Deliberation and Automaticity in Habitual Acts
Loading...
Date
2018
Authors
Advisor
Editor
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM
Title alternative
Abstract
Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from
deliberation, but are direct responses to the circumstances: habit essentially involves a variety
of automaticity. My objective in this paper is to show that this view is unduly restrictive. A
habit can explain an act in various ways. Pointing to the operation of automaticity is only one
of them. I draw attention to the fact that acquired automaticity is one outgrowth of habituation
that is relevant to explanation, but not the only one. Habituation shapes our emotional and
motivational make up in ways that affect deliberation itself. Hence mentioning a habit might be
indispensable in explaining an act which nevertheless ensues from deliberation. The view that
habitual acts are direct responses to the circumstances implies an impoverished conception of
habit, which fails to do justice to its rich explanatory potential in theoretical and pre-theoretical
contexts, as well as to its role in the history of philosophy.
Description
Sponsor
Keywords
habit, deliberation, automaticity, action explanation
Citation
Ethics in Progress, Volume 9 (2018), Issue 1, pp. 25-43.