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GLOBALISATION
Re-Reading its Impact on the Nation-State, the University, and Educational Policies in Europe

INTRODUCTION
The paper re-reads the complex and changing relationships between the university and the nation-state, and between national and supranational (EU-level) educational policies in Europe. It is focusing on long-term consequences of globalisation-related pressures on European nation-states with respect to national educational policies. It assesses the indirect impact of globalisation on European universities (via reformulating the role of the nation-state in the global economy), and a direct impact of Europeanisation – as a regional response to globalisation – on universities (via new EU-level discourse on the changing role of universities in knowledge economy). New educational policies promoted at the EU-level are viewed as de-linking the nation-states and public universities. The paper re-reads the changing institution of the nation-state and its changing educational policies in the context of globalisation (sections 2 and 3) and in the specific, regional context of Europeanisation (section 4). It follows from presenting three major positions taken in the literature with respect to transformations of the nation-state under globalisation to presenting the process of de-linking traditional universities and the nation-state and its practical dimension at the EU level at which the role of universities is viewed from the perspective of larger social and economic agenda (called the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs). The major lesson to be drawn from this re-reading exercise is that there are complex and often contradictory relationships between globalisation as a process affecting the nation-states, changing national educational policies, and national and EU-level policies – which all transform the future role(s) of European universities. In sum, current challenges European universities face, and current policy solutions European governments suggest, are best viewed in the overall context of globalisation. National governments are responding to both globalisation and Europeanisation: policies and strategies they produce, instruments they use, and contradictions they cope with are best re-read in this context.

Historically, modern states came to be nation-states because they triumphed in war, were (relatively) successful economically and won legitimacy in the eyes of their populations and other states (Held, 1995, pp. 71–72). The sovereignty of the state meant also – in the European context – the sovereignty of national educational policies and full state support for nation-state oriented universities (from their inception, especially in a German-inspired so-called 'Humboldtian' model, as

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modern institutions closely linked to modern nation-states). The university used to provide the modern nation-state with “a moral and spiritual basis” and professors were the representatives of the nation (Delanty, 2001, p. 33). National education systems in Europe were created as part of the state forming process which established the modern nation-state. They were born when states based on absolutistic or monarchical rule gave way to the modern nation-state: the history of national education in Europe is thus very much the history of the “nation state in formation” (Green, 1997, p. 131). National education systems contributed to the creation of civic loyalties and national identities and became guardians for the diversity of national languages, cultures, literatures and consciousness. The modern university and the modern nation-state went hand in hand, or were parts of the same wide process of modernisation. Consequently, reconfigurations of the modern nation-state in Europe today — caused by both globalisation and Europeanisation processes — are bound to affect the modern institution of the university. State-sponsored mass education has been the primary source of socialisation facing the individual as citizen of a nation-state. Individuals were given access to ‘knowledge’ and the opportunity of becoming ‘educated’ — together with the identification with, and participation in, the state as a national project. European nation-states were engaged in authorising, funding and managing education systems, including higher education, to construct unified national polities.

Under the pressures of globalisation (and European integration, speaking of Europe), the above historical assumptions no longer work, and the relationships between (public) universities and nation-states are changing; the modern pact is being widely questioned by both sides: (until recently, national) mission-bound universities on the one hand and fund-providing states on the other. The reliance of both institutions on each other is no longer evident; universities are becoming increasingly self-reliant (and self-supporting), and states are under global pressures to reformulate their tasks and priorities, including their funding priorities in social services provided by the welfare state. Traditional (largely) nation-state oriented and (mostly) welfare-state supported public universities are in new settings: if reformulations to the state’s roles and capacities are significant, so will be reformulations of the roles of universities. The university becomes radically delinked from the nation-state — and in the European context, new EU higher education policies are being developed which put lifelong learning (and the lifelong learner) in the center of the project of the integrated European Union. The focus on the EU education policy plane today — as discussed in section 4 below — seems to be on the de-nationalised European lifelong learner — rather than on the citizen of traditional European nation-states.

GLOBALISATION AND THE NATION-STATE

It is crucial to see both the changing historical relationships between the university and the nation-state and the current impact of globalisation on the institution of the state. Following the classification of David Held and his colleagues from their magisterial Global Transformations book (Held et al., 1999), in the debate on
globalisation it is possible to distinguish between three broad schools of thought: the hyperglobalisers, the sceptics and the transformationalists. We will use this classification in a much more narrow sense, associating the three intellectual camps with the three positions taken today with regard to the impact of globalisation on the nation-state and referring to them as globalists, skeptics and moderates. The three stances will need a reformulation with regard to the issue of the present and the future of the nation-state: those who pronounce its demise, those who maintain that generally nothing substantial has changed in recent decades, and those who see the transformation of the nation-state as fundamental (but not deadly to it).2

Indirectly, through discussing globalists’, sceptics’ and the moderates’ views on the future of the nation-state, we will get a continuum of possible answers to the question of the future of nation-state oriented higher education systems. It is hard to say which of the two close relationships the institution of the modern university has (its relationship to the nation-state or its being a part of the welfare state), will be more important for the future role(s) of the institution in the long term. Transformations to both aspects of the state are long-term processes and right now, on more practical grounds, the reformulation of the welfare state seems to be affecting universities more immediately and more directly (leading in higher education to financial austerity, privatisation, deregulation etc). In the future, though, the other dimension of transformations to the state, namely, the questioning of the autonomous role of the nation-state in a global setting (its ‘end’, ‘hollowing out’, ‘withering away’, ‘demise’, ‘decline’, ‘collapse’ etc, in various current formulations) may have even greater effects on the university, both in terms of reformulating its social purpose and missions – and in terms of future public funding for both teaching and research. The three theoretical positions taken with respect to the nation-state under global pressures lead to three different scenarios of the future of traditional public nation-state oriented (and welfare state supported) universities.

For the globalists, recent historical and political developments, and globalisation processes in particular, open a new epoch in human history, a radically new, post-national world order: “a new age” has just taken place and consequently we need “a new beginning” in our thinking (Albrow, 1996, p. 2). The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe brings an end to the “age of the nation-states” (and re-opens the issue of the future of welfare state) with the very idea of a nation being perhaps “only an ephemeral political form, a European exception.” This is no surprise, we are entering a “new age” (Guéhenno, 1995, p. x, 4, xiii). There will be no national economies (products, technologies, corporations or industries); consequently, citizens of nation-states are no longer in the same economic boat called the ‘national economy’ and they are not bound together by the same economic fate (Reich, 1992, pp. 3–8). The economy becomes “borderless” and what occurs under the influence of global forces is the “end of the nation-state”: nation-states appear to have been merely a transitional form of organisation for managing economic affairs (Ohmae, 2000, p. 210).

The social and political consequences of the shift of balance between the state and the market are as far-reaching as those of the industrial revolution in the past. States are collectively retreating from their participation in the ownership and
control over industry, services and trade as part of state policies. Susan Strange stresses that today it is increasingly doubtful that the state in general can still claim loyalty from its citizens substantially greater than their loyalty to family, to the firm or to their political party. People from stable political societies do not expect to have to sacrifice their lives for anyone except for their families. In short, the claim that there is a difference of degree between the loyalty to the authority of the state and the loyalty to other forms of authority cannot be sustained. Consequently, the state “is becoming (...) just one more source of authority among several, with limited powers and resources” (Strange, 1996, pp. 72–73).

The paradox of the global age is that the populations in general want to continue to be recognised as nations but nation-states are no longer able to protect their citizens from the uncertainties of the outside world: it is as impossible to “control” the world around them as it is to “ignore” it (Guéhenno, 1995: 138ff). In this context, most of the forces unleashed by globalisation are very hard to control for individual countries. Kenichi Ohmae, one of greatest management gurus at the end of the 1980s, claims in The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies that the old world has “fallen apart.” The nation-state has begun to “crumble” and the older patterns of linkages between nations have begun to lose their dominance. Current changes are fundamental: nation-states have lost their role as “meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today’s borderless world.” Nation-states today have much less to contribute to the global economy and much less freedom to make contributions. In the past, they may have been efficient engines of wealth production but in the new world order they have become “remarkably inefficient engines of wealth distribution” (Ohmae, 2000, p. 207). They are “inescapably vulnerable” to economic choices made elsewhere – by people and institutions over which they have no practical control at all.

The sceptics hesitate whether, generally, anything new has happened to the nation-state with the advent of globalisation. Most of the sceptics refer to the statistical data of world flows of trade, investment and labour from the 19th century onwards and claim that the contemporary levels of economic interdependence are not historically unprecedented. Most of them rely on an economic conception of globalisation, equating it with an integrated global market. They conclude that contemporary globalisation is exaggerated. They consider the globalist thesis as “fundamentally flawed” and “politically naïve” since it underestimates the power of national governments to regulate international economic activity; they tend to disregard the presumption that economic internationalisation might lead to the emergence of a new, less state-centric world order; and they point to the growing centrality of governments in regulating and promoting cross-border economic activity. They reject the ‘myth’ that the power of national governments or state sovereignty is being currently undermined by economic internationalisation or global governance and argue against the thesis of a convergence of macroeconomic and welfare policies across the globe. As Held et al. conclude, “rather than the world becoming more interdependent, as the hyperglobalisers assume, the sceptics seek to expose the myths which sustain the globalisation thesis” (see Held et al., 1999, pp. 5–7).
John Gray, a British postliberal political philosopher, differs considerably from other skeptics. His theses are not economic and his views are not economics-based but philosophical. He pronounces the “passing of social democracy” and views European social democracy as “belong[ing] to the past” (Gray, 1998, pp. 87, 99, 64). Where Gray grasps the nettle, as opposed to several other sceptics discussed here, is his clear realisation that we are no longer living in closed economies. Social democracy, especially European welfare state regimes, presupposes closed economies. Many of the core policies of social democracy, Gray rightly argues, just cannot be sustained in open economies. In open economies, Gray argues, egalitarian principles will be rendered unworkable – by the freedom of capital, including “human capital”, to migrate (Gray, 1998, pp. 87–89). Therefore, under current economic conditions, Continental Keynesianism is a “dead end” and European social models cannot survive in their current forms. Next sceptics, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, stay mostly in the realms of economics and they present an argument against the idea that the international economy has become or is becoming “globalised.” The major problems with globalisation they point out are that there is no proof of the emergence of a distinctly ‘global’ economic structure; that there have been earlier periods of internationalised trade, capital flows and monetary systems, especially before the First World War; that truly global transnational corporations are relatively few; and, finally, that the prospects for regulation by international cooperation, for the formation of trading blocks and for the development of new national strategies that take into account internationalisation are not exhausted (Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p. 196). Sceptics tend to reject the hypothesis put forward by globalists that what we are witnessing is the emergence of a new, less state-centric world order. They stress the growing centrality of states. States are not the “victims” of globalisation but its “midwives” (Weiss, 1998). Neither global governance nor economic liberalisation and internationalisation seems to be undermining the sovereignty of nation-states and their autonomy in determining the course of national welfare, tax and social policies.

Finally, the third position – that of the moderates – with respect to the impact of globalisation on the nation-state is the one I find especially convincing. This is the position with respect to the future of the nation-state which will guide my re-reading of the future of nation-state oriented university. In moderates, under the impact of current patterns of globalisation, the power of the nation-state is ‘re-positioned’, ‘re-contextualised’, ‘transformed’, ‘re-constituted’, ‘re-engineered’, ‘re-structured’, ‘dis-placed’, ‘re-articulated’, ‘re-located’, ‘re-embedded’, ‘de-centered’, ‘re-figured’, ‘re-shaped’, ‘eroded’ etc. Consequently, the traditional relationships between the nation-state and the modern university are substantially different in this perspective.

The moderates do not expect the arrival of a single world society nor do they find evidence for global convergence in economics, politics and culture. On the contrary, they stress “new patterns of global stratification” in which some states and societies are becoming central, and others marginal in the global order. At the core of their convictions, as Held summarises them, is a belief that globalisation is reconstituting the power, functions and authority of national governments (while
economic activity becomes increasingly deterritorialised due to production and finance acquiring global and transnational dimensions). They reject both “the hyperglobalist rhetoric of the end of the sovereign nation-state and the sceptics’ claim that ‘nothing much has changed’.” Territorial boundaries have become “increasingly problematic”, and sovereignty, state power and territoriality stand today in a “more complex” relationship than in the epoch during which the modern nation-state was forged. New non-territorial forms of economic and political organisation have emerged such as e.g. multinational corporations, transnational social movements and international regulatory agencies. The world is no longer purely state-centric or even primarily state-governed – as authority has become increasingly diffused among public and private agencies at all levels. Globalisation brings about, rather than the “end of the state”, a whole spectrum of adjustment strategies: the power of national governments is being “reconstituted and restructured” in response to the growing complexity of the processes of governance (Held et al., 1999, p. 9). Jan Aart Scholte describes the moderate stance as the one from which “globalisation is indeed a distinctive and important development in contemporary world history. However, its scale and consequences need to be carefully measured and qualified. Nor is globalisation the only, or always the most significant, trend in today’s society” (Scholte, 2000, p. 18).

Saskia Sassen in Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalisation and Globalisation and Its Discontents argues that the growth of a global economy plus new telecommunications and computer networks have profoundly reconfigured institutions fundamental to the processes of governance and accountability in the modern state. State sovereignty and the institutional apparatus in charge of regulating the economy (central banks, monetary policies) are being “destabilised” and “transformed” under the pressures of globalisation and new technologies (Sassen, 1996, p. xii). Economic globalisation has transformed both the territoriality and sovereignty of the nation-state but the state itself has been deeply involved in the implementation of the laws and regulations necessary for economic globalisation. Globalisation has therefore been accompanied by the creation of new legal regimes, especially for international commercial arbitration, along with institutions that perform ratings and advisory functions.

The nation-state itself (in Western advanced democracies) is becoming reconfigured as it is directly involved in this emerging transnational governance system. The state legitimates a new global doctrine about its new role in the economy – and what is central to this doctrine is a consensus among states to continue globalisation, to further the growth of the global economy (Sassen, 1996, p. 23). The powers historically associated with the nation-state have been taken on by global financial markets on the one hand and the new covenants on human rights on the other. They are very different from each other. Global capital markets represent a “concentration of power capable of influencing national government economic policy and, by extension, other policies as well” (Sassen, 1996, p. 42). This is exactly the point in which tax policies, welfare policies and, by extension, educational and research and development policies are influenced and transformed. Historically, educational policies were largely national policies; currently, they
seem to be a part of much broader, and mostly economic, policy packages. Education and research, and higher education and university research in particular, are not isolated islands. They are under constant scrutiny, as a small part of national economic policies. Sassen calls the function that global capital market exercises on national governments “disciplining” and concludes: “when it comes to public spending, governments are increasingly subject to outside pressures” (Sassen, 1996, p. 48, see also 2003). Public spending on both higher education and research and development – especially in the European transition countries – is not an exception: the general pressure in underfunded transition economies is to find more private funds for both education (e.g. through various forms of cost-sharing) and research and development (through increasing academic entrepreneurialism bringing more non-core non-state income) rather than consider increasing public funding.

Another moderate, Manuel Castells, in his trilogy, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, argues that “a crisis of legitimacy is voiding of meaning and function the institutions of the industrial era. Bypassed by global networks of wealth, power, and information, the modern nation-state has lost much of its sovereignty. By trying to intervene strategically in this global scene the state loses capacity to represent its territorially rooted constituencies” (Castells, 1997, p. 354). The modern nation-state seems to be losing on both fronts, global and domestic, vis-à-vis global actors and vis-à-vis their citizens. State control over space and time is bypassed by global flows of capital, goods, services, technology, communication, and information such that national identity is being challenged by the plural and hybrid identities of citizens. The nation-state is doomed because it is increasingly powerless in controlling monetary policies, deciding its budget, collecting its corporate taxes and fulfilling its commitments to provide social benefits to its citizens. In sum, the state has lost its economic power, even though it retains some regulatory capacity, as in Saskia Sassen’s diagnoses about the state basically having one final thing to do: producing new legal regimes for the global age in national settings (Castells, 1997, p. 254).

Such authors as Fritz Scharpf and John Gerard Ruggie stress the idea that the economic space of the nation-state and national territorial borders no longer coincide. Consequently, the postwar social contract between the state, market, and labour does not work anymore as it was designed to work within closed national economies. Scharpf argues that in the history of capitalism, the decades following the Second World War were “unusual in the degree to which the boundaries of the territorial state had become coextensive with the boundaries of markets for capital, services, goods and labour” (Scharpf, 2000, p. 254). Investment opportunities existed mainly within national economies and firms were mainly challenged by domestic competitors. “The ‘golden years’ of the capitalist welfare state came to an end” (Scharpf, 2000, p. 255). The social contract which had allowed the nation-states in advanced capitalist countries to be accompanied by a welfare state originated right after the Second World War. With the advent of globalisation, it is eroding. This post-war compromise assigned specific policy roles to national governments – which governments are increasingly unable, or unwilling, to perform today. One of
the indirect effects of globalisation is its impact on the ability of the state to "live up to its side of the post-war domestic compact" (Ruggie, 1997, p. 2). In the approach of both Scharpf and Ruggie, the impact of globalisation on the nation-state is through undermining the founding ideas behind the post-war welfare state: through liberalisation and the opening up of economies, nation-states begin to lose their legitimacy provided, in vast measure, by a social contract valid in closed, national economies. Out of the three scenarios of the future of the nation-state under the pressures of globalisation, the scenario of the moderates is the one I am strongly favouring. The remaining two perspectives would provide grounds for a different re-reading of the future of public universities in Europe. In the following section, I am assuming substantial transformations, recontextualisations and relocations of the nation state which result in substantial transformations, recontextualisations and relocations of the nation-state oriented, modern university.

THE NATION-STATE AND THE MODERN UNIVERSITY

The processes of globalisation seem to be affecting the traditional modern institution of the state simultaneously on many levels, from regional and subnational to national and supranational. The two crucial dimensions of the state in transition are its relation to the welfare state on the one hand and its relation to the nation-state on the other. Both dimensions are closely linked to higher education, especially to its elite segment, the institution of the university; which, in Europe, has been mostly state-funded as part of the well-developed post-war Keynesian welfare state apparatus (I am viewing higher education in Europe as part of the welfare state, following e.g. Nicholas Barr from his The Economics of the Welfare State, 2004, pp. 321–348), and which has been closely related to the modern construct of the nation-state.

Anthony Giddens provides the following definition of the nation-state: “a nation-state is (...) a bordered power-container (...) the pre-eminant power-container of the modern era” (Giddens, 1987, pp. 116, 120). The nation-state, in the course of the 19th century, had become an irresistible political form on a global scale. The social world discussed in sociology (but also in the political sciences, political philosophy and political economics) is less and less related to the above definition, and globalisation and its practices make the discussions on the classical world of sovereign nation-states increasingly irrelevant to its current theoretical concerns. The view of current states as “bordered power-containers” seems to be increasingly untenable both in theory and in practice (as Ulrich Beck stresses, “the whole conceptual world of national sovereignty is fading away – a world that includes the taming of capitalism in Europe by the post-war welfare state”, Beck 2000b, p. 17). The container theory of society is no longer able to explain the complexities of the new world order in which intergovernmental agencies, political and economic cartels, economic unions, transnational corporations, military alliances etc. play an increasingly important role and in which the nation-state is becoming “progressively less important” in world organisation (Giddens, 1987, p. 282).
The importance of the need to revise our theoretical thinking and to reorient ourselves conceptually and intellectually to the new “global order” has been shown by analysts of globalisation from the above disciplines. In practical terms, the consequences of abandoning the power-container view of society and the premises of the world organised through sovereign territorial nation-states are far-reaching. The advent of globalisation may bring about the erosion of the state as we know it i.e. the traditional nation-state described by the sociological container theory of society we have been familiar with. The central premise of (Beck’s) national modernity is already overturned – namely, the idea that “we live and act in the self-enclosed spaces of national states and their respective national societies” (Beck, 2000a, p. 20).

While discussing current transformations of the institution of the modern state, we need to bear in mind the institution of the modern university, born at roughly the same time, as an intellectual (and ideological) product of the same project of modernity. Transformations to the modern university are better understood in the context of transformations to the modern state. Since, as Guy Neave put it, the modern university was always “the Nation-State university” (Neave, 2001, p. 16). Gerard Delanty reminds us about the “pact” between the modern university and the state: “in return for autonomy, it [university] would furnish the state with its cognitive requirements.” The global process of the retreat of the state from the position of provider to that of regulator “fundamentally alters the historical pact between knowledge and the state” (Delanty, 2001, pp. 2, 103).

Modern states developed as nation-states – political apparatuses, “distinct from both ruler and ruled, with supreme jurisdiction over a demarcated territorial area, backed by a claim to a monopoly of coercive power, and enjoying legitimacy as a result of a minimum level of support or loyalty from their citizens”, argued David Held in his *Democracy and the Global Order* (Held, 1995, p. 48). And modern universities in large parts of Continental Europe developed as nation-state universities. The most prominent innovations for the concept of the state include territoriality, control of the means of violence, as well as an impersonal structure of power and legitimacy. It is only with the system of modern states that exact borders have been fixed. Holding a monopoly on force and the means of coercion only became possible with the breaking down of rival centres of power and authority. An impersonal structure of power was not possible as long as political rights, obligations and duties were tied to religion and traditional elites. Finally, human beings as “individuals” and “peoples” had won a place as active participants in the new political order. As Held went on to argue,

the loyalty of citizens became something that had to be won by modern states: invariably this involved a claim by the state to be legitimate because it reflected and/or represented the views and interests of its citizens (Held, 1995, pp. 48-49).

Although Held does not mention the theme, the modern legitimacy of the state brings us closer, in the 20th century, to the beginnings of the idea of the welfare state. Modern states have certainly won the loyalty of their citizens (as well as
achieved social and political stability) when they gradually introduced not only political rights, but also social benefits; including pension schemes, state-subsidised (if not free) higher education and affordable health care. The welfare state became a fully-fledged reality in Europe throughout the quarter of a century following the end of the Second World War.

But the legitimacy of, and loyalty towards, modern liberal democratic welfare states is under severe stress today and the whole idea of a post-war “social contract” between the state and its citizens is widely debated. Increasingly, there are differences between the “national interests” of particular nation-states and their citizens on the one hand and the corporate interests (economic interests) of particular transnational companies on the other, so states are torn between purely economic decisions which often undermine their traditional legitimacy and purely political decisions which could contribute to maintaining their legitimacy. There is an increasing awareness of the artificiality, or at least of the constructed nature, of nation-state citizenship. As Mike Bottery argues, it is only at the present time that “the political body defining the terms and boundaries of citizenship is something called ‘the nation-state’” (Bottery, 2003, p. 102). The loyalty of citizens of nation-states is closely related to a bilateral agreement, although never fully codified, between citizens and the state. Should the nation-state be threatened, so also will its role as primary guarantor of citizenship rights. It is very unclear indeed why – along with the (possible) dismantling of the welfare state and the (possible) end of the postwar “social contract” between governments, unions and workers, the decline in the capacities, capabilities and willingness of nation-states to provide some traditionally (sometimes even fully) state-funded welfare services – national loyalty should not be decreasing. And if it is decreasing anyway, for some structural reasons, it is hard to say why the whole modern paradigm of the close relationships between higher education (civic, national education) and the nation-state should not be substantially weakened. In the present re-reading of these relationships, I am strongly suggesting their weakening, especially in the additional context provided by the emergent EU-level educational policies discussed below.

The new order endorsed the right of each state to autonomous and independent action. As Held comments, “in this conception, the world consists of separate political powers pursuing their own interests, backed by diplomatic initiatives and, in the last instance, by their organisation of coercive power” (Held et al., 1999, p. 38). But today we experience the end of the Westphalian model, the end of the traditional world order of nation-states and the traditional relationships between them. In his strong formulation of 1995, “the modern state (...) [is] unable to determine its own fate” (Held, 1995, p. 92), which was later modified and quantified in a magisterial introduction to the globalisation debate which he co-authored with his colleagues (Held et al., 1999). The Westphalian order and the sovereign state evolved in a “symbiotic partnership”: rulers recognised each other’s sovereignty and, in turn, the consolidation of the Westphalian state system reinforced the primacy of the sovereign territorial state (see McGrew, 1997, pp. 4ff). Since the Second World War the modern nation-state has become “the principal type of political rule across the globe”, and it has acquired a political form of liberal or
representative democracy (Held et al., 1999, p. 46). Globalisation, if it is indeed reconstituting the nature of sovereign states, has profound implications for modern democratic theory and practices which have been constructed upon the foundations of the Westphalian order.

In Europe, the sovereignty of the state meant also the sovereignty of national educational policies and full state support for nation-state oriented universities (from their inception as modern institutions bound by a "pact" with modern nation-states). The historic function of the modern university – the transmission of national cultures, the inculcation of national consciousness in citizens of nation-states, forging national citizenship, the formative purpose and mission of supporting national ideas and ideals, mainly through the humanities and social sciences – seems up for grabs today. The modern university and the modern nation-state in Europe (especially in its Humboldtian version) were major agents of the same modernisation process in Europe. The crucial step in the historical development of European universities is what Guy Neave termed the process of their nationalisation – bringing the university formally into the public domain as a national responsibility. With the rise of the nation-state, the university was set at the apex of institutions defining national identity. The emergence of the universities in Berlin and in Paris marked the termination of the long process for the incorporation of the university to the state (Neave, 2001, pp. 25–26).

The process of the “nationalisation” of the university in Europe settled the issue of what the role and responsibilities of the modern institution in society should be. The emergent nation-state defined the social place of the emergent modern university and determined its social responsibilities. The nation-state determined the community to which the university would be answerable: it was going to be the national community, the nation. The services and benefits the unitary and homogeneous nation-state gradually, and over the passage of time, placed at the disposal of society went far beyond education and included e.g. generous healthcare systems and old-age pension schemes. Nowadays, as the reduction of the welfare state in general progresses smoothly (e.g. through new legislation) in most parts of the world, social contracts with regards to these (and possibly other) areas of state benefits and state-funded services may have to be renegotiated, significantly changing their content. Globalisation seems to be changing the role of the nation-state: the nation state is gradually losing its power as a direct economic player and at the same time it is losing a significant part of its legitimacy as it appears not to be willing, or able, to provide the welfare services seen as the very foundation of the post-war welfare state (I am viewing higher education as both public services and part of the public sector). It is important, I believe, to see higher education policies in the context of larger welfare state policies (which I am doing in more detail elsewhere, see Kwick, 2007b): higher education is a significant (and most often significantly fund-consuming) part of the public sector and a part of the traditional welfare state that is now under severe pressure, though perhaps under less pressure than the two main parts of it, healthcare and pensions. In more theoretical than practical terms, these phenomena had their powerful
The modern university in Europe (especially in its German-inspired “Humboldtian” version) has been closely linked to the nation-state. With the advent of globalisation, and its pressures on the nation-states, universities are increasingly experiencing their de-linking from both the traditional needs of the nation-state (inculcating national consciousness in citizens of the nation-state etc) and from its financial resources. They increasingly need to rely on the “third stream income” — especially non-core non-state income and earned income. In Europe, the overall social and economic answer to globalisation has been the strengthening of the European integration, and the policy agenda of this regional response to globalisation is called the Lisbon strategy for more growth and jobs. European universities, as well as governments of EU member states, find it useful to refer to this strategy in redefining the role(s) of educational institutions under both globalisation and its regional response, Europeanisation. Consequently, a recent decade brought about substantially new ways of thinking on universities on the level of the European Commission of the European Union. Emergent EU educational policies are increasingly influential as the university reforms agenda is viewed as part of wider Lisbon strategy reforms. The EU member states — national governments — are adopting not only the Lisbon strategy but also the social and economic concept of the university implied in it and consistently developed in subsequent official documents of the European Commission. The EU member states, for the first time in the fifty years of the history of the European Union, need to balance their educational policies between the requirements of new policies strongly promoted by the EU and the requirements of their traditional national systems (in the four first decades, higher education in general was left in the competence of the member states; today it is viewed by the European Commission as being of critical importance to the economic future of the EU and in need of EU-level intervention). Additionally, national educational policies are under strong globalisation-related (mostly financial) pressures, as all other social services of the “European social model.”

In this new ways of thinking, the traditional link between the nation-state and the modern university has been broken; moreover, higher education in the EU context has clearly been put in a post-national (and distinctly European) perspective in which interests of the EU as a whole and of particular EU member states (nation-states) are juxtaposed. The reason for the renewed EU interest in higher education is clearly stated by the European Commission: while responsibilities for universities lie essentially at national (or regional) level, the most important challenges are “European, and even international or global” (EC 2003a, p. 9). The major challenges facing Europe — related to both globalisation and demographics, such as losing its heritage and identity, losing out economically, giving up the European
Social Model etc – should be, according to a recent influential *Frontier Research: The European Challenge* report, met through education, knowledge, and innovation:

The most appropriate response to these challenges is to increase the capacity of Europe to create, absorb, diffuse and exploit scientific and technical knowledge, and that, to this end, education, research and innovation should be placed much higher on the European policy agenda (EC 2005b, p. 17).

Thus recent years have brought about intensified thinking about the future of public universities in Europe, from a distinct EU perspective. Regional processes for the integration of educational and research and development policies in the European Union add a new dimension to the nation-state/national university issue discussed in the preceding sections. On top of the discussions about the nation-state (and the welfare state), we are confronted with new transnational ideas on how to revitalise the European project through education and how to use European universities for the purpose of creating in Europe a globally competitive knowledge economy. For the first time in the 2000s new ways of thinking about higher education were formulated at an EU level – and were accompanied by a number of practical measures, coordinated and funded by the European Commission. Higher education, left at the disposal of particular nation-states in recent decades in Europe, returns now to the forefront in discussions about the future of the EU.

Consequently, Europe in the 2000s has been undergoing two powerful integration processes, initially separate but recently increasingly convergent. The former is the Bologna process, gradual production of the common European Higher Education Area (started by the Bologna Declaration signed in 1999) by 45 Bologna-signatory countries (reaching far beyond the 27 EU member states and ranging geographically from the Caucasus to Portugal). Its main goals include the adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees, the adoption of the three cycles of studies – undergraduate, graduate and doctoral, the spread of credit transfer systems enabling student mobility, and the promotion of pan-European quality assurance mechanisms. The latter is the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs, adopted by the EU countries in 2000 and simplified and re-launched in 2005: currently, it has only two targets – total (public and private) investment of 3% of Europe’s GDP in research and development and an employment rate of 70%, both to be reached by 2010. Increasingly, the goals of the Bologna process are being subsumed under the goals of the Lisbon strategy. The European Commission stresses that the divergence between the organisation of universities at the national level and the emergence of challenges which go beyond national frontiers has grown, and will continue to do so. Thus a shift of balance is necessary, the arguments go, and the Lisbon strategy in general, combined with the emergence of the common European Research Area (co-funded by EU research funds totaling 51 billion EUR for 2007-2013) in particular, provide new grounds for policy work at the European level, despite restrictions on engagement of the European Commission in education – leaving the area of education in the competences of the member states – as defined by the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (1992) (see Kwiek, 2004, 2006b).
In recent years the project of European integration seems to have found a new leading legitimising motif: education and research for the “Europe of Knowledge.” A crucial component of the Europeanisation process today is its attempt to make Europe a “knowledge society” (and “knowledge economy”) in a globalising world. “Education and training” (a wider EU category) becomes a core group of technologies to be used for the creation of a new Europe; the creation of a distinctive and separate “European Higher Education Area” as well as a “European Research (and Innovation) Area” is the goal the EU has set itself by a deadline of 2010. The construction of a distinctive European educational policy space – and the introduction of the requisite European educational and research policies – has become part and parcel of EU “revitalisation” within the wide cultural, political and economic Europeanisation project (see Lawn, 2003).

We are witnessing the emergence of a “new Europe” whose foundations are being constructed around such notions as, on the one hand, “knowledge”, “innovation”, “research”, and on the other – “education” and “training.” Education in the EU, and especially lifelong learning, becomes a new discursive space in which European dreams of common citizenship are currently being located. This new “knowledge-based Europe” is becoming increasingly individualised (and de-nationalised), though; ideally, it consists of individual European learners rather than citizens of particular European nation-states. The emergent European educational space is unprecedented in its vision, ambitions and possibly its capacity to influence national educational policies. In the new knowledge economy, education policy, and especially higher education policy, cannot remain solely at the level of Member States because only the construction of a new common educational space in Europe can possibly provide it with a chance to forge a new sense of European identity, as well as be a practical response to globalisation pressures, the arguments presented by the European Commission go. “Europeans”, in this context, could refer directly to “European (lifelong) learners”: individuals seeking knowledge useful in the knowledge economy. The symbol of this new Europe is not “the locked up cultural resources of nation states, but the individual engaged in lifelong learning” (Lawn, 2001, p. 177); not the nationally-bound and territorially-located citizen of a particular member state but the individual with an individuated “knowledge portfolio” of education, skills, and competencies. European citizenship is being discursively located in the individual for whom a new pan-European educational space is being built. The individual attains membership in this space only through knowledge, skills and competencies. At the same time, the economic future of Europe is believed to increasingly depend on investing in knowledge and innovation and on making the “free movement of knowledge” (the “fifth freedom”, completing the four freedoms of movement of goods, services, people and capital) a reality (EC, 2007, p. 14); “science and technology” are “the key to Europe’s future”, as the title of an EC communication runs (EC, 2004); and “the success of the Lisbon strategy hinges on urgent reforms” of higher education systems in Europe, as another title runs (EC, 2003b).

The idea of Europe, as well as the core normative narratives and major discourses that hold Europeans as Europeans together, is being redefined; and this
new education space (being constructed through the emergent European educational and research policies) in which the new European identity is being forged seems crucial. Through prioritising the idea of “lifelong learning” in the Lisbon strategy and in the EU agenda of “Education and Training 2010” (see EC, 2000a), learning becomes redefined as an individual activity, no longer as closely linked with national projects as in the times of founding (Neave’s) “Nation-State universities” already referred to. The new “learning society” comprises more and more “(European) learning individuals”, wishing and able to opt in and opt out of particular European nations and states (Kwiek, 2007b). Consequently, one of the key concepts in the Bologna process for the integration of European higher education systems is no longer employment but employability, a transfer of meanings through which it is the individual’s responsibility to be employed, rather than the traditional responsibility of the state, as in the Keynesian “full employment” welfare model.

The process of creating the European Higher Education Area and the simultaneous emergence of the European Research Area have one major common dimension: that of a redefinition of missions of the institution of the university (even though universities were at first neglected as places for research in EU thinking – for instance, in the first EU communication on the subject, “Towards a European Research Area”, universities and higher education in general were not even mentioned, see EC, 2000b). Both teaching and research are undergoing substantial transformations today. The institution of the university is playing a significant role in the emergence of the common European higher education and common European research spaces, but in none of these two processes, is the university seen in a traditional modern way – as discussed in the context of the emergence of the modern university in traditional European nation-states. It is evolving together with radical transformations of the social setting in which it functions (the setting of “globalisation” and, regionally, “Europeanisation”). Globalisation is the overriding notion in most major European discussions about the role(s) of higher education and research and development, the notion behind the Lisbon strategy, especially when combined with such accompanying new notions as the “knowledge economy” and the “knowledge society” – and in respect of the traditional contexts of economic growth, national and European competitiveness and fighting unemployment. The Lisbon “strategy for growth and jobs” is a regional (European) response to the challenges of globalisation. As globalisation seems to be redefining the role of the nation-states in today’s world, it is indirectly affecting higher education institutions. In this context – and thus indirectly – globalisation pressures are behind new higher education policies which promote competitiveness of nations (and regions) through education, research and innovation. Globalisation affects the proposed policy solutions in higher education of both national governments and the European Commission.

The impact of globalisation on EU-level educational policies and strategies, and increasingly on ensuing national policies and strategies, is substantial. Higher education is viewed, assessed, and measured in the context of both globalisation and Europeanisation. Globalisation, indirectly, for instance through a large Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, fundamentally alters the lenses through which
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universities are viewed, assessed, and measured. Its most evident impact on universities is the overall sense that (predominantly public) universities in Europe need profound transformations if Europeanisation is to be a successful response to globalisation. Consequently, the overall picture on reading recent EU documents, reports, working papers and communications is that the relationship between government and universities is in need of profound change. The two most recent documents, “Mobilising the Brainpower of Europe: Enabling Universities to Make Their Full Contribution to the Lisbon Strategy” (EC, 2005a, see Kwiek, 2007a) and “Delivering on the Modernisation Agenda for Universities: Education, Research and Innovation” (EC, 2006a) make clear that radical transformations of university governance are expected by the European Commission to make possible their full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy. Universities are urged to consider fundamentally new arrangements (new “contracts”) with societies and governments are urged to consider establishing new partnerships with universities, with a shift from state control to accountability to society (EC, 2005a, p. 9). As explained clearly in an EU issue-paper on university governance: “coordinated change is required both in systems regulation and in institutional governance in order to mobilise the enormous potential of knowledge and energy of European universities to adapt to new missions” (EC, 2006a, p. 1). The policy lesson for the EU member states is that substantial changes in governance are needed: according to new university/government contracts envisaged by the EU, universities will be responsible and accountable for their programs, staff and resources, while the state will be responsible for the “strategic orientation” of the system as a whole – through a framework of general rules, policy objectives, funding mechanisms and incentives (EC, 2006a, p. 5).

European universities have “enormous potential” but this potential “is not fully harnessed and put to work effectively to underpin Europe’s drive for more growth and more jobs.” Research is no longer isolated activity and emphasis in research is shifting from individual researchers to “teams and global networks” (EC, 2006a, p. 3). Therefore universities need autonomy and accountability; and full institutional autonomy to society at large requires new internal governance systems, based on strategic priorities, professional management of human resources, investment and administrative procedures (EC, 2006a, p. 5). From a larger perspective, as the title of another EU communication recently put, the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy requires “fostering entrepreneurial mindsets through education and learning” (EC, 2006c), from primary to secondary to higher education. With reference to the latter, the document promotes the commercialisation of ideas and development of new technologies by students and researchers (EC, 2006b, p. 9).

Consequently, universities under globalisation pressures face an imperative need to “adapt and adjust” to a series of profound changes Europe has been undergoing (EC, 2003a, p. 6). They must rise to a number of challenges. They can only release their potential by undergoing “the radical changes needed to make the European system a genuine world reference” (EC, 2003a, p. 11). They have to increase and diversify their income in the face of the worsening underfunding:
After remaining a comparatively isolated universe for a long period, both in relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding guaranteed and a status protected by respect for their autonomy, European universities have gone through the second half of the 20th century without really calling into question the role or the nature of what they should be contributing to society (EC, 2003a, p. 22).

But it is clearly over now. Thus the fundamental question about European universities today is the following: “Can the European universities, as they are and are organised now, hope in the future to retain their place, in society and in the world?” (EC, 2003a, p. 22, emphasis in original). It is a purely rhetorical question in the context of the whole communication on the “role of universities in the Europe of Knowledge”: the universities in Europe – as they are and as they are organised today – will not be able to retain their place. Restructuring is necessary, and a much wider idea of European social, economic and political integration applied to the higher education sector, expressed in the ideals of a common European higher education area, comes in handy. The university’s goal is the creation of an area for research where scientific resources are used “to create jobs and increase Europe’s competitiveness” (EC, 2000a, p. 1) which is a radical transformation of modern university missions, in its close relationships with the nation-state, especially in the Humboldtian tradition – national loyalty, national consciousness, almost and ideological arm of the nation-state (Kwiek, 2005, 2006a, 2006b). The impact of globalisation – and of Europeanisation – on education policy is thus fundamental: there is a new interplay of changing policies at the EU member states level (national education policies), at the EU level (Lisbon Strategy and the Bologna process) and at a global level (global education policies promoted by e.g. the OECD and the World Bank) and universities are influenced, directly or indirectly, by all of them at the same time.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

The paper re-reads a wider context for rethinking the changing relationships between the university and the state in Europe under globalisation pressures on the state. Globalisation is viewed as a major factor influencing the transformations of the state today, in its two major dimensions: the nation-state and the welfare state. As the nation-state is changing, the argument goes, so is the modern university, most often very closely linked to the state in major European variants of higher education systems. The modern university becomes radically delinked from the nation-state – and in the European context, new EU higher education policies are being developed which put lifelong learning (and the lifelong learner) in the center of the project of the integrated European Union. The individualised learner, the product of both globalisation and Europeanisation, is contrasted in the EU discourse on the future university missions with a traditional citizen of the nation-state, formed by the modern university which was born together with the nation-state. These challenges and chances seem to be clearly seen in the emergent EU discourse on the university in which both universities and students are delinked.
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from the nation-states; while universities are expected to be linked to the Lisbon strategy of more growth and more jobs, and more competitiveness of the European Union economy, students are expected to be more linked to the new project of the “Europe of Knowledge” than to traditional, individual national projects of particular European nation-states.

The present re-reading of both wider global trends (the impact of globalisation on the nation-states) and more narrow regional trends (the impact of the Europeanisation on national educational policies in Europe) is intended to show that universities could also be viewed in large social and economic contexts. Education policy studies need to critically develop these fundamentally new contexts if they intend to trace possible university futures. Directions for future research include such topics as the future of the (various forms of) European Social Model, the impact of new European policies on new national strategies for academic entrepreneurship and cost-sharing, gradual Europeanisation (and de-nationalisation) of large-scale research programs, the privatisation of social services and further reformulation of the role of the welfare state in knowledge economies, the impact of both the Lisbon Strategy and the Bologna process on the education sector, and the competition of the EU in research and innovation with other regions. Additional perspectives, not applied in the paper, would include economics in further welfare research, European studies in further European integration research, political sciences in further European governance research, and sociology in the academic profession and academic institutions research.

NOTES

1 The present paper presents arguments which are developed in more detail in my book (Kwiek, 2006a).

2 As to the globalists, I am referring to Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Kenichi Ohmae, Martin Albrow, Robert B. Reich, and Susan Strange; as to the skeptics, I am referring to Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Linda Weiss, and John Gray; finally, as to the moderates, I am referring here to Anthony Giddens, Saskia Sassen, Manuel Castells, Jan Aart Scholte, as well as David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton.

3 In Poland, the theoretical impact was already translated into changed national legislation in the case of the pensions reform and health care reforms at the end of the 1990s. To discuss transformations of higher education in CEE countries is to discuss a much wider political and economic process of transformations towards market economies; the accompanying reforms of the public sector seem unavoidable, and higher education figures in this sector prominently. In Poland, bold reforms of the public sector began in the second half of the 1990s, starting with pensions (the introduction of a World Bank-supported multipillar system), healthcare (decentralization of funding and partial privatization), and primary and secondary education (decentralization of funding). Current discussions at the EU level on the introduction of tuition fees in (largely tax-based) higher education systems in Europe, reflected by current (2008) Polish discussions of tuition fees, introduce the theme of privatization, new in the EU context (see Kwiek, 2008a, 2008c).

4 The difference between employment and employability is crucial: the latter term transfers the responsibility for a graduate’s future away from the state and towards the individual concerned. Especially in the context of “lifelong learning”, one’s “employability” clearly depends on one’s “knowledge ‘portfolio’” (Martin Carnoy). In the new situation in which “job” becomes “permanently temporary”, “workers are gradually being defined socially less by the particular long-
term job they hold than by the knowledge they have acquired by studying and working. This knowledge ‘portfolio’ allows them to move across firms and even across types of work, as jobs get redefined’ (Carnoy, 1999: 33). The responsibility becomes somehow privatized and individualized: given that the opportunities for studying, training and retraining are there, it is simply the individual’s “fault” not to be “knowledge rich”, not to have the right knowledge “portfolio.”

REFERENCES


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