, figure-ground differentiation and imagery, as a creative process involved in everyday thought and represented in language. Categorization is the process responsible for our ability to generalize, to create and use stereotypes and to create metaphors.

The major tenets of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) (Lakoff – Johnson 1980, 1999), which tries to account for the mental processes

³ Entrenchment is here understood as automatization and fossilisation of the complex, so that it becomes perceived as a whole, which may only partly be available for analysis of its units (Langacker 1991).

enabling our understanding of the physical, social and cultural worlds is presented in Section 2 below. The presentation starts with the account of the early version of the theory and continues with its more recent developments, including its contribution to discourse analysis in Section 2.7. Section 3 is dedicated to a brief discussion of Idealised Cognitive Models (Lakoff 1987), Section 4 to image schemata (Johnson 1987) and Section 5 to force dynamic schema (Talmy 2000) which may all contribute to the underlying conceptual structure providing the basic scaffolding for human thinking. Section 6 is also devoted to an alternative approach to human mental processing – the Blending Theory (Fauconnier – Turner 2002). Finally, axiological semantics (Krzyszowski 1993, 1997a) which attempts to elaborate CMT to account for the system of social and cultural values implied in language is presented in Section 7.

2. Conceptual Metaphor Theory

2.1. The early formulation

Within Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), metaphors, as expressed in language, are not seen as stylistic ornaments, but as evidence for the fact that thinking about, and understanding of the world outside our organisms, as well as the working of our bodies, involves metaphoric processes. CMT claims that this understanding is possible through a system of related concepts, some of which are emergent, some structured metaphorically, and some both emergent and structured metaphorically. Metaphors allow us to understand one thing in terms of another. Metonymy, on the other hand, is referential in nature, it uses one thing to stand for another. Lakoff – Johnson (1980: 106) identify the aims of semantics in the following words:

Any adequate theory of human conceptual system will have to give an account of how concepts are (1) grounded, (2) structured, (3) related to each other, (4) defined.

The basic claim of CMT seems to be that construction of meaning is experientially grounded and that many abstract concepts are metaphorically

structured. It must be stressed, however, that psycholinguists do not hold a unified view on experientialism. Some of them, e.g. Gibbs (1992), are fervent supporters of the claim, others, like Murphy (1997) are equally zealous opponents. Gibbs (1992) believes, following Lakoff – Johnson, that everyday concepts are metaphorically structured and quotes four reasons to support his claim. The first three are linguistic in nature, i.e. the systematicity of metaphorical expressions (first identified by Lakoff – Johnson 1980), novel extensions of conventional metaphors (elaborated on by Lakoff – Turner 1989) and polysemy (Brugman 1988).⁴ The fourth argument Gibbs uses is based on his psychological experiments concerning idiom processing.⁵

Gibbs and his co-workers conducted two experiments on idiom processing. One consisted in examining the mental images subjects had, underlying idiomatic phrases (Gibbs – O’Brien 1990). The experimenters found out that the images for idioms were much more constrained than those for non-idiomatic expressions and explained this as a result of an operation of a conceptual metaphoric constraint. In another study, Nayak – Gibbs (1990) investigated the facilitation of the process of understanding idioms related to emotions if they appeared in heavily metaphorical contexts. As such facilitation did occur, Nayak – Gibbs interpreted the results as evidence for the metaphorical structure of emotion concepts.

Murphy (1997), on the other hand, voices serious doubts concerning the existence and the role of conceptual metaphor. When it comes to the experiential grounding of metaphorical concepts, he is completely sceptical. He states: “Although the notion of embodiment is an interesting one, it is not an empirical finding” and adds: “the argument from embodied cognition must await further development of this theory” (Murphy 1997: 99).⁶

⁴ On the polysemy of the verbs of vision and their metaphoric extension from vision to understanding see Sweetser 1990. A strong criticism of polysemy can be found in Szwedek In press a and b.

⁵ A thorough revision of literature on idiom processing can be found in Cieśllicka 2004.

⁶ I believe that the correlation found by Piaget between the stages of physical and conceptual development in children could be considered as a tentative support for the embodied cognition (for a similar view see Zinken 2003). Also, Bernardez’s (2005) report on the so-called locked-in syndrome, such as presented in Bauby’s (1997) memoir – when the cognitive processes of a person transform and finally disintegrate as a result of a lack of sensory stimulation from a paralysed body – can be read as evidence for embodied cognition.

Having made this reservation Murphy turns to discussing the arguments Gibbs employs to support the conceptual metaphor claim. First, he turns to the polysemy argument. He highlights the fact that cognitivists in their metaphor-based descriptions of various linguistic phenomena do not devote much space to possible, alternative, literal explanations of these phenomena. In addition, he maintains that “I find Sweetser’s explanation of polysemy completely in keeping with a notion of how literally similar meanings might become encompassed by the same word over time. That is, her analysis of polysemy seems quite plausible to me – I simply do not find anything metaphoric about it” (Murphy 1997: 100). Here he touches upon one more important issue, i.e. the use of the term *metaphor* as employed by Lakoff and his followers. Sweetser’s use seems to coincide with that of Ullman (1962), Lyons (1977) or Geeraerts (1997), who all agreed that polysemy may result from metaphoric extensions of word meanings. Geeraerts introduces the notion of the redefinition of the prototypical meaning focus as a result of such diachronic change. Murphy’s most important reservation seems to be that, from an experimental psychologist’s point of view, CMT has not clearly described the representation of metaphorical concepts and should therefore not make such detailed claims about cognition as it does. This appears to be a perennial problem for studies which encroach on both linguistic and psychological territory: that is although both disciplines may ask similar questions and sometimes even use the same terms, the meaning of these terms, as well as what is regarded as a valid answer to the questions, may differ significantly.

2.2. Further development of CMT

Lakoff – Johnson (1999) recount research by Christopher Johnson (1999), Grady (1997) and Narayanan (1997), as possible evidence for CMT. Christopher Johnson investigated the acquisition of metaphor in L1. He analysed the language development corpus of Shem⁷ (MacWhinney 1995) and put forward a hypothesis that children go through a conflation period, when certain domains are conflated, as in “Let’s see what’s in the box”, when seeing is knowing what’s in the box (SEEING and KNOWING are con-

⁷ The corpus of speech development of a child, Shem, was compiled by Clark (1978).

flated). Only later do these two domains differentiate, but the connections established in early childhood between the sensory domain of seeing and what later becomes the abstract domain of knowing are already there and facilitate further metaphoric mappings.

Grady developed Christopher Johnson's ideas proposing a Theory of Primary Metaphors, which claims that the conflation period identified by the latter gives rise to a set of primary metaphors (e.g. KNOWING IS SEEING) which become atomic elements of more complex, future blends.⁸

Narayanan's research contributed to the Neural Theory of Language, which implements neural programming for testing hypotheses about language. They constitute what Lakoff – Johnson (1999: 38) call existence proofs for a potential for metaphoric mappings from sensorimotor domains to abstract domains. That is, in neural programming Narayanan managed to show that general motor control schemas can be used for computations about such abstract notions as verb aspect or the meaning of the MORE IS UP metaphor.

Going back to the original proposal of CMT, Lakoff – Johnson (1980), in their study of ARGUMENT, first tried to create a folk model of the concept, then to discover the metaphors structuring the concept and the relationships between them. It turned out that metaphors often create coherent, but not necessarily consistent complexes (metaphor mixing). One concept can be organized around more than one conceptual metaphor, as shown in Lakoff – Johnson's (1980: 92) example: *At this point our argument doesn't have much content*. This is possible because various metaphors (in the present example: ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY, ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER) can share some of their metaphorical entailments in this instance: *As we make more argument, more of a surface is created*. These entailments ensure the coherence of the conceptualization (*As more of a surface is created, the argument covers more ground*: JOURNEY; *As more of a surface is created, the argument gets more content*: CONTAINER). It also seems that they are akin to the notion of *tertium comparationis*, necessary in any comparative definition of metaphor, sometimes referred to as the abstract schema (for standard and target in Langacker 1987, 1991) or the generic space (Fauconnier – Turner 2002).

⁸ More on Blending Theory in Section 6 below.

Szwedek (2000, 2004, 2005) demonstrates that, unlike in Lakoff – Johnson (1980), it is not so much shared entailments, but the inheritance of properties that is responsible for metaphor coherence. He links this observation smoothly with his theory of objectification, stemming from Kotarbiński's reism. The basic tenet of the theory holds that any abstract entity must first be objectified before any metaphoric mappings can obtain between domains. It is firmly experientially grounded in the sense of touch. This primacy of objectification allows Szwedek to suggest a hierarchical topology of metaphors, in which ontological metaphors are viewed as more basic than structural or orientational metaphors. Szwedek (2005: 238) makes an eloquent general observation following from his theory:

Our immaterial worlds are perceived, or rather constructed in terms of material things. We can understand all other elements of our lives (processes, phenomena) only by assigning material features to these abstract elements – without in fact knowing what exactly we are talking about. (...) Undoubtedly, what keeps a variety of our worlds in unity, in cohesion with our basic world, as well as in harmony with our primitive physical experience of matter, is objectification. [translation mine, MF]

Objectification then appears as one of the basic processes in human conceptualisation on a par with Talmy's (2000) force dynamics, a cross-domain constant. It helps to clarify the relationship between various domains and facilitates cross domain mappings.

The position of Lakoff – Johnson (1980) on the status of source and target domains remains unclear. They say: "... we typically conceptualize the non-physical *in terms of* the physical – that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated" (Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 59).⁹ Ten pages later they say something slightly different: "... it might seem as if there were a clear distinction between directly emergent and metaphorically emergent concepts and that every concept must be one or the other. This is not the case." Moreover, they claim that both the defined and the defining are natural kinds of experience (Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 118). What, then, constitutes the difference between them? Lakoff – Johnson's answer is that "these [source] con-

⁹ This observation is by no means novel. Ullman (1962), while discussing types of metaphoric extensions of meaning, enumerated 'from the concrete to the abstract' as one such possibility.

cepts for natural kinds are structured clearly enough and with enough of the right kind of internal structure to do the job of defining other concepts” (1980: 118). Does this mean that WAR is more concrete and more clearly delineated than ARGUMENT? Why is it possible to have WAR both as the source and target of metaphors (ARGUMENT IS WAR vs. WAR IS A THEATRE)? What kind of embodied experience explains this fact? Or is there no explanation, but the circularity of ARGUMENT IS WAR, because ARGUMENT is less concrete than WAR. Is ARGUMENT less concrete than WAR because it is defined by WAR? An escape from this vicious circle would be to resort to a more basic concept, e.g. force (as in force-dynamics, see Section 5) underlying both argument and war. Force constitutes the more abstract schema, which has emerged from instantiations of its various guises, and which now serves as the commonality allowing the comparison between the two concepts.

Lakoff – Johnson (1999) propose a slightly different solution. Within the Integrated Theory of Metaphor, consisting of Christopher Johnson’s conflation hypothesis, Grady’s Primary Metaphor’s Theory, Narayanan’s Neural Theory of Language and Fauconnier and Turner’s Blending Theory, the atomic primary metaphors are unidirectional, with the mappings going from the sensorimotor domain (source domain) to abstract domains (target domains). When these primary metaphors become inputs for blending processes, complex multidirectional links can be formed. If we employ this hypothesis to the task set forth in the present book, the elements of the sensorimotor schema of force can be unidirectionally mapped onto abstract domains of WAR, ARGUMENT, POLITICS, THE ECONOMY, etc.; however, the mappings between these abstract, metaphorically understood domains, are no longer unidirectional, thus allowing for complex interactions between them.

Kövecses (2002), when discussing motivation of conceptual metaphors, stresses that some of the metaphors are experientially grounded, while others result from our socialisation in a given culture. This may be yet another explanation for the reversibility of source and target in some metaphors.

2.3. The criticism of Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Taylor (2002: 487-501) identifies a weakness of the Lakoffian approach to metaphor, that is its complete ahistoricism. Lakoff claims that all the dead metaphors are evidence of our metaphoric thinking. He in fact uses the term metaphor as an all covering term for figurative thought as represented in everyday language. He entirely disregards the rhetoric tradition and its typology of figurative expressions. In his theory, a distinction between catachresis and a novel metaphor seems irrelevant. Taylor's discussion of the idiom *spill the beans* and the linguistic expressions representing the conceptual metaphor COMPUTER MALFUNCTION IS A DISEASE convincingly proves his point.

Much of the criticism of Lakoff – Johnson (1980) stems from an inadequate representation of the views Lakoff – Johnson criticize. Moreover, CMT is presented as a completely novel approach, as if it had no links whatsoever with a long time metaphor research. Kardela (1992a and b) points to such predecessors of cognitive theory as Koehler (1935, 1940) and Guiraud (1976). He also stresses the similarity to the onomasiological approach to language developed by Baldinger (1984) from Ullman's (1951, 1962) structural semantics. Geeraerts (1993) discusses the links between CMT and philosophical epistemology, in particular Husserl (1929) and Merleau-Ponty (1945, 1960). Jäkel (1997 [2003]) confronts CMT, the comparative approach to metaphor of Aristotle and Quintilian, the interactionist approach of Richards (1936) and Black (1962) and the pragmatic view of Searle (1993). Jäkel (1999) elaborates on the 'overlooked' German philosophers and linguists. Fabiszak (2005) compares the cognitive approach to metaphor theorists from various disciplines such as the French structuralism (Barthes 1967 and Cohen 1979), semiotics (Chatman 1979 and Eco 1976, 1986, 1988), philosophy (Vico following Eco 1986, and Cassirer following Krois 1979), and English structuralism (Ullman 1957, 1962 and Lyons 1977).

A different attempt to place CMT within a broader background is a collection of articles gathered in Dirven – Pörings (2002). These articles try to connect two-domain and multi-domain metaphor theory (CMT and BT¹⁰) with Jakobson's work. Jakobson (1956 [2002]) proposes a theory of

¹⁰ On the multi-domain approach to metaphor – Blending Theory, see section 6 below.

mind, in which the major role is assigned to the metaphoric and metonymic poles of human thought. He sees the evidence for his claim both in language and in human behaviour. For him, metaphor (understood as substitution and similarity) is connected with selection aphasia, the poetry and romanticism in literature, and expressionism and symbolism in art; metonymy, on the other hand, (understood as dependent upon predication, contexture and contiguity) is responsible for agrammatism, novel and realism in literature and cubism in art. Dirven (2002 [1993]) elaborates the connection between the Jakobsonian metaphoric and metonymic poles with paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations in language, respectively. He views metonymy and metaphor as two mental strategies, which although forming a continuum, can be opposed in their prototypical uses along the following lines (Dirven 2002: 100):

In metonymy two elements are brought together, they are mapped on one another, but keep their existence and are construed as forming a contiguous system. (...)

In metaphor, too, two elements are brought together, but the source domain loses its existence when mapped onto the target domain. Although the source domain itself is wiped out, some aspects of its own nature or structure are transferred to that of the target domain. The contrast between the two elements or domains is often so great that this disparity can only lead to full substitution of one domain by the other.

Croft (1993 [2002]) is strongly critical of CMT, but he adheres to its major claims. He notices that the status of domains is of vital importance to the theory, therefore their nature cannot remain underspecified. He proves his point in a detailed analysis of the LIFE IS A PATIENT metaphor proposed by Lakoff – Johnson (1980: 49) as the underlying conceptual metaphor for such linguistic expressions as:

This is a sick relationship.
They have a strong healthy marriage.
The marriage is dead – it can't be revived.
Their marriage is on the mend.
We're getting back on our feet.

and several others. Croft (2002: 176) criticises this decision and convincingly argues in favour of the LIFE IS A BODILY STATE metaphor instead.

This shows how arbitrary the concept of domain and domain mapping is and how vague the procedures for domain identification are.

Kövecses (p.c.) maintains that the more detailed a study of the concept in question we conduct, the more apt our proposed domains should become. He advocates such methods as a means of linguistic analysis of examples, elicitation of folk models, and introspection. In view of this argument, in Chapter Three I shortly review the definitions of the concept of war as proposed or at least implied in philosophy, sociology, literature, mass media studies and linguistics. This revision is hoped to provide a necessary cultural grounding for the understanding of the concept of war essential in the identification, categorisation and labelling of conceptual metaphors in Chapter Four. A further discussion of the procedure of domain identification and a proposal for a method facilitating it is given in Chapter Five.

Nerlich – Clark (2002 [2001]) also offer a review of the roots of the present day theory of metaphor. They refer to Locke, Kant and Vico (the first two also discussed by Lakoff – Johnson (1999)) as the founding fathers of the 19th and 20th century philosophy of language. From among many contributors to the field, they consider Wegener (1885)¹¹ as one of the most prominent. Wegener saw words as prompts for the hearer to reconstruct other instances of the word's use and through these to arrive at the speaker's meaning. The speaker need not give the whole information, but through careful selection of words s/he should decide which are the necessary clues for the hearer to retrieve the intended information. This idea was further developed by Gardiner (1932), who claims that “the meaning of the word (in language) is an accumulation of the former applications of a word (in speech) to refer to specific things meant” (paraphrased by Nerlich – Clark 2002: 572). He even calls this possible range of applications “areas of meaning”. Stählin (1913) and Bühler (1930, 1934), two psychologists from the turn of the 20th century, have also ascribed to this model of meaning construction. Nerlich – Clark (2002: 586) finish their review of possible predecessors of cognitive theory with a warning:

... there is a danger that cognitive semanticists are going too far in opposing older, so-called ‘objectivist’ feature type theories of meaning. Mean-

¹¹ From a long list of authors quoted by Nerlich – Clark I have selected only those few whose affinity to cognitive theories of meaning I deemed most significant.

ing is not only *constructed*, a construction which has been studied from Gerber to Fauconnier, it is also *given* in a language, and it is this givenness that structuralist theories of meaning try to capture, especially in Europe...

Despite many criticisms that CMT has encountered, it has undoubtedly performed an important function in popularizing the cognitive linguistic approach to imagery and conceptualization. The ideas expressed in Lakoff – Johnson (1980) have given spur to many linguistic and interdisciplinary studies of metaphoric thinking. The following passage from Lakoff – Johnson (1980: 40) inspired research in linguistics and related social sciences:

The conceptual systems of cultures and religions are metaphorical in nature. Symbolic metonymies are critical links between everyday experience and the coherent metaphorical systems that characterize religions and cultures. Symbolic metonymies that are grounded in our physical experience provide an essential means of comprehending religious and cultural concepts.

Clearly, Conceptual Metaphor Theory can contribute to studies concerned with the intersection of language, cognition and society. It can inform discourse studies – see Section 2.7. below.

2.4. Generic metaphors and the Great Chain of Being

Lakoff – Turner (1989) apply CMT to the analysis of poetry. Their basic premise is that a poetic use of metaphor is based on the very same conceptual experientially grounded metaphors as the everyday metaphors are. In fact, poetic metaphors consist in the extension, elaboration, questioning and composition of the same patterns as those discussed in Lakoff – Johnson (1980). The authors further develop CMT by positing the existence of generic-level metaphors. These differ from the specific-level or basic metaphors in two ways: their source and target domains are not fixed, and the entities that undergo mapping are not specified. This follows from the fact that “[g]eneric level metaphors relate generic level schemas” (Lakoff – Turner 1989: 81). As neither ARGUMENT nor WAR are generic level concepts, the fact that the source and target domains are reversible in generic metaphors does not bear on the reservations voiced above. Yet, a proposal that

[t]here exists a single generic-level metaphor, generic is specific, which maps a single specific level schema onto an indefinitely large number of parallel specific-level schemas that all have generic level structure as the source domain schema

(Lakoff – Turner 1989: 162).

does seem to solve both the problem of domains that may serve as sources and as targets, as well as that of the reversal of source and target domains (as in LIFE IS ART and ART IS LIFE).

Another elaboration of CMT proposed in Lakoff – Turner (1989) is the Great Chain Metaphor. This metaphor is built on an elaborate and widespread belief that humans, animals, plants, things, or in short, the world as we know it, can be ordered in a hierarchy from more to less complex or advanced. Each level has characteristic properties, arranged in such a way that the higher order beings share the properties of the lower order, but not vice versa. For example, humans can have animal instincts, but animals do not have morality. The Great Chain of Being Model performs two functions. The first one is to extend the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor in such a way that it is possible to understand one level life forms in terms of another level of life forms. The second function is performed in combination with the Maxim of Quantity, and consists in allowing the selection of the most relevant attributes available in the source domain.

Interestingly, corpus studies can provide some if only indirect evidence for the existence of the Great Chain of Being. Stubbs (2002: 38 [2001]) writes:

Such sets of words [*corpse, body, victim*] also provide an insight into the way in which English categorizes a small part of the social world. There are several terms for dead humans. There are terms for dead animals, if they are useful as a food source. There are terms for large dead trees [*lumber, timber*], especially if they are useful and/or cultivated. But there are no terms for dead insects or smaller dead plants. The vocabulary embodies a hierarchy of importance and gives decreasing attention to humans, animals and plants.

Jackendoff – Aaron (1991) in their review of Lakoff – Turner (1989) stress the same drawbacks of presentation as was the case for Lakoff – Johnson (1980). They point out that the bibliography of the book is inadequate even for students in the beginners' course in literary theory.

They criticize the fact that there is no clear delineation of what is novel and particular for Lakoff – Turner’s approach and what is a widely accepted common knowledge within the discipline. Another related problem is that the views criticized by the book’s authors are not clearly attributed to anybody, so that misrepresentation and misinterpretation can occur, which Jackendoff – Aaron believe was the case with Rorty (1979, 1989).

2.5. Metaphor from a functional perspective

Goatly (1997) creatively develops the idea of conceptual metaphors. He calls their lexical realizations root analogies and plots a complex and detailed network of such analogies for the English language. This exhaustive list gives further support to Lakoff – Turner’s (1989) claim that poetic metaphor exploits conventional metaphor (or root analogies) through novel rewording. Unlike Lakoff and his co-workers, though, Goatly gives a careful consideration to a number of other approaches to metaphor. This, however, may occasionally result in a certain terminological confusion. One such case is with the term *simile* and its relation to metaphor. In the discussion of comparative view, it is stated that “metaphor can be best viewed as an ellipsed version of a simile or comparison” (Goatly 1997: 118), while a few pages later “... [t]hese simile frameworks may be exploited for metaphoric purposes” (my underlining) (Goatly 1997: 184). Is simile synonymous to metaphor or not? The answer to this question appears in passim (Goatly 1997: 231-238), where a distinction between literal similes, quasi-literal similes and metaphorical similes is introduced.

An undisputable contribution of Goatly to CMT is his attempt to place it within a larger framework, that of Relevance Theory and the Hallidayan functional approach to language. Goatly believes that the live metaphor which increases processing effort remains relevant if we extend the suggested levels of decoding, consisting of the knowledge of the language system, the knowledge of the context (situation and co-text), and factual and socio-cultural knowledge, by a fourth element: a description of an imaginary state of affairs. His elaborated model (Goatly 1997: 147-148) allows not only for a satisfactory interpretation of novel metaphors in discourse, but also for the interpretation of texts in a variety of genres, including fiction, and may be viewed as Phenomenalistic Metaphor for an actual state of affairs.

Goatly (1997: 166) proposed as many as thirteen functions of metaphors neatly subdivided into Halliday's three metafunctions:

Lexical Gap-filling, Explanation/Modelling and Reconceptualization correspond to Halliday's ideational metafunction. The next five functions have a strong interpersonal element: Argument by Analogy seems partly ideational, partly emotive; Cultivation of Intimacy, Humour and Games certainly have a phatic element (...) The ideological function, too, is both ideational and interpersonal (...). Fiction is partly interpersonal and partly textual. Enhancing Memorability, Foregrounding and Informativeness, along with Textual Structuring [primarily perform] (...) Halliday's textual function.

Apart from situating CMT within Relevance Theory and functionalism, Goatly gives careful consideration to the processes of identifying linguistic metaphors in texts. In order to do so he proposes an exhaustive list of markers which signal that a metaphor has been used. He also devises a methodology for topic (target) and ground (tertium comparationis) specification.

Reliable tests for metaphor identification have always been an important methodological issue. Goatly's contribution is thus undeniable. Yet, a regular use of this comprehensive and detailed inventory of lexical and syntactic triggers, seems a formidable research task.

Another useful strain of research introduced in Goatly (1997) is an attempt to show how contextual variables of a social situation influence the interpretation of metaphors. To do so, he analyses the use of metaphor in six different genres: conversation, news reports, popular science magazines, advertising, novels and poetry. His results indicate that the distribution of metaphor types within the different genres may depend on the purpose of the text, its discursal tradition, the relation between the author and the reader of the text and directly related to the processing times available to the addressor and the addressee, which in turn are related to the Processing Effort.

2.6. Linguistic and conceptual metaphor – a terminological problem

Dobrzyńska (1992), accepting many of the cognitive claims as a continuation of the structural and classical philological position in literary studies,

rejects the levelling between the poetic and everyday metaphor. She insists that the use of the term *metaphor* is only justified in the meaning of poetic or rhetorical figure of speech (Lakoff's novel metaphor). In other cases, different terms should be used, for example *catachresis* or *analogy*. Dobrzyńska does not seem to accept the distinction between metaphor as a linguistic expression and conceptual metaphor – a cognitive process which consists in a simultaneous activation of conceptual domains which facilitates the understanding of one thing in terms of another. Such understanding may underlie a variety of linguistic expressions, both these which we call metaphor and those which we call analogy. Lakoff – Johnson do not claim that linguistic expressions cannot be classified in the traditional way. What they do is to claim that their functioning, as well as much of human social and cultural, non-linguistic behaviour can be elucidated through a conceptual process, which they call conceptual metaphor.

Sadock (1993) represents a view similar to that of Dobrzyńska, advocating a stricter adherence to the classical terminology, which he briefly reviews. He stresses that

... all of these types of figures [metaphor, irony, euphemism] are alike in that they communicate in an indirect way what might have been communicated directly in terms of the conventions of language. For this reason, they have an effect over and above what would accompany the accomplishment of the intended effect

(Sadock 1993: 43).

This clearly suggests that catachresis (Goatly's metaphor in its Gap-filling function, Lakoff's everyday metaphor) cannot be subsumed under the concept of metaphor as understood by Sadock. He also supports the pragmatic approach to figurative language and claims that its understanding follows from the hearer's assumption that the Gricean Cooperation Principle is always in force. Similarly to CMT, he agrees that certain metaphors, e.g. understanding time in terms of space, may not only be a linguistic phenomenon, but rather a cognitive universal.

Ortony (1993) acknowledges this terminological difference and points out that the word metaphor is used in present-day cognitive research in two meanings: as a superordinate term for all figurative or imagistic use of language, and as a co-hyponym of other similar terms, such as catachresis, metonymy, simile and others. In the Lakoffian tradition it is

also used as a name for cognitive processes (conceptual metaphor), the evidence for which are networks of linguistic metaphors (see Goatly's root analogies).

Black (1993: 20) also notices this trend and comments:

A related inflationary thrust is shown in a persistent tendency (...) to regard all figurative uses of language as metaphorical, and in this way to ignore the important distinctions between metaphor and such other figures of speech as simile, metonymy, synecdoche.

He also rejects the division into dead and live metaphors:

... the only entrenched classification is grounded in the trite opposition (itself expressed metaphorically) between "dead" and "live" metaphors. It is no more helpful than, say, treating a corpse as a special case of a person: A so called dead metaphor is not a metaphor at all, but merely an expression that no longer has a pregnant metaphorical use. (...) one might consider replacing the dead and alive contrast by a set of finer discriminations: distinguishing perhaps between expressions whose etymologies, genuine or fancied, suggest a metaphor beyond resuscitation (a muscle as a little mouse, *muculus*), those where the original, now usually unnoticed, metaphor can be usefully restored (obligation as involving some kind of *bondage*); and those, the object of my present interest, that are, and are perceived to be, actively metaphoric

(Black 1993: 25).¹²

Black's most important contribution to the study of metaphor, though, is not his participation in a terminological discussion, but his interactionist theory of metaphor, which he summarizes as follows:

1. A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as "primary" and "secondary" one. (...)
2. The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing. (...) In retrospect, the intended emphasis upon "systems", rather than upon "things" or "ideas" (as in Richards) looks like one of the chief novelties in the earlier study.
3. The metaphorical utterance works by "projecting upon" the primary subject a set of "associated implications", comprised in the implicative complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject. (...)

¹² Itkonen (2005) expresses a similar view (I would like to thank Adam Głaz for this suggestion).

4. The marker of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the primary subject by applying to it statements isomorphic with the members of the secondary subject's implicative complex. (...)
5. In the context of a particular metaphorical statement, the two subjects "interact" in the following ways: (a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary subject's properties; and (b) invites him to construct a parallel implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject

(Black 1993: 27, 28).

Black's subjects would be Lakoff's source and target, Goatly's vehicle and topic, or Fauconnier's inputs. It is important to note the fact that contrary to Lakoff's Invariance Hypothesis, Black believes that both domains are affected by the working of metaphor. He also stresses that metaphor cannot be reduced to simile as "The literal comparison lacks the ambience and suggestiveness, and the imposed "view" of the primary subject, upon which a metaphor's power to illuminate depends" (Black 1993: 30). This position is similar to that presented by Jackendoff – Aaron (1991) in their review of Lakoff – Turner (1989). They observe that Lakoff – Turner's account of the poetic metaphor does not explain where the aesthetic power of metaphor comes from.

2.7. Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Discourse Analysis

The studies on the intersection of CMT and discourse have flourished, as evidenced in such works as Nerlich (2003, 2005 a and b), Musolff (2004), Charteris-Black (2004) and Zinken (2002, 2004). Nerlich stresses that metaphors play not only a representational, but also a performative function. They orient their users towards possibilities for action and shape their involvement and material investment. For example, in the British media representation of Foot and Mouth Disease, the pervasive metaphors were the military metaphors, and military solutions were applied to the problem (extermination of large herds of livestock and incineration of their carcasses). Whether the actions could have been different if another mode of representation had been chosen, is impossible to ascertain. Nerlich (2005) focuses on what she calls discourse metaphors in media lan-

guage and identifies their characteristics. They are strategically fuzzy, ideologically biased, have a social and cultural history, influence social and cultural frames and activate specific emotional commitments.

The social grounding of metaphors is also pronounced in Musolff (2004), who proposes to employ the concept of the given scenario within the metaphorical framework to solve the problem of cross-linguistic differences between German and British media representation of the debates about Europe. He shows how, within the same conceptual metaphor, different sets of mappings are selected in different discourses, giving rise to contradictory axiological values of the overall representations. For example, in the COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE metaphor introduced to European politics by Gorbachev, different source language cultures may lead to different implications. That is, in Russian, a house is usually a tenement block with many flats, which implies some independence within the flats, but also stresses a need for communal effort in servicing and managing the whole building. In the US and Britain a house is single-family small building set in a garden, fenced with walls. In this structure of the Source Domain the focus is on the separation from the others, not on co-operation.

Charteris-Black (2004) places the study of metaphor firmly within a discourse analytic framework and proposes to call it Critical Metaphor Analysis. There are two valuable theoretical contributions in his work. The first is the suggestion that the reversal of metaphors, where X IS Y subliminally facilitates the use of Y IS X, is quite common. The author exemplifies it with FOOTBALL IS WAR and WAR IS FOOTBALL. The second issue concerns methodology and calls for enhancing qualitative data analysis with quantitative metaphor frequency counts made possible by the use of language corpora. This topic will be further elaborated on in Chapter Two Section 4.

Zinken (2004) attempts to combine CMT with the Ethnolinguistic School of Lublin (ESL) developed by Bartmiński (see, for example 1999) and points out that within ESL, metaphor is just one among many important means of stereotyping, i.e. building a linguistic representation of the world. This representation has a clear social (interpersonal), as well as cognitive (intrapersonal) function, as within Bartmiński's paradigm "stereotypes are viewed as chiefly cognitive phenomenon, with evaluative function of enforcing in- and out-groups" relations (Zinken 2004: 116). Zinken identifies the major difference between the two approaches. For

instance, within CMT only representations stemming from direct sensorimotor experience are seen as literal, while others seem to be interpreted as metaphorical. ESL, on the other hand, makes a distinction between myth (conventional) and metaphor (performative), defined by Zinken (2004: 132) in the following words:

The distinction between metaphors and myths serves the purpose to distinguish two types of an imaginative, narrative understanding of the world: a type in which the speaker – more or less unconsciously – (linguistically) *behaves* according to a particular picture of the world (=the mythical type), and a type in which a speaker (linguistically) *acts* upon this picture (=the metaphorical type) (Zinken 2002). Metaphoric acts can be habitualised and thus be used with very little consciousness – as in what I have called discourse metaphors

(Zinken et al. submitted).

Zinken further develops his concept of a discourse-situated ‘figurative’ language use in cooperation with Evans (Evans – Zinken 2005). In their lexically based theory of conceptual projection, they draw a clear line between conventional uses of language, which does not require projection (though these projections may historically have resulted from them), and innovative uses. They also try to overcome the problem with stable between-the-domains mappings by positing that the projection obtains between lexical concepts (senses) rather than entire domains. The lexical concepts are viewed as access points to larger networks of meaning, both linguistic and conceptual. Thus the identification of domains and domain boundaries is no longer a problem. They do not reject CMT entirely, but rather add or renew its socio-historical focus, as evident in the following passage:

... how can we explain regular *patterns* of elaboration? The development of the theoretical construct of ‘conceptual metaphor’ was supposed to account for the fact that it is conventionally felicitous not only that someone *attacked* my arguments, but also that I *defended* my claims, and in the end *won* the argument. Do such coherent patterns not require us to assume that there is a general mapping – ARGUMENT IS WAR – which ‘lies’ behind such utterances? We will argue in this section that large-scale models do indeed play a role in the elaboration of concepts, but that the patterns of figurative language is a process which unfolds in socio-historical time between speakers, rather than constituting a generalised pattern which is licensed by virtue of ‘underlying’ conceptual metaphors

(Evans – Zinken 2005: 16).

The authors show that the interpretation of the metaphoric expression depends not only on the conventional metaphor that may be or may have been underlying it, but also on its interaction with the context, which facilitates the appropriate profiling of the concept in question.

Cameron – Deignan (2006) stress the need to focus on discourse analysis and corpus research in the investigation of the linguistic realisations of conceptual metaphors. They present a number of questions resulting from their research. For example, they show that linguistic metaphors are subject to lexical and grammatical restrictions. They refer to Deignan (2005), who discovered specific patterns of distribution of linguistic metaphors that cannot be explained by reference to the underlying conceptual mappings. For instance the plural noun *flames* is used more frequently about anger and love, while singular *flame* more often refers to faith and idealism and rarely to anger. Cameron – Deignan (2006: 674) claim that:

... these questions cease to be problematic when a metaphor is no longer viewed as a systematic web of mental connections, realised through language in a uni-directional relationship. We argue here and elsewhere that the relationship between language and thought is instead a two-way interaction within a single complex system. In this view metaphor emerges from a dynamics of language and thinking, and is at the same time conceptual and linguistic. Furthermore our data suggest that the affective – the beliefs, attitudes, values, and emotions of participants – plays a central, but often neglected, role in the emergence of particular forms of metaphor.

They develop their emergentist discourse approach to metaphor further and say:

Metaphorical language and metaphorical thinking are therefore interdependent, each affecting the other in the dynamic and dialogic processes of talking-and-thinking

(Cameron – Deignan 2006: 675).

They also expand their approach with a socio-cultural dimension:

... metaphor, like most other uses of language, is designed for other people and for particular discourse purposes. An important dimension of the dialogics of metaphor is its use to express affect and attitude along with the ideational content

(Cameron – Deignan 2006: 676).

This approach to metaphor seems to be akin to the approach transparent in Nerlich – Clark (2002) presented above, who stress the importance of language system in the study of metaphor. The emphasis on the role of metaphor in the expression of affect and the values of the speaker is also discussed in reference to frame shifting (Coulson 2001) and axiological semantics (Krzeszowski 1993, 1997) in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. All of these studies constitute the theoretical foundation for Chapter Four in which I analyse the use of linguistic metaphor in war reports to identify its function in war discourse in different times and languages. The presentation of data on a selected military conflict as represented in one newspaper is divided into three parts: paragraph-structuring metaphors, isolated metaphors, and other rhetorical strategies. Paragraph-structuring metaphors are lexical realisations of a single conceptual metaphor underlying larger portions of text, such as a paragraph or an entire article. They play an important discourse-structuring function. Isolated metaphors are also linguistic expressions motivated by conceptual metaphors, but their impact on discourse is limited to one sentence or sentence fragment only. Other rhetorical strategies may, or may not be motivated by conceptual metaphors but they contribute to the overall imagery and often enhance the rhetorical effect of the text.

The next section gives a brief overview of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory to consolidate the presentation so far. Then we turn to other conceptual structures (ICM, image schemata, force dynamics) organizing our mental processes to finish with Blending Theory and axiological semantics.

2.8. The systemization of metaphors

Kövecses (2002) offers a comprehensive outline of the state of the art of metaphor research. He structures the taxonomy of metaphors around four coinciding dimensions: conventionality, function, nature and the level of generality.

Both conceptual and linguistic metaphors can be highly conventionalised or novel (unconventional). A conceptual metaphor proposed by Lakoff – Johnson (1980) LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART is novel and can only have novel linguistic expressions. A conventional

conceptual metaphor, i.e. LIFE IS A JOURNEY, can have either highly conventional linguistic expression, like in *He passed away*, or a novel, however much exploited in CL literature, expression from Robert Frost's poem "The Road Not Taken": *Two roads diverged in a wood, and I - / I took the one less travelled by.*

The function dimension is related to Lakoff – Johnson's (1980) division of conceptual metaphors into ontological, structural and orientational. A distinction mentioned before in 2.1.

As far as the nature of metaphors is concerned, they can be either knowledge-based or image-based with a specific sub-type: the one-shot image metaphor. In this case it is impossible to unveil the generic structure underlying metaphor, it is more like a superimposition of two images, as in *My wife's waist is an hourglass.*

When it comes to the level of generality, metaphors can either be specific or generic. These two concepts are related to natural taxonomies with basic level representatives of a category and the hyperonym, the general label for the category. In the case of the conceptual metaphor the generic-level is represented by e.g. EVENTS ARE ACTIONS or GENERIC IS SPECIFIC, while the specific-level metaphors are, for instance, all those structural metaphors so common in CMT literature: ARGUMENT IS WAR, LIFE IS A JOURNEY.

This classification of metaphors by Kövecses (2002) puts together various typologies offered in Lakoff – Johnson (1980), Lakoff – Turner (1989) and Lakoff (1993). It offers a more structured account of the metaphorical construal of the world and the interaction between metaphorical expressions and metaphorical concepts.

3. Idealized Cognitive Models

Lakoff developed his theory of meaning further in his *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (1987) where he proposed the existence of Idealised Cognitive Models as the reference constructs for understanding concepts. He defines them as follows (Lakoff 1987: 68):

Each ICM is a complex structured whole, a gestalt, which uses four kinds of structuring principles

- propositional structure, as in Fillmore’s frames
- metaphoric mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson
- metonymic mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson

Each ICM, as used, structures a mental space, as described by Fauconnier.

In his discussion of the Dyirbal classifier system, based on Dixon (1982), he isolated what he believes to be the general principles of human categorization (1987: 95-96). There are eight such principles. *Centrality* distinguishes the basic from the peripheral members of the category. *Chaining* allows for the structuring of complex categories, so that the basic members can be chained to less central members, and these in turn to the members even further away from the centre. Not all the members are chained to each other, but those which are may be a testimony to the extension of the category. *Experiential domains* and *Idealized Models* motivate the links in the chains. They may but need not be culture specific. *Specific Knowledge* supersedes general types. In human categorization ‘*and everything else*’ is a possible category. Category members do not have to share *common properties*. These principles may explain (*motivate*) the existing categories, but cannot predict the new members.

An analysis of the Japanese classifier *hon* enables Lakoff (1987: 110) to formulate another list of principles of the linguistic organization. Here he includes: centrality, basic level members at the centre, conventional mental images and the knowledge about them, image schema transformations, metonymy in mental imagery and in experience, and metaphors.

Finally, he suggests that there are four types of cognitive models: propositional models, image-schematic models, and metaphoric and metonymic models. If cognitive models are synonymous to ICMs, it remains unclear why one should posit the three last types. The existence of image schemata has been posited by Langacker (1987, 1991), and metaphoric and metonymic mappings explained in Lakoff – Johnson (1980).¹³ Why insist on calling them models? At first, Lakoff claims that these three and Fillmore’s propositional structure are the structuring principles of ICMs. The meaning of ‘principle’ adds to the confusion. That is, are

¹³ Moreover, the status of ICM vs. Fillmore’s propositional structure is not delineated, either. If and how they differ is not spelt out.

propositional structures and image schemata parts of ICMs or are they external to ICMs? Are metonymy and metaphor principles *cum* rules or processes responsible for the change within the models? All of these doubts amount to a fundamental question: Do we need ICMs at all? Doesn't Ockham's razor require us not to create unnecessary constructs? Do we need an empty label that can be filled in with any concept posited by other authors? It seems that Lakoff (1987) does not give an adequate grounding for the independent existence of ICMs. He simply does not define how they differ from constructs posited earlier and in what way they improve the descriptive adequacy of cognitive linguistic theory.

4. Image schemata

As image schemata underlie the concept of ICM (Section 3 above) and the Generic Space of the Blending Theory (Section 6 below), it seems therefore necessary to refer to Johnson's (1987) work, in which he elaborates the notion of meaning as being experientially grounded. He claims that our meaning construction emerges from our bodily experience. The physical experience of the human body is the basis for a series of image schemata, which recur in a wide range of human everyday activities. Johnson (1987: 44) clearly indicates the inspiration of his theory with gestalt theory and says:

I am using the term "gestalt structure" to mean an organized, unified whole within our experience and understanding that manifests a repeatable pattern or structure. (...) [E]xperiential gestalts have internal structure that connects up aspects of our experience and leads to inferences in our conceptual system. What I am calling "image schemata" in this book are all gestalt structures, in the sense just described. (...) There are other kinds of gestalt structure besides schemata. For example, there are gestalts for complex categorical structures, for metaphorical projections, and for unified narrative patterns.

Johnson (1987: 126) proposes a partial list of schemata:

CONTAINER	BALANCE	COMPULSION
BLOCKAGE	COUNTERFORCE	RESTRAINT REMOVAL
ENABLEMENT	ATTRACTION	MASS-COUNT
PATH	LINK	CENTRE-PERIPHERY
CYCLE	NEAR-FAR	SCALE
PART-WHOLE	MERGING	SPLITTING
FULL-EMPTY	MATCHING	SUPERIMPOSITION
ITERATION	CONTACT	PROCESS
SURFACE	OBJECT	COLLECTION

Johnson (1987) discusses only a number of selected image schemata in some detail. Those most fundamental in examining the domain of ‘war’ are the schemata underlying the concept of ‘force’. There are seven basic image schemata, which underlie the notion of force. These are COMPULSION, BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, DIVERSION, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT, ENABLEMENT, and ATTRACTION. Compulsion is related to “the experience of being moved by the external forces” (Johnson 1987: 45). Blockage represents a situation in which our force meets an obstacle which stops or resists it. Counterforce is a “head-on meeting of two forces” (Johnson 1987: 46). Diversion is viewed as a variant of counterforce, where as a result of the interaction of two or more forces their vector is changed. Removal of restraint is a case in which the obstacle blocking our force is removed by an external force. Enablement originates from “a felt sense of power (or lack of power) to perform some action” (Johnson 1987: 47). Attraction takes place when through the operation of magnetic field or gravitation one object is pulled towards another. All of these schemata are related to such features of the notion of ‘force’ as interaction; movement and source, path, goal related to it; the scale of intensity; and finally, causality. After these detailed considerations Johnson admits that these schemata and features do not exhaust the list of distinct force gestalts and suggests a few more, i.e. IMPACT, CONTINUOUS STEADY FORCE, INTERMITTENT FORCE, DIMINISHING FORCE. It is difficult at this stage not to see the obvious problem of all semantic investigations, that is the number and identity of elements necessary for a description of meaning. Feature semantics could not solve the problem. Natural Semantic Metalanguage, with its ever increasing list of lexical

primitives, did not solve the problem. Image schemata do not seem to solve it either. Perhaps a desire for a complete definition cannot be satisfied?

Johnson used his force gestalts to explain the structure of the English modal verbs. His endeavour was based on the work of Talmy (1985) and Sweetser (1990). The investigation led him from the experientially grounded gestalts to the abstract notion of modality. In this way he hoped to have proven that even the most abstract of human concepts emerge from bodily experience.

5. Force dynamics

As a representative of the moderate wing of cognitivism, Talmy is clearly rooted in the generative tradition, as evidenced by the representations he uses (2000: 347-377, 471-550). Still, he is truly cognitive in an attempt to identify the structuring common to various cognitive systems, such as language, visual perception and reasoning. This interdisciplinary approach is evident in his insistence on using the concept of ception “to cover all the cognitive phenomena, conscious and unconscious, understood as the conjunction of perception and conception” (Talmy 2000: 139). At the same time he suggests that “...vision and language ha[ve] a content subsystem and a structure subsystem” (2000: 160), which seems strikingly similar to the Chomskyan claim that language consists of grammar (structure subsystem) and lexicon (content subsystem).

Despite the cognitivist demand for real-occurring data, Talmy uses constructed examples and formulates claims which could not be tested statistically, and therefore reduces possible empirical arguments to a manner of speech, as in:

... in language, fictive motion occurs preponderantly more than fictive stationariness. That is, linguistic expressions that manifest fictive motion far outnumber ones that manifest fictive stationariness. In other words, linguistic expression exhibits a strong bias toward conceptual dynamism as against staticism

(Talmy 2000: 171).

In this passage, expressions such as *more*, *far outnumber*, *a strong bias toward* could be referring to some real statistical values. Instead, they are used as if they were intensifiers.

When discussing the theory of the windowing of attention in language, Talmy suggests an Event Frame as a unit of analysis. An Event Frame consists of conceptual elements and interrelationships between them, which are often evoked together or co-evoked. He admits that the notion is similar to Fillmore's (1982) frame or scene, but he clearly specifies the differences between them. First of all, Talmy stresses both the co-existence and the exclusion of certain elements from the frame (windowing vs. gapping), whereas Fillmore focuses on co-presence only. Moreover, the Fillmoreian scenes have a language-specific sociocultural dimension, whereas Talmy's event frames are supposed to be more generic categories, universal across languages, and probably innate (Talmy 2000: 259-260).

For example, the force-dynamic event frame consists of such schematic elements as Agonist and Antagonist, an intrinsic force tendency ascribed to them – either towards action or towards rest, resultant of the force interaction – either action or rest, balance of strengths – weaker vs. stronger entity. As can be easily noticed, the elements of the event frame pattern into opposing dyads, receiving additional support from and even more basic characteristics of human reasoning – a propensity for dichotomy.

According to Talmy (2000: 409), force dynamics is

... first of all, a generalization over the traditional linguistic notion of "causative": it analyzes 'causing' into finer primitives and sets it naturally within a framework that also includes 'letting', 'hindering', 'helping', and still further notions not normally considered in the same context. (...)

Force dynamic patterns are also incorporated in open-class lexical items and can be seen to bring any of these together into systematic relationships. Lexical items involved in this way refer not only to physical force interactions but, by metaphoric extension, also to psychological and social interactions, conceived in terms of psychosocial "pressures". In addition, force-dynamic principles can be seen to operate in discourse, pre-eminently in directing patterns of argumentation, but also in guiding discourse expectations and their reversal.

This view is of particular value to the present study, as one of the working hypotheses to be tested against corpus data is the hypothesis that the concept of 'war' is an extension of the more schematic notion of 'conflict', which, in turn, may be analyzed within the force-dynamic approach. The fact that force dynamics may underlie our conceptualizations of psychological and social phenomena may be the mechanism enabling speakers to

create metaphoric mappings from the domain of ‘war’ to these social and psychological phenomena.

Talmy himself elaborates this possibility in the description of the ‘divided self’ and the force-dynamic patterning of intrapsychological force-like urges (e.g. ‘refraining’). He expands this idea in the following passage (Talmy 2000: 432-433):

The Agonist is identified with the self’s desires, reflecting an inner psychological state. It is being overcome by an Antagonist acting either as blockage – in this psychological context, one might say “suppression” – or as a spur. This antagonist represents a sense of responsibility or propriety and appears as an internalization of external social values. In effect, perhaps, a force-dynamic opposition originating between the self and the surroundings seems here to be introjected into an opposition between parts of the self. Correspondingly, the desiring part is understood as more *central* and the blocking or spurring part as more *peripheral*.

The psychodynamics can be further extended to sociodynamics, where “[t]he base of the metaphor is one object’s direct imposition of physical force on another object toward the latter manifesting a particular action” (Talmy 2000: 438), as in ‘urging’, ‘persuading’, ‘refusing’, ‘resisting’.

6. Blending Theory

Fauconnier (1997) presents his Blending Theory as an attempt to understand how language processing as well as other cognitive processes can be performed at such a staggering speed. He suggests that in thinking, and in understanding utterances, we build up mental spaces and conduct operations on them in order to decode the speaker’s meaning or to find a solution to a puzzle or to a mathematical formula. There are three types of mental spaces: generic space,¹⁴ input spaces and the blend. Generic space can be understood as a *tertium comparationis* for the input spaces. Fauconnier (1997: 149) defines it as follows

¹⁴ In a discussion on cogling in August 2005 Lakoff claims that the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor he and Turner posit in (1989) is a historical ancestor of the Generic Space of Fauconnier – Turner (2002).

There is a *generic space*, which maps onto each of the inputs. This generic space reflects some common, usually more abstract, structure and organization shared by the inputs and defines the core cross-space mappings between them.

Taylor (2002: 531), in his discussion of the Blending Theory suggests the following structure for the Generic Space:

Candidates for generic space concepts are image schemas, force dynamic interactions, abstract motion, or the superordinate concepts envisaged by Glucksberg – Keyser [1993].

However, the list of possible GS elements has not been clearly delineated. In fact, it remains an open research programme (Turner and Brandt 2004 p.c.).

The cross-space mappings between at least two input spaces allow for a partial projection into the blend, which is supplemented with three interrelated processes: composition, completion and elaboration. Consequently, the counterparts from the input spaces can be projected into the blend separately; they can be fused, as a result of the projection; or only one of them is projected. In this way, a part of the blend structure is inherited from the inputs, and a part emerges from the above mentioned processes. It remains unclear if the Generic Space has any direct influence on the Blend or is only mediated by the Input Spaces.

Another perennial problem in the studies of meaning that is shared by both feature-based semantics on the one hand, and CMT and BT on the other, is the limit to the detail of definition. Cognitive semantics has criticized feature semantics for not being able to provide a finite, exhaustive list of definitional features. It seemed that when the distinction between the encyclopaedic and dictionary definition of lexical items is blurred¹⁵ and supplemented with a radial structure of prototype-based categorization, the problem will be solved. But it is not the case. In metaphorical mappings of CMT as well as cross-space mappings and input – blend projections, the number or nature of these mappings is not clearly determined. Attempts have been made to restrict the metaphoric mappings through the Invariance Hypothesis (Lakoff – Turner 1989) or im-

¹⁵ See, for example, Lakoff (1987), Kövecses (1993), Taylor (2002).

age-schematic constraint (Turner 1993), which has been formulated in rather weak terms:

... the constraint says nothing about what can or cannot or should or should not be mapped from source to the target, nothing at all of what components of the target can or should be involved in the metaphoric invention, nothing whatever about the strategies of mapping or of reconception that might be used in the service of satisfying the constraint. Second, the constraint is not inviolable; however, if it is violated, the violation is to be taken as a carrier of significance

(Turner 1993: 298).

Fauconnier (1997: 162), concluding his presentation of the Blending Theory, observes:

As in so many of the examples reviewed in the book, a striking feature of the blended construction is its underspecification. Although there are strong constraints on blending, which I shall recapitulate below, there is no recipe for knowing what will be projected from the inputs and what will be projected back. In that respect the system is very flexible.

In view of the critique of the feature theory on very similar grounds, it is difficult to see this flexibility as a theoretical gain of the new approach. It seems that the only way out of this conundrum is to change the perspective on the issue. Such an attempt, among others, is made in Głaz (2002). In his description of the meaning of the domain of EARTH, he employs the dynamic usage-based context-dependent model deriving from Langacker's (1987, 1991, 2000) approach and supplemented with Fuchs's (1994, 1999) dynamic semantics. Głaz comes to the conclusion that

In texts, then, we are dealing with activations of semantic regions. Within the regions, it is possible to recognize areas of greater salience, easier to identify and name than others, which can be represented in network nodes. Nodes also serve as convenient landmarks for identifying textual meanings of the relevant item, although in the majority of cases such meanings do not correspond to the nodes in a one-to-one fashion

(Głaz 2002: 101).

Later he adds that the senses of lexemes should be viewed not so much as network nodes but rather as *open regions in semantic space* (Głaz 2002:

107).¹⁶ Semanticists should therefore content themselves with approximate definitions (Głaz 2002: 107). In this way what was regarded as a weakness of lexical semantic studies can be changed into their strength. Approximate definitions are not incomplete, because of defective or imperfect lexical analyses, but are a result of the dynamic nature of lexical meaning itself.¹⁷

Coming back to BT, as the blending process can become rather complex, Fauconnier (1997: 160) notes that

To understand the sentence in context is to have some idea of the kind of blend intended. But it may take a lot of elaboration for the speaker and the hearer to converge on sufficiently similar constructions. And, then again, there is no need for convergence. The folk theoretical illusion that each expression of language has a meaning that we all retrieve in basically the same way allows interlocutors to interact under the impression of mutual comprehension, when in fact they may be engaged in quite different mental space construction.

Although miscommunication and misunderstanding do happen and such partial convergence may be responsible for it, but to claim that “there is no need for convergence” seems too radical. Without at least partial convergence of communicated conceptualizations, any social activity would be doomed to failure, which is not the case.

The proposal presented in Fauconnier (1997) is further elaborated in Fauconnier – Turner (2002). One of the issues they expand on is the comprehensive description of the constitutive and governing principles of blending. The constitutive principles, or the structure of the mental spaces and the basic relations obtaining between them, do not differ much from what was proposed in Fauconnier (1997). The governing principles are a new development. They consist of The Topology Principle, The Pattern Completion Principle, The Integration Principle, The Maximization of Vital Relations Principle, The Intensification of Vital Relations Principle, The Web Principle, The Unpacking Principle, The Relevance Principle

¹⁶ Głaz’s open regions are an implementation of Langacker’s dynamic domains and correspond to frames, and other dynamic conceptual structures posited in cognitive linguistics. They are all, by definition, open to modification.

¹⁷ This paragraph is a slightly changed paragraph from my review of Głaz (2002) published in *Linguistica Silesiana* (2005).

and a number of Principles for Compression (312-352). All of these principles facilitate the achievement of the overarching goal: Achieve Human Scale. This goal can be subdivided into several subgoals such as Compress what is diffuse, Obtain global insight, Strengthen vital relations, Come up with a story, Go from many to one. In the running of the blend, the principles and goals can cooperate or compete:

Compression helps human scale, human scale helps getting a story, getting a story helps global insight, going from Many to One helps the blend achieve human scale. (...) Compression competes with topology, since topology is a pressure to preserve various distinctions and elements while compression works in the countervailing direction. Similarly, integration competes with unpacking since absolute integration leaves a blend that carries no sign of its distinctive inputs

(Fauconnier – Turner 2002: 336).

The authors (2002: 319) clearly state that this conception of cognitive processing is firmly based in experientialism:

Cognition is embodied, and the spectacular intellectual feats that human beings perform depend upon being able to anchor the integration networks in blends at human scale, using the vital relations that are employed in perception and action.

It also claims a neurological reality through connections, as indicated on page 40:

In the neural interpretation of these cognitive processes, mental spaces are sets of activated neural assemblies, and the lines between elements correspond to coactivation-bindings of a certain kind.

When it comes to the relationship between blending and conceptual metaphor, Fauconnier (1997: 168-171) shows that metaphors are just one type of cognitive processing, which involves blending. He formulates it in the following words: “blended spaces play a key role in metaphorical mappings” (Fauconnier 1997: 168)

Grady et al. (1999) compare CMT and BT and identify the main differences between them, as (1) the number of input spaces in CMT is two and in BT is two or more, (2) CMT is directional and BT is not, (3) CMT analyses entrenched conceptualization, BT focuses on the on-line

processing of the novel expressions or problems. I have a reservation concerning point (1). When Lakoff – Johnson (1980) mention mixed metaphors and the metaphorical entailments common to all the source domains involved in the ‘mixing’, they implicitly allow for a number of input spaces higher than two. Likewise, I disagree with the claim Grady et al. (1999: 110) later make: “conceptual metaphors are among the stable structures available for exploitation by the blending processes. (...) conceptual metaphors feed the blending processes by establishing links between elements in distinct domains and spaces.” Although the terms *exploitation* and *feed* seem a bit vague in this context, which may lead to a misrepresentation of the authors’ ideas (imperfect convergence of blends), it seems that blending is a theory of any creative mental process, and can well explain metaphoric conceptualization as well as many other processes: puzzle solving, mathematical problems creation and solving, understanding of jokes. It is therefore not the case that metaphor is responsible for the mappings in the blending process, but rather that blending may be a more general cognitive process, the result of which and not the cause of which is the metaphoric structuring of some concepts.

Coulson (2001) employs BT, CMT and frame shifting (a reorganization of frame elements in semantic representations resulting from a restricted deployment of background knowledge on the part of the speaker) in order to explain a wide array of semantic leaps phenomena.¹⁸ In an ingenious way she explains elements of American popular culture rhetoric and shows how BT, CMT and frame shifting can help us understand social relationships. An important aspect which she brings forth in her discussion of the abortion debate is the framing of moral discourse. She stresses the fact that the nature of social perception is constructive and shows that “moral reasoning (...) largely involves the presentation of alternative *framings* for various aspects of a morally ambiguous scenario” (Coulson 2001: 228). She also points out that, unlike rhetoric theorists,

¹⁸ Coulson (2001: 2):

Semantic leaps is not a technical term, but, rather, a family of interesting natural language phenomena. It includes all sorts of non-standard meanings absent from dictionaries and, typically, not computable by traditional parsers. Leaps include things such as metaphoric and metonymic expressions, hyperbole, understatement, and sarcastic quips. They also include things such as innuendo, subtle accusations, and the private meanings which arise when people live or work closely together.

such as Black (1962) and Perelman – Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), cognitive linguists rarely address the issue of values in such constructions.

The development of the Blending Theory can contribute to conceptual metaphor studies in that it draws the attention of the analysts to the common underlying elements of the Source and Target Domains. In BT terminology it stresses the influence of the Generic Space on the Input Spaces in the blending process. Lakoff (2005, see footnote 14, this chapter) claims that *GENERIC IS SPECIFIC* conceptual metaphor posited in Lakoff – Turner (1989) performs in CMT a similar role to that of the Generic Space in BT.

7. Axiological semantics

A notable exception to the generalization expressed by Coulson is the work of Krzeszowski (1993, 1997a), who promotes the idea of axiological semantics. He links values to emotions and observes that “emotions are among the major factors determining information processing rather than merely modifying it” (Krzeszowski 1997a: 9). He further develops this idea:

... in the ontogenetic development of every human, the first categorizations are valuations. This must be so, because Man is a valuating being. All our actions, our thinking, our attitudes and interactions with the world and with the other people, and last but certainly not least, our emotions are connected with or laden with certain values. To appreciate the presence of values as well as to value we need a platform of reference upon which valuations can be made. In other words, we need to recognize some system of values. Valuations constitute an aspect of all categorizations, and categorizations directly manifest themselves in language. This establishes a direct link between values and language

(Krzeszowski 1997a: 15).

The starting point for Krzeszowski’s analyses are Johnson’s (1987) image schemata and Puzynina’s (1992) axiology. He posits the existence of the basic positive-negative value scale, which he calls a *PLUS/MINUS* schema and calculates the axiological parameter of preconceptual image schemata. He convincingly argues for the hypothesis that one pole of every schema is usually evaluated positively while the other negatively and that

these evaluations are experientially grounded. He further goes on to discuss the axiological aspects of metaphors. He also proposes a series of techniques for eliciting the axiological charge of lexical items, understood as their position on the PLUS/MINUS scale.

8. A summary of the chapter and an outline for the analysis

Conceptual Metaphor Theory is an attempt to elucidate the mental processes responsible for our understanding. It claims that metaphor-based understanding consists in a co-activation of the source and target domains, which can be formalised in terms of metaphorical mappings. As a method of linguistic analysis of metaphorically structured concepts it first requires a description of the concept in terms of the folk model. The second step is to identify and name possible conceptual metaphors the evidence for which is found in linguistic expressions. Then metaphoric mappings underlying groups of expressions are formulated.

In CMT-informed discourse analysis attempts are made to explain the discourse function of conceptual metaphors (Cameron – Deignan 2006, Charteris-Black 2004, Musolff 2004, Nerlich 2005). They may influence the representation of the world through their affective power related to the hiding and highlighting of certain elements of the target domain filtered through the source domain structure. This valuating potential may also result from frame-shifting (Coulson 2001) or the operation of the PLUS/MINUS schema (Krzyszowski 1997).

The review of the literature suggests that the most basic conceptual elements of the concept of ‘war’ may originate from the image schema of force (Johnson 1987) and from the force dynamics Event Frame (Talmy 2000). Talmy’s force tendency towards rest or towards action and the presence of two interactants Agonist and Antagonist can be related to the notion of dichotomy or opposition.¹⁹

Conceptual metaphors, image schemata and force dynamics have a status of mental representations of human experience. These concepts form the theoretical underpinning of the present work. The work itself though

¹⁹ This element emerged from the data analysed in Fabiszak – Kaszubski (2006). It was a pilot study for the present research consisting in a corpus-driven analysis of the meaning of two VPs: *fight war* and *declare war* and two NPs: *battlefield* and *battleground*.

does not make any claims concerning the conceptual structure of the human mind. It has a much more modest objective. In Chapter Four, conceptual metaphor theory is applied to discourse analysis of war reports in Polish and British newspapers, so that the rhetorical strategies used in the representation of military conflicts could be effectively elucidated. It is hoped that this analysis will allow me to give a comparative overview of the linguistic and cultural similarities and differences permeating the political discourse. Chapter Five focuses on the corpus-based contextual analysis of the words commonly considered within the CMT as indicators of the use of the X IS WAR metaphor and tries to link frequency with sense salience and metaphor identification and categorisation.

In Chapter Two, we turn to a short presentation of corpus linguistic methods and of language of the press, as they seem a necessary foundation for Chapters Four and Five. Chapter Three gives an overview of various approaches to the concept of war to lay the cultural foundation for the understanding of the concept of 'war'.

Chapter II

Corpus linguistics and the language of mass media

1. Introduction

As indicated in the previous chapter, the leitmotifs of cognitive linguistics have been present in the works of many European linguists, such as e.g. Jakobson, Baldinger or Ullman. Then, even though in many cognitive linguistic publications it seems as if the ideas promoted there are a complete novelty, the belief in this novelty should be taken with caution as a result of the domination of Chomskyan theory in American linguistics starting from the 1960s. What is interesting about the development of Cognitive Linguistics is the fact that despite its criticism of unrealistic, linguist-invented examples of transformational-generative grammars corpus based Cognitive Linguistic studies have not gained much ground until the 1990s, and even then they were mostly conducted in Europe. Therefore, in the first part of this chapter I would like to give a brief sketch of the development of language corpora, and show how they can facilitate lexical studies of meaning.

Another important issue within cognitive linguistics is the conviction that both grammatical and lexical choices are meaningful, so that different 'surface structures' cannot stem from the same 'deep structure'. The variation within surface structure reflects the variation in signification. The rudimentary example, the approach to which differs in cognitive and generative theory, is the passive voice. For generativists it is a passive transformation – they stress the link between the active and passive form of the sentence and view the latter as the *transformation* of the former or both as the transformation of one underlying form. Cognitivists, on the other hand, concentrate on the change of perspective, on what is foregrounded and what is downplayed in either *construction* of meaning. A similar approach to meaning as construed: produced, reproduced and interpreted, is central to discourse analysis. Much of discourse analytic

work concentrates on the interpretation of the language of the media. As the present study is also concerned with data coming from the press, the second part of this chapter offers a succinct review of the most recent literature devoted to media and their language.

2. The beginnings of language corpora

A brief history of corpus linguistics is given in Teubert (2004). He claims that the first corpus of the English language in the modern sense has been gathered by Sir Randolph Quirk in the late 1950s. It was created with the aim of describing English grammar on the basis of empirical evidence, rather than a linguist's individual competence only. The Survey of English Usage, as the project was called, was not originally computerized. It was fed into computers only in the mid-1980s within Quirk and Greenbaum's research programme under the name of the International Corpus of English (www.ucl.ac.uk/english-usage/ice).

Another well-known corpus, the Brown Corpus, was gathered in the US by Francis and Kucera in the 1960s. Surprisingly, though, it did not gain much interest in America once it was completed.

The third well-known English language corpus was the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen Corpus used in the studies of grammar and word frequency by, among others, such scholars as Johansson, Leech and Hofland.

The first corpus which was constructed with the intention of conducting lexical research was the one gathered by John Sinclair in Edinburgh. His corpus-driven investigations into meaning have led him to doubt the claim that a word should be the basic unit of investigating meaning, so that he started to emphasize the importance of collocation (Sinclair 1991). Words abstracted from the context did not seem to have unambiguous meaning assigned to them, whereas those used in discourse could be interpreted easily.

Sinclair's work, however, was an exception as the majority of publications devoted to language corpora in the 1980s and 1990s were overridden with technical questions of corpus construction, such as the representativeness of corpora, word tagging and genre definition. The corpora found an obvious practical application in lexicography, so that 1987 saw the publication of the first corpus-based dictionary: *Collins-Cobuild English Language Dictionary*. It

seems that the time has come to go back to the original intention of Sinclair's – that of investigating the relationship between meaning and form (word).¹

3. Word meaning and the corpus

According to Teubert and Čermáková (2004), who base their view of language and meaning on the functional lexicogrammatic views of Halliday (1975, 1985; Halliday – Hassan 1985), native speakers learn meaning from discourse. It is discourse then, where we should look for meaning. When a speaker encounters a unit of meaning in discourse, the process of understanding starts. A part of this process is a reverberation of this unit with all the previous uses of it that the language user has encountered. This is the social dimension of understanding. Teubert and Čermáková represent an extreme position in claiming that there is no meaning outside social interaction. However, they agree that another part of decoding can be related to an individual's experience or memories. This is the psychological dimension, different for every member of the speech community.²

Meaning of words or collocations can be best represented by natural language definitions, as no other description, be it logical calculus or any other abstract formal system, can be understood or learnt without recourse to natural language.³

Sinclair (1991) phrases his opinion on the form – meaning interaction in a very radical manner:

Soon it was realised that form could actually be a determiner of meaning, and a causal connection was postulated, inviting arguments from form to meaning. Then conceptual adjustment was made, with the realization that the choice of a meaning, anywhere in a text, must have a profound effect on the surrounding choices. It would be futile to imagine otherwise. There is ultimately no distinction between form and meaning

(Sinclair 1991: 7).

¹ On the vague status of word as a unit of meaning see Sinclair (1991) and Teubert (2004).

² On the idea that the meaning of words can consist not only of propositions but also other structures, such as visual representations or image schemata, see chapter one. It is important to stress, though, that for first generation cognitive linguists meaning resides in the brain (mentalism), whereas in the approach presented here it resides in discourse.

³ I voiced a similar opinion in my PhD thesis published as Fabiszak (2001: 31-32).

This quote seems similar to Langacker's stance (1987, 1991b),⁴ as he also claims that a change in form must result in a change of meaning.

Tognini-Bonelli (2001) introduces a distinction she deems important in research involving corpora. She talks about corpus-based and corpus-driven studies. In corpus-based investigations the corpus is used only as a source of data which is supposed to support the hypotheses based on a preconception originating from sources other than the corpus itself (e.g. introspection or linguistic tradition). The corpus data cannot falsify a hypothesis; it can only corroborate it. In corpus-driven research the approach is different:

The theory has no independent existence from the evidence and the general methodological path is clear: observation leads to hypothesis leads to generalisation leads to unification in theoretical statement

(Tognini-Bonelli 2001: 84-85).

The "observation leading to hypothesis" methodology can raise certain doubts. To start an observation the analyst must first ask a question – put forward a hypothesis, which could be tested against the data. This hypothesis is inevitably informed by the analyst's knowledge of language, of linguistic theory, and of other social sciences. Such 'preconceptions' would make the analyst in question a corpus-based researcher. I can see no reason, however, why having these 'preconceptions' the analyst should be precluded from making sound data evaluation and from revising the original hypothesis, which would qualify as corpus-driven research.

A corpus-driven approach is represented by Stubbs (2002 [2001]), who stresses the empirical nature of his work. He distinguishes between three types of linguistic examples: attested (retrieved from the corpus), modified (retrieved from the corpus but presented after a linguist's intervention, e.g. shortening) and invented (based on the linguist's intuition). Having made this distinction, in building his analyses and generalizing the results, he depends solely on the corpus data. Among other things, he analyzes the distribution and meaning of such lexical items as, for exam-

⁴ Lakoff – Johnson (1980: 126-138) also comment on the form-meaning relationship, when they refer to Bolinger's (1977) conviction that a perfect paraphrase is not possible. They explain it by referring to spatial metaphors structuring our understanding of linguistic expression.

ple, *seek*; *large, big, great* – series; *cause* vs. *provide*; *undergo*. In the study Stubbs identifies a number of lucid rules for conducting corpus-based lexical semantic research. He suggests that in order to avoid artefacts, the results received from one corpus should be checked against data from another. The frequency counts can be regarded as guidance to the interpretation of the meaning of words, but the infrequent collocations should not be altogether neglected, as

an exclusive concentration on only the most frequent collocations may hide variation in the language. Second, collocations may differ quite sharply in different text-types. Many text-types are specialized in their uses of language, and no corpus can fairly represent every one of them
(Stubbs 2002: 29).

When it comes to the representativeness of corpus data, Stubbs admits that for technological reasons of data gathering even the most balanced corpora are biased towards written language, and within this type towards the newspaper genre. If we realize this fact, it should not hinder our research as at the same time corpora built of a number of texts by various authors are still more representative than one speaker's intuition. In addition, newspaper texts are the most widely read texts, and thus the most influential. Hence language corpora based on, or consisting in a significant part of newspaper articles, can shed light on the problem of discourse prosody.

Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1997), an experienced lexicographer and semanticist, discusses a range of possible analyses of lexical meanings carried out with the help of a language corpus. What might be useful for the present study is her observation that corpus material facilitates the uncovering of the properties of verbal senses, such as participants of an action, relations, and circumstantial properties.

Another valuable application of corpora allows one to identify the semantic prosody of lexical meanings in utterances. Semantic prosody is related to Sinclair's (1994) *aura of meaning*, and should be understood as the specific semantic expectations created by lexical items manifested in their semantico-syntactic context.

Moon (1998) offers a most comprehensive corpus-driven study of fixed expressions and idioms in English (=FEIs). When discussing the theoretical background of her investigations she emphasizes Sinclair's (1987) principles underlying language, i.e. the open choice principle and

the idiom principle. They both reverberate of the Hallidayan focus on the choice of pre-set constructions.

Moon, among many types of fixed expressions, discusses metaphors and says

Metaphors, initially transparent, come in from sporting, technical, and other specialist domains: for example, baseball metaphors such as *(way) out in left field*, *(not) get to first base*, or *touch base*, computing metaphors such as *garbage in garbage out*, and business metaphors such as *there's no such thing as a free lunch*. As neologisms become institutionalized and divorced from their original contexts of use, the explanation or motivation for the metaphor may become lost or obscure. They accordingly undergo processes of semantic depletion or semantic shift

(Moon 1998: 40).

As indicated in this passage, Moon does not share Lakoff – Johnson's insistence on calling dead metaphors – metaphor. She seems to adhere to the view that metaphoric expressions with time lose their figurative power, wear off and as a result of historical processes cease to be metaphors. This belief may have resulted from the terminological confusion discussed in Chapter One, Section 2.6. concerning the distinction between conceptual metaphor and linguistic metaphor. It may also be motivated by the ahistoricism of Lakoffian approach criticised by Taylor (2002, see Chapter One, Section 2.3.).

Apart from her disputing the metaphoricity of dead metaphors, Moon also stresses one important methodological point about corpus-driven research, i.e. "Searches are deterministic, and only report what has been sought, not what should or could have been looked for" (Moon 1998: 49). Similarly to Sinclair and Teubert, she emphasizes the fact that while the canonical, 'dictionary' forms of idioms and metaphors may be ambiguous between literal and non-literal readings, the textual realization will disambiguate the meaning (Moon 1998: 179). This claim goes against an observation made by Fabiszak – Kaszubski (2005 and 2006), namely, that quite often corpus data, even if the context is extended to a paragraph or a number of paragraphs, may remain uninterpretable in terms of literacy vs. metaphoricity. It may also be the case that expressions are inherently ambiguous, so that the judgment of various readers may vary, and also the judgment of the same reader on different occasions may diverge. In accord with our views on page 201, Moon seems to contradict

her earlier statement and observes that metaphorical FEIs are widespread in the lexicon and a major source of polysemy, which, in turn, “complicates analyses of metaphoricality”. Semino et al. (2004) also discusses this problem and suggests that metaphoricality may be a scalar concept.

In addition, Moon notices a certain genre-specificity of journalistic writing (1998: 71), which we also found out in our study of *battlefield*, *battleground*, *fight war* and *declare war* (Fabiszak – Kaszubski 2006). That is, journalese seems to employ these words in their metaphorical uses significantly more often than other investigated genres, i.e. fiction and history texts.

Apart from that, when examining the discursual functions of FEIs, Moon points out that while in an informative function the distribution of metaphors does not depart from the general pattern characteristic of the whole corpus, in their evaluative function the metaphors are much more commonly used than on average (47% as opposed to 33%). She concludes: “This suggests that the use of institutionalized metaphors is stylistic, bound up with evaluation, and centred on the interaction” (1998: 225). Later she adds: “[When using evaluative or informational-evaluative FEIs] the speaker/writer is persuading the hearer/reader to share his/her orientation towards the situation or to acknowledge the conventionalized cultural interpretation of the situation” (1998: 245). Moon (1998: 247) is finally led to conclude that evaluative orientations are more strongly associated with metaphors than other kinds of FEI.⁵

It emerges that negative assignments are roughly twice as common as positive ones. The same kind of distribution was also observed in the compilation of CCDI,⁶ which systematically recorded negative and positive evaluations. It is possible that negative evaluations are simply more salient, and so negative orientations are more likely to be noticed: the proportions reflect human error or bias. However, it is equally possible that negatively evaluating FEIs are indeed commoner than positively evaluating ones or neutral ones. If this is the case, it may be because FEIs are periphrastic and used as politeness devices or euphemisms (...) Note that there appear to be some distinctions here between British and American English: some FEIs which evaluate negatively in British English are neutral or even positive in American. For example, evidence in BofE suggests

⁵ Metaphors and other forms of figurative language as well as the use of implication are often discussed in CDA writing as veiled evaluation strategies.

⁶ CCDI is an acronym for *Collins Cobuild Dictionary of Idioms* edited by Moon (1995).

that in British English *labour of love* often has negative connotations, mildly denigrating the activity in question: *labor of love* in American is more usually neutral or positive.

In her research on cohesion and FEIs Moon empirically corroborates Lakoff – Johnson's (1980) claim that even when metaphors or proverbs are extended, the cohesive ties are not broken, so that the argument develops smoothly (1998: 288).

Similarly to Moon, who notices the problem of genre specificity, Partington (1998) stresses that claims about metaphors can benefit from the genre sensitivity of the studies. He concentrates on the journalistic business writing and using various press corpora (for example the 1993 edition of *The Times* on CD-Rom) devises a practical way of discovering metaphors popular in this genre. Using *WordSmith Tools* he identifies two lists of words: one which consists of words more frequently used in the business section than in the other sections of newspapers treated together, and those which are less frequent. The frequency lists indicated that business language is dominated with vocabulary related to an up and down motion. Partington links these findings to Lakoff – Johnson's orientational metaphor based on the up-down schema and its extensions into cultural values which he formulated as UP IS MORE, DOWN IS LESS and UP IS BETTER, DOWN IS WORSE.⁷ He stresses that although the corpus data give ample support to the claim that UP IS MORE, they also undermine the claim that usually UP IS GOOD. In fact, in the genre of press business reports, as Partington puts it:

... it is by no means the case that UP is always, or even predominantly BETTER. When, for example, costs, debts, inflation or unemployment are up, then this is far from good

(Partington 1998: 113).

An examination of the more frequent words list, besides the orientational metaphors, contributed to an identification of such possible metaphors as MARKET IS A RACE, AHEAD IS THE FUTURE, and depending on the vantage

⁷ I would like to point out here that in the chapter devoted to orientational metaphors, Lakoff – Johnson (1980: 16) talk about MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN and GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN cultural values and not UP IS MORE, DOWN IS LESS and UP IS BETTER, DOWN IS WORSE as suggested by Partington (1998: 113).

point AHEAD IS THE PAST, SOFT IS WEAK/EASY/LESS, HARD IS TANGIBLE/HARD IS INFLEXIBLE.⁸ The less-frequent-words list did not give rise to a new set of metaphors common in business journalism, of course, but only gave an indirect evidence supporting the more frequent list findings. For example, a relatively rare use of past forms such as *was* and *did* Partington puts down to the fact that business seems to be more interested in the future than in the past. In combination with the high frequency of words such as *beliefs*, *forecast*, *fear(s)*, *confidence*, *outlook*, *doubt(s)*, *expectations*, *speculation*, *apprehension(s)*, *estimates*, *likely* it may be evidence for the BUSINESS IS FORECASTING or GUESSING metaphor. His investigations lead Partington (1998: 118) to conclude that only a part of the possible vocabulary set of the vehicle of the metaphor is used to describe the topic.

For example, currency can be weak, but by no means can it be ill. This is akin to what Goatly (1997) pointed out in his study of root metaphors.

At the end of the chapter devoted to corpus-driven metaphor research, Partington (1998: 119) comes to a conclusion, which may seem devastating to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory:

The truth is, of course, that such metaphors have become genre-specific technical language. They have no figurative content, and to all intents and purposes are no longer metaphors at all. It might be possible to posit a general rule of metaphor, which states that “a metaphor ceases to be a metaphor when it has no simple literal alternative, or when a metaphor is much more common than its literal alternative in its genre”.

On the other hand, this is not a data-driven conclusion, but rather a statement of conviction particular to the author. It seems that his view of metaphor is more related to pragmatic theory, which sees metaphor as a clash between the literal meaning of the context and figurative meaning of the words used in a metaphor. These reservations about dead metaphors have already appeared in Black (1991, see Chapter One, Section 2.6.) and in Moon (1998) presented above.

⁸ This proliferation of metaphors requires certain caution as to the cognitive status of these metaphors. Partington, however, carefully distances himself from this conundrum. He stresses that metaphors definitely pervade language, but whether they pervade thought is something that cannot be established on the basis of corpus-based research.

Deignan (1999) identifies similar problems in metaphor corpus-driven research as I have mentioned above (Fabiszak – Kaszubski 2005 and 2006). She also notices other limitations of the corpus driven approach:

... it is not always easy to make decisions on meaning division, and (...) it can often be difficult to decide which citations of some words are metaphorical; this decision will depend on the definition of metaphor used.

... The researcher uses informed intuition to decide whether a particular citation of a word is metaphorical, within his or her own definition of metaphor. Intuition is also needed to decide whether a linguistic metaphor is a realisation of a particular conceptual metaphor. Further, the computer cannot tell the researcher which word forms to study. Concordancing is a powerful observational tool, but no more than a tool; a researcher is needed to decide what to examine and how to interpret the resulting data (Deignan 1999: 180).

On top of that, corpora are of limited usefulness in investigating innovative metaphor and require a bottom-up approach to theory building.

Deignan discusses problems inherent in metaphor theory research as well. She sees distinguishing metaphor from other related phenomena as the major problem. There are three aspects to this problem, i.e. a distinction between dead metaphor and polysemous senses (possibly as in catachresis), a distinction between metaphor and idiom, and between idiom and metonymy. In many studies, it must be admitted that these distinctions are neglected and all figurative uses are viewed as metaphoric (see for instance Lakoff – Turner's (1989) discussion of poetic language and a rather unclear distinction they make between metaphors, personification and proverbs), while others make minute distinctions (for example Sadock (1993) in building a speech act theory of metaphor, which distinguishes it painstakingly from other nonliteral linguistic figures such as metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, understatement, irony and euphemism).

One of the most recent approaches to metaphor in combination with corpus linguistics is Charteris-Black (2004), in which he integrates the insights from CMT and discourse analysis. His investigations focus on specific-domain corpora, such as the British party political manifestos, American presidential speeches, sports reporting, financial reporting and religious discourse (the Bible and the Koran). But he stresses, like Stubbs did before him, that it is "beneficial to *compare* the findings of a domain-specific corpus with those of a general corpus (...). In such cases a gen-

eral corpus serves as a control corpus” (Charteris-Black 2004: 31). For example, in analysing financial reporting he checked the frequency of potentially metaphoric words in *The Economist* sub-corpus and the entire Bank of English corpus and found out that words such as *attack* and *haven* were far more frequent in the general corpus. This led him to conclude that metaphors including these words are general and not domain-specific. He also remarks on the interaction of researcher’s intuition and corpus data: “It is not that corpus linguists do not rely on their intuitions as much as in the traditional approaches, but that their intuitions are measured against attested linguistic evidence” (Charteris-Black 2004: 31).

Yet another recent investigation of metaphor, which combines corpus linguistics, discourse analysis and conceptual metaphor theory is Koller (2004). In her study of metaphors in business media discourse, she uses two self-compiled, purpose-built corpora from British and American business magazines and newspapers. Her aim is to study the rhetoric of the language of business press reports. She finds out that there are three metaphors dominating this type of discourse, namely those of war, sports and evolutionary struggle. She also notices that in the analysed texts business is constructed as a masculinised social domain.

Fabiszak – Kaszubski (2005) contained a pilot study of the full-scaled project described in the present book. It aimed to investigate the genre distribution and metaphoricity of such lexemes as BATTLEFIELD, BATTLEGROUNDS, DECLARE WAR and FIGHT WAR. The results are summarised as follows:

An analysis of genre distribution of metaphoric expressions, even within such a small-scale pilot study as the present one, can bring about interesting results. It shows that the two verb phrases DECLARE WAR and FIGHT WAR and the noun BATTLEFIELD are used predominantly literally. They also reach the highest frequency in history texts. When we consider the genre distribution of metaphoric uses, history, not surprisingly, allows the least metaphoricity (2-4%), fiction ranks second with 6-18%, and the mass media seems to attract most metaphoric uses with 31-67% of metaphoricity. The high frequency of metaphoric expressions in the mass media in comparison to other genres corroborates earlier claims concerning the high usefulness of conventional metaphoric expressions in persuasive texts. From among the three expressions, DECLARE WAR has the greatest potential for figurative use, particularly in the mass media genre. BATTLEGROUNDS stands in stark contrast to these three expressions as it is used primarily metaphorically, which seems to be related to the fact that it appears most

frequently in the mass media. If we compare the distribution of the two nouns in the selected genres BATTLEFIELD is used figuratively more often in fiction, whereas BATTLEGROUND is used most often in history. This can also be partly explained by synonym specialisation

(Fabiszak – Kaszubski 2005: 316-317).

It therefore seems that if the metaphoric potential of lexemes from the domain of WAR is to be analysed in the present work, the data coming from the press may be the most promising source for the investigation. The results can be checked against the general corpus, to offer a broader perspective for the study.

The important questions that the pilot study identified were the problem with unambiguous assignment of the metaphor status (see the discussion of Moon above), and the definition of the concept of ‘war’, as well as its relationship to the concept of ‘politics’. A review of literature on war coming from various disciplines is endeavoured in Chapter Three, prior to the linguistic analysis of data, with the hope that a definition of war will emerge from the review.

Our second pilot study (Fabiszak – Kaszubski 2006) was conducted so that the potential of corpora for metaphor research could be tested. We discovered that the most useful data retrieving and sorting techniques were the sorting of concordances by their left and right environment, calculating z-score and retrieving the related compounds. All of these allowed us to construct semantic frames for the lexemes in question and to identify those elements which participated in metaphoric mapping. The wealth of data offered by the BNC (British National Corpus) also provided us with some unexpected examples, i.e. the use of *battlefield* in tourist brochures advertising ‘battlefield tours’.⁹

Despite this promising trend in investigating the literal and metaphorical meaning of lexemes there are some researchers who, apparently following the Bloomfieldian tradition in linguistics, deny the possibility of conducting any scientific investigation of the language-meaning rela-

⁹ We were not aware that visiting battlegrounds is a long-standing type of British entertainment. Knightly (1975) mentions that women, often army officers’ wives, and unconscripited aristocracy would visit the battlefields of the Crimean war, while it was still being fought. The custom was also followed during some of the late 19th c. wars fought in Africa.

tionship. Sampson (2001), for instance, describes the scientific method in simple words:

Listen, look. Summarize what you hear and see in hypotheses which are general enough to lead to predictions about future observations. Keep on testing your hypotheses. When new observations disconfirm some of them, look for alternative explanations compatible with all the evidence so far available; and then test these explanations in their turn against further observational data. This is the empirical scientific method

(Sampson 2001: 1).

For some reason, though, he rejects a possibility that the meaning of words can be investigated in a similar fashion. In fact he claims that "...human lexical behaviour is such that analysis of word meaning cannot be part of empirical science" (Sampson 2001: 181). The reason behind it may be that he refers to the generative linguistic approach to meaning as the theory of meaning and rejects it as erroneous on the grounds that word meaning, a fluid phenomenon, cannot be fully predicted by linguistic rules. At the same time he acknowledges the value of dictionaries providing definitions of words in everyday English:

The best dictionary does not pretend that its definitions have the exactness of a physical equation, but that is not a shortcoming in the dictionary: good but imperfect definitions are as much as can ever be available, for the bulk of words in everyday use in a human language

(Sampson 2001: 206).

He also makes a remark dear to the heart of any cognitivist: "In other words, we cannot expect to find the exactness which is proper to mathematics in analyses of human behaviour, which is produced by imaginative and unpredictable human minds" (Sampson 2001: 206). These words seem to indicate that he is close to the stance that artificial languages of logic are not the way to describe linguistic meaning, and to favour natural language definitions. Still he does not seem inclined to see approximate definitions as the scientific means of describing the dynamism of meaning, as does Głaz (2002: 107, see Chapter One, Section 6). This seems to be an irreconcilable contention between linguists who claim that a scientific investigation of linguistic meaning is not possible and those who claim the contrary. Needless to say, I belong to the second group.

Leaving the deadlock unresolved, we move in the next section to the language of the mass media and the mutual reinforcement that Conceptual Metaphor Theory and media discourse analysis can gain from each other. The common grounds for both is the view that communication is a social phenomenon and can be value-laden.

4. The language of the mass media, discourse analysis and metaphor

Bell (1991) sees media language as one of the most influential language input individuals experience today. The media can be divided into several genres with news and advertising as probably the most prominent. One of the advantages of analysing media language is its availability:

The average newspaper may provide you with 100,000 or more words of text. The problem is not so much getting enough language to analyse but deciding how to restrict yourself to a manageable amount

(Bell 1991: 3).

A journalist himself, Bell has a hands-on experience of how the news is constructed, and shows a more sensitive view of the genre distinctions within the news. The major division he stresses, although occasionally blurred by the journalists themselves, is the one between the hard news and the soft news (feature articles). He points out that the hard news tends to be more uniform in style, whereas the feature articles leave more room for an author's individual style and may even be written by non-journalists. Therefore he sees the genre division of language corpora as a weakness if the aim of the study is the news styles. He quotes Brown Corpus and LOB as the corpora who lump the hard and the soft news together under one heading: reportage.

Like Langacker and Sinclair with reference to the form and meaning of linguistic expressions, Bell believes that the form and content of the news are inseparable:

We cannot separate news form and news content. The values of news drive the way in which news is presented

(Bell 1991: 155).

In relation to the news values, Bell mentions Knightly's (1975)¹⁰ book on war correspondents, in which the tension between the drive for a scoop, loyalty to their own country and army censorship all shaped the content and the style of the news dispatches.

In his book Bell mentions in passing four different traditions in investigating the news media language: content analysis (Berelson 1952, Krippendorf 1980), critical linguistics (Fowler et al. 1979, Kress and Hodge 1979), semiotics (Hall et al. 1980) and discourse analysis (van Dijk 1988). Content analysis stems from the communication studies and was designed to investigate propaganda bias by means of quantitative study: frequency counts of pre-established discrete categories. When it comes to critical linguistics, Bell points out both its strong points and its drawbacks. He says:

This research is at its strongest in the direct comparison of different media accounts of the same event, demonstrating how language is a vehicle of covert interpretation in supposedly neutral reporting

(Bell 1991: 214).

He sees two major shortcomings of the approach, i.e. the conviction that every linguistic choice is intentionally meaningful and the imputing that the newsmakers have a stronger ideological bias than is really the case.

The semiotic tradition consists in close reading of media texts with the aim of identifying and decoding the ideology beneath the media reporting. Finally, Bell views van Dijk's approach as the most linguistically sound and revealing of the four.

Bell (1991) also discusses a change in reporting style between the 19th century chronology-based narration to one based on the lead, which comes first and summarises the main points of the story. Today "[t]he ideal news story is one which could be cut to end at any paragraph" (Bell 1991: 172).

Bell (2003) discusses changes that the language of the media has undergone between Capt. Scott's expedition to the South Pole of 1912-1913, and that of Peter Hillary of 1998-1999. One of the most striking differences is the technological one: that between press reports and televised reports, which however could not reach its recipients in real time. Another

¹⁰ Knightly's book will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

striking feature is the increase in the voyeurism of present day media, which impose their presence on the event's participants.

Carey (2003) in his article on press reportage stresses the similarity in the construction of the news and of fiction. The reception of both is dependent on the willed credulity of the readers. Carey (2003: 58) stresses that "... reportage relates by definition to a reality outside the text", but admits: "We have no means of judging its truth, though truth is the only thing that qualifies it as reportage and distinguishes it from fiction" (Carey 2003: 63). He concludes: "We are left with a paradox: reportage depends for its impact on authenticity, and has no means of validating it" (Carey 2003: 64).

Lewis (2003) follows de Tocqueville¹¹ in emphasizing the role the press has in shaping society's opinions and thus influencing the social consensus. She sees the development of electronic communication as a threat to the public service of the mass media, as it may become a forum for strongly partisan views presented without any editorial checks.

Wei (2003) in a study similar to the one I intend to conduct in the present book shows how the Taiwanese political press discourse differs from that of the West. She demonstrates how the choice of rhetoric, and in particular of conceptual metaphor, is closely linked with the socio-cultural values of the society it is designed to inform and influence.

Biber (2003), Ni (2003) and Ayto (2003) show how the vocabulary of the press differs from 'general' language. All three studies are corpus-driven. Biber (2003: 179) concludes his investigation of noun phrases in newspaper discourse with the following words:

The present study suggests that newspaper prose has been linguistically innovative in other ways designed to achieve a compressed style. That is, devices like noun–noun sequences, heavy appositive post-modifiers, and noun complement clauses are especially characteristic of newspaper prose. These features are all literate devices used to pack information into relatively few words. These devices are also commonly used in academic prose, together with functionally similar devices like attributive adjectives and prepositional phrases as postmodifiers. However, the features discussed above are noteworthy because they are considerably more common

¹¹ Charles Alexis de Tocqueville was a 19th c. French historian and politician, the founder of liberalism who described the emerging democratic society and the processes characteristic of it.

in newspaper prose. That is, at the same time that news has been developing more popular oral styles, it has also been innovative in developing literate styles with extreme reliance on compressed noun-phrase structures.

Ni compares the stylistic differences between four different genres (which he calls registers): academic writing, news, novels and short stories, and conversations. As could be expected, all of them differ with respect to the use of NPs. What's more, he has also run frequency counts for pronoun, and non-pronoun headed NPs, and NPs with pre- and post-modifiers within various register of the mass media language, i.e. press news reports, press editorials and broadcast news, and found out that there is an inside variation within the media language as well.

Ayto attempts to demonstrate that the press are responsible for either the introduction or at least the popularisation of many lexical blends. In this way he also suggests that the language of the press is distinct from other forms of writing.

Aitchison (2003) conducts a detailed analysis of the vocabulary used in press reporting as well as President Bush's speeches following the 9/11 attacks in the US. She shows that the rhetoric used by Bush changes from the early 'crusade' to a 'war on terror' wording. When it comes to press reports, Aitchison (2003: 200) concludes that

the language used was composed of mostly everyday words. A significant characteristic was the large number of different lexical items involved, all relating to disaster and tragedy. These were often polysyllabic, and were frequently combined into longer sequences. Neologisms and figurative language were rare, and gruesome 'facts' were exaggerated.¹²

¹² When talking about exaggeration, Aitchison (2003: 199) refers to the factoids released by the Press concerning the number of victims of the attacks: *Sunday Times* on Sept. 13th 2001 wrote that 5, 818 *are feared to have died*, when six months later the number dwindled significantly – *The Observer* on March 10th, 2002 reports that 2,672 *death certificates have been issued*. It is interesting to note that in the reporting of Jan/Feb 2005 tsunami disaster in S-E Asia the numbers were first small and then growing. There seem to be three possible reasons behind this difference: 1. Ease of count in a North as opposed to a South country (see Bell 1991 on the unequal representation of various nations affected by news values, such as proximity, eliteness, meaningfulness). 2. Presence of press agencies and reporters. 3. Maximizing vs. minimising the size of a tragedy.

As indicated in reference to Aitchison's study it is frequently the case that the language of the media and the language of politics are intricately intertwined. That is the press, radio and TV often mediate (sic!) between politicians and society by reporting and (mis)quoting their speeches and statements or by conducting interviews. Linguists analysing the language of politics, especially in the past, often use media as a source of text. This was the case with Bralczyk (2001), who analysed the language of the political propaganda of the 1970s in Poland on the basis of three sources: (1) political slogans, (2) editorials and political press commentaries and (3) speeches delivered by Party officials and the plenary session pronouncements of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party. The author admits that the dominant source consisted in texts from *Trybuna Ludu*, because he believed that this newspaper had the widest range of readers in comparison to other sources. In his study Bralczyk focuses on the pragmatic functions of political propaganda, i.e. the informative, ritualistic and persuasive functions. Significantly, in discussing the linguistic means applied to achieve the latter function, Bralczyk (2001: 98, 100) mentions two related issues, a predicativity of the copula-less constructions of the type: *Program Partii programem narodu* 'Party Program [is] the nation's programme' and the use of metaphors, e.g. *Huta Katowice stalowym filarem Polski Ludowej* 'Katowice Steelworks [is] the steel pillar of the People's Poland', which due to their form cannot be negated either. These are just two out of seven semantico-syntactic tools used in the introduction of propaganda values in discourse. Bralczyk (2001: 209) in the English summary to his book outlines this process in the following words:

The sender of political propaganda texts formulates a certain system of values. He introduces, most often not overtly, certain properties accorded to the world presented by propaganda, always tendentially, up to the point of fictitiousness. Thus, the world is accorded the same properties twice: once – as elements constituting it, and then – as elements facilitating its positive evaluation.

He further elaborates the idea of the represented world on (Bralczyk 2001: 212):

...the world presented by PTs [= propaganda texts] is not after all a direct reflection of the real world. It is a world not altogether fictitious, but subordinated to certain idealizations: it is a wished for, postulated, and desir-

able world. Hegel's principle of the legitimacy of the real world is reversed here.

Another example of the analysis of the language of the media, or at least written for a publication in press, is Cap (1998). He shows how language is used in a construction of the political identity of Russia, Byelorussia, Latvia and the Ukraine; their identity framed in opposition to the expansion of NATO. Assertions, simplifications and implications abound in this linguistic narrative, which often employs a thesis-antithesis argumentative structure.

Majkowska – Satkiewicz (1999) investigate the language of the Polish media in the 1990s and notice its increasing informality and expressivity. They contrast the results of their analysis of the Polish headlines with that conducted by Pisarek (1967) and emphasize that thirty years ago they did not contain emotionally or stylistically loaded words, while today they approach the rhetoric of advertising slogans. Their primary function is no longer to inform, but to shock and in this way to catch the attention of the readers. The intensification of dramatic effect is often achieved through a recourse to the rhetoric of conflict, full of aggression, accusations, and strong value judgements. The function of the news seems no longer to present information in a transparent language, but rather to draw the attention of its consumers to the media themselves. The media become self-reflective.

Frankowska (1994) applies Conceptual Metaphor Theory to an analysis of Polish political press texts and identifies a number of metaphors employed by the authors. These include: POLITICS IS THEATRE, POLITICS IS A GAME, POLITICS IS SPORT and POLITICS IS WAR. She also shows that metaphors from different domains can co-occur in one sentence. This leads her to suggest that it is possible to claim a synthetic, overarching metaphor: POLITICS IS A GAME, with the remaining conceptual metaphors: POLITICS IS THEATRE, POLITICS IS A GAMBLING GAME, POLITICS IS SPORT, POLITICS IS WAR being its subtypes (hyponyms).

A slightly different, philological approach is presented in Hughes (1988), who attempts to give a social history of certain semantic fields of the English vocabulary. In its history he points to the development of journalism as one of the forces driving semantic change. He emphasizes that the first news reports were occasional, i.e. appeared in response to an event of historical import, such as a battle. Only in 1702 did the regular

daily newspapers appear. Such regularity of publication required the construction of news on an everyday basis. Also, as the major objective of the newspaper publishers was to make profit, rather than primarily to inform the public opinion, so the news presentation and the choice of newsworthy items could not remain unbiased. Hughes believes that the popular press simplify the represented world in order to make sense of it. The number of repetitions offered by the mass media changes what may have been formulated as a tentative opinion, momentarily into a widely accepted cliché. Further, such categorisation used to increase clarity results in stereotyping. The reification of abstract concepts leads to vagueness as in pseudo-sociological phrases, such as *the permissive society*, *the stagnant society*, *the human condition* or *the silent majority* (Hughes 1988: 145). Sports and finance are often reported in what Hughes terms *metaphors of violence* and contain sexual innuendoes, as if to make the reports more entertaining, so that *battles*, *fights*, *massacres*, *slaughters*, *carnage* and *blitzes* become the usual terms describing economic relations (Hughes 1988: 145). The positional terminology in sport is replaced with the more aggressive imagery, for instance *backs*, *forwards* and *inside-forwards* are supplanted by *defenders*, *attackers* and *strikers* (Hughes 1988: 145). The financial market conceived of in masculine terms *hardens*, *firms*, *spurts ahead* or *spills over* (Hughes 1988: 146).¹³ The drive to sensationalise the news results in the weakening of the meaning of originally strongly emotionally loaded terms, such as *tragedy*, *disaster* or *massacre*, when they are applied to events such as a lost football match or the death of a favourite pet. At the same time, when the newspaper editor's policy is to calm the public opinion rather than arouse it, certain political or social events may be reported in what Hughes calls 'anaesthetic' vocabulary, which abounds in euphemisms. Journalese is also responsible for a revival of many archaisms and for coining new compounds, which Hughes terms Thesaurustone.

It is not only the development of journalism but also the spread of democracy and the use of ideologically loaded propaganda which, according to Hughes, contribute to these semantic changes. Politicians elected by ballot, unlike the hereditary rulers, need to attenuate their

¹³ Koller (2004) in her critical cognitive analysis of contemporary economic press reports confirms Hughes' findings and finds evidence for both the ECONOMY IS STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL metaphor and for a strong gender bias.

statements so that they ensure the support of many groups of voters. Thus the politicians increase the use of vague terms, as Hughes (1988: 196) aptly puts it: “political language is riven with conflicting motives, for it must be apparently clear yet actually ambiguous, apparently dogmatic yet actually flexible”.

In an attempt to cover xenophobic concepts in politically correct disguise, the so-called cosmetic semantics is employed. New and yet unmarked terms are used to refer to the same entities without true reconceptualization, as was the case with the South African government, which replaced *apartheid*, by *separate development*, and later by *plural democracy*, *vertical differentiation* and *multinationalism* (Hughes 1988:206). Such opaque new labels, similarly to latinizations (*extermination* for *killing*) and the borrowing of foreign terms, are a common euphemistic technique, which allows one to refer to an entity without calling up its image and its rich evaluative network of associations.

5. Conclusion

Technological development allowing researchers to create and search multimillion word corpora, linguists are able to rely more on language-in-use evidence, so that their own intuition is no longer the major source of reference. The linguistic corpora, however, reflect only a certain part of language, mostly written.¹⁴ Also the written part, even in the carefully designed corpora, is opportunistically tilted towards newspaper language. As a result the investigations of contemporary language often focus on a specific register: the language of the press. Journalists in their drive for a scoop, and in the attempt to sell, frequently use inflated rhetoric, responsible for the introduction of highly emotional vocabulary into the language of the news. They also construct catch phrases, which through constant repetition become the clichés reproduced again and again by the media, and by the authorities communicating with the public through the media. The value-laden, simplified picture of the world as represented by the media becomes the world for its recipients.

¹⁴ The volume of recorded spoken language is much smaller than that of the written language, also often it is a recording of speech based on a written script, like in radio or television talks or interviews.

A CMT-informed, corpus-based analysis of war reports is given in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five the most frequent words from the semantic field of war identified in the purpose-built corpus are searched for in the general corpus (BNC) to show to what extent they can be interpreted as indicative of the X IS WAR conceptual metaphor. Before we can turn to the linguistic analyses of these chapters, though, it is necessary to draw a wider picture of the cultural grounding of the concept of 'war' in Chapter Three.

Chapter III

The concept of 'war' in the humanities

1. Introduction

This chapter starts with an overview of the 19th century theoretical approach to war and warfare proposed by the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz. His theory is contrasted with this of the Swiss Henri Jomini, a general in the French and Russian army. They both laid the foundation for the contemporary theory of war.

Section 3 presents the views on the nature of war in the late 20th century of a philosopher and international relations expert Pierre Hassner. Section 4 is devoted to a review of a sociological analysis of war on the example of the Second Gulf War and the American intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. These two sections are the basis of the expert model of war proposed in Section 8. Section 5 leaves the expert investigations and moves into an examination of the image of war as represented in Polish and British literature. This section is followed by a review of a history of war journalism. They both contribute to the folk model of war, which is proposed in Section 8. Section 7 surveys linguistic analyses of the language used in the media representation of war.

2. Clausewitz and Jomini on war

General Carl von Clausewitz formulated his first reflections on the nature of war in a treaty of 1812 known in English as *The Principles of War* which he wrote for the crown prince of Prussia, to whom he was a tutor. As Bassford (1993) notes, this treatise was heavily influenced by another great soldier and theoretician of warfare, the Swiss, Henri Jomini. The mature version of Clausewitz's views: *On war* (the original German version appeared in 1831, the first English translation in 1873), however, is highly critical of the early writings of Jomini (*Traite de grande tactique* of 1806). Ironically, Jomini, who also knew Clausewitz's works, revised much of his position in accord with Clausewitzian critique and published

it as *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre* (1836, translated into English as *The Art of War*, and published in 1854). Unfortunately, Clausewitz could not comment on this work and retaliate against Jomini's criticisms of his own military thought, as he died in 1831.

What were then their observations on war?¹ Clausewitz saw war as a dynamic process, whose nature and understanding changes with each change of policy and according to the societies that fight these wars. He advocated civilian control over the military. He believed that political objectives are the main causes of war, but they may be enhanced by traditional stereotyping of the opponent or historical aversion between two nations.

In an endeavour to define war Clausewitz starts with a simple definition relating war to any use of force, as he writes: "War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. (...) [it] is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will" (1873: Book I, Chapter 1, part 2²). He develops the definition further, by adding the human factor, i.e. "Theory must also take into account the human element; it must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness. The art of war has to deal with living and moral forces..." (1873: Book I, Chapter 1, part 22). Moreover, Clausewitz does not hesitate to include uncontrollable elements, such as chance, into his theory of war and phrases it in the following way:

We see from the foregoing how much the objective nature of war makes it a calculation of probabilities; now there is only one single element still wanting to make it a game, and that element it certainly is not without: it is chance

(1873, Book I, chapter 1, part 20).

We see therefore how from the commencement, the absolute, the mathematical as it is called, no where finds any sure basis in the calculations in the art of war; and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web, and makes war of all branches of human activity the most like a game of cards

(1873, Book I, Chapter 1, part 21).

As we can see the WAR IS A GAME metaphor is by no means novel.

¹ This discussion is based on Bassford (1993) and Clausewitz, Carl. 1873 *On war*. Trans. by J.J. Graham. Now available from www.clausewitz.com.

² I am unable to quote page numbers here, as the Internet source I am using did not contain page numbers.

Having discussed the role of emotions and chance in war, he returns to the interaction between war and policy. He actually finds the distinction between the two largely artificial, which brings us to his famous statement: "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means" (1873: Book I, Chapter 1, part 24), which he rephrases and refines many times, for example, "war is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument" (Book I, Chapter 1, part 27). His search for an in-depth understanding of the nature of war leads him to slightly metaphysical reflections, as in:

War is, therefore, not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason. The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second more the general and his army; the third more the Government

(1873: Book I, Chapter 1, part 28).

This metaphysical twist received a ferocious criticism from Jomini, who saw the role of a theoretician of warfare in educating future army commanders in the conduct of war and not in the pondering on the nature of war. It must be emphasized, however, that a major part of Clausewitz's book is indeed devoted to the art of war, in the sense of strategy building, conducting tactical operations, and very detailed discussion of particular manoeuvres.

Jomini's initial picture of war was much more lucid. He saw war as a rather static phenomenon, which allowed only for superficial changes, such as the actual participants, war technology and political aims, but whose nature, on the whole, remained invariable. In his analyses he borrowed much of the vocabulary from geometry, describing the battlefield tactics in terms of front lines, interior lines, bases and key points.

Bassford (1993) concludes his discussion on the interaction between the two 19th century theoreticians by stating that Jomini's practical approach has been long incorporated into modern military doctrine construction, whereas Clausewitz's penetrating and complex theory may never become "conventional wisdom". He also stresses that a few of the

present-day scholars tried to discredit Clausewitz's theory as obsolete in the age of nuclear missiles and terrorist attacks. For example, van Creveld (1991) claims that the narrow strategic view of war as initiated and conducted by nation-states has been rendered invalid. He seems to be forgetting the point that Clausewitz made about a close interdependence between wars and the societies that wage them, so that a change in the society and its policy will necessarily cause a change in the nature of war. Moreover, in the part devoted to tactical operations in the mountains, he clearly showed that an infinitely smaller force can confront and even halt a larger force in guerrilla-like warfare. The soldiers' motivation and their superior knowledge of the terrain were clear advantages, as predicted by Clausewitz, both in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Bassford (1993) gives yet another counterargument to van Creveld, when he notices that although the conduct of the Persian Gulf War may have been very Jominian in nature, i.e. a superior military force secured victory, the post war period of reconstruction or indeed its failure, is very reminiscent of the Clausewitzian insistence on developing a post-war strategy before embarking on a war.

3. Philosophy and the concept of 'war'

Pierre Hassner³ has devoted four essays to the nature of war (Hassner 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002a, translated and published in Poland as Hassner 2002b). In his papers he thoroughly reviews the positions of various philosophers on the issue and formulates his own contemporary view referred to as the *bourgeois* and barbarian dialectics.

Hassner (1996 [2002b]) notes that in philosophical investigations the concept of 'war' is often closely related to the dichotomy between harmony and conflict. He mentions Heraclites and his idea of *Polemos* (Gr. 'conflict') as the father of all beings, Hegelian dialectics, the Weberian war of gods, the Darwinian struggle for survival, Marxist class war and Nietzschean will to power all as philosophies advocating the primacy

³ Pierre Hassner is a philosopher and journalist interested in the history of political science in post-Cold War Europe, the ethics of politics and war, the problem of war refugees and the character of nation-states.

of conflict over harmony. Hassner, however, refuses to analyse war in such hierarchical axiological terms.

He starts his discussion of war by a reference to Rousseau, who noted that war should not be regarded as an interaction between two human beings, but between states. In addition, a distinction should be made between war and social conflict or conceptual contradiction and violence. Then he proceeds to an analysis of the views of Waltz (1959) who distinguished three possible sources of wars: (1) the human psyche, (2) the organization of states, and (3) international anarchy. The first two potential militant drives can allegedly be remedied. The human inclination to violence can be curbed by means of education, religion, psychological or psychiatric treatment. The internal state organization can evolve towards non-violent forms, which traditionally are related to freedom of trade, democracy or, in Marxist philosophy, to socialism. The international relations, however, are a cause which cannot be overcome, because of the multitude of states, which as officially equal subjects of international law, do not have any superior power which could resolve disputes between them. Also, every state reserves the right to use force if it feels that its position on the international arena is threatened. Thus Hassner believes that, although the reasons of particular wars can be sought in point (1) and (2), it is point (3) which is a pre-condition of war as such.

Hassner also discusses the work of Bull (1977), who sees two possibilities, each of them equally unattainable, for avoiding war in international relations. One is related to the idea of a world-state, which, as the only state on Earth, would not have an opponent to fight with. However, as was noted by Montesquieu, such a mega state would certainly suffer from internal unrest. Another solution would be a federation of states, whose members would enjoy military, economic and cultural balance.

Further on, Hassner discusses the cultural and legal basis of war. He points out that Saint Augustine was the first philosopher to introduce the distinction between a just and unjust war. He claims that this idea has been defined by modern law, which codifies the conduct of war. In this way war becomes a legitimate activity in international relations. According to Hassner, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel object to the legality of war, as they regard it as immoral. They also notice that not only have such laws little independent bases, but they cannot be enforced, either.

Let us now return to the idea of free trade as a stimulus for peace. Locke and Montesquieu were convinced that a drive for the acquisition and accumulation of goods can be juxtaposed with a drive to violence and war and can become a lasting foundation of peace. Rousseau, on the other hand, argued that private property and the drive to luxury can precipitate wars, as it is desire that is the source of all evil. Hassner, having presented these two contrasting positions, relates them to the contemporary world and notices that although democratic countries with a free market economy do not wage wars on each other, they suffer from an insecurity induced by migration and the sense of exclusion and rejection related to it. The destabilization of modern societies is therefore inevitable.

Hassner also discusses the ritualistic power of war. Following Girard (1993 [1972]), he points out the link between war and *sacrum*. As the violent behaviour of human individuals and groups is inevitable, it is best to control it by directing it to a scapegoat, which, excluded from the group, can serve as the focus of hatred and a victim of the violent action. According to Dupuy (1992) a liberal economy changes violence into competition and the need for a scapegoat into a demand for goods. Such consumerism should prevent violence, but it does not, as in a liberal society the in-group relations increasingly weaken and a lack of social ties leads to estrangement and a feeling of insecurity, which can, in turn, trigger violence.

Hassner (1998) examines in detail the connection between war and morality. He identifies the basic contradiction between the myth of the heroic defender and the problem of killing another human being, which in all societies is either unequivocally condemned or at least has a dubious moral status.

The development of civilization has led to a decrease in interpersonal violence, from slavery and duels, through private armies, to allowing the right to the use of force only to states. Aggressive wars aimed at territorial conquests have become increasingly unacceptable in Western societies. The pacifist movement finds support in the expansion of trade and the globalisation of the economy. However, there are still many countries in the world which wage aggressive wars against each other, and commit atrocities, which the democratic, individualistic societies cannot efficiently suppress. In fact, they are unable to prevent terrorist attacks on their own territory. This inability stems from the reluctance on

the part of democratic societies to take risks and hazard the lives of their soldiers. If refraining from war is not possible, then the operation of the international law should minimise the casualties. (As pointed out above, the enforcement of such laws is often faulty, but the very emergence of the concept and not necessarily its immediate and complete implementation seems an important development in the approach to war and its moral dimension.)

Degeneration of the democratic system may lead to a situation in which the only motivation behind a government's decisions is its future re-election. This, combined with the inclination of a liberal consumer society for peace and inaction may result in a replacement of democratic mechanisms based on an informed public opinion with a populist demagoguery awakening the primitive desire for a scapegoat by intensifying the sense of constant threat.

The issue of the morality of war can be further complicated if we consider the so-called humanitarian intervention. As in the contemporary world every war may affect the functioning of the global economy and threaten the security of other societies, the need for an intervention of a third party into a bilateral conflict has increased significantly. The basic moral question in this new situation remains a balance between the aims and means employed to solve the conflict. The means may vary from verbal (diplomatic intervention), through economic (an embargo) to military intervention. Even within military intervention further subdivisions can be introduced, for example between an intervention conducted with or without the permission of the government of the country in question. As in the case of war the fundamental moral problem was the one between the myth of a hero and the necessity to deprive other humans of life, so in the case of humanitarian intervention the primary problem is to strike a balance between possible imperialistic intervention conducted in the name of humanitarianism on the one hand and the parochialism of consumer societies which lean towards inaction on the other.

In his (2000) paper, Hassner focuses on the changing nature of war in Western society. Modern war seems to evolve along a continuum from a war between two opposing nation-states, through civil or state-internal wars resulting from ethnic or religious conflicts, and military interventions launched to stop these state-internal wars, to military and policing actions aimed at international organizations, such as a mafia or ter-

rorism. Hassner quotes Lenin's reformulation of Clausewitz's maxim "Politics is a way to conduct war by other means", as an apt summary of the war-dominated 20th century. Eventually, he suggests his own revision of the war analysis by an introduction of two dynamic elements into the war paradigm.

The first element is the *bourgeois* barbarian dialectics. It is designed to replace the Hegelian dialectics of the master and slave and the Aronian dialectics of soldier and diplomat. The Hegelian opposition was seen as the driving force behind the wars in feudal society where the master's desire to subdue and control the slave and the slave's drive to freedom through an overthrowing and subduing of the master remained in conflict with each other. The Aronian dichotomy between the soldier and the diplomat referred to a conventional war between nation-states, where the periods of peace and war could be related to the alternation between the increased activity or exhaustion and failure of the diplomat and the soldier. Hassner's dialectics is aimed at capturing the nature of war in the era marked by the decline of nation-state wars and, what follows, of the nation-states themselves; in an era where the self-destruction of the whole of humanity can result from nuclear war; finally, in the era of terrorism, which can hardly be analysed within a conventional war paradigm. A nuclear strike is the epitome of *bourgeois* war, as the ultimate example of the concept of war based on technological supremacy. This is what Luttwak (1996) calls a post-heroic military policy, i.e. a strategy that only the best economically and technologically developed countries can afford, i.e. the United States. The employment of the so-called intelligent weapons and superiority in information and communication systems renders the enemy army paralysed and unable to retaliate, simultaneously reducing the American casualties, as well as the civilian casualties and even the enemy military casualties. This is a style of warfare characteristic of a society which displays an aversion to risk and violence and values the economy and technology.⁴

⁴ This claim of Hassner may be brought into question, especially if we compare it with Roxborough's observation about American arrogance. Especially that the considerable publicity the 'intelligent weapons' and the 'surgical strikes' receive, provokes instant criticism, when there are civilian casualties. The number of casualties is then not compared to the potential casualties of traditional weapons, but to the heightened expectations aroused by the media.

Terrorism represents a complete contradiction of such values. It is aimed at civilians, and uses such primitive methods as suicidal bomb attacks or ethnic cleansing. These two approaches to the conduct of war, i.e. technological supremacy and terrorism, can be seen as competing or complementary. The clash between them is most striking when in the process of humanitarian interventions these two different styles of warfare meet. This is what Hassner calls the conflict between the *bourgeois* and barbarian.

The second dynamic element in the new war paradigm, according to Hassner, is the blurring of the distinction between the police and the army. The tasks set before the international stabilization forces calls for a redefinition of the role of a soldier, whose major objective is not to conquer the enemy but to protect human rights in the endangered regions. It is difficult, however, to avoid the analogy between the stabilizing forces and the colonial armies, which calls the motivation behind such humanitarian intervention into question.

The ambivalence of the possible moral evaluation of contemporary war leads many theoreticians to contradictory conclusions. Chaunu (1996-1997) points out that the decline of inter-state wars and a disintegration of nation-states may lead to a return to intra-state anarchy and brutal social violence. Keegan (1994) states that although conventional war may soon come to an end, violence is unlikely to cease to exist, therefore governments will need well-trained armies to fight internal disturbances of ethnic or criminal origin. However, the training of such armies will differ significantly from the present day model and should be informed by the oriental tradition of war. Hassner (2000) criticizes both these approaches, as Chaunu's model seems too radical as a prediction of historical developments, while Keegan does not give convincing arguments for the thesis that a bourgeois-based army and criminal or terrorist organizations should abandon their present styles of warfare and turn to a style alien to either of them.

Finally, Hassner (2000) concludes his deliberations on the changing nature of war by presenting a model proposed by van Creveld (1991), who, similarly to Chaunu and Keegan, advocates the end of inter-state wars. Unlike them, though, he suggests that conventional wars will transform into a large number of low-intensity military conflicts. This prediction would seem a very likely development, if the Gulf Wars had not falsified it so quickly.

Reflecting on 9/11, Hassner (2002a) perceives this terrorist attack as a stimulus for a radical change in the philosophical paradigm of the contemporary world. A change from the world of Locke and Kant to that of Hobbes, Nietzsche and Marks. By the world of Locke, Hassner understands a world dominated by a free market economy, whereas the Kantian world was ultimately to be a democratic federation of states, in which every person is a citizen of the world. The fall of the Twin Towers put an end to these peaceful visions based on a conviction that prosperity leads to democracy and democracy guarantees peace.

Hobbes's world, filled with fear and distrust, seems closer to reality after 9/11, when the world achieved certain Nietzschean dimensions. For Nietzsche the ultimate cause of war was the death of God, i.e. the loss of the significance of the sphere of *sacrum*. The end of *sacrum* would be followed by the end of state and politics. This, in turn would lead to the arrival of the last man, which Hassner interprets as the onset of a hedonistic passive nihilism.

In Nietzsche's world the terrorist attack on America can be interpreted as a vehement rejection of the relativistic, God-less world of consumerism and a manifestation of heroic courage and apocalyptic destruction including self-destruction.

The Marxist element, informing the understanding and the reading of 9/11, is most pronounced in an article by Pamuk (2001) who stresses that the South and the East, i.e. African, Latin American and Asian societies, although they may condemn terrorism as such, were united in a feeling of satisfaction that this time it was the powerful U.S. who was attacked.

This reorientation in the philosophical perception of the world may lead to dire consequences. As a result of the attack, the *bourgeois* peaceful values may be rejected in favour of Manichaeism, which represents the world as a simplistic dichotomy. In such a world the terrorists will be instantly identified as evil, while the Western societies will naturally be good. This, in consequence, will lead to an unnecessary increase in violence, as a war against evil is by definition a just war.

4. Social studies and the concept of 'war'

The Second Gulf War between the US and Iraq has stimulated much discussion between American academics on American foreign policy. Some of the sociologists published their views in the journal *Political power and social theory*, vol. 16. I will review this issue, not so much to represent their criticism of the US government's foreign policy, but as to discover what image of war transpires from their writings.

Roxborough (2003a) defines war as a political, social, cultural as well as technical activity. He does not evaluate it, but rather sees it as one of the institutions of social life. He offers an overview of the research conducted within historical sociology and argues that war was a major factor in the growth of states, in the causation of revolutions (which he also sees as positive forces of social change), in the achievement of democracy, and women's rights movements. In the 'war and society' approaches to the topic, he points to the increased interest in the so-called home front and such issues as: how women and minorities were caught up in the war process, the impact war had on communities (esp. through patriotic pageantry and rituals of collective mourning), the image of war in the popular consciousness (movies, comics) and the relationship between war and economic growth.

When analysing the intervention of the US in Iraq in 2003, Roxborough leans heavily on Victor Davis Hanson's views on war as a culture-determined phenomenon. Hanson stresses that the democratic Western societies have developed an unusually aggressive style of war focusing on the decisive battle. That is why American military doctrine depends crucially on constructing a massive technological advantage over potential enemies and on the so called pre-emptive strikes. Roxborough (2003a: 188-189) puts it in the following words:

The American military has come to adopt a Jominian, engineering approach to military operations. By this I mean that, instead of thinking of a war as a clash of wills between two adversaries seeking to thwart each other, the American military tends to see war as the technical application of force to achieve a desired result. They are technocrats of violence. In this image, the adversary is an inert or resistant medium to be hammered into shape by American military power.

After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, when Bush declared a ‘global war on terror’ it remained unclear “whether this would be a literal war, or whether it would simply be another hype of militarized rhetoric, covering what would in essence be a low-key police and intelligence operation” (Roxborough 2003a: 186). In any event, one of the key issues was the problem with the conceptualisation of the enemy. American military tradition as spelled out above has been developed to win wars with an opponent similar to the US, i.e. a nation state. Although the US lost the Vietnam war despite its dominant military power, it did not influence the way of thinking about war by the American political and military elite. Thus a war on terror creates a basic problem of identifying the enemy. Terrorism and terrorists can only be fought within this strategy if their status as a social transnational movement is re-conceptualised. Therefore, the American foreign policy had to underscore that the US would hold the governments and the states on whose land terrorist organizations operate responsible for their actions. In this way they seek to legitimize American intervention in such countries.

When it comes to the Second Gulf War, Roxborough believes that there are two major causes behind the fiasco of American efforts to reconstruct the Iraqi state after the war. They are American military tradition and the misconception of the nature of terrorism on the part of American leaders. RDO (rapid, decisive operations) gave Americans a swift and spectacular victory over the Iraqi army, but by no means did they allow them to control the entire country. The major problem, as identified by Roxborough, was a disconnection between the achievement of military objectives and the political aims, which should be blamed on the Jominian rather than Clausewitzian approach to war.⁵ He claims that the periods between the fighting and humanitarian aid and state reconstruction were too long and allowed for chaos to take over.

In fact, Roxborough (2003a: 192) holds that the same problem has beset all the other peace-keeping operations conducted by the Americans in the post-Cold War period:

⁵ Clausewitz emphasized that a war can only be declared when the civilian administration has determined and designed the strategy for the post-war period, when the military objectives are achieved, because it is the victorious army and state who are responsible for the normalization of post-war life.

The cultural disposition towards RDO runs counter to the emotional and cognitive requirements of what the British used to refer to as imperial policing. (...) The search for a quick fix, together with the technocratic denial that local politics matters, have meant that "peace" in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia and elsewhere has been fragile.

This disregard for local politics has also been noticeable in the planning of the Iraqi war. Having construed Saddam Hussein as Hitler, the American authorities expected that the US army would be welcomed by the Iraqi people in the same way as it was welcomed when liberating France. Therefore the resistance on the part of some Iraqis and distrust of the others was quite unexpected. Under the circumstances, it is difficult not to see that the analogy between the Second World War and the situation in Iraq was pretty far-fetched. Roxborough (2003a: 198) concludes: "[p]olicy makers tend to rely on analogic reasoning rather than the systematic evaluation of evidence. While this is unavoidable, it has its dangers".⁶ This conclusion leads him to appeal to other sociologists to get involved in the policy making process as their expertise seems relevant to creating effective policy.

Roxborough also takes a close look at the American intervention in Afghanistan, and identifies similar problems. The major one was the need to realize that "Defeating Al Qaeda requires the repression of a social movement, not the elimination of an adversary state" (2003: 201). To achieve this aim, it is necessary to reject the traditional warfare strategy, where the purpose of a military action is not necessarily to physically eliminate the enemy force, but rather to render it ineffective, which can be accomplished by 15-20% casualties. In the case of terrorist forces, the aim must be to kill or capture every force member. Otherwise they will reorganize and strike again. Armies trained to fight wars against nation-states cannot meet this challenge.

⁶ On the role of analogy and metaphor in constructing social policy see Schön (1993). He describes how viewing slums as a diseased part of the city, in fact diseased beyond treatment, precludes any constructive action towards the improvement of life quality in the poverty districts. Only a change in the conceptualisation can lead to a change in policy. The linguistic technology behind policy setting is then an exercise in naming and framing, which are inevitably evaluative. This brings us back to the research by Lakoff 1987 and ICM (discussed in Section 3, Chapter One), Coulson 2001 and frame shifting, Fauconnier – Turner's (2002) blending (both in Section 6, Chapter One) and Krzeszowski's (1997) axiology (Section 7, Chapter One), to name just a few.

Finally, Roxborough (2003a: 205) formulates his views on the dysfunctionality of the American conceptualisation of war and voices them in the following words:

Deep in its heart, the American military is the victim of a series of Jominian antinomies: peace and war, war fighting vs. policing, victory or defeat, war or politics. These intellectual bifurcations serve an organizational purpose: they enable soldiers to accept a role as professionals under the tutelage of civilian leaders. This mythology is functional for both civilian political leaders and the uniformed military. But because it does not mirror the seamless nature of reality, tensions and contradictions constantly arise. Because these intellectual categories are artificial dichotomies, reality constantly intrudes in unwelcome ways. Peace and war cannot always be neatly distinguished; the distinction between policing and military operations is an artifact of the historical development of Western states; what constitutes victory or defeat is seldom a clear-cut matter, with one shading into the other; and most fundamentally war IS politics (his emphasis).

It would be difficult to overlook an affinity between these views and those represented by Hassner, who also stressed the responsibility of the winners to provide humanitarian relief to the refugees (politics in war) and the blurring of the distinction between an army and a police peace-keeping force.

Foran (2003) in his reaction to Roxborough's paper stresses that the picture of war as politics should be enriched with the connection between war and the economy, and quotes Tariq Ali's (2003: 18) aphorism: "Economics, after all, is only a concentrated form of politics, and war a continuation of both by other means". He also emphasizes the racial implications present in the American military doctrine perpetrated in the media through an image of the Iraqis as a "sick society". Foran's focus on the economy and racism leads him to refer to Peter Ustinov's saying: "Terrorism is the war of the poor, and war is the terrorism of the rich", which he quotes from Berger (2003: 34).

Another discussant from the *Political Power and Social Theory*, vol. 16, Hooks (2003) gives a short review of sociological analyses of war. He cites Mann (1986, 1993), who stressed that "states, not classes and not firms declare and wage war. As war is waged, the state is transformed as are other social institutions and relations among them" (Hooks

2003: 235). This definition of war concentrates on its traditional view and implies that when we talk about class wars or economic wars the word is used metaphorically. At the same time an emphasis is put on the fact that the effects of war are not just limited to casualties or equipment damage and loss on the battlefield, but also entail a transformation of the entire social life.

Hooks also refers to Elias' (1939 [1982]) study of the civilising process. Elias claims that modern Western culture, in which states, but not private people, can wage wars, is a result of the transformation of the military power and pacification of medieval warlords. Meyer et al. (1997) extend this view and claim that the freedom of military action on the part of nation states is further curbed, and can be interpreted as the civilising of the state.⁷

When it comes to the evaluation of Roxborough's position on the American war with Iraq, Hooks dissents from the former's classification of this war as a defensive war on terror. He believes that, in fact it was an aggressive war, whose main aim was to ascertain American domination in the Middle East. This disagreement between two sociologists clearly shows that the categorisation of war as defensive or aggressive is yet another artificial dichotomy, which can be used as a rhetorical exercise. The multi-causal nature of war does not allow for such clear-cut labelling.

Hooks also distrusts the idea of sociologists working for the government. In his opinion such involvement may lead to a misuse of information on the part of the government, as was the case with the Project Camelot he describes. Within this project, sociologists were to assist the CIA in understanding the nature of social revolutions. However, the information gathered allowed the CIA to identify potential revolutionaries, and to disclose their identity to their governments, which in turn led to their capture, torture and murder.⁸

Abu-Lughod (2003) in her rejoinder to Roxborough hypothesised that the destabilisation of Iraq might not result from a failure of American

⁷ The Second Gulf War in Iraq waged by the US without the UN or even NATO mandate goes counter to this trend.

⁸ Knightly (1975) voices similar ethical concern when it comes to the role of war reporters. Some of them, by sharing information with their governments, come dangerously close to espionage, others become a propaganda instrument in the hands of censoring authorities, see also Section 6 of this chapter.

state-re-construction policy, but may have been the political aim of the military action. She also stresses that it is not enough to talk about political or military elites as the authors of war. In fact, particular politicians should be held responsible for the war. In this, her position on war comes close to the tendency identified by Meyer et al., and quoted by Hooks, i.e. the civilising of the state. Her belief in the importance of agency in the war-process also coincides with the understanding of history as constructed by the great leaders more, or at least as much as, by the unidentified social, economic, political and cultural forces.

Centeno (2003) once again focuses on the American military doctrine based on technological advantage and strategic management. He draws an analogy between the Vietnam war and the war on terror. Despite an overwhelming equipment advantage, Americans lost in Vietnam. When it comes to terrorism, the requirement for the decisive battle also cannot be met. Terrorists do not act in accord with the American/Western style of war. They do not concentrate their forces or announce targets. Quite to the contrary, a terrorist war, like a guerrilla war, consists in a swift attack and equally rapid withdrawal. The only way to victory then is a total annihilation of the enemy, which does not seem a viable solution, as it would imply wiping out entire societies. Centeno (2003: 257) also mentions other forms of war, like those fought in Africa, which he describes in the following words:

It is not a class war, but undefined conflict with ethnic, tribal and territorial aspects to it (although much less than the Western media often asserts). But it is a capacity of relatively small bands to wreak havoc and create chaos that are truly threatening – Charles Taylor, the President of Liberia is a gruesome example of this. He has established a model of war featuring young children, and the generous use of drugs to reduce judgement and to trigger terrifying atrocities. This war is pure violence and chaos without any of the institutional restraints.

Another type of violence, which Centeno calls a class war, is the violence present in the big cities of South America, where the gap between the rich and the poor is so striking that it triggers militant actions on the part of each side. There, the security of the rich depends on private and not national/state army or police forces. In this way Centeno, although it is not his aim, provides a broad typology of wars, starting with the proto-

typical in our culture war between two nations, conducted by national armies, through a series of other less prototypical examples, such as guerrilla wars, the war on terror, tribal wars in Africa and city violence.

Summing up, within the sociological perspective war is described as a social, cultural, economic and political phenomenon. It is viewed as one of the social institutions, indispensable as a stimulus of social change. A series of popular dichotomies between war and peace, war and politics, politics and the economy, are seen as a serious oversimplification of a complex continuum. This superficial polarisation of meanings results in ineffective policy development. Similarly, as war is a multi-causal phenomenon, there can be no clear distinction between a defensive (just) war and an aggressive war. Some sociologists claim that war undergoes a civilising process, so that it becomes increasingly more controlled by the civilian authorities. The model of widespread violence affecting a whole society is now restructured into a model where the casualties are minimised. However, this tendency can be applied only to the Western cultural model of war. It is not true about other types of war, such as a terrorist war, African wars or city violence, the last two in particular appearing very close in nature to the fights between medieval warlords in Europe. The terrorist war, so close to guerrilla war, calls for yet another redefinition of the concept of war in the Western society. That is, if western armies are to successfully fight the terrorist organizations, their way of war must change, as in the war on terror there will be no single decisive battle.

5. Literature and war

One of the strains of research within sociology mentioned by Roxborough, was a representation of war in culture, i.e. films, comics and other media. In the present section I want to shortly present the image of war in Polish and British literature. This brief overview makes no claims concerning a thorough or novel study of the issue. It rather aims at identifying the major points and relies completely on the expertise of literary critics. First, I shortly review a collection of essays written by Maria Janion, a professor of the Polish Academy of Sciences specialising in literature and culture, in the years 1975-1998 and published as Janion (1998).

When it comes to British literary tradition I turn to a monograph on war and peace in the 20th c. by Jacek Wiśniewski (1987).⁹

Janion (1998) perceives the myth of the Polish national insurrection as constitutive of the Polish understanding of war and its close relation to patriotism. The failure of the three consecutive national uprisings (Kościuszko Uprising 1794, November Uprising 1830-31 and January Uprising 1918-19) contributed to the myth that it is not the winning but the honourable death which is the aim of a military action. The Polish mythic imperative, as defined by Janion (1998: 258), consists of six elements:

THE UPRISING – the need for the uprising is overwhelming, it is a necessity, in accord with the Polish insurrection tradition;

THE DEED – often stemming from an anxiety that it may be delayed, because the delay brings utter disgrace, an eternal flaw;

THE REDOUBT – to dig in on an indomitable position, possibly perish there; as in the words of *Warszawianka*:¹⁰ “today – your triumph or your death”;

THE SACRIFICIAL STAKE – as in the romantic image of the referendum of the ashes from *Lila Weneda* [a tragedy by Słowacki]: “This is the most glorious referendum, in which the nation to disclose its will carries not the ballots but its own ashes” or as in (*Gazeta Polska* Aug 28th 1944¹¹): “Let the city burn, Poland will rise”;

THE WORLD WILL SEE THE SACRIFICE AND BE ASHAMED – the quote from Słowacki will suffice: “Let them see us, as we perish”;

THE FIGHT IS HOPELESS, BUT NECESSARY FOR THE FUTURE GENERATIONS – Okulicki [the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Uprising 1944] and others spoke about “the seed” and “the supreme sacrifice” [my translation, MF].

The mythic imperative, as defined above, Janion clearly identified in Wańkowicz’s *Legenda o Hubalu* [The legend of Hubal],¹² where the

⁹ Marek Wilczyński and Jacek Fabiszak have suggested this source to me.

¹⁰ *Warszawianka – La Varsovienne* was written by a French poet, Casimir François Delavigne, to commemorate the Polish November Uprising against the Russian occupation. The poem was translated into Polish by Kazimierz Sienkiewicz and the music composed for it by Karol Kurpiński. It premiered in 1831 in the National Theatre in Warsaw.

¹¹ The date is very meaningful here, it is the 28th day of the Warsaw Uprising, during which the Polish capital was so heavily bombed and burnt that it was almost entirely destroyed.

¹² The works of literature referred to in this section are not listed in the Reference section. They were not listed by the original author either. In the remaining part of the

strikingly Tyrtean style in highly emotional terms builds one of the most popular romantic symbolic images, that of David fighting Goliath. However, the Polish literature of the Second World War did not only create and foster myths, but also self-reflectively (for example in *Koniec legendy* [End of the legend] by Szczepański) deconstructed the myth by juxtaposing the coarse and dreary reality of war as perceived by the protagonist with his belief in the heroic myth.

In her reference to Miłosz (1979), Święch (1972) and Jedlicki (1978) Janion discusses a strong tendency for stereotype and the lack of formal finesse of popular war poetry. She stresses that such poetry, especially in the Tyrtean tradition, does not function as a work of art as much as a frame or a scenario for rituals of national unity. It is responsible for the theatricality of public life. To further support her claims, Janion cites Duvignaud (1971), who emphasizes that in a time of social revolution there is no place for any revolutionary artistic expression. Literature and theatre facilitate the exteriorisation of human emotions, necessary for a redefinition and reconstruction of social roles and behavioural patterns.

When discussing war and literary form, Janion stresses that after the Great War, Polish war literature was dominated by the romantic myth. Protests against war (Strug, Wittlin) were rather rare and did not produce such a response as the French novel *Feu* by Henrie Barbusse. In his novel, Barbusse deconstructs the war myth. He stresses the conflict between morality and war. In composing his image of war, Barbusse uses an expressionistic technique. The book is populated with masses of nameless bleak soldiers, helpless victims of the war machine, where the corpses are dismembered by continuous machine gun fire, as if killed again and again, where the living are as hollow as the dead. Janion contrasts this literary tradition with the myth building tradition akin to the American Western. This second tradition seemed to be more popular in Polish representations of war (especially striking is the work of Kossak-Szczucka). Here war does not lead to a dehumanisation of soldiers, but rather presents them with an opportunity to show their best human virtues, such as heroism, courage, devotion, loyalty and sacrifice. Some apologists of war, such as Helmuth von Moltke, claim that "war is a part

chapter only those works which are referred to by the name of the author and the publication year appear in the References.

of the God-given order ... without war the world would sink in the swamp of materialism".¹³

Janion identifies two sets of conceptual metaphors (though she does not call them so), which may underlie these two competing representations of war, i.e. WAR IS HELL and WAR IS A CATASTROPHE on the one hand, and WAR IS SPORT, WAR IS A GAME on the other.¹⁴

Janion's analysis of war literature allows her to characterize several distinct perspectives on war. The prevailing style is based on the heroic myth, which praises the Glory of War as the ultimate test of human virtues. It contributes to the rituals of national unity and stimulates support for the war. In contrast, expressionism views war as an incomprehensible machine or catastrophe triggering an unexplainable alienation, terror and carnage. A civilian perspective leaves no room for either heroic deeds or painful pondering of war atrocities. It requires the mobilisation of all strength possible to secure survival. When faced with the threat to their life and dehumanising conditions, civilians often escape into the unreal or surreal world of dreams, where poetry and oneiric distance to reality make life and living possible.

Next, let's move to Wiśniewski's (1987) discussion of war and peace in 20th century British literature. He divided his investigation into three thematic-chronological periods: literature concerning the Great War, the Spanish War and the Second World War. In all the three cases he concentrated on what he assumed to be the key works in poetry and the novel. As he admits in the conclusion, he did not consider the so-called adventure war literature, as he was not concerned with popular literature, but with those poems and novels whose artistic value withstood the passage of time.

The Great War poetry can be divided into two periods, the first one called the "Rupert Brooke period" and the second dominated by the

¹³ These words ring very similar to the motivation provided for religiously based terrorism, as an action against consumerism and lack of values in the Western world. Van Moltke is quoted by Janion (1998: 45) from Toynbee (1963: 24), my translation.

¹⁴ At the 8th ICLC conference in Logrono, Spain, July 2003, I presented a paper in which I analyzed metaphors used in the Polish press: using two issues of a daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* from 2001, and seven issues of a weekly *Polityka* (three issues from 2001 and 4 issues from 2003). I have identified several metaphors, which correspond closely to what Janion was describing. I found evidence for, among several others, metaphors which I called WAR IS A NATURAL FORCE (Janion's catastrophe) and WAR IS A GAME.

Trench Poets. Brooke was a typical proponent of the Glory of War Myth; his poems were calls to arms, in which war was viewed as a duty to God, King and Country. His example was followed by many imitators authoring jingoistic poems. A breakthrough in the way of portraying the war came only after the loss of "the first hundred thousand", as the British Expeditionary Force was called; the desperately pointless attacks in the Battle of the Somme in 1916; and the necessity of introducing conscription. The terror and tediousness of the war of attrition caused war neurasthenia in many soldiers. Some of them, like Wilfred Sassoon and Robert Owen, wrote their poetry of protest while on leave curing their nerves. Sassoon composed his poems which rejected the euphemistic vocabulary of jingoistic verse and showed the misery of suffering and the death of soldiers, completely devoid of glory, in minute realistic detail. Robert Owen in "*Dulce et decorum est*" clearly rejected the grandeur of war and focused on the atrophy of emotions in soldiers as the only possible protection against the horror and despair of the trench combat. The futility of the war and the anguish of its participants so aptly recreated by the Trench Poets increased the number of the conscientious objectors to war.

Unlike poetry, prose accounts of the Great War, naively believed to be the war to end all wars, appeared only in the late 1920s, long after the Armistice. Wiśniewski stresses that contrary to poetry, some of which presents high artistic value, the war novels of the period are historically important accounts of the war by its survivors, but their literary value does not compare to Barbusse's *Feu*.

Robert Graves's poems and autobiography *Good bye to that all* show an original perspective on the war. Even in the first, jingoistic period of literature, he could not accept the exaggerated image of the bloodthirsty Huns, as he had German relatives, whom he had visited before the war. Both his poetry and prose show distance to the topic through the employment of farce, caricature and public school understatement. His bitter humour and resignation to war, which despite its carnage and absurdity is just another human condition and has to be lived through, put him side by side with such outstanding Second World War novelists as Evelyn Waugh, Joseph Heller and Thomas Pynchon and their black humour and anti-heroes.

Overall, British literature of the First World War is best known for Winfred Sassoon's poetry of anger and Robert Owen's poetry of pity and

the novels from the school of despair. It seemed that the disillusionment with the lie of the Glory of War Myth was so profound that it would not be possible to arouse any enthusiasm for war in the future generations. Yet this was not the case. Despite the increase in the pacifist attitudes, the younger brothers of the Great War soldiers, infatuated with the leftist ideology soon discovered that it was necessary to wage a war to fight Fascism. The Spanish War (June 1936-March 1939) gave them an opportunity to test their ideals in battle. In the first period, represented by John Cornford, the belief in an unambiguous alignment between good and evil dominated the scene. Cornford's writing was strongly ideological, as he was an active communist; despite his conviction that to be anti-Fascist precludes being anti-war, his poems and a prose *Diary Letter* describe the terror and ugliness of war in words very similar to those of the trench poets. Unlike the trench poets, however, he believes that some wars must be fought even if they are cruel and undignified. He adds motifs alien to the protest poetry of WW I, that of an individual's fight against his social background, and on a more personal note – a romantic farewell with a loved one. In the Great War poetry women were either a part of the home front – increasing the feeling of estrangement of the soldiers at war, or a part of the idealised and irretrievably lost past. The romantic farewell was alien to it, but present in earlier war poetry, for example of the Napoleonic era.¹⁵ This motif becomes more popular in World War II (e.g. by Alun Lewis). In World War I it is replaced with the homoerotic element.

The Second World War differed from the two previous wars by its geographical scope and by the fact that it received wide press coverage by war correspondents. It was also the most mechanised of the wars so far, which called for a serious restructuring of the army with an increasing number of the logistic units, whose major objective was not to participate in the fighting but to create and maintain the supply and support lines for the front. It also led to a social change in the British army, where the skills of the mechanics and mercantile organization of the stores became more important than a university education. Killing was done at a distance and the question of responsibility for it, as well as that

¹⁵ In Poland the farewell both interpreted at an individual level as a farewell to a mother or a beloved and at an allegorical level as a blessing from Mother Poland to her soldiers, was present both in the 19th c. painting and poetry, in the Great War and in the Warsaw Uprising.

of the responsibility of combatant and non-combatant personnel had to be asked anew. The literature of the period reflected these tendencies.

The poetry of the three major poets of the war, Alun Lewis, Sidney Keyes and Keith Douglas, first describes the tediousness of the prolonged training period of the phoney war, where the army drill is designed to depersonalize soldiers and to immunise them to the moral dilemmas of killing and the apprehension of death. There was no "Rupert Brooke period", as the disillusionment with war made a call to arms for valour and glory seem impossible. The Spanish War discredited fighting for any ideology, as no matter what lofty rationale had been declared to justify it, war is always cruel and revolting.

Similarly to the First World War, the Second World War novel appeared after a time lag. *Put out More Flags* by Evelyn Waugh is an exception in this respect, as it appeared in 1942. It is a comic book, inhabited by anti-heroes, in which Waugh ponders over the human propensity for immoral behaviour intensified by war. Anthony Powell's *A Dance to the Music of Time* sequence perceives war as a continuation of the general power struggle between men. War is immemorial, and hence dull and flat. C.P. Snow in his 12-volume *Strangers and Brothers* describes a group of people involved in the development of the A-bomb. It does not refer to war as action, but rather considers the responsibility of the workers of the war industry and the scientists developing new weapons for the technologically advanced slaughter. It presents the troubled conscience of all the people involved in the war process. The question of responsibility posed in such a way invalidates the historical division between war and peace. Olivia Manning in two trilogies: *The Balkan Trilogy* and *The Levant Trilogy* describes the experience of a civilian living in the shadow of war. Evelyn Waugh returns to the topic of war in the 1950s and 1960s trilogy *Sword of Honour*. It has not the lightness of the 1942 book, but testifies to a defeat of ideals, the collapse of myths and a nostalgia for past values.

Wiśniewski (1987) presents a detailed characteristics of the British war literature in the 20th c. Even a cursory overview of his work presented above allows us to identify the persistent motifs of this writing. The beginning of the Great War stimulated the creation of heroic-romantic poetry encouraging its readers to join the army and to perform their duty for the Glory of the King and Country. Soon, however, the fu-

tility of the war effort and the dismal carnage of the war of attrition were reflected in the poetry of protest. The novels of the time represent war as a catastrophe or a machine beyond the comprehension of men. The 1920s and early 1930s were dominated by the pacifist attitudes. The Spanish War, however, made it clear that to be anti-Fascist and remain anti-war was impossible. The international fight for the values embodied by the Spanish Republic sparked new enthusiasm. Quickly, though, it turned out that even the noblest values have no bearing on war atrocities, its suffering and bloodshed. The Second World War brought about another change in the representation of war. As poetry, unlike in the Spanish War, freed itself from the requirements of propaganda, taken over by the war correspondents, it became more private, focused on an individual experience of war and allowed the lyrical I to consider the moral issues, such as the struggle of good and evil, life and death, and the apprehension of suffering and dying. The novels no longer depicted war as an incomprehensible force of nature beyond human control, but rather as a natural social and political process recurring regularly in human history.

6. War correspondents

In his history of war correspondents, Knightly (1975) covers a period between the Crimean War (1854-56) and the Vietnam War (1954-75). He not only portrays a long line of reporters, but also identifies certain general issues involved in the trade. Knightly considers William Howard Russell of *The Times* the first civilian war correspondent. Earlier press reports were often written by army officers, who were involved in the military operations. Howard's work in the Crimea gave rise to some of the problems that have accosted war journalism ever since. Despite his glorification of war in the early dispatches, in which he started a number of war clichés, such as "rain of death", a grapeshot which "tore through the enemy lines", "the terrible enemy" and the "gallant" British troops (Knightly 1975: 10), many of his dispatches were unacceptable for the military. As Howard criticised the command of the operation, and described the situation of the British Expedition in much detail, he was accused of breaches of security, as in some of his dispatches he disclosed the position, weaponry and supply problems of the British. His strictures

as well as Thomas Chenery's vivid report on the shortcomings of the British medical support of the operation aroused outrage in Britain. As a result, the Government sought to replace the command, while charity organizations provided hospital care. This showed the power of the press, which the military strove to curb with a general order issued on Feb. 25th 1856 by Sir William Codrington, who warned the correspondents that if any security breach occurs, the correspondent will be removed from the front. This order, although it had little impact in the Crimean War, which was about to end, is considered the origin of British press censorship.

The period between 1865-1914 was regarded as the Golden Age of war journalism. The colonial wars reported then, ensured a distance for the European audience that wars that would be fought in Europe in the 20th c. could not. This reporting carried some of the racial prejudice, so that the battles with locals were reported with hunting vocabulary (see Chapter Four on the reporting of the war on terror as a hunt. The distance as well as the inequality of military power contributed to the Glory of War Myth, when war appeared as an exciting manly adventure. This period also raised a question about the non-combatant status of the war correspondents. Knightly (1975: 43) describes it in the following passage:

... Richard Harding Davis of the *New York Journal* and *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* – helped to start the Spanish American War. (...) The British, especially *The Times* correspondents, were not averse to a little intelligence work for the Foreign Office on the side, and one of the Americans, H. M. Stanley, was not above starting his own small wars in Africa and then reporting them.

The reporting of the Boer War (1899-1902), although it changed the perspective of the British as they did not win, aroused such civilian interest in the readers that Thos Cook and Sons advertised a tour of the battlefield. In his description of the warfare Knightly stresses that the British forces' major strategy was to fight and win battles, while the Boers defied this method and opted for guerrilla war. The British retaliation consisted in farm-burning, concentration camps and collective punishment, little of which found their way into the British press.

The press coverage of the First World War was plagued with the same flaws as the previous war accounts, only that this time the results were more acute for the readers. The combination of censorship and a

belief in the necessity of maintaining their nation's morale on the part of the reporters led to a serious distortion in the reports of 1914-1916. The propaganda writing created atrocity stories of the German cruelty in Belgium. These false reports, according to Knightly, should be held responsible for the distrust of the Western public when the truth about the concentration camps of the Second World War was revealed in 1945. At times, the misrepresentation of the situation on the front was so severe that in some reports the Battle of the Somme appeared to be a British victory. Thus the readers misinformed by the press were unable to organize effective protests against their Government's policy.

The failure of the journalists to cover the Great War impartially and Hemingway's fictitious image of the Austro-Italian front, started a new trend in war reporting. The new-style correspondent aimed at detailed and neutral reporting, with a focus on the impact of war on the individual. How hard and idealistic this approach was the reporters were soon to discover.

The Spanish War raised yet another problem involved in war journalism, that of a personal involvement of the reporters. The two extreme positions on the issue were represented by Drew Middleton and Herbert Matthews. Middleton (1972, quoted from Knightly 1975: 193) summed up the job of a war correspondent in the following words: "to get the facts and write them with his interpretation of what they mean to the war, without allowing personal feelings about the war to enter into the story. No one can be completely objective but objectivity is the goal". Matthews (1971: 6, quoted from Knightly 1975: 193), on the other hand, held a contrary view: "I would always opt for honest, open bias. A newspaperman should work with his heart as well as his mind". Knightly (1975: 216), although clearly drawn to the second position, notices its faults and expresses it in the following words:

The drawback of reporting with heart as well as mind is that if the cause is basically just, as the Republican one undoubtedly was, the correspondent tends to write in terms of heroic endeavour, rather than face unpalatable facts, and to mislead his readers with unjustified optimism.

When it comes to the reporting of the Second World War, it faced the same problems with censorship and propaganda as the First World War.

Goebbels, well aware of the power of the press, the radio, and propaganda films, created special units within the Wehrmacht, Propaganda Kompanien, drafted from former reporters and artists, which covered the military operations in all war theatres. The casualties they suffered were greater than in regular units. Reporting in Russia was seriously affected by censorship, but as news dispatches were written by bureaucrats with limited linguistic skills, the Russian public soon learnt how to interpret the distorted message. The American journalists were also heavily censored and contributed to the propaganda writing. The war in the Pacific was reported with the same racial overtone so characteristic of the colonial period wars in the Golden Age of war journalism. Both the Americans and the Japanese employed a racist perspective, which facilitated the dehumanization of the enemy (see also the discussion of the enemy vilification strategies in Chapter Four). This, in turn, led to appalling atrocities on both sides. It should come as no surprise that both sides reported only the atrocities of the enemy, and concealed those committed by their own troops.

The short overview of Knightly's book presented above does not do justice to its rich detail and lively style. Still, it clearly shows how war correspondents contributed to the creation of the Glory of War Myth. Although since the early beginnings of war journalism some of the reporters described the hard ploy of the soldiers and sometimes even dared to criticise the command, many were oblivious to the war suffering and enthusiastically depicted it as an exhilarating experience (especially in the Golden Age of war journalism). Already in the Crimean War censorship steps were taken against the reporters' freedom of speech. However, it was not only censorship that should be blamed for the biases in war reports, but also the journalists' patriotic zeal and their drive for a scoop, which led them to exaggeration of the enemy's losses and atrocities, and minimising of the casualties of their own troops. Correspondents' personal involvement in the operations often influenced their work, so that they represented the side they sympathised with in a more favourable light. Sometimes they were deliberately misinformed by the authorities they worked with. One of the notorious problems with war reporting was the journalists' non-combatant status, as they were often involved in intelligence work for their governments, and some, especially in the late 19th c. but also in the Spanish War, took active part in the fighting. When

it comes to the phrasing of the romantic legend of the war, the correspondents are responsible for the heroic vocabulary, in which the operations of their own troops were described, for using euphemisms when the facts were not palatable to their taste, and also for increasing the antagonism between the sides of the conflict through atrocity stories and racial prejudice, which dehumanised the enemy and both encouraged and justified ruthless brutality in the treatment of the adversary.

7. Linguistics and war

Linguists, when dealing with the domain of war, usually employ what Charteris-Black (2004) called critical metaphor analysis, which allows them to show how the use of metaphor highlights and hides certain aspects of the phenomena they are used to enunciate. This ability to manipulate the image of the world makes metaphors a powerful rhetoric device used in political propaganda in order to influence the public opinion.

Lakoff (1992¹⁶) in his widely circulated, Internet-published paper analyses the system of metaphors used to justify the First War in the Gulf. He identifies a series of metaphors, two of which are most strongly juxtaposed, i.e. WAR IS POLITICS and WAR IS A VIOLENT CRIME. Lakoff claims that the Clausewitzian definition of war as politics pursued by other means has a metaphorical basis and justifies it in the following way:

Clausewitz's metaphor is commonly seen as literally true. We are now in a position to see exactly what makes it metaphorical. First, it uses State-as-Person metaphor. Second, it turns qualitative effects of human beings into quantifiable costs and gains, thus seeing political action as economics. Third, it sees rationality as profit-making. Fourth, it sees war in terms of only one dimension of war, that of political expediency, which is in turn conceptualized as business.¹⁷

¹⁶ This paper has been first distributed via electronic mail starting on December 31, 1990. Then it was delivered to an audience at the University of California at Berkeley. Finally it was published in Pütz (1992).

¹⁷ This paper is an html document without page numbers, so I am unable to give any more exact reference than the year already quoted.

I disagree with labelling WAR IS POLITICS metaphor, as I see both 'war' and 'diplomacy' as parts of conducting politics, not as separate domains. Simultaneously, the definition of metaphor Lakoff also seemed to adhere to, at least in 1980, sees it as a mapping from one discrete domain to another and not between parts of the same domain. Still, even I admit that there exists a metaphor POLITICS IS WAR, as evidenced in 'attacks on the leader' and 'battles between party fractions'. Why, then, according to my intuition, should one be possible, but not the other? The difference primarily lies, I believe, in constructing 'politics' mostly in terms of performative speech acts: statements, declarations, international agreements. So that if we accept the well-evidenced metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR (posited by Lakoff – Johnson as early as 1980), and if we conceive of politics mostly as conducted through argumentation, then, by extension, politics can be seen as war, but only through the mediation of ARGUMENT IS WAR. As mentioned in Section 3 of this chapter, Lenin reformulated the Clausewitzian definition into "politics is a way to conduct war by other means", neither of which is for me metaphorical. Lenin's formula may be an ironical play on a well-known cliché, but not every implementation of rhetoric must necessarily result from conceptual metaphor. Also the major point that Lakoff makes, i.e. that war as politics hides the immoral aspect of war, does not have to result from its metaphoricity. Any fossilised expression may have this effect. I admit, however, that it may be the case that I have internalised the Clausewitzian metaphor so thoroughly that I cannot see its metaphoricity. Yet, I can see through it, and the immorality of killing others is not lost on me.

A way out of this conundrum may be the dynamic construal of meaning for the concepts of 'war' and 'politics'. In one construal, war would be a subordinate part of politics, in another they would be treated as two separate domains. Only then would defining metaphor as a mapping from one domain to another be rendered void, as the domains would remain in constant flux and could not be clearly determined. Blending Theory (see Chapter One, Section 6) claims that the spaces created in the short term memory for the interpretation or construction of blends (and metaphors) are ad hoc impermanent creations emerging solely for the purpose at hand. Also, Langacker claims that although language is biological in nature, it does not reside in any permanent shape in the brain, but should rather be viewed as a potential for meaning and expression,

activated when used. Perhaps, then, the problem with *WAR IS POLITICS* does not reside in the faulty definition of metaphors as a mapping from one domain to another, but with the desire stemming from structural semantics and calling for a discrete delimitation of concepts. Cognitive linguistics has long realised that finite and exhaustive definitions of meaning cannot be achieved if we believe in the dynamic nature of meaning.

WAR IS A VIOLENT CRIME is the second metaphor Lakoff posits. It raises doubts similar to the first one. I take both of these metaphors to be literal definitions of war. As evidenced in the survey of interdisciplinary perspectives on war presented above, it can be viewed as a political, economic, cultural and moral phenomenon. Definitions focusing on only one aspect of this complex and multi-faceted concept are incomplete and may be intentionally used to obscure those aspects which are not acceptable to the public opinion, but not all rhetoric is based on conceptual metaphors, though they may probably be activated by both metaphorical and non-metaphorical linguistic expressions.

The most valuable part of Lakoff's interpretation of the Gulf War rhetoric is his attempt to show the interaction between the *POLITICS IS BUSINESS* metaphor and the fairy tale scenario. This commercial metaphor reduces quality to quantity and allows us to see killing and mutilation of the enemy as a gain. At the same time, the fairy tale scenario requires the alignment of the subjects of international law, the nation-states, with the fairy tale roles of a hero (in this case the US), the victim (Kuwait) and the villain (Iraq). The major thrust of the scenario, apart from the obvious imperative for the hero to save the victim and punish the villain, is that it represents the two participants of international politics in terms of inherent asymmetry, in which the hero is endowed with all the positive qualities, and the villain with the negative. Such representation, evidenced in the rhetoric used in an attempt to convince the American and world public opinion that the war against Iraq would be a just war, grossly oversimplifies the complex reality, where the major destructive power of the war will be experienced by the innocent Iraqi civilians, and to a lesser extent by the American soldiers and their families not belonging to that group of Americans who will benefit from the war most.

Lakoff also identifies two more auxiliary metaphors, i.e. *WAR IS A GAME* and *WAR IS MEDICINE*, which also distance us from the suffering and death inherent in war.

Lakoff's analysis was further developed by Sandikcioglu (2000), who proposes yet another schema activated by the rhetoric used to justify the First Gulf War. She concentrates on analysing the asymmetrical relation in the representation of self and the other in the media discourse. She believes that the prejudice present in these representations results from the perceived dichotomy between the so-called Orient and the West, stemming from the colonial past, where the Orient is attributed such features as barbarism, weakness, immaturity, emotionality and instability, while the West is constructed as adhering to such values as civilization, power, maturity, rationality and stability. Let's have a look at just two selected oppositions and their consequences. For example, the immaturity – maturity contrast facilitates the metaphor THE ORIENTAL IS A STUDENT and THE WESTERNER IS A TEACHER.¹⁸ Thus the war may be seen in the terms of the necessary schooling of the Iraqis. Similarly, juxtaposing the oriental emotionality with the Western rationality renders negotiation impossible.

Another study dealing with the linguistic construction of reality designed to canvass for the support of war is Silberstein (2002). She investigates the media representations of 9/11. First, she shows how three speeches delivered by President Bush on the day changed the framing of the event from a tragic crash of two airplanes into attacks on 'our way of life'. The focus of the speeches transforms from declarations about assisting the victims and 'hunting' the people responsible for the tragedy to a 'war on terror'. Further, Silberstein shows how construction of national identity, or as she calls it 'nation-building' through 'convergence by divergence' is an important condition for securing national support for a military action. *Convergence by divergence*, a term coined by Smith – Smith (1994), refers to persuasion techniques, which build unity through a contrast with the external enemy. As in a war on terror the enemy is rather elusive, it was necessary to construct one narratively. Thus the Taliban of Afghanistan were identified and simplistically categorised as Al Qaeda.

Following Linde (1993), Silberstein claims that the construal of identities, both personal and national, involves story telling or a construc-

¹⁸ This metaphor is related to the idea of the educating obligation of the colonizers towards the natives, most forcefully expressed by Kipling's reference to the 'white man's burden'.

tion of socially displayed and reconstructed narratives.¹⁹ The eyewitness accounts were a step in the creation of such a national identity, where every American became a New Yorker, and Mayor Giuliani became the Mayor of America. These reports, although broadcast live on TV, were framed and directed by the newscasters in such a way as to report not facts, but the emotional reaction of the participants of the events. In the reporting, the discourse of courage mingled with the discourse of retaliation. The common denominator of both was the opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which implied that while ‘we’ have all the positive qualities, ‘they’ have these qualities’ contradictions. The drive to represent the world in such dichotomous terms, denying a possibility of there being more options than two, was most pronounced in the publication of the American Council of Trustees and Alumni. The ACTA report attacked the American Universities as being unpatriotic, as not all the professors wholeheartedly supported the call to arms. Some of the examples taken out of the speeches at campus rallies were so decontextualised that they became their opposite, so that even those professors who did support the military intervention were accused of not doing so.

The economic aspect of war was reflected in the consumerism as discourse of patriotism. Silberstein (2002: 124) quotes a prominent comment on this tendency from Margaret Carlson of *Time*, who wrote:

The Greatest Generation got to save old tires, dig a Victory Garden and forgo sugar. The richest generation is being asked to shop... The irony of this strange war is that just as we see the limits of what money can buy, buying becomes our patriotic duty.

Throughout the book, Silberstein shows how rhetorically loaded narratives enable the politicians and the media to foster national unity, to name and discredit enemies, to hunt the insufficiently patriotic ‘elements’ under the Patriotic Act curtailing civil liberties and, finally, to transform a shopping spree into an act of patriotism.

Underhill’s (2003) paper focuses on a slightly different issue. It does not attempt to analyse the discourse effects in the creation of the

¹⁹ On the socio-cultural role of metaphors in constructing frames and narratives on the example of Foot and Mouth Disease reporting in GB see Nerlich, Hamilton and Rowe (2002).

war-supporting narrative, but rather analyses the metaphors, which take war as their source or target domain. The juxtaposition of two lists of metaphors leads him to conclude that “when *The Economist* spoke of war, it transformed it into something else, e.g. problem solving, surgery or crime-fighting. Meanwhile, business, international relations, eradicating terrorism, eradicating poverty and even pacifism were all conceived of in terms of warfare” (Underhill 2003: 135). With regard to the WAR IS PROBLEM-SOLVING discourse metaphor, he claims that this metaphor is responsible for the narrowing down of the possible solutions. That is, once war is seen as a solution to a problem, no other solutions, apart from war, are considered. The focus is then on waging a war and winning it. Any appeal to alternative options is immediately construed as a dangerous dissention.

His interpretation of WAR IS CRIME-FIGHTING is valuable, as he claims that this metaphor allows politicians to construe a world where one nation-state's laws can be seen as superior to that of another, so that the superior states can legitimately enforce their vision of the world on other countries by means of war.²⁰

The combination of two metaphors: ERADICATING TERRORISM IS WAR and WAR IS CRIME-FIGHTING, Underhill sees as a dangerous justification for the war in Iraq. He stresses that they blur the meaning of the words, so that they can be used without restriction in attempts to persuade the public opinion to support the war. It is difficult to determine, however, in view of the opinions of Hassner and Roxborough presented above and calling for a redefinition of the concept of war, whether this blurring is just a sinister effect of a rhetorical excess or if it results from the change in the nature of war.

Critical metaphor analysis including the domain of war is represented by Charteris-Black (2004). He variously refers to this set of metaphors as military metaphors, war metaphors and conflict metaphors. He links them to the conceptual key LIFE IS A STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, and outlines their discursive role in the following words: “the domain of conflict highlights the personal sacrifice and physical struggle that speakers claim are necessary to achieve social goals” (Charteris-Black 2004: 91). His analysis of the sub-corpora for *The Sun* and *The Times* clearly show

²⁰ This image seems to be a distortion of the Bull's and Waltz's solutions to the problem of war discussed by Hassner and presented in Section 3 of this chapter.

that conflict metaphors are far more frequent in the sports section than in any other section of these newspapers. He also points out that much of the conflict vocabulary underwent semantic bleaching, so that its expressivity is much reduced in the sport reports. At the same time these metaphors often contribute to the paragraph-internal and inter-paragraph cohesion. They usually appear in the first and second paragraph of the text, facilitating topic setting and frame construction (Charteris-Black 2004: 123). Further, a series of common features between sports and war is identified, such as control over the territory, physical and mental strength of the participants, team spirit, codification of rules of conduct, the use of technology, and newsworthiness. Charteris-Black relates these similarities to the theoretical concept suggested by Lakoff – Turner (1989), that of the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor (see Chapter One, Section 2.4.), by means of which elements of the generic level domain can be mapped on a large number of specific level metaphors. This idea is also akin to Fauconnier – Turner’s (2002, see Chapter One, Section 6) concept of generic space.

It is also interesting to note that in four out of five types of texts investigated by Charteris-Black, i.e. (1) American presidential addresses and British party manifestoes, (2) sports reporting, (3) financial reporting and (4) the selected parts of the Bible, conflict metaphors were among the most frequent metaphors both in terms of types and tokens. In the first three types they were the most frequent, and in the fourth second in frequency after animal metaphors.

An earlier account of the lexical means aimed at disguising war is offered in Hughes (1988). His approach to lexical semantics follows a long tradition of historical linguistics. He analyses a series of semantic fields, indicating the changes in meaning and linking them to the external history of the English language. When it comes to the vocabulary of war, he identifies what he calls an anaesthetic style, which is designed to distance the audience from the negatively emotionally loaded concepts by means of appropriating new labels for them. He provides a long list of such replacements: *armies* become *defence forces*, *campaigns* > *operations*, *war zones* > *operational areas*, *battles* > *military engagements*, *bombs* > *explosive devices* or *strategic weapons*, *soldiers* > *military advisors*. *Killing* is replaced by one of many dysphemisms, such as *execution*, *elimination*, *extermination*, *cleansing*, or in the verb form by *to*

purge, to neutralize, to liquidate. Hughes (1988: 215) also makes an incisive comment on the change of the character of contemporary war:

This new vocabulary is not entirely attributable to the cynical motive of semantic disguise, but also arises from the verbal accommodation of new, less clearly defined forms of aggression, such as the guerrilla war and urban terrorism. Guerrilla warfare, by its very nature, is difficult to categorize; the sporadic and dispersed forays of independent groups are designed to create confusion. Should attacks be carried out against civilian population, it becomes difficult to distinguish between guerrilla and terrorism. Consequently, the counter-propaganda that the guerrilla are 'little better than criminals' can easily be deployed.

As a result, the term *army* is not applied to guerrilla or terrorist units. This semantic practice denies them the rights of nation-state soldiers expressed by the Geneva Convention.

It is interesting to note how Hughes's analysis following the media treatment of the Baader Meinhof Gang and the Red Brigades can be readily applied to the present rhetorical treatment of 9/11 as described by Silberstein. She also made a shrewd comparison between Bush's speeches and Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy" Address, which used very similar persuasion techniques, the vilification of the enemy playing the pivotal role in both. So it seems that the enemy changes, while the narrative practices remain the same.

8. Summary of the chapter

Chapter Three has presented various approaches to war. It starts with a review of expert views on the nature of war. In Sections 3 and 4 it is considered one of a number of social institutions, a socio-cultural pattern of interaction between different human communities. This dispassionate definition is often elaborated on to account for the new developments in war technology and strategy and to facilitate the classification of different guises of war. Even then the prototypical war is characterised as a military conflict between two nation-states conducted by the national armies by means of weapons. An ideal example of war would be the one described by the Geneva Convention, as the legitimate way of conducting military conflict. The real conflicts, diverging from the Convention,

would constitute less prototypical examples. If we were to construct a radial category for war, we could probably consider this type of war as the central model, with guerrilla war, tribal war, humanitarian intervention, and city violence as non-central extensions.

If we focus on the central model as the model for metaphorical mappings from the source domain of WAR, then the constituent elements of the domain would be the two opponents, the conflict obtaining between them, the two opposing armies and their weapons. The activities performed by the troops and the art of war in general would constitute the potential for metaphorical entailments. This model can be considered a specification of the generic force-dynamic event structure with the Agonist and Antagonist and the forces operating between them (Talmy 2000, see Chapter One, Section 5).

The folk model of war would probably be most akin to the image of war as represented in literature (Section 5, this chapter) or in the reports of war correspondents (Section 6, this chapter) rather than to the construction proposed by philosophers and sociologists. It would thus less likely include the definition of war as one of many social institutions. It would probably be based on the Glory of War Myth or one of the pervading metaphors, such as WAR IS A GAME or WAR IS A NATURAL FORCE. It would also rest on the FORCE image schema as its experiential basis. When it comes to the cultural grounding, the narrative construction of identity in the opposition to the other could also play an important role in the model.

The expert definitions of war point to one more important factor, i.e. the complex set of relations between politics, diplomacy, war, the economy and other spheres of social life.

Overall, this chapter has provided an important conceptual background for Chapters Four and Five. Chapter Four uses Conceptual Metaphor Theory in a contrastive analysis of war reports in two languages: Polish and English. The analysis is intended to show the similarities and differences between the political discourses conducted in the media and devoted to war. Chapter Five investigates the use of a number of lexical items identified in Chapter Four as typically occurring in war reports. It concentrates on the English language only. The source for analysis is the entire British National Corpus. In this way, Chapter Four concerns discourse specific rhetorical patterns with war as the target of linguistic representation, while Chapter Five focuses on 'language in general' and the employment of war as a source domain of the metaphorical mappings.

Chapter IV

A qualitative analysis of war news

1. Introduction

This chapter is an attempt to identify and describe conceptual metaphors that motivate the metaphorical construction of the concept of war in order to compare and contrast the discursive construal of war in war reports in two different languages and cultures over the period of 20 years. In this way it will add to the understanding of the concept of 'war' in this specific genre. That is why the interaction between the concepts of 'war', 'politics' and 'diplomacy' is also discussed. The analysis consists of a qualitative investigation of a number of newspaper articles describing four different military conflicts, three of the 1980s, and one which took place in 2001 (see Introduction to this book). A detailed description of the Polish and English corpus of war reports and commentaries gathered specifically for the present study is given in Appendix 1.

The analysis of data concentrates on the identification of linguistic metaphors and their role in the structure of discourse. The structure of particular conceptual metaphors underlying them, their constitutive mappings and entailments¹ are noted, but they are not detailed out, as the focus is on their function in discourse structure and in highlighting and hiding certain aspects of the target domain. To make the distinction between the conceptual metaphor and its linguistic realisation clearer I refer to the parts of the conceptual metaphor as Source and Target Domain, while to the lexical realisations as Vehicle and Topic of metaphor.

The qualitative analysis is expected to show what the predominant imagery patterns and rhetorical strategies were that were employed in reporting military conflicts. The analysis also allows the identification of words typical for the lexical field of war. This list (presented in Appendix

¹ John Barnden (2007) in his presentation at a RaAM workshop on metaphor in discourse claimed that in the analysis of discourse metaphors it is unnecessary and often impossible to identify all the mappings. Lexical items used as metaphor vehicles (sources) are often used to elaborate the source domain, to add to the liveliness of the image of the source domain.

2) serves as a basis for the quantitative study in Chapter Five. The aim of Chapter Five is to determine if the frequencies of the basic literal senses of these words corroborate the claim that the metaphorical linguistic expressions in which they appear are motivated by the X IS WAR conceptual metaphor.

2. Analysis of data

2.1. Trybuna Ludu on the Falklands war (1982)

The qualitative analysis section is divided for each conflict under consideration into several subparts.² The first one is devoted to linguistic metaphors whose influence extends over larger stretches of text than a sentence, thus organizing a paragraph, several paragraphs or an entire text. This section is called *Paragraph-structuring metaphors*. The second section is devoted to those metaphors which do not cluster in chains within one text, but constitute single instances in a particular text. They reappear, cross-textually, in the discourse on the given topic over time. I call these metaphors *isolated metaphors*, and the section is named so as well.³ The qualitative analysis of each subcorpus ends with a section on other rhetorical strategies deemed important for the given topic. They may but do not necessarily have to involve metaphorical expressions and is called *Other rhetorical strategies*. As these three types of rhetorical strategies were not always identified in the investigated texts, the analysis of the texts concerning various conflicts may consist of a different number of subsections.

² The rationale behind the structure of data presentation is repeated here after Section 2.7. of Chapter One for to facilitate the reading of the present chapter.

³ My isolated metaphors operate at the level of text and should not be confused with Lakoff – Johnson's (1980: 54) idiosyncratic metaphors which operate at the conceptual level. Isolated metaphors in my sense, are lexical realisations which do not create a chain, do not influence paragraph structure. On the conceptual level they can come from a rich, well-elaborated, complex metaphor.

2.1.1. Paragraph-structuring metaphors

The qualitative analysis of data, consisting in the close reading of all the collected texts, showed that, on the whole, the activated metaphors had little influence on the structure of the article. Only one commentary, that by Zdzisław Antos entitled “Falklandy-Malwiny: Groteska czy dramat” [The Falklands–Malvinas: A grotesque or a drama] from April 30th – May 2nd 1982, exploited the conceptual metaphor WAR IS A THEATRE extensively. A major part of the article was structured around this metaphor, so that its lexical realisations played a clear discursive function, as evidenced in the following sentences:

- (1) *Tak kończy się jeden z aktów sztuki, o której jeszcze nie wiemy, czy okaże się groteskowym widowiskiem, czy krwawym dramatem o nie ustalonym jeszcze tytule.* ‘This is how one of the acts of this play ends. We don’t know yet if this play will turn out to be a grotesque show or a bloody drama of an as yet unknown title.’
(Mappings: Stages of War are Acts of a Play, War is a Play, War is a Grotesque Show, War is a Bloody Drama⁴)
- (2) *Ale na razie oglądamy w telewizji niezwykle widowisko* ‘So far we have been watching an unusual show on television.’
(This is not a metaphorical expression. It refers to the farewell ceremony for the British fleet setting off to the South Atlantic. It does, however, elaborate the details of the vehicle.⁵)
- (3) *Wspaniała okazja do nakręcenia historycznych, batalistycznych filmów.* ‘A wonderful opportunity to make historical battle films.’
(Again, this is an elaboration of the Vehicle.)
- (4) *Największy show od czasu brytyjsko-francuskiej wyprawy do Suez w 1956 roku.* ‘The biggest show since the British-French expedition to Suez in 1956.’
(Mapping: War is a Spectacle)
- (5) *Widowisko ma kostiumowe akcenty.* ‘The show has costume overtones.’
(Mapping: War is a Spectacle)

⁴ Following the convention introduced in Lakoff – Johnson (1999) I will capitalise the first letters only when positing the possible conceptual mappings.

⁵ See Barnden (2007), footnote 1, this chapter.

- (6) *skompletowanie rekwizytów* ‘the collecting of the props’
(Mapping: Elements of Military Equipment are Theatrical Props)

The potential underlying conceptual metaphorical mappings postulated above as well as the elaborations of the Vehicle focus on those aspects of war which make it a spectacular show for those who can safely watch it from a distance. However, in this particular article the whole construction is employed ironically, so that through a clash between the entertaining aspect of the Source Domain and the death-related aspect of the Target, the show becomes a cruel spectacle. The author seems to ridicule the authorities who, in his view, want to hide the real picture of war behind the show. This is made possible by the active involvement of the mass media in the reporting of the event.

2.1.2. Isolated metaphors

Metaphoric expressions originating from the lexical field of theatre are also scattered in the other texts, but they do not seem to play any major discursive function, for instance:

- (7) *przedostatni akt wojny* ‘the last but one act of war’; *nowy akt agresji* ‘a new act of aggression’
(8) *teatr działań wojennych* ‘the theatre of war’
(9) *zakulisowe zabiegi* ‘efforts behind the scene’, *kuluary* ‘backstage’
(10) *odgrywać rolę* ‘to play a role’

The WAR IS A THEATRE conceptual metaphor underlying these expressions is an oblique reference to the Glory of War Myth, so aptly described by Janion (1998) and Wiśniewski (1987) from the literary perspective and by Knightly (1975) from a mass media critique perspective. The unveiled reference to the myth is rather rare. There are only four instances of it in all of the 69 texts analysed. Moreover, only one of them, number (15), does not carry ironic overtones.

- (11) *zatriumfuje brytyjski oręż* ‘the British army will triumph’
(12) *galanteria* ‘gallantry’

- (13) *podreperować nadszarpnięty prestiż i dumę narodową Brytyjczyków* ‘to repair the undermined prestige and the national pride of the British’
(14) *honorowe rozwiązanie sporu* ‘honourable solution of the conflict’

Before we turn to lexical fields more frequently represented in these war reports, we need to discuss the relationship between the concepts of ‘politics’ and ‘war’, as represented in these texts. Example (15) below seems to indicate that diplomacy stands in opposition to war, and that possibly they both form subparts of politics:

- (15) *kontynuowanie wysiłków na rzecz dyplomatycznego rozwiązania konfliktu* ‘a continuation of efforts for a diplomatic solution of the conflict’

At the same time, politics and war can too be juxtaposed:

- (16) *sygnały z frontu politycznego i wojskowego świadczą ...* ‘the signals from the political and military front indicate...’

Example (16)⁶ is significant also because it shows how terms from the lexical field of war (‘political front’) permeate the discourse on politics, even if the context – a real war, does not seem to require any further dramatisation of the topic. Example (17) shows a similar vocabulary use:

- (17) *manewr dyplomatyczny* ‘a diplomatic manoeuvre’

Some examples, e.g. (18), contrast military action with political dispute, and then the verbs from the lexical field of dispute tend to penetrate the realm of war:

- (18) *Ich kraj jest gotów do negocjacji z Wielką Brytanią, ale odpowie zbrojnie na wszelkie próby odzyskania wysp.* ‘Their country is ready for negotiations, but it will answer militarily to any attempts to recapture the islands’.

⁶ Szwedek (2006, p. c.) pointed out that example (16), and probably also (15), is an instantiation of the POLITICS IS WAR metaphor.

Negocjacje ‘negotiations’ are used in their literal sense, while *odpowie zbrojnie* ‘will answer militarily’ is used metaphorically. This use may be motivated by the conceptual metaphor WAR IS A DISPUTE.

Simultaneously, the verbs of speaking (dispute) play an important role in both politics and war, as in (19) and (20) below:

- (19) *stan niewypowiedzianej wojny* ‘the state of undeclared war’
 (20) *zdefiniowanie politycznego stanowiska* ‘the defining of the political stance’

Example (19) refers to a war-constitutive ritual, that of declaring war⁷, while (20) points to the role of constructing narratives in the making of politics. Appearing side by side with other metaphorical uses, they blur the distinction between the two.

The group of words originating in the lexical field of business and representing the metaphor WAR IS BUSINESS⁸ is most common with 13 types of lexical expressions:

- (21) *ekonomiczne podteksty* ‘economic undertones’, *bilans strat obu stron* ‘the balance of losses of both conflicting sides’, *zapłaci znacznie wyższą cenę w ludziach i sprzęcie* ‘... will pay a considerably higher price in both men and equipment’, *straty* ‘losses’, *kosztownym* ‘costly’, *rozmiar strat* ‘the scale of losses’, *w ostatecznym rachunku* ‘at the last count’, *minimalizować straty własne* ‘to minimise collateral damage (lit. self losses)’, *utracić/odebrać terytorium* ‘to lose/gain territory’, *znaczne ilości sprzętu woj-skowego* ‘significant amount of military equipment’, *osiągnąć cele polityczne przy minimalnej cenie* ‘to achieve political goals at minimal price’, *cena popularności* ‘the price of popularity’, *większość laburzystowskich posłów stwierdziła, że nie wolno mu [rządowi] wystawiać czeku in blanco*

⁷ Kamila Turewicz (2007, p. c.) has pointed out to me that this ritual may be motivated by the WAR IS A THEATRE conceptual metaphor, in that declaring war is like the part of the chorus in the theatre, the chorus which introduces the audience to the play and outlines whether it is going to be a tragedy or a comedy. Similarly, when war is declared, the audience (nation/states as well as their citizens) learn about the change from peace-to war-like relations obtaining between the countries.

⁸ The WAR IS BUSINESS metaphor appears in the Clausewitzian theory of war and is discussed in detail by Lakoff (1992).

‘the majority of Labour MPs stated that they cannot make out a blank cheque to [the Government]’

Possible underlying conceptual metaphor: QUALITY IS QUANTITY licences the degradation of human life to a quantifiable object. It is possible through the operation of the metaphorical mapping: Human Life is an Object of Trade, which entails that human life may have a price and may be exchanged for political gains. Some of the examples above may be considered an elaboration of the Vehicle rather than a linguistic realisation of conceptual metaphor. This elaboration consists in supported by the enumeration of equipment involved or lost by either side of the conflict.

The list presented in (21) signals a certain methodological problem with categorisation. That is if ‘politics’ is a concept superordinate to ‘diplomacy’ and ‘war’, and if in a coherent text anaphoric relations can hold between the superordinate and the subordinate noun, then it is difficult to say whether for example ‘economic undertones’, or ‘to achieve political aims at minimal price’ refer to ‘politics’ or to ‘war’. In fact, in such a context, conducting war and conducting politics seem largely synonymous. This synonymy is not only a matter of conceptualisation or wording, but also of social structure, as the heads of states, regardless of their education, are often also the commanders-in-chief of their country’s armed forces.

The next most popular sources represented in the war reports analysed here were FORCE and JOURNEY with 12 and 11 types of linguistic expressions respectively. The concept of ‘force’, as a basic system underlying a number of various conceptualisations, from causation, through psycho- and sociodynamic patterns to discourse structuring in argumentation, has been discussed by Talmy (2000, see Chapter One, Section 5). It seems that the concept of ‘force’ may be one of the systems underlying such concepts as ‘politics’, ‘war’ and ‘argument’, thus constituting a similarity allowing for cross-domain mappings. In the analysed articles the linguistic manifestations of the concept were the following:

- (22) *odbić Falklandy* ‘to recapture the Falklands’, *umocnienie suwerenności* ‘the strengthening of sovereignty’, *rzucenie na kolana* ‘lit., idiom the act of throwing sb. to the knees = humiliating sb., English equivalent: *bring sb. to their knees*’, *dotkliwy cios* ‘a painful blow’, *siły* ‘forces’, *przerzucać żołnierzy* ‘lit. to throw soldiers = to transfer soldiers’, *odpierać* ‘to throw back’, *napięcie* ‘tension’, *usunąć* ‘to

remove', *starcie/starcia* 'lit. frictions =clashes', *poprzeć stronę brytyjską z całą swoją mocą* 'to support the British side with all their might', *opór* 'resistance'

'Force' as a concept structuring the domain of war results in the representation of military conflict in terms of hand-to-hand combat (*odbić* 'recapture', *rzucić na kolana* 'to throw sb. to their knees', *dotkliwy cios* 'painful blow', *odpierać* 'to throw back', *usunąć* 'remove', *napięcie* 'tension', *opór* 'resistance'). It may also lead to abstracting from the war reality, when armies are referred to as 'forces', and military action is rephrased as 'the strengthening of sovereignty'.

The type frequency of expressions motivated by the metaphorical mappings from JOURNEY as the Source Domain was similar to that of FORCE. However, the Source Domain of JOURNEY did not structure the concept of 'war' but that of 'politics'.⁹ As the focus of the present study is 'war' and not 'politics', we will not regard it any further.

The remaining sources for the structuring of the concept of 'war' in newspaper reports were less frequently represented by linguistic expressions. They were GAME (5 lexical types), BALANCE (5),¹⁰ NATURAL FORCE (3), GEOMETRY (3), RAPE (2), and DISEASE (1). They were evidenced by the following expressions:

- (23) WAR IS A GAME: *szanse powodzenia* 'chances of success', *zagrać va banque* 'to play va banque', *USA prowadziły odwrotną zagrywkę* 'the USA played a different gambit', *posunięcie militarne* (CHESS) 'a military move', *przedłużanie gry na obu frontach* 'protracting the game on both fronts'
- (24) BALANCE: *przeważy u Brytyjczyków poczucie realizmu* 'the feeling of realism will dominate the British' (*przeważać* is morphologically related to *ważyć* = 'to weigh'), *wypowiedzi władz są ostrożniejsze i o wiele bardziej wyważone* 'the statements of the authorities are

⁹ Underhill (p.c.) drew my attention to the fact that POLITICS IS A JOURNEY seemed to be one of the most persistent images in the communist propaganda. See also Fabiszak (2007). Szwedek (p.c.) remarked that every process can be conceived in terms of a JOURNEY.

¹⁰ BALANCE, like FORCE, should be regarded as a scheme (see Johnson's (1987) image schemata, Chapter One, Section 4) underlying the concept of conflict and the related concepts rather than as a domain which allows for rich mappings.

- more careful and balanced', *rozważać* 'to weigh, to consider', *przeważa pesymizm/stanowisko* 'pessimism/a position dominates', *Pani Thatcher balansuje na linii między przeżyciem a upadkiem* 'Mrs. Thatcher is balancing on a line between survival and fall'
- (25) WAR IS A NATURAL FORCE: *fale nalotu* 'air raid waves' (SEA), *zaognienie sporu* 'lit. inflammation = aggravation of the conflict' (FIRE), *gorący etap* 'a hot phase' (FIRE)
- (26) WAR IS GEOMETRY: *punkt oporu* 'point of resistance', *linia obrony* 'defence line', *skala konfliktu* 'the scale of conflict'
- (27) WAR IS A RAPE: *pogwałcenie neutralności* 'violation of neutrality' (in Polish expressed by a morphological derivate of 'rape', not a Latinised euphemism), *gwałcić prawo międzynarodowe* 'to violate the international law'
- (28) WAR IS A DISEASE: *gorączka wojenna* 'war fever'

The source domains of GAME and GEOMETRY were already represented in Clausewitz's treaty on war. He compared conducting war to a game of cards, stressing that in both endeavours not only skill and assets (trumps or a well equipped and trained army), but also luck are important to achieve victory. In the present data the words from the lexical fields of both games of luck and chess are used. Like in Clausewitz, they highlight the significance of luck in war, but they are also used to refer to a phase of war ('gambit', 'protracting the game'). The last example motivated by the Source Domain GAME is particularly interesting as it combines game imagery with the literal and a metaphoric use of the word 'front'. This can be an evidence of the activation of a mixed metaphor (WAR IS A GAME + POLITICS IS WAR).

The geometrisation of war is related to the drawing of tactical maps, where, like in most cartography, the world is reduced to a handful of geometric symbols. Such reduction, naturally, dehumanises the soldiers to lines and points, hiding the fact that it is real people who are wounded, mutilated or killed on these 'lines' and 'points'. The idea of scale also clearly links war with geometry and cartography, allowing a distant perspective, enabling the authorities to compare one war to another as well as encouraging the WAR IS BUSINESS point of view. It disregards the individual perspective, where death and suffering are petrifying, unwanted experiences regardless of the number of people they may affect.

The concept of ‘balance’ is inherently linked to the concept of ‘force’. Talmy (2000) identifies balance of strengths as an element of the force-dynamic frame. It is therefore not surprising that BALANCE tends to appear as a source when force-related targets are intended. Stockwell (2002), for example, notes that Shakespeare’s *Richard II* is constructed around the BALANCE metaphor, which functions as a megametaphor or discourse-structuring metaphor in the play. In the Falklands war data, BALANCE underlies expressions concerned with the political dispute which may lead to war, so that these expressions may be regarded as referring to ‘politics’ as well as ‘war’. In any case, though, the result of the weighing of political pros and cons here is war. This balancing, apart from being intrinsically related with FORCE, is the major scheme underlying the WAR IS BUSINESS metaphor.

The activation of the Source Domain of NATURAL FORCE highlights the intensity of war; simultaneously it hides the human agent, apparently removing the responsibility for war brutality from the authorities who decided to launch it.

RAPE, like POLITICS, ARGUMENT and WAR is a particular realisation of the scheme of conflict based on the concept of force, which makes it a suitable input for mappings. Its use highlights the violent nature of war and implies that it is illegitimate.

The DISEASE metaphor in this case implicates a certain intensity and lack of control.

2.1.3. Other rhetorical strategies

The qualitative analysis has also isolated a group of semantically related words which played an important role in the construction of the war accounts. These words were not linguistic realisations of any WAR IS X conceptual metaphor. Despite that they are discussed below as they played an important function in the discourse structure and often interacted with some of the conceptual metaphors, especially those devoted to the representation of the enemy. These emotionally loaded words, although bleached through their overuse in the media reporting of political events, were used to increase the expressive power of the texts. They belong to a diverse group of vocabulary presented in (29) below:

- (29) terms for emotions: *entuzjazm* ‘enthusiasm’, *z wielką satysfakcją* ‘with great satisfaction’, *zatroskana* ‘worried’, *niepokój/zaniepokojony* ‘anxiety/anxious’, *wzrost zaniepokojenia międzynarodowego* ‘an increase in international anxiety’, *nastrój przygnębienia i smutku* ‘the mood of depression and sadness’, *żałoba* ‘mourning’, *ubolewać* ‘to regret’, *powaga* ‘solemnity’, *zaciętość* ‘determination’, *radosny* ‘cheerful’, *nadzieja* ‘hope’, *frustracja* ‘frustration’, *głęboki pesymizm* ‘deep pessimism’, *optymizm* ‘optim-ism’, *w atmosferze szczerości* ‘in an atmosphere of honesty’, *upokorzenie* ‘humiliation’, *gorycz* ‘bitterness’, *straszliwy* ‘horrible’, *zadowolenie* ‘satisfaction’, *złagodnieć* ‘to become less harsh’, *ostrożność* ‘caution’, *poszanowanie* ‘respect’, *ubolewać* ‘to deplore, in Polish morphologically related to ‘pain’ = *ból*’, *ulga* ‘relief’, *rzucenie na kolana* ‘the act of throwing sb. to their knees = humiliating’;
- emotionally loaded political terms: *anty-* ‘anti’, *ksenofobia* ‘xenophobia’, *nacjonalistyczny* ‘nationalistic’, *dplomacja kanonierek* ‘gunboat diplomacy’ (POLITICS IS WAR taken to the extreme), *kolonializm* ‘colonialism’, *ucisk* ‘oppression’, *wyzysk* ‘exploitation’ *interwencyjny* ‘intervention, adj.’, *eksploatować* ‘to exploit’, *ekspansjonistyczny* ‘expansionist’, *dominować* ‘dominate’, *postępowy* ‘progressive’, *anachronizm* ‘anachronism’, *okupować* ‘occupy’, *kolonialne i imperialistyczne ambicje* ‘colonial and imperialistic ambitions’, *znieważanie symboli narodowych* ‘profanation of national symbols’, *represje* ‘repressions’, *zatarg* ‘a conflict, lit. implies trade’, *stosowanie gróźb i nieprzejednane stanowisko* ‘the use of threats and uncompromising position’, *brutalne dławienie* ‘brutal suppression’, *hegemonistyczny* ‘hegemonic’, *nacjonalistyczne oszołomienie* ‘nationalistic stupefaction’, *samoobrona* ‘self-defence’;
- negative speech acts: *potępić* ‘to condemn’, *oskarżać* ‘to accuse’, *oburzać się/oburzenie* ‘to be indignant/outraged’, *ubolewać* ‘to deplore’;
- violence-related negative words: *awantura* ‘lit. brawl = incident’, *rozbój* ‘robbery, mugging’, *krwawy* ‘bloody’;
- deceit-related negative words: *rzekomy* ‘alleged’, *jakoby* ‘reputedly’, *stoi w jaskrawej sprzeczności* ‘it stands in stark/glaring contrast’, *szantaż* ‘blackmail’, *kłamlliwe wieści* ‘mendacious news’;
- irrationality: *absurdalna postawa* ‘absurd position’;

Among the emotion terms, those related with ‘anxiety’ dominated in the period preceding military action, while ‘sadness’-related ones appeared in the reports on the two sunken warships: Argentinean General Belgrano and British HMS Sheffield. Political decisions could arouse ‘hope’ and ‘optimism’ or ‘bitterness’, ‘frustration’ and ‘pessimism’ among the public. ‘Honesty’ and ‘caution’ were attributed to politicians, which the news makers seemed to be siding with. The Glory of War Myth was evident in the framing of the possibility of defeat as a humiliation.

In the emotionally loaded political terms, the subgroup associated with ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’ as well as ‘progress’ remaining in opposition to ‘anachronism’ were the catch-words of the political propaganda of the time, and I believe, aroused more agitation than the emotion terms per se.

Negative speech acts were used to report the statements of various authorities evaluating the actions of the politicians from the ‘expansionist’ side of the conflict.

Violence-, deceit- and irrationality-related words seem to be the common stock in the texts aiming at arousing the reader against the participant of the conflict, of whom these terms are alleged. Sandikcioglu (2000) discovered that similar features were ascribed to Arabs in general and to Hussein in particular within the so-called orientalist framework. In the Polish newspaper of 1982, similar values were employed to describe Great Britain (esp. in terms of violence and irrationality) and the US (esp. in terms of deceit).

2.2. The Times on the Falklands war (1982)

The corpus collected from *Trybuna Ludu* on the Falklands war consisted of all the articles that appeared in the newspaper between April 3rd /April 4th 1982 – June 17th 1982. A review of the newspaper for two weeks after April 17th 1982 did not render any more articles on the topic. The coverage of the war in *The Times* was naturally far more thorough. Therefore only a part of the group of articles was used in the present study. Also, the genre diversification of the articles varied. In *Trybuna Ludu* they could be classified as hard news and commentaries, while in *The Times* they ranged from parliamentary reports, hard news items, and war correspondent reports through political, military and economic commentaries on the war.

2.2.1. Isolated metaphors

The parliamentary reports constitute the bulk of the corpus in terms of word count. No wonder then that speech verbs are numerous represented. Similarly to *Trybuna Ludu*, the lines between 'war' as a hyponym of 'politics' and 'war' as an antonym of 'politics', are difficult to draw. One of the reasons behind this fuzzy nature of meaning of the concepts in question, apart from perspectivizing, may be the fact that they are all based on the concept of FORCE, as evidenced in these examples:

- (30) *The United States joined Britain last night in blocking a draft resolution in the Security Council for a ceasefire in the Falklands conflict but later admitted that its veto should have been an abstention.*
- (31) *At the time of the vote Mrs. Kirkpatrick said that the United States veto affirmed the principle that force should not be allowed to triumph.*
- (32) *Throughout Sunday, June 13, the 3rd Commando Brigade maintained pressure on the enemy from their newly-secured forward positions.*

Example (30) shows how conducting politics through diplomatic actions can be conceived of in terms of FORCE, in (31) the word *force* is equivalent to 'war', while (32) illustrates how the concept of FORCE structures the discourse on conducting military operations.

This image congruity is explored for rhetorical effect, when politics, war and diplomacy seem to merge or intermingle, see below:

- (33) *We shall have once again to try to substitute the weapons of peace for the weapons of war.*
- (34) *Mr Nicholas Budgen (Wolverhampton, North-West, C): In view of the great complement Mr Enoch Powell paid to her, has she recently fought an important battle on his behalf in Cabinet? Mrs Thatcher: I fight battles of war and battles of peace, frequently.*

Here the use of the words from the lexical field of war, such as *weapons* and *battles*, with the modifier *of peace* is clearly an oxymoron, but if we accept this oxymoronic vision, then *the weapons of war* and *battles of war* cease to be pleonastic.

Another set of examples of how these three concepts interpenetrate one another can be seen in (35) – (38):

- (35) *The search for peace must never be torpedoed by us.*
 (36) *The words of the citation read “... he carried on as if nothing has happened...” a commendation which covers equally well his coolness under political fire.*
 (37) *Mr Robert Adley (Christchurch and Lynton, C): Would she accept that most people in the country, and certainly on this side of the House, expect the Government to behave like a Government and not as if it is running a debating society, to make decisions and to come before this House and then defend them, whatever the decisions the Government takes.*
 (38) *to smooth over their differences on the Falklands dispute*

Words such as *torpedoed*, *under political fire* and *defend* used in examples (35), (36), and (37) respectively, show how military vocabulary permeates the discourse on politics, even though, as I have said before, in a country at war such intensification¹¹ of the emotive power of reporting does not appear to be necessary. It should be also mentioned that categorising the word *defend* as belonging to the lexical field of war may be disputed, as its meaning may be considered more general (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4.). However, in the context of press articles on a military conflict, this sense may be the most strongly activated. Sentence (37) illustrates a common juxtaposition of diplomacy and war, in this example diplomatic actions are clearly less valued than military action. The phrase in (38) is an instance of how a word from the lexical field of dispute has become equivalent to war,¹² as if to increase the distance to the emotionally loaded event. It is thus a stylistic trope with a rhetorical effect opposite to that in (35) and (36). This linguistic expression can be motivated by the conceptual metaphor WAR IS A DISPUTE.

The next most prominent discourse motif was that connected with face saving and face threatening. The central underlying metaphor here is

¹¹ As shown in Chapter Two, Section 4, Hughes (1988) considers the use of war-like vocabulary in non-military contexts as resulting from a desire to increase the expressive force of the text.

¹² Underhill (2003) calls such a linguistic phenomenon a switch, where a word seems to take up a new meaning, antithetic to its original meaning.

that of NATION/STATE IS A PERSON, and the cultural tradition referred to by Janion and Wiśniewski (see Chapter Three, Section 5) and labelled as the Glory of War Myth. The metaphor is clearly expressed in the following quotations:

- (39) *The fact that Britain was forced to veto was seen as a victory of sorts for Argentina which had been seeking to tarnish Britain's image within the international community. Members of the council had earlier been amending and refining the draft resolution with the aim of finding a formula that would save face for both sides and avert the battle over Port Stanley. Argentina will maintain its freedom to protect the nation's interest and honour, it will not be negotiated. Lord Shackleton, for the Opposition, said it was the first time Britain had suffered the humiliation of the loss of a colony since the fall of Singapore. Mrs Thatcher: The future of freedom and reputation of Britain are at stake...*

These excerpts amply demonstrate how nations and states are conceived of as people, and interaction between them within the framework of international politics, be it diplomacy or war, can be construed analogically to speech acts or physical interaction between people.¹³ This conceptualisation has a long tradition in European thinking on state and war, so that the conceptual metaphor NATION/STATE IS A PERSON goes back to the Renaissance idea of body politic described in detail in Musolff (2004). As a result of this metaphor countries can threaten each other's face or attempt to save it. In this way such human qualities as emotionality are ascribed to states. This emotional tone is further strengthened by references to the Glory of War Myth, represented by such phrases as *our ships and gallant men, bravery, dignity, injured pride, the supreme valour of our forces, to lower our colours, to kill for flags, revenge, pride and arrogance*. This Myth is also fostered by certain historical references, such as the one in the first sentence of (40):

¹³ See Chilton – Lakoff (1995) on the metaphorical construction of international relations. Also Musolff (2004) on the conceptualisation of the European Community.

- (40) *however great the nation's appetite for heroes, there is no conviction here that a new Nelson has been born*
Mr Victor Coodhew (St Albans, C): Will she confirm that 30 million lives were lost in the last world war in Europe because democracy refused to accept and resist the aggressive intentions of a dictatorship? Will she ensure such a thing does not happen again?
In scenes reminiscent of the last world war, posters were put up and loudspeaker messages broadcast at London railway stations, calling on men of the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, to return to their bases immediately.

The first example is designed to draw a parallel, or more likely to deny one, between Admiral Woodward and Admiral Nelson. The analogy to Nelson, even if negated, can arouse patriotic feelings in the British. The allusions to the Second World War have two different functions to play. The first one is an attempt to provide support in favour of war by analogising between Nazi Germany and the junta-governed Argentina. It is a far-fetched analogy, especially if we consider the death toll in both wars (in the Falklands war about a 1000 soldiers died on both sides to 'defend the freedom' of 1,800 Falklanders). The second mention of WW II, reporting the call for soldiers on leave, seems to aim at increasing the war feeling in the nation.

The analogy between the Nazis and the Argentines, an opposition between *our boys* and *invasion force* or *foul and brutal aggressor* contribute to a typical war propaganda routine of enemy vilification. It is also transparent in attempts to portray Argentines as deceitful and emotional (as tantamount to unreasonable):

- (41) *Feb 1982: More Argentine sabre rattling followed another round of negotiations at the United Nations, in New York.*
Accusing the Government of Argentina of deception and bad faith and of making manifestly impossible demands, Mrs Margaret Thatcher told Parliament yesterday that their total rejection of British proposals for a settlement of the Falklands crisis had implications of the utmost gravity.
Argentines gathered spontaneously (...) shouting, weeping and singing the national anthem.
Argentine left-wing xenophobes

Bob sounded calm, but said that the islanders were very disappointed and very worried, largely because they believed the Argentines to be unpredictable.

...they would stand idly by while South Georgia and British Antarctica, with no permanent inhabitants, were the subject of similar unprovoked and unjustified acts of piracy.

if they [Argentines] did not come to heel within 10 days British troops would go straight in to recover this country's property

Mr Sydney Bidwell (Ealing, Southall, Lab): Does her statement today mean that under her kind of leadership in the future there is no participatory role for a saner or civilized government of Argentina in any international system for the guarantee of peace in that area?

The imagery used here has a very similar ring to that used in *Trybuna Ludu* and to *Rzeczpospolita's* depiction of Americans in the reporting of the American air raids on Libya, as well as the American construal of the Oriental as showed by Sandikcioglu (2000, see Chapter Three, Section 7). Thus, the Argentines are construed as highly emotional (*sabre rattling, shouting, weeping, singing*), deceptive ([acting in] *deception and bad faith, making impossible demands*), unpredictable, not sane enough and not civilised enough to be partners in diplomatic talks with Britain; their nationalism is viewed as xenophobic; they are the dogs and the pirates. Unlike in the case of the Polish depiction of Americans and the American construal of the Iraqis, the British do not intend to teach a lesson to the Argentines (at least in the articles analysed in the present work), but rather to learn a lesson themselves:

- (42) *The objective should be genuinely to learn lessons for the future, rather than score narrow party political points for the present.*
(Conceptual metaphor HISTORY IS A TEACHER.)

The emotionally loaded vocabulary, in addition to that discussed above, also included propaganda related political terms (43), violence-related words (44) and emotion terms (45):

- (43) *It sounds to many of us as if, in the hope of saving some lives, Mr Foot is prepared to hand over the Falklands to a Fascist dictator.*

The Argentines talk much of the need for the decolonization of the islands. What they appear to mean by this is colonization by themselves.

the nub of this crisis is that the Argentine junta has ridden roughshod over the wishes and liberties of the Falklands Islands and has imposed a neo-colonial rule over these islands

our boys in the South Atlantic, trying to provide for our people who are under the heel of the Argentinean dictatorship, the right of self-determination and of democracy

The regime responsible for the invasion did not do it to bring freedom and democracy.

Their record of repression in Argentina is an indication of the sort of people we are dealing with.

Others are watching anxiously to see whether brute force [= Argentina] or the rule of law [= Britain] will triumph.

(44) *the hideousness of a bloody battle of Port Stanley*

Mr Foot attacked the hysterical bloodlust of The Sun and the Daily Mail.

(45) *Concern, deepest concern, cordial, cautious, friendly relations, hope, friendship, dramatic, tragic, agonizing, aggravated, acutely worried, awesome, indifference, displeasure, hysterical.*

The political terms presented in (43) unambiguously form a dichotomous series of positively evaluated words related to Britain (*liberties, the right of self-determination and of democracy, freedom and democracy, the rule of law*) and strongly negatively evaluated words related to the Argentine (*Fascist, dictator, neo-colonial rule, dictatorship, regime, repression, brute force*).¹⁴ Examples in (44) refer to the calamities of war, and are usually used in a context criticizing the advocates of war (see also a discussion of (50) below). The emotion words in (45) provide a compelling evidence that the language of a mass media reported debate on war is far from providing an unemotional, impartial style. Together with the examples of a heated parliamentary debate in (43) it actually undermines the belief that the British may introduce the rational “rule of law” and that

¹⁴ See van Dijk’s (1996: 8) results on racist discourse, where he shows that in the representation of self and the other the positive features of self are emphasized, the negative features of self are de-emphasized, while the negative feature of the other are emphasized and the positive features of the other are de-emphasized.

they actually represent values different from those of the “sabre-rattling Argentines”.

The third group of expressions is centred on the metaphor WAR IS BUSINESS. The economic cost of war, when it concerns possible losses in international trade, or considers the financing used for equipping the army, providing it with ammunition and fuel, training, supplying food, clothing and pay for the soldiers, organizing billets and medical support, finally paying insurance for requisitions, are hardly metaphorical (see example (46)). When, however, soldiers and civilians’ suffering, injuries and casualties are discussed in terms of gain and loss, then we encounter an implementation of the generic metaphor QUALITY IS QUANTITY in its specification WAR IS BUSINESS. It provides a metaphoric understanding of the ‘cost’ of human life. Often the human life is then balanced by such abstract and intangible notions as ‘freedom’ or ‘right to self-determination’. Such an approach is transparent in the excerpts in (47) and (58):

- (46) *As the Prime Minister said yesterday that she is ready if necessary to turn the Falklands into a fortress for an indefinite period, we are entitled to know the estimated annual cost of all this and where the money will come from?*
- (47) *Mr Whitelaw: The Prime Minister was surely right when she said freedom was worth defending. The right of self-determination of the Falklands is worth defending. That is what we are doing. The whole country owes an unrepayable debt to the forces who have given their lives in the Falklands.*
- (48) *As the price of recovery of the islands grows, in life, in injury and in money, will Mr Whitelaw accept that Argentina is not interested just in the Falklands and in South Georgia, but in the South Sandwich islands and British Antarctica...*
- (49) *a full list and analysis of the costs on life, equipment, and money in this tragic and unnecessary war?*

The passage in (48) is a particularly interesting instance of using the literal and the metaphoric meanings of the word *price* as if it was one in an enumerative sequence: *the price ... in life* (metaphoric), *in injury* (metaphoric) *and in money* (literal). What’s more, even the critics of the war (excerpt (49)) use the same metaphoric/literal meaning fuzziness in their argumentation (*costs on life, equipment and money*). Whether the speaker

is a supporter or a critic of the war, they both rely on the BUSINESS conceptual metaphor and obscure the distinction between the cost on life and cost on equipment and money, as if there were no difference in quality between loss of life and loss of money. Such uses contribute to the blurring of the distinction between metaphorical and literal, which leads to the bleaching and dangerous generalisation of meaning, as a result of which word meaning can be stretched ad infinitum, so that Underhill's (2003) switch of meaning can become possible. If we consider that much of politics is acted out in words, the vagueness of political speech acts may lead to misunderstanding and conflict.

In some cases the mercantile approach to human life is contrasted with the 'calamity of war' approach, as in (50):

- (50) *Since everybody believes that negotiations will have to take place in the end, how many more lives does the Government think it is sensible to lose before they go to the United Nations for some sort of ceasefire to permit these negotiations to take place, or is it the Government's intention in pursuing an ultimate military victory that this appalling tragedy which is now unfolding should be continued to its bitter end?*

Here the sensibility of losing any more lives is invalidated by reference to the Clausewitzian theory of war, where war is a necessary procedure before peace talks, and before a renegotiation of the pre-war status can take place. The questionable sense of this procedure is undermined by the use of a rhetorical question (*How many more lives...*) and highly emotionally loaded vocabulary (*this appalling tragedy*), which, together with the word *unfolding*, can be considered as originating in the lexical field of theatre.¹⁵

An extreme case of the rhetorical argumentation is represented by a journalist supporting the war, who attributes the following words to a simple seaman on board the royal navy fleet in the South Atlantic:

- (51) *And as a colour-sergeant remarked to me on the Canberra on the way down here, "If a place is worth dying for, it's got to be worth keeping".*

¹⁵ I would like to thank Jacek Fabiszak for this suggestion.

The metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE used here in combination with the conceptual metaphor WAR IS BUSINESS reverses the hierarchy of values, so that a few mostly barren islands become valuable, not because of any inherent value, but because people kill each other to keep or 'repossess' them.

The Clausewitzian teaching, echoed in (50), can also be discerned in such phrases as those in (52):

- (52) *Mr James Hill (Southampton, Test, C) said the task force, when it went into action, should not be in leg irons. It should be given complete freedom of movement once the political decision was made. the task force is and was clearly under political control*

These two quotes refer to Clausewitz's demand for a civilian control of the army. The example below rings of the famous Clausewitzian aphorism that war is *politics conducted by other means*:

- (53) *Lord Gladwyn (L) said it was hoped that diplomacy would succeed in solving the dispute. In the event of diplomacy failing (he went on) we must all assume that the Government has contingency plans, if necessary, for settling the dispute by other means.*

A number of metaphors seemed to turn up ad hoc, without any major impact on discourse patterns. They are listed below together with their exemplifications:

- (54) THE FALKLANDS WAR IS A CRUSADE: *Mr Peter Viggers (Gosport, C) said later: There is no better place for the beginning of a crusade for freedom than in the South Atlantic, where the sovereign territory of a democracy has been attacked by a dictatorship.*
WAR IS A NATURAL FORCE: *His forces swept through the Argentine lines and found some of their troops ready to surrender. (Mapping: Attack is a Wind)*
Both British ministers said in Parliament that the crisis, storming from the illegal landing of a group of Argentine scrap merchants on South Georgia, was potentially dangerous. (Mapping: War is a Storm)
Mr Nott, under pressure to resign as Secretary of State for Defence, said earlier that he would not hesitate to order the sinking of Argen-

tine ships or the storming of the islands. (Mapping: Attack is a Storm)

Whatever the outcome of the Falklands conflict, there will certainly be some form of inquiry into how the crisis erupted in the first place. (Mapping: War is a Volcano)

Had that been done, the United Kingdom would have been accused of inflaming the situation (Mapping: Starting War is Starting Fire)

WAR IS CLEANING: *There was no official report that either had on board the 27 or so Marines captured by Argentine troops in “mopping-up” operations on the Falklands and South Georgia.* (Mapping: Apprehending Enemy Soldiers is Mopping-up)

WAR IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT: *his men had an unshakeable hold* (Mapping: To Control the Battlefield is To Have a Hold on the Enemy)

My battle group is properly formed and ready to strike. (Mapping: A Battle Group is a Fighter in a Hand-To-Hand Combat, cross-fertilization with the conceptual metaphor: MILITARY UNIT IS A PERSON)

ANIMAL/HUNTING IMAGERY (WAR IS A HUNT): *Mrs Thatcher as a hawk, Mr Pym as a dove, Anglo-French Puma helicopters, hunter-killer boats* (Cross-fertilization with the conceptual metaphor: PERSON IS AN ANIMAL; mapping: A Weapon is a Predatory Animal)

WAR IS SPORT: *Argentina’s armed forces are on paper smaller, less well equipped and much less experienced than Britain’s but in terms of football they belong to the second or perhaps third division, not the Isthmian League¹⁶ and pose problems, which, for British forces far from home and any friendly port, could prove insoluble.* (headline: *Third division takes on Britain*) (Mapping: Quality of an Army is the Quality of a Football Team)

the genuine enthusiasm of the people — Who put the invasion on a par with winning a football match (Mapping: Conducting a War is Winning a Football Match)

This is the run-up to the big match which, in my view, should be a walkover. (Mappings: The Decisive Battle is The Big Match, Yielding to a Dominating Military Force is a Walkover)

¹⁶ Isthmian League is an amateur football league in Britain. The implication here is that Argentine is not a very easy enemy, but not a formidable one either.

Now this is the heavy punch coming up behind. (...) (Mapping: War is a Boxing Match; submapping: A Military Attack is a Punch)

We do not (he said) underestimate the threat posed to our forces by the Argentine and we cannot put our servicemen at risk by requiring them to pull punches in the face of that threat. (Mapping: To Spare Losses to the Enemy is to Spare the Competitor in a Boxing Match)

The admiral said he was surprised at the speed of the Argentine surrender at South Georgia. "We were told they were a tough lot, but they were quick to throw in the towel". (Rear Admiral Woodward) (Mapping: To Surrender is To Throw in the Towel)

WAR IS A THEATRE: *But now she [Mrs Thatcher] was no longer in charge. She was (...) a spectator of the tragedy which she was about to impose on this country.* (Mappings: War is a Tragedy, Prime Minister is a Spectator, Country is the Actor)

The people cannot be ignored like actors sitting in the audience watching the historic drama unfold in front of them on stage. (words attributed to Senor Robaldo, an oppositionist from Argentina) (Mappings: War is a Drama. The Society are the Spectators)

As the metaphors above do not motivate larger stretches of the texts analysed I comment on only a few of them. It is interesting to note that WAR IS A CRUSADE, which aroused such a strong reaction when used by President Bush after 9/11, here has a certain intensity, because in this framing, democracy and the right of self-determination become articles of faith (see also Charteris-Black's (2004) discussion of POLITICS IS RELIGION). Two metaphors: WAR IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT and WAR IS SPORT share a lot of their conceptual space, which should come as no surprise, when the sport in question is BOXING. They both share such elements as 'strike' or 'punch'. The WAR IS A THEATRE metaphor is here profiled differently within potential metaphorical scenarios than it is in the Polish corpus. The sentence by a British commentator profiles Mrs Margaret Thatcher as unable to change the course of events once certain political decisions were made. The utterance attributed to an Argentinean oppositionist deprecates a situation where the society of a country is unable to participate in the making of political decisions. In Polish the metaphor focused on the artificiality of a theatrical show and mapped it onto the ceremonies aimed at constructing the Glory of War Myth, which allowed the Polish journalist to make derisive comments on the event. In this way,

what from one perspective can be a reason for national pride and unity building, from another becomes bombastic pomp.

2.2.2. Other rhetorical strategies

Unlike in the Polish press of the 1980s, where even two supposedly different newspapers represented a very unified vision of political events, as exemplified in their reporting of the American air raids on Libya, the British reporting, even within one newspaper, *The Times*, represented many voices. Some of them self-consciously comment on the role of the media in a country at war, others criticise the government policy, while some border on self-abasement.

The two opposite stands on the role of journalism at war were represented by two essays. One was by Simon Jenkins, a war correspondent accredited to the fleet in the South Atlantic, who wrote:

(55) *Now I understand perfectly the predicament of my father's generation of war correspondents. For we have inherited it. I would imagine that there are a good many voices in London today arguing that our reporting of the Falklands War has been much too uncritical and indeed jingoistic.*

The other essay was authored by Philip Howard, who recounted the first Falklands crisis in 1770 and recollected the role of Dr. Samuel Johnson who then wrote a pamphlet against the military solution. He called Dr. Johnson the rhetorical Exocet missile and whole-heartedly supported his arguments.

Some of the participants in the public discourse, especially in the Parliamentary reports, were trying to make fierce arguments, employing colloquial expressions or insults, as exemplified below:

(56) *I know that the blood-thirsty hooligans opposite do not want one [a cessation of hostilities]. (a labour MP about the conservative MPs) Mr Anthony Marlow (Northampton North, C): With regard to the Falklands, unlike the Commonwealth and the United States and, despite their public utterances, our Community partners seem to have been flapping around like so many decapitated chickens.*

Earlier, Mr Anthony Marlow (Northampton North, C) had said: As our Community partners, instead of giving us wholehearted support over our Falklands problem, have decided to put us on probation, will he remind them that if they continue to wet their knickers at the first whiff of unvalidated Argentine propaganda, a lot of this trade benefit from our EEC membership will be put at risk. This dispute has revealed that the Government's defence priorities are mistaken. It has crippled the Royal Navy for the sake of the Trident programme, and the result is that these recent events have found the Government with its trousers down in the south Atlantic.

These lively expressions seem to add to the intensity of the parliamentary debate, the first one giving a negative evaluation to the Conservative MPs' support of the military solution; the second one creating a dynamic picture of indecision; and the last two producing a vivid image of incompetence, bordering on obscenity. Such rhetoric was unlikely to appear in the Polish press of the period, as Polish political leaders were then construed as infallible 'fathers of the nation', in accord with the NATION IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor,¹⁷ and decorum required them to use only a rigidly formal style.¹⁸

2.3. Trybuna Ludu on the American air raids on Libya (1986)

2.3.1. Paragraph-structuring metaphors

In the series of *Trybuna Ludu* articles devoted to the American air raids on Libya there is one, which relies heavily on a discourse structuring metaphor WAR IS A DISPUTE. The article is an anonymous TASS commentary of April 16th 1986. I will quote one of its paragraphs, heavily permeated with intensely emotional, propaganda-loaded vocabulary:

¹⁷ More on the role of FAMILY as the source domain in constructing national politics can be found in Lakoff (1996).

¹⁸ Okulska (2004) writes about the conversationalization of the Polish political discourse on the basis of radio interviews of the years 2000 ad 2001. She also emphasizes the lack of dynamism of the political interviews prior to transformation. Clearly, a certain fossilisation of topics and linguistic expression was dominating the political discourse of the communist era in Poland.

- (57) ...neoglobalizm ujawnił swą rzeczywistą istotę i przemówił prawdziwym językiem – językiem bomb, ognia i śmierci, tym samym językiem, którym Waszyngton „rozmawia” z narodem wietnamskim, paląc napalmem ludzi i ziemię. Tym samym językiem, z którym „rozmawia” z wolną Nikaragwą, wysyłając przeciwko niej bandy płatnych morderców, pogrobowców byłego dyktatora i popiecznika Waszyngtonu – Somozy. Tym samym językiem agresji, który odezwał się gdy Amerykanie dokonali desantu na niewielką wyspę na Morzu Karaibskim — Grenadę. ‘Neoglobalism has disclosed its real nature and spoken its true language – the language of bombs, fire and death, the same language, by means of which Washington “talks” to the Vietnamese, burning people and land with napalm. It is the same language with which Washington “talks” to free Nicaragua, sending the bands of contract killers, epigones of the former dictator and a supporter of Washington – Somoza. This is the same language of aggression, that was heard (lit. sounded), when the Americans landed on a small island on the Caribbean Sea – Grenada.

In this passage the distinction between politics and war is clearly irrelevant; in fact, the possible border is further blurred when the image of politics (neoglobalism) speaking a language of war (bombs, fire, death, bands of contract killers, landing) is created. This image seems to be a perfect example of blending, where the two input spaces merge to create a new space, in which the blended reality, and not that of the input spaces separately, unfolds.

A well-represented thread of imagery is motivated by the legal domain. The examples presented below are undeniably metaphorically used expressions, however; there are several legal terms in the texts, e.g. *pogwałcenie prawa międzynarodowego* ‘the violation (lit. rape) of the international law’, which are not used metaphorically. That is the phrase *prawa międzynarodowego* ‘international law’ is used literally, while *pogwałcenie* ‘violation’ is of course metaphorical. However, below the focus is on the metaphorical exploitation of LAW as the Source Domain for the understanding of the concept of war. The highly emotional context blurs the distinction between the metaphorical and literal linguistic expressions even further, so that the effect is a vehemently propagandist image, where the journalistic responsibility for the produced meanings is a nonce issue.

- (58a) *Administracja Reagana wystąpiła w roli sędziego i kata egzekwującego wyroki.* ‘Reagan’s administration played the role of a judge and executioner executing the sentence’
samozwańczy sędziowie ‘self-appointed judges’
Chcą oni sami stanowić współczesną odmianę „pax americana”, który brzemieniem waszyngtońskiej dominacji ciążył na narodach Ameryki Łacińskiej, a który dziś ma ogarniać dowolnie wybrane obszary świata. ‘They want to pronounce a self-designed contemporary version of “Pax Americana”, which oppressed the nations of Latin America with a weight of American domination, and which will now include any selected area of the world’.
...działając z pozycji imperialistycznego żandarma ‘acting from the position of an imperialist policeman’
chęć przekształcenia go w basen amerykański, w którym panowałyby prawo terroru i lotniskowców ‘a will to transform it [the Mediterranean] into an American sector ruled by a law of terror and aircraft carriers’
- (58b) *pod pręgierzem narodów* ‘pilloried by the nations’
głównym winowajcą ‘the main culprit’
Nadzieje na bezkarność nie spełniają się. ‘Hopes for impunity are vain.’
te rządy USA i W. Brytanii powinny być postawione przed sądem „jako mordercy dzieci” ‘these governments of the USA and Great Britain should be brought to court as the “murderers of children”’

The metaphoric expressions originating in the lexical field of law presented above can be grouped into two major categories. The first one (58a) is structured around the conceptual metaphor THE USA IS A JUDGE AND A POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD. It also gains additional solid support from the Hubris strand, which is discussed later. The phrase ‘the law of terror and aircraft carriers’ is an elaboration of the Vehicle, it is not used metaphorically. It may be historically motivated by the so-called ‘gunboat diplomacy’ conducted by the colonial empires, among other, in China during the Boxers’ Revolution. The second group of expressions (58b) clusters around the idea that the USA, and GB as their accomplice, should be amenable to law for the crime they performed on Libya. The entire construct is possible through the operation of personification: STATE IS A

PERSON, so that as a result states can be pilloried, prosecuted in court or indeed victimised.

Another metaphor covering a stretch of discourse is THE WESTERNER IS A TEACHER/ THE ORIENTAL IS A STUDENT, discussed by Sandikcioglu (2000, see Chapter Three, Section 7) with respect to the 1990-1991 war in Iraq. In a TASS commentary quoted in *Trybuna Ludu* of April 19-20th 1986, however, it is used ironically:

(59) *...celem amerykańskich nalotów na Libię było „udzielenie lekcji” – pisze, że „pomoc naukowe” jakimi operował Biały Dom – bomby i rakiety – zabijały przede wszystkim spokojnych mieszkańców Trypolisu i Benghazi, wśród nich dziesiątki dzieci*

‘the aim of the American air raids on Libya was “to teach a lesson” – [the TASS commentator] writes that the teaching aids used by the White House – bombs and rockets – were first of all killing the peaceful citizens of Tripoli and Benghazi, tens of children among them’.

(Mappings: Air Raids are Teaching a Lesson, Bombs and Rockets are the Teaching Aids)

In this example, the air raids are represented as “teaching a lesson”, but the inverted quotes instantly distance the reader from the content, and the “teaching aids”, which are deconstructed as bombs and rockets, mark the passage as clearly ironic.

Another role assigned to the USA through a metaphoric construal of the represented world is that of a sheriff:

(60) THE USA IS THE WORLD SHERIFF: *USA, wraz z ich flotami i bazami wojskowymi – mogą pełnić rolę samowolnego szeryfa, podczas, gdy narody – szczególnie państw rozwijających się – mogą być potraktowane jak Indianie, z którymi szeryf może rozprawić się wedle własnej woli.*

‘The USA, together with their navy and army bases, can perform the role of a wilful sheriff, while the nations, especially of the developing countries, can be treated as Indians, whom the sheriff can crush at will’

obecny świat nie jest amerykańskim „Dzikim Zachodem” a kraje rozwijające się nie mogą być traktowane jak indiańskie szczepy.

Stany Zjednoczone nie są także wszechmogącym szeryfem, „zaprowadzającym porządek” przy pomocy swego colta. ‘The world today is not an American “Wild West” and the developing countries cannot be treated like Indian tribes. The United States is not an almighty sheriff either, a sheriff who “introduces order” with his colt’.

(Mappings: The USA is the Sheriff, The Contemporary World is the Wild West, The (Developing) Nations are the Indian Tribes; implications: The USA can crush other Nations at will like the Sheriff could crush the Indian Tribes, The USA Introduce Their Order by Means of Force like the Sheriff Introduced His Order with His Colt)

THE USA IS THE WORLD SHERIFF metaphor is a discourse-structuring metaphor in an anonymous *Pravda* commentary published in *Trybuna Ludu* on April 14th 1986. It highlights the reactionary nature of the American worldview, as the time of the Wild West is long gone. It must be emphasised here that the word ‘reactionary’ in the language of the propaganda of the time created a dichotomy with ‘progressive’, which were axiologically linked with evil and good respectively.

2.3.2. Isolated metaphors

There are several other examples originating in the lexical field of dispute, as in (61) below:

- (61) *Jeżeli dokonane zostaną nowe ataki – dodał – udzielimy zdecydowanej odpowiedzi i zadamy agresorom ciężkie straty.* ‘If new attacks take place – he added – we will give a determined answer and will inflict heavy losses on the aggressors’.

(Mapping: Retaliating against Enemy Attack is Giving a Determined Answer)

This quote, attributed to Muammar Gaddafi, shows how the conceptual metaphor WAR IS A DISPUTE is employed to map *answering* onto *a military retaliation*. A similar mapping, but going in the opposite direction, underlies the next example:

- (62) *...czy prezydent Reagan swym atakiem na Libię nie storpedował ostatecznie spotkania na szczycie. ‘Has president Reagan not torpedoed the summit with his attack on Libya?’*
 (Conceptual metaphor: POLITICS IS WAR, mapping: Taking Wrong Political Decisions is to Torpedo a Political Meeting, The Political Meeting is an (Enemy) Ship)

Here ‘an attack on Libya’ is synonymous to war, which is constructed as a weapon, a torpedo, used by the American President. It is significant that the question implies that the President may not have intended the side effects of this war, or at least disregarded them. In any case this implication is one of the ways of portraying the enemy in the war.

The Americans, like the Iraqis in the data analysed by Sandikcioglu (2000) are represented as sub-human and irrational:

- (63) ANIMAL metaphors: *„Pan Reagan może uważać innych ludzi za wściekłe psy. Ja uważam jego politykę za dotkniętą wściekliwością — stwierdziła ona [prof. U. Ranke-Heinemann, RFN]. — Jest to polityka mordu i morderców, która gryzienie, strzelanie i bombardowanie przyjmuje jako zasadę.” ‘Mr. Reagan can consider other people as rabid dogs. I consider his politics as afflicted by rabies – she stated. – This is a politics of murder and murderers, adopting biting, shooting and bombing as a rule’.*
IRRATIONALITY metaphors: *o wojennym szaleństwie rządzących wielkim mocarstwem* ‘about the military madness of the government of a superpower’, *igrającym nieodpowiedzialnie losami milionów ludzi* ‘irresponsibly playing with the fortunes of millions of people’, *nieobliczalny krok amerykańskiej administracji* ‘an unpredictable step of the American Administration’

The first statement above is attributed to Prof. U. Ranke-Heinemann, West Germany, who first accuses President Reagan of treating other people as rabid dogs, and then claims his politics to be contaminated with rabies. This claim is followed by a curious blend of elements from at least three input spaces: legal or violence related terms (‘murder, murderers’), rabid dogs space (‘biting’) and war space (‘shooting, bombing’), all of which result in an image of great intensity and emotional appeal. The re-

maintaining disease and irrationality labels are a common stock of insults used to degrade the enemy.

Another group of such labels is organized around the notion of American arrogance. It is related to the notion of a classical tragic flaw or Hubris, where the protagonist's conviction of his infallibility leads to tragic consequences. The American perspective implying that the American vision of the world is the right one, and the American style of war (the decisive battle, massive technological advantage, pre-emptive strikes) is supreme, are criticised implicitly by Sandikcioglu (2000, see Chapter Three, Section 7) and quite openly by Roxborough (2003a, see Chapter Three, Section 4). The propaganda employed in *Trybuna Ludu* exploited this notion of Hubris on several planes, as can be seen below:

- (64) Hubris terms: *jaskrawy przykład arogancji oraz lekceważenia opinii światowej przez rząd USA* 'a dire example of arrogance and disregard of the public opinion by the US government', *przedstawiciel narodu, który ma pretensje do kształtowania stosunków międzynarodowych. A tego nie można robić wyłącznie według indywidualnego wyobrażenia.* 'a representative of a nation who has an ambition to shape international relations. Yet this cannot be done only in accord with one's own conception, *buta i pycha* 'arrogance and pride', *głęboka pogarda* 'profound disdain'

In the Hubris category such features as arrogance, pride, disregard for world public opinion, disdain and misguided ambition are ascribed to the Americans.

There are two more history-grounded conceptual metaphors in the analysed texts:

- (65) AMERICAN AIR RAIDS ON LIBYA ARE NAZI AIR RAIDS ON POLAND: *Wielu ludziom starszego pokolenia ta bezprecedensowa akcja, przypomina wyczyny lotników hitlerowskich we wrześniu 1939 r. bądź też bombardowanie Warszawy przez samoloty niemieckie w 1944 r.*
'This unprecedented action reminds many people of the older generation of the exploits of the Nazi pilots in September 1939 or the bombing of Warsaw by the German planes in 1944'.

...obecne obrazy zniszczeń i ludzkiego cierpienia w Libii odtwarzane w telewizji przywodzą na pamięć zgliszcza i krew ofiar nalotów hitlerowskich z września 1939 r.,... ‘...the present images of destruction and human suffering in Libya broadcast by television bring to mind the ruins and the blood of the victims of the Nazi air raids of September 1939,...’

(Mappings: The Destruction of Libyan Cities in 1986 is the Destruction of Polish Cities in 1939, The Americans are the Nazi)

AMERICAN AIR RAIDS ON LIBYA ARE A CRUSADE: *Nasz przywódca, pułkownik Kaddafi powiedział: „Stany Zjednoczone postępują wobec Libii i świata arabskiego jak średniowieczny krzyżowiec...”*

‘Our leader, Colonel Gadaffi said: The United States treat Libya and the Arab world as the medieval crusader did...’ (words ascribed to ‘a local journalist’)

antylibijska krucjata Białego Domu ‘White House anti-Libyan crusade’ (Mapping: The USA is a Medieval Crusader)

The first Nazi-based example, if it were not so strongly negatively emotionally loaded, could almost be amusing due to the contradiction in terms it contains. The ‘unprecedented action’ can after all be hardly reminiscent of past actions. This contradiction may serve as a counter-example to the strong version of Critical Discourse Analysis, supporting its stern assessment by Bell (1991, see Chapter Two, Section 4), who claims that many of the journalist’s lexical choices may be a subconscious falling back on set phrases. In this case, it seems that the author of the text was more after the formidable emotional effect rather than image coherence, and that his word choice was not so much aimed at persuading the public as at arousing it.

This analogy referring back to the World War II schema is not reserved for the Polish press only, as Roxborough (2003a, see Chapter Three, Section 4) points out the American authorities, while preparing ground for the Second Gulf War, constructed Saddam Hussein as Hitler, and the Iraqis as the occupied French, who would await liberation from the American soldiers. Clearly the Second World War is an important reservoir of images and stereotypes structuring our understanding of contemporary wars.

The CRUSADE conceptual metaphor, although it does not seem to have much intensity for the Polish public, is clearly important from the Arab perspective. It is supported in the texts by numerous references to colonialism and related terms used literally, but with a clear ideological bias.

The conceptual metaphor WAR IS A NATURAL FORCE is also well-supported with numerous examples shown in (66), divided into several metaphorical mappings:

- (66) **Waging War is Starting a Fire:** *podejmuje dziś akcje w uwielokrotnionym stylu XIX-wiecznej polityki kanonierek, mogące podpalić pokój świata.* ‘he takes action today in the multiplied 19th c. gunboat policy, which can set flame to the world’s peace’
by to okropne wydarzenie nie stało się iskrą zapalną dla światowego pokoju ‘so that this terrible event would not become a spark setting fire to the world’s peace’
War is an Avalanche: *[naloty] mogą rozpętać lawinę wydarzeń* ‘[air raids] can start an avalanche of events’
War is a Wild Animal: *polityka nieokiełznanego wyścigu zbrojeń jądrowych* ‘the policy of an unbridled nuclear arms race’
Enemy is a Wild Animal: *pragnął brutalnie „poskromić” niezależną od siebie, antyimperialistyczną, orientację Dżamahiriji* ‘he wanted to brutally tame the independent, anti-imperialist orientation of Jamahiriya’
War is an Animalistic Behaviour: *przeciw prawu dżungli* ‘against the law of the jungle’

In (66) I have presented examples originating from two inputs: NATURAL FORCE and WILD ANIMAL. The first three conceptual metaphors highlight the intensity and the unfathomable peril that war creates. It constructs war as beyond human control. It is therefore not particularly coherent with the context, in which the blame and the responsibility for the war is so undeniably apportioned to the United States. The major function of these mappings is to raise apprehension and anxiety about the outcomes of the conflict in question.

The remaining two metaphors facilitate the construing of a portrait of the enemy, in the first case of Libya, and in the second – of the USA. The ‘taming’ example rests on an assumption that the US treats their enemies as animals, without respect. This conceptual metaphor gains indirect support from the expressions activating the Glorious War Myth, such as *godność narodowa* ‘national pride’, *złamanie i rzucenie na kolana* ‘lit. breaking and throwing to the knees = humiliating’, *zwiększenia bezpieczeństwa i autorytetu Stanów Zjednoczonych* ‘an increase in the security and authority of the United States’.

In the ‘law of the jungle’ example the US is imputed to conduct their policy (including the waging of wars) in accord with the ‘law of the jungle’ rather than international law or the United Nations Charter. THE USA IS A WILD ANIMAL is yet another example of the vilification of the enemy already discussed in relation to the examples in (60), (64), (65). This metaphor is facilitated by the operation of the Great Chain of Being. That is, when a higher level entity, in this case humans are conceived in terms of a lower entity, here animals, they undergo a degradation.

The expressions illustrating the WAR IS A RAPE metaphor draw on two sources: the extremely emotionally negatively loaded RAPE and LEGAL terms:

- (67) *gwałcąc podstawowe normy prawa międzynarodowego i zasady Karty Narodów Zjednoczonych ‘raping (=violating) the basic norms of the international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter’*
autorzy wtorkowego gwałtu ‘the authors of the Tuesday rape’

As in the previous set of texts on the Falklands war, the WAR IS A RAPE metaphor triggers negative emotions in the audience. Lakoff (1992, see Chapter Three, Section 7) in his analysis of the metaphor system underlying the first Gulf War claimed that to ensure the support of the American public opinion the war for oil had to be rhetorically restructured as a war in defence of Kuwait, which was cast as a rape victim. In Polish reporting of the air raids on Libya it is not Libya, but the international law which is violated.¹⁹

The second example in (67) is yet another case of a slightly incoherent image. The agents of the rape are referred to not as rapists, or perpetrators of a crime, but as ‘authors’.²⁰ It imparts a certain glamour to the agents, a rather unwanted effect in the present context. It seems to work along similar lines as the surgical operations of the contemporary war re-

¹⁹ A different language/culture-specific perspectivizing within the same conceptual metaphor has been discussed by Musolff (2004, see Chapter One, Section 2.7.) as metaphoric scenarios and by Kövecses (2002) as cultural variation in metaphor.

²⁰ The example from an article by Zbigniew Leśniowski published on April 18th 1986.

porting lore, where the positive value of a widely respected medical profession is predicated of the war's perpetrators.²¹

2.3.3. Other rhetorical strategies

Another small set of awkwardly used phrases in this context are the euphemistic expressions used to describe the major goal of American air raids, i.e. killing Muammar Gaddafi. Two expressions which according to Hughes (1988, see Chapter Two, Section 4) could be regarded as examples of the anaesthetic style were used:

- (68) *postawiono im zadanie jego[Kadafiego] fizycznej likwidacji* 'they were set a task of his [Gaddafi's] physical elimination'
usunąć spośród żywych niewygodnych dla polityki Stanów Zjednoczonych osób 'to remove the people inconvenient for the United States policy from the living'

These two clauses, although clearly euphemistic, can hardly be regarded as an attempt to disguise the atrocities of war as the first phrase appears in close proximity to *barbarzyńskich działań przeciwko dzieciom i spokojnej ludności* 'a barbaric action against children and peaceful population', while the second – is in the context of *Terror masowy podpadający pod kategorię zbrodni wojennych dowództwo amerykańskie zastosowało przede wszystkim w Korei i Wietnamie, gdzie dywanowe naloty dosłownie równały z ziemią całe miasta i wsie, a napalm wypalał indochińskie lasy i pola, a strzelcy z helikopterów zabijali wszystko co się rusza* 'The

²¹ It must be emphasized that I do not make any claims about the coherence and consistency of conceptual metaphors here, I only point to the fact that the way certain expressions are employed is inconsistent. They may be regarded as performance errors on the part of the journalist, similar to the violation of certain well-established collocation patterns of the Polish language, e.g. *Brunatnożółty piach Sahary pokrywa dużą większość jego powierzchni* 'the brown and yellow Sahara sand covers a big majority of its surface' by Ignacy Krasicki published on April 19-20th 1986. The unmarked collocation, I believe, would be *znaczna/duża część* 'a significant/big part'. Adam Gład (p.c.) pointed out to me that *Korpus PWN* (the Corpus of Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, a Polish scientific publisher) corroborates my observation: *znaczna część* has a frequency of 416, *duża część* 408, while, *duża większość* 5. That last phrase is used in the context of parliamentary vote and in this context it cannot be replaced.

American command employed mass terror which could be categorized as a war crime first of all in Korea and Vietnam, where carpet bombing literally levelled out entire towns and villages, while napalm burnt the forests and fields of Indochina and helicopter riflemen shot everything that moved'. Such contexts can hardly allow the audience to distance themselves from the gory topic. The employment of these euphemisms is thus either another slip of the pen, or a testimony to the irresistible allure that newspeak has for journalists. Or else it may be a result of the news production process, so accurately described by Bell (1991, see Chapter Two, Section 4), where the final version of the article appearing on the page does not necessarily conform to the author's original, but may result from revisions by the news editor or the production editor, all performed under significant time pressure.

The overall impression created by the analysed texts rests on a repetitive massive use of highly emotionally and ideologically loaded vocabulary presented in (69):

- (69) terms for emotions: *głębokie zaniepokojenie* 'profound anxiety', *ucierpieć* 'suffer', *oburzenie* 'outrage', *najgłębsza troska* 'deep concern', *gniew* 'anger', *pasja* 'passion', *zatrważający* 'appalling', *powaga* 'solemnity', *gorycz* 'bitterness', *rozczarowanie* 'disappointment', *dezaprobata* 'disapproval', *szok* 'shock', *straszny* 'terrifying',
evaluative terms: *cyniczna akcja* 'cynical action', *ryzykowna decyzja* 'risky decision', *bezsensownie* 'senselessly', *moralnie wątpliwy i absolutnie bezwstydnny* 'morally doubtful and absolutely shameless', *haniebny* 'disgraceful', *nikczemny* 'despicable', *napastliwy* 'virulent'
negative speech verbs and their derivatives: *pogróżki* 'threat-DIM', *wymowa moralna* 'moral significance' (in Polish *wymowa* is morphologically related to *mowa* 'speech'), *potępiać* 'condemn', *piętnować* 'stigmatize'
emotionally loaded political terms: *niedopuszczalny warunek* 'unacceptable condition', *wojskowo-strategiczne i ekonomiczne panowanie* 'military, strategic and economic domination/rule', *terrorizm państwowy* 'state terrorism', *zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa* 'a security threat', *bratni(-a,-e)* [*Libia, kraje/państwa socjalistyczne*] 'sister (lit. brother) Libya, socialist countries/states',

eskalacja konfliktu ‘an escalation of the conflict’, *hegemonizm* ‘hegemony’, *neoglobalny szowinizm* ‘neoglobal chauvinism’, *amerykański dyktat* ‘American diktat’, *interwencjonizm* ‘interventionism’, *imperializm* ‘imperialism’, *neokolonializm* ‘neocolonialism’, *zaborczość* ‘a tendency to annex territory’, *fanatyzm* ‘fanaticism’, *ekstremizm* ‘extremism’, *wielkomocarstwowy* ‘superpower, adj.’, *stosowanie przemocy i ślepego odwetu* ‘employment of force and blind retaliation’, *syjoniści* ‘Zionists’, *dywersja* ‘sabotage’, *wojny kolonialne* ‘colonial wars’, *ekscesy* ‘riots’,
violence-related negative words: *agresja* ‘aggression’, *agresor* ‘aggressor’, *depcząc prawa międzynarodowe* ‘treading upon the international laws’, *okaleczona bombami Libia* ‘Libya mutilated by bombs’ (personification of state + highly emotive word), *brutal* ‘brutal’, *ofiary* ‘casualties, victims’, *nie sprowokowany, niczym nie uzasadniony akt brutalnego rozboju* ‘unprovoked, unjustifiable act of robbery’, *akty przemocy* ‘acts of violence’, *okropieństwa wojny* ‘war atrocities’, *gangsterstwo* ‘gangsterism (political violence)’, *amerykańskie bestialstwo* ‘American bestiality’, *piracki atak lotnictwa amerykańskiego* ‘a pirate American air raid’, *odwet, zemsta* ‘revenge, retaliation’, *zniewolić* ‘to enslave’, *pognąć* ‘to oppress’, *awanturniczy hazard* ‘belligerent gamble’, *neogangsteryzm* ‘neogangsterism’, *przelana krew* ‘shed blood’, *Amerykańskie ludobójstwo* ‘American genocide’, *rozbójnicza akcja/zbrodnia* ‘murderous action/crime’, *trupy* ‘corpses’, *bandyci* ‘bandits, thugs’, *śmierć, śmiertelny* ‘death, deadly’
deceit-related negative words: *spisek* ‘conspiracy’, *kłamiwe wybiegi* ‘false excuses’, *szantaż zbrojny* ‘military blackmail’, *agresywnym knowaniom* ‘aggressive scheming’, *ze zdradziecko napadniętą Libią* ‘with a treacherously attacked Libya’

The data above are, to a certain extent, similar to those presented in (29), so that such categories as: terms for emotions, emotionally loaded political terms, violence- and deceit- related negative words are repeated here and many of their representatives match those in (29). The negative speech acts category of (29) had to be re-structured and re-named; consequently, in (69) we have two categories: evaluative terms and negative speech verbs and their derivatives. The reason behind this is that in the Libya texts the alliances are very transparent. The US is constantly vili-

fied and constructed as the brutal oppressor of the heroic and innocent Libya. Thus, it is not only negative speech acts which are used to create this image, but also numerous negative evaluative adjectives and nouns (labelled here as evaluative terms) as well as verbs and verbal derivatives (labelled here negative speech verbs and their derivatives). As a result, not only the wide range of abusive roots, but also an extended use of word categories testify to the intensity of the propaganda of the time. Among the emotionally loaded political terms many of the examples in (69) coincide with those of (29). However, if interpreted jointly with the violence related negative words, the LEGAL metaphors of (60 a and b) and the RAPE metaphors, the press construal of the American air raids on Libya is less focused on the notion of colonialism and anachronism and more on the legal, or in fact illegal nature of the American military action. The Falklands reports also seemed less antagonistic to the British, while the Libya reports are vehemently anti-American. In consequence, violence-, deceit- and irrationality-related terms are lumped together in the discussion of their role in the construing of the war frame in the section on the Falklands, while in the present analysis IRRATIONALITY (example (63) above) is raised to the level of a source for metaphoric mappings generated to insult the enemy. Generally, the techniques of ritual verbal abuse of the opponent are brought to the utmost.

Some of the labels from the violence related stock may, at first sight, seem to generate a series of metaphors with potentially rich imagery, such as AMERICAN ACTIONS ARE PIRATE/GANGSTER/BARBARIC ACTIONS. However, none of these possibilities is explored in the discourse. They only serve a highly emotive, evaluative function, but do not contribute to the construction of discourse (unlike the JUDGE, POLICEMAN, TEACHER or SHERIFF discussed above, which affected the construction of paragraphs or entire texts). They only play a subsidiary function, in that they emphasize the brutality and illegality of the action, creating the background for the more particular metaphors. They follow the pattern of ENEMY ACTION IS 'NEGATIVE' ACTION, where almost any word with negative connotations can be substituted for 'NEGATIVE'. This evaluative bias precludes the representation of the complexity of the political situation described and results in a bi-polarity of the represented world.

2.4. Rzeczpospolita on the American air raids on Libya (1986)

In the qualitative analysis of the data from *Rzeczpospolita* I present the results in contrast with those from *Trybuna Ludu* to point out similarities and differences in their construal of the war, and to avoid repetition. The two newspapers used the same sources to construct their articles, so that many of the passages are, word-for-word, identical in both newspapers. They are identical especially in the official materials, which both newspapers had to publish, such as the official communiqué of the Warsaw Pact or the letter from Mikhail Gorbachev to Muammar Gaddafi. There is, however, some variation in the selection and ordering of the material. For example, in the two articles devoted to the opinion of the ‘man-in-the-street’, different respondents were chosen although both newspapers admit using the material collected by the unnamed Polish Press Agency journalists.

When it comes to the reprints from the Soviet sources, the “giving a lesson” TASS commentary is reprinted in full in *Rzeczpospolita*, while the “sheriff” commentary from *Pravda* appears only in *Trybuna Ludu*. *Rzeczpospolita* refers to two commentaries from *Pravda*, one labelling the air raids as *rozbój, awantura* ‘robbery/mugging, brawl’, which places the rhetoric in violent emotive terms, and another one which attributes hysteria and hypocrisy to the American society and the American authorities respectively – terms from the deceit group. In none of these commentaries, though, could any evidence of discourse structuring-metaphors be detected.

2.4.1. Isolated metaphors

Like in the previous group of texts, also here the concepts of politics, diplomacy and war interact closely with one another.

- (70) *Stany Zjednoczone, które wypowiadają się werbalnie przeciwko terroryzmowi, faktycznie prowadzą politykę terroryzmu międzynarodowego i agresji, ingerencji w sprawy wewnętrzne innych państw. The United States, who speaks verbally (sic!) against terrorism, actually conducts a policy of international terrorism and aggression, of intervention into the internal affairs of other countries.’*
Brutalne lekceważenie zasad międzynarodowego współżycia, po-deptanie Karty Narodów Zjednoczonych stanowi swoistą amerykań-

ską odpowieź – po ostatnich próbach jądrowych – na różnorodne pokojowe propozycje Związku Radzieckiego...

‘A brutal contempt for the rules of international co-existence, and the trampling over the United Nations Charter constitute the American answer – following the latest nuclear tests – to various peace proposals of the Soviet Union.’

In the first sentence of (70) the diplomatic acts are contrasted with military acts, so that ‘speaking against terrorism’ is opposed to ‘the policy of state terrorism, aggression and intervention’. Interestingly enough, policy here is synonymous to a militant action, and remains in contrast to political dispute, tantamount to diplomacy. Diplomacy is phrased by means of what seems to be a pleonasm: ‘speaking verbally’, but may as well be a necessary distinction between ‘speaking verbally’ – diplomacy and ‘speaking militarily’ – war.²² This last phrase may be a result of the activation of WAR IS A DISPUTE metaphor. The interaction obtaining between two superpowers is framed in terms of a dialogue, where the USA gives an answer to the Soviet Union, the answer consisting in a military act. This sentence also represents the hubris set of labels with such words as ‘contempt’ and ‘trampling over’. This ties in nicely with the legal terminology, also often intertwined with the arrogance attributed to the enemy:

(71) *Zakłada ona także „prawo” do bezprawia ze strony USA, tzn. do jednostronnej interwencji zbrojnej, jeżeli taką decyzję podejmie prezydent. [doktryna Reagana]* ‘[Reagan’s doctrine assumes the right to a breach of justice (in Polish expressed by a pun lit. the law to anti-law) on the part of the USA, i.e. to unilateral military intervention if the President so decides.’

USA uzurpują sobie prawo „karania” siłą każdego, kto myśli inaczej niż przedstawiciele amerykańskiej administracji ‘The USA claim the right to “punish” by force everyone who thinks differently than the representatives of the American Administration’.

Here the legal motif intertwines with the hubris motif, so that the USA is presented as an arrogant state, which places its actions above the law, and is ready to inflict punishment on others. The second sentence testifies to the

²² See also Section 2.2.1, this chapter, where *The Times* cites Mrs. Thatcher referring to *the weapons of peace and the weapons of war; battles of war and battles of peace*.

activation of the NATION/STATE IS A PERSON conceptual metaphor, which allows the construal of the USA as someone dealing punishment on others.

The newspaper also offers a definition of war, reminiscent of the Clausewitzian formula attributed to a Polish political scientist from the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Prof. Longin Pastusiak:

- (72) [Opinia] Prof. LONGINA PASTUSIAKA politologa z Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodowych: *Brutalna napaść Stanów Zjednoczonych na Libię jest jednym z przejawów szerszego zjawiska w polityce administracji Reagana, a mianowicie wzrastającej tendencji do posługiwania się siłą militarną jako narzędziem polityki zagranicznej*. ‘Prof. Longin Pastusiak, political scientist of the Polish Institute of International Affairs: The brutal assault of the United States on Libya is an indication of a widespread phenomenon in the politics of Reagan’s administration, i.e. a growing tendency to use military force as a tool of foreign policy’.

‘The use of military force as a tool of foreign policy’ is clearly a reformulation of Clausewitz’ famous quote of *War is politics pursued by other means*.

An overview of the remaining metaphors present in the *TL* reports shows that only the DISEASE metaphor does not appear in *Rzeczpospolita*. In the case of the NATURAL FORCE metaphor and FORCE schema²³ further linguistic realisations can be added to those presented above.

- (73) *szantażowanie świata przez USA kolejnym kataklizmem, w imię ludobójczej polityki, sprzecznej z zasadami humanitarnymi* ‘the USA blackmails (threatens) the world with another (natural) catastrophe, in the name of the politics of genocide, which stands in contradiction to humanitarian principles’
(Mapping: War is a Natural Catastrophe)

In (73) war is construed as a natural catastrophe, something that is so powerful that it cannot be controlled.

The FORCE schema example is interesting in so far as it does not refer to any abstract power of the countries involved in political conflicts, but through the NATION/STATE IS A PERSON metaphor reduces the conflict

²³ The FORCE schema was not discussed in the *TL* reports from Libya, because it was realized by the same linguistic expressions as those described in the Falklands reports.

to a fist fight. This interpretation, however, needs to deconstruct yet another layer of meaning, that of the propaganda colouring of the word *kułak* ‘fist’, which is a Russian loanword and a doublet to *pięść* ‘fist’. *Kułak* was used in the post war propaganda denominating rich land-owners before the agrarian reform. This lexical choice strengthens the negative impact of the sentence. The example runs as follows:

- (74) *Przykładem posługiwania się przez Waszyngton kułakiem militarnym jest nie tylko Libia*, ‘Libya is not the only example of the use of the military fist by Washington’

Rzeczpospolita also employs one phrase based on the WAR IS MEDICINE conceptual metaphor, as shown in (75):

- (75) *Ofiarami tzw. chirurgicznego bombardowania przez lotnictwo USA padły przede wszystkim kobiety i dzieci* ‘The victims of the so-called surgical bombing by the US Air Force were first of all women and children.’

(Mapping: Air Raid is a Surgical Operation)

The phrase ‘so-called’ is of particular importance here as it questions the meaning of the following words, as well as flags off the phrase as non-literal. ‘Surgical bombing’ in this context is presented as an empty claim of precision on the part of the American administration and allows the Ghana representative to the UN, Mr. Gieho, to whom the words are attributed, to use irony.

2.5. The Times on the American air raids on Libya (1986)

As was the case with the Falklands crisis reporting, the data from *The Times* on the American air raids on Libya consist of a selection of articles on the topic. *The Times Archive online* allows one to search for key words in the newspaper texts of a delimited period. The time boundaries were set between April 12th 1986 and May 10th 1986. The key word ‘Libya’ returned 273 articles in which this word appeared. Out of these, 84 were selected on the basis of their article lead-ins as being the most relevant to the topic analysed here. As in the case of the Falklands articles the present

selection included hard news: reports from Tripoli and other involved capitals, as well as reports from parliamentary debates in the House of Commons and commentaries.

2.5.1. Paragraph-structuring metaphors

The group of metaphoric expressions that comes to the fore of the text sample draws on the lexical field of animals. These animal names are mostly used as terms of abuse, and can be potentially a result of the activation of the following metaphorical mappings: Colonel Gaddafi is a Mad Dog, Colonel Gaddafi is a Dangerous Snake, America is a Paper Tiger, Mrs. Thatcher is Reagan's Poodle. These mappings are all motivated by the conceptual metaphor PERSON IS AN ANIMAL. The intensity of the *mad dog* abuse was further increased by an elaborate explanation provided by Robert Fisk in his commentary on the use of rhetoric by the American President and Vice-President and the effect it may have on the Arabs:

(76) *The word 'dog' has a special significance in the Arab world. It means something filthy and corrupt; traditionally – long before the days of Islam – a dog was symbolic of dirt. Thus when Vice-President Bush first called Moammar Gaddafi a 'mad dog' on Wednesday – some hours before President Reagan adopted the same phrase – even moderate Arabs felt insulted. In the Gulf and in the Levant, newspapers called Mr Bush's statement both insolent and arrogant.*

The use of the *mad dog* abuse term by the American President and Vice-President about Colonel Gaddafi places the comments of Prof. U. Ranke-Heinemann quoted in *Trybuna Ludu* and discussed above, in a light which was not available to the readers of *TL*, as Colonel Gaddafi was not referred to as a mad dog in the Polish newspaper. Could that suggest that the newspaper editors were so conscious of the techniques of language use and propaganda that they knew that denying a frame activates it just as well?²⁴

²⁴ See Lakoff (2003) 'Don't think of an elephant' task and his discussion about the framing of political discourse by means of conceptual metaphors.

The *dangerous snake* label seems to be far less ritualistic and is creatively elaborated, as shown in (77) below:

- (77) *Mr John Browne (Winchester, C): In the near future terrorist overlords like Gaddafi will be in a position to dispatch atomic bombs, if not by missile then in the cargo holds of scheduled civilian aircraft. In view of such a threat, there is a clear duty on our leaders to act with fortitude. It is extremely unwise merely to tease a dangerous snake. It should either be left alone or killed.*

Here a conservative MP uses the conceptual metaphor in its typical function²⁵ of creating a frame of reference within which what applies to dangerous snakes should be applied to people. Here the choice of metaphor determines the choice of the solution.

The animal abuse term was also used about the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, when she was called *the President's [Mr Reagan's] poodle*. However, in her interview for the BBC radio *World This Weekend* reported in *The Times* she overcame the reference frame she was being placed within by her critics and said:

- (78) *'I don't think I would make a very good poodle, and I am not,' she said. 'I might be more a sort of a bulldog.'*

Then she proposed her own frame and added:

- (79) *'There is no question of dancing to someone else's tune. We looked at the tune and we agreed that it should be played.'*

In this way she showed her high command of rhetorical skills, an ability to reframe political discourse to her own advantage.

The animal labels did not exhaust the repertoire of enemy vilification, which also included reference to insanity, when President Reagan was reported to have called Colonel Gaddafi a *mad dog*; and Colonel Gaddafi was reported to have referred to Mr Reagan and Mrs Thatcher as *that crazy man* and *that crazy woman*.

²⁵ This function of conceptual metaphor has been investigated at length by Schön (1993). He calls this type of metaphor generative metaphor.

It was accusations of excessive emotionality, though, which appeared consistently in the texts:

- (80) ...*Europeans dislike the Gaddafi regime, abhor and condemn terrorism and wish to take firm measures against it, but (that) launching military strikes against Tripoli would be 'emotional and liable to lead to further terrorist acts in West Europe', as one official put it.*
Mr Cyril Townsend (Bexleyheath, C): Most of the recent terrorist incidents involving the Middle East are due to the Abu Nidal group rather than Libya. Many of us are deeply troubled by her uncritical support for the US which has grossly over-reacted to provocation. Does she not agree that over-reaction would only fuel terrorism, bitterness and bloodshed?
Mr Jack Ashley (Stoke-on-Trent South Lab): No country in the world has a better record for firm, intelligent and calculated responses to terrorism than we have. It is therefore incredible, in the light of that record, that she should associate us with the emotional spasm by President Reagan.
West Germany is also urging Washington to desist from 'emotional' action.

In examples in (80) emotionality is contrasted with *firm, intelligent and calculated responses* and condemned as inappropriate. Ironically, these reservations against emotionality are often surrounded by highly emotional vocabulary, such as *abhor, bitterness* and *bloodshed*. It is difficult to decide whether speakers using such contradictory elements in their speech believe that emotional political speech is appropriate, while what they call emotional political decision making is inappropriate, or simply they cannot resist the temptation of achieving emotional impact on their addressees.

Occasionally some of the metaphor-based expressions are not just used in isolation and abandoned, but, as shown in the examples of *dangerous snake, President's poodle* and *dancing to someone else's tune*, they become creatively elaborated, in this way contributing to the structure of discourse, as shown in the text fragments below.

- (81a) *Indeed military action will tear even more deeply into the wounds of the Middle East.*

(81b) *One can choose one's friends in one's own image and to one's precise individual preference. One does not have that luxury with super-power allies and nuclear deterrents.*

(81c) *Without Mrs Thatcher the trend towards Fortress America would have been accelerated.*

It is sentiment more than necessity that impels the US to defend us. If there was a war between Russia and the West fortress America would be in no greater danger of nuclear destruction than it is at present. If no nuclear weapons were used America would be absolutely safe. The Russians could not get large numbers of troops across the Bering Straits. There is no chance of their being able to do a Hannibal over the Alps on the US.

In (81a) the POLITICAL ENTITY IS A PERSON metaphor is employed for a strong emotional effect that the phrase *tearing even more deeply into the wounds* may create in the readers, amplifying the critique of the military action and placing the Middle East in the position of a victim (see the Innocent Victim Myth of Lakoff 1992, Chapter Three, Section 7). In (81b) the same conceptual metaphor underlies the idiom *to choose one's friends in one's own image*. The idiom, however, becomes negated by the following sentence, so that the analogy between human relationships and international relations is denied. Of course, it could not be denied if it was not, in the first place, evoked. The passages quoted in (81c) come from different places of one article "And if the eagle should fly? / Implications of a US military withdrawal from Western Europe" by Woodrow Wyatt, which is structured around the image of AMERICA IS A FORTRESS. Here, the underlying conceptual metaphor STATE IS A HOME is elaborated into STATE IS A FORTRESS, and the whole argument of the article is structured around this notion. Generally, the entire text is rhetorically very rich, starting with the headline, in which the eagle metonymically stands for America, and continuing with an intertextual historical reference to an ancient Carthaginian military leader Hannibal.

2.5.2. Isolated metaphors

Similarly to previous subcorpora, the data on Libya from *The Times* show an intricate embroiling of the concepts of WAR, POLITICS and DISPUTE.

- (82a) *There is, in truth, a mutual incomprehension between Arabs and Americans that the US-Libyan confrontation is already accentuating.*
(Mapping: Air Raids are A Means of Accentuating Incomprehension in a Dispute)
- (82b) *Then no sooner had Tory backbenchers gunned down the Shops Bill than the bombs and guns of US F111 warplanes were in rather more serious action against the cities of Libya.*
Mr Neil Kinnock will deliver an all-out onslaught against the Government's practical support for the American attack.
The Kremlin's caution, for the second time in a month, was well disguised behind a barrage from the news agency TASS, which described the US action as 'barbarous and totally unjustified aggression'.
In a stinging new attack on the United States for its recent air raids on Libya, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, warned in a Kremlin speech that a similar crisis over Syria or Iran could break out at any moment.
(Mapping: A Violent Speech is A Military Attack)

In (82a) the international relations between Arabs and Americans are construed of in terms of DISPUTE, as if an air raid were a person taking part in a conversation, accentuating the lack of understanding between the interlocutors. The examples in (82b) draw on the lexical field of war. In the first example, the author is clearly well aware of the associations that the use of *gunned down* can activate and uses the phrase in a pun-like fashion, aiming at achieving an aesthetic effect. The remaining three instances in (82b) can be considered fossilised figurative expressions, with limited emotional appeal, perhaps with the exception of the *onslaught* reactivated with the strengthening modifier *all-out*.

A close reading of the texts identified a number of expressions which seem to be motivated by conceptual metaphors. None of these expressions, though, was in any way re-activated. They are listed in (87) below.

- (83) PERSON IS AN ANIMAL: *Reagan Administration hawks; as free people they have not let themselves be cowed by threats of violence; [i]t [the US] is bristling with new threats, now not only to Libya, but also to Syria and Iran;*
(Conceptual metaphors: NATION/STATE IS A PERSON+PERSON IS AN ANIMAL)

WAR IS GARDENING/FARMING: *to plant bombs*; (Mapping: Bombs are Seeds)

NATION/STATE IS A PERSON: *a substantial measure of European backing; nobody in London would be surprised if America struck against Libya (+HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT); [*t*]he lack of a friendship treaty makes it easier for Moscow now to leave Libya to the mercy of US warplanes without losing face (+ metonymy: CAPITAL FOR A STATE); *Much of the optimism among Western governments about the chances of averting a serious new East-West clash stems from the difficult relationship between the Kremlin and Colonel Gaddafi, who is one of its closest allies in the Arab world.* (+HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT, +metonymy: THE SEAT OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE)*

WAR IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT: *strike, combat, hit back, to give a warning knock*

STATE IS A HOME: *Even this, however, arouses unease among the Greeks, Italians and Spaniards, who have most to lose from a war on their doorstep; [*d*]emands from within the Government that Libya should 'clean up its house' – the words were in the article written by a cousin of Colonel Gaddafi – have been coupled with further Libyan assurances of undying friendship with the Soviet Union* (+CLEANING, NATION/STATE IS A PERSON)

WAR IS A LESSON: *Was not the American air attack intended to 'teach Gaddafi a lesson'?*

HISTORY IS A TEACHER: *Commentators are already outlining the lesson of the Libyan crisis in which we are still embroiled;*²⁶

RELIGION: *If he [President Reagan] goes through with a military strike, he will alienate his European allies, give a martyr's status to the Libyan leader in the Arab world, and fail to halt terrorism anyway;*(Mapping: A Politician is A Martyr)

WILD WEST: *the fact that the United States decided to use direct military action against Libya will confirm in the Soviet Union the image of President Reagan as a trigger-happy cowboy who does not*

²⁶ Here, similarly to the reporting of the Falklands crisis, the British learn a lesson (HISTORY IS A TEACHER conceptual metaphor), while Americans, as in the paper by Sandikcioglu (2000) analysing the representation of the Iraqis in the American reporting of the Gulf War, teach a lesson, this time to the Libyans.

flinch at attacking civilian targets; (Mapping: President Reagan is A Trigger-happy Cowboy)

WAR IS BUSINESS: *'There are three more members of his family down here,' one of the group said. 'We will pay back the Americans for this.'* (Mapping: War is Balancing the Sheets, possible interference from the MORALITY IS RETRIBUTION conceptual metaphor posited in Lakoff (1996))

WAR IS MEDICINE: *The Americans had indeed bombed a heavily populated residential area of Tripoli and had killed and wounded civilians; if nothing else, it proved that all the talk of 'surgical bombing' was, as usual in the Middle East, a myth; Mr Neil Kinnock said that without doubt Colonel Gaddafi was a malignancy;* (Mappings: Air Raids are Surgical Operations, The Enemy is a Tumour)

WORLD WAR II: *their execution had been 'in retaliation for the new Nazi policy spearheaded by the international terrorist Reagan and his decision to launch aggression on the Arab people in Libya'.* (Mapping: The Enemy is the Nazi)

WAR IS A MACHINE: *Mrs Thatcher has not merely protected the Alliance from corrosion but enhanced British influence on Washington within it; Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, said that the West's machinery for fighting terrorism and crime had 'moved decisively into higher gear';* (Mapping: Military Alliance is a Machine)

All the above expressions, although they can be traced back to certain conceptual metaphors, are highly inactive. Even those which are clearly marked as figurative with quotes, or embedded in a tuning device, as in *the image of President Reagan as a trigger-happy cowboy*, do not seem to perform any important discursive function.

2.5.3. Other rhetorical strategies

In the case of the reports of the American air raids on Libya, just like in the case of the Falklands crisis reporting, a text testifying to what I call self-conscious journalism was identified. It reads:

(84) *The Times has taken a very different and broadly favourable view of the wisdom and morality of the Libyan raid and of Britain's role in it. But a newspaper which finds itself in marked disagreement with the opinions of its readers must seriously address their concerns if it is to have any hope of influencing them.*

In this passage from the leading article of April 18th 1986, the author admits the discrepancy between the newspaper's stance and its readers' opinions, as well as makes a mission statement amounting to an acknowledgement of the fact that the aim of the newspaper is not so much reporting facts, as influencing the public opinion.

There are three intertextual references in the present corpus. First, to another ancient sign: the Trojan Horse, which is used to refer to Britain as the American Trojan Horse in the EU, in a veiled way implying that supporting the US against the predominant tendency in the EU is a deception. The second is a reference to a popular culture film hero, when President Reagan is referred to as a 'Rambo' persona.²⁷ Here the analogy creates an image of the American president as a person who favours military action. The third intertextual reference is attributed to 'one Moscow diplomat', who said *there will be an awful lot of sound and fury, but I would be surprised if they tried to raise the temperature*. Here it seems that both the quote from *Macbeth* and the use of expression building upon WAR IS A NATURAL FORCE (FIRE) have predominantly an aesthetic purpose, they are a play on words identifying the speaker as eloquent.

2.6. Trybuna Ludu on the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1988-1989)

The selection of texts for the analysis was designed to cover about a month around the announcement of the withdrawal (May 15th 1988) and about a month around the official completion of the withdrawal (according to *Trybuna Ludu* Feb 15th 1989).²⁸ This sample of texts is the smallest in the present study.

²⁷ The quotes are used to mark out the name, clearly stressing its figurative nature (see Goatly 1997 and Cameron – Deignan 2003).

²⁸ Grant (1994) gives Feb 3rd 1989 as the date of the completion of the withdrawal.

2.6.1. Paragraph-structuring metaphor

The small size of the corpus is probably the reason why only one discourse-structuring metaphor could be identified here. The conceptual metaphor is AFGHANISTAN IS A MAZE WITH A WALLED-IN EXIT. It appears as a title of a commentary and is then repeated in the conclusion:

- (85) *Okoliczności te powodują, że afgański labirynt ma nadal zamurowane jedyne wyjście. Jeśli mur tego nikt rozsądny nie przełamie, krajowi grożą dalsze nieszczęścia bratobójczej, niszczycielskiej wojny.* ‘These circumstances are the reason why the Afghan maze still has its only exit walled-in. If this wall is not pulled down, the country will be threatened by further misfortunes of fratricidal, destructive war’.

This metaphor highlights the difficult political and military situation Afghanistan is in. The pulling down of the wall is a call for a new solution.

2.6.2. Isolated metaphors

This image of an insurmountable wall is one of the most enduring images of the period. It produces interesting effects, that is, the same metaphor re-appears in different places in discourse, but remains unrelated to previous occurrences. For example, in another text the same image is instantiated by the following phrase:

- (86) *Ślepy zaułek – tak charakteryzują obserwatorzy polityczni rozwój wydarzeń w szeregach afgańskiej opozycji, która zebrała się na radzie konsultacyjnej – Szurze, w pakistańskim mieście Rawalpindi.* ‘A dead end – this is how political observers characterise the situation of the Afghan opposition who have gathered at a council – Sura – in the Pakistan city of Rawalpindi’.

Similarly to the reporting of the American air raids on Libya, the dominant leitmotif of the commentaries is the vilification of the USA. Here it is contrasted with the USSR being construed in metaphoric terms as a friend and neighbour of Afghanistan (actualisation of STATE IS A PERSON

metaphor). Such bi-polar metaphoric construal of international politics is discussed in detail by Chilton – Lakoff (1995).

All the usual metaphors construing war in terms of NATURAL FORCES, SHOW, GAME, HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT also appear in these reports, but they do not perform a textual function in their structure. There is, however, one more interesting case that I would like to discuss at some length. That is the picture of social life based on military fighting as the main form of activity:

- (87) *KC KPZR wyraża przekonanie, że każdy z weteranów, którzy powrócili z Afganistanu, będzie z taką samą ofiarnością wykonywał nowe zadania. Ich energia jest potrzebna przebudowie, sprawie odnowy socjalizmu, obrony jego zdobyczy. Partia – głosi orędzie – wierzy w was, pokłada w was nadzieję, wzywa was do pierwszych szeregów walki o rewolucyjne przeobrażenia społeczeństwa radzieckiego. ‘The CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] is convinced that every veteran who has come back from Afghanistan will perform new tasks with equal dedication. Their energy is needed in the restructuring, the renewal of socialism, the defence of its gains. The Party – the address goes – believes in you, pins its hopes on you, calls you to the first line of the fight for a revolutionary transformation of the Soviet society’.*

This rhetoric creates a picture of a society of soldiers whose main objective both in times of war and in times of peace is fight.²⁹ It seems to be an actualisation of the PEACE IS WAR conceptual metaphor. The expression *Peace is War and War is Peace* was one of the Party slogans used in Orwell’s 1984. This image of the world may imply that society is expected to function as if it were at war all the time (cold war), so that it must be ready for hardships and sacrifice. Such society has also its enemy externalised, which should contribute to its unity (see Hassner 1996, Chapter Three, Section 3). This representation of the world blurs the distinction between war and peace and creates a feeling of life under constant threat.

²⁹ Eubanks (1999) discusses the results of a focus group study of the BUSINESS IS WAR metaphor conducted in the US and quotes a licensing story, in which the respondent claims that the metaphor was more appropriate when the veterans of the Second World War and Korean War worked in business, but is less appropriate for the generation of the 1990s managers, who have no war experience.

2.6.3. Other rhetorical strategies

The sample also contains a text which shows the attitude of the Polish journalists of the era to the mass media, which is in stark contrast to that represented by the British (see the sections on *The Times*). There is no space for self-conscious pondering on the role and ethics of journalism. Quite to the contrary, the function of the mass media is conceived of as giving the truth to the people:

(88) *Wyjście ostatnich oddziałów radzieckich z Afganistanu obserwowałem w Moskwie patrząc w telewizor i prowadząc niekończące się rozmowy z różnymi ludźmi. Telewizyjny obraz nie kłamał. 'I observed the withdrawal of the last Soviet units from Afghanistan in Moscow, watching television and incessantly talking to other people. The television picture did not lie'.*

The most remarkable foil to this conviction was a political graffiti, popular in the 1980s, which read *Telewizja kłamie* 'Television lies'. Apparently such a possibility did not occur to the *TL* Moscow correspondent.

2.7. Rzeczpospolita on the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1988-1989)

As was the case with the reporting of the American air raids on Libya, many of the texts in both *TL* and *Rz* were very similar (e.g. the report from the press conference of gen. Liziczow³⁰). Some of the texts, though, were original and appeared only in *Rzeczpospolita*, for instance a report by a PAP correspondent Krzysztof Mroziewicz (also writing for *Trybuna Ludu*) from May 16th 1988, in which he interviews a Soviet APC captain, who describes the atrocities performed on the Soviet soldiers.

Also the construction of the enemy in *Rzeczpospolita* seems slightly different from that in *TL*, as in the latter the alliances were presented along the following lines: the Soviet Army was helping their neighbour, the Afghan government, to consolidate the revolutionary gains of socialism. The major enemy was the US, supplying the opposition with weap-

³⁰ This conference, and the numbers quoted by the General are also reported in *The Times*.

ons and training. In *Rzeczpospolita*, however, the opposition was not construed solely as the internal problem of the Afghan government, but as a threat to the Soviet army as well.

Unfortunately for the major objective of this chapter, which is to compare and contrast the conceptual metaphors motivating language use in war reports in two languages, only a handful of dead metaphoric expressions was identified; consider (91) below:

(89) *Droga do pokoju w Afganistanie – nikt temu nie przeczy – będzie długa i najeżona przeszkodami.* ‘The road to peace in Afghanistan – nobody denies that – will be long and full of (lit. bristling with) obstacles’ (POLITICS/WAR IS A JOURNEY)

Armia rządowa w ciągu kilku lat walki z siłami opozycji wyrosła jednak na sprawną, dobrze uzbrojoną i wyszkoloną. ‘The government army over several years of fighting with the opposition forces has become (lit. grown up) efficient, well equipped and well trained.’ (AN INSTITUTION IS A PERSON, mapping: Army is a Person Growing Up)

W operacji oczyszczania z sił rebelianckich szlaku Kabul – Salang zginąć miało – jak podała afgańska Agencja Bachtar setki rebeliantów z ugrupowania Masuda. ‘In an a mopping-up operation the Kabul – Salang route of the rebel forces, according to the Bachtar Agency, hundreds of rebels from Masud’s group died’. (MILITARY OPERATION IS CLEANING).

The possible underlying conceptual metaphors could of course not be posited on such scarce evidence, but have been identified and discussed in other studies.³¹

³¹ See Lakoff (1992, in Chapter Three, Section 6) and Chilton – Lakoff (1995) on politics, and Hughes (1988, see Chapter Two, Section 4) on social cleansing, though he does not discuss it in terms of CMT, but rather as a case of euphemism at the level of language.

2.8. The Times on the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1988-1989)

The corpus of articles analysed in this section comes from *The Times Archive online*, the key word ‘Afghanistan’ was searched for in the same two periods as those delineated for *Trybuna Ludu*, i.e. May 7th 1988 – June 2nd 1988 and Jan 28th 1989 – March 3rd 1989. The search rendered 52 and 74 articles for each period respectively. Out of these, 88 were selected as concentrating on the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan and on the general situation in Afghanistan at the time.

2.8.1. Paragraph-structuring metaphors

In two cases conceptual metaphors constitute a frame of reference for longer stretches of text and are effectively elaborated. In the first case, the Source Domain is that of ANIMAL:

(90) *‘If the Najibullah regime adopts a porcupine stance, it may be a lot more difficult for the fox, in the form of the guerrillas, to dislodge it than wishful thinking has led some people to expect,’ a European military expert said.*

(Conceptual metaphor: AN INSTITUTION IS AN ANIMAL, mappings:
Najibullah Regime is a Porcupine, The Guerrilla is a Fox)

Here a military expert uses the reference to two animals to illustrate the point he is making. The metaphor serves both as an ornament and as a strengthening of the argument through an analogy to the animal world, in which a prickly porcupine, although itself not a particularly aggressive or powerful animal, cannot be easily defeated. The fox – guerrilla tactics, which was so efficient against a regular army occupying a large and mountainous terrain – may not be equally rewarding.

The following excerpt shows a far less skilful use of metaphorical expression motivated by WAR IS MEDICINE conceptual metaphor:

(91) *The “bleeding wound” that Mr Gorbachev inherited when he came to power nearly four years ago has been lanced, but it is far from*

healed. (SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN IS A BLEEDING WOUND FOR THE SOVIET SOCIETY conceptual metaphor)

While it is quite obvious that a festering wound can be lanced in the hope of bringing relief and healing it, it is difficult to see why anyone would lance rather than stitch a bleeding wound. The expression seems to be a misguided blending of two phrases *lancing a boil* and *dressing a wound*. (91) can be yet another testimony to the claim I have made earlier in this chapter, namely that occasionally the journalists get carried away by their language and lose control over the particular phrasing they use.

2.8.2. Isolated metaphors

The discourse frames described above rested on the use of national symbols and emotional, evaluative vocabulary. Example (92) below is construed around the THE WESTERNER IS A TEACHER conceptual metaphor, in which the Soviets are given a lesson.

(92) *The second motive was simply to teach Moscow that further extensions of the Soviet Union's power beyond its frontiers would meet a strong response, and that Moscow would pay a heavy price. That lesson has been learnt, and the price extracted.*

Here the LESSON metaphor³² is intermingled with the BUSINESS metaphor, which appeared regularly in the analysed texts, as evidenced in (93) below:

(93) *Moscow's heavy price for eight-year conflict; The Soviet Union has had to pay a heavy price for waging war in Afghanistan for more than eight years. The figure of 15,000 dead, acknowledged by Moscow on Thursday and confirmed by Western intelligence sources, provides a reliable indication of the human price paid.*

³² It must be mentioned that the LESSON metaphor underlies several linguistic expressions in which the Soviets are described as learning a lesson through gaining experience rather than being taught by someone who knows what is right.

In a speech showing just how little was achieved at the cost of more than 13,000 Soviet lives,

(Mapping: Human Life is a Price in a Business Transaction)

In these examples human lives are reduced to figures in statistics; however, probably because the figures are frighteningly high, the powerful appeal of the sheer figures is not diminished. Although this type of conceptual metaphor usually hides the human suffering of the deceased and of the bereaved families, it does not seem to work this way here.

There is an example in the data in which the WAR IS BUSINESS conceptual metaphor spans three different concepts: the economy, human lives and politics, so that in this case the human losses are effectively downplayed as yet another item on the balance sheet. This impression is further strengthened by the use of a slightly dismissive word *adventure*.

(94) *The withdrawal will mark the end of a Soviet adventure that eventually proved as costly in economic and human terms at home, as it was politically costly abroad.*

Personification is one of the most pervading types of metaphor in the present corpus. It is most often applied to cities which become heroes standing their ground in war (95a) and confronted by a personified regime, government or army (95b):

(95a) *The threat to Jalalabad seems to have abated, as the deadline set by the Mujahidin for it to fall has passed.*

Kabul wrestles with refugee crisis

should it [Najibullah's government] fail to maintain a grip on Kabul.

Kabul edgy after first street battle

Rebels tighten their noose on Kabul (headline, Feb 10th, 1989)

Kandahar is especially vulnerable because of the distance between the city and its airport, which the Mujahidin plan to attack shortly.

(95b) *the ability of the 40,000-strong Afghan Army to survive on its own' no accurate assessment of the life expectancy of the regime can be made until the winter ends.*

The personified cities thus can feel threatened, edgy or vulnerable and they stand up to a hand-to-hand combat, in which they wrestle, or have a

noose tightened around them. The personified army becomes a single entity, and as such a single organism it is or is not capable of survival. In the same vein the regime can boast of life expectancy. All of these expressions seem to refer back to the underlying conceptual metaphor, which is so well entrenched that it probably escapes the notice of most of the readers. It is also not exploited by the journalists. There is only one example in which the metaphor NATION IS A PERSON is creatively elaborated on in a reference made by Mrs Thatcher to the words of Lord Palmerstone, the 19th-century British Foreign Secretary and later British Prime Minister:

- (96) *Lord Palmerstone's words about nations having no permanent friends or allies but only permanent interests have become almost a commonplace of Anglo-Soviet relations since they were quoted by Mrs Thatcher during Mr Gorbachev's first visit to London.*

Here the metaphor is employed to construct a cynical political argument.

In the data there are further examples of what may be considered the blurring of the concepts of 'war' and 'diplomacy', where war vocabulary is applied to non-military situations, but also when the reference is unclear, so that the word may be equally well implicating military or diplomatic action.

- (97a) *When we signed the accord, we pledged we would not take part in combat operations during the withdrawal if not attacked. But if we are, we will react in a corresponding way. We can see there are attempts to torpedo the agreements, and this would have serious negative consequences.
But the exercise, witnessed by a media circus of more than 100, backfired because of the elaborate security precautions needed to protect both the Soviet and Afghan participants from attack, not only from the Muslim rebels who have vowed to keep on fighting, but also as a result of bitter splits inside the PDPA.*
- (97b) *Rebels attack morale rather than cities
[Najibullah] conducting a "peace offensive" called National Reconciliation on behalf of Moscow since January 1987.*
- (97c) *Already locked into their own struggle with the fundamentalists, whose dream of an Islamic theocratic state conflicts with their own preference for a restoration of the traditional monarchy, the moderates saw a chance to win an important victory over the fundamentalists.*

In (97a) the words from the semantic field of war are used literally (*take part in combat operations, attacked, attack, fighting*) and figuratively (*to torpedo the arguments, [the ceremony] backfired*) side by side. It can be considered, I believe, as evidence of the weakening of their metaphoricity, so that they become bleached, and then eventually regarded as polysemous items, whose metaphorical origin can be reconstructed but may not be active at every use.³³

In (97b) there are two instances of a slightly different status. The first example is evidently a pun, utilizing both the figurative and the literal implications of the word *attack* quite intentionally. The second example employs an oxymoron *peace offensive* deliberately with the aim of ridiculing the plan dubbed *National Reconciliation*, which clearly appeared dishonest and ineffective to the author of the article.

Excerpt in (97c) is a perfect instance of such a use of vocabulary with military undertones that it may well transform itself from a description of a diplomatic conflict into one of military nature.

2.8.3. Other rhetorical strategies

Unlike the reporting in *Rzeczpospolita*, which was constructed around the antagonism between the Soviets and the Americans, *The Times* built its presentation of the situation around four participants: with the Soviets playing the lead, the Afghans the support, and the Americans and British given the cameos. The representations of the four involved nations were not based on any particular metaphors, with the exception of the necessary personification, which is analysed later. The framing of the Soviets was definitely less aggressive than that of the Americans in *TL*, but was nevertheless biased. A representative example of such a subtle bias are the references to the analogy between the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the evacuation of the American embassy from Saigon in 1975, quoted in (98):

(98) *Kabul-based Western diplomats have been angered by what they see as recent false analogies drawn in sections of the media with the*

³³ Another possible interpretation is to call such uses as evidence of context-triggered source (Semino 2006).

fall of Saigon in 1975 and the shaming exit of the last US helicopters with South Vietnamese officials desperately fighting for a place. They point out that the unforgettable scenes took place two years after the departure of American troops and after Saigon was conquered by North Vietnam.

The Soviet military was spared the humiliating confusion of the American flight from Saigon. The final stages of the Soviet retreat were completed with a degree of order and precision that would have dignified the Imperial Russian Army. As befits the commanding officer, the Commander in Chief, Lt-General Viktor Gromov, was the last to cross into Soviet territory, minutes before the midday deadline.

The first excerpt comes from an article of May 27th 1988 by Christopher Walker from Kabul. Here the parallel is denied on the basis of the argument that the beginning of the Soviet pull-out cannot be compared to what happened in Vietnam. In the second excerpt from a leading article published on Feb 16th 1989, a day after the official completion of the Soviet withdrawal, the Soviet officers could not be awarded the recognition for minimising self-losses and conducting a well-ordered retreat, as in the first sentence they 'are spared the humiliating confusion'. They did not earn the dignified retreat but rather were spared the humiliation. Placed in a position of a syntactic Patient, they are not the Agents of the successful operation, merely the beneficiaries. The following two sentences through their lofty reference to the Imperial Russian Army and the elevated style marked by the use of such words as *dignified* and *befits*, carry undertones of irony.³⁴ Although the correlation at the level of states and the military command seemed inappropriate to *The Times* journalists, the correspondence between the soldiers' experiences seemed more fitting, so that in the same leading article there is the following passage:

³⁴ Andreas Musolff (p.c.) disputes my interpretation of the second passage and claims that the thrust of the passage is that the USSR was 'spared the humiliating confusion', and that the edge of the comment is against the US. I agree with the perspective on the US, but my point is exactly that the USSR were 'spared the humiliation' rather than that they efficiently conducted a military operation.

- (99) *The Soviet Union now has a generation of young people whose lives have been overshadowed by the Afghan war, much as the Vietnam war overshadowed the lives of a generation of Americans. Their response has been similar. Many have become disaffected; some have turned to pacifism, others to drugs, yet others to vigilantism.*

When the analogy allows for an appreciation of the Soviet military skill, it is denied, but when it reinforces the potentially disruptive effects of war, it is endorsed.

Similarly to the Polish reporting of the departure of the British fleet for the Falklands, the British reporting of the Soviet homecoming employs the Glory of War Myth and the THEATRE metaphor to create a sarcastic distance, which allows the reporters as if to see through the ceremonious pomp. In (100) below the tension of the relatives expecting the return of another group of soldiers in the border town of Teremez, and the pompous welcome by the orchestra are contrasted with the image of a bleak truck column transporting useless junk:

- (100) *Eventually headlights on the bridge signalled the arrival of the day's column, as the band dutifully struck up with the "Defence of the Motherland" and a motley collection of about 20 army trucks approached. Most were carrying junk bits of old engines, spare tyres and old oil drums.*

The Glory of War Myth reduced to a handful of empty symbols, such as 'Mother Russia', 'red carnations' and the 'traditional loaves of bread', as well as slogans alien to the readers of *The Times* like 'internationalist duty', its strangeness further emphasised with the use of the quotation marks, emerges from the following passage:

- (101) *Mother Russia' stages joyous border welcome;*
The column then drew up in front of a reviewing stand where it was addressed by local party officials and a cluster of generals. The men were told that they had come back after fulfilling their "internationalist duty" in Afghanistan, and that Mother Russia would accord them special respect for their courage and heroism.

This message was reinforced by the slogans on the vehicles which declared: “We have fulfilled the Motherland’s order”, “Hello Motherland” and “Motherland, meet your sons”.

After the ceremony the soldiers were briefly mobbed by journalists and local Uzbek women offering them red carnations, the chance to send a telegram home and traditional loaves of bread, the word “peace” baked on top.

The picture above strikes one with its foreignness and artificiality, while the fragment below, although attributed to a despatch from a Soviet journalist of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, is a clear mockery, ridiculing the spectacle into which such political and military operations can be transformed:

(102) *Soviet general will sign off with soliloquy*

FROM EDWARD GORMAN, TERMEZ, SOVIET UZBEKISTAN

Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Afghanistan, will be the last Kremlin soldier to leave the country, according to Mikhail Kozhukov, veteran war correspondent of the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda.

In a despatch yesterday he reported: “On February 15 at 10am local time, Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov will be the last to cross the bridge. He will pass without looking back. Then he will stop and ‘deliver a speech’, but just to himself. It will last one minute, seven seconds. It will not be written down nor listened to.”

The use of meticulous detail (*[the speech] will last one minute, seven seconds*) in combination with the future tense adds to the sense of the surreal of the predicted scene.

The disdain also rings in phrases such as

(103) *He [one Western military source] added: “One should be wary against portraying this as the Soviet Army slinking out with their tail between their legs.” (AN INSTITUTION IS A PERSON + PERSON IS AN ANIMAL conceptual metaphors)*

Everywhere the signs of the final ignominious Soviet departure are to be seen.

It was fitting that the last Soviet soldiers to leave Kabul sneaked out under cover of darkness on Tuesday night, with no ceremony and no

attempt to put a brave face on their withdrawal. Like the other re-treating troops encountered by Western journalists, their main emotion was an undisguised sense of relief.

The negating of the scornful predication in the first sentence does not annul the frame (Lakoff 2003, see footnote 24, this chapter) in which the Soviets are depicted in such derogatory terms as the mad dog Colonel Gaddafi in President Reagan's and Vice-President Bush's wording referred to in Section 2.5.1.

Despite the cancelling of the Saigon analogy in the text of May 27th 1988, on Feb. 15th 1989 Christopher Walker evaluates the Soviet withdrawal as *ignominious*.³⁵ In the third excerpt the Soviets are mocked for not staging a ceremony, although many other ritual departures and welcomes were reported in an equally supercilious manner.

The secretive nature of the Soviet actions evoked by the verb *sneaked out* above is also exploited for the construction of the Soviets as unreliable and deceitful, as evidenced in the quotes below:

(104) *Mr Gorbachev, during his 20-minute outburst against the US summit stand, also cited alleged violations by the Americans and Pakistan of the Geneva accord, signed in April and aimed at withdrawing all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.*

Behind a smokescreen of public denials, the Kremlin is striving to create a pro-Moscow buffer zone in neighbouring provinces of northern Afghanistan,

There was truth in its words, but not the whole truth. [About Pravda report on withdrawal]

In the first sentence Gorbachev is depicted as emotionally overreacting. The other two sentences show the Soviets as mendacious. The same accusations were levelled at President Reagan and the Americans in the case of the *TL* reports on the American air raids on Libya, in some of the parliamentary reports in *The Times* on the same issue, and in the American construal of Saddam Hussein as analysed in Sandikcioglu (2000, see Chapter Three, Section 7). Clearly, such accusations are a typical constituent of enemy vilification.

³⁵ The leading article with 'sparing the humiliating confusion' discussed above appeared on the following day.

The last element of the representation of the Soviets in *The Times* reporting of their withdrawal from Afghanistan consists in portraying them in such a prosaic situation as window shopping, which for them, living in the economy of deficit at home, was a glimpse of another world:

(105) *In the Chicken Street bazaar, where off-duty Soviet soldiers often came to ogle the cornucopia of consumer goods never available at home, none was to be seen yesterday for the first time in years. Another salesman was openly contemptuous of the occupying army which, until a few weeks ago, had 20,000 men committed to guarding Kabul alone. "The Red soldiers had no money and no manners. I had no time for them at all they seemed like peasants to me," he said.*

The implication here is that the consumer goods offered in the Kabul Bazaar are more advanced technologically than what the Soviets can acquire at home. It may suggest that the Afghan traders are more civilised than the barbarian Soviets.

The fragment published on Feb 16th 1989 and referring to the *cornucopia of consumer goods* provides a stark contrast for a different description of the Kabul shops, which appeared on Feb 27th 1989 and which runs as follows:

(106) *Among staple items now unobtainable or available only at black-market prices well out of the reach of most Afghans are petrol, paraffin, sugar, ghee (edible cooking fat), eggs and meat. Nan, the flat bread which is the mainstay of Afghan cooking, is rationed severely. In recent blizzards there have been reports of people freezing to death in bread queues. Among the black-market prices charged in the capital, where the average civil service salary is less than Pounds 30 a month, were sugar at Pounds 5 a lb, petrol Pounds 20 for 20 litres and meat at Pounds 4 a lb.*

Either the Kabul of the time was a city of such startling discrepancies, which is not impossible, or the first fragment might be an exaggeration designed to ridicule the Soviet soldiers.

The Afghans, as is the case in (98) above, are often framed as the victims of the Soviet occupation. The government army is referred to as *A*

ragbag army awaiting the final showdown and appears as completely incompetent:

(107) *The primitive nature of the Afghan military machine was demonstrated by the facilities at the checkpoint at the village of Tangiye Pol-i-Charki where our car was halted. Water was being drawn from a well and the only cooking equipment was a rusty charcoal grill. On the hillsides some of the hundreds of Soviet tanks left to the Afghan Army were silhouetted on the snowy skyline, a basic error that made them easy targets as one Westerner with military experience pointed out.*

Despite such derogatory evaluation, when a broader perspective is applied the image of a humanitarian catastrophe predominates:

(108) *A member of the small UN team still in Kabul said: "Now that the Russians have gone, this has become very much a human story rather than one about East versus West."*

The Americans fare no better in the picture of the world emerging from *The Times*. When it comes to creating political forecasts on the future of Najibullah's government, they are referred to as the *gung-ho Americans* refusing to be realistic, while President Reagan is so puerile that instead of a briefing before a diplomatic journey he is shown films:

(109) *They are showing films about Russia to President Reagan to help put him in the mood for next week's trip to Moscow. For the sake of a happy summit, they had better keep him away from Rambo III.*

The only reasonable nation on the scene are the British. Unlike the Americans, they are capable of accurate political calculation, as suggested in (110a), as well as unprecedented selfless sacrifice, in contrast to the Soviets (110b):

(110a) *The British, who have the best record among Western diplomatic missions for the accuracy of their forecasts about the volatile Afghan situation, are more cautious*

(110b) *Now that the Russians have gone, many of the most severe casualties in Afghanistan's continuing "dirty war" are being treated by a three-strong British volunteer surgical team, working in nightmare conditions in a heavily fortified Red Cross hospital which treats the wounded from either side.*

Because of the shoot-to-kill curfew ordered by the beleaguered Afghan Government, the British team have to travel the 100 yards between the hospital and their sand-bagged lodgings after dark in a Jeep flying a large, illuminated Red Cross flag and driving at a snail's pace.

In the finest tradition of Florence Nightingale and others from Britain tending the wounded on battlefields far from home, the three have maintained an unflappability and sense of humour that has impressed both the poorly equipped Afghan hospital workers and the handful of other foreign volunteers alike.

To non-British ears 'the finest tradition of Florence Nightingale' may sound a bit exulted, but the journalist's intention seems to be quite solemn. Apparently, such national symbolic references as 'Mother Russia' mentioned before, do not carry a similar positive emotional impact on the non-Russian addressees.

This section closes with a longer fragment which, as was already the case with *The Times* reporting of the Falklands and Libyan conflicts, falls under what I call self-conscious journalism:

(111) *The other shells, being farther off, had hooted as they fell. This one screamed as it passed over the Mujahidin position on the ridge to explode on the plain behind, not far from a village which is still inhabited.*

Looking towards the houses, the American journalist crouching beside me growled: "What a lousy death blown up for someone else's photo opportunity."

This is all that the minor artillery duel really was. For the benefit of three cameramen, the group of Mujahidin from Maulavi Yunis Khalis's faction of the Hezb-i Islami party at the post near the village of Muhmand fired three shells from a Russian 120mm gun at a government battery on a hill guarding Jalalabad.

This text testifies to the ethical dilemmas that war reporters must face when performing their profession, when such lofty quandaries as impartiality or reliability come second to the simple responsibility for one's documentary's subjects, and to the intense feeling of absurdity of filming or reporting other people's death and suffering.

2.9. Trybuna on the war on terror

As the size of the Polish newspapers and newspaper articles increased significantly between the 1980s and 2001, only two thirds of texts underwent close reading in the qualitative analysis. The samples of texts were collected from the newspaper between October 1st 2001 and December 21st 2001.

2.9.1. Isolated metaphors

Similarly to the previous analysis, the present one also identified references to the Glory of War Myth (especially in President Bush's speech reprinted in *Trybuna*), and such metaphors as WAR IS A THEATRE/FILM, WAR IS A GAME OF CHESS, WAR IS CLEANING, WAR IS A NATURAL FORCE. Still, the words which may be considered evidence for these metaphors are usually highly polysemous (see also Chapter Five on indicators of conceptual metaphor), and no evidence of any discourse-structuring clusters have been found in the texts signed by Polish journalists. Occasionally the metaphor seems to be reactivated as a result of elaboration, as in the example below:

(112) *Jaki czarny scenariusz napisze życie? Tych scenariuszy nie szczędzili hollywoodzcy twórcy: były łodzie podwodne nafaszerowane ładunkami atomowymi, bomby mogące zniszczyć milionowe metropolie. To naprawdę jest już wojna XXI wieku. 'What black scenario will life write? Hollywood artists did not spare us such scenarios: there were submarines stuffed with nuclear fuses, bombs which could destroy metropolises with millions of inhabitants. This really is a 21st century war.'*

In this excerpt the Vehicle is explored in order to cast some light on the Topic. In this way the conceptual categories underlying both the Vehicle and the Target merge to create a category of things that require scenarios, in the way suggested by Glucksberg (2003).³⁶

Sometimes an entire sentence, and not just a part of it, activates the source domain of a conceptual metaphor, so that its meaning can be interpreted and its evaluative power appreciated only in the context of other sentences, which allow us to reconstruct the target of the metaphor:

- (113) *Ten pierwszy atak ma sprzyjać temu, by to nie Amerykanie i Anglicy mieli sami ścigać terrorystów po terytorium Afganistanu. Ta partia jest rozgrywana po mistrzowsku. USA chcą działać przy współpracy ludności miejscowej, a nie przeciw niej, jak to czynili tam Rosjanie, a wcześniej Amerykanie w Wietnamie. ‘This first attack is designed in such a way so that the Americans and the English would not have to chase the terrorists in Afghanistan by themselves. This round of the game is played in a masterly fashion. The USA wants to act in cooperation with the local population and not against them, as the Russians did, and prior to that as the Americans did in Vietnam.’*

Although in this example the metaphor adds to the intensity of the argument, it is not exploited in any other part of the article.

The metaphor WAR IS MEDICINE, which appeared in the 1986 reporting of the American air raids on Libya by *Rzeczpospolita*, was there clearly attributed to a non-Polish speaker, a Ghana UN representative, who referred ironically to an American claim on ‘surgical bombing’. In 2001 the expression does not need to be flagged off with the hedge ‘the so-called’, but its appropriateness is brought into question again:

- (114) *[Zygmunt Słomkowski, journalist:] Uderzenia są jednak chirurgiczne, gdyż cele bomb i rakiet to lotniska, stacje radarowe, obrona przeciwlotnicza, stanowiska dowodzenia itp. Nie dotyczy to ludności. [Dr Piotr Balcerowicz, a pundit in Oriental Studies] Mam nadzieję, że uderzenia będą chirurgiczne, ale już została zbombardowana elektrownia zaopatrująca Kabul w energię. W wyniku tego uderzenia będą cierpieli mieszkańcy stolicy. Bombardowania doprowadzą*

³⁶ Analysing the “My lawyer is a shark” utterance, Glucksberg (2003) suggests that metaphors of this type are categorical assertions.

do zwiększenia fali uchodźców, a także do klęski głodu. W Afganistanie już odczuwa się brak żywności i duża część ludności egzystuje dzięki pomocy zewnętrznej.

'The strikes are surgical, as the targets for bombs and rockets are airfields, radar stations, air defence, command posts, etc. They do not affect the civilians.

I hope that the strikes will be surgical, but the Kabul power station has already been bombed. As a result, the inhabitants of the capital will suffer. The bombings will lead to increasing the wave of refugees and starvation. Afghanistan already experiences food shortages and much of the population depends on international aid'.

Here the respondent accepts the conceptual metaphor suggested by the journalist, but formulates his answer in such a way as to put it in doubt. The linguistic expression as such, unlike in the 1980s, seems to be well-established in the language.

A metaphor which did not appear in the analysed Polish war reports of the 1980s is WAR IS A HUNT. I am not claiming that it has suddenly appeared as a translation from English language sources. The common collocations extending the meaning of *polowanie* 'hunt' in Polish are *polowanie na męża* 'hunting for a husband', and *polowanie na sensację* 'hunting for a scoop' (*Mały Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN [MSJP PWN]* 1969). Another word from the same semantic field, i.e. *oblawa* 'hunt', because of Kaczmarek's³⁷ song *Oblawa* 'Manhunt', may seem more likely to be used about police action rather than military operation; however *MSJP PWN* (1969) states that it can be used both in reference to the police and military action.

In the reports of the war with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 this metaphor has been elaborated to the extent that it structured an entire paragraph of a text. As the article concerned the types of American forces to be used in Afghanistan, it was most likely translated from the American sources, so that its wording could have been influenced by the original text:

³⁷ Jacek Kaczmarek (1957-2004) was a Polish poet, singer and writer. He is considered to have been the Solidarity bard, the voice of the Opposition in the 1980s Poland. His songs circulated through the underground publishers. *Oblawa* 'Manhunt' is an adaptation of the song *Ochota na volkov* 'A hunt for the wolves' by Vladimir Vysotsky.

(115) *Jednym z najważniejszych zadań, jakie stoją przed siłami specjalnymi w Afganistanie, jest bezpośrednio uderzenie w terrorystów Al-Kaidy, a przede wszystkim w jej przywódców, w tym Osamę bin Ladena. Jeden z planów przewiduje wypłoszenie ich z kryjówek i schwytanie, a w razie konieczności fizyczną eliminację podczas próby wyrwania się amerykańskiej obławie, nawet poza granicami Afganistanu. Niezależnie od wyników operacji na terenie tego państwa, polowanie na terrorystów nie może zakończyć się tylko na nim. To zaś oznacza rozciągnięcie antyterrorystycznej wojny, choćby ograniczonej, na kolejne kraje. Niewątpliwie będzie to wojna sił specjalnych.*

‘One of the most important tasks that the special forces face in Afghanistan is a direct strike at the Al Qaeda terrorists, in particular at its leaders and Osama bin Laden. One of the plans involves flushing them out from their hiding places and capturing them; when necessary it also involves elimination in the case of their attempt to break free of the American hunt, even outside the Afghan borders. Independently of the results of the operation in this country, the hunt for terrorists cannot stop there. This entails spreading the anti-terrorist war, even if limited, on other countries. Undoubtedly, it will be a special forces war’.

(WAR IS A HUNT, THE ENEMY IS AN ANIMAL conceptual metaphors)

In this excerpt, the enemy, Al Qaeda terrorists, is rhetorically degraded to the level of animals, a common stylistic means in a propagandist vilification of the enemy.

2.9.2. Other rhetorical strategies

Unlike in one of the texts of the 1980s, in 2001 the journalists do not believe that they have an unrestricted access to information, or that ‘the television picture does not lie’. Urszula Piwowar-Lesman in her article “Dawkowanie informacji” [‘Dosing information’] criticizes American journalists for co-operating with the American government and the military and not striving for unvarnished news. She construes a dichotomy between the Western, biased journalists and the Al-Jazeera television channel, which through this juxtaposition seems to be a more impartial source.

2.10. The Times on the war on terror

The corpus of articles analysed in this section comes from *The Times Archive online*, the key words *Afghanistan* and *terrorism* were searched for in the same period as that delineated for *Trybuna Ludu*, i.e. Oct. 1st 2001 – Dec. 21st 2001. From several hundred articles submitted as a result of the search, 124 were selected as most pertinent to the war on terror conducted in Afghanistan. The choice was based on the content of the summaries provided for each article.

2.10.1. Paragraph-structuring metaphors

Of the analysed articles, two were built around one conceptual metaphor. The first was a feature article by Simon Jenkins classified as opinion and a commentary under the title “Real hawks would not dispatch the bombers” published on Oct. 03rd 2001. The structuring conceptual metaphor POLITICIANS ARE HAWKS OR DOVES was activated already in the title. *Real* is the key word here, as Jenkins defines the term in accord with his own political vision, contesting the usual association of *hawks* with aggression and speed. He juxtaposes *hawks* with *the defeatists*, who only later are dubbed as *doves-in-khaki*. Musolff (p.c.) sees a two-fold distinction here: one between *doves* and *doves-in-khaki* and another between *hawks* and *real hawks*. This differentiation allows the author to contrast *real doves*, i.e. outspoken pacifists with the *doves-in-khaki*, i.e. cowardly military men, who bomb Iraq but refrain from a land operation. The *real hawks* in opposition to *so-so hawks* and *the doves-in-khaki* would invade Iraq. The metaphor, POLITICIANS ARE HAWKS OR DOVES, elaborated in paragraphs two and three (see below), is then employed as a discourse-structuring device.

(116) *Since that man, Osama bin Laden, is last reported to be hiding in the Pamir Mountains, he is no easy prey. To be a good hawk has meant caution. It has meant exploiting the global shock after September 11 and translating it into an alliance capable of united action. It has meant pursuing accomplices, demonstrating vigilance and sometimes making strange friends. It has meant isolating and bringing pressure on those who harbour terrorists. Hawkism over the past three weeks has been the acceptable face of interventionism.*

And the defeatists? They are not the apologists for the Taliban, an insignificant group. They are those whose reckless use of military power is so often counter-productive. They are the doves-in-khaki, the militarists who have kept Saddam Hussein and his regime secure by bombing his country each week.

If we were to plot the occurrences of *hawks* and *hovering over the prey, doves-in-khaki, no easy prey*, as the phrases related to the dominant concept, we would receive a distribution which shows that the use of the word *hawks* and the related phrases cluster at the beginning of the article in order to set the frame of reference (Koller's 2003 scene setting). In the body of the text the references are less frequent. In the final paragraph the phrase appears again as if to close the frame.

The entire article is saturated with metaphorically used expressions, the motivation of which is not limited to the dominant source domain. In paragraphs 6 and 11 the Wild West Myth is activated through the use of such expressions as *trigger-happy Bill Clinton* and "*dead or alive*". In paragraph 7 *blitzkrieg* triggers the associations with the Second World War. In Paragraph 13 *hawks* are contrasted with yet another metaphorical category, that of a slave to US militarism. Overall, the discourse structure is here based on a dominant conceptual metaphor POLITICIANS ARE HAWKS OR DOVES. Simon Jenkins, a prominent right-wing commentator, uses this metaphor, together with the other supporting metaphors to criticise the *trigger-happy Clinton*, for employing, what neoconservatives consider, half measures, i.e. for not being interventionist enough.³⁸

The second article built around a conceptual metaphor is again a feature categorised as a cover story. It is an article "Counsel of war" by Christopher Andrew published on Oct. 4th 2001. It is based on the conceptual metaphor HISTORY IS A TEACHER and implies that we should not only learn from our own life experience, as all higher organisms do, but also from the past experience of other people. This assumption underlies the whole of our education system, and is so common that it hardly seems metaphorical. In the present article the author argues that intelligence information should not be disclosed to the public, as it weakens the intelligence system and serves the enemy. In doing so, he advocates that even though the Western societies are democratic, its citizens should rely on

³⁸ Andreas Musolff (2006, p.c.) has pointed it out to me.

the better judgement of the national leaders, as keeping the public informed in detail about classified intelligence operations he considers counter-productive. To support his argument he draws a parallel with the functioning of Bletchley Park during the Second World War. The following expressions scattered in the text construct the HISTORY LESSON scene:

- (117) *The lesson, obvious to all who worked at Bletchley Park, is to stop telling bin Laden anything about the intelligence operations against him.*
Sadly, there is no sign that the lesson has been learnt.
Past experience suggests that this simple lesson will not be learnt easily.
The time has come to relearn the lessons of Bletchley Park and the Ultra secret.

The article starts as an informative review of two books about Bletchley Park, or perhaps a history essay about it. Only as late as in paragraph 12 (out of 40) is the conceptual metaphor activated. Similarly to the previous article, the image appears in the final sentence to provide a structural closure to the text. In the body of the text, other historical references are made to the Korean War, and to the Falklands War to provide further illustration of the argument. Ironically, information on the new intelligence technologies are provided by the editors in the following sections of the newspaper undermining the very argument put forward by Andrew.

The same metaphor appears in a few other articles when, for example, *the lesson of Somalia* or *the lesson of the Gulf War* are mentioned. In these cases, however, its textual function is limited to one paragraph only.

2.10.2. Isolated metaphors

Several phrases used in these articles can indicate the reliance on mappings between the WAR and the DISPUTE domains as shown in (118):

- (118) *PRESIDENT Bush fired another warning shot across the bows of Iraq and Iran yesterday by naming America's 22 most wanted terrorists, including men believed to be sheltering there.*
He got a real rocket, but the damage was done.

... poor Sir Michael was just one victim of the US Defence Secretary's need to fire off a few tension-relieving rounds.

These three examples draw on the WAR domain and employ multi-word expressions, some of them clearly idiomatic. I assume that because of their length they have better chances of invoking the concept of war than single word expressions bleached through overuse, such as *attack*.

The word *front* seems to occupy the middle of the scale between easily activated metaphors and dead metaphors. It is variously modified to indicate whether military or non military action is referred to. *A different front* referred to the war propaganda, and *humanitarian front* to organizing refugee camps before the launching of air strikes in Afghanistan; there were also *political* and *diplomatic fronts*. The best example of the diversity of *front* is in the sentence below:

(119) *This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries.*

The phrase *another front* reappears in the analysed texts 3 times and is used to frame the bombing of Afghanistan as one among many measures taken against the terrorists, and not as war as such. In this way the word acquires a general ring to it and ceases to evoke, it seems to me, the military conceptualisation unequivocally. Simultaneously, the word collocates with *line*, *lines* 12 times, when it is used in a clearly military context.

Several phrases originating in the military lexical field, apart from *humanitarian front*, are used to describe the relief aid, which gives them a slightly ironic tinge, as in *US plans to bomb Afghans with food* and *the US "guns and butter" strategy*, a modification of the *stick and carrot* saying. These rhetorical strategies employing the conceptual metaphor X IS WAR in war reports can be linked to the phenomenon of the context-triggered source discussed by Semino (2006).

A dominating metaphoric linguistic pattern used specifically in the reporting of a war against bin Laden and al Qaeda, also identified in the Polish press, is that based on the conceptual metaphors WAR IS A HUNT, PERSON IS AN ANIMAL. It is evident in the use of such phrases as those in (120):

(120) *to snare bin Laden, to smoke his men out of their hiding places they will chase bin Laden from cave to cave, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves, The hunt for him [bin Laden], to hunt down those responsible, evade the dagnet, the task of smoking out the al-Qaeda network, risky task of ferreting out bin Laden*

The word *hunt* is used 15 times in the corpus. This linguistic strategy is again a part of the enemy vilification technique, by means of which the enemy is degraded, dehumanised and therefore not deserving respect or humanitarian treatment. Such wording may enhance the inhuman behaviour towards future detainees in the interment camps of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.

Other vilification methods differ in the use of particular words, but not in general concepts from those identified in other war reports. Thus, Osama bin Laden is described as *a bullet-eyed and belligerent, rabid revolutionary, [making] a calculated gesture of contempt for America*. The Taliban are referred to as a *regime [which] has been brutal and destructive to the point of insanity*. Terrorism is framed as *Random acts by people who will occasionally act out their particular derangement in a violent way. Those are criminal actions to be handed by law enforcement*. The selected examples presented here all point to the familiar domains common in the vilification procedures, such as INSANITY, BRUTALITY, CRIMINALITY. It is not difficult to make a link between *mad dog* Gaddafi and *the rabid revolutionary* bin Laden in the anti-terrorist pro-American propaganda, as well as between the anti-terrorist pro-American accusations of insanity, brutality and criminality ascribed to the Taliban, and the anti-American accusations of the same nature forwarded by *TL* in 1986. The strategies remain the same, only the subject of vilification alters with the change of the political scene, or perspective.

The domain of LAW (or CRIME, or CRIMINALITY) is employed not only to portray the enemy, but also to frame the entire war on terror. The Western leaders and the mass media made an effort to construct this international conflict as a persecution of criminals, not as a war between nation-states or between the West and the Orient. Such an approach is evident in the frequent use of the *crim*(-e/s, -inal/s)* morpheme (33 hits). It is also indirectly supported by the dichotomy between the representation of casualties:

(121) [Gingrich:] *After the 1996 attack on Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, where 19 of our military personnel were murdered, we failed to apply the necessary pressure to force the Saudi Government to deal with terrorists based on their soil.* (TERRORISM IS A CRIME conceptual metaphor)

He [Rumsfeld] can be brutally frank, as he has been when discussing the deaths of civilians. "There's no question but that when one is engaged militarily, there is going to be unintended loss of life. It has always been the case. It certainly will be the case in this instance. And there's no question but that I and anyone involved regrets the unintended loss of life," he said.

Bob Marshall-Andrews (Lab, Medway) said that to try bin Laden at an international court, even in his absence, would signal to the Islamic world that he was accused of an international crime against humanity. (TERRORISM IS A CRIME conceptual metaphor)

In these examples killing American military personnel and American civilians is described as *a crime*, while killing Afghan civilians as *an unintended loss of life*, the key difference being the intentionality and declared regret on the part of the perpetrators. However, if the deaths of the civilians *ha[ve] always been the case [and] will be the case in this instance*, it seems a bit cynical to claim that regret significantly changes the qualification of the action. The change seems to apply at the verbal level, not the factual level.

Construing the war on terror as a law-enforcing operation invites the use of the Wild West rhetoric, where the good sheriff persecutes the evil criminals. Such vague references ring in generating "most wanted" lists and setting a price on the heads of the Al Qaeda leaders.

These efforts are sometimes contradicted by the policy makers themselves (see 122), which adds to the general conceptual confusion, which resulted from the war on terror:

(122) *We were at war, but we insisted on reacting as if these were problems for the criminal justice system. Terrorism of this kind is not a law enforcement problem. It is a diplomatic, military, and intelligence agency problem.*

The conceptualisation problem appeared at the very onset of the war on terror policy-building and -reporting, when President Bush used the word

crusade. In the period analysed here he is trying to clarify the issue and with much determination denies that the war has any religious or cultural innuendoes (see Silberstein 2002, see Chapter Three, Section 7). Simultaneously, however, he uses religiously loaded vocabulary,³⁹ e. g. *This is not a war between Christianity or Judaism and Islam. This is a war between good and evil*. Some journalists refer to terrorism as *a snake*, a clear biblical reference to the Devil; they also talk about *Campaign Objectives ... described by one aide as a "policy bible" or the Prodigal son [who] poses a crude threat to House of Saud*. These failures to conform to the self-proposed conceptualisation may be an indication of the dominating power of the conceptualisation by bin Laden and his supporters, who clearly refer to *the American soldiers of Satan*, and freely use religious analogies, as shown in (123):

(123) *"The Devil is America, and the British Government," said Abdullah Khan, 23.*

"It is Bush and Blair I blame for Muslims going to fight. They are being provoked to do it by those two Great Satans."

This conceptual, definitional problem is also pronounced in an article devoted to the meeting of British Muslim scholars in Birmingham. In the article, M. Faizul-Aqtab Siddiqi, president-general of the International Muslim Organisation, was explaining the meaning of *jihad*, and the difference between *jihad* and *qitaal*. According to him *jihad* is a peaceful and law-abiding struggle against injustice, while *qitaal* is a rise against oppressors which, however, can only be called for by leaders of state.

There are also references to other types of war conceptualisations in the analysed texts, such as WAR IS A DISEASE and WAR IS A NIGHTMARE (see the discussion of Janion and Wiśniewski in Chapter Three, Section 5).

(124) *Without the UN, we can never have a just end to the Afghan nightmare. Historically, we know that the civil wars that have plagued Afghanistan tend to close down in the winter months.*

These references, however, did not extend beyond one sentence and did not seem to influence the representation of the war in larger stretches of text.

³⁹ See also Charteris-Black (2004) who claims that POLITICS IS RELIGION is a dominant metaphor in American political discourse.

The last element of the representation of war in the selected articles that needs to be mentioned are the historical analogies to World War II and to the Spanish War. Just like in the Polish reporting, World War II seems to be a pivot of our understanding and conceptualising of war as such. When it comes to the Spanish War, though, it does not seem to occupy much space in Polish imagery or the mythic pantheon.

This section closes with a discussion of the discrepancy between the self-conscious journalism and ornamental use of metaphorical phrases. An entire article by Robert Oakley is devoted to the uncovering of the news-making processes⁴⁰ and discusses the tension created by the requirements of 24 hour news coverage. It also points out that politicians try to influence the representation of the government objectives in the media, putting the journalists' impartiality to test. The broadcasting of the news practically world-wide places an additional strain on anchors and media pundits to word their comments in a way acceptable to a wide range of non-homogenous audiences, often identifying with the opposing sides of the conflict. At the same time some uses of metaphorical or intertextually informed phrases seem to perform a solely ornamental function. Such expressions are presented in (125):

(125) *But however meticulously US and British special forces draw squares on Ordnance Survey maps and comb them mile by mile, his enemies within may in the end be his [bin Laden's] nemesis... Apocalypse now?; Reportage; War on terror (headline)*

In either case, the possible analogy pointed at by the underlined words is not elaborated. It seems to work like a witty bon mot with no consequences for article structure or line of argumentation.

3. A summary of the qualitative analysis of war reports

The analysis of the war reports from the 1980s and from 2001 published in *Trybuna Ludu*, *Rzeczpospolita*, and *The Times* show that the concepts of 'politics', 'diplomacy' and 'war' remain in an intricate relationship.

⁴⁰ Robin Oakley: "Conflicts rage in covering the war 24 hours a day", *The Times* Oct 19th 2006.

Both in the Polish and British press articles, two perspectives on the meaning of 'politics' are most commonly adopted. First, politics is considered as a superordinate, general term covering both diplomacy and war. Second, it is used as a synonym of diplomacy and antonym of war. This dual nature of the concept contributes to its rhetorical exploitation. That is, in some texts, its reference is vague and wavers between politics=diplomacy at the subordinate (basic) level, and politics as an instantiation of the superordinate level. In such cases, when uttered by politicians, these words can be interpreted either as a warning of imminent military action or as sustaining the proposal for a diplomatic solution. Such indeterminacy does not contribute to efficient communication.

In war reporting, or to be more exact in war propaganda, narrative construal of identity and massive analogising, metaphor and non-metaphor motivated, flourishes in a necessary step in persuading the public to war, that is in an enemy vilification routine. There is a common set of negatively evaluated labels that are used to refer to the enemy in order to disparage them. The reservoir of these abuse terms consists of a set of metaphors mapping the enemy onto discredited categories or categories considered inappropriate for the participants of the political process (THE ENEMY IS AN ANIMAL, THE ENEMY IS A PIRATE, THE ENEMY IS THE NAZI). Much of the vilification is achieved through the use of emotionally loaded attributive terms, such as *emotional*,⁴¹ *deceitful*, *criminal*, *brutal*. These attributes often form dichotomous⁴² series with the attributes predicated of the self, such as *rational*, *honest*, *lawful* etc. This repertoire is used by the British about the Argentines in the Falklands War; by the Poles about the Americans in the air raids on Libya and during the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; by the British (and Americans, as reported in *The Times*) about the Libyans; by the British about the Soviets withdrawing from Afghanistan; and by the Polish and the British about the Taliban in 2001. This observation places Sandikcioglu's (2000) article in a wider perspective. That is, the rhetorical strategies used by the American media to debase the Oriental were not developed solely for the purpose of denigrating one specific group of people. Quite to the contrary, it is a frame persistently used in enemy vilification. It is the enemy which is the variable, the strategies are by default.

⁴¹ On the rhetoric of emotional control in American discourse see Lutz (1996).

⁴² On the use of categorisation and the dichotomous series in the media construction of self and other see Fowler (1996).

A similar process, that is one of employing the same construal but with shifting perspective, can be noticed in the use of the Glory of War Myth in combination with WAR IS A THEATRE metaphor. In the *Trybuna Ludu* reporting of the British fleet setting off to the Falklands, and in the British coverage of the Soviet arrival in Termez from Afghanistan, the same tones of scorn could be discerned. Evidently, the Glory of War Myth requires an emotional attachment to the nation's specific identity-building narratives and symbols. For outsiders, who could not have developed any emotional link with the foreign nation-constructing codes, the Myth, stripped of its emotional power, seems odd if not downright ridiculous.

The shift in perspectivizing that I propose here is not the same process as frame-shifting in discourse as described in Coulson (2001). The major discrepancy here is that the addressees of the mass media construal of the events are two different groups of recipients for the two different perspectives. The readers of *Trybuna Ludu* and the readers of *The Times* of the 1980s do not inhabit the same discourse space. In 2001, though, the situation changed so that to a greater extent the evaluation and the framing of the events in both discourse spaces coincided.

Cases of the Coulsonian frame-shifting could also be observed in my data. First, when the supporters and the critics of the military solution of the Falklands crisis both used the same metaphorical frame WAR IS BUSINESS, but they employed a different perspective, i.e. the supporters emphasised the glorious nature of sacrificing one's life for one's country, while the critics avoided the Glory of War Myth and construed war as a calamity. Next, Mrs Thatcher effectively used frame shifting in the discourse on the American air raids on Libya, when she reframed herself as a bulldog rather than a poodle of Mr Reagan, and suggested her own framing of the situation ('dancing to the tune of our choosing').

The conceptual metaphors underlying some of the expressions in the analysed articles performed several functions. First, they were used as framing devices structuring entire texts (THE FALKLANDS WAR IS A THEATRE, AMERICAN AIR RAIDS ON LIBYA ARE A DISPUTE, THE USA IS THE WORLD SHERIFF, AMERICAN AIR RAIDS ON LIBYA ARE TEACHING A LESSON TO THE LIBYANS, AMERICA IS A FORTRESS, NAJIBULLAH'S REGIME IS A PORCUPINE, WAR ON TERROR IS A HUNT FOR BIN LADEN). In this way conceptual metaphors contributed to the discourse cohesion and often also served as the basis of argument through analogy, or as illustrations strengthening the points made. In some cases, the metaphor did not domi-

nate the entire text, but permeated the discourse, reappearing in a number of texts, but without much influence on the text structure (AFGHANISTAN IS A MAZE WITH A WALLED-IN EXIT in example (86); example (85) is a case of a structural metaphor).

Second, conceptual metaphors were used to increase the expressive power of texts. Their aim was to arouse emotions in the readers and through empathy to induce the feeling of unity in the nation. Third, within the vilification of the enemy strategy, the role of the metaphors consisted in evaluation. A reference to a metaphor-based scenario increased the intensity of the evaluation activating all the analogous frames and narratives related to the metaphor (e.g. AMERICAN AIR RAIDS ON LIBYA ARE NAZI AIR RAIDS ON POLAND). Finally, the metaphors performed an ornamental function, especially when used by the speakers who wanted to stress their own eloquence (*the gunning down of the Shops Bill*).

The same functions have also been performed by other devices, for example, the emotional appeal of the text could be increased by saturating it with emotionally loaded, but non-metaphorical vocabulary, such as terms of emotion (*concern, solemnity, hysterically*), verbs of negative valuation (*accuse, condemn*) or value-laden propaganda key words (*jingoism, progressive, colonial, junta, liberty*, etc.). The aesthetic function could also be expressed through intertextuality (e.g. the quotation from *Macbeth* by a Moscow diplomat). The unexpectedly high emotionality of the texts analysed lends further support to Silberstein's (2002) claim that the mass media do not so much report the facts as construe emotions, which apparently sell better than facts in the mass media market.

The last two issues I would like to emphasize here are what I call self-conscious journalism and slips of the pen. The *Trybuna Ludu* and *Rzeczpospolita* journalists of the 1980s showed minimal if any awareness of the mass media as the fourth estate. Probably after years of totalitarian censorship, which controlled not only what should not be, but also what had to be published, they viewed the media as a mere channel for the official propaganda. Quite to the contrary, the British journalists appeared highly self-conscious.⁴³ In some articles they discussed the role of war reporters and the question of journalists' impartiality, in others they talked about the public mission of the media in educating society and explaining

⁴³ On the sense of public mission in the British media as opposed to the sense of commercial entrepreneurship in the US see Gripsrud (1998: 24–26).

the motifs behind the government's policy. Finally, they touched upon the ethical dilemma that reporters of human suffering and death must face, i.e. whether they should limit themselves to professional coverage of the news or should try and alleviate the pain they witnessed.

The slips of the pen that could be spotted in the analysed materials appeared when the journalists seemed to be carried away by their words, so that logic and coherence were sacrificed for the lofty, metaphor- or emotion- imbued wording, as when *a bleeding wound is lanced* (*The Times*) or *an unprecedented action* is reminiscent of the past (*Trybuna Ludu*). Sometimes the choice of words seemed to contradict the intention, as was the case with the *authors of the Tuesday rape* and the euphemisms used about the aim of the American air raids on Libya (both from *Trybuna Ludu*). I believe that these slips are a testimony to the time pressure that the journalists have to face, as well as an indication that not all the words used and published were carefully chosen to construct a predetermined representation of the world. Quite often the journalists may be falling prey to certain word patterns, which do not necessarily have to be the best means of expressing their personal or their newspaper's stance.

On a theoretical level, the analyses conducted in the present chapter unambiguously demonstrate that Conceptual Metaphor Theory can provide a concise as well as in-depth comparative overview of the similarities and differences in the political culture and international perspectives of the media in various countries.

The main focus of the present chapter was the investigation of the domain of WAR as a target of metaphors in press reports. At a theoretical level, as presented in Chapter One, WAR could be seen within the force dynamic model of Talmy as consisting of three elements: (1) the Agonist and the Antagonist, (2) force tendency and (3) the balance of strengths between the interactants. However, the analyses presented above showed that the major thrust of metaphorical representations was directed towards the Participants of the conflict only. It took a form of the enemy vilification strategy. This strategy has a built-in dichotomy, which can be represented by an axiological axis with 'the enemy' occupying the negative pole and 'us' occupying the positive pole. The identification of the enemy seems vital for this type of discourse, as one nation was always represented in such negative terms, regardless of the fact whether the country of the reporter took part in the conflict.

The recurring metaphor referring to the concept of 'war' as a whole rather than to its elements was the WAR IS A THEATRE metaphor strengthening the Glory of the War Myth. The only other metaphor that did not implicitly or explicitly focus on the participants of the conflict was WAR IS A DISPUTE metaphor, which placed WAR in a complex network with POLITICS and DIPLOMACY.

The analyses presented above seem to indicate that , at least within the newspaper war reports, the constituent element of the WAR domain that was targeted by conceptual metaphors most frequently and with a widest variety of sources was the participant of the war, in particular the enemy.

Chapter V

Words from the lexical field of war and their metaphoric potential

A corpus-based study

1. Introduction

The present chapter is devoted to the domain of WAR as a source of metaphors. A number of investigations have been conducted so far into the metaphorical conceptualisation of various aspects of human life and society in terms of war on the basis of different discourses. For example, Charteris-Black (2004) analysed the language of political speeches, sports reporting, financial reporting and religious discourse; Koller (2004) examined business media discourse; Nerlich – Clark (2002), Nerlich et al. (2002), Nerlich (2005) considered the media representations of foot and mouth disease, stem cells and avian flu; Musolff (2004) considered the political debate about uniting Europe. All of these authors use real discourse as their data and identify its source. This is a significant step forwards in comparison to some CMT publications (Lakoff – Johnson 1980, also much of Lakoff – Johnson 1999, Kövecses 2002), where the source of examples on which the theory is built remains unspecified, most probably coming from introspection. This work is not a critique of introspection as such, but rather a non-valuating indication of difference in data type. In the case of both of these research styles there is a step in the analysis when the researcher moves from linguistic expression to categorisation through conceptual metaphor identification and labelling.

Kövecses (2002: 5)¹ for instance, perpetuates what he calls ‘classic examples’ from Lakoff – Johnson (1980). Among others, he gives AN ARGUMENT IS WAR conceptual metaphor and supports it with such sentences as

¹ I quote these examples from Kövecses (2002) and not Lakoff – Johnson (1980) to show that they are constantly reiterated and form a vigorous meme in the academic discourse on metaphor.

I *demolished* his argument.
I've never *won* an argument with him.

There is no indication here of any doubt concerning these examples. In the literature they seem to be universally considered good examples of the metaphor in question. However, the dictionary definition taken from the *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (CCELD)* gives only two senses of the word *demolish*. First, in the context of building demolition as opposed to construction, with the meaning of knocking down buildings; and second, in the metaphorical use in the context of argument, with the meaning of criticising someone's idea or belief. Thus, this word does not seem to belong to the domain of WAR. Why should it be an indication of AN ARGUMENT IS WAR conceptual metaphor? After all it can be a lexical realisation of A THEORY IS A BUILDING conceptual metaphor. Similarly, the verb *win* can be used in many different contexts (the *CCELD* gives such contexts as competition, game and battle), why should a decontextualised example be an indication of ARGUMENT IS WAR conceptual metaphor? After all it can as well be the first example to hypothesize ARGUMENT IS A COMPETITION or ARGUMENT IS A GAME metaphor.

Charteris-Black (2004: 95-96) also notices a similar problem with the determining which words evoke which conceptual domain. He discusses this problem not with respect to the war domain, but BUILDING and JOURNEY. He points out that the words *bridge* and *barrier* can be interpreted either as indicative of BUILDING or JOURNEY metaphors. He rightly suggests that only reference to context can solve the problem. Unfortunately, not all potentially metaphorically used expressions appear in disambiguating contexts, as indicated by Charteris-Black's (2004: 98) example 5.14:

... that we had torn down the *barriers that separated those of different race and region and religion*. (Carter)

Also, despite his identifying of the problem, Charteris-Black does not explicitly use his own solution.

Also Koller (2004) noted that the WAR metaphor is quite specific, as its source domain is not uniform. It consists of both physical violence and military strategy elements. Further, Koller explains this lack of uniformity through the blending of the two domains in the course of the historical development of the concept and method of war from fistfights to

modern technological warfare. As suggested in Chapter Three, though, based on the review of contemporary philosophical and sociological works devoted to war, the modern understanding of war is based on the 19th and in particular 20th century wars between nation-states, and performed by the national armies. Although war as such certainly involves physical violence and hand-to-hand combat, these are not the most salient features of war. In fact, if war between personified nation or states can be conceptualised as HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT (Lakoff 2001, see Chapter Three, Section 7), then WAR and HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT can be considered separate domains. This distinction is vital for the analysis presented in this chapter.

In personal communication referred to in Chapter One, Section 2.3. Kövecses suggested that the only way to posit conceptual metaphors is informed introspection. To achieve this, in accord with his advice, this book includes a chapter (Chapter Three) on the conceptualisation of war emerging in the other social sciences, so that the analyses in Chapter Four could be “informed”. A revision of selected examples of the CMT literature on war also presented in Chapter Three showed what was the traditional wording of metaphors about war.

In this chapter I intend to go a step further and suggest a possible use of corpora as a source of knowledge about the frequency of use of words, often regarded as indicative of WAR metaphors in various contexts. I believe that the knowledge of these frequencies can facilitate the process of categorizing, identification and labelling of metaphors. My assumption is that words whose frequency in war contexts is high are a good indicator of WAR metaphors when used figuratively, while words which have the highest frequency in another literally used domain are not. I want to investigate

- (1) how frequently these words are used in the military context, as opposed to other possible contexts
- (2) is the military context the most frequent
- (3) if not, which context is the most frequent.

The answers to these questions can be found in a corpus. They constitute linguistic facts.

2. The data

This study is intended as an attempt to devise a corpus based aid in the identification and naming of metaphor Source Domains. It is not meant as a criticism of previous analyses, rather as a modest proposal for the advancement of intersubjectivity in metaphor research. The selection of words for the analysis is completely data-driven, to avoid any personal bias. The method is developed in relation to the WAR domain, because the background knowledge necessary for the interpretation of corpus data has already been gathered in Chapters Three and Four.

The Times War Reports Corpus (TWRC), used in Chapter Four and described in Appendix 1, has been used as a starting point for the selection of key words. In step one, a concordancer *antconc* freely available via the Internet from Laurence Anthony's web page (<http://www.antlab.sci.waseda.ac.jp/software.html>) has been used to compile a frequency list for *TWRC*. The words considered as typical for the lexical field of war have been selected from the list. Different word forms have been collapsed under one entry, so that the results for *attack* (noun and verb), *attacked*, *attacking*, *attacks* have been added together. That means that the results for words which do not differ in form in their verbal and nominal uses have been relatively higher, than for those where spelling differences occur between the word classes, as in the case of *invasion*, *invade*. In some cases the concordance lines have been checked to eliminate the homonyms which do not belong to the field in question, but could increase the score. For example the occurrences of the possessive pronoun *mine* have been subtracted from the results for the noun *mine/s*. The final frequency list consists of 167 items and is presented in Appendix 1.

In step 2 the decision to consider only those words which have a frequency above 100 occurrences in TWRC has been made. This decision has limited the list to the top 51 words.

In step 3 of the data selection, three independent linguistically trained judges have read the list and performed two tasks. First, they have ascertained that the words in the list represent the lexical field of war. Second, they have marked out those words which they have considered metaphorical in this lexical field. If at least two judges have agreed on a word's metaphorical status, the word has been crossed out from further investigations to circumvent the problem of the Source Domain. That is there seems to be no independent way of deciding whether a metaphoric

use of such a word is a mapping from the war domain or from the domain which was a source for the mapping into the WAR domain in the first place. They have ruled out *terrorism* and *terrorist* as not belonging to the war lexical field. They have removed the following words as metaphorical: *support, intelligence, crisis, strike, response, fire*.

In step 4, the judges' intuitions have been further corroborated by the intuitions of corpus lexicographers as presented in the *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (CCELD)*. This dictionary was based on the *Cobuild Corpus*, later expanded and renamed as the *Bank of English*. It was a project led by Prof. John Sinclair, the precursor of corpus lexicography. This dictionary has been selected, because it was based on a corpus different from the one that is used in the present study, i.e. the British National Corpus. This dictionary is also used in the Pragglez procedure (described in Section 4) used in the analysis (Sections 5.1-5.7.). It is important to describe the structure of a dictionary entry in the *CCELD*. It is arranged by the senses and in the case of verb-noun homonyms the two parts of speech do not have separate entries. In such cases, the nominal uses of the word follow the explanation of the verb senses. They may have their own example preceded by the formula *used as a noun*.

The *CCELD* have confirmed the judges' intuitions. It has also eliminated further words, for example *force*, because it belongs to more domains than one. It has a military sense listed as number 20:

20. A force of soldiers or armed people is an organized group of soldiers or military vehicles.

However a more general sense is listed as 9:

9. Someone or something that is referred to as force has a considerable effect or influence on a situation or on people or things.

Sense number 7 is the first nominal sense, which is also the most concrete:

7. If you use force to do something or if it is done by force, strong and violent physical action is taken to achieve it.

Sense number 7 seems to be the primary one in accord with the embodiment hypothesis. The other two senses considered here (number 9 and 20) are both metaphorical extensions of 7 and it would be difficult to

prove that 9 is an extension of 20 rather than 7. Such words have also been deleted from the list.

The filtering procedure based on the intuition of the three judges concerning word metaphoricality in the war context as well as the consultation of the *CCDEL* has rendered the following list of words as having an unambiguously military sense:

military, attack, defence, general, troop, fight, bomb, crisis, missile, alliance, soldier, target, navy, weapon, raid, army, armed, invasion, ally, conflict, campaign, civilian, rebel, commander, naval, colonel, arms.

One word with a *TWRC* frequency below 100 has been added to the list on the basis of my intuition: *surrender*, because it shows a significant metaphorical potential and represents a less investigated grammatical category, that of a verb.

The 28 words obtained in the filtering process presented above have been used as queries in the *British National Corpus Word Query* (the corpus is described in Section 3 below). The *Word Query* shows all word forms beginning with a given letter string. In this way related derivatives or inflectional forms can be identified. If these forms have a frequency of around or above 200, then they are included in the analysis. In the case of the word *attack*, the *Word Query* results with a frequency above 200 have been the following:

attack	9275
attacked	2851
attacker	622
attackers	289
attacking	1160
attacks	3347 ²

The senses of the word forms identified by the Word Query and not in the qualitative analysis of newspaper reports have been checked in the *CCELD*. In the present case the word to consult has been *attacker*. There has been no such entry in the *CCELD*. As a remedy another corpus based

² Word formation derivatives such as *attack-and-run*, *attack-oriented* with the frequency of 1, *attack-minded* with the frequency of 5 and other words with such low frequencies were removed from the analysis.

dictionary: the *Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* (MEDAL 2002) has been consulted. Here the definition does not include any military reference:

someone who physically attacks someone else

The word has therefore not been considered as indicative of the source domain WAR. The remaining words are used as queries for concordances of 200 random hits divided into different grammatical categories, for example *attacks* as 3rd person sg. present tense verb and plural noun, by means of the *POS (Part of Speech) Query*. The concordances are analysed with the aim of determining the predominant literal use (possible basis for metaphoric processes).

The *Word Query* results identifying morphologically related words and their frequencies are presented below. The number following the word indicates its frequency. Some of the words may have the same string of letters representing different part of speech. The word forms marked in bold are considered most interesting because they have morphologically related forms from different word classes: verb, noun and adjective. As many studies concentrate on nouns and the very formulation of conceptual metaphors requires nominalization, the word forms representing a number of word classes are analysed. It is also in accord with the call by Goatly (1997) to extend research on metaphorically used expressions beyond the noun.

allied (Adjective=A)	1340	bombardment	278
allied (Participle=Part)	311	bombed	326
ally	841	bomber	597
armed (A)	3475	bombers	486
armed (Part)	524	bombing	1048
armies	998	bombs (N)	1104
arms (Noun=N)	10554	campaign (N)	8351
army	11173	campaigns (N)	1281
battle (N)	5826	civilian	1356
battled	222	civilians	791
battlefield	334	colonel	1817
battles (N)	871	command (Infinitive=Inf)	436
bomb (N)	1877	command (N)	2605

commanded	722	invasion	1904
commander	1905	military (A)	
commander-in-chief	207	military (N)	10322
commanders	446	missile	460
commando	395	missiles	874
commandos	256	naval	1011
commands	936	navy	1476
conflict (Inf)	242	raided	1993
conflict (N)	5058	raiders	287
conflicting	927	raid (N)	1163
conflicts (N)	1427	raids	649
defence	11692	rebel (N)	661
defences	1093	rebellion	974
defend	2021	rebels (N)	1124
defended	977	soldier	1717
defender	1197	soldiers	3427
defenders	650	surrender (N)	461
defending	1188	surrender (V)	511
defensive	1240	surrendered	497
fight	6706	target (Inf)	241
fighter	954	target (N)	5858
fighters	927	targeted	797
fighting	5526	targeting	414
fights	670	targets	2582
fought	2865	troop (N)	509
general (N)	1558	troops	4725
generals	415	war	27264
invade	251	weapon	1940
invaded	570	weapons	3918
invaders	251		

These key words are used as the query items in the BNC. As many theoretical works in Conceptual Metaphor Theory seem to refer to language in general rather than to any specific genre, the BNC as a whole is consulted. The analysis follows the Praggelaz procedure.

3. The British National Corpus

The *British National Corpus* is a 100 million words corpus of contemporary British English created between 1991-1994. As with many corpora it is biased towards the written mode of the language (90%), but has a spoken part as well (10%). The selection criteria devised during the design stage were to ensure that within the written part 75% of the texts were informative, 25% were fiction. As for the types of media, 60% are books, 25% are newspapers and journals, between 5-10% are miscellaneous published materials (leaflets, brochures), between 5-10% are miscellaneous unpublished materials (letters, notes) and up to 5% texts written to be spoken. Texts could not be older than 1975 with an exception of a number of fiction texts which go back to 1964.

The spoken part is divided into a demographic section and a context-governed part. The demographic part consists of transcriptions of recordings made by 124 volunteers, both men and women from 38 different locations in the UK and from various social groups, who recorded their conversations for three days. The context-governed part consists of transcriptions falling into four categories: educational and informative contexts, business events, institutional and public events and leisure events. More detailed information is available on the *BNC* website at <http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk>.

BNC can be accessed through a dedicated concordancer *SARA*. The concordancer allows the researcher to look up the investigated word or phrase. It returns the matches in the form of concordance lines. If the context in the line is not sufficient it is possible to consult the text from which the example was derived through the *Browse* function. The returns can be sorted by left and right context, so that the same phrases preceding or following the node word can be grouped together, which facilitates the interpretation. *SARA* also offers collocability tests: z-score and MI (Mutual Information) statistical tests can be used for a predefined window size, i.e. a selected number of words to the left and right of the node word. an attempt to utilize z-score for the task in hand has been made, but the interpretation of results was as time consuming as interpreting the concordance lines, therefore the method was abandoned.

4. The Pragglez Procedure

The presentation of this procedure is based on the Panel Discussion: “Finding Metaphor in natural discourse: report on applying the Pragglez procedure”, which took place at the 6th Researching and Applying Metaphor (RAAM) Conference in Leeds, April 10-12, 2006. The panellists were: Gerard Steen, Ewa Biernacka, Lettie Dorst, Anna Kaal, Irene López-Rodríguez, and Tryntje Pasma, who participate in two research programmes conducted at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, i.e. “Metaphor in discourse: Linguistic forms, conceptual structures, cognitive representations” and “Conversationalisation of public discourse”.

Pragglez was developed through a cooperation of 10 metaphor researchers:

P eter Crisps, Chinese University Hong Kong, Hong Kong
R ay Gibbs, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz CA, USA
A lan Cienki, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
G raham Low, University of York, York, UK
G erard Steen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
L ynne Cameron, University of Leeds, UK
E lena Semino, Lancaster University, UK
J oe Grady, Cultural Logic LLC, Washington DC, USA
A lice Deignan, University of Leeds, UK
Z oltán Kövecses, Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary.³

They set the goal of developing a reliable procedure for metaphor identification and proposed the following steps:

- 1) Decide about words. The word as the lexical unit examined for metaphorical use.
- 2) Establish the contextual meaning of the examined word.
- 3) Determine the basic meaning of the word on the basis of the dictionary (Most concrete, human oriented as opposed to specific or vague).
- 4) Decide whether the basic meaning of the word is sufficiently distinct from the contextual meaning.

³ The presentation of the researchers and the formulation of the five steps of the procedure given below are a verbatim quote from the handout distributed during the panel.

- 5) Decide whether the contextual meaning of the word can be related to the more basic meaning by some form of similarity.
- 6) If yes, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical.

With regard to point 1, the pool of words has already been established in Section 2. The way in which I employ the remaining instructions is shown in an example below.

The first word on the most frequent list of the 'war' words in my data was the noun *forces*, which, however, was considered a metaphorical use of the word *force*, therefore it is not considered in my analysis as it could blur the possible mappings by originating outside the investigated domain. For the second word, the adjective *military*, 200 random hits from the BNC were examined and considered by the present researcher as non-metaphorical uses of the word. The third most frequent word, *attack*,⁴ turned out to present a panoply of uses and is therefore suitable as the test example for the procedure. Incidentally this word was also discussed at the RAAM 6 panel, but only shortly and on what appears to be an invented example.

I take step 3 first. According to the *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary [CCELD]* (1987) the verb *to attack* has the following senses:

1. To attack someone is to use violence against them in order to hurt them, for example by hitting them or stabbing them.
2. If a group of people such as an army attacks buildings, towns or other armies, they start to use weapons violently against them in order to damage or destroy them.
3. If you attack someone or something such as a belief or an idea you criticise them strongly.
4. If something, such as a chemical, a disease or an insect attacks something, it harms it or spoils it.
5. If you attack something such as a job or a problem, you start to deal with it with energy and enthusiasm.
6. When players attack in a game of football, hockey, etc. they try to score goals.

⁴ The newspaper texts corpus was not tagged for parts of speech, so that the high ranking of the word *attack* is probably due to the collapsing of the verbal and nominal uses of the verb. The BNC investigation was conducted separately for different grammatical categories.

According to the embodiment hypothesis and step 3 of the Pragglejaz procedure, sense 1 is the most concrete, human oriented and specific sense of the word. It is therefore basic. I consider sense 2 as a non-metaphorical specification of sense 1. This meaning network is similar to that of *force/forces* discussed in Section 2. The analysis in Section 5.1. indicates which of the two literal senses is more frequent.⁵ Senses 3-6 are metaphorical, because they involve cross domain mappings. Let us apply these assumptions to data:

- (1) *If any of you attacks your brother from now on, if not ordered to do so by a superior, that attacker will be enslaved and used for chirurgical experiments in our laboratories for as long as he lives.* [CJJ 465]⁶

Here the verb is used in its basic, non-metaphorical sense of a person using physical violence against another with an aim of hurting them.

- (2) *The purpose of field artillery is both to destroy enemy assaults and to support one's own infantry as it attacks.* [CLX 214]

This is sense 2, a non-metaphorical extension of sense 1 in a military context.

- (3) *While they may not realise it, owners can be held liable if their dog attacks someone, or causes an accident or damage, and this policy covers them up to £1 million.* [ARJ 998]

Although no such sense is singled out in the dictionary, it can also be considered as a non-metaphoric extension of sense 1. The use of the word *attacks* here does not require any metaphorical operations, such as, for example, the personification of the dog.

- (4) *Finally, Gassendi attacks the idea that proofs must be syllogistic in form.* [ABM 464]

⁵ I hesitate to call the most frequent sense more salient, as saliency, although most certainly related to frequency is not its direct function.

⁶ Information in square brackets identifies the source text (acronym) and the sequence number of the node word.

In sentence (4) *attacks* is used in its dictionary sense 3 – a thinker disagrees with an idea. In this context it is a metaphorical use.

- (5) *There are problems with the way the sodium attacks the materials of the lamps and the very high temperature that the lamps have to run at.* [B73 783]

In sentence (5) the verb is used in its sense 4, i.e. a chemical damages the material of lamps. It is metaphorical.

- (6) *Because HIV attacks the immune system, such a vaccine may itself cause an AIDS-like syndrome by suppressing the cells of the immune system.* [CJ9 1933]

Here again, sense 4 is used, in the meaning of a disease disrupting the functioning of the immune system influencing it destructively. It is metaphorical.

- (7) *Sanchez-Vicario also, of course is equally tough and she attacks every ball so well.* [A0V 620]

Sentence (7) represents the use of the verb *attacks* in accord with sense 6, i.e. in a sport context. I consider this use metaphorical.

These were relatively clear instances, let us have a look at some less so.

- (8) *In terms of that deterrent, is it not right that when a submarine is cruising anywhere in the world's oceans, any potential aggressor who attacks the United Kingdom will stand the risk of unacceptable and devastating retaliation from us?* [HHV 16344]
- (9) *China attacks Patten 'reforms'* [CFC 1397]

Examples (8) and (9) show that analysing only agents or patients of an action would not be sufficient for determining the contextual meaning and as a result the metaphorical/non-metaphorical status of the use in question. Example (8) shows a military context, while example (9) – political. In (8) then, *attacks* is used non-metaphorically, while (9) is metaphorical. This interpretation is of course possible only if we believe that the use in sense 2, in the war context, is a non-metaphorical specification of sense 1.

The examples above show how the Pragglejazz procedure is understood and employed in this chapter. It is applied to the word forms selected in a corpus-driven process described in Section 2.

5. The analysis of concordance lines: Frequency of literal and metaphorical uses

5.1. ATTACK

These considerations take us back to the verb *attack* used as an example in the discussion on the Pragglejazz procedure. The physical sense was given as number 1 and was considered basic. The status of sense 2 as a non-metaphorical specification or metaphorical extension will be held in abeyance until further evidence is accumulated.

When it comes to the noun *attack*, despite the mention of the disease context in verb sense 4, the nominal use is singled out as a separate sense:

7. An **attack** of an illness is a short period in which you suffer badly from it and cannot control it.

Similarly to the verb, also in the case of noun sense 1 ‘physical violence’ is considered as basic.

A search in the BNC and an analysis of 200 random hits of the particular POS forms rendered the following results:

Table 1. The frequency of uses of different senses of the lemma ATTACK, considering its various morphological forms

Word	Literal	Metaphorical
<i>attack</i> , base form of a lexical verb and the infinitive (200 random hits out of 1457)	65 physical violence 48 military	54 criticise ⁷ 10 disease 7 sport 16 other

⁷ Labels used in this and the following tables are created on the basis of two sources: one is the dictionary definition, often presenting a context sensitive synonym for a given sense; the other is the researchers intuition, naming the synonym of the sense or the context in which the sense appears. Thus senses of the verb query can either be given in the form of a

Word	Literal	Metaphorical
<i>attacks</i> , present sg. 3 rd person (183 hits)	42 physical violence 5 military	35 criticise 30 disease 71 other
<i>attacked</i> , past tense and past participle (200 random hits out of 2581)	65 physical violence 38 military	45 criticise 7 politics 4 disease 3 eat 38 other
<i>attacking</i> , participle, (200 random hits out of 763)	54 physical violence 36 military	72 criticise 8 work intensively 6 sport 24 other
verb total (783 random hits out of 4984)	226 physical violence 127 military	206 criticise 44 disease 13 sport 167 other
<i>attacking</i> , adjective, (175 hits)	29 military 23 physical violence	114 sport 3 criticism 6 other
<i>attack</i> , singular noun, (200 random hits out of 6028)	38 physical violence 49 military	52 criticism 32 disease 15 sport 13 other [1 proper name]
<i>attacks</i> , plural noun (200 random hits out of 2648)	54 physical violence 63 military	42 criticism 28 disease 8 sport 5 other
noun total (400 out of 8676)	92 physical violence 112 military	94 criticism 60 disease 23 sport 18 other 1 proper name

In the case of the noun, the military sense prevails over the ‘physical violence’ sense. The metaphorical sense of ‘criticise’ and the ‘physical violence’ sense have similar frequency.

synonymous verb or indicated by the noun describing the context of use. The choice between the synonym and context label is based on space economy.

The adjectival *-ing* form is most often used in the sport context (*attacking play, attacking or defensive attitude, attacking batsman*).⁸ In the case of all the other word forms the most frequent use is that in the ‘physical violence’ sense. This sense is also the most basic one in terms of the Pragglejaz and embodiment requirements. As the ‘physical violence’ sense is indicative of the HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT domain, the question arises whether the uses of the verb *attack*, say in the meaning of ‘criticise’, should be considered as exemplifications of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor or perhaps a more concrete ARGUMENT IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT metaphor. Of course, to posit a new conceptual metaphor one needs a more complex lexical representation than just one verb use.

Szwedek (2006 p.c.) suggested that WAR, being the most salient example of the CONFLICT domain is probably the prototypical source for metaphoric understanding of other concepts within this domain, thus justifying the original Lakoffian formulation of the metaphor. Another factor coming into play here is the fact that in the case of the total sum of nominal uses the military sense predominates. At the same time the frequency of the nouns is higher than that of the verbs. Possibly then, the basic meaning for the lemma is the military sense (the total frequency does not show this as, 5 verb forms, and only two nominal forms were investigated, so that the balance is twisted towards the verb). The uncertainty concerning the role of the verb *attack* as the indicator of a war metaphor will be cast over a broader background after the analysis of the remaining verb – noun pairs.

5.2. BOMB

Now we turn to the next cluster of morphologically related words, i.e. *bomb* (N and V), *bombing* (N and V), *bombard*, *bombardment*. The CCELD gives the following senses for the noun *bomb*:

1. A **bomb** is a weapon which explodes and damages or destroys a large area. Some types of bombs are left in the place where they are intended to explode, and other types are dropped from an aircraft.
2. People talk about **the bomb** to refer to the atom bomb when considering the possession of nuclear weapons as a political issue.

⁸ *Attacking* as an adjective does not appear either in the CCELD or in the MEDAL, so its dictionary sense could not be used for reference.

Senses 4,5,6 concern the use of the noun **bomb** in various idiomatic expressions:

4. If something costs a **bomb**, it costs a great deal of money.
5. If a car, bike, etc. **goes like a bomb**, it goes very fast indeed.
6. If an event **goes like a bomb** or **goes down a bomb**, it is extremely successful.

Senses 3 and 7 of this entry refer to a verb and are shown below:

3. If people **bomb** a place, they attack it by dropping bombs on it from an aircraft.
7. If you **bomb** along, you move very quickly, usually in a vehicle.

According to the *CCELD* the basic sense of both the noun and verb *bomb* is its military sense. Senses 5, 7 are considered metaphorical extensions of the basic sense along the dimension ‘speed’. When it comes to senses 4 and 6, I cannot see any link between this sense and the basic sense. I intended to single it out in column 3 in the results table as a separate sense, but it did not appear in the analysed sample of 200 words.

When it comes to the noun *bombing*, it is added to sense 3 of the *bomb* entry, but does not have a separate definition. The *MEDAL* offers a separate definition:

an attack or attacks made using bombs.

It, clearly, has only one, military sense, so if it occurs in any non-military contexts, these occurrences can be considered metaphorical extensions.

The verb *bombard* is defined by the *CCELD* in the following way:

1. If people **bombard** a building or area of land, they attack it with continuous heavy gunfire or bombs.
2. If one thing **bombards** another it attacks this thing continuously and with a lot of force, for example by hitting it with something.
3. If you **bombard** someone with questions, criticism, etc, you keep asking them aggressive questions or saying aggressive things to them.

The noun *bombardment* is defined in a similar way in the *CCELD* with the number 1 sense awarded to the military meaning, and number 2 to the ‘speaking’ meaning. The military sense is the basic sense here and the ‘speaking’ sense is its metaphoric extension.

Let's see the results of the identification of literal and metaphorical senses in the table below.

Table 2. The frequency of uses of different senses of the lemma BOMB considering its various morphological forms

Word	Literal	Other	Metaphorical
<i>bomb</i> , base form of a lexical verb and the infinitive (117 hits) ⁹	108 military	5 ambiguous	2 fail 1 move fast 1 hit guitar strings
<i>bombed</i> , past tense and past participle (200 random hits out of 211)	181 military	1 metonymy 3 ambiguous	7 fail 4 sport 2 move fast 2 be drunk
<i>bombing</i> , participle (91 hits)	81 military	0	8 move fast 1 move noisily 1 act fast (solving maths)
<i>bomb</i>, verb total (408 out of 419)	370 military	8 ambiguous 1 metonymy	11 move fast 9 fail 4 sport 2 be drunk 1 move noisily 1 act fast 1 hit guitar strings
<i>bomb</i> , singular noun (random 200 out of 1877)	191 military	1 song name 2 ambiguous	1 unexpected news 1 rapid increase (population bomb) 1 naughty children 1 went down a bomb 1 it cost them a bomb 1 two to the bomb
<i>bombs</i> , plural noun (random 200 out of 1104)	192 military	0	4 volcanic bombs 2 chords in guitar music 1 ideas 1 people in a relationship

⁹ The number of the hits differs from that of the POS query result, because the grammatical category was tagged wrongly 11 times. Nouns were tagged as verbs.

Word	Literal	Other	Metaphorical
<i>bomb/s</i>, noun total (random 400 out of 2981)	383 military	1 song 2 ambiguous	4 volcanic bombs 2 chords in guitar music 1 rapid increase 1 unexpected news 1 naughty children 1 went down a bomb 1 cost a bomb 1 two to the bomb 1 idea 1 people in a relationship
<i>bombing</i> , singular noun (random 200 hits out of 746)	200 military	0	0
<i>bombings</i> , plural noun (195 hits)	195 military	0	0
<i>bombing/s</i>, noun total (395 random hits out of 941)	395 military	0	0
<i>bombarded</i> , past tense and past participle (165 hits)	33 military 4 physical attack	0	105 abstract (<i>questions, ideas</i>) 13 physical particles (<i>neutrons, rays</i>) 7 natural forces (<i>hail, snow</i>) 3 sport
<i>bombardment</i> , noun (200 random hits out of 278)	151	2 ambiguous	22 natural forces (18 from the same source) 14 physical particles 7 abstract 3 sport 1 sensory stimulation

The lemma BOMB, because of its morphologically related nominal and verbal synonyms, is particularly interesting for lexical analyses. As for the noun *bomb*, in both the singular and the plural it was predominantly used literally, but had a small number of metaphorical extensions. Similarly to this noun the verb *bomb* had a small number of metaphorical extensions. All of the attested examples of the plural noun form *bombings*

and a sample of a random 200 examples out of 746 of the singular form *bombing* were used in the literal military sense. There were no metaphorical extensions found. When it comes to the noun *bombardment* as many as 25% of the uses were metaphorical, while the verb *bombard* (only the past tense and past participle forms were attested in a significant number) was predominantly used metaphorically. These results, similarly to those obtained for the nouns *battlefield* and *battleground* presented in Fabiszak – Kaszubski (2005), show that such closely related synonyms appear in complementary distribution, so that one form is more likely to be used metaphorically, while the other literally.

5.3. CONFLICT

Another lexeme to investigate is that of *conflict*. The *CCELD* first defines its nominal senses:

1. **Conflict** is 1.1 serious disagreement and argument about something important. 1.2. A state of mind in which you find it impossible to make a decision or choice.
5. A **conflict** is 5.1 a serious difference between two or more beliefs, ideas or interests, which cannot be reconciled. 5.2 fighting between two or more countries or groups of people.

Senses 2,3,4 and 6 explain the use of the word in specific prepositional phrases. There is only one verbal sense:

7. If two or more ideas, interests, accounts etc. **conflict**, they are very different and it seems impossible for each of them to be true.

The dictionary also gives the adjective *conflicting*, following the verb sense 7, but does not define it, and only provides two examples, neither of them military. According to the definitions, only the countable noun has a military sense. An analysis of a sample of 100 random hits out of 329 of the verb *conflict*, showed 24 singular nouns erroneously tagged verbs and 76 uses of the verb, all in the general sense given above. For the adjective *conflicting* 200 random hits out of 881 were analysed. 6 of them were verbs tagged as adjectives, 193 were used in the general sense and 1 was

used in the military sense. The results of the analysis for the noun *conflict*, which is the only one belonging to the domain of WAR, are given below:

Table 3. The frequency of uses of different senses of the noun conflict

Word	Literal	Metaphorical
<i>conflict</i> , singular noun (200 random hits out of 5058)	54 military 1 physical violence	145 general
<i>conflicts</i> , plural noun (200 random hits out of 1427)	35 military	164 general 1 disease
noun total (400 random hits out of 6485)	89 military 1 physical violence	309 general 1 disease

The analyses presented in the paragraph above indicate that the verbal and the adjectival uses should not be considered as metaphorical extensions of the military sense, simply because they do not have such a sense. When it comes to the noun, indeed the military sense is the most concrete of those attested in any significant number (i.e. ignoring the single physical violence use). Thus this military use may suggest that when the noun is used in any of its other senses it can be considered a lexical realisation of the conceptual metaphor X IS WAR.

5.4. DEFEND

Next, we shall have a closer look at the lemma DEFEND. According to the *CCELD* the verb *defend* has the following senses:

1. If you **defend** someone or something 1.1 you take some action in order to protect them against danger or violence. 1.2 you do or say something that is intended to help them to survive or continue, for example when their rights or existence is threatened.
2. If you **defend** a person or their ideas or actions, you argue in support of them when they have been criticised.
3. If people **defend** a place or a country they protect it against attack by using military force.
4. If someone, especially a lawyer **defends** someone accused of something they argue in a court of law that the charges are not true.

5. If a champion **defends** his or her title or championship, he or she plays a match or a game against someone who will become a new champion if they win.

Here senses 1.1 and 1.2 are formulated in very general terms such as *some action, something*. It is thus difficult to say if this is the most concrete human oriented sense of the word. Unlike the definition of the verb *attack* it does not include reference to the use of physical force. The *MEDAL* organizes the senses differently with the military sense coming to the fore in the example, as shown in the formulation of the first sense and the example chosen to illustrate it:

1. to protect someone or something from attack: *Thousands of young men came forward, willing to defend their country.*

The vagueness of the *CCELD* definition of the first sense may be an indication that it is sense 3 which is the most basic. I therefore also consider it as the most basic. This hypothesis is tested by the frequency counts in the analysis. Senses 2, 4 and 5 are regarded as metaphorical extensions of sense 3.

The noun *defence* has 5 senses in the *CCELD*:

1. **Defence** is 1.1 action which is taken in order to protect someone or something against attack. 1.2. the system and organization of a country's armies and weapons.
2. A **defence** is 2.1 a quality or possession that someone or something has and that they can use to protect themselves. 2.2 A way of behaving or thinking which protects you emotionally and stops you showing weakness. 2.3 something that you say or write which supports ideas or actions that have been criticised or questioned. 2.4 a process in a court of law of denying a charge which has been made against someone.
3. The **defence** is the case that is presented by a lawyer for the person in a trial who has been accused of a crime; also used sometimes to refer to this person and his or her lawyers.
4. The **defences** of a country or region are all its armed forces and weapons.
5. The **defence** in a football team, a hockey team, etc. is the group of players who try to stop the opposing players scoring a goal or a point.

The word *action* used in the explanation of sense 1 is so general and vague that it is difficult to say to what extent this sense can be considered as 'most concrete, human oriented'. In this case, however, the example cho-

sen to illustrate it may cast some light on the issue: *They carried sticks for defence rather than aggression...* It does imply physical aggression and so introduces a certain parallel to the definition of the word *attack*.

The adjective *defensive* has its military sense as number 1:

1. You use **defensive** 1.1 to describe things that are designed for or capable of defending a country or area by military force. 1.2 to describe things that are intended to protect someone or something
3. Someone who is **defensive** acts in a way that is intended to hide their weakness.

Sense 2, not quoted above, refers to the phrase *on the defensive*, which will not be considered here. I regard sense 1.1 as the basic one, while sense 1.2 as its generalisation. Sense 3, although more human oriented than 1.1 concerns an inner psychological state difficult to observe and therefore less concrete than 1.1.

The results of the analysis of the literal and metaphorical uses of these three parts of speech derived from the stem *defen** (showing their frequencies) are presented in the table below.

Table 4. The frequency of uses of different senses of the lemma DEFEND considering its various morphological forms

Word	Literal	Other	Metaphorical
<i>defend</i> , base form of a lexical verb and the infinitive (200 random hits out of 2021)	31 military 18 physical violence	43 general	53 speaking 25 sport 10 legal 20 other
<i>defended</i> , past tense and past participle (200 random hits out of 977)	43 military 7 physical	4 general	97 speaking 19 legal 18 sport 12 other
<i>defending</i> , participle, (200 random hits out of 640)	23 military 11 physical	3 general	87 speaking 23 legal 18 politics 14 sport 21 other
verb total (600 random hits out of 3638)	97 military 36 physical	50 general	237 speaking 57 sport 52 legal 18 politics 53 other

Word	Literal	Other	Metaphorical
<i>defensive</i> , adjective, (200 random hits out of 1240)	54 military 14 physical	60 general	30 sport 13 speaking 10 business 9 emotional 5 political 5 other
<i>defence</i> , singular noun and proper noun, (200 random hits out of 11477)	57 military 3 physical	57 proper noun	32 legal 17 sport 16 speaking 14 other 4 ambiguous
<i>defences</i> , noun (200 random hits out of 1098)	70 military 1 physical		32 legal 21 disease 14 against sea 14 emotion 13 sport 10 speaking 10 business 15 other
noun total (400 random hits out of 12575)	127 military 4 physical	57 proper noun	64 legal 30 sport 26 speaking 21 disease 14 against sea 14 emotion 10 business 29 other 4 ambiguous

In this table, the third column shows those uses of the verb where on the bases of the limited sentential context, even if extended to a wide co-text view, it was impossible to determine the nature of the protective action taken, be it physical or verbal. This seems to be corroborated by the dictionary definition, as here the wording is also general. In the case of the nominal uses, column 3 was used to single out the proper names involving the word *Defence* (*Minister/stry of Defence*, *Defence Secretary*). For the verb *defend* the most frequently used sense is that of speaking to protect someone or something from criticism. Here, as in the case of *attack*, the noun is most frequently used in the military sense. At the same time, the verb is used twice as often in the speaking sense than in the military sense. Can this be taken as an indication that the use of the noun in its

speaking sense will have a more metaphorical ring to it than the verb? Will the verb have a weaker power of activating other potential metaphoric mappings from the same domain?

5.5. FIGHT

The next item to be analysed is *fight* in its various grammatical forms. The *CCELD* defines verbal senses thus:

1. If you **fight** something, you try in a determined way to prevent it or stop it happening
2. If you **fight** for something you try in a determined way to get it or achieve it.
3. If you **fight**, 3.1 you take part in a battle or war. 3.2 you try to hurt someone, for example by hitting them with your fists, while they try to hurt you in a similar way. 3.3 you take part in a boxing match. 3.4 you quarrel with another person.
4. If you **fight** someone for something, for example for an important job, you compete with them for it.
5. If you **fight** an election in a particular place you are a candidate in an election and you try win it.
9. When you fight an emotion or desire, you try very hard not to feel it, show it, or act on it.

Senses 6, 7, 8 and 10, 11, 12, 13 explain the meaning of specific verb phrases (e.g. *to fight for breath*) or noun phrases (*fighting chance*, *fighting fit*). When it comes to the nominal derivatives they do not have separate subentries, but follow the verbal senses. Senses 1, 2, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 4 introduce nominal examples with the phrase *used as a noun*. Sense 3.1. develops this phrase into a sense description: *used as a noun, especially to refer to a battle to get control over a particular place*. It also introduces a derivative uncountable noun *fighting*, with an example, but no definition, indicating that it is very similar in meaning to the preceding verb sense. Sense 7 introduces an uncountable noun *fight* – *the desire or ability to keep fighting*. Among these senses, sense 3.2 seems to me to be the most concrete one. The military sense 3.1 can either be considered as a literal extension of sense 3.2 or, more in line with the metaphor WAR IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT, as a metaphorical extension of sense 3.2. If we reject the first of these two conflicting premises, then

lexical realisations like (10) should not be considered as representing the POLITICS IS WAR conceptual metaphor, but POLITICS IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT.¹⁰

- (10) *People can see how across there Israeli politicians fight each other in parliament, and in Greece they bring to account a corrupt prime minister.* [A57 352]

Naturally, within blending theory we could possibly claim that the end product of the WAR IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT blending process became the input for another blending process resulting in POLITICS IS WAR, but it seems a bit stretched and against Ockham's Razor Principle. An analysis of the frequencies of the 'physical violence' and the military sense may cast some light on this dilemma. The results of the analysis of the lexeme *fight* are given in Table 5. The metaphorical uses are divided into target domains often reported to be described in terms of war. The uses, whose context does not point to any such specific domain, are dubbed 'general'.

Table 5. The frequency of uses of different senses of the lemma FIGHT considering its various morphological forms

Word	Literal	Other	Metaphorical
<i>fight</i> , base form of a lexical verb and the infinitive (200 random hits out of 3534)	36 physical violence 31 military	9 ambiguous 5 <i>fight shy of sth.</i>	81 general 15 sport 11 politics 6 business 5 disease 1 chemistry
<i>fight</i> s, 3rd person singular (138 hits)	39 physical violence 4 military	12 nouns tagged as verbs 2 <i>fight</i> s shy 3 unclear	52 general 11 disease 7 business 7 politics 1 argument

¹⁰ Here POLITICS as the target domain is used as an example. The doubts raised at this point would also obtain for any other target domain, be it ARGUMENT, GAME, BUSINESS, DISEASE, etc.

Word	Literal	Other	Metaphorical
<i>fighting</i> , participle (200 random hits out of 2368)	55 military 34 physical violence	2 ambiguous	88 general 7 sport 6 politics 4 disease 2 law 1 fire 1 business
<i>fought</i> , past tense and past participle (200 hits out of 2865)	76 military 28 physical violence	2 ambiguous	59 general 15 politics 13 sport 4 disease 3 fire
verb total (738 random hits out of 8905)	166 military 137 physical violence	13 ambiguous 7 <i>fight shy of</i> 12 nouns 3 unclear	280 general 39 politics 35 sport 24 disease 14 business 4 fire 2 law 1 argument 1 chemistry
<i>fight</i> , singular noun (200 random hits out of 2293)	104 physical violence 10 military	4 ambiguous	45 general 11 argument 8 sport 7 politics 6 disease 4 emotions 1 chemical
<i>fight</i> s, plural noun (200 random hits out of 356)	175 physical violence 2 military	2 misspelt <i>flights</i> 2 verbs, erroneously tagged as nouns	12 argument 3 general 2 politics 1 sport 1 disease
<i>fight</i>/s, noun total (400 random hits out of 2649)	279 physical violence 12 military	4 ambiguous 2 misspelt 2 verbs	48 general 23 argument 9 sport 9 politics 7 disease 4 emotions 1 chemical
<i>fighting</i> , noun (200 random hits out of 1583)	128 military 53 physical violence	1 <i>fighting chance</i>	12 general 5 sport 1 fire

As can be seen in Table 5, in the analysed samples the metaphorical uses of the verb *fight* prevail over the literal uses. As far as the literal senses are concerned, the infinitive, the base form and in particular the third person singular when used in their literal meaning are most often employed in the physical violence sense. Apparently, the past tense and past participle are more common in military contexts than the present tense, as these forms, when used literally, are most often used in their military sense. The joint results for all the verb forms analysed show the predominance of the metaphorical uses; when it comes to the literal uses, the military sense prevails over the physical violence sense. It may support the claim that the use of the verb *fight* in its metaphorical senses can be an indication of the metaphor X IS WAR.

The situation with the noun *fight* differs considerably from that of the verb. The physical violence sense is clearly most frequently used. The metaphorical uses here amount to about 25% of the analysed examples. The military use is rare. Thus, unlike in the case of the verb, the claim for the basicness of the most human oriented sense and the frequency of this sense reinforce each other. As a result, the metaphoric uses of the noun *fight* could be considered as representing the conceptual metaphor X IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT rather than X IS WAR.

It is interesting to note that another nominal derivative: *fighting*, behaves in an entirely different way than the noun *fight*. In this case it is the military sense that dominates. Therefore when used metaphorically, the noun *fighting* to an even greater extent than the verb *fight*, and unlike the noun *fight*, can be considered an indication of the underlying metaphor X IS WAR.

5.6. INVADE

Another group of morphologically related words to be considered is that of the *invade* family. The verbal senses in the *CCELD* are described thus:

1. To **invade** a country means to enter it by force with an army.
2. If people, animals or insects **invade** a place or a building, they enter it in large numbers; sometimes used humorously.
3. If someone or something **invades** your privacy, they disturb you when you are peaceful or when you want to be alone.

In this entry the first, military sense is the basic sense. Senses 2 and 3 are the metaphorical extensions of sense 1.

The noun *invader* is defined as:

1. **Invaders** are soldiers who are invading a country.
2. An **invader** is a country or army that has invaded or is about to invade another country.

Here sense 1 is the basic one, more in accord with the human scale. Sense 2 extends the meaning to abstract entities like countries and can be therefore considered metaphorical.

Invasion has the following definition:

1. An **invasion** is the action of an army entering a country by force.
2. An **invasion** is also 2.1 the arrival of someone or something in a place where they are not wanted. 2.2. the arrival in a place of large numbers of people or things; often used humorously.

Sense 1 will be here considered as basic. Senses 2.1 and 2.2 are its metaphorical extensions.

Table 6. The frequency of uses of different senses of the lemma INVADE considering its various morphological forms

Word	Literal	Metaphorical
<i>invade</i> , base form of a lexical verb and the infinitive (200 random hits out of 251)	100 military	25 about abstract entities (<i>thoughts</i>) 25 come in big numbers 24 about pest, weeds etc 14 privacy, personal space 10 about natural forces (<i>sea</i>) 1 sport 1 species
<i>invaded</i> , past tense and past participle (200 random hits out of 266)	121 military 7 physical violence	24 about abstract entities 21 come 8 privacy 7 natural forces 3 business 3 about sexual intercourse 3 animals 3 disease

Word	Literal	Metaphorical
verb total (400 random hits out of 516)	221 military 7 physical violence	49 about abstract entities 46 come 24 about pest 22 privacy 17 natural forces 3 business 3 sexual intercourse 3 animals 3 disease 1 sport 1 species
<i>invasion</i> , noun (200 random hits out of 1904)	165 military 2 physical violence	9 arrival 8 disease 5 of privacy 3 sport 3 about pest etc 2 natural forces 1 about abstract entities 1 species 1 sexual intercourse
<i>invasions</i> , noun (141 hits)	104 military 2 physical violence	20 arrival 6 natural forces 2 business 2 disease 1 species 1 about abstract entities 1 of privacy 2 ambiguous
<i>invasion/s</i>, noun total (341 hits out of 2045)	269 military 4 physical violence	29 arrival 10 disease 6 of privacy 3 sport 3 about pest 8 natural forces 2 business 2 abstract entities 2 species 1 sexual intercourse 2 ambiguous

Word	Literal	Metaphorical
<i>invaders</i> , plural noun (200 random hits out of 251)	170 military	13 unarmed group of people 6 pest 4 band/team name 2 species 1 new and popular things 1 abstract entities 1 personal space 1 sexual violators 1 virus

In the case of the verb *invade*, and the nouns *invasion* and *invaders*, the basic sense is at the same time the most frequent. It is the military sense. When used metaphorically they refer to large groups of people, animals, or plants deemed threatening but even slightly more often to abstract entities, such as feelings or thoughts, appearing in the mind of an experiencer. In all these cases, I believe, the words in question can be regarded as indicative of the X IS WAR metaphor.

5.7. SURRENDER

The last set of words to be investigated in this section is the verb and the noun *surrender*. According to the *CCELD*, the verb *surrender* has the following senses:

1. If you **surrender**, you stop fighting or resisting someone and agree that you have been beaten, often by formally signing a document.
2. If you **surrender** to a force, temptation, feeling, etc you are unable to resist it any longer and so you allow it to gain control of you or influence you.
3. If you **surrender** something to someone, you give away something that is valuable or important to you.
4. If you **surrender** a ticket, passport, or some other document, you give it to someone in authority when you are told to do so.

Senses 1, 2 and 3 also have their nominal equivalents, introduced by *used as a noun* phrase. The analysis of the senses suggests that sense 1 is the basic one, while sense 2 is its extension. It seems that senses 3 and 4 are not related to sense 1 in a synchronically transparent way. Etymologically, the word comes from the Old French *surrender* ‘give up, deliver’

and was borrowed with this sense as well as the military sense, which must have been a meaning extension from the then basic ‘give’ (*OED*). Historically, then, sense 3 could be considered basic, with 4 being its specification, and 1 and 2 extensions. At present, though, the first interpretation seems most consistent, i.e. sense 1 being the basic one, sense 2 its metaphorical extension, senses 3 and 4 related to each other but with the relation to senses 1 and 2 weak or altogether non-existent.

The results of the analysis of the BNC examples are presented in Table 7 below.

Table 7. The frequency of uses of different senses of *surrender* considering its various morphological forms

Word	Literal	Metaphorical
<i>surrender</i> , base form of a lexical verb and the infinitive (200 random hits out of 511)	80 military sense 22 give away	65 to abstract entities (<i>will, power</i>) 18 unarmed groups of people 5 sport 5 sexual 2 disease 1 natural forces 2 unclear
<i>surrendered</i> , past tense and past participle (random 200 hits out of 400)	92 military 14 one person to another 21 give away 5 adjectives tagged as verbs, all in the military sense	50 abstract 9 sport 4 sexual 3 psychological 1 natural forces 1 disease
verb total (400 random hits out of 911)	172 military 43 give away 14 one person to another 5 adjectives tagged as verbs	115 abstract entities 18 unarmed groups of people 14 sport 9 sexual 3 psychological 3 disease 2 natural forces 2 unclear
<i>surrender</i> , noun (200 random hits out of 461)	122 military 11 give	58 abstract 7 sexual 2 about armed criminal groups

The analysis of the examples from the BNC shows that the most frequent sense is the military one. Therefore, both the verb and the noun *surrender* can be considered as indicative of the X IS WAR metaphor.

6. Summary of the results and conclusion

An analysis of various literal and metaphorical senses of the words identified as common in the war reports and thus considered as constituting the lexical field of war has shown that the military sense has not always been the most frequent literal sense of the word. For example, in the case of the verb *attack* and the noun *fight* the 'physical violence' sense dominated. On the other hand, a related noun *fighting* has been mostly used in its military sense. It is therefore relatively safe to claim that while the noun *fight* seems to be more indicative of the X IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT metaphor, the noun *fighting* is more likely to be a manifestation of the X IS WAR metaphor.

As for the verb *defend*, what seemed to be a metaphorical sense of 'speaking' turned out to be most common. The question arises at this point whether, in accord with the embodiment claim, 'speaking' is not more basic, concrete, bodily based than 'defending' in the military sense? Can this basicness be overruled on the basis of etymology? And how far in word history would we need to go?¹¹ Whatever the answer to this question may be, sheer frequency may suggest that even if in some cases the use of the verb *defend*, in its 'speaking' sense, may activate the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, in many cases the metaphor will remain dormant.

When it comes to synonyms and morphologically related words, they seem to select different meaning foci as if to utilize their formal differentiation. That was the case with the verbs *bomb* and *bombard*, where *bomb* was predominantly used in its military sense, while *bombard* in the metaphorical sense. This tendency is also reflected, though to a lesser extent, in the use of their nominal derivatives. *Bombing* in the analysed sample was used only in the military sense, while *bombardment* had a small number of metaphorical uses. The case of the nouns *fight* and *fighting* has been presented above.

¹¹ According to the *OED* it is a borrowing from Old French into Middle English with the first sense 'ward off, protect'. The 'speaking' sense is listed as number 5, but it also appeared already in Middle English.

The noun *conflict* has predominantly general sense uses. The military sense can be considered as a narrowing of the general sense. There seems to be no ground for interpreting it as a metaphorical extension of the military sense. It is therefore not a manifestation of the X IS WAR metaphor.

From among the investigated words, four groups can be distinguished. The first one consists of the words with a strong (understood as most frequent) military sense or the military sense as the only literal sense and with a strong metaphorical potential. They are *bombard* (V), *fighting* (N), *invade* (V), *invasion* (N), *invaders* (N), and *surrender* (V, N). Group two is constituted by the words in which the ‘physical violence’ and the military sense compete with each other and it is difficult to claim with any degree of certainty whether they are an indication of the X IS WAR or the X IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT metaphors. They are *attack* (N) and *fight* (V). The third and fourth group should not be taken as an indication of the X IS WAR metaphor. The third group includes *attack* (V), *conflict* (N) and *fight* (N). *Attack* (V) and *fight* (N), on the basis of the frequency of their ‘physical violence’ sense can be considered as expressions of the X IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT. *Conflict* (N), from the fourth, one-element group, is so general that when it is used about ARGUMENT, SPORT, WAR etc it can be considered as a statement of inclusion; a generalisation, often perhaps euphemistic, rather than a metaphorization. These results are summarised in Table 8 below.

Table 8. Summary of the results

Group I: good indicators of WAR as source of conceptual meta- phor	Group II: ambiguous be- tween WAR and HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT as source	Group III: good indicators of HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT as source	Group IV: general hyponym for the interaction of competing forces
<i>bombard</i> (V) <i>fighting</i> (N) <i>invade</i> (V) <i>invasion</i> (N) <i>invaders</i> (N) <i>surrender</i> (V, N)	<i>attack</i> (N) <i>fight</i> (V)	<i>attack</i> (V) <i>fight</i> (N)	<i>conflict</i> (N)

Concluding, the high frequency of senses other than military, in the case of the investigated words – the ‘physical violence’ sense – should be

taken as an indication that these words may not be a lexical realization of the underlying conceptual metaphor X IS WAR. Instead, they may be a manifestation of the X IS HAND-TO HAND COMBAT conceptual metaphor. This does not necessarily mean that if the military sense predominates, then its metaphoric extension will be evidence of the X IS WAR metaphor. For example, in sentence (11) below, the word *bomb* does not seem to evoke the X IS WAR conceptual metaphor:

- (11) *So has a summer of bombing round country lanes and setting psychics loose in the circles helped him figure out whether whirlwinds, UFOs or tabloid journalists are responsible?* [ACP 2088]

In this example the verb *bomb* clearly has little to do with seeing a trip in the country as war. The effect of the metaphor seems to be limited to highlighting the fast, frantic movement.

As has been indicated in the introduction to the present chapter, many scholars working in the cognitive discourse analysis noted the problem of identification of source domains for metaphors. Investigation of naturally occurring discourse is not as clear as introspection, as there is only as much context as the text producer gave and it cannot always fulfil the requirements of linguistic analysis and interpretation. In this chapter an attempt has been made to show that a corpus-based analysis of the words considered the indicators of a specific domain may show which non-metaphoric senses of the word are most frequent and that this knowledge may influence the indicator status of these words. That is, if one of the basic senses of a word is far more frequent than the other, it is more likely to be activated in every use and in metaphor formation and interpretation.

Conclusion

This book is a study in cognitive discourse analysis. The Conceptual-Metaphor-Theory-informed examination of Polish and British war reports has shown that despite the fact that a number of different conflicts were investigated, in all of them similar discourse patterns could be identified. The most significant one, around which much of the propagandist construal of a particular war was built, was the vilification of the enemy. No matter whether Poland and Britain were conflict participants, allies of the parties in conflict or more distant observers, one party of the conflict was identified as ‘the enemy’ and was consequently denigrated. The sheer juxtaposition with ‘us’ was often enough to ameliorate the picture of the self and to strengthen the national unity in times of crisis.

The summary results of the enemy vilification analyses are repeated in the Table 9. on the next page, which shows that the most popular rhetorical strategy used about the enemies was the attribution of the negatively emotionally loaded values (e.g. *colonialism, imperialism, deception, arrogance, irrationality, insanity, barbarism, emotonality, criminality*). Another strategy was to employ conceptual metaphors linking the enemy with the negatively construed categories, as in THE ENEMY IS THE NAZI, THE ENEMY IS A (HUNTED) ANIMAL, THE ENEMY IS A (SPURNED) ANIMAL, THE ENEMY IS A PIRATE. It seems that the ritual verbal abuse of the enemy is a part of the cultural construal of war. And it is this element of the concept of ‘war’ which is the most frequent target of conceptual metaphors.

These results place Sandikcioglu’s (2000, see Chapter Three, Section 7) identification of the Orientalist framework used to denigrate the Iraqis in the American media in 1991-1992 in a broader perspective. That is, the enemy vilification strategies identified in the present work are similar to those posited by Sandikcioglu. This similarity thus seems to suggest that these verbal vilification rituals are a regular pattern in any war propaganda and are not specific to any particular war or any particular enemy. There are, of course, some minor differences. For example, it would be hard to attribute colonialism to the Afghans in the 1988-1989 reports. However, the majority of the rhetorical patterns, especially their conceptual metaphorical motivation, remain the same.

Table 9. Enemy vilification framework: The depiction of the enemy

<p><i>Trybuna Ludu</i> 1982</p>	<p><i>The Times</i> 1982</p>	<p><i>Trybuna Ludu</i> 1986</p>	<p><i>The Times</i> 1986</p>	<p><i>The Times</i> 1988-1989</p>	<p><i>Trybuna</i> and <i>The Times</i> 2001</p>	<p>the American media (Sandkcioglu 2000)</p>
<p>about the British: negative values: colonialism, imperialism, hegemony, deception, irrationality, brutality</p>	<p>about the Argentinians: negative values: emotionalism, unpredictability, deception, xenophobia dichotomy: neo-colonial regime vs. right to self determination GENERAL GALTIERIS A FASCIST DICTATOR ARGENTINEAN ACTIONS ARE PIRATE ACTIONS</p>	<p>about the Americans: negative values: irrationality, arrogance (Hubris terms), deception, brutality, imperialism, neo-colonialism, state terrorism, cynicism, immorality THE USA IS A JUDGE AND A POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD, THE WESTERNER IS A TEACHER, THE USA IS A JUDGE AND A POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD, THE USA IS THE WORLD SHERIFF, ENEMY IS AN ANIMAL: rabid dog, AMERICANS ARE NAZI, AMERICAN ACTIONS ARE PIRATE/ GANGSTER/ BARBARIC ACTIONS</p>	<p>about the Libyans: ENEMY IS AN ANIMAL: mad dog, poisonous snake</p>	<p>about the Soviets: negative values: emotionality, deception, barbarism THE WESTERNER IS A TEACHER / THE SOVIETS ARE THE STUDENTS, ENEMY IS AN ANIMAL: a dog with a tail between its legs</p>	<p>about the Taliban: negative values: criminality, brutality, insanity ENEMY IS A (HUNTED) ANIMAL</p>	<p>about Iraqis: The Orientalist framework: THE ORIENTAL IS A STUDENT / THE WESTERNER IS A TEACHER; dichotomous series of attributed values: the Orient – the West barbarism – civilization weakness – power immaturity – maturity emotionality – rationality instability – stability HUSSEIN IS HITLER (+ LEADER FOR THE NATION/STATE metonymy)</p>

Another interesting process discovered in the war reports was the framing of the Glory of War Myth. In its original form the Myth conceptualises the war as a time of heroic deeds, the ultimate test of human virtue. It finds its cultural expression in the army parades, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the rituals of mourning for the soldiers who died on the field of battle. After the Great War and the criticism of the Myth in literature (e.g. some of the Trench Poets, see Chapter Three, Section 5) it became discredited. In this way, two competing representations of war were created: the original Myth and the discredited Myth. These two rival representations were used for different framings of the war reports depending on the perspective of the reporter. The in-group perspective encouraged occasional references to the original Myth, especially in the British reporting of the British losses in the Falklands War. The out-group perspective, on the other hand, referred to the discredited Myth, for instance in the Polish reporting of the setting off of the British Navy for the Falklands and in the British reporting of the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan. In these cases the *WAR IS A THEATRE* conceptual metaphor framed the appeals to the national symbols of the other as pompous. The shared historical experience or its lack determined the perspective of the Glory of War Myth, the perspective selected within a metaphorically construed scenario (see Musolff 2004 in Chapter One, Section 2.7).

The Glory of War Myth has been motivated also by the *STATE IS A PERSON* conceptual metaphor. Through this metaphor characteristics of people could be attributed to states. For example, the metaphorical mapping: *State Has a Face* framed military defeat in terms of a humiliating loss of face. This observation has certain theoretical implications. That is, we cannot claim that the Target Domain of *STATE* has a structural element onto which the ‘face’ from the Source Domain of *PERSON* could be projected. A similar effect has also been noted by Barnden (2007, see footnote 60). Thus, we could claim that the element of ‘face’ is attributed of, not mapped onto the domain of *STATE*. This finding can lend further support to Szwedek’s (2005) claim, resulting from his Objectification Theory (see Chapter One, Section 2.2.) – that in ontological metaphor it is not shared entailments but the inheritance of properties which is responsible for the Target Domain structure.

The identification of the enemy vilification pattern and framing of the Glory of War Myth have shown that Conceptual Metaphor Analysis can contribute to the ongoing comparative discourse analysis of the lan-

guage of the media and politics. These two strategies of war representation also indicate which elements of the domain of WAR are most often construed metaphorically. Also, they show how media discourse yields legitimization to social and political interaction, how linguistic representation of self and the other construes reference for political and military action in which the lives of the enemies as well as of 'our' society members are sacrificed.

Interaction between a number of conceptual metaphors has also been noted in the present study. One of the most pervasive combinations was that between the generic metaphor QUALITY IS QUANTITY, the image schema BALANCE and a specific structural metaphor WAR IS BUSINESS. The dominant mapping resulting from this interaction was Human Life is an Object of Trade. As a result, human life can be exchanged for political gains hidden under the labels of *freedom* or *the right for self-determination* used in the lofty style of political propaganda. The BALANCE schema also underlies non-metaphorical parts of the model of WAR, as war requires funds for military equipment, training, soldiers pay, etc.

The ontological metaphor NATION/STATE IS A PERSON often interacted with the structural metaphor WAR IS A HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT. Consequently, the opponents in the combat were mapped onto nation/states. For example in *America struck against Libya* both countries are personified and framed as opponents in a combat. Such effects are predicted by Chilton – Lakoff (1995) in their discussion of the conceptualisation of politics as an interaction between personified nation/states.

The conceptual metaphor WAR IS A CRUSADE, which played a minor function in the present data is conversant with Charteris-Black's (2004, see Chapter One, Section 2.7.) findings concerning the POLITICS IS RELIGION conceptual metaphor dominating American political discourse. In the British reporting of the Falklands War in 1982 when WAR IS A CRUSADE motivates the metaphorical scenario the focus is on 'democracy' and 'the right for self-determination' viewed as articles of faith. In the Polish reporting of the American air raids on Libya in 1986 the metaphorical scenario based on the same conceptual metaphor concentrates on a different mapping, i.e. The USA is a Crusader. The perspective is then not on the righteous struggle, but on the characteristics of one of the opponents. This disparity between the British and the Polish perspectives

within the same metaphorical scenario is in accord with Musolff (2004, see Chapter One, Section 2.7.), who introduced this concept to CMT.

Apart from the qualitative analysis of the metaphorically motivated linguistic patterns employed in the representation of war, the *Times* War Reports Corpus was used as a source of the most frequent words from the domain of WAR. These words are commonly considered as indicators of the X IS WAR metaphor, i.e. point to WAR as a source of conceptual metaphors. However, an investigation of the frequency of uses of these words in their different senses does not seem to corroborate such an interpretation. For some of these words, e.g. *attack* (V) and *fight* (N) the uses in the physical violence sense are more frequent. They can be thus considered good indicators of the HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT domain as the source of the conceptual metaphor rather than that of the WAR domain. Another group of words, i.e. *attack* (N) and *fight* (V) have comparable frequencies of uses in both the 'physical violence' and the military sense. Although frequency should not be equalled with salience, such frequency studies can cast some light on the interpretation of linguistic expression as indicating the use of certain domains as sources of conceptual metaphors. This may facilitate the process of metaphor categorisation and help identify the inter-metaphor interaction.

Appendix 1

The structure of the war reports corpora

The data for the analysis come from three newspapers, two Polish: *Trybuna Ludu* (TL, *Trybuna* since 1990) and *Rzeczpospolita* (RZ), and one British: *The Times*. As was noted in the Introduction, the size of *The Times* was much bigger than that of *Trybuna Ludu*. That is why the Polish data for two out of three of the wars of the 1980s is supplanted with the articles from *Rzeczpospolita*.

Trybuna Ludu has had a digitalised on-line database only since May 2004. This meant that printed issues of the newspaper had to be surveyed in search of the articles of interest. The exact time span of the survey is given in Table 10.

Table 10. The time span of the survey of the printed issues of *Trybuna Ludu* and *Trybuna* with regard to the topics in question

Topic	Time span
The Falklands war	April 3-4 th 1982 – June 17 th 1982
The air raid on Libya	April 12-13 th 1986 – May 10-11 th 1986
The withdrawal from Afghanistan	May 7-8 th 1988 – June 1-2 nd 1988, January 28-29 th 1989 – March 3 rd 1989
The War on Terror	October 1 st 2001 – December 21 st 2001

The selected articles were either scanned and converted into a text format or re-typed into the computer. This procedure led to a creation of four subcorpora of different size, as shown in Table 11.

Table 11. The size of the *Trybuna Ludu* subcorpora

Topic	Number of texts	Word count
The Falklands war	70	42,247
The air raid on Libya	67	24,195
The withdrawal from Afghanistan	45	13,002
1980s total	182	79,444
The War on Terror	207	98,349
Total	389	177,793

Rzeczpospolita has an on-line archive available since 1993, so that the articles on the air raid on Libya and on the withdrawal from Afghanistan had to be scanned and typed. The time span and the size of the *Rzeczpospolita* corpus are given in Tables 12 and 13 respectively, below.

Table 12. The time span covered by the subcorpora derived from *Rzeczpospolita*

Topic	Time span
The air raid on Libya	April 11 th 1986 – May 6 th 1986
The withdrawal from Afghanistan	January 30 th 1989 – March 3 rd 1989

Table 13. The size of the *Rzeczpospolita* subcorpora

Topic	Number of texts	Word count
The air raid on Libya	42	17,984
The withdrawal from Afghanistan	19	6,465
Total	61	24,449

The Times has a digitalised database of all of its issues between 1785-1985. The issues from 1985 up till now are available from the on-line archive. The time span for this newspaper and the size of the subcorpora are given in Tables 14 and 15.

Table 14. The time span covered by the subcorpora derived from *The Times*

Topic	Time span
The Falklands war	March 29 th 1982 – April 24 th 1982 ¹
The air raid on Libya	April 12 1986 – May 10 th 1986
The withdrawal from Afghanistan	May 7 th 1988 – June 2 nd 1988, January 28 th 1989 – March 3 rd 1989
The War on Terror	October 1 st 2001 – December 21 st 2001

Table 15. The size of the *Times* subcorpora

Topic	Number of texts	Word count
The Falklands war	132	123,645
The air raid on Libya	84	47,161
The withdrawal from Afghanistan	88	51,994
1980s total	304	222,800
The War on Terror	124	93,492
Total	428	317,292

As can be seen from the comparison of Tables 11, 13 and 15, the English language corpus is larger than the Polish one. Apart from the average size of the newspapers, the reason behind this was the centrality of the Falklands war to the British public and its relatively peripheral importance for the Polish public. The air raids on Libya and the withdrawal from Afghanistan reports from *Rzeczpospolita* were scanned first. Their analysis indicated, as is shown in Chapter Four, that the wording of the reports in *Rzeczpospolita* and in *Trybuna Ludu* was very similar, often identical. Clearly the newspapers had the same source of international news. Con-

¹ These time borders are wider than in the case of *Trybuna Ludu*, because for both newspapers 6 issues preceding the beginning of the war and 6 issues following the end of the war were surveyed, but the topic was of a different degree of interest for the Polish and the British public; therefore, simply, the Polish press had given it less attention, which is reflected not only in the fact that no information on the approaching war was given in *TL* until the April 3-4th issue, but also in the relative size of the corpora.

sequently, the *Rzeczpospolita* reports on the Falklands war were not considered.

The assembled corpora are called *Trybuna Ludu War Reports Corpus* (TLWRC), *Rzeczpospolita War Reports Corpus* (RWRC) and *Times War Reports Corpus* (TWRC).

Appendix 2

The frequency list of the words from the lexical field of war in the Times War Reports Corpus (TWRC)

1. force/forces	1015
2. military	762
3. attack/ed/s/ing n/v	666
4. war	608
5. terrorism	508
6. action (-s)	499
7. support/ed/ing n/v	469
8. terrorist/s	418
9. defence	382
10. general/s	367
11. troop/s	321
12. aircraft	293
13. security (Security Council 126)	281
14. operation/s	275
15. ship/s	246
16. fight/s/ing/fought	245
17. withdrawal/s	237
18. bombing/s	206
19. terror	201
20. intelligence	193
21. crisis	189
22. kill/ed/ing/s	186
23. missile/s	172
24. alliance/s (Northern Alliance = 71)	169
25. commander/s	168
26. soldiers	157
27. target/s n or v	154
28. bomb/s	151
29. navy	146
30. weapon/s	139
31. strike/s [air strike], also the verb struck +19	137

32. raid/s	136
33. army	134
34. armed	127
35. invasion/s	127
36. base/s (the Base =2)	124
37. withdraw/rew/n/ing/s	119
38. response	118
39. supply/ies	118
40. ally/ies	117
41. conflict, N	114
42. bases	113
43. campaign/s	113
44. civilian	112
45. rebel/s, N	112
46. fire/d/ing/s	110
47. naval	109
48. arms	108
49. colonel(74 Col. Gaddafi)	108
50. casualty/ies	105
51. nuclear	103
52. helicopter/s	96
53. battle/s	95
54. marine/s	92
55. mission/s	93
56. officer/s	93
57. threat	92
58. loss/es	91
59. front	90
60. defend/ed/ing/s	87
61. launch/ed/ing/s	84
62. coalition	83
63. enemy/ies	83
64. fear/s	83
65. line/s	80
66. bomber/s	77
67. harrier/s	77
68. landing	77
69. aggression	76

70. fleet/s	76
71. operate/d/ing/s	76
72. camp/s(19 training camps + 2 sg.)	75
73. guerrilla/s	74
74. shoot/ot/s/ing	74
75. win/won/ing/s	73
76. dispute	71
77. refugee/s	71
78. carrier/s	70
79. destroy/ed/ing/s	70
80. ceasefire	69
81. secure v/adj.	69
82. assault/s	68
83. attacked	65
84. hit/ting/s	65
85. occupation	64
86. die/d/ing/s	63
87. submarine/s	59
88. surrender/ed/ing/s	59
89. drop/ped/ing/s(also temp drop, etc, noun food drops)	58
90. unit/s	58
91. damage	57
92. interim	55
93. fighter/s (both soldiers and aircraft)	54
94. gun/s	53
95. rocket/s	53
96. command	52
97. combat	50
98. jihad	50
99. atrocity/ies	48
100. pilot/s	48
101. victory	48
102. strategy	47
103. frigate/s	46
104. garrison	45
105. warship/s	45
106. tank/s	43
107. destroyer/s	42

108. danger	40
109. resistance	40
110. retaliation	40
111. dangerous	39
112. injure/d/ing/s	39
113. wound/ed/s v/n	38
114. headquarters	37
115. strategic	37
116. death	35
117. air strike/s	34
118. brigade	34
119. invade/d/ing/s	34
120. occupy/ed/ing/s	34
121. defeat	33
122. hostile	33
123. servicemen/man	33
124. violence	33
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126. deploy/ed/ing/s	31
127. struggle/s	31
128. dead	30
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130. destruction	29
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142. artillery	24
143. frontier	23
144. hostilities	23
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146. Marine	23
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148. evil	22
149. invader/s	22
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151. patrol/s	22
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153. column	21
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155. barracks	18
156. repossess/ed/ing/s	18
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158. allied	15
159. exocet	15
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Streszczenie

Praca pt. „Dyskurs wojenny w ujęciu teorii metafory konceptualnej – implikacje” ma cele zarówno opisowe jak i metodologiczne. Cel opisowy stanowi analiza struktury konceptualnej pojęcia wojny w polskich i brytyjskich tekstach prasowych dotyczących konfliktów zbrojnych w latach 80. minionego wieku i w roku 2001. Jest to zatem porównawcza analiza dyskursu w dwu różnych językach na przestrzeni 20 lat. Szczególną wagę przywiązuje się do roli metafor konceptualnych w strukturyzowaniu dyskursu.

Celem metodologicznym pracy jest stworzenie narzędzia pozwalającego na bardziej intersubiektywne określenie domeny źródłowej metafory w oparciu o analizę frekwencyjną sensów wyrazowych występujących w dużych korpusach językowych.

Rozdział pierwszy pracy zarysowuje podstawy teoretyczne. Przedstawia chronologiczny rozwój Teorii Metafory Konceptualnej poczynając od wczesnej pracy Lakoff'a – Johnson'a (1980), poprzez jej rozwój w studium Lakoff'a – Turner'a (1989) po jej wersję zintegrowaną z książki Lakoff'a – Johnson'a (1999). Omówione są podstawowe pojęcia niezbędne dla funkcjonowania metafory konceptualnej takie jak domena źródłowa i docelowa, projekcje metaforyczne, systematyka metafor (zwłaszcza w ujęciu Kövecses'a 2002 i Szwedka 2005). Niezbędny aparat pojęciowy związany z teorią metafor obejmuje wyidealizowany model poznawczy (Lakoff 1987), schematy wyobrazeniowe (Johnson 1987) i dynamikę siły (Talmy 2000). Ukazane jest zastosowanie teorii metafor do analizy dyskursu w pracach Charteris-Black'a (2004), Koller (2003, 2004), Musolf'a (2004) i Nerlich (2003, 2005 a i b). Jest to szczególnie ważna część rozdziału pierwszego, gdyż część badawcza zawarta w rozdziale czwartym nawiązuje do metod wypracowanych w ramach prezentowanej w tych pracach nowej gałęzi językoznawstwa kognitywnego zwanej kognitywną analizą dyskursu lub krytyczną teorią metafory.

Rozdział pierwszy zawiera również krytykę teorii metafory konceptualnej z perspektywy psycholingwistycznej (Murphy 1997) oraz próby umiejscowienia jej w szerszej perspektywie badań nad językiem (m. in. Jäkel 1999, Kardela 1992a i b, Nerlich – Clark 2002). Wykazane są również związki między teorią metafory konceptualnej a funkcjonalizmem Halliday'a (Goatly 1997) oraz między teorią metafory konceptualnej a teorią amalgamatu (Turner – Fauconnier 2002). Omówiona jest też próba powiązania teorii metafory z aksjologią w ramach semantyki aksjologicznej Krzeszowskiego (1997).

Rozdział drugi wprowadza podstawowe pojęcia dotyczące korpusów językowych, które stanowią podstawę analizy materiału językowego w rozdziałach czwartym i piątym. Zawiera też prezentację studiów nad językiem prasy koncentrując się na tych badaniach, które stosują teorię metafory konceptualnej, gdyż rozdział czwarty rozpatrujący językową strukturę pojęcia 'wojny', opiera się na niewielkich korpusach artykułów prasowych zebranych przez autorkę. Rozdział piąty posługuje się stumilionowym korpusem języka angielskiego: British National Corpus (BNC).

Rozdział trzeci ma na celu przedstawienie definicji pojęcia 'wojny' wyłaniające się ze współczesnej filozofii i socjologii, które posłużą do stworzenia eksperckiego modelu poznawczego. Rozdział ten prezentuje też obraz wojny zawarty w literaturze polskiej (w oparciu o Janion 1998) i angielskiej (Wiśniewski 1987) jako model kształtujący popularny schemat poznawczy. Trochę miejsca poświęcono też historii reporterów wojennych (Knightly 1987) jako tych, którzy kształtują przekaz prasowy mający duży wpływ na rozumienie pojęcia wojny u czytelników. W tym rozdziale omówione są też wcześniejsze badania językoznawcze poświęcone współczesnym konfliktom zbrojnym.

Rozdział czwarty stanowi szczegółowa analiza jakościowa artykułów prasowych z *Trybuny Ludu* (od 1991 *Trybuny*), *Rzeczpospolitej* i *The Times'a*. Zasadniczym celem tej części pracy jest porównanie metafor konceptualnych wpływających na przedstawienie wojny w języku polskim i angielskim. Dobór tekstów oparty był na założeniu, że przedstawienie konfliktu może zależeć od stopnia zaangażowania danego kraju w tenże konflikt. Dlatego wybrano relacje dotyczące czterech różnych konfrontacji militarnych:

- (1) wojny brytyjsko-argentyńskiej o Falklandy z 1982 roku, w której Polska była jedynie obojętnym obserwatorem, a Wielka Brytania jedną z walczących stron;
- (2) nalotu Stanów Zjednoczonych na Libię w 1986 roku, w którym Polska była silnie zaangażowanym obserwatorem, a Wielka Brytania sojusznikiem jednej z walczących stron;
- (3) wycofania wojsk radzieckich z Afganistanu w latach 1988-1989, w których Polska była sojusznikiem jednej z walczących stron, a Wielka Brytania obserwatorem;
- (4) wojny z Talibami w Afganistanie w roku 2001, w którym Polska i Wielka Brytania były sojusznikami wspierającymi działania wojsk amerykańskich.

Pomimo takiego spektrum czasowego i różnego stopnia zaangażowania stron metafory konceptualne stosowane w obu badanych językach były bardzo podobne. Np. metody szkalowania wroga, mające na celu obniżenie lęku przed złamaniem tabu, jakim jest odebranie życia drugiemu człowiekowi oraz wzmocnienie

jedności narodowej, zarówno te motywowane metaforycznie jak i inne były jednakowe. Degradowano wroga poprzez metaforę CZŁOWIEK TO ZWIERZĘ odwołującą się do Wielki Łańcuch Bytów. Przypisywanie wrogowi cech zwierzęcych pozwalało na ominięcie tabu. Pojawiały się też wyrażenia bazujące na metaforach kulturowych, takich jak WRÓG TO PIRAT, WRÓG TO BARBARZYŃCA, WRÓG TO HITLEROWIEC/FASZYSTA. Zgodnie z teorią van Dijka (1996, 1997, 1998) przypisywano też wrogowi negatywny biegun spolaryzowanych wartości, takich jak okrucieństwo, ksenofobia, imperializm, kłamliwość, nieracjonalność, szaleństwo. Tak pisała polska prasa o Brytyjczykach, Amerykanach i Talibach i prasa brytyjska o Argentyńczykach, Libijczykach, Rosjanach i Talibach. Pokazuje to wyraźnie, że schematy konceptualne i wynikające z nich zabiegi retoryczne są niezmiennie, zmieniają się tylko wrogowie.

Ciekawym zjawiskiem był również Mit Chwały Wojennej w rozumieniu Barthes'a (1967), który był wzmocniony przez metaforę WOJNA TO TEATR. Wyrażenia motywowane przez tę metaforę pojawiły się zarówno w polskich jak i brytyjskich relacjach z wojny o Falklandy, jak i w brytyjskich relacjach z wycofania wojsk radzieckich z Afganistanu. W tym przypadku zadziałał scenariusz metaforyczny postulowany przez Musolff'a (2004). Scenariusz taki oparty jest o metaforę konceptualną, ale w ramach różnych języków, prawdopodobnie z powodu różnej struktury domen źródłowych specyficznych kulturowo, pozwala na stworzenie różnej perspektywy i odmiennych implikacji. I tak polskie relacje z opuszczenia portu w Plymouth przez brytyjską armadę zderzały patos Mitu Chwały Wojennej z nierzeczywistością domeny TEATR i nadawały opisowi charakter ironiczny. Brytyjczycy, stosując ten sam mit i tę samą metaforę uderzali w ton podniosły. Za to w relacjach z Teremez, do którego z Afganistanu wracała Armia Czerwona, Brytyjczycy również stosują ironię zderzając drobiazgowo planowanie wycofywania wojsk i przyziemne szczegóły operacji logistycznych z patosem ceremonii nawiązujących do Mitu Chwały Wojennej.

Materiał językowy poddany analizie w rozdziale czwartym wskazał też na wpływ takich metafor na konceptualizację wojny, jak uosobienie narodów, państw i miast, WOJNA TO GEOMETRIA (metafory ontologiczne); WOJNA TO HANDEL (WAR IS BUSINESS), WOJNA TO DYSPUTA, HISTORIA TO NAUCZYCIEL, WOJNA TO SIŁY PRZYRODY, WOJNA TO GRA, WOJNA TO SPORT, WOJNA TO CHOROBA, WOJNA TO MEDYCYNA, WOJNA TO SPRZĄTANIE, WOJNA TO POLOWANIE, WOJNA TO WALKA WRĘCZ (metafory strukturalne). Niektóre metafory strukturalne to projekcje pomiędzy domenami, które mogą być traktowane jako specyfikacje ogólnego pojęcia 'konfliktu'. Tak jest w przypadku WOJNY, DYSPUTY, GRY. Schematem organizującym projekcje pomiędzy domenami WOJNY, SIŁ PRZYRODY, GWALTU jest pojęcie 'siły' zaczerpnięte z teorii dynamiki sił Talmey'ego (2000). Występują też metafory motywowane kulturowo, takie jak WOJNA TO KRUCJATA, WRÓG TO HITLEROWIEC/FASZYSTA, STANY ZJEDNOCZONE TO SZERYF CAŁEGO ŚWIATA.

Na poziomie teoretycznym rozdział czwarty wykazał, że Teoria Metafory Konceptualnej może być przydatnym narzędziem w porównawczej analizie dyskursu prasowego w dwóch różnych językach.

W rozdziale piątym podstawą wyboru leksemów wyszukiwanych w korpusie BNC jest lista frekwencyjna wyrazów z pola leksykalnego wojny dla języka angielskiego stworzona w oparciu o relacje wojenne analizowane w rozdziale czwartym. Analizie poddano częstotliwość występowania różnych znaczeń następujących leksemów: ATTACK, BOMB, CONFLICT, DEFEND, FIGHT, INVADE, SURRENDER. W sumie przebadano 7230 przykładów. Określono użycia metaforyczne w oparciu o procedurę PRAGGLEJAZ. Frekwencyjność znaczeń dosłownych uznano za wskaźnik podstawowego znaczenia danego leksemu. Przyjęto, że o ile kontekst wyrazowy nie aktywizuje innych domen, to metaforyczne użycie wyrazu powinno najsilniej aktywizować domenę podstawowego znaczenia dosłownego jako źródła metafory. Na podstawie frekwencyjności i w oparciu o przedstawione wyżej założenie stwierdzono, że niektóre wyrażenia językowe uznawane za przykład działania metafory X TO WOJNA, mogą wskazywać na działanie innych metafor konceptualnych, np. X TO WALKA WRĘCZ. Tym samym wykazano, że frekwencyjność znaczeń dosłownych zbadana na podstawie korpusu może stanowić wskazówkę w kategoryzacji domen źródłowych i w nazywaniu metafor. Jest to o tyle istotne, że implikacje wynikające z danej metafory konceptualnej zależą od określenia struktury domeny źródłowej.