Browsing by Author "Rodzynkiewicz, Mateusz"
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Item KILKA UWAG O RELACYJNYM UJĘCIU WINY W PRAWIE KARNYM(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 2001) Rodzynkiewicz, MateuszThe aim of the article is to order the views on the relational view of fault expressed so far in the Polish literature, as well as engage in polemic against some authors and point out some relevant aspects not discussed so far. The author dismisses the popular criticism of positioning the culpability relation on the axes of the subject’s behaviour and the legal system. Perceiving the relation bearing criminal responsibility probably gives more interesting implications than maintaining that this relation occurs between the offender and the offence. The Author also postulates that the relational view of fault can be made consistent with the so-called pure normative view, remaining in opposition to the psychological and comprehensive views. This is the point where this sort of relational view differs significantly from the view referring to the relation „subject-act”, as this latter approach is more consistent with the psychological or comprehensive theory of fault, and it is not really in line with the pure normative view. The Author supports the view about the ambiguity of the concept of fault in the criminal law.Item Pojęcie winy w prawie karnym -próba analizy krytycznej na tle ujęcia relacyjnego. W sprawie definicji winy -replika (Wojciech Patryas )(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1992) Rodzynkiewicz, MateuszThe article present a critical analysis of two representative concepts of guilt in criminal law (so called normative and psychological theories). In these theories, the definitions of guilt are formulated in the form of classical definitions, i.e. in the way which is not adequate to the semiotic essence of the defined term. From a semiotic point of view "guilt" is a name of a certain relation; hence, the author accepts in principle a so-called relation approach to guilt presented by W. Patryas. However, the author criticizes the selection of elements of the quilt relation proposed by W. Patryas. In a legal sense the term "guilt" retains its sense as long as there exists criminal legislation of a given type. In other words, non-classical definition of the guilt relation should be constructed so that the elements of this relation were: (i) behavior of an offender, and (ii) description of behavior contained in a legislative act, including modalities connected with an offender and with the situation in which he or she acted. Guilt can be ascribed, if there is the relation of accordance between the offenders behavior (extralingual reality) and the description of this behavior. A definition of guilt must therefore be of extralingual character (analogy to A. Tarski's semantic definition of truth). The relation approach to guilt cannot be reconciled with the dogma of degrees of guilt. This may lead either to the rejection of the relation approach, or to the revision of traditional views held by legal doctrine.Item Próba analizy prawnokarnej konstrukcji umyślności(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1990) Rodzynkiewicz, MateuszThe article indicates incoherencies in Art. 7 § 1 of the Penal Code of 1969. The notion of intentionality de lege lata goes beyond linguistic intuitions and is of eclectic character. Discussing the form of intentionality known as dolus eventualis the author supports W. Wolter's theory of neutrality, stressing its conclusion according to which dolus eventualis is only a fiction of intention. The author critically presents a new approach to intentionality put forth by K. Buchała and A. Zoll. Analizing the question of „dolus directus" the author indicates that also in that case lawyers create the fiction of intentionality. Namely, they refer „wanting" to the necessary side-effect of the perpetrator's behaviour. There is an error in this reasoning, for one may „want" something that is the aim of one's behaviour or a means necessary to the attainment of that aim, and not something that is „disconnected" from that aim, being only a side-effect of one's behaviour. The author assumes that in the latter case there is no intention but the neutrality of will related to the side-effect understood by the perpetrator as necessary, just as in the case of dolus eventualis in W. Wolter's conception where the neutrality of will is referred to the side-effect understood by the perpetrator as possible. In the last part of the article the author formulates two versions of defining intentionality de lege ferenda. The first refers to the contents of Art. 7 § 1 of the Penal Code, the second to the proposal put forth by K. Buchała and A. Zoll. Finally the author points to the methodological advantages of his formula in the context of so-called directional offences.