

SHOULD PHILOSOPHERS GOVERN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Edited by

Zdzisław Krasnodębski



Should Philosophers Govern the European Union?

An Attempt at an Answer
from a Central European Perspective

Krzysztof Brzechczyn

1. Introduction: What is Philosophy, the European Union and Central Europe?

To answer the question posed in this way, one must first answer what philosophy, the European Union, Central Europe are and what role philosophy could play in the European Union.

The search for a definition of philosophy is already a philosophical problem. According to Arno Anzenbacher's textbook definition, philosophy is "a critical rational knowledge of the conditions for a comprehensive understanding of reality."¹ However, attempts to build a complete philosophical system are pretty rare in the history of philosophy. Real philosophers usually specialise in certain branches of philosophy. For our topic, fields such as the philosophy of history, political philosophy, or social philosophy are relevant, and here – though this is also uncommon—they strive to construct a synthesis—a comprehensive view of the subject of their study.

¹ Arno Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do filozofii*, (Kraków: Unum 1992), 39-42.

As Karl Marx noted, philosophers can assume two roles: interpreters of the social world and practitioners striving to change it. In the latter case, they can take on the role of an ideologist, an advisor to a ruler, or even a political agitator. The distinction between these two social roles is essential, as sometimes intellectuals may serve as mere political propagandists by leveraging the authority of science.

2. What is the European Union Becoming?

According to the information on the official EU website, the four central decision-making institutions that direct the administration of the European Union, set its policy direction, and influence the law-making process are the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission. Additionally, there are seven European institutions, seven bodies, and over 30 decentralised agencies throughout the EU. The mentioned source lists purely administrative bodies, namely 20 various agencies and four inter-institutional services. In total, some 60,000 officials work in this jungle of institutions.² Throughout the entire community, the following are plainly visible:

- increasing bureaucratisation,
- a rise in political regulation, as evidenced by the growing role of the European Commission and projects to transform the EU into a federation and abolish the veto right,
- increased regulation in the economic sphere, *vide* Green Deal,
- increased regulation in the cultural and moral sphere, *vide* the recognition of access to free abortion as a

² Types of EU institutions, bodies and agencies European Union (europa.eu), in *European Union website* accessed 25.04.2024.

human right or the mechanism for the forced deportation of immigrants to Member States.

One might ask: Is the layer of Euro-bureaucrats, emancipating themselves from the influence of member states, becoming merely a tool in the hands of the largest EU Member States, Germany and France, or are they transforming into a transnational ruling class? In the first case, this process could lead to growing opposition from smaller European countries against the dominance of the Franco-German duopoly. In the second case, the emergence of a transnational ruling class might reduce the autonomy of citizens not only in smaller Member States but also in France and Germany: it is easier to control one's sovereign, and therefore, dependent on national societies, power in Berlin or Paris than Euro-power in Brussels.

According to the classical interpretation by Max Weber, the defining characteristic of real power is the monopoly on the use of force within a given territory. The transnational ruling class (*in spe*) does not yet possess these prerogatives but is clearly striving for them. This is how the recurring plans for creating a European army or the common defence policy of EU countries can be interpreted.

Let us describe that usually political power and the administrative apparatus in the social sciences are presented as follows:

- committee to manage owners' interests (Marxism),
- “night watchman” guarding free market principles (liberalism) in the interests of the bourgeoisie,
- welfare state compensating economic inequalities through redistribution mechanisms (social democracy),
- guardian and guarantor of the moral order (Catholic social teaching).

One can also distinguish a less known approach according to which political power is a class structure generated by unequal access to means of coercion and having its own

specific type of interests.³ For it is in the interest of power to enlarge the scope of its own regulation, thus, in this understanding power serves itself.

The ongoing centralisation of decision-making in the EU should, therefore, not be presented merely as a threat to Poland's sovereignty—i.e. a reduction in the scope of political regulation by nation-state rulers at the expense of transnational rulers (*in spe*)—but as:

- a threat to the political freedom of citizens of all Member States, as transnational power is less controllable than national power, e.g. it is easier to organise demonstrations against the decisions of “one's authority” in Berlin or Paris than to go to Brussels;

- citizens of Germany or France will be faced with “their rulers” more powerful, reinforced by an emerging transnational power;

- centralisation of decision-making on an EU scale will not solve the problems of individual Member States but will only create the new ones. For example, the different geopolitical positions and paths of historical development of individual EU countries determine their distinct geopolitical interests and differing perceptions of geopolitical threats;

- the problem of the democratic deficit in the EU is deepening, as EU bodies, not directly elected by the citizens of individual Member States, have primacy over the elected authorities of the respective nation-states.

Therefore, one can wonder how to counteract the centralisation of EU decision-making processes. Two proposals are available on the political market:

- the concept of a multi-speed Europe meaning different speeds of integration and adoption of the Euro;

³ See, for example, Leszek Nowak, *Power and Civil Society: Toward Dynamic Theory of Real Socialism*, (New York: Greenwood Press 1991).

– Europe of nations, or the defence of national sovereignty—this is how one can interpret the tightening cooperation among the European conservative circles before European Parliament elections, as well as the initiative of the Conservative Political Action Conference in Budapest.

The third option I would like to consider is the creation of regional agreements among Member States that would take over the competencies of the Brussels central administration. In this way, the regulations introduced would not be pan-European, but would have local variants and adaptations. The Three Seas Initiative, composed mainly of Central European countries, could fulfil this role. Before examining it more closely let me outline the specifics of this region.

3. What is Central Europe?

Delineating the exact borders of Central Europe has always been problematic. In the north-south latitudinal division, the lands belonging to Central Europe were part of *Barbaricum*, stretching north of the Danube and east of the Rhine—Poland. After the fall of Rome, the monarchy of Charlemagne gave rise to Christianitas—the Western civilisation. In the 10th century, after adopting Christianity, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech lands became its permanent part. However, starting from the 18th century, the meridian-based division of the continent into the industrialised West and the economically backward East, became increasingly widespread. Central Europe was perceived as part of the economically backward East in this division.

In the 20th century, one of the first to popularise the term Central Europe was Joseph Partsch, author of *Mitteleuropa*, published in 1904 under the aegis of the Berlin Central European Society. According to him, the borders of Central Europe were to be primarily political borders encompassing the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, with

Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro to the south. The area of Central Europe thus outlined was to be an area of expansion for German-Austrian capital. During the First World War, the idea of a union between Austria-Hungary and Germany was popularised by Friedrich Naumann, author of *Mitteleuropa*. In his view, the region was to encompass an area stretching from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Adriatic and the southern end of the Danube Plain, as well as the areas between the Vistula basin and Galicia (in Austria-Hungary) and the Vosges and Lake Constance. These lands were to be economically united and politically linked by an alliance between Berlin, Vienna and Budapest, in which Prussia was to be assured of dominance. However, the defeat of the Central Powers in the First World War put an end to Germany's plans for domination of Central Europe, at least for a while.

These historical, economic and geopolitical considerations mean that the borders of Central Europe are blurred, and the region itself is distinguished based on three distinct criteria: geographical, historical-civilisational and geopolitical. The first type of criteria considers features such as the topography, climate, fauna and flora. Historical and civilisational criteria include the type of economy and political system, cultural model, and the ethnic and religious composition of the region's societies. According to geopolitical criteria, Central Europe was located on the borderlands of the Russian, Ottoman, Prussian-German, and Habsburg (Austro-Hungarian) empires.

Another source of difficulty in understanding Central Europe's past and present is the history of individual Central European societies. Models and categories developed for analysing the history of Western Europe are often challenging to apply to Central European history. Let us list them in turn. These include the princely legal system creating a different model of feudalism, secondary serfdom, un-

stable statehood, and the development of national consciousness.

Feudalism. The lands and peoples that later became part of Central Europe were not conquered by the Roman Empire. For this reason, feudalism in these areas developed independently, through the dissolution of pre-class communal tribal societies, and therefore differed significantly from the classical Western European feudalism that emerged from ancient social relations. Unlike Western Europe, a vassal-fief system never developed in Central Europe. In Central Europe, land was formally owned by the ruling authority but was actually controlled by the administrative apparatus. The ruling class in the princely law society was a social group referred to in historical sources as the *nobiles*. The power of this social class was based on their control over means of coercion and means of production, namely land. Individuals recruited from this social class held offices in the state administration.⁴

Alongside the peasant population obligated to various dues and services for the state, there existed a category of servile population that was exempt from basic dues in exchange for producing various goods and performing services for the state. This is reflected in the place names that have survived to this day, such as Grotniki, where *groty* (arrowheads) were made, and Szczytniki, where *tarcze*—*szczyty* (shields) were produced, etc. From the surviving toponyms, it is possible to identify around 40 specialities, about half of which were craft skills that served the needs of the ruler and the state apparatus.

Although the mighty had their own landed estates, their size in Poland or Hungary usually did not exceed a few villages, in exceptional cases reaching up to a dozen.⁵ Dur-

⁴ Karol Modzelewski, *Chłopi w monarchii wczesnopiastowskiej*, (Wrocław: Ossolineum 1987), 129-132.

⁵ Marian Baranski, „Majątki możnowładcze na Węgrzech w XII w.,” *Przegląd Historyczny*, (n.p.: DiG 1979), vol. 70, 428.

ing this period, the power of a castellany in an average administrative district extended over more than 100 villages. In the mentioned countries, approximately one-third of the total value of contributions was allocated to the salaries of the lowest-level administrative officials, which significantly exceeded the income obtained from their country estates.⁶

The society under princely law in the 11th-13th transformed into a state society. As a result of immunity grants, ecclesiastical institutions and the nobility received land, and rulers renounced their rights to the settled peasant populations on that land. The transformation of the princely legal system into the estate system known in Western Europe was completed by the colonisation under German law and the establishment of towns on uninhabited land (*lat. in cruda radice*).

Secondary serfdom. The 16th century saw the division of the European economy into a developed West and a backward East. The Elbe River is regarded as the boundary between these two economic zones. To the east of the river, a system of manorial serfdom took shape, while to the west of the Elbe capitalism emerged. The core of the manorial system was serfdom in the form of personal, land and court dependency. Personal servitude restricted the freedom of the peasants, who could not leave their home village or marry without the master's consent. In addition, the serfs and their children had to serve at the lord's court and perform the work he indicated. The owner also had the right to sell peasants without land. Land subjection limited the peasants' freedom to dispose of the land they used, as they could be deprived of it depending on the will of the lord. Finally, the last dimension of feudal subjection—judicial subjection—made the peasant dependent on the owner's judicial authority.

⁶ Karol Modzelewski, *Chłopi w monarchii wczesnopiastowskiej*, 143.

In Western Europe, divided serfdom prevailed. This meant that the various forms of power over the peasantry were divided between different owners: one held judicial power over the peasant, another held land power, and a third held personal power. East of the Elbe, unitary serfdom prevailed.

Crisis of statehood. The birth of the manorial and serfdom system was part of a whole chain of transformations at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries.⁷ During this time, an international division of labour took shape: Western Europe specialised in manufacturing production and importing its goods to less industrialised countries, while societies with a manorial-serfdom economy specialised in producing and exporting raw materials and agricultural products to more developed countries. In Central Europe, competition from Western manufacturing and the isolation of the peasantry from the internal market undermined the development of towns and the bourgeoisie.

Bohemia and Hungary lost their independence as a result of the defeat in the Battle of Mohács in 1526. Bohemia then became a part of the Habsburg Empire, while the eastern part of Hungary fell under Ottoman rule. In the case of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the direct and indirect consequences of the manorial-serfdom economy undermined the state's finances, which, alongside the progressing anarchy of the political system, was one of the factors contributing to the crisis of the Commonwealth. This crisis left it unable to field an army of 100,000, unlike Austria, Prussia, and Russia and led to its collapse at the end of the 18th century.

Development of national identity. In Western Europe, national consciousness was formed according to the state-

⁷ For more on this topic, see Krzysztof Brzechczyn, *The Historical Distinctiveness of Central Europe: A Study in the Philosophy of History*, (Bern: Peter Lang 2020).

nation model. Subjects of the monarchy simultaneously became members of the nation, and democratisation processes made national identity the basis of civic consciousness.

The disrupted development of statehood in Central Europe meant that national identity was fundamentally shaped according to the nation-culture model. Aside from the “state nations” of the Poles and Hungarians, societies in Central and Southern Europe were peasant communities, lacking their own elites, which developed only with a delay in the 19th century. National formation processes began with awareness of one’s ethnic distinctiveness, the development of native intelligentsia, and political elites using national languages. Later, national elites formulated programs for emancipation and political autonomy, culminating in establishing their statehood.

In this part of Europe, national processes occurred on two levels. On the one hand, the multinational empires of the Hohenzollerns, Habsburgs, and Romanovs attempted to Germanise or Russify Central Europe’s former “historical” nations: the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles. On the other, the “state nations” of Central Europe, mainly the Hungarians and Poles, tried to maintain their cultural hegemony over those nationalities that had not established their nation-states. The national consciousness of the Slovaks, Romanians, Serbs, and Croats developed in opposition to the Magyarisation and Germanisation of their societies. Meanwhile, the formation of national consciousness among the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians proceeded in opposition to Polish culture, represented on the borderlands by the nobility and intelligentsia, as well as to the Russification efforts of the Russian state.

4. What is the Three Seas Initiative?

The Three Seas Initiative comprises 12 European Union countries between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. These countries account for almost a third of the total area of the European Union, with a population of almost 112 million people. In January 2021, Ukraine and Moldova expressed interest in participating; the U.S. and Germany have observer status.

The Three Seas Initiative was initially conceived as a response to China's economic activity. In 2012, Beijing launched an initiative—at first directed at Central European countries, the Balkans, and later Greece to build Silk Road 2.0. The goal of that project was to invest in infrastructure that would increase China's economic presence and, consequently, its geopolitical influence.

The conceptual work on the Three Seas Initiative began while Barack Obama was still the U.S. President. The first meeting took place in September 2015, and the first summit of leaders was held in August 2016 in Dubrovnik, where the cooperation goals were defined, primarily in the economic sphere (energy, transport, and digitalisation). In July 2017, the initiative gained greater prominence due to the participation of the U.S. President, Donald Trump, at the summit in Warsaw. Subsequent summits were held in Bucharest (2018), Ljubljana (2019), Tallinn (2020), Sofia (2021), Riga (2022), and Bucharest (2023).

Between 2016 and 2020, the U.S. under President Trump treated the Three Seas Initiative as a political counterweight to the influence of the Berlin-Paris axis and the old EU states. For this reason, during the first period of Biden's presidency, the U.S. naturally showed less interest in the project, at least in geopolitical terms. However, transforming the Three Seas Initiative into a geopolitical coun-

terweight to the old EU Member States seems at present to be either unlikely or entirely unrealistic. Primarily, redefining relations with the old EU Member States and the structures of the EU itself would need to be in the interest of at least the most significant of the twelve countries. Moreover, within the individual states of the Three Seas Initiative, a consensus beyond existing divisions would need to be established for such a political shift to be enduring. The divergences and contradictions among the Three Seas countries (e.g., the conflict between the Czech Republic and Poland over Turów and Hungary's stance on the Ukraine conflict) are too numerous for the initiative to play such a role.

The example of the vote to ban the sale of cars with internal combustion engines from 2035 shows how difficult it is to create such a majority. Poland opposed the ban for many months. It was later joined by the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and, after a change of government, Italy. Only the threat of Germany blocking the ban in March 2023 allowed the creation of a so-called blocking minority at the European Council level (this is made up of at least five countries with at least 35 percent of the EU population). When three weeks later Franz Timmermans announced an amendment to the regulation allowing the registration of cars with internal combustion engines burning synthetic fuels, which was beneficial for the German economy, the country withdrew its opposition. Only Poland voted against the new European Council regulation, with Bulgaria, Romania and Italy abstaining.

More promising is cooperation in the economic field—the most advanced objective of the initiative. One of the best-known projects under the auspices of the Three Seas Initiative is the *Via Carpathia*, linking Thessaloniki with Klaipeda. However, it is difficult to expect deepening and strengthening of economic cooperation. Poland—the largest country in the Three Seas Initiative—is, nonetheless, too

weak to be a standalone driving force for regional economic cooperation (with a population of 38 million compared to 112 million) without the support of the U.S.

5. Does Wanting Mean Only Being Able: On Poland's Role in the Three Seas Initiative

Georg Friedman, an American political scientist, has long propounded the thesis that Poland, with its population potential, can aspire to become a regional power.⁸ After Russia's aggression against Ukraine, our country became a leader in supporting Ukraine in the region and in the European Union.⁹ In the first stage of the conflict—that is, when Germany, for example, hoped Ukrainian resistance would last a few days at most—Poland donated €2 billion worth of military equipment to Ukraine. According to Mykhail Minakov, the proxy war between the U.S. and Russia in Ukraine has elevated Poland to the role of a *middle power*, which he lists alongsidewith Turkey and India. According to Minakov, the importance of a country is determined by its gross domestic income, population and defence spending. Further variables are the ability to influence the balance of power in international relations and foreign policy activity. Addi-

⁸ This view was expressed by Friedman even before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, see *Poland a Regional Power? George Friedman: make no single mistake*. WITH G. Friedman interviewed by Kamil Turecki, 2 IV 2017, In: Onet. News (Poland a regional superpower? George Friedman: Don't make one mistake – News (onet.pl), accessed 02.08.2023).

⁹ Between January and November 2022, Poland's direct aid to Ukraine amounted to EUR 3 billion, ranking it 6th on the donor list, and was equivalent to 1.5% of Polish GDP, putting Poland in second place behind Estonia. For comparison, the US spent 0.2% of its GDP and Germany 0.25%, quoted in Kazimierz Dadak, "Polski interes narodowy a wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska," *Arcana. Kultura. Historia. Polityka*, no. 169-170, (Kraków: Arcana 2023), 67.

tionally, one should consider the cultural power of a state, reflected in the shaping of a positive image. The mentioned criteria define a state's ability to influence others politically, economically, militarily and culturally.

Poland's growing role in foreign policy is not only due to the fact that the Polish state has become a mere "possessor of a strategic area."¹⁰ Playing such a role would not be possible without diversifying energy resource supplies, which has made Poland's economy less dependent on deliveries from Russia. Among the most important projects undertaken by the Law and Justice government between 2015 and 2023 in this regard were:

- the completion of the construction of the Lech Kaczyński LNG terminal in Świnoujście; the decision to build the LNG terminal was initiated in 2006 by the government of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and the investment continued by the governments of Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz was completed in autumn 2015; the LNG terminal has the capacity to receive up to 5 bcm of natural gas per year, with the possibility of increasing the receiving capacity to 7.5 bcm (Poland's annual demand is 20 bcm);

- the completion of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, which was launched on 27 September 2022, with a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The idea of constructing the pipeline first emerged in 1991, was revisited by Jerzy Buzek's government in 2001, but was abandoned by Leszek Miller's government (SLD-PSL coalition). The project was revived during the tenure of the Law and Justice government (2015-2023);

¹⁰ See, for example, Maciej Zakrzewski, „Dlaczego Polska się spasała. Odsłaniamy kurtykę. Trzecie szarpnięcie za sznurek,” *Arcana. Kultura. Historia. Polityka*, No. 65, (Kraków: Arcana 2022), 53; Mykhailo Minakov, *Ukraine and the Rise of the Middle Powers* in Focus Ukraine. A blog of the Kennan Institute, 31 July 2023 (Ukraine and the Rise of the Middle Powers, Wilson Center, accessed 2.08.2023).

- the commissioning on 5 May 2022 of the Poland-Lithuania cross-border gas pipeline under construction in 2020-2022, enabling gas transmission not only to Lithuania, but also to Latvia and Estonia;
- the opening on 17 September 2022 of the Vistula Spit Canal, which shortens the maritime route from Elbląg to the Gdańsk Bay by approximately 100 km and allows for bypassing Russian territorial waters;
- the start of construction of the LGN floating terminal in Gdańsk, which is scheduled for completion in 2026;
- plans to build a Central Transport Port and modernise rail links.

Diversification of resource supplies enabled the sale of 1 million cubic meters of natural gas to Moldova in October 2021. This was, for the first time in Moldova's history, a purchase of this resource from a country other than Russia.

* * *

At the elections of 15 October 2023, Poles decided otherwise.¹¹ Although Law and Justice won the most seats in the Sejm, a coalition consisting of Civic Platform, the Left and the Third Way formed the government. Its Prime Minister was Donald Tusk, who initiated a retreat from the construction of macro-economic and geopolitically significant investments, such as the construction of the Central Transport Port. The aspirations, or rather the lack thereof, of the government currently in power in Poland, were emphatically presented by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz in Donald Tusk's government in an interview in June 2018: "All four Central European countries function as elements of Germany's internal

¹¹ For an analysis of the election results, see: Jerzy Żurek, "Powyborcze refleksje, Wolni i Solidarni. Między Ideą a Praktyką." *Kwartalnik Społeczno-Polityczny*, no. 3, (n.p. 2023), 7-22.

economy. Poland also functions similarly, as our economy is closely dependent on the German one. Tusk's strategy (hot water policy—note by K.B.) resulted from the awareness of this dependence.”¹² What is more, the interlocutor of the magazine “Pressje” was reconciled with such a situation, as the world, according to Wallerstein, is arranged in such a way that there are centres and peripheries in it. As a result of various historical circumstances, Poland was assigned the role of a periphery, and one must—as the Minister's argument can be understood—simply come to terms with this. It is worth noting, however, that Wallerstein in his theory—which was not noted by Sienkiewicz in the interview—also distinguished semi-peripheries, i.e. countries that specialise in particular sphere of production or services and, on that basis, establish relatively partner-like relations with the centre.

The question posed in the title of the conference is therefore difficult to answer unequivocally. It all depends on which philosophers, which European Union and, finally, which politicians we are talking about. It seems that the centralising path the European Union is taking in its current form means that putting it in the hands of philosophers will not help much. A certain alternative would be to decentralise decision-making and to make autonomous individual supranational regions from the Brussels headquarters, but—as we can see—the power elites in the individual Member States are divided on this because—as in the case of Poland—the vassal role of the comprador elites suits them just fine.

¹² Nasi przodkowie skazali nas na peryferyjność — Klub Jagielloński (klubjagiellonski.pl), accessed 25.04.2024. The interview titled *Między szarpnięciem cugłami a ciepłą wodą w kranie. Z Bartłomiejem Sienkiewiczem rozmawia Krzysztof Mazur* appeared in the 51-52 issue of *Pressje* magazine, which came out in 2017.

**SHOULD
PHILOSOPHERS
GOVERN
THE EUROPEAN
UNION?**

SHOULD PHILOSOPHERS GOVERN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Edited by

Zdzisław Krasnodębski

Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej
Kraków 2025

Cover
IGOR STANISŁAWSKI

Make-up
AGNIESZKA KUCZKIEWICZ-FRAŚ

© Copyright Zdzisław Krasnodębski, 2025

ISBN 978-83-67830-39-3

Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej
(Centre for Political Thought)
www.omp.org.pl; www.usa-ue.pl

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Should Philosophers Govern the European Union? <i>Zdzisław Krasnodębski</i>	7
--	---

I.

Philosophy and Politics in the European Union <i>Zdzisław Krasnodębski</i>	11
Should Philosophers Govern the European Union? <i>Bronisław Wildstein</i>	29
Why Should Statesmen Rule in the European Union? <i>Agnieszka Nogal</i>	37
Should Philosophers Rule? <i>Justyna Schulz</i>	49
Should Philosophers Govern the European Union? <i>Paweł Kaczorowski</i>	60
Should Philosophers Govern the European Union? An Attempt at an Answer from a Central European Perspective <i>Krzysztof Brzechczyn</i>	76

II.

The Rule of the Philosophers through the Eyes of Plato <i>Zbigniew Stawrowski</i>	95
Philosophy and Power – Plato or Kant? <i>Violetta L. Waibel</i>	104
Who Resides in the Platonic Cave and What Is Its Dimensions? <i>Mamuka Beriashvili</i>	117

Should Philosophers Govern the EU? The Dichotomy of One vs Multitude: A Philosophical Lens of Spinoza <i>Davit Galashvili</i>	131
Hypothetical Governance by Philosophers: Pros and Cons of a Political Alternative <i>Irakli Taboridze</i>	141
Should Our States Be Governed by Philosophers? <i>Xuedan Li, Jure Zovko</i>	156
The Thematological Analysis of Community and Society in the Modern Crisis Situation Based on the Reflections of Giwi Margwelaschwili <i>Mariam Khazaradze</i>	182
The Governance of Philosophers or the Philosophy of Governance: the Context of the European Perspective on Georgia <i>George Gavgadze</i>	196
Does Inclusive Excellence as Academic Criteria Have the Form of Good? <i>Ivana Renić</i>	210
Index of names.....	221