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## **Paths to Democracy of the Post-Soviet Republics: Attempt at Conceptualization**

### **1. Introduction**

From the perspective of fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is possible to distinguish five basic developmental paths the post-Soviet republics followed. The societies in which an independent civil revolution took place, enter the first developmental path. However, this path of development bifurcates into two further sub-variants. Namely, civil revolutions in the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) resulted in their independence and stable democracies. On the other hand, civil revolutions in the Caucasus republics (Georgia, Armenia) proved only partially successful. Civil movements in these countries managed to gain independence, yet they were unable to build stable democracies. Countries such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine achieved sovereignty and followed the next developmental path, seceding from the Soviet Union. However, it was mainly local communist nomenclatures that initiated establishment of independent states. Democratization – characteristic of the first period of their independent existence – was counterbalanced by the subsequent emergence of autocratic tendencies that surfaced with different force and from different reasons. And again, this path of development bifurcates into two developmental variants. In the former, growth of power regulation was hampered by successful civil resistance (Ukraine), whereas in the latter, growth of power regulation did not encounter such strong civil reaction (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova). Finally, the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) followed the fifth developmental path. In these societies, independence permitted to preserve dictatorship of local communist nomenclatures.

Therefore, naturally, a question arises how to identify social mechanisms leading to this developmental differentiation of the post-Soviet republics. It seems that an answer to this problem lies in the nature of real socialism in the Soviet version and the way of its collapse. This view will be systematically presented in this paper which is divided into five sections (including *Introduction*). In the second section, main theses of non-Marxian historical materialism, establishing a theoretical base for made analyses, are presented.<sup>1</sup> This approach is extended in the third section. Political development of the post-Soviet republics is described in the fourth section. In the last section, the paper closes with a summary of presented conceptualization and concluding remarks that place this developmental differentiation of the post-Soviet countries in the global context.

## 2. The Legacy of Soviet Socialism

According to theoretical categories of non-Marxian historical materialism real socialism in the Soviet Union may be characterised by three basic features. Firstly, it was a social system where one social class, disposing means of coercion, production and indoctrination, controlled politics, economy and culture. Secondly, the main interest of this class of triple-lords consisted in the maximisation of power regulation. Thirdly, this social system built up an empire consisting of the Russian metropolis and the external provinces: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Ukraine. Let us briefly characterise the three above-mentioned aspects of real socialism in the Soviet version.

### 2.1. On Three Class Divisions

Class divisions, in accordance with non-Marxian historical materialism, exist not only in economy, but also emerge spontaneously

<sup>1</sup> Full presentation of this theory is in: Leszek Nowak, *Property and Power. Towards non-Marxian historical materialism*, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983; idem, *Power and Civil Society. Towards a Dynamic Theory of Real Socialism*, London: Greenwood Press, 1991.

in other spheres of human activity, such as politics and culture. In each sphere of social life it is possible to distinguish a material level consisting of means of coercion, production and indoctrination. Relation to the means of coercion in politics determines the division of society into two social categories: the class of rulers, which controls the use of means of coercion, and the class of citizens, deprived of such possibilities. In economy, the material level is made up of the means of production, which determines the division into the class of owners and the class of direct producers. In the cultural domain, the material level consists of the means of spiritual production – for example printing presses, radio, and television. Between these pairs of social classes: priests and the indoctrinated, owners and direct producers, rulers and citizens, a contradiction of interests arises. In the cultural domain, the class of priests enhances its spiritual domination over the indoctrinated at the expense of their spiritual autonomy. In economy, the class of owners maximises its profits limiting income of direct producers. In the sphere of politics, the class of rulers enlarges power regulation at the expense of citizens' autonomy. Social antagonisms, resulting from unequal access to the material means of society (means of coercion, production and indoctrination) in each of these three domains of social life have an autonomous character. Class divisions in other domains of social life can only strengthen antagonisms in a given domain or conversely, weaken them.

Thus control over the material means provides the basis for typology of societies in non-Marxian historical materialism. Applying this criterion it is possible to distinguish class societies, where existing classes are separated, and supra-class societies where, for example, one social class, keen on increasing the range of its social influence, may seize control over the means of coercion, production and mass communication. A society with a triple class of rulers-owners-priests, monopolising control over politics, economy and culture, exemplifies a type of supra-class systems. This social system refers to the structure of real socialism. The apparatus of the Communist Party, which controlled not only political life, but also economy and culture, was the counterpart of the triple-lords class.

## 2.2. On Political Nature of Socialism

Real socialism was the system of triple-rule in a political version because possession of the means of production and indoctrination by the class of rulers-owners-priests was subordinated to the enlargement of power regulation. In order to present the dynamics of social systems of this kind, dynamics of power should be described in the first place. Now, the main theses of the first model of power in non-Marxian historical materialism will be presented in brief.<sup>2</sup> Theses

<sup>2</sup> Theory of power in non-Marxian historical materialism applies methods of idealization and gradual concretization (Leszek Nowak, *The Structure of Idealisation*, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980). Presented theory consists of a sequence of models. The first model of power considers only those factors which are regarded as main ones for the phenomenon of political power. That is why, among other, in the first model, the influence of cultural and economic domain, institutional structure of power, social consciousness of political classes, internal relations, technological growth of means of coercion and faction competition is omitted in the analysis of the evolution of a purely political society. In the process of concretization, some idealising assumptions are cancelled out, transforming the original approach into a multi-model theory of power whose level of realism increases (Leszek Nowak, *Power and Civil Society*, op. cit.). Among numerous contributions made to the theory of power in non-Marxian historical materialism, it is worth mentioning, papers refining the concept of revolution in that theory (Krzysztof Brzechczyn, "Civil Loop and the Absorption of Elites", in: *Social System, Rationality and Revolution*, ed. by Leszek Nowak, Marcin Paprzycki, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993, pp. 277–283; Katarzyna Paprzycka, Marcin Paprzycki, "How Do Enslaved People Make Revolutions?", *ibidem*, pp. 251–265; G. Tomczak, "Is It Worth Winning Revolution?", *ibidem*, pp. 265–277) and analysing influence of such factors as: unsuccessful aggression and subordination (Krzysztof Brzechczyn, "Unsuccessful Conquest and Successful Subordination. A Contribution to the Theory of Intersocial Relations", *ibidem*, pp. 445–456), different types of political systems (T. Banaszak, "Problem autokratyzacji ustroju politycznego" [The Problem of Autocratisation of Political System], in: *Marksizm, liberalizm, próby wyjścia* [Marxism, Liberalism, Attempts of Exit], ed. by Leszek Nowak, Piotr Przybysz, Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 1997, pp. 381–399), secret police (Krzysztof Brzechczyn, "Władza a tajna policja polityczna. Próba modelu" [Power and Secret Political Police. An Attempt at Model], *Przegląd Politologiczny* 1–2, 1999, pp. 81–97), generational divisions (Krzysztof Brzechczyn, "Pokolenia a demokracja" [Generations and Democracy], in: *Filozofia a demokracja* [Philosophy and Democracy], ed. by Piotr W. Juchacz, Roman Kozłowski, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 2001, pp. 215–241), different types of institutional change (Lidia Godek, "Wprowadzenie demokracji kontraktowej w Polsce. Próba interpretacji" [The

(i–iii) concern static assumptions of such a model, whereas thesis (iii–viii) dynamic ones.

- (i) Every citizen has a set of preferences, which direct his or her actions. Among citizens' actions it is possible to distinguish those that are autonomous and regulated. Regulated actions are undertaken under threat of repression from the ruler, but autonomous actions are not restricted by similar sanctions taken by those controlling means of coercion. This distinction should not be conceived too simply because citizens' actions regulated by rulers comprise also administrative ones. Their regulation by power is a base of social order; therefore regulation is profitable for both parties<sup>3</sup>. The ratio of the number of regulated actions to the number of actions undertaken by citizens (universe of action) is called *civil alienation*. It is assumed that intensity of civil resistance depends on the level of civil alienation and can be presented as follows:
- when the number of regulated actions is low (and thus civil alienation is also low), social peace prevails as citizens have no reason to resist;
  - when the level of civil alienation is high, the level of resistance is low as declassed and atomised citizens are unable to resist;
  - a political revolution breaks out when civil alienation is moderately high; which means it is painful enough to evoke political reaction, yet not so painful as to paralyse citizenry;
- (ii) There are two basic methods to subordinate social life: bureaucratization and terror. Bureaucratization replaces

Introduction of Contract Democracy in Poland. An Attempt at Interpretation], in: *Rola wyborów w procesie kształtowania się społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Polsce* [The Role of Elections in the Formation of Civil Society in Poland], ed. by Sebastian Drobczyński, Marek Żyromski, Poznań: WSNHiD, 2004, pp. 117–133) and class compromise (Krzysztof Brzechczyn, "Porozumienie przy Okrągłym Stole w świetle koncepcji kompromisu klasowego. Próba modelu" [The Round Table Agreement in the Light of Concept of Class Compromise. An Attempt at Model], *ibidem*, pp. 27–47) on the evolution of a political society.

<sup>3</sup> Krzysztof Brzechczyn, "Unsuccessful Conquest and Successful Subordination", op. cit., p. 447.

- autonomous social relations (citizen – citizen type) by etatised ones (citizen – ruler – citizen type). This way, power gradually permeates into the structure of social life making it impossible to undertake any social action without its permission. Resorting to terror, rulers physically ‘eliminate’ from social life (death, long-term prison or isolation, etc) those from the class of citizens who are centres of independent social relations;
- (iii) However, the state of declassation does not last forever. It is assumed that when bureaucratization of social life passes a certain threshold, there appears a tendency for revitalization of autonomous social bonds among citizens. It means that etatised social bonds are replaced by autonomous ones, social relations controlled by authorities shrink and the sphere of autonomous social life enlarges;
  - (iv) It is supposed that at the starting point of dynamic relations between rulers and citizenry, peace prevails. In *the phase of increasing civil alienation*, as a result of the mechanism of political competition between disposers of means of coercion an average ruler is forced to enlarge his/her sphere of regulation. Those, who do not compete, are eliminated from the political structure of power or, by process of trials and errors, learn to enlarge their sphere of control. In consequence, social autonomy shrinks and the sphere of power regulation enlarges;
  - (v) According to static assumptions, growth of power regulation intensifies citizens’ resistance, which gradually transforms into a mass civil revolution. Possible victory or failure of a civil revolution opens the way to bifurcation of political development;
  - (vi) Let us suppose that citizens have won. Then, from a purely materialist point of view, nothing of consequence changes, because inside the class of citizens, a division into (new) disposers of means of coercion and those who are deprived of such clout, is spontaneously reconstituted. Now, the crowds, not to mention armed civil guards, form the means of co-

- ercion. Therefore, a revolutionary elite structures the core of a new class of rulers. The mechanism of political competition among them leads once more to the growth of power regulation. This, in turn, leads to the growth of civil resistance and an outbreak of the next political revolution. When this revolution wins again, the mechanism of a civil loop repeats once more. However, civil loops cannot repeat endlessly and some revolution in a row will lose;
- (vii) The defeat of citizens’ movement enables the rulers (new or old ones) to use post-revolutionary terror. It afflicts those from the class of citizens who are the centres of independent social bonds. In *the phase of enslavement*, atomisation of the class of citizens makes it possible to control an increasing number of social fields. When all domains of social life are subordinated, the system reaches the state of total enslavement. In such circumstances, the only means to stop power disappears. Under such social conditions, there are no social spheres to regulate. Because the mechanism of political competition forces typical rulers to enlarge their sphere of regulation, further competition proceeds at the expense of social spheres already controlled by other rulers. Periodic purges, which make a clean sweep of surplus candidates for power, solve the problem of political over-competitiveness. This way, enslavement of citizens turns into self-enslavement of rulers which, starting at the bottom of power apparatus, gradually reaches the centre of power;
  - (viii) However – according to static assumptions – in an analysed political society, there appears a tendency towards a gradual revitalization of independent social bonds, which increases citizens’ ability to resist. This leads to a revolution, which initiates *the phase of cyclical declassation* and gradual reduction of power regulation. This revolution is crushed, but rulers – in order to avoid a follow-up, reduce the scope of their control. Yet, mechanisms of political competition lead once more to the growth of power regulation, triggering an outbreak of the next revolution on a greater scale. This forces

rulers to make larger concession and makes it more difficult for them to repress rebels. Thus a political society evolves according to the following scheme: civil revolution – repression – concessions – growth of political regulation – next political revolution with a wider social base;

- (ix) Finally, in *the phase of a cyclical revolution*, mass protests erupt and their scale is so widespread that authorities instead of starting off with repression, have no choice but allow sweeping concessions, which reduces control of the rulers to the level acceptable by the class of citizens.

One may, roughly speaking, distinguish counterparts of developmental phases of the presented model of a purely political society in the history of the Soviet society. The overthrow of the tsarist regime in February 1917 can be perceived as a civic revolution leading to a civil loop. The Provisional Government tried to regulate economic life concentrating in its hands more and more power. This, however, stirred social unrest, which culminated in the October Revolution, commanded by the Bolsheviks, and levelled against the Provisional Government. Very soon, however, the Bolsheviks began to concentrate power for the sake of power. Nationalization of banks, introduction of “war communism” or formation of secret police, enjoying a wide scope of competencies over citizens’ lives, may serve as a confirmation of the above. It brought about a new wave of social unrest with peasantry at the oppositional forefront. Finally, social disturbances spread to cities: seamen and workers in Kronstadt – closest supporters of the Bolsheviks rebelled against them. Pacification of the Kronstadt revolution ended the second civil loop and led to the imposition of total political control over people. The Stalinism period, from 1929 to 1953, can be perceived as a phase of enslavement. Stalin’s purges in the 30s are a counterpart of a sub-phase of self-enslavement of power.

The prisoners of Gulag, transforming themselves from atomised individuals into self-organized masses, initiated a series of prison riots. The first uprising broke out in July 1950, in the labour camp near Vorkuta. First half of 1953 marked the apogee of the Gulag uprisings, resulting in a certain liberalization of the oppressing political

system, manifested by Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin’s Cult at the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party. These events can be interpreted as the transition of the whole system to the phase of cyclical declassification. Recurrent civic revolutions included: worker’s strikes in Novocherkassk and fourteenth towns of central Russia in the 60s, national revival in the Baltic countries in the 70s, strikes at the beginning of the 80s. They led, on the one hand, to repressive measures towards rebellious citizens, but, on the other hand, forced those at the helm of the Communist Party to make political concessions so as to avoid an outbreak of the next revolution. The Gorbachev’s reforms comprised the most serious attempt to avoid social revolution similar to the Solidarity movement in Poland. However, this reformism policy, increasing social autonomy of people, stimulated, in fact, revitalization of autonomous civil bonds and led to the growth of civil unrest, precipitating the final decline of the triple rule.<sup>4</sup>

### 2.3. Dynamics of the Soviet Empire

However, presented model of a purely political society and its historical operationalization does not take into consideration internal relations of the Soviet Union and the very fact that this country played the role of an aggressor in relations with the neighbouring societies. Therefore, it is necessary to concretise the first model. The main theses of the 4<sup>th</sup> model are presented in an analogous way. Theses (i)–(ii) describe static whereas, and (iii)–(v) its dynamic part.

- (i) Successful aggression ousted the authority of a conquered country and enslaved its citizens. The ruling class of aggressor’s society gained extraordinary growth of external power regulation. Aggressiveness conceived in such a way occurs in certain phases of development of an analysed society. It is possible to distinguish two ranges of aggressiveness. The society enters *the first range of aggressiveness* in the late stage of

<sup>4</sup> More on this: Leszek Nowak, “The Totalitarian Approach and the History of Socialism”, in: *From a One-Party State to Democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe*, ed. by Janina Frentzel-Zagórska, Amsterdam – Atlanta: Rodopi, pp. 45–67.

the *phase of increasing civil alienation*. Owing to an extraordinary increase in power regulation, the class of rulers stabilizes relations with its own class of citizens and averts the threat of revolution. In the *second range of aggressiveness*, a political society enters the *phase of enslavement*. Then, external growth of power regulation allows for averting the threat of self-enslavement of the class of rulers;

- (ii) It is worth characterising social consequences of aggression for its victim. The class of rulers of an attacked society is removed and the whole country is incorporated into the empire. The class of citizens of a conquered society becomes enslaved, irrespective of the developmental phase it achieved. A successful conquest has the same consequences as a lost civil revolution – it leads to the enslavement of the class of citizens;
- (iii) Let us suppose, at the starting point of our analysis, that social peace prevails. In the initial stage of development rulers enlarge their domestic spheres of regulation. It leads to the growth of civil alienation and social resistance. In order to avoid an outbreak of a revolution, rulers conquer another society, entering the first range of aggressiveness. This takes place when civil alienation passes the threshold of class peace. Enslavement of citizens from conquered societies stabilizes social peace in the metropolis. Not for a long time, however. Political profits reaped from aggression run out and rulers have to undertake subsequent aggression or enlarge spheres of regulation at home. However, the second solution intensifies resistance of metropolitan citizens. Subsequent conquest of another society leads to the formation of an empire consisting of a metropolis and external provinces. Finally, after some time, at a given technological level of the means of coercion, cost of conquest and control of provincial citizens exhaust possibilities of empire's growth;
- (iv) From that moment on rulers have to enlarge their spheres of regulation at the expense of the autonomy of metropolitan citizens, which intensifies their resistance. The growth of civil

alienation leads to an outbreak of a revolution in the metropolis. If – *in the phase of a civil revolution* – social disturbances in the metropolis co-occur with similar events in provinces, it offers the best chance of victory for the latter and separation of rebellious provinces from the empire. During revolution the level of aggressiveness of the empire decreases because rulers are busy struggling with own citizens;

- (v) Let us suppose that the revolution of metropolitan citizens is defeated. In the *phase of enslavement*, the level of aggressiveness of a considered society is still low because rulers enlarge the sphere of regulation at the expense of the autonomy of metropolitan citizens. The aggressiveness of the empire increases in the *sub-phase of self-enslavement of authority*. At that time aggressiveness reduces the threat of self-enslavement of power structure because successful conquest provides new vistas for power regulation;
- (vi) In the *phase of cyclical declassification*, the level of aggressiveness again decreases because metropolitan class of rulers has to deal with the resistance of own citizens. Simultaneously, the process of revitalization of autonomous social bonds commences also in the provinces of the empire. The provinces, which were conquered earlier, initiate this process. Provinces conquered later are still enslaved. However, this phase of development is prolonged because possession of external provinces allows to maintain different factions of citizenry at different levels of enslavement. The class of rulers, instead of dealing with protests of the whole class of citizens, deals with isolated citizen protests, occurring at different time and in different parts of the empire;
- (vii) In the *phase of a cycling revolution*, the level of aggressiveness increases again. However, this growth is morbid because metropolitan citizens are less and less willing to fulfil the social role of an imperial gendarme. Civil revolutions in provinces enjoy greatest chances of victory when they coincide with revolutionary occurrences in the metropolis, which brings the existence of the empire to an end.

In the political history of the Soviet Union and its neighbouring societies one may find, roughly speaking, counterparts of two waves of aggressiveness. The first range of aggressiveness took place in the years 1917–1921. At that time the Caucasus republics were conquered and the Soviet domination in Central Asia was restored. The second range of aggressiveness took place in the years 1939–1941. Then, Western Belarus and Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were incorporated into the borders of the Soviet Empire. High level of Soviet aggressiveness was still maintained during hot confrontations (Berlin crisis, Korean War) and the Cold War with the capitalistic world. The level of aggressiveness decreased after 1956 when the model of peaceful co-existence of the two military camps was promulgated. Again, the growth of aggressiveness appeared when the empire was approaching its end, which was testified by growing engagement in the Third World or invasion on Afghanistan.

### 3. Collapse of the Empire. Attempt at Conceptualization

However, the final years of the Soviet Union history hardly fall under the 4<sup>th</sup> model of a purely political society as a result of an emergence of a new political phenomenon, which was not captured in this model. Namely, in the face of increasing weakness of the central authority, local fractions of the class of rulers, making or refusing to make concessions to own citizens, seceded from the Soviet Union and established independent states, which preserved the whole power.

In order to conceptualise this phenomenon, the final stadium of the development of an imperial society should be concretised. In a society of a political type, rulers can enlarge their sphere of regulation at the expense of the autonomy of own citizens (i) and/or by conquest of other societies (ii). In the first case, rulers have to overcome growing resistance of own citizens. In the latter, they have to crush the resistance of subordinated rulers and enslaved citizens. In both cases, under force of tacitly accepted assumptions, the universe of citizens' actions remains constant.

However, when this assumption is waived, rulers enjoy another possibility of maintaining civil alienation at a constant level. Namely, local factions of rulers can enlarge the universe of political actions. Let us remind that civil alienation is a ratio between the sum of actions regulated by rulers to the overall number of actions undertaken by citizens. Therefore, even in spite of the growth of power regulation, civil alienation remains at a constant level. In an exceptional situation, when the growth of the universe of citizens' action is higher than the growth of regulated action, the level of civil alienation may even decrease.

One way to enlarge the universe of citizens' actions consists in the separation of a new society  $S'$  from a mother-society  $S$ . In such a way the society  $S'$  is established and separate classes of rulers and citizens are constituted in it. Independent existence of a given society generates in it a set of new domains of social life, e.g.: military policy, diplomacy, internal security etc, which can be regulated by the class of rulers. Moreover, rulers of the society  $S'$  take control of these domains of social life which were regulated by metropolitan rulers.

As a result of gained sovereignty, rulers of a new society  $S'$ , instead of reducing citizens' autonomy, subordinate new spheres of social life, which are formed in the course of separation from the previous metropolis. As a consequence of the enlargement of the universe of citizen's action, civil alienation decreases, even in spite of the growth of power regulation. Civil alienation also decreases as a result of concessions made by rulers who strive to stabilise independent existence of their society. In order to ensure support of own citizens, which is needed to confront the authorities of the empire, rulers make concessions to own citizens. In the model of a purely political society, the growth of citizens' political autonomy is the prerequisite to win civil support. Jointly, reduction of civil alienation occurring thanks to the enlargement of the universe of citizens' actions and/or concessions made by rulers is named *the independence effect*.

Let us consider who it to gain profits and who to bear costs of the formation of a new political society  $S'$ . It is obvious that secession is politically profitable for the local faction of rulers because separation from the empire allows for further growth of power regulation without the risk of civil resistance. New authorities control new domains

of social life, which emerged as a result of independent existence. Also, the class of rulers seizes control over these spheres of public life that were dominated by the class of metropolitan rulers.

Whether successful secession is profitable for citizens depends on the degree of concessions made by provincial authorities and on the advancement of liberalisation processes in the metropolis. When the level of civil alienation, as a result of the independence effect, becomes lower than the level of civil alienation of metropolitan citizens, then secession is profitable for provincial citizens. However, when, in the spite of the independence effect, the level of civil alienation is still higher than the level of civil alienation in the metropolis, then independence is unprofitable for provincial citizens.

However, rulers from the metropolis are to bear most substantial costs. Successful secession weakens their position inside the empire and encourages citizens from the metropolis and other provinces to further political resistance. Additionally, shrinking of the territory and population of such an empire weakens its international position. It is natural that imperial rulers usually undertake actions leading to a subsequent incorporation of rebellious provinces into the structure of the empire.

If an insurgent province is threatened with a military intervention, in a newly independent society the phenomenon of *regulatory credit* occurs.<sup>5</sup> Because conquest would deteriorate citizens' position, they accept without demur introduction of stricter disciplinary rigours, which are considered as administrative actions of the authority. For that reason, civil alienation remains at a constant level and may even become lower. In the latter case, growing citizens' support for the authority of an attacked country is witnessed.

It is possible to distinguish two kinds of secession conceived in such a way: *progressive* and *regressive*. Progressive secession occurs in those provincial societies where the level of power regulation is lower than that of a metropolitan society. In such societies, enlargement of the universe of citizens' actions and concession made by rulers lead to the reduction of civil alienation. As a result of relations between the class of rulers and citizenry, class peace is introduced. Thus, inde-

<sup>5</sup> Krzysztof Brzechczyn, "Unsuccessful Conquest and Successful Subordination", op. cit., pp. 447-450.

pendence stabilises civil peace in the province and protects 'civilised' provincial society against the intervention of a 'barbarian' metropolis.

When authorities consolidate their position, the mechanisms of political competition lead to the growth of power regulation. Its results may be twofold. If a decrease in civil alienation stimulates revitalization of citizens bonds and promotes civil self-organization, then readiness of civil masses to resist is a sufficient guarantee of class peace and stabilization of democracy. If a decrease in civil alienation does not stimulate revitalisation of civil society strongly enough, then the growth of power regulation leads to the open autocratization of a political system.

Regressive secession occurs in these provincial societies where the level of power regulation is higher than that of power regulation of a metropolitan society. Passivity of citizen masses makes restoration of sovereignty an initiative of local faction of rulers, who this way may maintain their political domination. In this type of secession the independence effect also appears, but its range is circumscribed. Although, the level of civil alienation decreases, it does not introduce class peace in rulers - citizens relations. Paradoxically, independence retards the decrease in power regulation in the province of the empire, protecting it against the wave of liberalization coming from the centre. In this case, sovereignty protecting a 'barbarian' province against intervention of more 'civilised' metropolis allows to preserve the political *status quo*.

To sum up, in the conceptual apparatus of non-Marxian historical materialism, it is possible to distinguish the following basic paths of disintegration of a political empire:

- (i) victorious civil revolution;
- (ii) progressive secession;
- (iii) regressive secession.

#### 4. Political Development of the Post-Soviet Republics: A Survey

This chapter aims to present an introductory categorization of political development of the post-Soviet republics from 1985 to 2004. The description is organized around the following criteria:

- size and range of civil resistance and forms of its institutionalization;
- political concessions made by republican authorities;
- level of control over republican structure of power exercised by the class of citizens;
- way of gaining independence;
- fate of democratic systems in newly independent states.

Bearing in mind striking similarities in the political evolution of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian, the development of the Baltic societies will be presented jointly, in one narrative. The same strategy of description is adopted with regard to the societies of the Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Yet, political development of other republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine is presented separately.

#### 4.1. Victorious Civil Revolution

##### 4.1.1. Victorious Civil Revolution Leading to Stable Class Peace (Political Development of the Baltic Societies)

In the Baltic countries political protests began from ecological discontent (Estonia) and celebrations of forbidden historical anniversaries (Lithuania, Latvia).<sup>6</sup> In 1986 Estonians protested against construction of phosphorus mines. These protests had a political context because implementation of new investments meant migration of Russian workers. Finally, the ecological demur made central authorities in Moscow resign from the construction of new mines. In Lithuania, civil revival commenced from an independent celebration of the 600<sup>th</sup>

<sup>6</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: Grzegorz Blaszyk, "Partie polityczne Litwy w latach 1988–1992" [Political Parties in Lithuania from 1988 to 1992], *Obóz* 25/26, 1993, pp. 57–77; Jerzy Krawulski, *Estonia, Litwa, Łotwa. Przeobrażenia polityczne i gospodarcze* [Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia. Political and Economic Transformations], Warszawa: CBW UW, 1996; Jan Lewandowski, *Estonia* [Estonia], Warszawa: Trio, 2001; Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

anniversary of Lithuanian Baptism (1986) and in Latvia – from independent commemoration of the 1940 deportations. Also, Estonians commemorated tragic anniversaries of the Soviet-Estonian relations. One of the largest demonstrations took place at the time of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement commemoration, on 23 August, 1987, in Tallinn, capital of Estonia.

Very soon, these demonstrations gained momentum and acquired a massive following. For example, at that time in Estonia from 150 to 300 thousand people used to participate in different kinds of manifestations and forms of protest (Estonia had 1.5 million inhabitants). The largest demonstration was held on 23 August 1989. Then, 2 million people (the 2/3 of the population of the Baltic republic) formed a human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius to protest against the results of the Molotov–Ribbentrop agreement.

Mass civil movement in the Baltic republics was organized in the form of Popular Fronts that officially supported Gorbachev's *perestroika*. First organization of this type in the Soviet Union was founded in April, 1988 in Estonia. In Lithuania, the Popular Front (*Saiudis*) was established in June, 1988, in Latvia – in October, 1988. Apart from these structures, there emerged other independent organizations and political parties that overtly called for restoration of full state independence and complete political freedom.

Self-organized civil movement took control over some legally existing organizations and enforced political concessions from the authorities of the Baltic republics that had to enlarge their sphere of autonomy from Moscow.

In Estonia, at the beginning of April, 1988, the participants of a joint session of the Boards of Writers and Artists Associations demanded the dismissal of Karl Vaino, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, and of Brunon Saul, Prime Minister of the republican government. Moreover, the participants of this assembly wanted to have full rights to the Estonian language granted and punish those guilty of crimes against the Estonian nation committed during the Soviet occupation. Under social pressure, K. Vaino was dismissed in late spring 1988 and B. Saul resigned from his post in autumn.

The Supreme Council of the Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic restored the traditional flag of the Estonian pre-war independent state.

In October and November 1988, the Popular Front collected 800 thousand signatures under a petition for amendments in the Estonian republican constitution. Under civil pressure, on November 16, 1988, the Supreme Council passed amendments to the republican constitution and admitted 'The Declaration of Sovereignty' granting, in practice, priority of the republican law over the federal (Soviet) one. In January 1989, the republican parliament also bestowed on the Estonian language the status of the state language of the republic.

Also, in Lithuania grass root members of different official republican organizations became more independent in their support of civil movement. In November 1988, members of the Lithuanian Union of Artists dismissed own authorities, loyal towards the Communist Party, and choose democratically more independent representatives. On October 18, 1988, the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic granted the Lithuanian language the status of the state language and restored traditional symbols of the independent state (flag and national anthem). Over half a year later, on May 18, 1989, the Supreme Council declared sovereignty of the Lithuanian Republic.

On April 1986, the official Union of Latvian Writers claimed more rights for the national language. One year later, the same demands were restated by the organization of the Latvian teachers. Under increasing civil pressure, the Supreme Council of the Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic proclaimed sovereignty of Latvia on 28 July, 1989 and granted to its national language the status of the state language.

Growing civil movement was one of the most important causes of divisions in republican Communist Parties. The Communist Party of each Baltic republic split into a faction remaining loyal towards Moscow and a faction supporting greater republican autonomy from the centre of the Soviet Union. In Estonia, this division revealed in the first half of 1989, during the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Estonian Communist Party. In Latvia, the Communist Party had just declared that it is not part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This declaration was an impulse to establish a faction that still remained obedient to Moscow. In Lithuania, in December 1990, the Lithuanian Communist Party renamed into the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and

openly supported republican sovereignty, which brought about the rise of a pro-Moscow faction.

As a result results of elections held in the first half of 1990, citizens' movement took control over the legislature of the Baltic republics. In Lithuania (February 24, 1990) *Saiudis* gained 73 seats in the 133-seat Supreme Council. In Estonia (March 19, 1990) the Popular Front gained over half seats in the 105-seat Supreme Council. Finally, at the end of April, the Latvian Popular Front gained 131 seats in the 201-seat Supreme Council.

Electoral victories of opposition accelerated the process of achieving independence. On March 11, 1990 the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared restoration of state's independence and the 1938 constitution. In reaction, Moscow decided to cut off oil and gas supply. The economical blockade was lifted in June 1990 when Lithuanian authorities withdrew from immediate implementation of the declaration. The Estonian Supreme Council was more careful because it declared, on 30 March, 1990, that the Soviet occupation did not cease *de iure* the existence of the pre-war Republic of Estonia. Therefore, the Estonian parliament proclaimed the onset of the restoration of the Republic of Estonia. The transitory period should come to an end with the establishment of all institutions and prerogatives of an independent state. A similar strategy was adopted by the Supreme Council of Latvia that on May 5, 1990, declared restoration of an independent state, constitution from 1922 as well as reestablishment of the pre-war name of the state.

Aspirations to independence were confirmed by referendums held in each Baltic country at the turn of February and March in 1990. In the Lithuanian referendum 90% of voters supported an independent state. In Latvia and Estonia, respectively 74% and 78% of electors voted for independence. At the same time the Baltic nations boycotted the federal referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, held on March 18, 1991.

The Soviet Union was forced to recognise state independence of the Baltic countries after the unsuccessful coup d'état in August 1991. On the 20<sup>th</sup> of August the Supreme Councils of Estonia and Latvia proclaimed full restoration of independence. This decision was ac-

cepted by the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union that on September 6, 1991, annulled the 1940 annexation of the Baltic states and announced ratification of treaties with each Baltic state defining the status of Russian army and schedule of its withdrawal. In the second half of 1991 the Baltic states outlawed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other organizations supporting federation with the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the newly independent countries began to build own armies. In the years 1992–1993, in all Baltic countries presidential and parliamentary elections were held. In the first half of the 90s, Estonia and Lithuania proclaimed own constitutions and Latvia amended its own constitution from 1938. This way instigation of stable democracy in the Baltic societies was completed.

Political development of the Baltic societies may be interpreted in the categories of a victorious civil revolution. Mass civil protest movements enforced political concessions on the part of republican factions of the class of rulers. Those factions fearing impending loss of political support, sided with own citizens' fight for independence, which was testified by democratization of the republican political systems and increasing autonomy within the Soviet Union. This strategy allowed for smooth transition to independent statehood and peaceful exchange of ruling elite that under new conditions respected democratic rules of political game. Membership of those states in the Council of Europe and European Union points to the stability of built democracy.

#### 4.1.2. Victorious Civil Revolution Leading to Growth of Power Regulation

##### A. Political Development of the Armenian Society

Civil revival in Armenia begun from the support and solidarity shown with Armenians inhabiting Nagorno-Karabagh, a mountainous region located in Azerbaijan.<sup>7</sup> At the end of 1987, the national

<sup>7</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: Józef Darski, "Kto na Kaukazie potrzebuje Rosji. Próba panoramy politycznej" [Who Needs Russia on the

movement spread among Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabagh who claimed unification with Armenia. On February 20, 1988, the Council of Deputies of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabagh appealed to the Supreme Councils of Armenia and Azerbaijan requesting incorporation of this region to Armenia. This request was supported by Armenians from Armenia: from February 21 to 26, 1988, several thousand people demonstrated at Yerevan's Opera Square. A couple days later (February 27–28, 1988) the Armenian–Azeri conflict broke out. Several dozens of Armenians living in the village of Askeran and the town of Sumgait, near Baku, were killed. In the ensuing months the Armenian–Azeri conflict escalated. The Council of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabagh decided to leave the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and join the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. This decision marks the beginning of a regular Armenian–Azeri war and ethnic purges of Armenians in Azerbaijan. Paradoxically, an earthquake of tragic consequences (December 7, 1988) calmed down political situation for several months in Armenia.

In 1989 in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh the national movement formed a conspirational Armenian National Army consisting of 40 thousand soldiers and in November that year founded an overt organization – the Armenian National Movement. At the end of 1989, under a growing pressure of mass civil movement, the Supreme Council, dominated by the communists, passed the bill "On Unification of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic and Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabagh".

Caucasus. An Attempt at Political Panorama], *Obóz* 33, 1998, pp. 103–141; Nora Dudwick, "Political Transformations in Postcommunist Armenia: Images and Realities", in: *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 69–110; Andrzej Furier, "Niepodległość krajów zakaukaskich po rozpadzie ZSRR" [The Independence of the Caucasus Countries after the Collapse of the Soviet Union], *Obóz* 37, 2000, pp. 65–93; idem, "Od rozpadu ZSRR do niepodległej Armenii" [From Collapse of the Soviet Union to Independent Armenia], *Studia Polonijne* 22, 2001, pp. 91–107; David E. Mark, "Eurasia Letter: Russia and the New Transcaucasus", *Foreign Policy* 105, 1996, pp. 141–159; Irena Tatarzyńska, "Azja Środkowa i Zakaukazie. Zagrożenia oraz rywalizacja pomiędzy tradycyjnymi i nowymi uczestnikami wielkiej gry o wpływy" [Central Asia and the Caucasus. Threats and Competition Between Traditional and New Participants of Great Game over Influences], *Obóz* 25/26, 1993, pp. 167–178.

During elections held in June 1990 to the Supreme Council, the Communist Party won 56% of votes and the Armenian National Movement – 44%. However, as a result of a split inside the Armenian Communist Party, Vazgen Manukian, one of the ANM leaders, became Prime Minister and Levon Ter-Petrossian – Chairman of the Supreme Council. Thus, opposition seized the whole power. On August 23, 1990, the Supreme Council proclaimed “the Act of Sovereignty”. At that time, the Azeri–Armenian war intensified again. Russian troops supporting Azerbaijan landed in the capital of Armenia, some other units pacified Armenian villages in Nagorno-Karabagh. These events radicalised claims of Karabagh Armenians. At the beginning of July, at the joint session of the Council of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabagh and Councils of the Districts, secession from the Soviet Union and formation of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabagh was proclaimed.

After the Moscow coup d'état, Armenian authorities decided to become independent and sever links with the Soviet Union. In a referendum held in September 1991, 95% of voters favoured state independence, which was proclaimed by the Supreme Council of Armenia on September 23, 1991. Levon Ter-Petrossian, who gained 83% of votes in the presidential elections, became first president of Armenia. However, an ongoing war (from 1992 to 1994) with Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabagh influenced the process of democratization in Armenia.

In the Republic of Nagorno-Karabagh there emerged a military dictatorship and social life was completely controlled by the authorities. This impacted on the political situation in Armenia. National unity, required at the time of struggle with the enemy, toned down critique and disciplined opposition. In 1994 the authorities suspended the largest opposition party (the *Dashnaktsutiun*, Armenian Revolutionary Federation) and closed down over a dozen of newspapers and journals. As a result of overt frauds and manipulations in parliamentary elections in 1995 and presidential elections in 1996, president Ter-Petrossian could firmly hold the power. But he became a hostage of Karabagh Armenians. When the president aimed to terminate a conflict with Azerbaijan in 1998, he was forced, in a series of terrorist

assassinations, to resign. Dual citizenship permitted politicians from Nagorno-Karabagh to run for elections. Owing to this, presidential elections in 1998 were won by Robert Kocharian, previous leader of Nagorno-Karabagh, and since 1997 also Prime Minister of the Armenian government. Armenians from Nagorno-Karabagh were appointed to many key state posts, which was defined as the rule of the “Karabagh clan” over Armenia, and this process strengthened autocratic tendencies inside this society.

Victorious civil revolutions took place both in the Armenian society and in the Baltic societies. However, in contradistinction to Baltic societies, in Armenia, the victorious revolution ended with a civil loop. This situation could have resulted from militarisation of political development. Long-term ‘hot’ and later ‘cold war’ with Azerbaijan resulted in the effect of *regulative credit*, permitting the new Armenian political elite to increase power regulation without provoking protests of own citizens. It is profitable for the Armenian class of rulers to foster the state of international conflicts because it hampers civil protests.

### B. Political Development of the Georgian Society

In Georgia, mass protest movement began in summer of 1988.<sup>8</sup> It culminated in spring next year when several thousand people took part in manifestations held in the capital of Georgia. However, brutal pacification of these protests radicalised this civil society. Among plethora of independent organizations, the Helsinki Union, under the

<sup>8</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: Józef Darski, “Kto na Kaukazie potrzebuje Rosji” [Who Needs Russia on the Caucasus], op. cit.; Andrzej Furier, “Niepodległość krajów zakaukaskich po rozpadzie ZSRR” [The Independence of the Caucasus Countries after the Collapse of the Soviet Union], op. cit.; Wojciech Górecki, “Abchazja” [Abkhazia], *Prace OSW* 9, 2003, pp. 20–23; idem, “Ossetia Południowa” [South Ossetia], op. cit., pp. 23–27; David E. Mark, “Eurasia Letter: Russia and the New Transcaucasus”, op. cit.; Wojciech Materski, *Gruzja* [Georgia], Warszawa: Trio, 2000; Darrell Slider, “Democratization in Georgia”, in: *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, op. cit., pp. 156–201; Irena Tatarzyńska, “Azja Środkowa i Zakaukazie” [Central Asia and the Caucasus], op. cit., pp. 167–178.

leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, enjoyed largest popularity and civil support. Opposition went on strikes, including hunger strikes, it organized sit-down demonstrations and blockaded highways. Under growing social pressure the republican authorities were forced to make gestures of independence. In the second half of 1989 the Supreme Council of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic declared sovereignty. At that same time the Supreme Council announced elections, which were held in autumn 1990 and won by the coalition "Round Table – Free Georgia", headed by Gamsakhurdia. The victorious coalition gained 155 seats in the 250-seat Supreme Council. The legislative controlled by the opposition changed the name of the state from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Republic of Georgia and appointed Gamsakhurdia to the post of a Speaker of the Supreme Council. On March 9, 1991, the Supreme Council annulled federal treaty on the foundation of the Soviet Union, which meant separation from the Soviet Union and an onset of independent existence. On March 31, 1991, in a ballot on independence of the republic, 95% of voters voted for full independence; the turnout was 99%. On April 9, 1991, the Georgian parliament declared restoration of an independent Georgian state and appointed Gamsakhurdia President. This decision was confirmed in the first in the Soviet Union presidential elections held on May 26, 1991. Gamsakhurdia gained 86% of votes.

It is worth recognising that until mid 1991, the Georgian society developed in an analogous way to the Baltic societies. Civil movements in both societies gained mass support and managed to form own organizations. In effect, the opposition in both analysed cases, won elections and took control over republican institutions of power. Why did political development of these countries diverge? The Baltic societies succeeded in building stable democratic systems, but introduction of democracy in Georgia failed. It seems that it was a coincidence of three factors:

- internal anarchization of political life in Georgia;
- ethnic conflicts: Abkhazian-Georgian and Ossetian-Georgian wars;
- mechanism of a civil loop – concentration of power in the hands of a new political elite.

Paramilitary structures played a significant role in the political life of this country. Each political movement had own armed formations or security guards to protect themselves. Some military groups gained autonomy from their political bosses and acted on their own. One of them was *Mkhedroni* (horsemen in Georgian) headed by Jaba Ioselani, a former university professor, teatrologist, intellectual with a criminal record. *Mkhedroni* were founded at the beginning of the 90s and had from 3.000 to 5.000 members. This formation was accused of drug smuggling, robberies, and offering business "protection". When Gamsakhurdia became president, he established his own National Guard that combated with existing military groups, very often applying their own methods. Ioselani was arrested in February 1991 and sent to prison where he stayed without formal charges until the end of 1991.

The second factor consisted in ethnic conflicts on the territory of Georgia. In autumn 1990, the communist authorities of South Ossetia proclaimed the rise of the South Ossetian Socialist Soviet Republic and secession from Georgia. Georgian state did not accept this decision and in 1991 started a war. Thanks to Russian military aid, South Ossetia defended independence. Separatist tendencies emerged in Abkhazia in March 1989. On August 25, 1990, Abkhazia proclaimed sovereignty and later the authorities of that province established an independent state. Georgia refused to accept this state of affairs and went to war with an insurgent province, which lasted from August 1992 to September 1993. Russian military aid helped Abkhazians to defend their independence.

The growth of power regulation for the sake of power regulation was the third type of factors influencing development of Georgian society. This mechanism was marked by personal traits of Gamsakhurdia – namely his megalomania. For example, in summer 1991, the leader of Georgia went on strike demonstrating against the imperialistic policy of Kremlin, which apart from economical losses did not bring any profits. Nationalistic ideology summarised in a slogan "Georgia for Georgians" meant "georginisation" of public life, in practice – an appointment of Gamsakhurdia's adherents to public posts. It turned out that within a new administrative division of the

state that introduced prefectures, prefects were appointed by the president. Gamsakhurdia closed mosques and took part in christianization of Islamic villages. The growth of power regulation at the expense of non-Georgian part of citizenry, on the one hand, intensified ethnic conflicts on the territory of Georgia, but, on the other, deepened national unity and support for the authorities. However, when power regulation increased at the expense of the Georgian class of citizens, the new authority was gradually losing following and citizens became more and more critical towards new power.

When on September 2, 1991, the National-Democratic Party organized a demonstration in Tbilisi, it was pacified by the police forces loyal towards Gamsakhurdia. In the wake of the pacification a wave of demonstrations against the president, who was abandoned by his supporters, ensued. In December 1991, civil protests escalated into a regular civil war. On January 2, 1992, after a month siege, the Military Council, an informal oppositional body, took the House of Parliament defended by the president and introduced the State of Emergency. Gamsakhurdia was forced to migrate. The Military Council invited Eduard Shevardnadze to stabilise the situation. Following his arrival, Shevardnadze was appointed Chairman of the State Council, a provisional parliament.

Gradually Shevardnadze consolidated his power. He won the 1992 presidential elections and the political party that supported him, the Union of Georgian Citizens, received a sizeable number of mandates in the parliamentary elections. However, the consolidation of power by the president was accompanied by election frauds, manipulations and tightened control over the mass media. This situation culminated in the ensuing waves of civil protests on November 2002, which are known as "the revolution of roses". In its aftermath Shevardnadze was forced to resign.

The victorious civil revolutions took place both in the Georgian society and in the Baltic societies. However, the outbreak of ethnic conflicts on the territory of the Georgian republic and radicalism of the anticommunist opposition led to anarchy and facilitated civil loops in the political development of the Georgian society. Such a sequence of events occurred for the first time in the years 1990–1992 and repeated in the years 1992–2002.

## 4.2. Progressive Secession

The political development of Western Soviet republics (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) and Azerbaijan in comparison with the Baltic societies distinguishes itself by smaller range of civil movement, its later institutionalization and failure to seize control over republican institutions and organs of power. In the elections to parliamentary assemblies of the Western republics in 1990, the opposition gained about 1/3 of seats. The majority of seats was taken by communists who held the whole power in the first years of independence.

### 4.2.1. Progressive Secession Leading to Civil Resistance (Political Development of the Ukrainian Society)

In Ukraine civil revival stimulated by Gorbachev's *perestroika* began later than in the Baltic republics – namely in the second half of 1988.<sup>9</sup> Earlier, independent social endeavours were limited to a handful of dissidents whose activity did not go beyond postulating equal rights to the Ukrainian language, legalisation of Greco-Catholic Church and environmental protection. First demonstration, held in autumn 1987, commemorating Ukrainian victims of the Stalinist terror, gathered about 400 protesters.

In the second half of 1988, in the milieu of Kievian writers and intelligentsia, the Initiative Group of the Popular Movement for Restora-

<sup>9</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: Piotr Andrusieczko, Marek Figura, "Przebieg transformacji ustrojowej na Ukrainie w latach 1991–1998" [The Course of Transformation on Ukraine, 1991–1998], in: *Ścieżki transformacji* [The Paths of Transformations], ed. by Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 2003, pp.117–135; Józef Darski, "Rok 1989: Jesień Ludów czy KGB?" [Autumn of the People or KGB?], *Frona* 23/24, 2001, pp. 62–120; Andrzej Chojnowski, *Ukraina* [Ukraine], Warszawa: Trio, 1997; Jarosław Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy, 1772–1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu* [History of Ukraine, 1772–1999. The Birth of Modern Nation], transl. by Katarzyna Kotyńska, Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2000; Illya Prizel, "Ukraine between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism", in: *Democratic Change and Authoritarian Reaction in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 330–371.

tion was established (later on called: *Rukh* which stands for Movement). At that time, patriotic masses and public meetings in support of the Movement assembled about several thousand adherents. The first congress of the Movement held from 8 to 10 September 1989, demanded more autonomy for the Ukrainian Republic in the Soviet federation.

In September 1989, in the face of growing social pressure, the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party was forced to step down. In October 1989, the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic granted to the Ukrainian language on the territory of the republic, the status of the state language. Also, the authorities announced free elections, which were held on March 4, 1990. In spite of civil revival and social mobilization, although limited to Western part of Ukraine, the elections to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Ukraine were won by the Communist Party. The opposition, forming the Democratic Alliance of Ukraine, won in the western part of the state, gaining 115 seats in the 450-seat parliament. At the first session of the new Council, despite protests lodged by opposition, V. Ivashko, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was elected Chairman of the Republican Parliament. When he was appointed Deputy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Kravchuk, another Communist activist, replaced him. In July 1990, the Supreme Council proclaimed sovereignty of Ukraine; however this republic remained within the borders of the Soviet Union. Public meetings and demonstrations against new federation treaty gathered from 20 (Kiev) to 100 (Lviv) thousand people. However, in a plebiscite held in March 1991, 80% of voters supported alliance with the Soviet Union. During the August coup, oppositional deputies demanded the session of the Council be called. On August 24, 1991, 346 deputies out of 400 present, voted for the Act of Independence of Ukraine. This decision was supported by a referendum, held simultaneously with the presidential elections. In December 1991, 90% of voters supported independence. Leonid Kravchuk became first president of the sovereign Ukrainian State.

Ukrainian independence was initiated by the local class of rulers. This way, the communist elite, seceding from the Soviet Union, was able to control the process of democratization and still hold the whole

power. However, civil support, in the first years of consolidation of new statehood, was contingent upon concessions made to citizens. In the first period of the independent existence, democratic system was build and elements of free market economy introduced. Therefore, from 1991 to 1994, a tendency toward democratization prevailed. However later on, concessions made by authorities, as a result of a relative weakness of civil society and social mobility, proved transitory.

Very soon, political groups coming from the former Communist Party, which gained mass support in parliamentary elections, dominated the Ukrainian political scene. In turn, anticommunist and national opposition (e.g. Chornovil in presidential elections of 1991 gained 27% of votes) was marginalised. The growth of power regulation, leading to autocratization of political system, manifested itself in political assassinations (death of Chornovil and Gongadze), concentration of political prerogatives in the hands of president, bureaucratization of economy and control of the mass media. It is estimated that 32 bills, 60 presidential decrees and 80 governmental instructions regulated economic activity. The authorities, resorting to election manipulations and frauds, stirred social unrest. In the last presidential campaign, such demeanour of authorities resulted in the outbreak of protests, known as "the Orange Revolution". In their result the second turn of elections had to be repeated.

#### 4.2.2. Progressive Secession Leading to Growth of Power Regulation

##### A. Political Development of the Azerbaijan Society

The civil revival in Azerbaijan was limited to intelligentsia and groups of city dwellers.<sup>10</sup> The Popular Front of Azerbaijan was established in June 1989. Several months later, as a result of an agreement

<sup>10</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: Audrey L. Altstadt, "Azerbaijan's Struggle toward Democracy", in: *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, op. cit., pp. 110-156; Tadeusz Świętochowski, *Azerbejdżan i Rosja. Kolonializm, Islam i narodowość w podzielonym kraju* [Azerbaijan and Russia. Colonialism, Islam and Nationality in Divided Country], Warszawa: ISP PAN, 1998; Irena Tatarzyńska, "Azja Środkowa i Zakaukazie" [Central Asia and the Caucasus], op. cit., pp. 167-178.

between the Popular Front and the Communist Party, the Supreme Council proclaimed sovereignty of the republic. In the elections held in 1990, the Democratic Bloc election coalition, set up by the Popular Front, won 26 out of 360 seats.

This way, the whole structure of power was controlled by the aparatchiks of the Communist Party. Several days after the coup in Moscow, on August 30, 1991, the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic proclaimed independence. Next month presidential elections were held. Ayaz Mutalibov, the former first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, was the only candidate. Due to the fact that elections were held hastily, other candidates had no chance to register. Mutalibov gained 98.5% and the turnout was 86%. Admittedly, the Communist Party was dissolved, but its members were appointed to state posts. On November 1991, Mutalibov formed the National Council consisting of representatives of opposition and nomenclature. The National Council was to replace the Supreme Council and seized the whole legislative work, although the Supreme Council still existed.

In the wake of the war with Armenia, Mutalibov's popularity waned, according to charges levelled against him by the opposition, he was solely to blame for the course of war. As a result of the March demonstration organized by the Popular Front, Mutalibov was forced to resign. In June 1992, new presidential elections were held and won by Abulfaz Elchibey. The new president tried to reorient internal as well external policy of Azerbaijan, seeking cooperation with Turkey and withdrawing from the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, his political fate depended on the Armenian-Azeri war. War defeats provoked putsch organized by colonel Surat Huseinov, who instigated a march on Baku, calling for Elchibey's resignations. President called Heydar Aliyev as a mediator and appointed him Chairman of the National Council. However, Huseinov refused to negotiate and insisted that President resign. Devoid of the Popular Front's political support, Elchibey stepped down. Aliyev assumed the mantle of a provisional President and Huseinov of Prime Minister. The putschists conducted a referendum legitimising the upheaval in October 1993. In autumn that year, Aliyev won the presidential elections.

The change of political elite brought about an increase in power regulation. This fact is testified by the cult of the president as well as censorship and imprisonment of political opposition. In 1995 there were five thousand political prisoners in Azerbaijan. Election frauds became inherent in election campaigns. For example, in the 1995 parliamentary elections, four out of twelve parties were disqualified and so was the case with 60% of candidates, most of whom acted on behalf of the opposition. The so-called patriarchal voting, when the head of family votes for those of kin, became a common practice. According to Western observers, elections were neither free nor fair.

The political development in Azerbaijan may be construed as a progressive secession culminating in a successful autocratization of the political system. Initial, real democratization of the society, epitomized by the change of the head of state in 1992, ended with toppling a legally chosen president. Yet, during the reign of his successor, constant growth of power regulation did not provoke any significant civil protests. The war with Armenia triggered *the effect of regulative credit* allowing, in the face of an external threat, to increase power regulation by the Azeri political elite.

### B. Political Development of the Belarusian Society

Belarus developed acting impulses coming from the neighbouring republics.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, political changes were controlled by the ruling nomenclature. The Popular Front, main civil organization, was established in October 1988, but it was legalised three years later (June 1991). By then, local authorities of the Belarusian republic had been persecuting activists of the Front. Participants of independent demon-

<sup>11</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: Paweł Kazanecki, "Białoruska panorama polityczna – wiosna 1993" [Belarusian Political Panorama – Spring 1991], *Obóz* 25/26, 1993, pp. 79–84; Kathleen J. Mihalisko, "Belarus: retreat to authoritarianism", in: *Democratic Change and Authoritarian Reaction in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, op. cit., pp. 223–282; Eugeniusz Mironowicz, "Narodziny białoruskiej suwerenności w latach 90." [The Birth of Belarusian Sovereignty in 90s.], *Obóz* 35, 1998, pp. 87–94; Wincuk Wiaczorka, "Białoruski Front Narodowy 'Odrodzenie'" [Belarusian Popular Front "Restoration"], *Obóz* 25/26, 1993, pp. 85–98.

strations were beaten and dissipated with lachrymatory gas. Members of the Popular Front were arrested for abuse of national symbols. The police confiscated literature, press and leaflets published by independent organizations. The first constituent congress of the Popular Front was organized outside Belarus, in Vilnius, because the authorities of Minsk forbade the meeting. In spite of political repression, thousands of people joined manifestations and other forms of activity organized by the Front.

Multicandidate elections to the republican Supreme Council were held in March 1990. In Belarus, unlike in other republics, a certain number of seats (50 out of 360) was reserved for "war veterans" and other organizations. During election campaigns about one hundred thousand people participated in rallies and meetings organized by the Popular Front. In elections, the Democratic Bloc, a coalition of independent organizations set up by the Front, gained 67 out of 360 seats. It was not enough to control republican structures of power. The Belarusian Communist Party could, without any obstacles, appoint its members to most important posts. Mikalai Dzemyantsei, an apparatchik from the BCP, was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council. The first initiative of the Popular Front put on the agenda of the Supreme Council consisted in the ratification of the state sovereignty declaration. The republican authorities rejected this proposal, but following consultations with Moscow, when it turned out that the central authorities would not object, they changed their mind. On July 27, 1990, the Supreme Council declared sovereignty of the republic. However, the support of the Belarusian population for state independence remained very low. In all Soviet Union March referendum, held in 1991, 83% of voters supported remaining within the borders of the Soviet Union. The Supreme Council was able to proclaim independence of Belarus following an unsuccessful coup d'état in Moscow, on August 24, 1991. This declaration did not change, however, relations in the Belarusian power structure. The only change consisted in the dismissal of M. Dzemyantsei, Chairman of the Supreme Council. He was replaced by Stanisław Shushkevich, one of the leaders of the Popular Front. However, the opposition was unable to appoint its candidates to executive posts of power structure. In December 1991,

the Popular Front collected 800 thousand signatures under petitions calling for a referendum on pre-term elections, which, according to the postulates of the opposition, were to be held in the first half of 1992. However, the Supreme Council controlled by Communists simply ignored these petitions and elections were held in a constitutional term, in 1994. It came as no surprise that the opposition, devoid of real clout, won only 25% of votes. The Communist nomenclature was the real triumph of the parliamentary elections. The election results opened up vistas for the marginalization of the opposition. This process was precipitated a year later when Alyaksandr Lukashenka won presidential elections. Since 1995 successful autocratization of the Belarusian political system has been symbolized by the growth of Lukashenka's personal power.

### C. Political Development of the Moldavian Society

In Moldova civil revival was mostly limited to the Romanian-speaking intelligentsia which in May 1989 established the Moldavian Popular Front.<sup>12</sup> In the elections to the Supreme Council held in February 1990, the Popular Front gained 101 out of 406 seats. Analogously to the political development of Azerbaijan, Belarus and Ukraine, civil support of the Moldavian opposition was insufficient to seize control over legislative and executive branches of power. However, the coalition with reform-oriented communist deputies provided a base for political changes in Moldova. The newly elected

<sup>12</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: Stephen R. Bowers, Scott J. Hammond, Vasile Nedelciuc, "Moldovia: the Transformation of Post-Soviet Society", *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 22, 1997, pp. 143-164; William Crowther, "The Politics of Democratization in Postcommunist Moldova", in: *Democratic Change and Authoritarian Reaction in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, op. cit., pp. 282-330; Luke March, "Socialism with Unclear Characteristics: The Moldovan Communists in Government", *Demokratizatsiya* 12, 2004, pp. 507-524; Rafał Morawiec, "Mołdawia" [Moldova], *Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia* 2, 1992, pp. 125-135; Paul D. Quinlan, "Back to the Future: An Overview of Moldova under Voronin", *Demokratizatsiya* 12, 2004, pp. 484-504; Alicja Sowińska-Krupka, "Mołdawia 1940-1989: od sowietyzacji do odrodzenia narodowego" [Moldova 1940-1989: from Sovietization to National Revival], *Studia Polityczne* 5, 1996, pp. 127-141; Jacek Wróbel, "Naddniestrze" [Transdnistria], *Prace OSW* 9, 2002, pp. 15-20.

Supreme Council declared republican sovereignty and after the Moscow coup d'état, on August 27, 1991, it proclaimed independence.

However, political development of the Moldavian society was distorted by separatist aspirations of the Russian, Ukrainian and Gagauz population. In September 1990, local communist nomenclature, aiming to protect own economic and political interests, proclaimed the Transdnestr Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the Moscow coup this usurpatory state declared full independence and renamed into the Transdnestr Moldavian Republic. Moldova, that went to war with Transdnestr (from April to July 1992), did not accept that state of affairs. Thanks to the aid of the 15<sup>th</sup> Russian Army, the Transdnestr Moldavian Republic was able to protect its sovereignty.

The threat of territorial disintegration of Moldova forced the communists and part of opposition to make a political compromise. This agreement resulted in the formation of the national consent government under the auspices of President Mircea Snegur who, manoeuvring between the followers of integration with the Commonwealth of Independent States and adherents of the union with Romania, strengthened his own position, favouring the policy of 'moldovization' of the country. However, this compromise marginalized the pan-Romanian Popular Front and blocked the process of democratization. In the succeeding parliamentary elections, the Moldavian Communist Party obtained more seats in the parliament. The communists won elections in 1998, but owing to the agreement between lesser parties, they were unable to form a government. It was possible after parliamentary elections of 2001, when the Moldavian Communist Party gained 71 seats in the 101-seat parliament. They could form the government and elect president. The monopoly of one party hampered the process of democratization. Administrative state reforms, in the wake of which 13 counties were replaced by 32 districts, pointed to the growth of power regulation. Additionally, 30% of bureaucratic personnel was changed. The new ruling elite tightened its control over radio and TV stations. Critically thinking journalists were discriminated and opposition radio programmes, press agencies, journals and newspapers were closed. The only state company, which had monopoly on press distribution, refused to circulate journals and newspapers slanted critically towards the authorities.

Consequently, the authorities broke the law in organized elections. During elections, only those unswerving towards the authorities were appointed committee members, which established a base for manipulation. At the time of campaigns, local as well as central authorities used to cut off electricity during transmissions aired by the opposition, they censored statements made by independent candidates in government controlled mass media and restrained public meetings. Western observers called the local elections held in 2003 "free but not honest".<sup>13</sup>

Political development of the Moldavian society can be interpreted in terms of a progressive secession. The first period of building their statehood was threatened by separatist tendencies espoused by national and ethnic minorities calling for the establishment of own political organisms or tightening links with the Soviet Union. The political compromise with the Moldavian communists was made at the expense of further democratization. The policy of 'moldavization' provided the base for territorial integrity which, in turn, marginalised the Popular Front, the most important Pan-Romanian democratic force. This paved the way for post-communist political parties, which dominated political scene and led to a slow autocratization of the whole political system of that country.

#### 4.3. Regressive Secession (Political Development of the Central Asian Societies)

Social life of the Central Asian societies is based on different "civilizational foundations" than that of West-European societies.<sup>14</sup> Class divisions, even in an enlarged version, presupposed by non-

<sup>13</sup> Paul D. Quinlan, "Back to the Future: An Overview of Moldova under Voronin", op. cit., p. 493.

<sup>14</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: Erkin Abildaev, Osmon Togusakov, "System polityczny i uwarunkowania jego rozwoju" [Political System and Conditions of its Development], in: *Kirgistan. Historia - społeczeństwa - polityka* [Kyrgyzstan. History - Society - Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, Warszawa: Elipsa, 2004, pp. 340-350; Aalybek Akunov, Wojciech Bartuzi, Janat Jamankulov, "Opozycja polityczna" [The Political Opposition], ibidem, pp. 414-430; Narynbek Alymkulov, "Oblicza modernizacji politycznej państwa" [The Faces of Political Modernization of the State], ibidem, pp. 262-283; Muriel Atkin, "Thwarted democratization in Tajikistan",

Marxian historical materialism, do not prevail in these societies, as divisions are based on biological kinship: familiar, clan and tribal relations. In the first stage of the development of real socialism – an increase in power regulation – clan and tribal structures were persecuted by the communist triple-rule as they constituted the main barrier to the imposition of political domination of triple-rulership. However, in the second stage of the evolution of that system – a de-

in: *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, op. cit., pp. 277–312; Tadeusz Bodio, Kazak kızı Nurgul, Wojciech Jakubowski, "Przywództwo i elity polityczne" [Leadership and Political Elites], in: *Kirgistan. Historia – społeczeństwa – polityka* [Kyrgyzstan. History – Society – Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, op. cit., pp. 392–412; Piotr Borawski, "Chanowie współczesnej Azji" [The Khans of Modern Asia], *Sprawy Polityczne* 23/24, 2003, pp. 15–37; Andrei Chebotarev, "Opozycja polityczna" [The Political Opposition], in: *Kazachstan. Historia – społeczeństwo – polityka* [Kazakhstan. History – Society – Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, Konstancy A. Wojtaszczyk, Warszawa: Elipsa, 2000, pp. 218–231; Ibadulla E. Ergashev, Wojciech Jakubowski, "Partie polityczne i organizacje społeczne Uzbekistanu" [Political Parties and Social Organisations in Uzbekistan], in: *Uzbekistan. Historia – społeczeństwa – polityka* [Uzbekistan. History – Society – Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, Warszawa: Elipsa, 2001, pp. 151–159; William Fierman, "Political Development in Uzbekistan: Democratization?", in: *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, op. cit., pp. 360–409; Eugene Huskey, "Kyrgyzstan: the Fate of Political Liberalization", *ibidem*, pp. 242–277; Wojciech Jakubowski, Piotr Załęski, "Organizacja systemu władzy publicznej" [The Organization of the System of Public Authority], in: *Kazachstan. Historia – społeczeństwo – polityka* [Kazakhstan. History – Society – Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, Konstancy A. Wojtaszczyk, op. cit., pp. 170–188; Daniel Łaga, "Kalendarium ważniejszych wydarzeń w historii Kazachstanu" [The Chronicle of Important Events in History of Kazakhstan], *ibidem*, pp. 449–469; M. Mashan, "Partie polityczne i ruchy społeczne" [Political Parties and Social Movements], *ibidem*, pp. 188–217; Michael Ochs, "Turkmenistan: the Quest for Stability and Control", in: *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, ed. by Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, op. cit., pp. 312–360; Martha B. Olcott, "Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakhstan", *ibidem*, pp. 201–242; Lucyna Roszyk, "Transformacja uzbecka: przełom czy kontynuacja?" [An Uzbek Transformation: Turning Point or Continuation?], in: *Uzbekistan. Historia – społeczeństwa – polityka* [Uzbekistan. History – Society – Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, op. cit., pp. 171–189; idem, "Model transformacji tadżyckiej – próba rekonstrukcji" [The Model of Tajik Transformation – An Attempt at Reconstruction], in: *Tadżykistan. Historia – społeczeństwa – polityka* [Tajikistan. History – Society – Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, Warszawa: Elipsa, 2002, p. 201–231; idem, "Dylematy transformacji kirgiskiej. Między modelem a praktyką zmiany systemowej" [The Dilemmas

crease in power regulation – starting from the mid 50s, tribal and clan structures begun to coexist with structures of triple-lordship. Later on, domination of local communist nomenclatures in Central Asia was directly propped up by clan and tribal ties. Usually, members of influential tribes and clans became first secretaries of republican Communist Parties, but their deputies were Russians, coming from the centre. In 1964, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, coming from the tribe of the great *zhus*, was appointed first secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazak Socialist Soviet Republic. Members of nomenclature in Kyrgyzstan usually recruited from southern clans of this republic. Uzbekistan was ruled by Sharif Rashidov, coming from the Samar-kanda clan. Saparmurad Niiyazov, a member of the *Tekke* tribe, became first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan. Tajikistan was ruled by clans' representatives coming from Leninobodis and Kulob. Members of the Leninobodis clan were elected first Secretary, members of the latter – Minister of Security. Clan and tribal domination based on biological kinship, overlapping with class domination based on disposition of means of coercion, production and communication, strengthened the power of local factions of the triple-lords class. This is why despotism of local nomenclature, corruption and nepotism in societies in Central Asia was more widespread than in other republics of the Soviet Union. In a presupposed conceptual apparatus, the level of autonomy of citizens in the societies of Central Asia was lower than the level of autonomy of the metropolitan citizens, not to mention the Baltic republics.

Vitality of tribal and clan structures fundamentally weighed on the process of revitalization of autonomous civil bonds. In case of Central Asian societies, the very use of the expression "revitalization of autonomous civil bonds" is not adequate, because a Western-style

of Kyrgyz Transformation. Between Model and Practice of Systemic Change], in: *Kirgistan. Historia – społeczeństwa – polityka* [Kyrgyzstan. History – Society – Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, op. cit., pp. 315–333; Michael Rywkin, "Problemy narodowościowe krajów byłego ZSRR" [National Problems of the Previous Soviet Union's Countries], *Obóz* 28, 1993, pp. 83–95; Irena Tatarzyńska, "Azja Środkowa i Zakaukazie" [Central Asia and the Caucasus], op. cit., pp. 167–178; Askar Tulegulov, "Elita polityczna" [The Political Elite], in: *Kazachstan. Historia – społeczeństwo – polityka* [Kazakhstan. History – Society – Politics], ed. by Tadeusz Bodio, Konstancy A. Wojtaszczyk, op. cit., pp. 255–267.

civil society, based on autonomous, individual social relations, which take place between human beings, has never governed public life of these societies. Individuals have always represented and acted on behalf of their own family, clan or tribe. It is possible to claim, whatever it might mean in the conceptual apparatus of non-Marxian historical materialism, that during Gorbachev's *perestroika*, revitalization of tribal and clan bonds occurred. But these bonds, if coupled with triple-class rule, blocked the development of autonomous civil relations. As a result of the above, the process of revitalization of autonomous civil relations, stimulated by Gorbachev's reforms, never gained such momentum as analogous social processes in the metropolitan society and some provincial sub-societies.

Thus, liberalisation processes, coming from the centre of the empire, posed a serious threat to the rule of local communist nomenclatures. The victory of democratic forces in the Moscow coup d'état paradoxically precipitated the secession of Central Asian republics from the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan proclaimed independence on August 31, 1991, Tajikistan, on September 9, 1991 and Turkmenistan, on October 27, 1991. Kazakhstan gained independence last, namely after the meeting in Bialowieza, on December 16, 1991.

However, in case of the Central Asian societies, the collapse of the Soviet Empire did not lead to the collapse of the system of triple-lordship. Local factions of the triple-lord class, by proclaiming independence, defended own class interests and preserved political *status quo*.

At the level of basic relations: the class of triple-lords – citizenry, independent existence of the Central Asian societies changed nothing. Citizens of new states accepted this fact with passivity and indifference. The independent statehood did not stir enthusiasm or social revival. Suffice it to say that independent existence did not even provoke personal changes in the structure of power. New presidents of the Central Asian states previously held posts of first secretaries of their Communist Parties. So was the case with Islam Karimov – president of Uzbekistan, Nursultan Nazarbaev – president of Kazakhstan, Saparmurad Niyazov – president of Turkmenistan, Rahmon Nabiev – first president of Tajikistan. The only exception was Kyrgyzstan, where as a result of a compromise between most important tribal groups, Askar Akaev, a former scientist, became president.

At the institutional level, political divisions have not been formed yet. Authorities controlled political parties and social organizations. In some countries, one-party model was overtly accepted (Tajikistan), in other, oppositional parties were banned and marginalised or – if they exist – have clearly restricted character (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). The executive branch of power dominated over the legislative and judiciary branches of power structure.

Presidential and parliamentary elections were nothing but a façade. According to Western observers, they were neither free nor fair. Referendum held in 1994 in Turkmenistan, concerning prolongation of Niyazov's presidency until 2002, might serve as a prime example. In its result, the 1997 presidential elections were cancelled. When many candidates stand for elections, potential rivals were eliminated by frauds and manipulations and had no chance to compete fairly. Organization of elections in Kazakhstan aptly illustrates this thesis. In order to prevent other candidates from launching effective election campaign, Nazarbaev unexpectedly shortened his term in October 1998 and scheduled elections for January next year. The Central Election Commission disqualified two most important rivals of the president. One of them was Kazhegeldin, former Prime Minister, and the other – Awezov, leader of the opposition party, *Azamat*. As a result of these manipulations Nazarbaev gained 81.7% votes (turnout reached 87%).

At the level of social consciousness, the authorities wanted to legitimize its power appealing to the tradition of oriental despotism. It is claimed that a Western model of democracy is inadequate and therefore an oriental model of a democratic system is needed.

Political changes in Central Asia can be subsumed into the model of regressive secession. In spite of being for a long time part of the Soviet Empire, civilizational distinctiveness of the Central Asian societies and vitality of tribal divisions slackened the process of revitalization of autonomous social bonds. Described situation was brought about not as a result of terror and repression of the metropolitan triple-class (although it played a role), but rather vitality of tribal structures coexisting with the structure of class domination. Since these societies are based on a very distinctive civilizational fundament, it is difficult to prognosticate their further development

applying directly theses of the first model of a political society. Let us remind that according to the static assumptions of this model, if growing power regulation has passed a certain threshold, revitalization of social bonds takes place, which results in a civil revolution. In case of the Central Asian societies tribal and clan structures pose the most significant obstacle to the revitalization of autonomous social bonds. The gradual democratization of countries from this region may be stimulated by modernization, leading to individualization of social life, which will set into motion processes described in the first model of a political society in non-Marxian historical materialism. Whether this situation comes true is contingent upon processes of modernization alone. The response of non-Marxian historical materialism in this case may be twofold. Modernization processes may occur in a selective way, adjusting to interests of an autocratic political structure (casus China), or may occur in an autonomous and spontaneous way. Then, autocratic political structure would have to adjust to the interest of social classes and groups espousing modernization.

### 5. The Variety of Democratization in the Global Context: Summary

Developmental differentiation of the post-Soviet republics resulted from the force of two classes: rulers and citizens. The force of each class may be defined as its ability to promote own social interests in relation to each other. Such a definition of the relations between the class of citizens and rulers, allows to distinguish five developmental paths of the post-soviet societies:

- (i) victorious civil revolution leading to class peace;
- (ii) victorious civil revolution leading to a civil loop;
- (iii) progressive secession leading to civil resistance;
- (iv) progressive secession leading to an increase in power regulation;
- (v) regressive secession leading to an increase in power regulation.

At one pole there are societies with an active and organized class of citizens who are able to make a victorious revolution. However, the outcome of these revolutions was twofold. Some revolutionary

disturbances ended with the introduction of stable class peace (i) some – with a civil loop (ii). The Baltic societies (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) pertain to the first group, whereas Georgia and Armenia – to the latter. At the second pole there are societies with a passive and atomised class of citizens (v). Independence initiated by local communist nomenclatures did not translate into political benefits for citizens. This is the fate of the societies of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). Between these two opposite poles there are societies whose citizens were strong enough to force concessions on the part of authorities, but too weak to seize the whole power. In the first stage of limited democratization, citizenry gained some level of autonomy. However, in the second stage of autocratic consolidation, the mechanisms of political competition led to the growth of power regulation, which provoked (iii) or not (iv) the resistance of citizenry. The third developmental variant is represented by Ukraine, the fourth one by Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova.

The above can be conceived in the qualitative language of non-Marxian historical materialism. Bearing in mind a number of factors incorporated in the first model of power and its further elaboration, it seems quite a lot. First of all, it permits to present a comprehensive framework embracing political development of all post-Soviet republics. This is the greatest advantage of this conceptualization. However, problems appear as soon as we come to details. One of them is the course taken by revolutions in particular countries. Why revolutions in the Baltic societies were successful, whereas those in the Caucasus failed? This problem refers to the role of national consciousness in the process of democratization: why, in the Baltic case, national consciousness comprised a factor favouring democratization, whereas in the Caucasus case, it was one of the main obstacles to it. Another question relates to the overlap between democratic development and economical reforms: did privatisation and free-market reforms accelerate or hamper democratization? Or maybe they are neutral to the process of democratization, which displays its own dynamics, first of all, in the sphere of politics.<sup>15</sup> One may hope that

<sup>15</sup> Considerations on this topic in non-Marxian historical materialism were presented among others by Krzysztof Brzechczyn, "The Collapse of Real Socialism in

further concretization of the theory of power in non-Marxian historical materialism, grasping both cultural and economic dimensions of social life, shall allow for further clarification of mentioned problems.

However, thanks to the comprehensiveness of presented picture of political transformations occurring in the post-Soviet societies, it seems congruent to pose a question concerning the influence of the global context on the processes under analysis.

The global context is understood here as a coincidence of three types of factors: policy of Western European and North American states, network of international organizations (e.g. non-governmental organizations observing human rights), and international economical relations.

At the time of *perestroika*, Western countries supported territorial integrity of the Soviet Union till the very decline of this state. Just several days before the Moscow coup d'état, President Bush went to Kiev to persuade Ukrainian leaders to moderate their demands towards Moscow. This strategy led to indifference towards democratic and independent aspirations of the Balts and their moral rights. The Baltic societies own their independence to themselves.

However, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, there emerged three kinds of political strategies adopted by the Euro-Atlantic World. It is possible to call them provisionally: *democratic support* (i), *maintenance of status quo* (ii), and *democratic encouragement* (iii). The aim of the *democratic support* strategy consists in strengthening international security and democratic consolidation of the post-Soviet countries. The Baltic states, which became members of the CE, the EU, NATO and other international organizations, are the recipients of such a policy. In the Central Asian states, ruled by the post-Soviet, yet mostly secular dictatorships, the strategy of *maintaining status quo* is adopted. This is why they impede, to a certain degree, the spread of Islamic funda-

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Eastern Europe versus the Overthrow of the Spanish Colonial Empire in Latin America. An Attempt at Comparative Analysis", *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in History and Archaeology*, vol. 1, no. 2, 2004, pp. 105–135, and Achim Siegel, "Entdifferenzierung, Desintegration, Re-Differenzierung. Zur Modellierung des politisch-ökonomischen Krisenzyklus in der Volksrepublik Polen", in: *Differenz und Integration. Die Zukunft moderner Gesellschaften*, ed. by Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997, pp. 363–369.

mentalism in this region. This policy was bolstered after September 11<sup>th</sup>. The strategy of *democratic encouragement* was adopted towards countries located between Russia and Central and South Europe, such as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, where. This strategy has matured slowly. At first, these countries were recognised as a grey zone pertaining, formally, or what is more important, informally, to the Russian sphere of influence. However, tightening links with the Western world strengthened civil societies in some of these countries and they gained ability to resist. The interest of Western opinion combined with an active role played by democratic states and international organizations helped to seek political compromise and routes to democratization. Ukraine and Georgia were the main beneficiaries such a policy. One may hope that democratization will spread to other countries belonging to this group.

Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (ed.)

# Values and Norms in the Age of Globalization

Offprint

2007



**PETER LANG**  
Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften