Browsing by Author "Kordela, Marzena"
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Item MOŻLIWOŚĆ KONSTRUOWANIA OGÓLNEJ TEORII ZASAD PRAWA UWAGI DO KONCEPCJI ROBERTA ALEXY’EGO(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 2007) Kordela, MarzenaSince the middle eighties o f the 20th century Robert Alexy has consistently developed the conception of legal principles. That conception, despite its initial ancillary function in respect of the theory of constitutional rights that he worked on, very soon proved of major importance as its basic theses applied to all norms o f conduct which belong to a legal system and have been defined as principles. There two types o f factors that have decided about the universal nature of this conception. They are (1) the approach that looks at legal principles as optimisation commands which formulate an obligation to carry out a certain state o f affairs to the highest degree in the existing actual and legal circumstances, and (2) the procedure of balancing the principles, which is a formalised expression of solving of the, inevitable in the system, collision o f principles. Although Alexy has not as yet articulated clearly that a general, not only a particular, theory of principles could be built on the basis o f his work so far, it seems justified to believe, having in mind the advanced stage of the already existing conception, and, what is more, its practical usability in areas beyond constitutional law, that sound foundations on which this conception could be grounded already exist.Item PRZEGLĄD PIŚMIENNICTWA(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 2009) Kordela, MarzenaJacek Sadomski, Konflikt zasad — ochrona dóbr osobistych a wolność prasy, Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2008, ss. 377.Item PRZEGLĄD PIŚMIENNICTWA(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 2004) Kordela, MarzenaE. Morawska, Klauzula państwa prawnego w Konstytucji RP na tle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, Toruń 2003, Wyd. Dom Organizatora TNOiK, ss. 415.Item Teoria prawa Zygmunta Ziembińskiego(Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza w Poznaniu Wydział Nauk Społecznych, Instytut Filozofii UAM, 2015) Kordela, MarzenaZygmunt Ziembiński was one of the most prominent theoreticians of law in Poland in the second half of the 20th century. He developed an original theory of law defined as a theory of legal phenomena, which covered both logical-linguistic as well as real aspects of law. The theory served as a base for the development of a unique so-called advanced normative conception of sources of law, one of the greatest achievements of theory of law in Poland. This conception encompasses all the indispensable elements of a coherent system of binding legal norms: 1) indication of a political justification (ideological assumptions) of the entire system of law; 2) pre-judgment of law-making competence of government agencies; 3) determination of the status of custom and precedent; 4) compilation of a catalogue of permissible interpretation rules; 5) compilation of a catalogue of permissible inferential rules (permissible rules of legal inferences); 6) compilation of a catalogue of permissible collision rules.Item UZASADNIENIA AKSJOLOGICZNE W ORZECZNICTWIE TRYBUNAŁU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 2000) Kordela, MarzenaSentencing in cases of conformity of lower ranked normative acts with acts which are superior within the legislative hierarchy the Constitutional Tribunal is usually having recourse to three following types of motivation statements: descriptive statements (expresses in phrases), directional statements (in form of norms of behavior) and, finally, appraisals. Taking into consideration some visible regularities in citing appraisals by Constitutional Tribunal, or even sequences o f such appraisals given for to prove axiological rationality of the decisions taken by the Tribunal - one can distinguish characteristic types of such reasons; i.e. reasons based on interference of the type „from the whole to a detail”, reasons built up in so-called negative inferences, next - reasons based on inferences focused on „the essence itself’ of a given regulation, reasons based on inferences appealing to a „definition” o f particular values and also - reasons based on: inferences of reductive character, admitted spirit of consequence of the legislator in his appraisals, inferences based on preferential questions. Despite of such a heterogeneity (from formal logic up to the sphere of applying the law) all the above cited types of axiological reasons can be reduced to one scheme that prejudges their validity in law - since all them are provided with the quality of being rational and objective.Item Wybrane problemy źródeł prawa(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1994) Piotrowski, Artur; Kozłowski, Tomasz; Piszko, Robert; Kordela, MarzenaThose papers concern selected issues taken from the area of the origin of the law and the legal system. The authors consider relations between changes in the concepts of the origin of law and formal transformations of the legal system. A. Piotrowski stresses an increasing number of judicial decisions in the Polish statutory law, which in consequence blur the sharp line between the making and the execution of law. T. Kozłowski describes difficulties which are currently encountered in the process of the law-making in the light of a collapse of the authority of the law, and postulates a detailed research into that phenomenon. R. Piszko provides a global characteristics of the relations between the legal system and other systems outside that system, operating in the same environment and argues that concepts in that area should be precisely defined. M. Kordela discusses the role of ombudsman in Poland in the reconstruction process of legal principles (material, formal and institutional) on which a concept of legal state, and the contents of its concept are based.Item ZASADY PRAWA JAKO NORMATYWNA POSTAĆ WARTOŚCI(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 2006) Kordela, MarzenaThe principles of law have been vividly discussed for several dozens of years by jurists involved in the theory and philosophy of law as well as scholars representing dogmatic disciplines and practicing lawyers. This special interest has its primary source in the fact that the principles of law have been recently far more widely used not only in the acts of la w application, but also in research results where they have enabled formulation of important scientific concepts, and have shown directions of further investigations. The principles of law are usually defined as a category of the norms of conduct; a category which distinguishes itself by a catalogue of certain specific features of its elements, such as: generality, high rank in the hierarchical legal system, significance, gradation of realisation, possibility of creating a conflict without the necessity of declaring any of the incompatible principles invalid, the procedure of “weighing”, “balancing” or “harmonising” of incompatible principles when making explicit or unambiguous decisions. Principles qualified as the norms of conduct, on the other hand, share these characteristics only slightly because due to their construction it is extremely difficult to identify precisely their addressees, the circumstances in which they are applied and the prescribed (or prohibited) conduct. This difficulty may be solved when the principles of law are not treated as a norm of conduct. Although the principles and the norms have the same origin (genus) i.e. a directival expression, it is the differences between them which are far more important. While the norms of conduct require an obligation of a certain behaviour in specifically denoted circumstances from explicitly specified subjects, the principles in that sequence consist of only one element: an obligation. It is because the obligation created by principles does not require a certain, adequate conduct, but rather a realisation of a certain value. All the properties distinguishing the principles are simply the properties of those values, for which the principles constitute a normative form, while the legislator, besides the competence to establish law, has also the competence to establish legal values. Therefore, even if a value being implemented in the legal system has a previously determined definition, having its origin in, e.g. generally accepted moral values, it will never become legally binding unless the legislative fiat. However, how the obligation to realise that value will be “translated” into ordinary norms, is a totally different matter.