

turned out to be the belief that has a metaphysical origin. It comes from the worldview which presupposes the existence of a common human nature. The idea has been often used to justify a universalistic ethics. Rorty – as I mentioned before – describes moral universalism as unrealistic statement because he claims that no one can make an identification with all human beings at the same time. Resigning from the metaphysical universalism for the sake of ethnocentrism of “we” willing to enlarge, does not contradict moral progress, but – as I suppose – it thwarts the valuable hope that it is possible to live in the world with no enemies.

Krzysztof Brzechczyn

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## BETWEEN LIMITED DEMOCRATISATION AND LIMITED AUTOCRATISATION. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

### I. Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine emerged as an independent state with the population of almost 50 million and territory of 603.700 square km. At face value, Ukraine seemed to be a democratic country able to satisfy all standards of a European state and aspire to membership in NATO and the UE.<sup>1</sup> However, from the perspective of fifteen years of Ukrainian independent existence, democracy in this country appeared to be transitory and counterbalanced by the subsequent emergence of autocratic tendencies, provoking social protests of December 2004, known as the Orange Revolution.

The aim of this paper is to present in a coherent theoretical framework the conceptualisation of both contradictory social ten-

<sup>1</sup> This argumentation is presented in the paper by Odushkin (*The Acceptance of Ukraine to the European Union: Integrating and Disintegrating Factors for the EU*. "Polish Sociological Review", 2001, no. 4 (136), pp. 370-371) emphasising progress made in the sphere of human rights (rejection of death penalty) and ignoring obstacles resulting from autocratisation of political system.

dencies present in the recent history of Ukraine. This task is achieved by employing models and conceptual apparatus of a non-Marxian historical materialism.<sup>2</sup>

## II. The Structure of Soviet Socialism

Ukraine in the period from 1918 to 1991 was a part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the legacy of real socialism in the Soviet version has been a crucial factor influencing political development of the Ukrainian society. The Soviet – version real socialism may be characterised by three basic features. Firstly, it was a social system where one social class, having at its disposal means of coercion, production and indoctrination, controlled politics, economy and culture. Secondly, the main interest of this class of triple-lords consisted in the maximisation of power regulation. Thirdly, this social system built up an empire consisting of the Russian metropolis and the external provinces, inhabited by non-Russian-speaking citizens. Let us briefly characterise the three above-mentioned aspects of real socialism in the Soviet version.

### A. On Three Class Divisions

Class divisions, in accordance with a non-Marxian historical materialism, exist not only in economy, but also emerge spontaneously in other spheres of human activity, such as politics and culture. In each sphere of social life it is possible to distinguish material level consisting of means of coercion, production and indoctrination. Relation to means of coercion in politics determines a division of a society into two social categories: the class of rulers, which controls the use of means of coercion, and the class of citizens, de-

<sup>2</sup> Full presentation of this theory in: L. Nowak, *Property and Power. Towards a non-Marxian historical materialism*. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983, idem, *Power and Civil Society. Towards a Dynamic Theory of Real Socialism*. London: Greenwood Press, 1991.

prived of such possibilities. In economy, material level is made up of means of production, which determines a division into the class of owners and the class of direct producers. In cultural domain, material level consists of means of spiritual production – for example printing presses, radio and television.

Thus control over the material means provides the basis for a typology of societies in a non-Marxian historical materialism. Applying this criterion it is possible to distinguish class societies, where existing classes are separated, and supra-class societies where, for example, one social class, keen on increasing the range of its social influence, may seize control over means of coercion, production and mass communication. A society with a triple class of rulers-owners-priests, monopolising control over politics, economy and culture, exemplifies one type of supra-class systems. This social system refers to the structure of real socialism. The apparatus of the Communist Party, which controlled not only political life, but also economy and culture, was the counterpart of the class of triple-lords.

### B. Political Nature of Socialism

Real socialism was the system of triple-rule in a political version because possession of means of production and indoctrination by the class of rulers-owners-priests was subordinated to the enlargement of power regulation. This social system evolved according to the developmental mechanisms of a purely political society, which constituted the second feature of Soviet socialism. If political history of the Soviet society is conceived in such a way, it is possible to distinguish, roughly speaking, two stages: the first stage – lasting from the October revolution to the Gulag uprisings – was characterised by a steady rise of power regulation. The second stage – from the uprisings in the Gulag to Gorbachev's reform – was dominated by a gradual liberalisation of the system. This liberalisation occurred, according to the mechanism of evolutionary progress, as a

result of lost revolutions: civil pressure (e.g. uprisings in the Gulag, workers strikes in Novochoerkask in the 60s, national revival in the Baltic countries in the 70s) led – on the one hand – to repressions toward the rebels, but – on the other hand – to prevent the next outbreak of civil disobedience, the class of triple-lords made political concessions to the class of people.

### C. Imperial Structure of the Soviet Version Socialism

Imperial structure forms the third basic feature of the Soviet society. The Soviet Union consisted of the Russian metropolis and non-Russian republics, annexed during two waves of aggressiveness. The Caucasus countries: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, eastern Belarus and Ukraine as well as societies of Central Asia were incorporated in the years 1918-21, whereas Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, western Belarus and Ukraine were incorporated in the years 1939-41.

The fact of possessing external provinces prolonged the process of liberalisation of the whole imperial society. The class of triple-lords could exploit national divisions among citizenry through maintaining different national groups of the class of citizens at different levels of enslavement. As a result, the class of triple-lords, instead of quelling protests of the whole class of citizens, dealt with isolated citizen protests, occurring at different times and in different parts of the empire.

### III. The Collapse of the Soviet Empire. Theoretical Considerations

The collapse of real socialism in the Soviet Union was a coincidence of two independent processes: the collapse of the system of triple rule and the collapse of the political empire. The collapse of triple-lordship led to a rise – at a different rate and with different

scope – of free market economy, free press and political pluralism. The decline of the empire, in turn, caused the emergence of the independent states. In the conceptual apparatus of a non-Marxian historical materialism it is possible to distinguish the following paths of disintegration of the socialist empire:<sup>3</sup>

- (i) victorious civil revolution,
- (ii) progressive secession,
- (iii) regressive secession.

*Victorious civil revolution* occurs in these provincial sub-societies, where the level of power regulation is lower than the level of power regulation of the metropolitan society. The resistance of citizens enforces liberalisation of the political system and autonomisation of provinces within the empire. These processes are accelerated when the self-organised provincial civil society seizes total control over institutions of power and finally secedes from the empire. The political development of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia and Armenia falls under this model of imperial disintegration.<sup>4</sup>

*Progressive secession* occurs in those provincial societies where the level of power regulation is lower than that of the metropolitan society, but higher than that of a provincial society, where a civil revolution has taken place. The provincial class of triple-lords still holds power, but at the expense of political concession made to own citizenry. In the first stage, independence facilitates and stabilises democratisation, protecting this “more civilised” society against

<sup>3</sup> More on this: K. Brzechczyn, *Upadek imperium socjalistycznego. Próba modelu* [The Collapse of the Socialist Empire. Attempt at a Model]. In: K. Brzechczyn (Ed.), *“Ścieżki transformacji. Ujęcia teoretyczne i opisy empiryczne”* [Paths of Transformation. Theoretical and Empirical Approaches] (Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Humanistyki, 19). Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 2003, pp. 135-171.

<sup>4</sup> More on this: K. Brzechczyn, *Dynamika demokratyzacji. Próba konceptualizacji rozwoju politycznego w republikach postradzieckich* [Dynamics of Democratisation. Attempt at Conceptualisation of Political Development in Post-Soviet Republics]. In: K. Brzechczyn, J. Silski (Eds.) *“Demokracja. Między ideałem a praktyką, teorią a empirią”* [Democracy. Between Ideal and Practice, Theory and Empirical Research]. Poznań: WSNHiD, 2006, pp. 95-100, 106-110; idem, *Paths to Democracy of the Post-Soviet Republics. Attempt at Conceptualisation*. In: E. Czerwińska-Schupp (Ed.), *“Values and Norms in the Age of Globalisation”*. Berlin: Verlag, 2007, pp. 544-554.

an intervention of a "barbarian" metropolis. However, later on, the mechanism of political competition among the class of rulers leads to the growth of power regulation. At the institutional level, the process of democratisation is counterbalanced by attempts at autocratisation of the political system. Their success or failure depends on the reaction of citizenry. The political development of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan falls under this type of the path of imperial disintegration.<sup>5</sup>

*Regressive secession* occurs in these provincial societies where the level of power regulation is higher than that of power regulation of the metropolitan society. Passivity of citizenry makes restoration of sovereignty an initiative undertaken by a provincial faction of the class of triple-lords, who, this way, may maintain their political domination. In this type of secession independence retards a decrease in power regulation in the post-provincial society, protecting it against the wave of liberalisation coming from the centre of the empire. In this case, sovereignty protecting a "barbarian" society against an intervention of a more "civilised" metropolis allows to preserve political *status quo*. The political development of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan falls under this type of imperial disintegration.<sup>6</sup>

#### IV. On Political Evolution of the Ukrainian Society

As it was ascertained, political development of the Ukrainian society falls under the type of progressive secession. The overlap of democratic tendencies with autocratic ones constitutes its most characteristic feature. When Gorbachev launched his perestroika, Ukraine was ruled by Brezhnev's protégé, V. Shcherbytskyi (from 1972 to 1989) who hampered implementation of the new policy.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> More on this: K. Brzechczyn, *Dynamika...* pp. 100-106 and 110-112; idem, *Paths...* pp. 558-563.

<sup>6</sup> More on this: K. Brzechczyn, *Dynamika...* pp. 112-116; idem, *Paths...* pp. 563-568.

<sup>7</sup> This subsection is based on empirical research conducted by: P. Andrusieczko, M. Figura, *Przebieg transformacji ustrojowej na Ukrainie w latach 1991-1998* [The

Therefore, civil revival stimulated by the reformist policy of Gorbachev began in Ukraine later than in other parts of the Soviet Union – namely, in the second half of 1988. Earlier, independent social endeavours were limited to a handful of dissidents whose activity did not go beyond postulating equal rights to the Ukrainian language, legalisation of the Greco-Catholic Church and environmental protection. First demonstration held on October 4, 1987, commemorating Ukrainian victims of the Stalinist terror, gathered about 400 protesters. In the second half of 1987 and first half of 1988 a lot of independent social initiatives emerged including: the Ukrainian Cultural Club, the Initiative Group for Releasing of Ukrainian Political Prisoners, the Ukrainian Society of Independent Intelligentsia, the Ecological Society "The Green World", the Academic Society "Hromada" and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

In the second half of 1988, in the milieu of Kievian writers and intelligentsia, the Initiative Group of the Popular Movement for Restoration was established (later on called: *Rukh*, which stands for Movement). At that time, patriotic masses and public meetings in support of the Movement assembled about several thousand adher-

Course of Transformation in Ukraine in the Years 1991-1998]. In: K. Brzechczyn (Ed.), *„Ścieżki transformacji. Ujęcia teoretyczne i opisy empiryczne”* [The Paths of Transformations. Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Descriptions]. Poznań: Zys i S-ka 2003, pp. 117-135; B. Berdychowska, *Kalendarium odrodzenia narodu na Ukrainie 1985-1991* [Chronicle of the National Restoration in Ukraine, 1985-1991]. "Więź", 1991, no. 11-12, pp. 26-40; idem, *Przed wielką zmianą* [Before the Great Change]. "Więź", 1991, no. 11-12, pp. 46-52; J. Darski, *Rok 1989: Jesień Ludów czy KGB?* [Autumn of the People or KGB?] "Frona", 2001, no. 23/24, pp. 62-120; A. Chojnowski, *Ukraina* [Ukraine]. Warszawa: Trio, 1997; J. Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy, 1772-1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu* [History of Ukraine, 1772-1999. The Birth of Modern Nation]. Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2000; T.A. Ol-szański, *Wybory prezydenckie na Ukrainie, październik-grudzień 2004 roku* [Presidential Elections in Ukraine, October-December 2004]. „Prace OSW”, 2005, no. 11, pp. 5-58; I. Prizel, *Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism*. In: K. Dawisha, B. Parrott (Eds.), "Democratic Change and Authoritarian Reaction in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova". Cambridge: University Press, 1997, pp. 330-371; *Ukraina na zakręcie. Drogi i bezdroża pomarańczowej rewolucji* [Ukraine on the Bend. Roads and Backwoods of the Orange Revolution] (2005). Warszawa: Trio.

ents. Despite declaration of loyalty towards constitutional order and reformist attitude, members of the Ukrainian Popular Front were intimidated and discriminated against by local authorities. The *Rukh* programme was published in 'Literaturna Ukraina', the organ of the Union of Ukrainian Writers, following personal intervention of Gorbachev. The first congress of the Movement was held from 8 to 10 September 1989 in Kiev. Over one thousand participants demanded dismissal of the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party and more autonomy for the Ukrainian Republic in the Soviet federation.

In September 1989, in the face of growing social pressure – student demonstrations and hunger-strikes – V. Shcherbytskyi, the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was forced to step down. He was replaced by V. Ivashko. In October 1989, the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic granted to the Ukrainian language on the territory of the republic, the status of the official language. Also, the authorities announced free elections, which were held on March 4, 1990.

In January 1990 the *Rukh*, as a form of support for establishment of an independent Ukraine, formed a human chain from Kiev to Lviv consisting of one million participants. At the turn of 1989 and 1990 the Greco-Catholic Church (known also as the Uniate Church) was being reconstructed. By spring 1990 this church consisted of 1,000 priests, 186 monks, 700 nuns and 1,000 chapels. Pope John Paul II approved the structure of the Uniate Church and the sacra of 10 bishops consecrated in the underground.

In spite of civil revival and social mobilisation, although limited to the Western part of Ukraine, the elections to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Ukraine were won by the Communist Party. The opposition, forming the Democratic Alliance of Ukraine, won in the western part of the state, gaining 115 seats in the 450-seat parliament. In comparison with the previous Supreme Council a change in national identity of deputies was noted; namely 331 of them were Ukrainians and 99 Russians. At the first session of the new Council, despite protests lodged by opposition, V. Ivashko, First Secretary of

the Ukrainian Communist Party, was elected Chairman of the Republican Parliament. When he was appointed Deputy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Kravchuk, another Communist activist, replaced him (July 23, 1990). On July 16, 1990, the Supreme Council proclaimed sovereignty of Ukraine (355 deputies voted in favour, 4 – against); however this republic remained within the borders of the Soviet Union. Public meetings and demonstrations against the new federation treaty gathered from 20 (Kiev) to 100 (Lviv) thousand people. In October 1990, student demonstrations and hunger strikes were held in Kiev. The demonstrators demanded new federation treaty be rejected, proclaimed their own Ukrainian constitution and organised free elections in spring 1991. Moreover, protesters called for the dismissal of Masol, the Prime Minister of Ukrainian government as well as nationalisation of the property of Ukrainian Communist Party's and return of Ukrainian soldiers serving outside the republic. Under social pressure the Supreme Council dismissed the Prime Minister and revoked an article from the republican constitution referring to the leading role of the Communist Party. However, in a plebiscite held in March 1991, 80% of the voters still supported alliance with the Soviet Union. In spring of 1991 a new element in social situation came into view – namely, worker strikes in the eastern part of Ukraine (Donbas). The first wave of strikes took place in July – August 1989. At that time postulates of workers were limited to economic issues and leaders of political opposition and workers did not co-operate. The second wave of strikes, which took place in March – April 1991, was supported by the activists from the Popular Front. Three hundred thousand people in 155 coal-mines went on strike, advancing political postulates that included curbing bureaucracy and implementation of the Act of Sovereignty. In order to prevent opposition leaders from contacting strikers, the authorities arrested some leaders of the *Rukh* (Stephan Chmara) and calmed down the situation making economic concessions.

The Moscow coup d'état in August 1991 posed yet another challenge to the republican authorities. The ambiguous attitude of

Kravchuk towards the Committee of Martial Law provoked political protests. Kravchuk did not condemn putchists, but declared that their regulations were null and void on the territory of Ukraine. He appealed for peace and continuation of work. However, all Ukrainian parties condemned the coup. In Kiev, 8 thousand people protested against the putchists. These demonstrations spread to other cities. Opposition deputies demanded the session of the Council be called. On August 24, 1991, 346 deputies out of 400 present, voted for the Act of Independence of Ukraine. This decision was supported by a referendum, held simultaneously with the presidential elections. In December 1991, 90% of the voters supported independence. Leonid Kravchuk became first president of the sovereign Ukrainian State.

In spite of the political revival in 1988-1991, the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party managed to hold power quelling separate protests mounted by political dissidents, religious movements, students and workers and successfully preventing any co-operation among these social groups keen on undermining the communist nomenclature. The Ukrainian nomenclature supported independence, that was first promulgated by the anticommunist opposition, at the right time. This way, the communist elite, seceding from the Soviet Union, was able to control the process of democratisation and still hold the whole power. The first President of the Ukrainian state, L. Kravchuk declared that state-building takes priority over democratisation of the political system inherited after the Soviet Union. This program was backed by the leadership of *Rukh* and other parties coming from the anticommunist opposition. Kravchuk rewarded leaders of those parties offering them various state posts. At the end of 1992 this policy resulted in a split in *Rukh* and an emergence of a constructivist faction headed by V. Chornovil, which very soon became politically marginalised. The majoritarian election law favoured independent candidates and hindered formation of political parties. As a result the so-called party of power (*partiya vlady*) could corrupt independent candidates and members of parliament could remain in full control of the political process.

These tendencies were strengthened during Kuchma's presidency. The privatisation of economy became postponed, as a host of enterprises became objects of "national strategic importance" and could not be privatised. It is estimated that 32 bills, 60 presidential decrees and 80 governmental instructions regulated economic activity. According to the annual report of the Legacy Foundation, Ukraine received on a scale ranging from 1 (fully free) to 5 (repressive) state, a 4.0, and took 126<sup>th</sup> place in the world.<sup>8</sup> About half of the Ukrainian gross national product was generated in an informal sector of economy. Ukraine ranked as one of the most corrupted states in the world.

The presidential elections of 2004 closed a decade-long presidency of Leonid Kuchma. According to opinions of Ukrainian constitutionalists, the president could not run for the third term. The Presidential camp of power decided to support the candidature of Viktor Yanukovych, a sitting Prime Minister, so as to avoid the victory of Viktor Yushchenko, the previous president of the Ukrainian State Bank and Prime Minister (2000-2001). During the campaign, Viktor Medvedchuk, the chief of the President's Administration, resorted to defaming and calumniating Yushchenko's candidature. State-censored mass media ignored Yushchenko's campaign giving media coverage only to Yanukovych. Local administrations hindered Yushchenko's campaign, discriminating his followers and adherents all over the country. An attempt to poison Yushchenko after dinner with the chief of State Security Service has remained unexplained. Since this event, Yushchenko could consequently present himself as an "honest man", who wanted to take over power from "the bandits". His electoral headquarters warned against possible frauds and forgeries and staged protests in case of Yushchenko's defeat. During the first round of elections Yushchenko won 39.30% of votes and Yanukovych 39.26%. Yushchenko's advantage amounted to 156,000 votes. After the first round Kuchma dismissed 12 chiefs of counties (*rajon*) where Yushchenko won and refused to change the electoral law so as to prevent frauds. Blatant forgeries taking place between the first and second round of elections

<sup>8</sup> J. Hrycak, op. cit., p. 356.

committed by the presidential camp had a twofold aim. Firstly, they were to ensure the victory of Yanukovych. Secondly, to subordinate Yanukovych to people from the Presidential Camp and deprive him of any authority as he would owe his victory to forgeries made by Kuchma's people. However, implementation of this strategy caused an unexpected civil reaction. When, on November 22, the Central Election Committee announced the results of elections and Yanukovych was to gain 49.42% of votes, whereas Yushchenko – 46.70%, the citizens mounted a protest. This same day in the centre of Kiev, several thousand people manifested against frauds and forgeries, demanding rerunning of elections. Despite frost and snow, they stayed overnight. This situation continued for almost two weeks. The scale, persistence and spontaneity of protests, known as the Orange Revolution surprised Yushchenko's staff as well as the authorities that had no choice but negotiate. In the meantime, the number of protests swelled to about half a million. The political compromise struck between the Presidential camp and the leadership of the Orange Revolution meant a re-run of the second round of elections and change of political system. After one week of protests, on December 3, 2004, the Supreme Court invalidated the results of the second round of elections and ordered their repetition on December 26. Five days later the Ukrainian parliament, as a part of political compromise, changed the electoral law and passed amendments to the Ukrainian constitution, limiting prerogatives of the president, which in practice, liquidated a semi-presidential political system and introduced a parliamentary one. In the repeated runoff Yushchenko won 51.99% of votes (support of circa 15 million people) whereas Yanukovych – 44.40% (support of circa 13 million people) with a turnout of 77%.

## V. The Perspectives of the Orange Revolution

In order to answer adequately a question pertaining to the perspectives of the Orange Revolution one should enumerate developmental variants perceived from the perspective of a non-Marxian

historical materialism. The situation in the Ukraine could evolve into a violent confrontation or a social compromise. The violent confrontation could bifurcate into two developmental sub-variants: victorious (i) or lost (ii) revolution. Also, the compromise path of development bifurcates into two developmental sub-variants: a compromise leading to new division of spheres of influence among different factions of the ruling class (iii) or to the growth of civil autonomy (iv).

The victory of citizens (sub-variant i), from a purely materialist point of view, would change nothing, because the victory of citizens necessitates disposition over means of coercion. This way, inside the class of citizens the division into (new) owners of means of coercion and those who are deprived of such influence would be spontaneously reconstituted. The revolutionary elite would form the core of a new class of rulers disposing rebellious crowd and revolutionary guards. The mechanism of political competition among a new elite of power would lead again to the growth of power regulation and – later – to control over economy. Incomplete privatisation and weakness of the single class of owners would facilitate totalitarisation of the society: emergence of the social class controlling economy and politics.

Defeat of the citizenry (ii) would also be socially expensive, because it would provoke political repressions towards the protesters and initiate the period of social inertia. Social compromise would be the best option, yet not each form of social compromise. The compromise (iii) leading to the division of spheres of influence between different factions of the ruling class would also hinder the growth of civil autonomy. Therefore, the best option consists in a compromise (iv) which enlarges or, at least, safeguards political and economic liberties of citizenry.

Fortunately, the Ukrainian society avoided violent confrontation (sub-variants i and ii). However, it seemed that the Orange Revolution was not able to initiate sub-variant (iv) of development, most optimal for society, that leads to the enlargement of the range of civil autonomy (measured e.g. by the growth of economic liberty). Instead of that, the civil protest contributed only to a new division



of power, expressed by the change of the political system from presidential to parliamentary, between different factions of rulers (sub-variant iii). Why, therefore, the Orange Revolution was not able to enforce such social compromise which would lead to the growth of civil autonomy and not to a new division of power?

In order to answer this question, one needs to examine closely the structure of the Ukrainian civil movement. Each social movement can be analysed according to three dimensions: material, institutional and consciousness one. At the material level, social movement violates material monopoly of the ruling class (disposition of material means of society) and challenges the rules of subordination. At the institutional level, a given social movement breaks the institutional monopoly of the ruling class and generates own organisations. At the level of consciousness, a given social movement challenges the ideological monopoly of the ruling class, creating its own utopia diagnosing social situation and proposing solutions.

*Revolutions* are called mass social movements equipped with material components. Then, such a social movement violated the material monopoly of the ruling class. These revolutionary movements are divided into *full* and *partial*. So-called classical revolutions are full mass movements, which include these three levels of social life: they violate the material monopoly of the ruling class, form own organisations and create revolutionary consciousness. Partial mass movements, which contain two components of social life (e.g. material and institutional or material and consciousness) are called *revolts*. Finally, one may distinguish a *mutiny*, that is social movement containing only one, namely, material component.<sup>9</sup>

Perceived from this perspective, the Ukrainian December contained a material component – demonstrations of citizens violated standard rules of subordination. However, their range was limited only to the capital of Ukraine and bigger cities of the Western part of the country. The Ukrainian movement of protest was devoid of

<sup>9</sup> G. Tomczak, *Is It Worth Winning a Revolution?* In: L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki (Eds.) "Social System, Rationality and Revolution" ("Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities", 33). Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993, pp. 265-277.

institutional component. It did not create stable institutions and organisations which would survive the period of revolutionary mobilisation. Moreover, this political movement did not contain the component of consciousness. Ukrainian protesters did not promulgate own vision of political changes, calling only for the repetition of the second round of elections.

Although, the Ukrainian protests were revolutionary in character, it was – in the light of a typology presented here – the most primitive revolutionary movement (*mutiny*), devoid of institutional and consciousness components. Since the very beginning it was dependent on an alliance with Yushchenko's camp which was, in fact, one of the factions rivalling for power inside the ruling class. Yushchenko, the hero of the Orange Revolution, was the former Prime Minister and the president of the State Bank. This is why these protests were able to enforce the repetition of the second round of elections to ensure Yushchenko's victory, but did not manage to enforce implementation of the Orange Revolution programme. In fact, the Ukrainian movement of protest had neither a programme nor instruments to implement its agenda. Not to mention Yushchenko's election programme, which was very vague, moralistic and propagandist.

However, the Orange Revolution proves that further political development of the Ukraine will not depend exclusively on what the representatives of ruling class' factions negotiate at the table, but also on what the class of citizens is ready to accept and eventually able to enforce on streets and squares. The fact that the authorities in their comportment and calculations have started taking into consideration so conceived "citizenry factor" seems to be the most important legacy of the Orange Revolution. This legacy can be preserved only if citizens are ready to react and protest.

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This collection of studies, consisting of three domains of subjects: morality, politics, law (tradition and modern times), is a proceedings of an interesting international conference "Etyka a współczesność" [Ethics and modern times]. The papers presented at the conference were written in Polish, English, French and German. The volume contains studies in the fields of axiology, politics, law as well as those concerning problems of ethics: freedom and responsibility – a retrospective look; Values and life. In this volume ethics is treated not so much as a postulative field, i.e. normatively but rather as a descriptive-empirical discipline. The mutual penetration of these two kinds of ethics is obvious.

Roman Kozłowski and Karolina M. Cern, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Szamarzewskiego 89c, 60-569 Poznań, Poland.

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W POZNANIU  
61-734 Poznań, ul. F. Nowowiejskiego 55, tel. 061 829 39 85, fax 061 829 39 80  
e-mail: [press@amu.edu.pl](mailto:press@amu.edu.pl) <http://press.amu.edu.pl>  
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