ABSTRACT: The article presents an in-depth and detailed reflection on the concept of „integral interpretation” put forward by the Polish musicologist Mieczysław Tomaszewski. The problematics of interpretation has for many years been the focus of Tomaszewski’s attention and interest, as evidenced by his numerous publications devoted to it. They culminate in the formulation of this concept, described by the author as the method of an adequate interpretation of a musical work. In contrast to many contemporary approaches to the issue of the scope of musicology’s subject area, for Tomaszewski the concept of a musical work is central to the discipline, and he poses questions concerning its ontology and understanding in the spirit of Roman Ingarden’s theory of musical work, to which he frequently refers. Tomaszewski regards the process of interpretation as a kind of „rising” to the level of the work, the meaning of which (intentio operis), often identified with the authorial meaning (intentio auctoris), stands at the highest point in the hierarchy of meanings ascribed – from this point of view – to the work. In turn, the work itself functions in different phases, existing as a score, a performance, a result of the processes of perception and as its reception within a culture. In my article I attempt not only to present Tomaszewski’s method, but above all to argue against its anachronicity and limitations resulting from a lack of reference both to contemporary artistic practice and contemporary research methodology in the humanities and in musicology.

KEYWORDS: musical work, Tomaszewski, Ingarden, methodology of musicology, interpretation, integrity, value.
chiefly to the music and musical culture of the eighteenth–twentieth centuries and explicitly in his numerous theoretical works. These labours of the mind, focused on the core issues of ‘humanistic musicology’ and mapping out the critical junctures in our discipline, have stimulated significant response and gained positions of authority in many milieux in Poland. Yet the issue addressed by Tomaszewski has a more than local scope. Perceiving the importance of interpretation—in which, of course, he is not alone—the Polish musicologist has attempted to formulate an adequate method for the analysis and interpretation of the work of music which would restore the category of the work to its due place in the ever-expanding subject area of musicological research. As evidence to this effect, Tomaszewski often articulates in his writings a thesis according to which the essence of interpretation is ‘rising to the level of the work’. This view is of such significance in Tomaszewski’s conception that I shall return to it many times.

And one further remark. The stance adopted by Tomaszewski is also a distant echo of the category of mathesis universalis, the essentially utopian ideal of order which, as we surmise today, science and its cognitively credible methods wish to fulfil. Tomaszewski’s concept of a method for the ‘integral interpretation’ of the musical work embodies the dream of mathesis universalis, whilst the ‘adequacy’ of that method is the premise from which he derives his entire reasoning.

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Mieczysław Tomaszewski is undoubtedly an advocate of a prescriptive interpretation of musicology, as he convinces us: ‘How is musicology and how could it be, and even how should it be, so as to be able to answer the questions asked of it by contemporary man?’ (p. 9) I fully support the ethical tone of this utterance, although at the same time it augurs certain perils for anyone formulating a programme for the academic discipline they practise in terms of ‘obligation’. We ask why musicology would venture into the near or distant future along those particular lines rather than any others and what criteria we would apply to set the course and aims of the postulated changes. Should they—and if so, to what extent—have the character of abstract directives based on a professed system of values or, on the contrary, arise from the changes taking place in the humanities and in reflection on the subject of musicological study? Before I move on to a polemic with the concept of ‘integral interpretation’, I shall try to explain the essence of Tomaszewski’s view on the situation of musicology.

• Firstly, I would call the model of musicology proposed by Tomaszewski a mysterious-solar model. After all, it is undeniably dominated by the mood and methodology of that which is positive and constructive, which renders coherent

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2 M. Tomaszewski, W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej [Towards a humanistic musicology], in Interpretacja [Interpretation], ed. L. Bielawski et al. (Warsaw, 2000).

(Bonum ex integra causa), which aims to give the reader and the author the feeling that so long as we point out the ‘flaws’, muddiness and areas of neglect of our discipline and adopt a few simple ‘healing procedures’, then its situation will improve. Such a role in Tomaszewski’s conception is to be played by the ‘integral interpretation’ of the musical work.4

- Secondly, I sense that Tomaszewski sees the future of musicology sub specie humanitatis, advocating its traditional interpretation, underpinned by the authority of history and worthy historiography, but not overly sensitive to the turbulence of contemporary humanism. The problem is that today we do not know for certain what ‘humanism’ signifies, although I agree with the author that it would be good if we could clarify its meaning. But that remains impossible, and our endeavours in this area, even when treated with the utmost seriousness, in keeping with the motto of the ‘dehumanisation of the humanities’, will not necessarily bring effects that satisfy all the parties in the debate about the status of values in contemporary culture. Furthermore, the ‘direction of hope’ that Tomaszewski subtly plots, namely a return to humanistic-artistic reflection dominated, until recently, by the naturalist mindset, is unrealistic, insofar as the treatment of music as a biocultural phenomenon has become a scientific fact. It demands that we take account both of certain ontological premises and also of methodological procedures, regardless of whether we ourselves choose this or that path of enquiry towards an understanding of what music is and what influence it has on our lives in culture.5

- Thirdly, in incorporating a critical moment in his utterance, Tomaszewski ascribes it a rather limited role. I do not call the author to anarchy, but the sentence that ‘from time to time some of the leading musicologists even [emphasis M. J.] dare to demand in the process of interpretation such general aesthetic categories as grandeur, succinctness and intimacy’ is simply not adequate to the dynamic of the internal changes taking place in musicology since at least the eighties, although we find traces of this dynamic earlier still, chiefly in Anglo-American thought. I am not concerned here with that one sentence alone, but with the peculiar critical methodological reticence that is characteristic of many of Tomaszewski’s texts.

- Fourthly, Tomaszewski invites us on a path towards a multi-faceted humanistic musicology, rightly respecting the mysteriousness and wondrousness

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4 M. Tomaszewski, W stronę interpretacji integralnej, 49-65. This text is discussed in detail further in the present article, mainly in respect to its methodological perspective and the issues concerning the ontology and cognition of music. Earlier, however, for example on the question of expression or context, I shall be referring to it more briefly. Page references for quoted passages are given in parentheses.

5 In discussing the ‘principle of hierarchisation’, in W stronę interpretacji integralnej (p. 63), Tomaszewski invokes the now completely outdated opinion of Ernst H. Gombrich that the problem of value would be present in analyses of works of art if ‘the humanities did not try to imitate the natural sciences in ignoring the problem of value’. However distant we might be from a naturalistically-determined humanism, we cannot hide behind a screen of ignorance, since the problem of value is also, although obviously in a different way, present in naturalistic enquiry.
(in the Heinian sense) of the musical art. Yet he proposes that to achieve this goal we seek one-sided and traditional means and tools. Such notions as ‘work’, ‘value’, ‘artistry’ and many others, which for Tomaszewski would lend coherence and ‘lustre’ to the musicology dictionary are for many areas of the musical activity of contemporary man—not just the composer-artist in the Europcentric sense of the word—inappropriate, unfortunate or awkward. Today, they are no longer capable of ordering the entire subject area of musicology, unless they were to be fundamentally redefined, which is seldom beneficial to such notions.

Fifthly, Tomaszewski strongly accentuates the hierarchic (‘unity’ as the centre, ‘integrity’, ‘factors’, ‘aspects’) and—as I would boldly assert—hieratic (the ‘lustrous’ dictionary, as mentioned above) character of his methodological proposition. In writing forcibly that ‘[…] in every coherent system of culture there exists a specified hierarchy of values […]’, Tomaszewski attaches little weight to the post-modernist watershed, which is not the source of all evil that many thinkers would have us believe, but which has brought to anthropology, history and literary scholarship significant questions and occasionally even solutions to important problems, for example in the redefining of the notions referred to above or the awareness of changing research tools, the neutrality of science, the role of the researcher and his involvement in the subject, and finally the way we apprehend interpretation. Here, my insistent thinking about interpretation as the centre of musicological reflection, conditioning to a considerable extent all the other problems and aspects, converges with what Tomaszewski writes: ‘An inspection of the situation of musicology in its singular, but central aspect that is the interpretation of the musical work […] inclines one to state that we are witnessing a change of paradigm […]’.

Sixthly, I have no doubt that the way Tomaszewski proposes of understanding our discipline’s subject area, which would be charged with delimiting at least the approximate boundaries within which musicology should move in building its identity, is a narrow one. I pass over here the fact that in more recent times debate has raged over the possibility of accepting that we already live in the post-disciplinary era, including in musicology. The view of a too narrowly defined subject area of musicology arises mainly from the ‘attempt to define’ our discipline formulated by Tomaszewski (see p. 7 of the text and p.10).

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7 Tomaszewski mentions the ‘repossession’ ‘[…] of aspects of the scientific study of the musical work’. See M. Tomaszewski, ‘W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej’, op. cit., 15. The author also asks, on the next page of this text, if ‘it is not worth trying to regain that which through the post-Hanslick paradigm was expelled from the domain of academic procedures […]’. This is a pertinent remark, although we should note that Kerman, from 1967 through to 1985, and also the ‘new musicologists’ of the late eighties pointedly drew attention to this need and shifted musicology in this very direction.
The ‘solarity’ of the model proposed by Tomaszewski pervades not only the methodology and general premises of the possible recasting of musicology. It also pervades the whole of the discipline’s subject area, as is evident in particular where the author speaks of the ‘work’, ‘values’, ‘plenitude’ and ‘unity’, enmeshed in hierarchic, clear and seemingly obvious mutual relations. Additionally, the author notes that the whole of this area is encompassed ‘on each separate occasion by a different syndrome composed of such relations as static/dynamic, open/closed, discrete/non-discrete, objective/subjective, natural/artificial, natural/cultural, direct/coded, sacred/profane, heroic/erotic, egalitarian/elitist, mimetic/absolute, artistic/functional, aesthetic/ethical’ (p. 16). The invoking of such a configuration of notions, set in traditional pairs of opposites, is intended to bring a certain conceptual neatness, which would counteract the excessive or chaotic nature of the artistic and cultural phenomena of the times conventionally termed ‘contemporary’. We know very well, today, that these pairs of opposites do not adequately order art and culture in relation to periods much more ‘balanced’ than our own (prior to the last quarter of the nineteenth century) and that such a proposition creates the ostensibly impression that the defining of a precise axis of mutually polarised points of reference within a different syndrome each time gives us a satisfactory answer to the question of the ‘differentia specifica of the object under study’ (p. 15–16). As I see it, essentially all the pairs of notions are deserving of polemic, whilst their configurations may be multi-faceted, open to many possibilities, not just binary; they may be mutually reducible and they may even lose their raison d’être. If we adopt a scientistic interpretation of musicology, then music ought to be defined as a biocultural phenomenon, and so the nature/culture duality loses its traditional justification. If we consider the relations between the aesthetic and the ethical, then we easily observe that the fortunes of these notions not only meander today more than ever before, but they also succumb to mutual reduction. Universal processes of aestheticisation undermine the ‘contrastively’ equiponderous roles of ethics and aesthetics. The renewal of aesthetics as a discipline in permanent crisis (anti-aesthetics or aesthetics-post-aesthetics), meanwhile, is possible by pointing to its loci commune with ethics, as has already been observed by Soeren Kierkegaard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Emanuel Levinas. When we take account of the most difficult problem of all, that of ‘objectivity/subjectivity’, then we see that in many views on art there is reference to a disturbance of the proportions between knowledge about art and the belief that a given phenomenon or object can certainly be called art. One interesting observation in this respect is that of Boris Groys, who maintains that the modern work of art has the same logical structure as Jesus Christ in Kierkegaard’s interpretation, since, as the author of Either/Or asserts, ‘as a man he is no different to Jesus as God. We can no longer discern in him any attributes that would indicate his divinity. It can no longer be stated on the basis of outward manifestations whether Jesus is God or man. This is determined solely by the act of
And the same applies to art: the act of faith plays a decisive role here, which also justifies confidence in the power of the absurd, which allows one, contrary to the laws of common sense, to consider every object as art. Finally, when we examine the debate about the crisis or depreciation or—completely differently—the growing role of ‘representation’ in contemporary art, and also in discourse on art, we see a new perspective that suppresses the ‘mimetic/absolute’ duality.

In order to account for my critical judgment on the solar model of musicology according to Tomaszewski, I shall employ a certain comparison by way of example. In a discreet polemic between two eminent Polish writers and thinkers, Ireneusz Kania and Zygmunt Kubiak, the question arises as to a criterion for constructing the canon of European literature, of fundamental significance for the identity of our culture. As is noted by Kania, whose point of view I fully accept, the canon put forward by Kubiak has a unilaterally solar character, as it excludes ‘dark’ works from the picture of European humanity and culture, from Parmenides, through the Marquis de Sade, to Emile Cioran and Philip Larkin (we speak here of men of letters, yet we may, without hesitation, consider Francis Bacon and his art as the patron of this side of culture in general and of contemporary culture in particular). By denying their significance and the role they play in our culture, we illicitly remove one of the elements of its binary foundation, namely contradiction. Contradiction as a positive value determines the specific identity of European culture in the sense that it guarantees a radical pluralism, giving priority to freedom over the oppressions which muzzle it, by exclusion or other means. And so culture, in its full diversity, cannot exclude any of its products, even the lethal, but should responsibly, in a free and critical way, correct their influence and significance among the users of culture by constructing alternatives. Scholarship, too, cannot exclude from its orbit even the most radical and isolated views. This is one of the fundamental parameters of open musicology, which, having rid itself of any selfish reasons guaranteeing its homogeneous and monochromatic inner picture, must seek intellectual justification for its multi-faceted research in the name of the above-mentioned contradiction.

It will not be an abuse if I say that musicology, as a discipline whose subject, music, fortunately has an exceptionally vague ontic status, is embracing with increasing determination many mutually contradictory—and not just complementary—musical practices in artistic creation and performance, including a variety of hybrid forms in which contemporary culture abounds (e.g. in operatic theatre or pop culture, one random example of which is the ‘Rap Na Powstanie Warszawskie 1944’ [Rap for the Warsaw Rising, 1944]). There is also room within the scope of musicological enquiry for such phenomena as music and violence (the case of Marilyn Manson or Eminem) and the role of blasphemy in art (Madonna’s ‘Like a Virgin’), which, appearing in the proximity of Olivier Messiaen’s

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theological music, forge the counter-examples so characteristic of the polylogue of contemporary culture. Musicology, open and radical in some situations, must—if I may employ that hard modality—find tools and lexis for the interpretation of musical phenomena that are programmatically incoherent both in ‘high-brow’ production (if we accept this criterion as still apt) and also in all other areas of musical culture and phenomena governed by negative values (evil, ugliness, disgust, scatological aesthetics, as in Life with an Idiot by Victor Erofeyev and Alfred Schnittke or La Grand Macabre by Michel de Ghelderode and György Ligeti).

Tomaszewski writes: ‘Musicology is the study of—and at the same time critical reflection on—the musical work and of music in general, of the work as an artistic phenomenon and the work as a creative message: of the way in which it exists and the ways in which it functions in society, in time and space, that is, in history and culture.’(p. 10)¹⁰

One may clearly read from this definition certain characteristic features which affect the whole trajectory of Tomaszewski’s thinking in this and other texts devoted to musicology. A distinctly ‘contemporary’ motif that links many of the previously proposed definitions of musicology is the conviction of the need to expand the definition, to blur its boundaries; this supposedly results from musicology’s ever-expanding relations with other fields of learning. The inter- and transdisciplinary correlations which arise in this way weaken the dominant position of the ‘work’ in favour of all kinds of musical manifestation, of which the opus is just one of the possibilities. For Tomaszewski, however, the ‘opusic’ (‘ergonomic’) is that which is fundamental in musicological study, taking account of its sense, value, artistry and ‘unique objectivity’. The thesis of interpretation as ‘rising to the level of the work’ entails very serious obligations towards the intentio operis, situated at the tip of the hierarchy, and it also reveals musicology’s defensive attitude towards the usurping external methods which might weaken the central position of the ergon. But let us bear in mind that the expansion to include all kinds of musical manifestation that is proposed here shifts the point of gravity towards ‘man’ as creator, co-creator (many composers of a single work, the collective object of musical actions in non-European cultures, and also the artist-performer), user, author of various forms of the cultural circulation of those manifestations and participant in these processes. On the other hand, the essential notions, to which the notion of the ‘work’ belongs, have, as a result of the multi-directional and dynamic changes in artistic practices over the last century, been axiologically degraded, semantically blurred and made dependent on the often arbitrary decisions of the subjects, the participants of musical culture. The picture of decomposition is

¹⁰ In my interpretation of this definition, I pass over one small detail, namely the formulation ‘Musicology is the study of—and at the same time critical reflection on […]’. Every academic discipline involves critical reflection, but I presume the author had in mind those areas of reflection—critical, of course—which are no longer, or not yet, science, irrespective of whether this concerns the distant past or contemporary times.
completed by the fact that it was in the twentieth century that the category of *dés-oeuvrement* arose—the disinheritance of the ‘work’ from its traditionally perceived parameters, on which, as I understand it, Tomaszewski bases his conception. The development of the subject range of musicology, if only in this one area alone, the incorporation within it of musical manifestations and behaviours which we might call declared and actual anti-works, has moved musicology on to another level of discussion on the subject of its identity. And this is what Tomaszewski fails to notice.

Let us take a closer look at the ergonomic factor, and so the importance of the ‘particular and concrete musical work as the foundation of the discipline, as its constant and central point of reference’. (p. 11) I am of the conviction that the ontological questions of the musical work are settled for Tomaszewski, although I utter this thought with caution. Let us cast aside for a moment all those products of various artistic practices which are denied the status of the ‘work’, be it in the name of a radical aversion to all normativism, as a consequence of the countless failed attempts to fix unequivocal criteria—ontological or axiological—of the ‘work’, or due to the locating of such a criterion in the receiver’s individual act of decision, often based on belief, intuition or self-interest. Even then, rejecting most contemporary output (which I treat here as a momentary and theoretical gesture), the problem of the ontology of the ‘work’, including the musical ‘work’, is not rendered free from doubts and reservations, to such an extent that Aaron Ridley postulates the complete rejection of the ontology of the musical work in favour of its aesthetic. Tomaszewski stands at the opposite pole to Ridley, of course. His ontological considerations are derived almost wholesale from Roman Ingarden’s theory, located chiefly in his *The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity*, from the enquiry conducted by this eminent Polish philosopher (a pupil of Edmund Husserl) into the essence of the work. The structure of this theory also allows Tomaszewski to formulate conclusions regarding the way in which the musical work becomes established and functions in culture; I shall return to this question shortly.

Tomaszewski is also unusually attached to the thesis of the importance of ‘the particular and concrete musical work’. I agree entirely with the author that the ‘problem of individuality’ cannot be overestimated and that the stance which ensues from such a conviction is shared by both musicologists and scholars of other art forms. That which is unique, apart and irreducible, which encloses the fortuitous existence of a given object, constitutes a manifestation of the work of *haecceitas*. That final completion of ‘essence’ in a particular thing is, as Duns Scotus would have it, the effect of the action of ‘individuation’, whereby an entity possesses not only a generic model but also its concrete particularity and by the same stroke differs

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as an individual from all other individuals of that same kind. We are interested here in what defines the uniqueness of a thing, and also its self-containedness, the ontological mystery concealed within the individual object or phenomenon.

As Gerard Hopkins observed, every such object, besides its distinctness, is equipped with an inner force, an energy, which not only enables that individuality to be integrated, but also allows us to sense and experience it. The tension between that which is general and, when we speak of ‘essence’, lasting and invariable, on one hand, and that which determines the individual completion and character of the work, on the other, creates much scope for polemic on the way in which works (or aesthetic objects in general) exist and the paths to their cognition—from radical empiricism to radical Platonism. The relationship between a work’s ‘essence’ and its individual ‘completion’ then becomes one of the central issues of philosophical thinking about music. It is clearly the essential aspect of ‘something’ (music) that determines whether it is what it is. It is also clear that inasmuch as there exists at all something like the ‘essence of art’—and not that art (music) is ‘something which we call art (music) or ‘something which we believe to be art—it seems necessary to summon convincing arguments in favour of essentialism, with which, in light of the multitude of phenomena nowadays labelled ‘art’, many scholars wrestle in earnest... albeit without success. The adoption of an essentialist stance is associated with many inconveniences, particularly when the object of our interest is contemporary artistic practice, the multifority of the objects referred to as aesthetic objects and certain features of essentialism itself, which are treated distrustfully today. On one hand, the question of the ‘essence’ of art boils down to an answer to the question of the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied for us to consider a given object to be a work, although many philosophers and aestheticians have now mollified their stance, enquiring merely of the necessary conditions of this relationship (Arthur Danto in his later works). The difficulties which arise from the postulate of showing the conditions of both kinds, those essential properties, also result from a lack of certainty as to whether there exists a genuine need to construct a general theory of art (nota bene Tomaszewski calls for just such a theory), and they are the effect of fundamental doubts over the possibility of defining essential properties. On the other hand, philosophers often raise the argument that essentialism is burdened with negative connotations; it is also sometimes treated as a dogma, and its advocates do not see the complexity of the world of art that surrounds us.

An important role in Tomaszewski’s model, including from an ontological and methodological point of view, is played by the category of context. I have a fundamental doubt whether the proposed research method, which I would call’

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14 See Arthur Danto, After the End of Art (Princeton, 1997), 139.
additive’, guarantees the anticipated unity of the work and does not distort the significance of context. Tomaszewski suggests that ‘the object [is] interpreted [...] at first immanently [...], but immediately after that also contextually’ [emphasis M. J.] (p. 11). This issue is worth investigating against the wider background that is created by the dispute between advocates of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ methods in the humanities. Quite some time has passed since the decision suspending, or even resolving, that dispute in favour of a communicational method as broadly understood, possessing the capacity to integrate the two aforementioned points of view. Whilst internal methods were based on the notion of autonomous structure, composition, construction or form, analysing all references to reality lying ‘beyond’ the work and apt to have any kind of influence upon it, external methods employed prescriptions deriving from historical, psychological or social geneticism and determinism. The communicational method provides a solution which reconciles the two sides of the methodological debate. It posits that the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ belong to the work to an equal degree, as they are coupled together by the category of the receiver. The receiver, in the ontological sense, is not ‘something’ that is located outside the work, but rather ‘belongs’ to the work. Designed into each work is an addressee of its communicational message. The encoding of the content which constitutes that message, meanwhile, takes place through operations on the syntactic-semantic relations known to and understood or sensed by the emitter and—in the process of interpretation—recognised to a greater or lesser extent by a real receiver, who is the concretisation of the ‘schematic’ receiver inscribed in the design of the work. Of course, the ‘schematic’, ‘ideal’ or ‘imagined’ receiver may be exclusively an object of research and theoretical interpretations, yet each of these interpretations must take account of the fact that the structural-functional side of that object is one of two sides, the other being the real receiver, whose interpretations obviously represent concretisations of the model designed by the author.

An analogous situation exists with context, which in some contemporary theories ceases to function as additional knowledge about the work in respect to the events, facts and processes, etc. which brought the work into existence and accompanied it on its cultural trajectory. In the tradition of humanistic thought, including in musicology, there occur many stances according to which work and context are clearly and unambiguously distinguished. This sort of isolationism, respecting the autonomy of cultural objects and thereby guaranteeing the objective assessment of their place and significance within that culture, must confront accusations of the artificial separation of objects from their context, and also of cognitive idealism. We arrived at a change to this traditional way of thinking from different directions, whilst contextualisms are manifold, and they all (and not they alone) run aground on a reef of reflections both on their place within humanistic cognition as broadly understood and on the problem of values, which they absorb to varying effect. I shall mention here just two solutions: one provided by semiotics, the other associated with the new historicism of Stephen Greenblatt.
In the case in hand, semioticists speak essentially about a specific sign communication. This is unintentional communication, since every musical work communicates ‘something’ about the context, situation, time or circumstances which gave rise to it, which surround it or to which it always ‘somehow’ refers. Of course, one must also consider the case of intentional communication, since the composer may consciously, with a particular purpose in mind—more or less specified, directly or allusively—communicate about some state of affairs. We can say that the music of a particular composer or era always contains signs which indicate or allow us to determine features of the culture or environment from which that music comes and in which it functions. Thus context is not something added to a work in its immanence, a category which admittedly elucidates some, or even many, of the work’s mysteries but lies outside the work and constitutes a subsidiary source of knowledge about it. Context is the ‘cultural space of the work’, inscribed within it as an irremovable part of the work’s ontology, guaranteeing its comprehensive—which does not always mean full—understanding.

Greenblatt, meanwhile, states that ‘the work of art is […] the product of a negotiation between a creator or a class of creators, equipped with a complex, communally shared repertoire of conventions, and the institutions or practices of society’. From the point of view of the composer, the active participant in this negotiation, we can speak of an intended context, intentionally important and given to the interpretational endeavours of the work’s receivers. Such a context would be—one may assume—conventionally presented in a deliberate way, with the use of specific means, the correct reading of which is possible if, of course, we assume the existence of rules of interpretation that justify it. The constituted context, meanwhile, will concern the reader’s interpretational behaviours, placing the work within a set of circumstances—different each time, or unique—which determine its place in the social discourse. A separate problem arises when we wish to interpret the relations into which the two kinds of context enter, as well as the relationship between different theories of context, seen, in particular, in light of the values which pertain to them and the criteria of evaluation which constitute, in the opinion of some scholars, a more primary problem than ontological or cognitive questions.

On the question of values, I shall merely signal that Tomaszewski in his conception, and not just in the text under discussion, postulates the return of axiology to ‘the fold of musicological interests’ (p. 11). I consider this postulate to be one of the most important expectations of every humanistic discipline, and decidedly instructive, as Tomaszewski makes it, for musicology. The question of whether the problem of values, understood in a variety of ways, was expelled with greater or lesser energy from the ‘fold of musicological interests’ in the past or was reinstated within it is chiefly a function of the working of the model of ‘returns’ (Giambattista

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15 Mary Hunter and James Webster, Introduction to Opera buffa in Mozart’s Vienna (Cambridge, 1997), 7–8.
Vico, *La Scienza Nuova*, 1725–44) within the paradigms of disciplines for which one of the fundamental criteria of distinction (science/non-science) and division (natural/human sciences) was and is the attitude towards values and valuation (a similar fate befalls the notion of expression). Tomaszewski speaks of an ebbing and flowing of interest in the question of value in musicology, which seems wholly understandable insofar as we treat changes in scholarly attitudes and paradigms as a cyclical phenomenon. Besides this, there exists, as I have written, the problem of the way in which we understand values and their mutual relations and situating in respect to the object (action), whilst one should bear in mind that such a state of affairs, the attainment of which requires even an unconditional dissociation from any sort of axiological qualification of an object (action), may also be a value, since axiological neutrality is also an attitude towards value. Moreover, it also occurs that the value of a given action is identified with the aim it is intended to achieve, whilst the value of a particular object is identified with its sense or significance in culture, in the system of the arts, or in social reception. After all, alongside questions of values and their relations to the object, that is, music (musical manifestations), we also pose the question of the problem of value in relation to every academic discipline, chiefly in respect to its potential or actual inter- and transdisciplinary connections: from questions of the neutrality of scholarship and its freedom from values, through its social character, which assumes axiological implications, to the ethical dimension of science and the restoration of the role of the committed subject of study.

The fact that we speak increasingly often of a return to values in musicological enquiry, as Tomaszewski notes with a hint of satisfaction, does not determine...
177

Bonum ex integra causa... A dialogue with Mieczysław Tomaszewski’s

how they are to be approached, what role they are to be ascribed in various academic points of view and how we see the relationship between the axiological and ontological status of the ‘work’ and of all other kinds of musical manifestation. These questions take on greater weight when musicology ponders the reorientation of its object of study, involving the direction of attention towards music as performance, and also towards the sphere of musical meanings and their interpretations, as broadly understood. Irrespective of all these important, although frequently complex, issues, two of them are of fundamental significance. The first concerns the relationship of the ontology of the work (musical manifestation) and its value, most commonly aesthetic (Aaron Ridley), but also ethical (Maciej Jabłoński); the second concerns the relationship of value and the criteria of valuation.

Tomaszewski demands, with justifiable determination, that musicology reincorporate expression into the scope of its study of the work, having eliminated it hitherto for various reasons, and especially ‘[…] due to the anxiousness to maintain the “scientific character” of its scholarly procedures’. However, the approach proposed by Tomaszewski requires a brief explanation. He does not consider the notion of expression from the point of view of its fundamental feature: polysemy. This is a question of particular weight in that, depending on how we understand the specific way of communicating that is expression, we may speak of three groups of approach. In my text devoted to music as a means of communication, I write the following: ‘advocates of the first approach recognise in expression the expression of some states of affairs, above all mental states (emotions, moods, feelings). Advocates of the second approach see expression as a process of evoking (arousing, stimulating, generating) mental states in the receiver. Finally, representatives of the third approach treat expression as a state of affairs involving the ascribing to a given object of mental traits, by means of anthropomorphisation, of “emphasising”, or else as a result of properties objectively found in the object. Thus we say, for example, that Ludwig van Beethoven’s sonata is “pathétique” because a) it is a sign of “exaltedness”, b) it is “exalted”, because it evokes specific relations, or c) it is “exalted”, just as a person can be “exalted”. And so expression may be a special case of representation (a face in a portrait expresses anger, but at the same time we can say that anger is represented through particular artistic means) and may also signify action, especially the evoking of particular emotional states (we say that a performance of a given work is expressive, is full of expression, and so that it evokes in the receiver particular emotional states associated with the content which the receiver labels “expressive”). In a certain sense, another dynamic meaning—albeit derived from evocation—of the notion of expression is impression, which concerns exclusively the effects which music causes, the arous-

17 M. Tomaszewski, W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej, op. cit., 17.
18 M. Jabłoński, "Music as a Medium of Communication. Two Visions of Musicology" (with Piotr Podlipniak), Interdisciplinary Studies in Musicology, 7 (2008), 33.
The determining of reactions and attitudes, the determining of gestures, deeds and behaviour (when an anthem is played in a concert, expressivity is associated with patriotic content, whilst impressivity stirs us to react—we stand up).

Initiating his deliberations on ‘integral interpretation’, Tomaszewski draws an appealing image of a plurality of views in musicology referring to the multitude of methods employed and to the fact that while each of them admittedly brings to the subject ‘an aspect, facet or moment’ of the existence of a work, none of them—there is no other way of understanding this—apprehends the work in its ‘plenitude, draws nearer to its essence or reads its message’. Instead, it ‘isolates’, ‘reduces’, ‘selects’ and ‘does not suffice’ (p. 49). ‘Thus dissatisfaction with the feeling of insufficiency is a fact’, writes Tomaszewski, indeed quite rightly, although we know very well that a lack of satisfaction occurring as a result of the insufficiency of methods and tools and their progressive cognitive sterility is not untypical of the situation of scholarship, especially during the second half of the twentieth century (p. 50). Since such is the case, since the clear majority of the methods hitherto applied in musicology render us blind to values, then the postulate of formulating a method which would treat the work in an integral way, taking into account all the aforementioned parameters, with the axiological to the fore, is justified. In order to be realised cognitively, the ‘integral interpretation’ should, on one hand, ‘take account of everything that has been discussed’ and, on the other, ‘rise to the level of the work’ (p. 55). The two conditions enumerated by Tomaszewski form a modal framework for further detailed propositions. As has already been said, Tomaszewski is a firm advocate of musicology which places the musical work at the centre of its thinking, which treats the intentio operis as related to the intentio auctoris, and he does all of this in a methodologically traditional way. He consistently and deliberately employs such terms as the work ‘per se’, ‘in itself’ or ‘as such’, regardless of the fact that it would be extremely difficult to indicate how a work understood in this way exists, and—more importantly—that he does not prove as much within this conception. This is an issue of perhaps fundamental weight, as it concerns the relations between the object and the subject of cognition, and especially the question of whether the object (work) is ‘dependent’ or ‘independent’ in respect to cognition. The rank of this issue rises when we note that Tomaszewski clearly postulates ‘the need to “listen intently” to the work “as such”, to contemplate it’, and so not avoiding epistemological questions. (p. 55) On the question of the subject-object cognitive relationship, Jacek Juliusz Jadacki enumerates three possible stances, defined in various ways by particular philosophers, which boil down to the acknowledgement or not of (1) the self-containedness (non-self-containedness), (2) dependence (independence) and (3) autonomy (non-autonomy) of the object in relation to the subject. Thus we ask whether an object-work ‘in itself’ is self-contained, that is, it does not lose its existence when it ceases to be cognised, or that the opposite is true: the object is not self-contained, that is, it loses its existence when it ceases to be cognised. We ask also whether an object is dependent, which means that the
object-subject cognitive relationship brings changes in the object; contrarily, we will say that ‘an object is independent when no change or property in the subject affects the state of the object’. Finally, we enquire whether an object is autonomous, meaning that it is separate from the subject, that it belongs to the extra-subjective world. Non-autonomy, with a premise worded in this way, would concern solely the subject’s own experiences.

Regardless of what, as a result of our considerations, the answer will be to the question of the self-containedness, dependence and autonomy of the object (work) in respect to the cognitive subject, I would like to know whether, on this question of the work ‘in itself’, Tomaszewski is in any measure a Kantist, which would signify that the work ‘in itself’ was for him and for us outside the bounds of cognition, as a noumenal entity. Such an entity lies beyond our awareness, although it is the cause of a variety of states; perhaps, then, the author of the concept of ‘integral interpretation’ is a continuator of phenomenological thinking? Yet it would not be out of place to ask to what extent Ingarden’s views on the musical work are dependent on the theses contained in his *Spór o istnienie świata* and *Das literarische Kunstwerk* and what influence this fact has on the work of the musicologist. Or perhaps Tomaszewski is—although I do not believe so—a Platonist, like Peter Kivy. However, from a whole succession of utterances on this subject we may deduce that we are dealing here with the direction of essentialist thinking where vertical motion—‘rising to the level of the work’—is a metaphor serving its apotheosis. Tomaszewski admits that this rising which the interpreter is to undertake conditions his arrival ‘at the essence of the thing’, thereby serving the success of the integral interpretation itself (p. 55) For this reason, at least, one should surmise that the definitions of the work which I cite after Tomaszewski have in his conception a more ethical than ontological status.

At this point, we come to another problem, one which I see as fundamental to the whole concept of ‘integral interpretation’. I admit that ethical arguments in favour of the existence of the work ‘as such’, as was the case with E. D. Hirsch’s strategy for the defence of the status and significance of the *intention auctoris*, for example, can be understood, albeit not necessarily shared. However, it is difficult to accept the statement that ‘the method of integral interpretation assumes the need to “listen intently” to a work, “as such”, its contemplation, but at the

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20 Ibid.
21 R. Ingarden, *Spór o istnienie świata* [Dispute over the existence of the world], vol. i (Kraków, 1947), vol. ii (Kraków, 1948).
same time to look at it from a couple of complementary perspectives, which offer a chance of reading what the work has to say to us’ (pp. 55–56). We have here a certain contradiction, the full explanation of which would require discussion with the author, as we do not find it in his texts about ‘integral interpretation’. Tomaszewski writes about the contemplation of the work ‘as such’ as a condition for the success of his method, whilst on the other hand stating that ‘at the same time’ the work should be the object of inspection ‘from a couple of complementary perspectives’, at which we may arrive by employing appropriate principles: complementarity, ontological plenitude, contextuality and hierarchisation. Thus, there occurs a situation in which the contemplation of a work ‘in itself’ is accompanied at the same time by its inspection from perspectives which radically invalidate contemplation. These numerous paths to cognition which should be trodden in order to take in the fullness of the work are contrary to contemplation, although they are undoubtedly attractive and bring us invaluable knowledge about the work. Yet they lead not only to different cognitive effects, but also give different ‘pictures’ of the work. Contemplation, linked by Arthur Schopenhauer to aesthetic experience, forces one to meet particular conditions, as it is disinterested, whereas experience is an aim in itself. It is isolating, passive (the passivity of contemplation was opposed by Ingarden, close to Tomaszewski with his ontology) and demands total concentration. We also talk of contemplation as being ‘inactive’, perception that is immediate and dispassionate and such that holds attention on the object completely and for a long time.

Now let us take a brief look at those perspectives and their defining principles, on which the construct of Tomaszewski’s conception rests. He writes: ‘(1) The principle of complementarity. This is intended to prevent one-sidedness in scholarship. It postulates that we take account of—to put it metaphorically—the other side of the coin. And so not only the logos, but also the ethos of the work. (2) The principle of ontological plenitude. This is directed against the fragmentary perspectives on the work that have hitherto held sway. In most general terms, we are talking about seeing the work in all the natural phases of its existence within the space of culture, from conception to reception. (3) The principle of contextuality. This opposes the excessive isolation of the work. It postulates considering the work within its organic context: biographical, historical and cultural. (4) The principle of hierarchism. This prevents an excessive axiological relativisation of the work. It opposes the omission—when considering the work—of the sphere of its value and sense’ (p. 56) Let us note at once that the principles to which Tomaszewski ascribes such weight and significance are essentially ‘soft’. Their ‘softness’ derives from the fact that 1) they are not sufficiently precise (the author—in principle 1—speaks of logos and ethos, but does not mention what significations of these notions he has in mind, and he also overlooks—why?—pathos. The rhetorical perspective illuminating the meaning of these notions ascribes pathos a crucial role in the process and success of persuasion), 2) Tomaszewski employs such terms as ‘natural phases of
existence’ (principle 2) and ‘organic context: biographical, historical and cultural’ (principle 3), as if they were universally binding, for all forms of musical art. Yet we do not know why these and not other (all?) phases of a work’s existence would be ‘natural’ and what this means, all the more so since one can easily point to examples which do not fulfil these phases, 3) Tomaszewski employs terms which relativise and ‘soften’, which weaken the grounds of the particular principles. This occurs when the author writes of the ‘excessive isolation of the work’ (principle 3) or the ‘excessive axiological relativisation of the work’ (principle 4). But when does the excessive isolation of the work begin and when does it end? Is it when we pass over, for some reason—for example, the lack of data justifying the hypothesis—one of the contexts, for instance the biographical? Isolation is linked to a question persistently raised by many scholars, that of the autonomy of the work, whilst the role of a common denominator which would unite the views in this area (autonomy is spoken of in respect to the laws governing the realm of art, the genesis, structure and value of the work, the method of interpretation and the modes of evaluation) makes it impossible to achieve consent on the question of the criteria on which at least a temporary definition of these notions could be constructed. We also ask—and an answer in this area is even more difficult to come by than in the one before—what is meant by the ‘excessive axiological relativisation of the work’? Does the ‘excess’ in this case concern the removal of the problem of value from the field of vision of musicology in general? Or perhaps it rather constitutes a sort of warning against attempts to bring into question the principle of hierarchism in axiological matters? If so, then on what grounds are we to obey these and not any other value-determining hierarchies and criteria? Do historical criteria alone suffice in this area, as some historians and musicologists maintain? Besides this, in the margins, the problem of value does not necessarily have to be a problem of the ‘value of the work’, as Tomaszewski suggests. It may also, for example, be the ‘value of resonance’, which can be a complex product of the cognition and experiencing of the work by individual and collective receivers. Is axiology indeed inscribed—and if so, then in what way and to what extent (a sort of ‘excess’)?—in the work? Is it a consequence of cognitive processes and—following that—of the sanction which the community or culture produces? Does the restriction introduced by principle 4 apply also to the problem of the reduction of values, for example aesthetic to ethical or vice versa? Finally, ‘sense’ (‘meaning’, sometimes identified simply with the ‘values’ or ‘purposes’ of art) can be possessed by a work that contradicts all the principles, phases and aspects on which Tomaszewski builds his conception. Such a work would, therefore, be ‘senseless’ or would have a different (what?) sense to that which we infer when examining the principles that undergird the ‘integral interpretation’?

From a sensitive reading of the discussions of the principles which, as I understand it, delimit these perspectives on the work as the object of contemplation, I conclude that Tomaszewski’s conception may be termed a spotlight concep-
tion of the musical work and of its analysis and interpretation founded on the postulate of an adequate method, strongly historically orientated and ethically inflected; it is also a conception soi-disant progressive but in fact retrospective, which does not necessarily attest its weakness, particularly when we take into account the axiological dimension to Tomaszewski’s methodological thinking. However, it cannot be said of this method that it is a method for ‘integral interpretation’, since 1) the author does not stipulate what he understands by the term integrity or integral interpretation; this we can only assume; 2) these assumptions do not bring an unequivocal answer to the questions and do not dispel the doubts which are engendered by the content of pt 1; 3) a reconstruction of the concept does not enable us to call it ‘integral’, and my proposal of a rather long-winded name is a sort of makeshift, showing in descriptive mode what is important in that conception. Explaining that makeshift name for Tomaszewski’s conception, I would say that the postulate of an adequate method is expressed directly in this conception and ensues from a diagnosis of the state of musicology in respect to the understanding and the treating of the analysis and interpretation of the musical work and a deep conviction that this state is unsatisfactory, with which we can concur. If, however, we are prepared to admit that scholarship is subject to change and that the life of paradigms is delimited by the phases of normality, that is, the action of the given paradigm, and by ruptures in the phases in the form of revolutions (Thomas Kuhn) or catastrophes (Rene Thom), then the appearance of a new paradigm, for instance as a consequence of the postulate of an adequate method, and so one which would establish the state of affairs ‘once and for all’, is neither possible nor surely desirable (since the adequacy of one approach would place a question mark beside another approach or interpretation which, on different grounds, would also claim the right to adequacy). Tomaszewski is of the opinion that from the premise of the need to seek an adequate method there ensue specific consequences for the obligation of musicology, as he also expresses directly. This is to be served by such steps as defining musicology, delimiting its optimal subject range (the way in which Tomaszewski understands the category of the ‘work’), indicating the neglected areas (value, expression, context, etc.) and the need to engage with other disciplines, yet with the proviso that the aims of the human sciences (in the traditional sense of the term) and the natural sciences are essentially divergent and that their cooperation may be of only meagre benefit to musicologists. Yet most important of all are the reasons for which I call Tomaszewski’s conception ‘spotlight’ and not ‘integral’. For me, there is no doubt that the key to solving this problem is the author’s understanding of the principle of ontological plenitude (pp. 58–60). Thus Tomaszewski again reminds us of his favoured theory of the musical work as formulated by Ingarden, of its basic notions of ‘intentional object’, ‘concretisation’ and ‘indeterminateness’, creating, on the basis of these notions, the thesis that ‘the musical work as a phenomenon manifesting itself in the space of culture’ (p. 58) is of a phasically differentiated character. Writing about phasical-
ity as the way in which the musical work manifests itself in culture, Tomaszewski states that ‘in each of them the interpreter encounters a different kind of object of study (in semiotic terminology, a different kind of “text”).’

One crucial element in the study of the progress of human knowledge which is revealed by this and further passages from Tomaszewski’s article is the attempt to reconcile notions or categories, with the aim of harmonising ideas from different philosophical sources into a single coherent line of reasoning. The incorporation of semiotic terminology, specifically the notion of the ‘text’, which has an extremely wide-ranging polysemy, without indicating what way of interpreting he has in mind, when the author speaks of the interchangeability of the terms ‘a different kind of object of study’ / ‘a different kind of “text”’ arouses interest, since semioticty, and in particular a semiotic understanding of the ‘text’, would be quite apt here if from this methodological decision, and not a simple equivalence of terms, we drew consequences, for example, for the articulation of the role of the receiver and the interpretation of the aesthetic object in the process of cognising the musical work. If Tomaszewski, at the very beginning of his argumentation which initiates a description of the phases and of the terminology ascribed to them, designates a semiotic point of reference for each of the ‘texts’ (there are four phases and four texts), then those consequences could encompass all the phases/texts, and not just the final phase, when reference is made to the ‘sign object, that is, the symbolic text’. However, since that is his choice, I would willingly ask why ‘sign’=‘symbolic’ and not, for example, ‘iconic’, given that—say—‘reception’, ‘decoding’ and ‘verbalisation’ through and within the framework of a given culture may concern a relationship of an iconic or indexical character, or all at the same time (indeed, such an order would give that ‘moment of integrity’ which is sought by Tomaszewski in his conception, as it is based on the integral function of the triad in Charles S. Peirce’s

It is not clear to me why Tomaszewski introduces here the notion of the ‘text’, availing himself of its semiotic interpretation. Semiotics generally understands the ‘text’ as a sort of macro-unit, governed by specific generative rules, not infrequently absorbing the elementary-level units that are signs. See Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington, 1979), 12 (we might also turn, for example, to Lotman’s definition of the text: Juri Lotman, *Struktura tekstu artystycz- nego*, trans. Anna Tanalska (Warsaw, 1984), 76–81 [Eng. trans. as *The Structure of the Artistic Text*, trans. Gail Lenhoff and Ronald Vroon, Michigan Slavic Contributions, 7 (Ann Arbor)]). Let us remember that the problem of the ‘text’ is vividly present, for example, in anti-structuralist semiotics, thanks to Roland Barthes, who, *nota bene*, wrote many times on the subject of music. Let us note, however, that the clear separation of ‘work’ and ‘text’ has extensive consequences. In the case of the ‘work’, we have either the standard philological reading or a context-anchored hermeneutic reading. The interdisciplinariness of Barthes’s approach, with its concentration on the ‘text’, shows its inexhaustible energy, since the ‘text’ is in constant motion, continually produced and reproduced in readers’ interpretations. The theory of the text, as Barthes sees it, ‘brings with it [...] the promotion of a new epistemological object: the reading. [...] Full reading [...] is the kind in which the reader is nothing less than the one who desires to write, to give himself up to an erotic practice of language.’ See Roland Barthes, *The Theory of the Text*, trans. Robert Young in his *Untying the Text* (Boston and London, 1981), 42.
system of the triad of the Categories and semiotic triads/trychotomies). Meaningfulness (and thence meaning-creativity) appears at all the stages or phases of cognition, even those which do not participate in the conscious and rationalised part of the whole complex process about which Tomaszewski writes: from the genesis of the work to its function and role in culture and in the transcultural circulation of musical codes and meanings.

I am also intrigued by the division of the process in which the musical work ‘manifests itself in the space of culture’. The organisation of this process, which assumes four phases, constitutes an economical model, ousting from our field of vision other phases which—as might perhaps be acceptable to Tomaszewski, inclined as he is towards hierarchic thinking—would create with the phases originally proposed a sort of hierarchic arrangement. I would see such a ‘new’ organisation of phases supported by certain criteria which I would most readily construct on triads, of which one of the elements would always bear the name ‘between’ (the Platonic metaxu). This attempt might not quickly succeed, however, as the ‘between’ will be rejected by the proponents of scientism, whilst conciliatory methodological centrists will be amused by the time lost on seeking it. ‘Between’ signifies here fluidity, ‘not yet one thing, but already not another’, ‘transition’, ‘instability’, but also ‘mediation’ and ‘boundary crossing’. Finally: ‘intermediacy’; let us just recall that this is precisely the cognitive situation that Heinrich Heine had in mind when defining music as a poetical intermediary ‘between’ spirit and matter. Thomas L. Elliot apotheoses ‘between’ in his *The Hollow Man*:26

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the shadow
[...]
Between the conception
And the creation
Between the emotion
And the response
Falls the shadow
[...]

So we would be dealing with a sense of dwindling, of the subsiding of a given segment of one phase and the rising of the next, which in its stabilised part will

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25 ‘The mode that is proper to existence is intermediacy – and we will never be capable of distinguishing whether it is a mode of cognition or being...’, Andrzej Falkiewicz *Istnienie i metafora* [Existence and metaphor] (Warsaw, 1996), 427.

take on a quite easily recognisable profile (for example, the phase of creation is certainly divided into the pre-conceptual and conceptional sub-phases; the participation of consciousness is decisive here, and so their theoretical, at least, differentiation is apt and justified).

In writing about a ‘phase of conception’, in which ‘the work is an intentional object, i.e. the musical text constituted by the composer’, Tomaszewski effects the following procedures: a) he equates, for reasons unknown, the Ingardenian intentional object with the semiotic interpretation of the musical text, b) he overlooks the constitutive role of the schema, at both the stage of creation and in that ‘between’ which links the composer designing the schema with the performers/receivers who concretise that schema. The possibility of ‘fleshing out’ the schema and the way in which the subjectively active concretisation takes place connect the sphere of performance (the phase of artistic realisation) with the sphere of reception (the phase of aesthetic perception), but also distinguishes them. The activity of the performer, who ‘brings [the work] to life’, does not correspond to a lack of activity on the part of the receiver, in whom, allegedly, ‘some tonal text of the work is constituted’, and nothing more. (p. 58) These two phases are filled with activity on the part of admittedly most often different subjects, equipped with different cognitive tools, competences, habits, preferences or value systems, but in both cases they are sense-generative activities, as in the case of the composer. To treat the receiver as a subject who merely decodes, without imparting to the messages/signs sent by the composer his own meanings, often impossible to foresee, is to belittle the problem of ‘musical sense’ as a domain of the whole of man’s musical activity. It would be worth, therefore, following through this crucial thread, as it unquestionably—insofar as we demand it—serves to integrate the entire process, all the phases. Finally, the phase of conception (as the name suggests) does not take account of the fact that part of the creative process has an unconscious character, and so we cannot speak of ‘conception’. Let us further draw attention to the fact that Tomaszewski completely passes over the admittedly extremely complex question of the ‘source’ of art/the work which ‘lies’ beyond the phase of conception—understood as the intuitively-intellectually decisive phase: the aim, the strategy, the choice of means and their coherence—that contains a complex of factors arising from these premises. Irrespective of how Ingarden—on whom Tomaszewski frequently relies—wrestles with this problem, it exists particularly there, where we examine the essential dimension of art and what Martin Heidegger discussed in his conception of the ‘Source’ (*Ursprung*), understood as the ‘beginning’, ‘genesis’, ‘provenance’, but also as an Enigma or Mystery which concerns not only the source but also that which issues from it.27 The sourceness of the work would be a universal and philosophically weighty question, the germ

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or nucleus of every—always unitary—creative process, the intricacies of which elude unequivocal cognition. For the scholar of interpretation, this question is of primary importance, since becoming an object generates the capacity for being a sign, although in order to become a sign an object must point to itself as a sign, must be ‘interpretable as a sign’. Wojciech Kalaga differentiates here *inchoative interpretability*, that is, pure, germinal interpretability, being a significal capacity (a source capacity, as we would say) from *effective interpretability*, and so ‘interpretability as’.28

The designation of the second phase (artistic realisation) and third phase (perception) as ‘emitting’ and the next two phases (perception and reception) as ‘receiving’ is another oversystematic treatment of the content which stands behind these terms. Performance, artistic interpretation, is a process in which perception plays an equally important role as in the case of the receiver (non-performer), although it does serve other purposes. The tension ‘between’ the schema and the concretisation is of a dual nature here. At the same time it both results from the realisation of a certain theoretical premise which Ingarden formulated, but it also leads to the constituting of an aesthetic object *in concreto*. Thus emissive activity takes place along the path leading from the composer, through the work, the performer and the receiver in the direction of what we may generally and vaguely call reception, which concerns both the performer and the receiver. The receiver is inscribed in the work, as we know from the general tenets of communication theory, and the composer is also a receiver, relatively aware of the resonance of his music and also more or less actively coexisting with various forms of the circulation of art, which bring him knowledge of the system of the values shared within a given milieu, group or community. Of course, this simplified schema assumes the transparency of circulation and the clarity of forms, which in the case of many of the forms and institutions of contemporary culture, the overproduction of simulacra and the ubiquitous manipulation which renders the efficacy of communication dependent upon a compromise ‘between’ the person (composer, performer, receiver) and the code, is an almost unattainable effect (for example, the so-called ‘noise composers’ and music created from processed interference on recordings of traditional musical works).

The phase of reception is particularly—perhaps alongside the phase of ‘conception’—debatable. Firstly, as already mentioned, we have here reference to semiotic terminology (sign object, symbolic text), from which Tomaszewski fails to draw quite obvious conclusions. Secondly, Tomaszewski clarifies cultural reception as intersubjective and objectivised. In cultural theories, these two words mean roughly the same, unless we assume that cultural products are in essence biocultural phenomena. I would prefer to speak of intersubjectivity and conventionality, since the second of these terms makes us aware of the crucial processes of the st

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28 Wojciech Kalaga, *Mgławice dyskursu* [Fuzzy discourse] (Kraków, 2001), 143.
abilisation→conventionalisation / destabilisation→deconventionalisation of the actions and products of culture, and so a) refers to strictly cultural processes, b) defines the field of activity within the scope of the norm or system and indicates when and in what circumstances the artist declares himself against norms and systems, c) allows us to observe changes to that which Boris Asafiev calls the musical intonational dictionary of the era and d) reveals the germs of new criteria for the valuation of some artistic phenomena to the detriment of others.

Thirdly, I am interested by the processes of verbalisation about which Tomaszewski writes so laconically. The question of language on music, be it from the perspective of its historical changes and opposing paradigms, the angle of the dominance of the ‘subjective’ over tendencies to consign vague notions to the margins of study, or in order to find in music that which is general versus that which is specific and material (philosophical musicology versus technical musicology,) is for me a key factor in present-day considerations of music. The question as to whether we can say something important about music without reference to empirically hard evidence, in practice obtained by means of specific analytical methods, is a question which in a somewhat different rhetoric was posed in the 1920s by Charles Seeger and which remains current today (George Steiner, Pascal Quignard, Emile Cioran). Fascinating for the musicologist is the observation and recognition of the implacable mechanism of the birth and working of that something resembling a lie which, for the lack of other possibilities, we cultivate, namely the translation of musical Mystery into language—almost irrespective of whether it be the language of learning or any other language. Yet the virtue of these processes of verbalisation is that they allow our experience of music to be an object of dialogue with other people. Whilst experience itself is something private and intimate, meaning belongs to the realm of that which is public and may be the object of various forms of communication.

Fourthly, and lastly, Tomaszewski chose to restrict the processes of encoding, decoding and verbalisation in relation to the symbolic text to that culture in which it ‘arose and to which it was addressed’ (p. 59). This step is regrettable, since the problem of reception, particularly when we speak of the contemporary multiplicity of artistic practices, should be treated not only as a manifestation of the vitality of the native culture to which works created with that intention belong. Also crucial here is the axis between the native culture or homeland of a given symbolic text and the culture(s) which takes up, adapts and challenges those texts, which makes them an object of play, manipulation and reflection. In the phase of reception, we are never dealing with a ‘holistic approach’ to the work (p. 59), since the phase of reception—both intra- and intercultural—is endless; the multitude of ‘stations’ (particular ‘interpretations’) along that path are items of evidence of the work of sense/meaning, and they contribute to the processes of the stabilisation or destabilisation of the established order. From the brief discussions set out above, it emerges quite clearly that the order of phases in Tomaszewski is limited
fourfold. One, through the closure to the ‘pre-conceptional’, ‘source’ problem; two, the closure concerns the ‘sensotropic’ sphere, particularly in relation to the receiver; three, it is linked to the restriction of the role of musical meanings to one single phase; and the fourth limitation arises when the work of senses/meanings is reduced to the cultural area proper to the given symbolic text.

Time now to account for my decision to call Tomaszewski’s conception a spot-light conception. Well, this spotlightness signifies here, as is self-evident, the lack of that which integrates, and so of the denominator to which the author and his commentators could reduce, and from which they could extract, all the ontological forms of the ‘work’, as is suggested by the chapter on the principle of ontological plenitude. The interpreter in Tomaszewski’s conception deals each time with an object (‘a different kind of research object’, as Tomaszewski writes) which he must illuminate by means of different tools, arising from different assumptions regarding the nature of that object, and using different terminology. When turning the spotlight on one of the objects submerged in the particular phases—objects distinguished with greater or lesser precision—we leave the others in the shade, awaiting their turn, for the spotlight to move. Between these assumptions, tools and terminological apparatus there is no equivalence; they concern different ontological domains. A different picture, created with different tools, appears when we speak of the pre-conceptional phase and the phase of the reception of the symbolic text as part of intercultural exchange. A different picture again is obtained when interpreting an acoustic text from the phase of aesthetic perception and another when we focus on the work as intentional entity in relation to its tonal and non-tonal components; nota bene I do not know why Tomaszewski attributes ‘aestheticality’ to the phase of perception alone, although aisthesis pervades all the stages in the shaping of the work and its manifestations in culture. This spotlight-ness, and by consequence the ‘separateness’ of the points of view defined by the ‘turns of the spotlight’, revealing ‘separate’, distinct objects of study, is not a fault in Tomaszewski’s conception if we draw from it the right conclusions. The author is correct in pointing to the need for a multi-faceted approach to the musical work, to the variety of perspectives, the use of which can only enhance the richness of the picture that emerges from each cognitive contact with a work of musical art. As to the value of such an attitude, no musicologist can have any doubt. Spotlightness, as I understand it, also assumes something more—a play of light and shade in a dual sense. When the spotlight falls on one of the objects (phases, texts, aspects, etc.), the others plunge into darkness or—at best—are eclipsed and weakened by the shadow that arises on the periphery of the luminosity, in the action of which that object and no other has found itself. So what does this mean for the other objects (their multitude is evoked by Tomaszewski), which, after all, in keeping with the premises of the integral method, should (unceasingly) remain in the light, in order to make evident the action of the principle of ‘unity in diversity’ exemplified by the musical work integrated in all the phases of its manifestation in culture?
The problem does not go away. Tomaszewski not only seeks integrity, but also calls his method integral, arousing understandable interest and a need for questions as to what underpins this integrity. The lack of an answer admittedly does not make the task of reconstruction any easier for us. Perhaps Tomaszewski tacite assumes the existence of ‘some’ form of integrity—based on sources, pre-constitutive in relation to that which this integrity concretises and maintains. But we can go further and point to several possibilities, the perception and consideration of which would—perhaps—lead to the constitution of an integral method based on clear premises. A helping hand here is extended by Tomaszewski himself, when he places the notion of the ‘text’ (in the semiotic sense of the word, as he himself stipulates) at the centre of his repertoire of notions—alongside the phases. Were we to advance one step further, although without predicking on the notion of the ‘text’ (in this convention it is more of a hindrance than a help), but on the sign, and so turning to pansemioticism, then the first restrained hypothesis would read as follows: adopting a pansemiotic attitude would make it possible to obtain in the category of the sign, or even better of the sign-triad, an integrating category, since, as the rule says, a sign as a sign in potentia requires its object (music→extra-musical reality) and interpretant (Piercean pragmatics places no little emphasis on this aspect of semiotic processes). This triple relationship, the ties imposed by semiotics as Wissenschaftslehre, creates an unbroken sequence of mediations, as is worth remembering, particularly when speaking about the phasic manifestation of the work in culture, and especially about the sphere of reception. Continual mediation, occurring via the intermediary of the sign, precludes any closure of the sphere of reception in either the time or the space of a given culture. Quite the opposite: it renders reception irrepressibly dynamic and creative. Tomaszewski could have turned to pansemioticism, with its integrating function of the sign; I believe, however, that he preferred not to, since adopting such an option would have meant accepting that—to put it trivially—‘everything could mean everything’.

As a consequence, Tomaszewski would have granted the receiver in essence the unconstrained, or only slightly restricted, possibility of creating meanings not necessarily concordant with the intentio operis or intentio auctoris; the desideratum of rising to the level of the work would become radically weakened, and the whole situation would incur the label of a postmodernistic revolt. On another occasion, I wrote on this matter the following: ‘In juxtaposing Ferenc Liszt’s Consolatio and Fryderyk Chopin’s etudes, which continue to “stimulate and move”, with Włodzimierz Kotoński’s Study for one strike of a cymbal, which at most raises an eyebrow and ‘a chuckle’, Tomaszewski assumes, although he does so covertly, that sense works in one direction alone: from the work to the receiver. Yet he does not take into account the fact that there exists an extensive area of the working of sense which acts in the opposite direction: to the work from the receiver. Every work of art or, more broadly, every aesthetic object has an ‘open’, in some fundamental sense ‘incomplete’, status, and sense-generative processes running
from the receiver to the work can be unpredictable. The senses which appear as a result of such processes cannot be derived from the work; they are not expected by the receiver himself, and not assumed by the composer. This state of affairs by no means results from a deviational character to the syntactic and/or semantic design of the work or a strategy of deception consciously programmed by the composer to show up the receiver’s lack of competence (in an extreme instance, to ridicule him), but the very nature of the open work, of every work of art.29

Donald Davidson’s charity principle recommends treating the text we are interpreting kindly, even if we draw attention to its more or less significant shortcomings. One crucial element in this strategy is the proposing of possible ways of accounting for the weaknesses spotted in the interpreted text. All the more reason, then, as I see it, to point to the benefits that could accrue from indicating the areas around which philosophical thought guides us, ascribing to the notion of ‘integrity’ a wide range of content. I shall enumerate just a few of these, without subjecting them to detailed analysis, since that task passes beyond the framework set for my text. Irrespective of the possible solution proposed a few paragraphs ago, namely that of pansemioticism with its integrating role of the sign-triad, with account taken of the premise of synechism, that is, the continuity of cognition, I see the following significations of the notion of ‘integrity’ which for both historical and philosophical reasons might be applicable:

• The integrity of all things, derived from the argument of the harmony and symmetry of the cosmos, united by a musical ideal. Let us recall that this is exactly what Hermann Hesse’s creation Lü Bu We had in mind in The Glass Bead Game: ‘Perfect music has its cause. It arises from equilibrium. Equilibrium arises from righteousness, and righteousness arises from the meaning of the cosmos.’30 Music, which permeates the universe and man, becomes the object of a cult shaping the life of man in everyday harmony, purity (the aforementioned clarity gains a further significance) and closeness to the truth.

• Integrity from the perspective of the hierarchy of entities, of which the fundamental entity has an integrating power.

• The integrity which signifies the original indivisibility of sensory cognition into the separate senses: ‘original unity broken up into the imperfection of the senses’.31

• The integrity of existence orientated towards special kinds of value and emotional involvement, without which the cognition and comprehension of

31 Maria Podraza-Kwiatkowska, "O muzycznej i niemuzycznej koncepcji poezji" [On a musical and non-musical conception of poetry], in Muzyka w literaturze [Music in literature] ed. A. Hejmej (Kraków, 2002), 49.
Bonum ex integra causa... A dialogue with Mieczysław Tomaszewski’s reality becomes impossible; the integrating role would therefore be fulfilled by inner experience. Tomaszewski’s phrase ‘I experience, therefore I am’ could testify in favour of this interpretation.

- The integrity of word and deed, the concordance of the intention and the sense of the work, and so authenticity (some even prefer to speak of ‘truth’); authenticity—excellence: the integritas – consonantia – perfectio of Aquinas, whom Tomaszewski readily invokes?32

Each of the meanings of the notion of ‘integrity’ invoked here, and all the others for which space was wanting, could acquire reflections of quite sizeable proportions. However, two solutions seem worthy of particular attention. The first is based on the ontological interpretation of integrity, whilst the second is connected to the category of experience. The application of the premises of theories of integral ontology (e.g. that of Andrzej Chmielecki) to musicology requires not only consideration but also a hefty dose of boldness, given the nature of our subject—music, which makes any sort of consideration on the subject of its ontological status engender doubts and at times even disappointments (this was demonstrated by Zofia Liśa and other critics of Ingarden’s theory, it was shown by Ridley in a dispute with advocates of ‘identity’ conceptions of the musical work, and it is indicated by the debate between Platonist and anti-Platonist philosophers that was carried on a few years ago on the pages of The British Journal of Aesthetics).33

Assuming for a moment that an attempt at such an application might succeed, one should enumerate at least a few of the premises of integral ontology, the first of which is considered fundamental. This is the premise that there exists some basic entity, One, from which many arise, which ensures continuity and determines the transformations and multiplication of that which is Primary. Such thinking has its deeply historically-rooted justification in the form of the Great Chain of Being, ‘composed of an immense, or—by the strict but seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle of continuity—of an infinite, number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kinds of existents, which barely escape non-existence, through “every possible” grade up to the ens perfectissimum’.34 Leszek Nowak, a philosopher particularly close to my own way of thinking on the postulates of the interpenetration of philosophy and literature and the links between art and science (poetry and idealistic method in science) approaches the problem of a distinguished basic entity in the following way: ‘A variety of metaphysical doctrines fall within a certain common structure. First they identify entities which exist, and

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32 Paweł Taranczewski, “Estetyka ekstatyczna i normatywna Władysława Stróżewskiego” [Władysław Stróżewski’s ecstatic and normative aesthetic], Krytyka i estetyka, 5/2 (2003), 194. The term ‘ecstatic and normative aesthetic’ would certainly also largely suit Mieczysław Tomaszewski’s way of thinking about values, the work and musicology, which is keenly interested in ontology and aesthetics.


then they postulate the relationship in which something must stand to something which has already been deemed an entity in order to be deemed an entity itself.\textsuperscript{35} Nowak clarifies that ‘the history of European philosophy adheres to a certain line of development’, marked by four paradigms: the ‘realcentric’ (the basic entities are external to man and may be both material and ideal), ‘theocentric’ (the absolute is the only basic entity), ‘anthropocentric’ (man occupies the place of things, ideas or God; this paradigm was fixed by Descartes in his \textit{cogitationes}, ‘and the existence of everything else […] must be deducible from the original premise of the existence of the human I’\textsuperscript{36}) and ‘sociocentric’, in which the basic entity is a collectivity, and not a single person. Nowak, studying the memorably inspiring, albeit controversial, thought of Andrzej Falkiewicz, adds ‘subjectocentricism’, derived from that thought, where the primary entity is ‘I’, the ‘subjectum’, the ‘individual’. Two modest quotes from Falkiewicz’s views show what the Poznań philosopher had in mind: ‘living in the world, I am already together with it, always \textit{I am it}. And so the problem of being of the world is above all a problem of \textit{me being}, the only intimate problem which I resolve competently and in my own name’; ‘[…] that which I cognise as a private person and which I study as a humanist, biologist, physicist and microphysicist is a network of subjective and objective relations, a product of relationships about which my own relationship with the world can give me an approximate—yet the only available—idea.’\textsuperscript{37} Availing ourselves of a few random examples, we would say that the realcentric paradigm (materialistic variant) would embrace the view of Nelson Goodman, who posited in \textit{Languages of Art} that the ‘score thus defines the work’ and that ‘complete compliance with the score is the only requirement for a genuine instance of a work’.\textsuperscript{38} Peter Kivy, meanwhile, suggests that musical works are generalities, pre-compositional tonal structures of a sort, the performances of which are their embodiments or signs; Kivy thus places himself within the same paradigm, but in the idealistic variant. Marxist theories, meanwhile, including the theory of reflection, will be placed within the sociocentric paradigm (some theories advanced by anthropologists could also be located here, as well as within the anthropocentric paradigm, from John Blacking’s ‘How musical is Man?’ and Wolfgang Suppan’s ‘Das musizierende Mensch’ to theses formulated by cognitivists or biomusicologists. Let us note that the anthropocentric, or more neatly anthropotelic,\textsuperscript{39} paradigm abounds in \textit{loci commune} with the sociocentric paradigm, on account, among other things, of the integrating role of the

\textsuperscript{35} Leszek Nowak, “Zagadka punktu wyjścia” [The conundrum of the point of departure], \textit{Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Humanistyki}, 18, Mass., 43.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Andrzej Falkiewicz, \textit{Istnienie i metafora}, (Wrocław, 1996), 156, 168.
\textsuperscript{38} Nelson Goodman, \textit{Languages of Art} (Indianapolis, 1976), 178, 186.
Bonum ex integra causa... A dialogue with Mieczysław Tomaszewski’s cognitive triad of ‘senses – reason – faith’ which Pitirim Sorokin regarded as the basic components of his theoretical system known in sociology as ‘integralism’).

In Chmielecki’s opinion, integral ontology is ‘the most general theory of reality’, and the notion of being has a contextual character, which means that it assumes the existence of other entities; ‘[...] the existence of some entity is at once necessarily its coexistence with other entities’, he writes. From the point of view of integral ontology and its premises, which was my point of departure here, it is important to correctly interpret the entity composed of ‘essence’ and ‘existence’, defined by factors of determination (these determine what an entity is—its essence, including the essence of music) and factors of realisation (these, in turn, determine the existence of an entity, that is, its appearance and duration, including the existence of music, the Ingardenian ‘musical work as a phenomenon manifesting itself in the cultural space in a phasically differentiated way’). These factors could also serve—if we accepted and developed the premises of integral ontology—the reality of art, which is the bearer of values; Chmielecki speaks about this, although he treats values as ideal entities, distinguished from empirical products. The heart of the problem lies in the fact that such values fulfil neither the criterion of acting or being a source of changes in something else, for example in the relationship ‘art’-’man’, nor the criterion of being an object of effect, that is, being altered by outside action. Finally, it is time to note that integral ontology grants existential fundamentality to some form of physical, although not necessarily material, existence and treats the ultimate establishing of that which exists in the form of some ideal entity (the differences between Chmielecki and Nowak on this matter would require a separate discussion). On this last issue, Chmielecki writes: ‘thus the “establishing” of something is that by which that something is defined, it is the source of its essential properties, its being something specific’; it falls to us, therefore, to consider the question as to which of the external determinants ‘establishes’, is the source of the essential properties of art, and of music in particular, since both are encompassed by ‘the most general theory of reality’, that is, integral ontology.

A separate—and striking—issue arises from Nowak’s subjectocentrism, namely experience—most probably inner experience (Tomaszewski’s ‘I experience, therefore I am’). This problem is all the more striking in that the figures of the critical

Besides this, Zachariasz distinguishes the ‘cosmocentric’ paradigm, which could contain the first of the meanings of ‘integrity’ enumerated in the present article and supplement Nowak’s list.

41 Ibid, 66, 72. A conception of integral ontology constructed in this way would not, therefore, encompass the view of music according to which it possesses the capacity to affect the receiver, or it should be said at least that this capacity is not connected with the sphere of values (expression—in one of the meanings of this notion—as a value).
42 Ibid, 65.
thought of our times which serve to break up the identity ‘I’ include the dismantling of the Cartesian cogito and also Lacan’s assertion that ‘I’ does not exist, but only occurs, most commonly ‘in brief moments of perfect anarchy, of discontinuity’.

The propositions for extreme solutions, born in contemporary culture, such as a particular kind of experience of reading which weakens the subject, leading to its reinterpretation (as in Thomas the Obscure, by Maurice Blanchot, for whom experience is transcendence and destabilisation), collide with attempts—drawn from a completely different perspective—to reconstitute the Schopenhauerian contemplation, or the Schellingian ‘blessed silence’, reflection on oneself and removing the questions of art from the jurisdiction of time, located within Bohrer’s concept of an absolute present. These and other views, such as Charles Taylor’s considerations of the subjectivity of language and the understanding—Romantic in spirit—of that which is individual, exemplify the problem of experience as a task for contemporary human science, with particular focus on such questions as ‘modernity as experience’, ‘the immediacy of experience’ (Eggebrecht writes that the experiencing of music, like no other art form, is imbued with immediacy), ‘the extinction of experience’, ‘the uncertainty of experience’, ‘cognition – apprehension – experiencing’, or finally the ‘discursive mediation of experience’. The tension that is expressed in the relations ‘between [...] experiential immediacy and [...] the discursive mediation of that experience’ constitutes, regardless of the evaluation of that state of affairs, one of the main—and still inspiring—points of reference for the inevitably polyphonic debate on the role of experience in our cognition and experiencing of the world, including art. Perceiving the category of experience from the perspective of the ‘third modernity’ (Stephen Toulmin’s term) not only imposes the above questions, which ignite discussions of the elusiveness of the object of reflection, and even its inaccessibility or the limits of its extremity (e.g. representations of the Holocaust). These discussions very often draw on the wide-ranging etymology of this notion, pointing to semantic fields created in the history and practice of various languages, referring to such meanings as ‘being in passage’ and ‘openness to boundless space’, ‘perception and knowledge’, ‘intentional action’, and finally, most crucially, ‘putting oneself to the test’, describing the possible negative consequences of our contact with the world, the uncertainty and fear which are the result of sensory participation and action, including the

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45 Martin Jay, "Granice doświadczenia granicznego" [The limits of critical experience], in M. Kwiek (ed.), Nie pytajcie mnie, kim jestem. Michel Foucault dzisiaj [Don’t ask me who I am. Michel Foucault today] (Poznań, 1998), 59.
gaining or accumulating of experience, in the world (a motif employed in the deconstructionist concepts of experience of Blanchot and Jacques Derrida).46

Therefore, musicology in respect to modernity has also to consider the problem of experience in all its subtle riches, certainly not reduced merely to the laws of perception and to conclusions issuing from reflection and research conducted as part of the ‘biomusicology paradigm’. The discussion of the figures of subjectivity carried on, by no means furtively, by Carolyn Abbate47 and Karol Berger48 and in the text by Ridley already cited several times here, rejecting ontology in favour of aesthetics, that is, performance and its experiencing, are good examples of the interest in this problem among musicologists. The question of the immediacy of the experiencing of music and its discursive fruits is not exclusively a dilemma of post-modern humanists, as it was discussed in the 1920s by Charles Seeger, fully aware of the gulf that arises between experience of music and its verbalisation. The American musicologist firmly maintained that ‘musical knowledge’, which arises as part of the process of practising music, of intimate and intuitive contact with it, never translates satisfactorily into ‘knowledge about music’, which helps to form the foundations of the science that musicology would be. Thus musical experience is experience of music, and not triggered by music. In this context, it is worth noting the words of Leo Tolstoy, which reflect another very interesting example of experience: ‘While I listened [to the music of Chopin – MJ], I became as one with Chopin; I felt as if I had composed the piece myself’.49 Kendall Walton, for his part, develops this idea of the artist, confirming us in the conviction of the extraordinary, but also mysterious, nature of this experience: ‘I feel intimate with the music – more intimate, even, than I feel with the world of the painting. The word of the painting (...) is out there, something I observe from an external perspective. But it is as though I am inside the music, or it is inside me. [...] a most personal and subjective manner.’ (Marcia Herndon calls this phenomenon ‘flow’). Thus we speak about reception, about experience in which the subject ‘merges’ with the object, is unable to build any distance in respect to it, cannot distinguish himself and music as two independently existing entities. We also speak about reception which absorbs the listener, his whole physical being and awareness, to such an extent that he does not notice the world around him.50

46 Ryszard Nycz, "O nowoczesności jako doświadczeniu" [On modernity as experience], Teksty Drugie, 2006/3, 8–9. See also Barbara Skarga, Kwintet metafizyczny [Metaphysical quintet] (Kraków, 2005), 120, and Andrzej Leśniak, Blanchot, Derrida. Topografie doświadczenia [Blanchot and Derrida. The topography of experience] (Kraków, 2003), 7–8 (the etymology cited here also includes ‘danger’, ‘boundary’ and ‘threat’).


48 Karol Berger, "Musicology according to Don Giovanni, or: should we get drastic?", Journal of Musicology, 22/3 (2005), 490–501.

49 George Marek and Maria Gordon-Smith, Chopin (New York, 1978), 246.

This kind of experience can certainly be called ‘integral’, due to the sense of the unity, the indivisibility of the two entities: the musical work and the receiver. Understood in this way, integrity takes on a special dimension, if we take into account the case of the artistic performance of a musical work or even the inspiring concept of ‘music as performance’, willingly discussed today. ‘Between the script of the score […] and us lies a huge, phenomenal explosion, performance’, writes Abbate. Phenomenal in that it has an ethical dimension, although ethicality is here in some sense confined to the sphere which is enclosed on one hand by the rules and norms of the profession and on the other by the integrity of the performer (e.g. in respect to the intentio auctoris, if we ascribe to this instance a central, or at least a significant, role in the hierarchy of the sources of musical sense). This sort of integrity is ‘weaker’ than integrity in the strictly moral sense—that which we consider as referring to the value of virtue and to the identity of man. Hence reference to the quasi-moral character of ‘integrity as a professional integrity’ of musical performance.

From this, as from the earlier examples of the phenomenon of integrity and of the ways in which it is conceptualised, it ensues quite clearly that it has numerous connections with the sphere of the ontology of the musical work (one would ask if this applies only to the work of music as traditionally understood. How—if at all—should we interpret the ‘integrity’ of those musical manifestations which on principle oppose the substance of this notion, just as they oppose the categories of ‘unity’ or ‘identity’—in the theoretical sense or in the philosophical sense, as Ridley would have it?), with the sphere of cognition and experiencing on all the levels of their organisation (emotional, intellectual) and in respect to all the participants in musical communication (individual/community, composer/performer/receiver, critic and scholar, who is only seemingly capable of extricating himself from the subjective context of justifying his theoretic assertions). Finally, the notion of integrity also has connections in the axiological sphere, particularly in the relationship of aesthetic to ethical values. To the question ontology or aesthetics? aesthetics or ethics? cognition or experience? I do not seek an answer here, as I have doubts as to whether such an explanation, although desirable for disinterestedly enquiring science, would resolve any of the blessed riddles set us by the art of music.

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