Populist Discourse in the Polish Media

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8. Populism and Social Media. Analysis of the Political Communication Activities of Paweł Kukiz and Citizen Social Media Users During the 2015 Electoral Campaigns

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Introduction

Hybrid media systems with increasingly interlinked new and traditional media (Chadwick, 2013; Kübler and Kriesi, 2017) have created new possibilities in political communication. Thanks to these systems, political actors are now able to choose between various channels of communication, with social media being most effective in providing unfiltered access to the general public and potential voters (Golbeck, Grimers, and Rogers, 2010; Jacobs and Spierings, 2016). In this sense, social media have become an ideal channel for populist communication (Ernst et al., 2017). Their appeal is increased by the widespread perception that they are free from the influence of professional journalists (i.e. 'media elite') and are thus much closer to citizens ('the people'). Social media are generally seen as giving citizens greater opportunities to express their opinions and influence the information agenda.

In contrast to research focused on social media interactions between specific political actors and other social media users (i.e. reactions to statements posted by a political actor on his/her Facebook or Twitter profile), this chapter analyzes populist political communication from two different perspectives: that of the political actor and that of citizen users. In the first perspective, we will concentrate on messages constructed and disseminated by a political actor on social media, aiming to identify the elements of populist discourse in the Facebook posts of Paweł Kukiz, a Polish populist politician. The second perspective will concern the statements of social media users who may also use populist discourse; here, we will analyze their posts concerning various Polish politicians, including Paweł Kukiz.

These two study perspectives share (1) the same study period, covering the electoral campaigns preceding the Polish presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015, and (2) a focus on critique of 'the elite' (*anti-elitist populism*) in the analyzed statements that were posted on (3) social media platforms – Facebook and YouTube. However, before presenting the results of our analysis, it is necessary to explain the methodological challenges associated with both aforementioned perspectives. To this end, we will elaborate on the observations made in chapter 7, regarding the specificity of social media in populist political communication.

Populism and Social Media – Methodological Challenges

Research from the Perspective of a Political Actor

In this perspective, whose characteristics and consequences are presented in detail in chapter 1, the main goal was to analyze the statements disseminated by actors of political communication and to identify the elements of populist discourse in those statements. The research process consisted of several stages: (1) selection of the political actor, (2) selection of the communication channel, (3) determination of the study period, and (4) content analysis (concerning the format and actual content of the statements). Each of these stages will be explained in detail later in this section.

As noted in chapter 7, modern populism owes a lot to the development of social media. However, it is worth explaining in greater detail how the presence and activity of political actors (parties and their leaders) in this specific communication area can be considered in the context of populism.

In literature, the role of a populist leader is defined in two ways. In one interpretation, the political leader is seen as a central figure of populism who is essential for mobilizing the masses (Weyland, 2001), and whose personalist and paternalist leadership is a fundamental feature of populism (Roberts, 1995). The second interpretation treats the political leader as just one of many articulators of the populist style, the main protagonist of populism, accompanied by other actors, such as political parties (Stanley, 2008; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011). The latter approach is characteristic not only of researchers who see populism as an ideology, but also of those who define populism as a kind of discourse or political strategy (Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). In this chapter, we employ the latter approach.

Our decision to focus on the statements of a single Polish politician, Paweł Kukiz, the leader of the Kukiz'15 movement, follows the argumentation of B. Moffitt, who defines political leaders as visible symbols of modern populism, widely covered by the media and responsible for setting the limits of discourse on populism. In addition, many populist parties are in fact 'personal parties' of their leaders, with activists working for the personal success of the man at the head. Thirdly, the political position of a populist leader is relatively stable on the national scale, in contrast to the parties or political movements whose senior members may even be barely known outside the party (Moffitt, 2016). In this sense, Paweł Kukiz is a fine example of a populist leader, even though his movement – taking its name from his surname – is not formally a political party.

The selection of Paweł Kukiz for this study was associated with his success in the Polish presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015. An ex-rock star and political novice, he received 3 million votes in the presidential elections in May that year (third place with 20.8% votes). In the parliamentary elections held in October 2015, his political movement Kukiz'15 won 42 seats in the Sejm, the lower chamber of the Polish parliament, making it the third strongest political force in Poland.

The choice was also largely based on the fact that social media were the main channel of communication for Paweł Kukiz. He often argued that traditional media were not interested in him or his political views, accusing them of bias and favoring politicians from other parties (Adamczewska, 2016). In addition, previous analyses of

Paweł Kukiz's political career and the communication aspect of his electoral campaigns show that in his statements (those published by traditional media and social media, as well as his parliamentary addresses) Kukiz relied heavily on constitutive features of populism – critique of 'the elite' and reference to 'the people', while emphasizing his anti-systemic stance and using colloquial and emotional language (Kołodziejczak and Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, 2017; Wrześniewska-Pietrzak and Kołodziejczak, 2017; Lipiński and Stępińska, 2018).

The combination of these two premises, i.e. social media as the main channel of communication and the presence of core elements of populist discourse, places this study among a relatively small body of research concerning relations between populism and new media, especially as it pertains to political communication through social media. These relations may be considered on at least two levels.

First, new media are becoming an environment which exacerbates the division between 'the political and media elites' and 'the people' (Van Zoonen, 2012). As B. Krämer (2017) argues, actors using the elements of populist discourse via the Internet tend to contest traditional media, accusing them of bias, while proclaiming themselves to be the sole holder of true information and the only representative of 'the people'. Therefore, new media are becoming a place for expressing anti-elitist attitudes and for frequent reference to 'the people'.

Political actors using the elements of populist discourse have successfully used new media to become independent of traditional media and have been able to overcome geographic barriers in disseminating their messages (Moffitt, 2016). It does not mean, however, that they have completely forsaken traditional media. Quite to the contrary, research shows that "there is a compatibility of media logic and populism that lead to a media coverage of populist political actors or populist statements made by politicians. There are at least three aspects of media logic that are especially favourable to the dissemination of populism: the media interests in conflict framing, strategic framing, and personalization" (Esser et al., 2017, p. 372).

Secondly, novel technological possibilities created by new media are also important for populist political communication. The directness and openness of this communication sphere may be beneficial for populists (Barlett et al., 2013). Social media platforms create much more direct links between users than traditional media (Engesser et al., 2017) and enable immediate interaction. Thus, the use of these new communication tools by populist actors allows them to have close, almost personal contacts with potential voters, closing the gap between political actors and their followers.

In addition, the environment of social media and their specific mode of information transfer, based on short, simplified posts, facilitates the spread of ambiguous ideologies, including populism (Ernst et al., 2017). Finally, social media are free of charge, removing any potential financial barriers on the part of the senders and receivers of any messages.

The aforementioned observations lead into the next stage of the research procedure, which involved selection of a specific communication channel. In this study, we chose to analyze only Facebook posts, even though in 2015 Paweł Kukiz also posted content on Twitter.

The reason for this decision was partially due to the low number of tweets and their high irregularity. Furthermore, in Poland, Facebook is the clear leader among social me-

dia platforms, reaching 82% of Polish Internet users, i.e. 23 million people, compared to 4 million Twitter accounts (IAB Polska/PwCAdex, 2017). In Poland, Twitter is also perceived mainly as a platform for politicians and journalists, and as such it is less relevant in research on populist political communication (Królowie Polskiego Twittera, 2013). With its reputation for being a platform for communication among elites and not between elites and ordinary citizens, Twitter did not fit the purpose of our research: analysis of political communication directed toward citizens – potential voters.

The third stage of the research process involved determining the study period from which we could select materials for the research sample. The collected material covered the presidential and parliamentary campaigns (days between May 1 and 8, 2015 and between October 16 and 23, 2015). On one hand, that period may be described as the most dynamic, characterized by increased communication on the part of political actors fighting for potential votes. On the other hand, the voters themselves can be expected to be more interested and to actively participate in communication on social media, e.g. to obtain information essential for choosing their candidate. This assumes an exceptionally intense relationship between political actors and citizens during that period, which is crucial for research on populism.

In order to characterize the populist political communication on social media from the perspective of a political actor, we also need to examine the character of the content and the way it is presented by the political actor on his Facebook profile. This can be established using content analysis – objective, systematic, and quantitative review of the visible content of statements (Berelson, 1952). This is a permanent feature of content analysis, regardless of whether the analyzed statements are published via traditional or new media.

In our research, we used traditional content analysis (Herring, 2004). This was possible thanks to the relatively small sample and short time period under study. Our analysis was based on Facebook posts treated as individual text units and on the categories of the codebook presented in detail in chapter 1.

Research from the Perspective of Citizen Internet User

The access to content generated by the web users – and not only to that created by political actors – is invaluable for researchers dealing with political communication. However, many experts on media and politics fail to notice the fact that only a small fraction of content in the Internet is created by politicians and journalists. Most of it is produced by non-professional web users but research on political communication rarely reflects that.[1]

In research on the content of messages disseminated via social media it is important to emphasize the challenges and limitations associated with this material. One of the

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[1] This process is sometimes noticed by theoreticians, although it is called "certain actions of citizens" (Schultz, 2008, pp. 36–72), "associative communication" (Goban-Klas, 1998, p. 9; Pawełczyk and Piontek, 1999, pp. 41–42) or "horizontal-associative communication" (Kolczyński, 2008, pp. 17–18). It is worth noting that an important element of social media communication is its public character, which before the twenty-first century was largely hindered by the lack of a widely accessible communication channel for citizens.

greatest problems is creating the database itself, which requires the use of an appropriate web crawler (Amudha, 2017, pp. 128–136). This challenge appears immediately and concerns the selection of material, related to the immense amount of data that may be included in the analysis. For example, the number of Polish Facebook users exceeded 17 million in 2018 (Digital, 2018), and given that more than half of them log in everyday (Sadowski, 2012), we are dealing with the audience similar in size to the number of viewers during the largest events broadcast by the Polish television.[2]

However, it is much more difficult to estimate the actual scale of user activity in the generation of content on a specific subject (e.g. politics, populism, elections, etc.). Depending on the applied exclusion criteria, these numbers may range from a few thousand (research on microtopics), through dozens of thousands (mesoscale), to several million posts (macroscale). In our case, the number of posts directly related to 'the elite' (using the keyword "elite" and its various declensions in Polish) was about 1,000 for the parliamentary elections and about 900 for the presidential campaign, selected from about 30 thousand and 43 thousand posts, respectively, suggesting elements typical of populist discourse. With such high numbers, reduction of the sample material can pose a significant problem (Gabbouj et al., 1999).

In research on the content produced by political actors, selection criteria rely mainly on the subject itself and additional criteria such as the popularity of a given text unit, time limitations, etc. In comparison, in analysis of content created by users, the selection criteria can be much more intricate. There are criteria related to a political actor or social media user (e.g. fans, followers, or subscribers of a given politician) and those related to the scope and character of the statement. Therefore, selection may be based on the presence of a given additional element (a photo, link, or shares by other users), time (e.g. publication during or after the electoral campaign), or location of the author. However, the most important for selection are the topics present in the research material itself, identified based on the catalog of relevant keywords.

A lot depends on the precision of keywords. In research on electoral communication, one can use candidates' names or the word *election* in various declensions in Polish, but these need to be accompanied by exclusion keywords (e.g. due to other meanings of the Polish word for elections, *wybory*, which may also mean *choice* as in *consumers choice*, or *decision* as in *life decisions*). In addition, after software-based selection, the relevance of each text needs to be reassessed by a researcher (coder), as the automated content analysis is imperfect – it has problems with reading graphics, cannot interpret irony, and cannot apply the cultural background that is often indispensable for evaluating the context of a given statement (Weitzel et al., 2015).

Another crucial element of research is delineation of text units. It is easier in traditional media, due to the relative linearity of texts and the absence (or low number) of intertextual links. This means that analysis of a press article involves its natural components such as its title, lead, main text, headings, photos, etc. More problems arise when delineating radio and TV materials.

Meanwhile, the level of complexity and diversity of text units constructed or distributed by social media users are associated with a much greater number of chal-

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[2] The number of Facebook users who log in everyday (about 9 million) is similar to the average audience of the national team football matches (e.g. Poland–Portugal on February 29, 2012).

lenges. These include (1) intertextuality – references to other texts on other websites, retweets, materials from external servers, comments, shares, reactions, extended galleries of photos, (2) metadata accompanying social media posts, and (3) text present in the graphical elements of the text unit and graphical elements in the text itself.

Only allowing for the aforementioned issues, can a database consisting of social media posts be used to perform content analysis. This research technique requires a theoretical foundation and operationalization of terms, preparation of a categorization key (also known as a codebook), and processing the final database which contains the results of the survey. It is also crucial to determine an effective method of encoding the collected information, which is described in detail in chapter 1.

Findings

Paweł Kukiz's Communication Activity on Facebook During the 2015 Electoral Campaigns

The aim of the first part of this research was to determine whether or not Paweł Kukiz used elements of populist discourse in posts on his official Facebook profile, and if so, which components of populism were present. Quantitative analysis showed that in May 2015 his Facebook profile was 'liked' by 36,657 users. By October 2015 that number increased more than tenfold, reaching 395,803 people. This upward trend can also be observed in the number of posts published by P. Kukiz in both analyzed periods (May 2015 – 26 posts, October 2015 – 65 posts) and in how often Facebook users shared his posts (283 and 425, respectively). The opposite trend can be observed in the number of 'likes' and comments his post received, which dropped by about 40% between May and October. Therefore, Paweł Kukiz's increased activity on Facebook did not result in increased involvement of his fans.

In P. Kukiz's posts, the most frequently represented elements of populist discourse were anti-elitism and reference to 'the people' (ordinary citizens). Every other post in both analyzed periods criticized 'the elite', understood mainly as the political elite (parties or specific politicians) or media elite (journalists and media organizations). During his presidential campaign anti-elitist posts constituted 46.1% of all posts, compared to 53.8% a few months later, during the parliamentary campaign. During the earlier period, Paweł Kukiz focused mainly on criticizing the political elite (every fourth post), but in the second campaign he turned strongly to the media elite (every third post).

It should be emphasized here that Paweł Kukiz's message can be distinguished by an anti-systemic stance, which was excluded from the category of anti-elitism in our analysis. Posts that included anti-systemic content constituted an additional reinforcement of Paweł Kukiz's anti-elitist message, accounting for 8% of all posts in both analyzed periods.

Every tenth post contained reference to ordinary people – citizens. Paweł Kukiz demanded that power be given to 'the people', and asked for justice for 'the people' and greater control by the people over the state (see Table 8.1). This approach is char-

acteristic for the populist strategy described in chapter 7, i.e. one which uses social media to reinforce the division of 'the elite' and 'the people', questions the objectivity of traditional media and accuses them of failing to represent the interests of 'the people'.

Table 8.1. Presence of indicators of populist discourse in Paweł Kukiz's Facebook posts

	Presidential campaign (May 1–8, 2015)		Parliamentary campaign (October 16–23, 2015)		Total	% of all posts
	number of posts (N=26)	% posts	number of posts (N=65)	% posts		
Critique of the elite – including:	12	46.1	35	53.8	47	51.6
Critique of political elite	7	26.9	16	25.8	23	25.3
Critique of media elite	5	19.2	19	29.2	24	26.4
References to the people	3	11.5	10	15.4	14	15.7
Anti-systemic attitude	2	7.7	6	9.2	8	8.8

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 8.1 shows the frequency of appearance of individual elements of populist discourse. In our research on the content published on social media, we observed that the small size of text units may lead to difficulties in identifying individual types of populism in a single post. Therefore, we attempted to determine the simultaneous presence of the individual elements of populist discourse in the analyzed material, and their combinations – in order to detect various types of populism according to the classification by J. Jagers and S. Walgrave (2007 – see: chapter 1).

Table 8.2. The presence of types of populism in the Paweł Kukiz's Facebook posts

	Presidential campaign (May 1–8, 2015)		Parliamentary campaign (October 16–23, 2015)		Total	% of all posts
	number of posts (N=26)	% of posts	number of posts (N=65)	% of posts		
Complete populism	0	0	0	0	0	0
Anti-elitist populism	2	7.7	10	15.4	12	13.2
Empty populism	1	3.8	0	0	1	1.1
Excluding populism	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Own elaboration.

The aforementioned data show that on Paweł Kukiz's Facebook page anti-elitist populism was identified in 13% of posts from the entire study period. Excluding populism and complete populism were not found in any of the analyzed posts. Incidentally, empty populism could be found in posts made during the presidential campaign, i.e. when in a single post Kukiz referred to 'the people' (the citizens of Poland), but did not include any reference to 'the elite' or 'out-groups'. According to the applied typology, Paweł Kukiz's stance may be described as anti-elitist, with every third post being critical of 'the elite', but without mentioning 'the people' or 'out-groups' ('the others').

Although in the light of J. Jagers and S. Walgrave's (2007) typology, Paweł Kukiz's communication on social media can be described as populist (i.e. including reference to 'the people') in only 15% cases, one needs to take into account the specificity of this communication platform – its short form and large number of posts which refer to previous posts. Therefore, in our opinion, analysis of populist content in social media posts should also take into account individual indicators of populism even when they are not accompanied by the constitutive reference to 'the people'. In short, in research on populism, social media posts should not be evaluated in isolation.

The obtained results confirm the previous observations that Paweł Kukiz and his movement Kukiz'15 are one of the clearest examples of populist discourse in recent politics (Kołodziejczak and Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, 2017; Hess and Kasprowicz, 2017).

Communication Activity of Social Media Users During the 2015 Electoral Campaigns

The purpose of this part of the research was to determine the intensity of discussion (measured in text units – posts) about individual candidates among social media users in Poland during the two electoral campaigns in 2015. We also wanted to measure how frequently the indicators of anti-elitist populism were present in statements by social media users referring to individual political actors (candidates for president of Poland or political party leaders).

To this end, we conducted a content analysis of around 30,000 text units posted during the presidential election campaign (February 4–May 24, 2015) and 43,000 text units posted during the parliamentary election (July 17–October 25, 2015).

The selection of text units (social media posts) was based on the catalog of key-words which suggested that a given statement contained features of populist discourse, i.e. various declensions of the words 'people' and 'elite' in Polish. The decisive major-ity of posts came from Facebook (presidential elections – 81% of all materials, parlia-mentary elections – 85%) and YouTube (presidential elections – 13%, parliamentary elections – 8.6%). We focused on those posts that were autonomous statements or comments on previous posts. Any extensions, such as hyperlinks or texts in pictures, were excluded from analysis.

Then, we narrowed the database by selecting only those posts that unambiguously contained information on presidential candidates or the leaders of parties participating in the elections. Given the large size of our database, it can be used an indicator of the popularity of topics related to individual candidates themselves.[3] The results of this analysis are presented in Figures 8.1 and 8.2.

The results indicate that during the 2015 presidential campaign social media posts referred mainly to two major rivals – the incumbent president Bronisław Komorowski, representing Civic Platform (33%), and Andrzej Duda, the candidate from the main opposition party, Law and Justice (29%). Paweł Kukiz was the third most popular politician in the selected posts (15%). The remaining candidates were mentioned in less than 10% of posts in the study period.

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[3] These data are not intended to represent the popularity of candidates in the sense of the sympathy expressed towards them. In this case, only the number of entries was examined, not the sentiment expressed.

Figure 8.1. Percentage of posts referring to individual candidates in the 2015 presidential campaign (%, N≈30,000)*

*Magdalena Ogórek: 1.86%; Paweł Tanajno: 0.56%; Adam Jarubas: 0.53%.
Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 8.2. Percentage of posts concerning the leaders of political parties in the 2015 parliamentary electoral campaign (%, N≈43,000)


Source: Own elaboration.

During the parliamentary campaign in autumn 2015, social media users focused mainly on the incumbent Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz from Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform, hereafter PO) (30.5%) and Paweł Kukiz (23%). Third most discussed was Janusz Korwin-Mikke (a right-wing politician and a leader of the KORWIN party), followed by Jarosław Kaczyński: a leader of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice party, hereafter PiS).

Content analysis of statements referring to political actors and at the same time containing indicators of *anti-elitist populism* produced interesting results. After selecting posts which contained at least one anti-elitist strategy (discrediting, blaming, or detaching 'the elite' from 'the people'), the number of posts referring to individual politicians changed. However, it needs to emphasized that the presence of *anti-elitist populism* in these posts did not necessarily come from the viewpoint of the post's author but could also be quoting the anti-elitist message of a political actor.

Thus, in the case of the presidential elections, the inclusion of anti-elitist criteria resulted in an increase in the proportion of posts referring to Janusz Korwin-Mikke (from 7% to 17%) and the extreme right-wing Grzegorz Braun (from 5% to 17%). A large decrease was observed for posts dedicated to Andrzej Duda, the candidate of PiS party and the major rival of the incumbent president at that time, Bronisław Komorowski (from 29% to 12%). The proportion of posts referring to other candidates did not change as dramatically (Figure 8.3).

Figure 8.3. Percentage of social media posts referring to presidential candidates during the presidential campaign, containing indicators of anti-elitist populism (%, N≈30,000)


Source: Own elaboration.

Even greater discrepancies were seen for material from the parliamentary campaign in 2015. In the case of text units containing both reference to Paweł Kukiz and

criticism of 'the elite', the percentage of posts rose from 23% to 29%, putting P. Kukiz at the top of this ranking (see Figure 8.4). The proportion of posts about Janusz Korwin-Mikke also increased (from 17% to 19%), but there was a decrease in posts about Ewa Kopacz (from 30.5% to 22%) and Jarosław Kaczyński (from 17% to 12%).

Figure 8.4. Percentage of social media posts referring to leaders of political parties during the parliamentary election campaign, containing indicators of anti-elitist populism (%, N≈43,000)

Source: Own elaboration.

Conclusions

Analysis of the content of Facebook posts by Polish populist politician Paweł Kukiz before the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015 revealed a high percentage of statements criticizing 'the elite', in particular political and media elites, and a relatively high number of statements criticizing the existing political system in Poland. These results confirm previous observations based on analysis of the content of Paweł Kukiz's communication, conducted using both quantitative and qualitative methods (Kołodziejczak and Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, 2017; Wrześniewska-Pietrzak and Kołodziejczak, 2017), that he consistently dissociates himself from other actors on the political scene and from mainstream media, which he perceives as 'the elite'. Moreover, Paweł Kukiz often emphasizes his anti-systemic attitude and the need to completely change the existing political order, including the way political parties function and the entire electoral system in Poland. Such action is part of his movement's self-proclaimed fundamental strategic goal: to break the duopoly of the Polish political scene.

It should be noted, however, that the percentage share of anti-elitist populism in the sense proposed by J. Jagers and S. Walgrave (2007) – although still higher than any

other type of populism – was significantly lower than the percentage of critical statements about 'the elite' without any reference to 'the people', similar to the observations made in chapter 2 on the populist content in print media.

Secondly, analysis of the content of Facebook posts published by ordinary users (i.e. not political actors) provides insight not only into the level of their interest in particular political actors during electoral campaigns, but also their attitude towards these politicians. In both analyzed periods (the presidential and parliamentary campaign in 2015) Paweł Kukiz was among the top three political actors referred to in social media posts: during the presidential campaign, he was outdone attention-wise only by the two main election rivals – Bronisław Komorowski and Andrzej Duda, while during the parliamentary campaign only by the incumbent prime minister, Ewa Kopacz.

Interestingly, if we considered only posts that referred to a particular political actors and at least one anti-elitist strategy simultaneously (discrediting, blaming, or detaching 'the elite' from 'the people'), Paweł Kukiz's numbers went up. During the parliamentary campaign in 2015, posts devoted to him were the most numerous among those containing critical references to 'the elite'.

The activity of Internet users who join the discussion about politicians by adopting their language or viewpoints (here: juxtaposing the evil 'elite' with good 'people') is an important factor in the dissemination of ideological postulates. Due to the fact that Internet users mainly trust other Internet users, their adoption of narratives and distribution of content advantageous for certain political actors may be an important component of populist political communication, as such persons may serve as intermediaries or even opinion leaders influencing other potential voters.

In the course of our research on social media content from the perspective of political actors and citizen users, we have identified some challenges posed by this type of research. While when assessing traditional media it is possible to treat a unit of analysis (usually a single article or news item) as a complete statement and sufficient to determine whether a given message is populist or not, the specificity of social media publications is not subject to the same rules. Applying the same approach may distort the actual picture of the situation. Therefore, the content of communication via social media requires a populist researcher to take a more comprehensive view of the study material, taking into account the self-referential and mutually complementary character of the social media posts. Only in this way is it possible to build a coherent picture of the political message on social media.

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