

Vilification of the enemy: Different enemies, the same linguistic strategies

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Cognitive Discourse Analysis is one of the new trends within Cognitive Linguistics, now gaining momentum. It combines the insights from the first generation CL, which focused on the individual cognitive processes and, among other things, emphasised the role of metaphorical processing in cognition with Critical Discourse Analysis, which concentrated on elucidating the links between discourse and society. This paper attempts to identify the recurrent patterns of enemy vilification in war reports and commentaries in two newspapers: the Polish *Trybuna Ludu* and the British *The Times* in the 1980s and in 2001. This cross-language and cross-conflict analysis hopes to isolate the recurrent linguistic patterns characteristic of war discourse and to shed some light on their social function.

1. The aim, the data and the method of the present study

The present paper is most indebted to critical discourse analysis as proposed by Van Dijk (e.g. 2000 and earlier works). In his work on the construction of ethnic minorities, immigration and racism, he refers to the ascription of positive in-group values to 'us' and negative in-group values to 'them', as well as under-representation of negative information about 'us' and of positive information about 'them'. He claims that ideologies, such as racism, are shared social representations

or mental models which tend to be polarised, as most ideologies presuppose conflict and struggle.

Koller (2005) and Wodak (2006) call for a combination of cognitive approaches to mental representations and CDA in order to enhance our understanding of the relationship between discourse and society. Wodak (2006: 185) observes that

Stereotypes and prejudicial beliefs are thus enforced and manifested inter alia by metaphors, analogies, insinuations and stories. [...] [...] belief systems are cognitively and emotionally embedded and also have historical roots.¹

Thus, an integration of cognitive approaches which recognize the importance of metaphorical and analogical construction of mental models, as well as the importance of their emotional appeal with the critical discourse analysis focusing on the discursive construction and transmission of belief systems, should prove a fruitful line of investigation.

Several works have appeared recently which could fall into this new branch of linguistics, often termed Cognitive Discourse Analysis (see Charteris-Black 2004, Musolff 2004, Koller 2004, Nehrlich 2003, 2005a). They all utilise the fundamental premise of Cognitive Linguistics, i.e. that research should be usage-based. Therefore all of these studies start with the bottom-up analysis of language corpora, some of them purpose-built (e.g. Charteris-Black's corpus of British Party Manifestoes and American Presidential speeches and Koller's business language corpus), others employing the extant corpora (e.g. Musolff's use of COSMAS and the Bank of English). Qualitative analysis supported with frequency searches allows us to forward hypotheses on the intricate interaction between linguistic representation of cognitive structures, their use in discourse and society. My study is conversant with this new trend in Cognitive Linguistics.

The present paper stems from my research on the discursive representation of war in Polish and British press reports of the 1980s and 2001. One recurrent theme of the representation was enemy vilification. It consisted of several rhetorical patterns, such as a dichotomy between the self and the other, dual opposition series of positive in-group values ascribed to us and negative values ascribed to them,

¹ This position is akin to the idea of habitus proposed by Bourdieu and popularised by Bernardez (e.g. 2007).

represented by highly emotionally loaded words, face-threatening and face-saving strategies applied to the outcome of STATE AS PERSON metaphor, The Glory of War Myth, and systematically used cognitive metaphors. I will take a closer look at each of these strategies in the following sections of the paper. First, however, I will describe the sources of my data.

For the purpose of the investigation, a corpus of war articles from two newspapers: *Trybuna Ludu* and *The Times* was compiled. Both of the newspapers in the 1980s were representing their respective governments' position on international as well as internal affairs. In 1989 *Trybuna Ludu* changed its name to *Trybuna* and now represents the left part of the Polish political scene, which is no longer dominant.

The texts and text samples come from 1982, 1986, 1988, 1989 and 2001. They concern such topics as the Britain-Argentina war over the Falklands (April 2nd-June 14th 1982), the American air raid on Libya (April 15th 1986), the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (May 15th 1988-Feb. 3rd 1989), and the first phase of the War on Terrorism – the overthrowing of the Taliban government in Afghanistan (Oct.-Dec. 2001). Tables 1 and 2 show the size of the two corpora.

Table 1

The size of the *Trybuna Ludu* subcorpora

The topic	The number of texts	The word count
The Falklands war	70	42,247
The air raid on Libya	67	24,195
The withdrawal from Afghanistan	45	13,002
War on Terrorism	193	98,349
Total	375	177,793

Table 2
The size of the *Times* subcorpora

The topic	The number of texts	The word count
The Falklands war	132	123,645
The air raid on Libya	84	47,161
The withdrawal from Afghanistan	88	51,994
War on Terrorism	124	93,492
Total	428	316,292

The differences in the sizes of these corpora are mainly related to two factors. The first one is the centrality of the war in question to the newspaper policy (cf. Bell 1991 on the choice of subjects for press reporting), which accounts for the difference in the number of articles devoted to the Falklands war in the two newspapers. The Polish corpus consists of all the articles identified as pertaining to the issue and published between April 3-4th 1982 and June 17th 1982, while the British corpus is a random selection of articles from the period of March 29th 1982 – April 24th 1982. The second factor amounts to the differences in size between the two broadsheets. For example, *Trybuna Ludu* of 1982 consisted of 8 pages on weekdays and 10 on weekends, while the size of *The Times* ranged from 22 to 28 pages.

The texts in the corpus underwent a close reading with the aim of identifying text structuring metaphors, in the sense of Nehrlich (2005b, 2006) as well as those cognitive metaphors which did not dominate the imagery of any single text, but rather inconspicuously but systematically reappeared in the discourse on war. Also three strategies other than metaphorisation, i.e. self and other dichotomy, face-threatening and face-saving and the Glory of War Myth were identified and analysed. One section will be devoted to each strategy. The first section, though, will be devoted to a cursory sketch of the use of the concept of vilification in a few sociological studies. The paper will close with a conclusion.

2. Vilification

Montuori (2005: 24) defines totalitarian mindset as “a contextually-based authoritarian or anti-pluralist attitude” and claims that “the perception of an out-group as a threat and an enemy is the glue that holds this mindset together.” The focus on the scapegoat constructed through an emphasis on and exaggeration of differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (cf. van Dijk 2000 and other works) cast upon the schema of dichotomous opposition results in the ascription of negative values to the out-group. Stereotypy allows for a simplistic categorisation of the other and a reduction or elimination of the anxiety-enhancing ambiguity inherent in the psychological and social life.

Scapegoating in connection with either/or mode of thinking and hierarchisation/centralisation characteristic of the totalitarian mindset allows the authorities operating in such a context to reduce the complexity to a single goal: winning a conflict with the enemy. This construction of the socio-political and economic situation contributes to the unification of the in-group (cf. Silberstein 2002 on ‘nation-building’ through “convergence by divergence”). It can also facilitate the construction of the charismatic leader, who, prior to the construction of the externalised enemy, had no charismatic qualities (see for example Mrs Thatcher before and after the Falklands War and Bush before and after 9/11). Montuori closes his paper with a reference to Erich Fromm’s escape from freedom hypothesis, according to which freedom carries inherent ambiguity, whose processing requires much effort and does not allow one to fall back on pre-constructed cognitive and behavioural frames. For many people it is a strain from which they prefer to escape. Montuori (2005: 34) sees education for pluralism as a necessary step in social growth and formulates it in the following words:

Understanding the way that media shape our present and our understanding of possible futures, and also understanding how the proliferation of media resources can be navigated to obtain a number of different perspectives on an issue, are becoming key competencies in a ‘media-ted’ world.

Enemy vilification is also discussed in connection with issues other than totalitarianism. White and Perrone (2001) link it to racism and hate-crime on the basis of a sociological study of ethnic youth gangs conducted in Melbourne,

Australia. Young (1988) identifies it as an element in local social mobilisation, where communal identity is built through the vilification of the antagonist's interests in a community conflict. Brillet (2003) analyses the vilification in the context of the 'harkis'² legacy.

3. Self v. other dichotomy

The polarisation between the representation of self v. the representation of the other is strikingly blatant in war discourse. In the data investigated it takes its most prototypical form in the British reporting of the Falklands War as the reporters, especially the war correspondents aboard the Royal Navy ships in the Atlantic, were far from impartial, as some of them admitted (Jenkins, Simon "Free speech and the Falklands, Why I'm proud to take Britain's side", *The Times* 06/09/1982).

The most blatant example of such polarisation is the categorisation of the British soldiers as *our boys* and of the Argentines as *invasion force* or *foul and brutal aggressor*. Another typical routine in this discursive strategy is the ascription of negative in-group values to the out-group, as suggested by van Dijk (1984, 2000). Here, emotionality and deception are attributed to the enemy, as evidenced in the following examples:

- (1) *Feb 1982: More **Argentine sabre rattling** followed another round of negotiations at the United Nations, in New York. Accusing the Government of Argentina of **deception and bad faith** and of making **manifestly impossible demands**, Mrs Margaret Thatcher told Parliament yesterday that their total rejection of British proposals for a settlement of the Falklands crisis had implications of the utmost gravity. Argentines gathered spontaneously [...] **shouting, weeping and singing** the national anthem. Mr Sydney Bidwell (Ealing, Southall, Lab): Does her statement today mean that under her kind of leadership in the future there is no participatory role for a **saner or civilized** government of Argentina in any international system for the guarantee of peace in that area?*

² Harkis was a name given to Muslim auxiliaries in the French army during the Algerian war of Independence.

The Argentines are construed as highly emotional (*sabre rattling, shouting, weeping, singing*), deceptive ([acting in] *deception and bad faith, making impossible demands*), unpredictable, not sane enough and not civilised enough to be partners in diplomatic talks with Britain.

Often the positive in-group values associated with the self are contrasted with the negative in-group values ascribed to the other:

- (2) *The Argentines talk much of the need for the **decolonization** of the islands. What they appear to mean by this is **colonization** by themselves.*

*[...] the nub of this crisis is that the Argentine junta has ridden roughshod over the wishes and **liberties** of the Falklands Islands and has imposed a **neo-colonial rule** over these islands [...]*

*[...] our boys in the South Atlantic, trying to provide for our people who are under the heel of the **Argentinean dictatorship, the right of self-determination and of democracy** [...]*

*The **regime** responsible for the invasion did not do it to bring **freedom and democracy**.*

*Their record of **repression** in Argentina is an indication of the sort of people we are dealing with.*

*Others are watching anxiously to see whether **brute force** [= Argentina] or **the rule of law** [= Britain] will triumph.*

The political terms in (2) form a clearly dichotomous series of positively evaluated words related to Britain (*liberties, the right of self determination and of democracy, freedom and democracy, the rule of law*) and strongly negatively evaluated words related to the Argentine (*neo-colonial rule, dictatorship, regime, repression, brute force*).

A similar tone is present in the Polish reports on the American air raids on Libya. Here the list of negative labels is so long and elaborated that the negative value words sound more like insults in an abuse ritual rather than a value attribution.

- (3)(a) *cyniczna akcja* ‘cynical action’, *ryzykowna decyzja* ‘risky decision’, *bezsensownie* ‘senselessly’, *moralnie wątpliwy i absolutnie bezwstydnny* ‘morally doubtful and absolutely shameless’, *haniebny* ‘disgraceful’, *nikczemny* ‘despicable’, *napastliwy* ‘virulent’, *awanturniczy hazard* ‘belligerent gamble’,

- (b) *hegemonizm* ‘hegemony’, *neoglobalny szowinizm* ‘neoglobal chauvinism’, *amerykański dyktat* ‘American diktat’, *interwencjonizm* ‘interventionism’, *imperializm* ‘imperialism’, *neokolonializm* ‘neocolonialism’, *zaborczość* ‘a tendency to annex territory’, *fanatyzm* ‘fanaticism’, *ekstremizm* ‘extremism’, *wielkomocarstwowy* ‘superpower’, *stosowanie przemocy i ślepego odwetu* ‘employment of force and blind retaliation’, *Amerykańskie ludobójstwo* ‘American genocide’
- (c) *nie sprowokowany, niczym nie uzasadniony akt brutalnego rozboju* ‘unprovoked, unjustifiable act of brutal robbery’, *akty przemocy* ‘acts of violence’, *okropieństwa wojny* ‘war atrocities’, *gangsterstwo* ‘gangsterism (political violence)’, *amerykańskie bestialstwo* ‘American bestiality’, *neogangsteryzm* ‘neogangsterism’, *rozbójnicza akcja/zbrodnia* ‘murderous action/crime’, *bandyci* ‘bandits, thugs’
- (d) *odwet, zemsta* ‘revenge, retaliation’, *zniewolić* ‘to enslave’, *pogłębić* ‘to oppress’
- (e) *spisek* ‘conspiracy’, *kłamliwe wybiegi* ‘false excuses’, *szantaż zbrojny* ‘military blackmail’, *agresywnym knowaniem* ‘aggressive scheming’, *ze zdradziecko napađniętą Libią* ‘with a treacherously attacked Libya’

In (3a) such qualities as cynicism, irresponsibility and a predilection to military solutions are predicated of the US. (3b) is a list of highly negatively emotionally loaded political terms constantly repeated by the cold war propaganda of the era. Interestingly enough, the value of some of the terms depends on the perspective³ taken. For example, the term ‘superpower’ when applied to self, is probably an indication of national pride, while when used by a small nation about its antagonist it implies a threat. Examples in (3c) ascribe violence and brutality to the US, while those in (3d) imply that American foreign policy is founded on retaliation as opposed to the positive in-group value of ‘peaceful co-existence’. (3e) describe Americans as untrustworthy, capable of deceit, treachery and blackmail. Simultaneously, Libya is constructed as an innocent victim of imperialistic aggression. It is important to note that Poland did not take part in this conflict. This

³ On the role of perspectivising see for example Langacker (1991: 62-63), who refers to the presumed vantage point as a necessary element of imagery or scene construal.

is why it was not construed as the opponent of the US. Rather as empathising with Libya, to which positive values (progress, independence, anti-imperialism) were attributed.

Although the Government of Mrs Thatcher supported the American air raids of Libya and allowed Americans to use their air bases in Britain for the attack, *The Times* did publish some unfavourable comments on the US, voiced by the British MPs during the parliamentary debate:

- (4) [...] *Europeans dislike the Gaddafi regime, abhor and condemn terrorism and wish to take firm measures against it, but (that) launching military strikes against Tripoli would be 'emotional and liable to lead to further terrorist acts in West Europe', as one official put it.*

Mr Cyril Townsend (Bexleyheath, C): Most of the recent terrorist incidents involving the Middle East are due to the Abu Nidal group rather than Libya. Many of us are deeply troubled by her uncritical support for the US which has grossly over-reacted to provocation. Does she not agree that over-reaction would only fuel terrorism, bitterness and bloodshed?

Mr Jack Ashley (Stoke-on-Trent South, Lab): No country in the world has a better record for firm, intelligent and calculated responses to terrorism than we have. It is therefore incredible, in the light of that record, that she should associate us with the emotional spasm by President Reagan.

West Germany is also urging Washington to desist from 'emotional' action.

In these excerpts, emotionality, so much despised in the Argentines, is ascribed to the Americans. It is contrasted with *firm, intelligent and calculated responses* of the British and condemned as inappropriate. Ironically enough, these reservations against emotionality are often surrounded by highly emotional vocabulary, such as *abhor, bitterness* and *bloodshed*. It is difficult to decide whether speakers using such contradictory elements in their speech believe that emotional political speech is appropriate, while what they call emotional political decision-making is inappropriate, or simply they cannot resist the temptation of achieving emotional impact on their addressees.

In this conflict, Britain was an ally, which allowed the use of their air space and the American air bases in the UK, but did not take an active part in it. The framing of the conflict participants, therefore, is not as clearly two-valued as was the case with the Falklands war.

A similar framing is used in the British reporting of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This event is construed as involving four participants: the Soviets, the Afghans, the Americans and the British. Among the four, only the British are ascribed positive values. The representation of the Soviets, far less vitriolic than that of the Americans in *Trybuna Ludu* reports on Libya, are nevertheless slightly biased. The excerpt below seems to favourably contrast the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with the American evacuation from Vietnam, but the use of the verb *spare* in *sparing the confusion* employs the ‘don’t think of the elephant’ framing identified by Lakoff (2004):

- (5) *The Soviet military was **spared the humiliating confusion** of the American flight from Saigon. The final stages of the Soviet retreat were completed with a degree of order and precision that would have dignified the Imperial Russian Army. As befits the commanding officer, the Commander in Chief, Lt-General Viktor Gromov, was the last to cross into Soviet territory, minutes before the midday deadline.*

In some places the value ascription is manifestly pronounced, for instance when excessive emotionality is ascribed to Mr Gorbachev (he gave a *20-minute outburst*), when the Soviet daily *Pravda* is accused of partial reporting of the withdrawal (*There was truth in its words, but not the whole truth*) or when the Red Army soldiers are described as *og[l]ing the cornucopia of consumer goods never available at home* and referred to by a Kabul salesman in the following words: *The Red soldiers had no money and no manners. I had no time for them at all they seemed like peasants to me.*

The representation of the Afghans is not much more favourable. They are either framed as the victims of the Soviet occupation or completely incompetent:

- (6) *The **primitive** nature of the Afghan military machine was demonstrated by the facilities at the checkpoint at the village of Tangiye Pol-i-Charki where our car was halted. Water was being drawn from a well and the only cooking equipment was a rusty charcoal grill. On the hillsides some of the hundreds of Soviet tanks left to the Afghan Army were silhouetted on the snowy skyline, **a basic error** that made them easy targets as one Westerner with military experience pointed out.*

The Americans fare no better. In the text presenting the views of different diplomats on the future of Najibullah’s government they are referred to as the

gung-ho Americans refusing to be realistic. While President Reagan is so puerile, that instead of a briefing before a diplomatic journey he is shown films:

- (7) *They are showing films about Russia to President Reagan to help put him in the mood for next week's trip to Moscow. For the sake of a happy summit, they had better keep him away from Rambo III.*

The only reasonable nation in the world represented by *The Times* is the British. Unlike the Americans, they are capable of accurate political calculation, as suggested in (8a), as well as unprecedented selfless sacrifice, in contrast to the Soviets (8b):

- (8)(a) *The British, who have **the best record** among Western diplomatic missions **for the accuracy** of their forecasts about the volatile Afghan situation, are more **cautious**.*

- (b) *Now that the Russians have gone, many of the most severe casualties in Afghanistan's continuing "dirty war" are being treated by a three-strong British volunteer surgical team, **working in nightmare conditions** in a heavily fortified Red Cross hospital which treats the wounded from either side.*

Because of the shoot-to-kill curfew ordered by the beleaguered Afghan Government, the British team have to travel the 100 yards between the hospital and their sand-bagged lodgings after dark in a Jeep flying a large, illuminated Red Cross flag and driving at a snail's pace.

***In the finest tradition** of Florence Nightingale and others from Britain tending the wounded on battlefields far from home, **the three have maintained an unflappability and sense of humour** that has impressed both the poorly equipped Afghan hospital workers and the handful of other foreign volunteers alike.*

To non-British ears 'the finest tradition of Florence Nightingale' may sound a bit exulted, but the journalist intention seems to be quite solemn. Again the emotional colouring of the text depends on the vantage point of the reader. The in-group and the out-group perspective are in discord and assign the representation conflicting values.

In *The Times* reports of the first stage of the War on Terror, the Taliban are vilified through an ascription of negative values (9a), while the image of

Americans is ameliorated through the downplaying of their participation in the negatively evaluated events (9b):

(9)(a) [Osama bin Laden is a] *bullet-eyed and **belligerent**, **rabid** revolutionary, [making] a calculated gesture of **contempt** for America. [The Taliban] regime has been brutal and destructive to the point of **insanity**. [Terrorism consists in] Random acts by people who will occasionally act out their particular **derangement** in a violent way. Those are **criminal** actions to be handed by law enforcement.*

(b) [Gingrich:] *After the 1996 attack on Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, where 19 of our military personnel were **murdered**, we failed to apply the necessary pressure to force the Saudi Government to deal with terrorists based on their soil. He [Rumsfeld] can be brutally frank, as he has been when discussing the deaths of civilians. “There’s no question but that when one is engaged militarily, there is going to be **unintended loss of life**. It has always been the case. It certainly will be the case in this instance. And there’s no question but that I and anyone involved regrets the unintended loss of life,” he said. Bob Marshall-Andrews (Lab, Medway) said that to try bin Laden at an international court, even in his absence, would signal to the Islamic world that he was accused of **an international crime against humanity**.*

In (9a) the Taliban and their leader are described in terms of brutality, insanity and criminality. The examples in (9b) show the dichotomy between the representation of ‘our’ (American) casualties and ‘their’ (the Afghan) casualties. The killing of American soldiers is framed as murder, and of American civilians in the plane attacks of 9/11 as a crime against humanity. At the same time the Afghan civilians dying in the American air raids of Afghanistan are hidden behind a euphemistic ‘unintended loss of life’.

A biased representation of the self and the other, as exemplified above, usually rests on the ascription of such values as emotionality, irresponsibility, brutality to the enemy and prudence, empathy, self-sacrifice ascribed to ‘us’. This framing often reinforces if not creates the pretext for abandoning diplomatic efforts and implementing military action.

4. Conceptual metaphors

Value ascription presented in the previous section is one of the strategies of enemy vilification. It is frequently enhanced with the use of metaphors, which structure the discourse and can add emotional colouring to the text.

The most pervasive metaphor was ENEMY IS AN ANIMAL, the lexicalisation of which could be found in the reports of most conflicts. Its instantiations, through the Inheritance Hierarchy (Lakoff 1993) could take the form of ENEMY IS A DOG or ENEMY IS A SNAKE as shown in (10) below:

- (10) *if they [Argentines] **did not come to heel** within 10 days*
*„Pan Reagan może uważać innych ludzi za wściekle psy. Ja uważam jego politykę za dotkniętą wścieklizną – stwierdziła ona [prof. U. Ranke-Heinemann, RFN]. – Jest to polityka mordy i morderców, która gryzienie, strzelanie i bombardowanie przyjmuje jako zasadę.” ‘Mr. Reagan can consider other people as **rabid dogs**. I consider his politics as afflicted by **rabies**, she stated. This is politics of murder and murderers, adopting **biting**, shooting and bombing as a rule’.*
*Thus when Vice-President Bush first called Moammar Gaddafi a ‘**mad dog**’ on Wednesday – some hours before President Reagan adopted the same phrase – even moderate Arabs felt insulted.*
*[bin Laden as] **rabid** revolutionary*
*He [one Western military source] added: “One should be wary against portraying this as **the Soviet Army slinking out with their tail between their legs**.”*

The examples in (10) show that at different times and from different perspectives the Argentines, the American leader, the Libyan leader, the Taliban leader, and the Soviets were labelled as dogs. Interestingly enough, within the vilification rhetoric only the mappings from the dog frame, in which dogs are filthy, aggressive, despicable creatures are permitted. The interpretation claiming that Colonel Moammar Gaddafi is Vice President George Bush’s best friend would be incoherent and therefore discarded. In this way the context restricts the reading of the metaphor.

The interpretation of ENEMY IS A SNAKE does not require such narrowing of the source domain, as in Christian culture, as well as in many others, snakes are usually associated with evil.

- (11) *Mr John Browne (Winchester, C): In the near future terrorist overlords like Gaddafi will be in a position to dispatch atomic bombs, if not by missile then in the cargo holds of scheduled civilian aircraft.
In view of such a threat, there is a clear duty on our leaders to act with fortitude. It is extremely unwise merely to tease a **dangerous snake**. It should either be left alone or killed.*

In this excerpt a conservative MP uses the metaphor in its typical function⁴ of creating a frame of reference within which what applies to dangerous snakes should be applied to people. Here the choice of the metaphor determines the choice of the solution.

Yet another particularisation of this metaphor takes the form of ENEMY IS A WILD ANIMAL. In this case the scenario evoked by the use of the metaphor does not allow a simple attribution of negative features to Libya:

- (12) *pragnął brutalnie „**poskromić**” niezależną od siebie, antyimperialistyczną, orientację Dżamahiriji ‘he wanted to **tame** the independent, anti-imperialist orientation of Djamahirija’*

The ‘taming’ example rests on an assumption that the US treats their enemies as animals, without respect. In this rhetorical frame the contextual knowledge assigning the role of the ‘good guys’ to Libya, and that of the ‘bad guys’ to the US is necessary for the intended interpretation of the text. In the frame where Gaddafi is a mad dog, Libya would require ‘taming’, and the ‘taming’ would be the right way of conduct (cf. Sandikcioglu 2003 on the asymmetrical representation of the Orient and the West in the American media).

The metaphor ENEMY IS AN ANIMAL interacts with and augments the metaphor WAR IS HUNTING. The latter has become the predominant discourse pattern creating metaphoric chains in the sense of Koller (2003) both in *The Times* and in *Trybuna*. A list of typical expressions from *The Times* and an excerpt from *Trybuna* are shown in (13a) and (13b) respectively.

⁴ This function of conceptual metaphor has been investigated at length by Schön (1993).

(13)(a) *to snare bin Laden, to smoke his men out of their hiding places they will chase bin Laden from cave to cave, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves, The hunt for him [bin Laden], to hunt down those responsible, evade the dragnet, the task of smoking out the al-Qaeda network, risky task of ferreting out bin Laden.*

(b) *Jednym z najważniejszych zadań, jakie stoją przed siłami specjalnymi w Afganistanie, jest bezpośrednio uderzenie w terrorystów Al-Kaidy, a przede wszystkim w jej przywódców, w tym Osamę bin Ladena. Jeden z planów przewiduje wypłoszenie ich z kryjówek i schwytanie, a w razie konieczności fizyczną eliminację podczas próby wyrwania się amerykańskiej obławie, nawet poza granicami Afganistanu. Niezależnie od wyników operacji na terenie tego państwa, polowanie na terrorystów nie może zakończyć się tylko na nim. To zaś oznacza rozciągnięcie antyterrorystycznej wojny, choćby ograniczonej, na kolejne kraje. Niewątpliwie będzie to wojna sił specjalnych.*

‘One of the most important tasks, that the special forces face in Afghanistan, is a direct strike at the Al Qaida terrorists, in particular at its leaders with Osama bin Laden. One of the plans involves **flushing them out from their hiding places and capturing them**, when necessary it also involves elimination in the case of an attempt to break free of the American **hunt**, even outside Afghanistan borders. Whatever the results of the operation in this country, the **hunt** for terrorists cannot stop there. This entails spreading the anti-terrorist war, even if limited, to other countries. Undoubtedly, it will be a special forces war’.

By means of the WAR IS HUNTING metaphor Al Qaeda terrorists are rhetorically degraded to the level of animals, a common stylistic means in a propagandist vilification of the enemy process pointed out by Ehrenreich (1997). This linguistic strategy, defiling the enemy encourages such inferences which dehumanise the other and represent ‘them’ as not deserving humanitarian treatment.

Another metaphor, used by both newspapers in the 1980s was ENEMY IS A PIRATE metaphor.

(14) [the Argentines] *committing unprovoked and unjustified acts of piracy*
piracki atak lotnictwa amerykańskiego ‘a **pirate** American air raid’

In the British example, the analogies encouraging the metaphoric mappings are more pronounced, as the Argentinean Navy attacked the Falklands Islands. In the

Polish example, though, an air raid is seen as pirate, which naturally requires not just simple mappings, but a blending of shipbound pirates and fighter and bomber pilots. In both cases, the label is used with the intention of highlighting the sense of the illegality and cruelty of the enemy action. In this case, however, a methodological problem arises that I am unable to solve here. That is, if the expression is not further elaborated and does not lend much of its structure to the target domain but is only limited to the implication of negative values to the enemy, can we claim a status of conceptual metaphor for a single expression, even if, in the Polish data on American air raids of Libya, it is used 10 times within a 124,000 word corpus and modifies different nouns?

The last conceptual metaphor that I want to analyse here is ENEMY IS A NAZI. It is both implied in the British discourse on the Falklands War (15a) and elaborated in the Polish discourse of the American air raids on Libya (15b). It shows that the Second World War is the most prototypical and perhaps most salient example of war in the European discourse (when it comes to American discourse, the Vietnam war seems to be the most relevant historical reference frame).

(15)(a) *Mr Victor Coodhew (St Albans, C): Will she confirm that 30 million lives were lost in **the last world war** in Europe because democracy refused to accept and resist the aggressive intentions of a dictatorship?*

*It sounds to many of us as if, in the hope of saving some lives, Mr Foot is prepared to hand over the Falklands to a **Fascist dictator**.*

(b) *Wielu ludziom starszego pokolenia ta bezprecedensowa akcja, przypomina wyczyny lotników hitlerowskich we wrześniu 1939 r. bądź też bombardowanie Warszawy przez samoloty niemieckie w 1944 r.*

‘This unprecedented action reminds many people of the older generation of the exploits of the Nazi pilots in September 1939 or the bombing of Warsaw by the German planes in 1944’.

In (15a) the metaphorical framing of the Argentinean capturing of the Falklands allows one to draw analogies to the World War II, analogies which become the foundation for arguing in favour of decisive military retaliation. In (15b) the reference to WW II is used to induce emotional reaction in the audience. Its power, however, is slightly diminished by the unintended contradiction between the ‘unprecedented action’ which ‘reminds’ one of the past events.

In the analysed corpora, a number of other conceptual metaphors were used (among them WESTERNER IS A TEACHER/ORIENTAL IS A STUDENT, first described in detail by Sandikcioglu (2003)), but they were not used with reference to various enemies, but rather restricted to the conceptualisation of one. This is why they will not be discussed in this paper, which aims at identifying vilification patterns common across different perspectives on different enemies.

5. Face-threatening and face-saving at war

Brown and Levinson's (1988) politeness theory construes verbal interaction as an exchange between Model Persons (MPs) endowed with two properties: rationality and face.⁵ Rationality allows an MP to plan and execute actions aimed at achieving a specific goal. Face, on the other hand, is related to two particular wants: 1) the want to be unimpeded and 2) the want to be approved of.

The application of the concept of face, and of face-related strategies to war rhetoric and enemy vilification, is only possible after the implementation of NATION/STATE IS A PERSON metaphor.⁶ Personification allows one to attribute human qualities, including the concept of face, to nation/states. Personified states interact on the international arena but their actions are restricted by the conflict between the drive towards the unimpeded attaining of the goal and positive evaluation of their action by other personified states (here the Moral Accounting metaphor put forward by Lakoff (1996) can also be incorporated).

An imposition of politeness theory on the metaphoric understanding of nation/state results in the following linguistic representations:

(16) *The fact that Britain was forced to veto was seen as a victory of sorts for Argentina, which had been seeking to tarnish Britain's image within the international community.*

Members of the council had earlier been amending and refining the draft resolution with the aim of finding a formula that would save face for both sides and avert the battle over Port Stanley.

⁵ The notion of face as a positive self-image was first introduced by Goffman (1967).

⁶ On the fundamental role that this metaphor plays in the conceptualisation of international relations read Chilton and Lakoff (1995).

Argentina will maintain its freedom to protect the nation's interest and honour, it will not be negotiated.

*Lord Shackleton, for the Opposition, said it was the first time **Britain had suffered the humiliation** of the loss of a colony since the fall of Singapore.*

*Mrs Thatcher: The future of freedom and the **reputation of Britain** are at stake [...]*

*[t]he lack of a friendship treaty makes it easier **for Moscow now to leave Libya to the mercy of US warplanes without losing face.***

In these excerpts personified Britain and personified USSR are involved in face-threatening diplomatic speech acts. An exchange of the diplomatic notes between the countries is construed as a verbal exchange between people, including the notion of face. The interpretation of and the reaction to Face Threatening Acts (FTAs) obtaining between nations/states, however, reaches beyond the positive and negative politeness strategies which cease to be available once diplomatic solutions are abandoned in favour of military ones. Then, the notion of FTA is employed as an excuse for waging war on an enemy accused of posing a threat to 'us'. When the threat to the national substance (territory or citizens) is not very transparent (as was the case in the Falklands War), then framing discourse in terms of FTA allows for placing the enemy in the role of a person violating the norms of acceptable social behaviour and in this way becomes yet another strategy of enemy vilification.

This strategy is often intertwined with the Glory of War Myth, which enhances the positive representation of self-image. The Myth will be analysed in greater detail in the following section.

6. The Glory of War Myth

In her analysis of Polish war literature from different periods, Janion (1998) identifies the pervading perspective on war, based on the 'heroic myth', which praises the glory of war as the ultimate test of human virtues. It contributes to the rituals of national unity and stimulates support for the cause. Wiśniewski (1987) analyses the British war literature of the first half of the 20th century (the Great War, the Spanish War and the Second World War). He notes a fluctuation of perspectives between the debunking of the Glory of War Myth in the Trench Poets'

verse through the exaltations of some of the supporters of the Spanish War who saw a clear line between good and evil (Cornford), to more personal enunciations of the WW II poets (e.g. Keyes, Douglas). The Glory of War Myth as perpetuated by literature, painting and, later, film focuses on the splendour of parade uniforms, the grandeur of comradeship of the ‘brothers in arms’ and the fits of honour and ‘courage under fire’.

In the war reports appearing in the press (as also pointed out by Knightly 1975 in his analysis of the role and style of war correspondents since Crimea to Vietnam), occasional references to the Glory of War Myth seem to be aimed at unifying the sense of identity through a reference to shared historical experience, national heroes and common values. The reference to honour often links it to the concept of FTAs discussed in the previous section. Also, the representation of the myth can frequently be structured around the WAR AS SHOW metaphor. This seems to be the case in the example below:

- (17) *Tak kończy się jeden z aktów sztuki, o której jeszcze nie wiemy, czy okaże się groteskowym widowiskiem, czy krwawym dramatem o nie ustalonym jeszcze tytule.* ‘This is how one of the acts of this play ends. We don’t know yet if this play will turn out to be a grotesque show or a bloody drama with an as yet unknown title.’

[...] *Ale na razie oglądamy w telewizji niezwykle widowisko* ‘So far we have been watching an unusual show on television’

[...] *Wspaniała okazja do nakręcenia historycznych, batalistycznych filmów.* ‘A wonderful opportunity to make historical battle films.’

[...] *Największy show od czasu brytyjsko-francuskiej wyprawy do Suez w 1936 roku.* ‘The biggest show since the British-French expedition to Suez in 1936.’

[...] *Widowisko ma kostiumowe akcenty.* ‘The show has costume overtones’

[...] *skompletowanie rekwizytów* ‘the collecting of the props’

The sentences and phrases in (17a) all come from the same article describing the farewell given to the British Navy leaving for the South Atlantic during the Falklands War. The journalist clearly does not empathise with the Her Majesty’s soldiers. Rather he frames the farewell as a grotesque, pompous and meaningless endeavour.

Similarly to the Polish reporting of the departure of the British fleet for the Falklands, the British reporting of the Soviet homecoming employs the Glory of War Myth and the THEATRE metaphor to create a sarcastic distance, which allows the reporters as if to see through the ceremonious pomp. In (18) below, the tension of the relatives expecting the return of another group of soldiers in the border town of Teremez, and the pompous welcome by the orchestra, is contrasted with the image of a bleak truck column transporting useless junk:

- (18) *Eventually headlights on the bridge signalled the arrival of the day's column, as the band dutifully struck up with the "Defence of the Motherland" and a motley collection of about 20 army trucks approached. Most were carrying junk bits of old engines, spare tyres and old oil drums.*

The Glory of War Myth reduced to a handful of empty symbols, such as 'Mother Russia', 'red carnations' and the 'traditional loaves of bread' as well as alien slogans like 'internationalist duty', with its strangeness further emphasised with the use of the quotation marks, emerges from the following passage:

- (19) *'Mother Russia' stages joyous border welcome;*
The column then drew up in front of a reviewing stand where it was addressed by local party officials and a cluster of generals. The men were told that they had come back after fulfilling their "internationalist duty" in Afghanistan, and that Mother Russia would accord them special respect for their courage and heroism. This message was reinforced by the slogans on the vehicles which declared: "We have fulfilled the Motherland's order", "Hello Motherland" and "Motherland, meet your sons".
After the ceremony the soldiers were briefly mobbed by journalists and local Uzbek women offering them red carnations, the chance to send a telegram home and traditional loaves of bread, the word "peace" baked on top.

The picture above strikes one with its foreignness and artificiality, while the fragment below, although attributed to a despatch from a Soviet journalist of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* is a clear mockery ridiculing the spectacle into which such political and military operations can be transformed:

- (20) *Soviet general will sign off with soliloquy; Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov FROM EDWARD GORMAN, TERMEZ, SOVIET UZBEKISTAN*
Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Afghanistan, will be the last Kremlin soldier to leave the country, according to Mikhail Kozhukov, veteran war correspondent of the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda.
In a despatch yesterday he reported: "On February 15 at 10am local time, Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov will be the last to cross the bridge. He will pass without looking back. Then he will stop and 'deliver a speech', but just to himself. It will last one minute, seven seconds. It will not be written down nor listened to."

The use of meticulous detail (*[the speech] will last one minute, seven seconds*) in combination with the future tense adds to the sense of the surreal of the predicted scene.

The excerpts above show how the out-group perspective lends the Glory of War Myth to deconstruction. However, in the analysed data there was ample evidence for the classical use of the heroic myth, especially in the use of such phrases as *our ships and gallant men, bravery, dignity, injured pride, the supreme valour of our forces, to lower our colours, to kill for flags, revenge, pride and arrogance*.

7. Conclusion

The analysis carried out above identifies four discursive strategies: self v. other dichotomy, conceptual metaphors, the pragmatic theory of face and the Glory of War Myth, all entering a complex network of interaction and employed to enhance enemy vilification. The construction of the hideous other is a necessary feature of war propaganda, which, as noted by Hassner (1998), must reconcile an inherent conflict between the heroic myth of war and the necessity of killing other human beings, which in most cultures is a taboo act. Only when we degrade the enemy to the level of animals, or construe them as alien or as a threat to 'our way of life', can we draft soldiers for a kill.

On the methodological level, this study attempts to show how transgressing different fields of linguistics, drawing on discourse analysis, Cognitive Metaphor

Theory and pragmatics in an analysis of media texts, can contribute to an understanding of how mental models are linguistically constructed and perpetuated in society. In this way, it establishes links between Cognitive Discourse Analysis and the theory of cultural transmission (e.g. Tomasello 1999), and of synergic cognition by Bernardez (2006 and earlier works) based on Bordieu's habitus and calling for an integration of distributed cognition with the historical socio-cultural perspective.

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