

TERRORIST PANDORA'S BOX

Analysis of chosen terrorist issue

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Polish and Finnish Terrorism at the Turn of XIX and XX Century. In the Search for Theoretical Explanation of Terrorist Acts at the Edge of Western Civilization

Introduction

Contemporary terrorist academic literature seems to concentrate on Islamic violence acts in the second part of XX and at the beginning of XXI first century (Hamas, Jichad, Al Qaeda, ect.¹), sometimes taking into consideration ideologically motivated terrorist attacks in Western European states during the cold war (Red Brigades, Red Army Fractions, ect.²) or nationally driven in the following decades (ETA, IRA, ect.³). This focus has been strengthened by New York attacks on September 11, 2002 and subsequent ones in Madrid and London. Wild, poor and blind by religion Muslims were to threaten civilized and stable countries of Western World. The ground for such a perception of international developments was facilitated by theorists who had announced civilization conflict as a new post cold war world order.⁴ Self image of civilizational superiority allows many states and societies to forget about their own terrorist tradition, to condemn this form of fight as well as to participate in different forms of mediation groups, counter terrorist alliances, ect., Contemporary terrorist acts are often described as unacceptable way of fighting for political and social aims. At the same time very similar methods were used, especially at the turn of XIX and XX century, by many European nations, what is still – usually in veiled and modified form – appreciated as a part of struggle for independence. Additionally nowadays explanations of terrorism tend to stress ideology,

¹ R. M. Barnas, *Terroryzm: od Asasynów do Osamy bin Ladena*, Wrocław 2001.

² Y. Alexander, D. A. Pluchinsky, *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*, New York 1992.

³ E. Martinez-Herrera, *National Extremism and Outcomes of State Policies in the Basque Country, 1979–2001*, "International Journal on Multicultural Studies" 2002, vol. 4, no 1.

⁴ E.g. S. P. Huntington, *Zderzenie cywilizacji*, Warszawa 1997; B. R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, Rutgers 1995.

economic conditions and psychological factors as decisive factors in terrorism developments. For example Sebastian Wojciechowski enumerates three groups of factors contributing to creation of terrorism: ideas (regarding political orientation, ethnicity, religion or ideology), economic and social conditions in locations of terrorists origins (poverty, unemployment, economic discrimination) and psychological aspects of behavior motivations. Those overlapping factors form so called "triad of terrorist motivation," facilitating conditions for terrorist acts.⁵ But when developing analytic workshop also further elements could be mentioned, e.g.: power imbalances as well as values and social structures behind the phenomenon.

This paper's aim is to analyze factors determining historical developments of terrorism and test them in different theoretical perspectives. The main research questions addressed in this paper are what contributes to creation and implementation of terrorist ideas, and define their form as well as frequency. Here the central thesis is that terrorism as a phenomenon of violent interests' articulation might be typical for different societies and its form depends on cultural and social factors. States and societies in similar situation might react differently in violence creation what reflects their different cultural and social patterns. Empirical analyses will base on Finland and Poland as countries in comparable political situation at the end of XIX and at the beginning of XX century. Both were the eastern outskirts of western civilization, conquered and controlled by tsars' empire. In both cases the reaction for Russian oppression included terrorism but its scale, perception and commemoration were different. Terrorism as a concept will not be defined here due to two reasons: text length limitations, phenomenon's complexity (defining terrorism is a problematic task, and a source of disputes among scholars around the world⁶). Analysis will base in this respect on considerations presented in previous articles of this thematic series.⁷

Poland and Finland at the Turn of XIX and XX Century

Lack of independent statehood in Poland and Finland made both, revived in the middle of XIX century, nations concentrate on regaining/gaining full sovereignty. The Finnish and Polish autonomy was based on constitutional

⁵ S. Wojciechowski, *The Triad of Terrorist Motivation – Introduction*, in: *Terrorism as a Timeless Actor on the International Stage*, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznań 2005, p. 5.

⁶ B. Bolechów, *Counterterrorism After 9/11*, in: *Terrorism as a Timeless Actor on the International Stage*, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznań 2005, pp. 64–65.

⁷ Books on terrorism edited by Sebastian Wojciechowski: *Terrorism as a Timeless Actor on the International Stage*, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznań 2005; *The Power of Terrorism*, T. Wallas, S. Wojciechowski (eds.), Poznań 2005; *The Faces of Terrorism*, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznań 2006.

acts⁸. The constitution given to the Kingdom of Poland was more liberal than that given to Finland and guaranteed a larger amount of rights. Until the November Uprising (1830) the Kingdom of Poland had a large autonomy, which was also much wider than that of Finland. However, in 1817 the Finns have already undertaken the first careful attempts to gain their own written constitution.⁹ But liberal constitution, together with the attitude of the Polish elites towards respecting it, turned out into reasons of trouble for the Kingdom, while a resurrection of expectations occurred. That caused the disappointment of Alexander I towards the Polish governance and hitherto the radicalization of attitudes led on the one side to repression and on the other side to active resistance. In Finland the situation looked differently. The absence of statehood traditions, self-governance and leading elites, that would act as natural advocates of the first two, caused minor demands and expectations. Finns remained relatively passive, while waiting for better circumstances in order to postulate their conditions for autonomy. Additionally, the Swedish-speaking elites were satisfied with maintaining the *status quo* after gaining control over territories and the acknowledgment of their rights by the Tsar.

The limitation of self-reliance, as a consequence of the Polish resistance during the November Uprising, made the status of both states similar. The Polish unhappiness and the consecutive Tsar repressions in between 1832–1863 accompanied the imperturbable attitudes of Finns. In fact, when the January Uprising collapsed (1964) the rest of the Polish autonomy was taken away, while Finland was moving into the stage of its highest prosperity. Despite the fact that, in between 1809–1863 the Finnish parliament was not summoned even once (except for the Porvoo meeting in 1809), the elites in Finland, until that moment in a decisive majority of Swedish speakers, remained very loyal to the Tsar.¹⁰ The Finnish loyalty reached its peak during the Crimean War and the January Uprising, was awarded by Alexander II. The autonomy was extended as a result of many liberal reforms and the national political and social development was finally possible.¹¹ Contrary to Poland, the Finns manage to take full advantage of the given autonomy. They decided for a non military course of action based on their understanding of the conditions and rules that existed in 19th century Empire, as well as of the legal procedures determining the patterns of behaviour. The Senate (government of the Great Duchy of Finland) work out

⁸ J. Hartley, *The Constitution of Finland and Poland in the Reign of Alexander I: Blueprints for Reform in Russia?*, in: *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A comparative Study*, M. Branch, J. Hartley, A. Maćzak (eds), London 1995, p. 48.

⁹ J. Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe. International Crises in the Period of Autonomy 1808–1914*, London 1981, p. 40.

¹⁰ J. Kekkonen, *The Main Trends in Finnish Legal History during the Period of Autonomy*, in: *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A comparative Study*, M. Branch, J. Hartley, A. Maćzak (eds), London 1995, p. 113.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 116.

procedural patterns, as well as its own ethos. However, the lack of independent institutions lasting from the times of the Swedish ruling, resulted in the fact that the newly created procedures were best matching XIX conditions.¹² That happened mainly, while they were not encumbered by historical ballast and archaic social relations.

The situation changed at the very end of XIX century. Several attributions of the Finnish autonomy were limited. Since 1899 the issues related to the Empire were taken away from the Finnish competency and given to the Russian administration in St. Petersburg. The given imperial law was pre-empting the national one. In 1901, the Finnish and Russian army were united. (It has to be remembered that no other imperial territory had its own army during that time). However, the example of the Finnish autonomy agreed upon in the first half of the XIX century, ceased to match the Russian defence ideals at the end of century. In 1902, the Russians gain access to Finnish offices.¹³ It should be mentioned that the majority of the listed actions and action proposals towards Finland had been brought to life on the Polish territories situated under Russian control already much earlier – since the January Uprising. The policy of repression led to the stirring of movements aimed at defending the Finnish autonomy. The forms and manners of action were determined by political realism, which indicated, that armed actions, active resistance or other forms of military action might have resulted in a tragic counter reaction. The majority of the protests however accepted the forms of action, which were not prohibited by law. Those were protests, the collection of the signatures for petitions, or other acts of citizen insubordination.¹⁴

Analysing the Finnish positioning in the Russian Empire one has to observe, that throughout three quarters of time, the Russian domination was beneficial and was developing in the desired directions. The fundamentals of Finnish statehood, brought about by the Russians, were becoming stronger. The absence of radical actions was caused in the beginning by the lack of elites, nation and state traditions. The main goal for both Russian and Finnish was the maintenance of a *status quo* satisfactory for both sides. The consolidated fundamentals of loyalty and realism were bringing benefits, did not allow radical actions to happen and restricted activities to the frames provided by law. The legal actions meant avoiding violence and at the most, accepting the passive resistance and protests orchestrated by the Kagal (fin. Kagaali) organisation.¹⁵ Finns re-

¹² O. Jussila, *How did Finland Come under Russian Rule*, in: *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A comparative Study*, M. Branch, J. Hartley, A. Mączak (eds.), London 1995, p. 71.

¹³ J. Pajewski, *Historia powszechna 1871–1918*, Poznań 2002, p. 86.

¹⁴ E. Thaden, *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland*, Princeton University Press, 1981.

¹⁵ The protest against the February manifest from 1899 took the shape of collecting signatures for the petition addressed to the Tsar. It was signed by around half million of Finns. Similarly, the law regarding language and military service faced civil insubordination ac-

sponded by writing a petition (signed by one fifth of the population) and later by boycotting Russian institutions, especially conscription.¹⁶ On the other hand "Finland's example actually shows that the policy of oppression drove even a previously relatively calm and passive part of the empire to the path leading to uncompromising separatism, and eventually to independence."¹⁷

The opposite situation occurred in Poland. The tradition of holding the power together with the presence of strong Polish elites, such as formerly the nobility, raised huge expectations connected to the range of autonomy. The given autonomy was endangered though, by the attempts of enforcing it without taking into consideration the conditions of the time. Legal actions were faced with the Tsar's ignorance, which led to radical movements.

Norman Davies points out three main differences between Poland and Finland, namely the strategic, ethnical-demographical and mental character.¹⁸ Additionally for Poland, the Russian domination brought the end of a few centuries of glorious and often powerful statehood tradition. Poland managed to create its own culture and to establish its ruling over a considerable area in the middle Europe. Polish nobility were the bearer of that tradition. By contrast to Poland, Finland remained under the Swedish ruling and did not create its own elites. The existing ones had Swedish origins and they were using Swedish language. In addition, both the Finnish statehood and any other type of culture different from the folk culture were absent. The Finnish language was the language of the peasants. The Russian rulers brought thus the opportunity of statehood emancipation, followed by that of language and nation.

Polish and Finnish Terrorism

Polish and Finnish terrorism appeared under very similar circumstances – increased Russian oppression aiming at autonomy limitations. However their frequency of terrorist acts differed as well as its perception.

Finnish terrorist acts were very sporadic. The most important and known example of Finnish political terrorism was assassination of Russian General Governor Nikolai Bobrikov.¹⁹ He symbolized the policy of brutal russifica-

tions. See: O. Jusilla, *Wielkie Księstwo Finlandii 1809–1917*, in: O. Jussila, S. Hentilä, J. Nevakivi, *Historia polityczna Finlandii 1809–1999*, Kraków 2001, pp. 82–83.

¹⁶ M. Fry, *Nationalism and the Orgins of World War One in Russia*, www.sassoonery.demon.co.uk.

¹⁷ C. Jokinen, *Tyrannicide: "Heroism or Terrorism. Part I: The Case of Eugen Schauman," "The Eurasian Politician,"* July 2007; M. Futrell, *Northern Underground: episodes of Russian revolutionary transport and communications through Scandinavia and Finland, 1863–1917*, London 1963.

¹⁸ N. Davies, *Boże igrzysko. Historia Polski*, vol. II, Kraków 1992, p. 461.

¹⁹ M. Klinge, *Geschichte Finnlands im Überblick*, Helsinki 1995, p. 104.

tion,²⁰ increased oppression of 1899–1905²¹ and “was a hated tyrant – even for those who were otherwise prepared to be loyal to the Tsar.”²² As the main executor (in Finland) of Empire’s policy aiming at assimilation and unification of the tsars’ state, he introduced several policies threatening the existence of Finnish autonomy and Finnish nation. Bobrikov was shot by Eugen Schauman, Finnish civil servant at Senat Square in the center of Helsinki on June 16, 1904.²³ Assailant committed a suicide one moment later. What is important he was involved in Activists movement – Finnish radical separatists, disappointed with moderate and ineffective policy towards Russia. Activists had tried earlier to kill the general several times, always unsuccessfully. Bobrikov policy was seen as illegal (because by limiting Finnish autonomy he was breaking existing laws and treaties) as a result his death was to bring “normality” back. This distinguished Activists in their own eyes from “ ‘senseless and barbaric’ terrorism of nihilists and anarchists,”²⁴ dominating at that time on “terrorist market” in Europe, especially in Russia.²⁵

Act of Schauman inspired another terrorist attack, committed one year later by Lennart Hohenthal. He killed a Finnish pro-Russian prosecutor Eliel Soisalon-Soininen. Because he killed a Finn his attack was not considered as national heroism. But at the same time “the Activists in general had experienced that direct action yielded more benefits than compliance even if it meant violence.”²⁶ Several, mainly unsuccessful terrorist attacks on state officers were conducted. But Activists did not managed to attract wider spectrum of society and constitutional trend prevailed. As a result 1905 strikes were not connected with terror and massive violence in Finland.²⁷

Murder of Bobrikov fulfils at least two criteria of defining terrorism: attracting attention and revenge. Both were achieved by attacker(s). On the other hand no innocent civilians suffered and the attack was targeted at public official and an foreigner (this is why – on the other hand – Hohenthal does not exist in public memory as a national hero).

Bobrikov’s assassination was seen by Finns as an act of patriotism and Schauman as a martyr, who sacrificed himself for the goodness of he nation. His act from the very beginning was not classified as terrorism but tyrannicide – something acceptable and justified under the conditions of Finnish nation being persecuted by Russian Empire and simultaneously powerless in open

²⁰ S. Zetterberg, *Finland through the centuries*, in: *Facts about Finland*, Helsinki 2000, p. 52.

²¹ V. Meri, *Beneath the Polar Star. Glimpses of Finnish History*, Helsinki 1999, p. 86.

²² C. Jokinen, *Tyrannicide: Heroism or Terrorism...*

²³ S. Zetterberg, *Viisi laukausta senaatissa*, Otava 1986.

²⁴ C. Jokinen, *Tyrannicide: Heroism or Terrorism...*

²⁵ M. Tomczak, *Evolution of International Terrorism*, in: *The Faces of Terrorism*, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznań 2006, pp. 9–15.

²⁶ C. Jokinen, *Tyrannicide: Heroism or Terrorism...*

²⁷ T. Cieślak, *Historia Finlandii*, Wrocław 1983, pp. 187–190.

confrontation. This approach justified this terrorist act by changing its classification and stressing specific circumstances. Schauman's act was commemorated by a memorial plaque in the building of the Council of State. This approach might be found also now, but it is rather rare stance among political elites.²⁸ Nowadays, due to centenary, Finnish public opinion was deliberating if Schauman was a hero or a terrorist. According to the prime minister Matti Vanhanen "By today's standard's it was purely and act of political terrorism, and altogether deplorable. [...] At the time some felt that it was a heroic act, which it was not. The same kind of thing can be seen right now around the world. People celebrating murder."²⁹ As a result no celebration was organized and additionally the place of attack remained closed general public.³⁰

Official Finnish attitude towards Bobrikov's case have had to change due the international developments. Methods acceptable and used in the past could not be appreciated nowadays. Grounds for independence and patriotism had to be denied as not fitting contemporary classification of permissible fight methods.

Contrary to the Finnish case, terrorist acts were relatively common at the turn of XIX and XX century in Polish territories, especially in Russian partition sector. Polish tradition of noble parliamentarianism of XVII and XVIII century, which was free from fighting forms present at that time in Western European monarchies, was replaced a century later with terror violence, similar to the Italian one. Powerless in the front of dominating enemy together with growing oppression and limitations in autonomy pushed Poles towards that form of struggle. Polish daggerers appeared as a consequence of January uprising in 1905 and later on its downfall. They attacked high officials of tsarist's regime, both of Polish and Russian nationality (about one thousand victims). Together with leaders capturing the first phase of Polish terror ended. Second began in the last but one decade of the century and combined in different cases nationalist, class and anarchist motives. Aleksander Kwiatkowski was one of the organizers of unsuccessful bombing attack against tsar Alexander II in 1881. One year later Ignacy Hryniewiecki, on 13 May blew up a bomb killing the tsar, himself as well as an innocent private person. Six years later, Bronisław Piłsudski, brother of the future president Józef Piłsudski, prepared the next attack on tsar Alexander III.³¹

²⁸ The murder of the Russian General-Governor Nikolai Bobrikov by the Finnish activist Eugen Schauman was not an act of terrorism or even terror. Meanwhile, the murders by many terrorist organizations against claimed "collaborators" of the opposed regimes are indeed terrorism. The difference is that Schauman did not seek agitating general fear by assassinating Bobrikov, although the murder was politically motivated; also, Bobrikov was not an "innocent civilian." See: A. Kullberg, C. Jokinen, *From Terror to Terrorism: the Logic on the Roots of Selective Political Violence*, "The Eurasian Politician," July 2004.

²⁹ H. Aittokoski, *Finland shaken 100 years ago by murder of Governor-General Bobrikov*, "Helsingin Sanomat," June 15, 2004.

³⁰ P. Kauppinen, *No followers for Eugen Schauman*, "Helsingin Sanomat," June 15, 2004.

³¹ J. Besala, *Sztyletem i bronią. Kiedy byliśmy terrorystami*, "Polityka" 2004, no 21.

1905 political developments were marked in Polish territories by terrorist activity of Military Organization of Polish Socialist Party led by Józef Piłsudski. In February 1905 Iwan Kalajew killed Grand Duke Serge in Moskau.³²

Military Organization of PSP (created in 1904) tried to be perceived as germ of the future Polish army, a patriot formation not a terrorist one. Piłsudski several times opted against terrorist methods. Nevertheless MO carried out very many actions of terrorist nature.³³ On 18 August 1905 Wanda Kraheńska tried to kill general-governor Gieorgij Skałon in bombing attack. He was responsible for 1905 manifestation pacification and further repressions. On August 15, 1906 in bombing attacks a few dozen policemen and collaborators were killed, making it the most bloody terrorist attack of that time. Altogether Military Organization organized about 2500 actions. One of the most famous was a post train assault.³⁴ 17 fighters robbed in Bezdany near Vilnius the public money transported to St. Petersburg, to finance structure creation in Galicia. Four future prime ministers of Poland participated in this attack: Józef Piłsudski, Walery Sławek, Aleksander Prystor, Tomasz Arciszewski.

MO actions were seen by the Polish society as examples of Polish heroism aiming at regaining independence. It followed the logics of military resistance and uprisings, deeply rooted in Polish tradition and mentality. Additionally terror initiators played later on, in sovereign Poland, prominent roles in the public life. At the same time terrorist methods did not harmonized with Polish self-image of brave and honorable soldiers, who honestly fight for justified aims or against sneaky and dishonest enemies. Polish messianic beliefs resulted in justification of struggle necessity and special role that the nation was to play.

Nowadays terrorist traditions are not given prominence, on official websites MO is even referred as a terrorist organization. On the other hand there are rare voices reminding the context of independentary terrorism Poland,³⁵ and stressing lack of alternatives.³⁶

Theoretical Explanations of Finnish and Polish Terrorism

In the light of the presented analysis, the dominating behaviours in the Polish and Finnish cases, are leading to the question of finding an explanation for tendencies to more and less radical actions. The attempt to answer the ques-

³² A. S. Kowalczyk, *Sawinikow*, Warszawa 1992, p. 50.

³³ J. Besala, *Sztyletem i bronią...*

³⁴ P. Duber, *Józef Montwiłł-Mirecki – Książę Rewolucji. W Stulecie Akcji Rogowskiej*, "Mówią Wieki," October 2006.

³⁵ M. Skowron, *Terroryzm z ludzką twarzą*, "Tygodnik Solidarność" 2001.

³⁶ K. Jałoszyński, *Terroryzm czy terror kryminalny w Polsce*, Warszawa 2001.

tion, why were Poles more keen to terrorist methods, whereas Finns were tilted to them in lesser extent, may be done among others by using, after David Laitin five theoretical explanations: historical sociology, power of symbols and institutions theory, anthropological analysis, micro-basic research and last but not least historical methods.³⁷

The historical sociology approach places the emphasis on the social classes as leading element in the development of attitudes and methods of action. In the case of Poland, the traditional nobility began to lose in XIX century its position in favour of the bourgeoisie, the town citizens, the new bureaucratic class and the new aristocracy in junction with the partition powers. Those groups, included in the system provided by new, invasive determinants, were interested in the maintenance of the *status quo* bringing them benefits. Although, the clash between the new elites, the old ones and the peasants influenced the radicalisation of both the old elites and the peasants, its materialization came as military forms of action.

In what concerns Finland, the process did not occur in a manner and amount comparable to the one in Poland. In the beginning, the Tsar rules were based on designed for the old, Swedish-speaking elites. The emancipation of the peasants, until then of Finnish origins, which occurred in the second half of the century, did not lead to the creation of own elites, capable of replacing the previous ones. The elites that existed simultaneously were divided in the matter of accepting the Russian policy towards Finland. The Finnish solidarity towards Russia may be considered as an element limiting radicalism. It was only during the civil war in 1918 that the discrepancy between the working class and the old elites had led to the radicalisation of attitudes and military actions. Soon afterwards, however, in the name of national unity the Finnish social democracy gave up revolutionist methods of fighting, proving the importance it attached to parliamentarism, feminine type of culture³⁸ and dominating consensualism.³⁹

The power of the symbols and institutions may be an indicator of the higher radicalisation of groups in which omnipresent cultural institutions, such as language, make collective action easier. Accordingly, language and cultural homogeneity would then increase the ability to perform military, also terrorist, actions. In the case of the XIX century Finland, the society was divided into Swedish elites and emancipating peasant-majority. The Russian presence though, was limited mostly to administrators and soldiers. Also the knowledge of the Russian language was not widely spread among the Finns. Linguistic

³⁷ See: D. Laitan, *National revivals and violence*, in: *Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture*, J. Bowen, R. Petersen (eds.), Cambridge 1999.

³⁸ G. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*, London 2001.

³⁹ L. Pye, S. Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton 1965.

difference raised difficulties for Finnish to learn Russian (added to this, the Finns were lacking any kind of pragmatic motivations), as well as for Russian to learn Finnish. Moreover, the process of the Russian language penetration into the Finnish lifestyle was limited by two additional factors. First, a language autonomy principle, which assured exclusivity for Swedish language domination in the national administration (guaranteed during the Russian overtaking of Finland in 1908). Secondly, there was the process of replacing the Swedish language with the Finnish one in the cultural, scientific and political life during XIX century.

In the Polish case, the high level of Russian population present on ethnically and historically Polish territories, led to the acceptance of the Russian language by a much higher percentage of citizens. Additional factors accelerating the process were the Russification policy, the interrelation of languages, the easiness in accepting the language and the presence of other ethnical groups on the former Polish territories,⁴⁰ i.e. Byelorussians and Ukrainians among which the absorption of Russian language was faster. While comparing the Finnish and Polish situation it is difficult to clearly define the role and strength of the language factor in explaining the reasons of radical actions.

Another approach suggested for the research of the phenomenon is the anthropological analyse⁴¹. The method is based on the pre-assumption that the use of the strong arm, also terrorist, tactics leads to the self development of the individual as both a citizen and a person. Such conviction is preserved in the existing tradition, in legends based on the heroic battles, in models of heroes, etc. The method used above, however, is not giving full explanation of the phenomenon which is being described. On the one hand, Finland, in contrast to Poland, is in fact characterised by a feminine type of culture. On other hand, both states are strongly underlining the pathos of struggle and defending the Western World for the eastern threats.

A further approach in researching the sources of strong arm tactics and radical behaviours is characteristic for micro-basic research. David Laitin⁴² distinguishes as precondition for the materialization of those attitudes the need of mobilising the recruits. In order for it to happen, two factors are required. Firstly, there has to exist a social group in which violence is an element of normal cultural repertoire. This layer has to involve not only the elites, who as the leading group are simultaneously unable to initiate radical actions, but first of all middle and lower classes, and especially young people. Second, each of the

⁴⁰ See: *Europa nieprowincjonalna. Przemiany na ziemiach wschodnich dawnej Rzeczypospolitej (Białoruś, Litwa, Łotwa, Ukraina, Wschodnie pogranicze III Rzeczypospolitej) w latach 1772–1991*, K. Jasiewicz (ed.), Warszawa–London 1999.

⁴¹ K. Wojciechowski, *Antropological and Axiological Premises of Terrorism*, in: *The Faces of Terrorism*, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznań 2006.

⁴² D. Laitin, *National revivals and...*, pp. 32–33.

persons mentioned above has to be a member of local social groups (not political or economic). In social groups the norms of honour are in force, determining the others to follow the actions of the leaders. This leads to a climax and releases radical actions. The bigger the number of groups, the higher the possibility that actions will take place. (According to Latain, in political groups the crucial factor defining the rules of behaviour is a compromise reached by the leaders; in economical groups though, the *fair play* rule is applied).

In Polish tradition the role of such a group was performed by the nobility. It was a strong and numerous group, led by the conviction of its own exceptionality and special privileges, but also of its duties, based on the concept of honour and on the pathos of chivalry battles. The process of impoverishing the nobility determined plenty of youth to follow the historical hero-fighters. In the XX century, the successors of this tradition transformed into military-patriotic organisations (such as Sokół) and Scouts movements. The Finnish tradition is lacking social groups so strongly settled in tradition. The Finnish nobility had Swedish origins and had no connection to Finnish masses. Also the concept of honour was limited due to the lack of statehood tradition.

Latain is warning upon the *sustaining mechanism*⁴³ based on violence. Once initiated, the violence is sustained by three factors. The first one is behaviour of the local society – picking out tactical victories and diminishing strategic loss. The second factor is the high cost of abandoning the communities dealing with the escalation of violence. The third factor is the institutionalisation of the *culture of violence*. In the case of a dominant enemy power, situated on a given territory and having a higher and better access to weapons, military action is an irrational behaviour. Therefore, support among potential recruits is not existing. However, if a small group performing an audacious and brave action, aimed at damaging the enemy (i.e. Political assassinations, terrorist attacks) is successful, it ensures wider support. It may propel further radical actions, creating the appearance of an advantage and is leading to the so-called tyranny of *sink costs*. After individuals are joining military actions, their return to the previous state is incredibly difficult from both psychological and legal (ensuring safety and immunity) reasons. Following the sequence of actions based on the logical schema of action – repression – action, the creation of the *culture of violence* – state occurs, in which “regular people remain indifferent towards violence and perceive it as a part of ‘normal’ life.”⁴⁴ Violence and terrorism are becoming a part of cultural behaviours, adopted with the purpose of implementing political plans. The described mechanism reveals to a wider extent the reasons, why in Finland actions of violence took place only sporadically and why there has not been an increase in the tradition of radical actions. The


⁴³ Ibidem, pp. 36–37.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, pp. 36–37.

sustaining scheme also perfectly characterizes XIX and XX century Polish resistance against partition powers and invaders. Unsuccessful revolts and uprisings became both a source of the moral victory myth, as well as a spiritual model for another generations. The struggle for freedom and independence was perceived as a patriotic duty, which in itself was an element of identity. Struggle, including terrorist methods, as a natural state found its reflection in messianic conceptions.

The last of the methods used by the analysis is the historical method. Based on the previous historical analysis it is allowing the creation of the pattern of leading behaviour in the Finnish and Polish cultures. The defining factor is the way of reaction to increased pressure or external expectations. The functioning of such a defined variable is shown by the manner of reaction to a given stimulus: the degree of adjustment level is characterised by the tendency to submission or resistance. The analysis of the historical material is leading to the statement that the level of adjustment is inversely proportional to the level of pressure in the case of Poland and directly proportional in case of Finland (Scheme 1). Together with the growth of pressure, the level of adjustment is growing (Finland) or decreasing (Poland). Interdependence does not have a linear character. The pace of value growth and loss is changing while approaching limits. The limes, though, are defined by the nation/state survival in case of Finland, as a result of a state centric political culture and in case of Poland by the military and economic possibilities (a result of the glorious tradition of resistance and freedom principle being a part of political culture).

Scheme 1. Finland and Poland. Model of behavior patterns under external pressure



Source: Author's concept.

"The model Pole, facing the dominating power [...] is developing against it an increased activit. Regardless, whether that is a foreign power, a sum of actions

of own police forces, or the logic of the economic system, an inevitable stimulus is leading to an inevitable reaction."⁴⁵ Forms of external pressure were contrary to the sense of autonomy and glorious history, so they caused resistance in all the possible forms. The lack of a rational thinking, though, created a closed circle among: resistance, its breakthrough and the increase of the pressure. Its effects during partition times were cyclical uprisings, revolts and acts of terrorism. They additionally contributed to strengthening of military struggle pathos and heroism – i.e. national martyrs. Poles "are existing due to suffering and for the suffering, and the majority of the daily professional, political and intellectual decisions is essentially exposed to suffering."⁴⁶ Historically, the only opposition to resistance were abilities. In the time of partition, the ability of regeneration stood in the successive replacement among generations of young men, killed in consecutive uprisings. The idea of struggle *for our freedom and yours* and of *fighting until the end* had to lead to the creation of terrorist activity, It reflected limited abilities in the front of dominating oppressor.

In case of Finland, historical experience allowed to tolerate waves of pressure and violence. Such an approach, owed to the lack of imperialistic traditions and realistic attitudes, was caused by the belief in its benefits. The Russification process in XIX century did not meet counter actions based on violence. Political realism leaned towards concessions. The limit was a threat to the existence of the Finnish state and nation. Only that type of pressure could determine the Finns to embrace active resistance, military actions as well as terrorist acts. The intensification of the pressure on the turn of the XIX and XX century was perceived as such an example. It resulted in both radicalization and in the assassination of general Bobrikow.

Conclusion

As shown in presented analyses, cultural and historical factors may play very important role in creating and differentiating terrorist behaviors, their implementation and social acceptance. Also conditions, especially related to power imbalances, may have influential role for creating pro terrorist attitude. Additionally European states, in the face of Islamic terrorism of XXI century, are forced to forget or to redefine their terrorist heritage, often related to independence struggle and linked to events and individuals of key importance from the point of view of national history. Both Finland and Poland are good example of all above-mentioned elements. Their similar situation under Russian control at the turn of XIX and XX century did not result in similar terrorist activities. In Finland political terrorism was much less developed then in Poland.

⁴⁵ K. Wojciechowski, *Moi kochani Niemcy*, Gdańsk 2000, p. 77.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 94.

Differences may be explained by several theoretical approaches. In most of them previous historical developments seem to play a very important role. They are especially social structures (presence of nobility) and splendid history. They both, by creating the dominating norms of honor and freedom, accelerated and strengthened violent activities, also of terrorist nature.