DOI : 10.14746/pp.2022.28.1.7 Beka CHEDIA East European University (Tbilisi, Georgia); Jamestown Foundation ORCID: 0009-0006-7658-3005 Impact of the Pandemic on Damaging the Democratic Process in a Hybrid Regime in Georgia Abstract: In hybrid political system of Georgia, in condition of COVID-19, the population obeyed con- trol and strict regulations. Concepts such as the Iron Curtain, curfew, etc., have returned to the country’s political vocabulary. How can these symbols of a totalitarian (Soviet) past fit into the process of de- mocratization? What is the reaction of society, other political actors? Why and how pandemic damaged democracy in Georgia? Does this threaten to revise the concept of a democratic political system, which will be especially difficult for post-totalitarian society?   This research paper examines case of Georgia: how political institutions, political elite, society, Me- dia, the country’s legislative base was ready for new reality and what political consequences this crisis would have in the process of democratization and nation-building. Unfair political competition during the elections, the growth of populism, the partial abandonment of certain rights, the deepening of polar- ization, etc. – are these challenges related only to the pandemic or have they also threatened Georgian democracy in “normal” times? Key words: Georgia, hybrid regime, COVID-19, elections, crisis, populism, democratic standards Introduction The following paper aims to answer the following research question: What impact has the pandemic had on the Hybrid political regime of Georgia, has it become more democratic, more authoritarian, or retained its current status? The pandemic in Georgia coincided with two very important elections, Parliamentary Elections 2020 and Local Self-Government Elections 2021, which were supposed to de- cide the fate of not only the existing political regime and power, but also the democratic future of the country. This research paper analyses Impact of the Pandemic on the status of democracy in the country with using examples of this two pandemic elections, as well as the entire political process. Special attention is paid to the analysis of populism and polarization in the context of a pandemic. In the paper, the author argues that a post-So- viet society, such as Georgia, which, after the collapse of the USSR, is making every effort to eradicate totalitarian practices and is in the process of democratization, may face a wider range of problems: the growth of populism, the partial abandonment of certain rights, the deepening of polarization, the devaluation of democratic values, etc. political elites may be tempted to stop the country’s democratic development. In the study author analyzes Georgia’s restrictive policy measures to limit COVID-19 (state of emergency, curfew, quarantine or lockdown) and key devel- opments during the Pandemic (2020–2021), including constitutional reform 2020, changes electoral rules, political crisis, etc. How these anti pandemic measures cor- 98 Beka CHEDIA PP 1 ’23 responded to democratic norms and whether political players used it to strengthen their position. For this as research tool is using a certain data matrix that classifies the behavior of political actors directly during the pandemic (2020–2021) and shows the connection between the pandemic and populism, manipulation, polarization as the opposite of democracy. The research is based on the collection and analysis of empirical data on the behavior of the political elite, the government, parties and the opposition. Two types of data are compared: before the pandemic and during the pandemic, – to identify what changes have occurred (if any) in various parameters, such as the number of political subjects partic- ipating in the elections, and the difference in the number of voters before and after the pandemic, growth or shrinkage of the political scene and level of political participation. Theoretical background If even in developed democracies a pandemic contributed to a change in the usu- al political order and temporarily limited democratic norms and some of the rights of people, then in poorly developed democracies the situation is even more complicated. Freedom House identifies Georgia as Transitional or Hybrid regime (Freedom House, 2021). As some studies show – the higher the democratic quality the lower the restriction of individual freedoms and the concentration of power on the national executive (Engler et al., 2021, p. 1082). The experts of the V-Dem Institute found that in those European countries where democratic institutions were strong before the pandemic, anti-pandemic measures could not damage democratic standards, but in those countries where democra- cy was weak even before the pandemic, the pandemic had a negative impact (Lührmann et al., 2020). More recent (2021) analyses of same scholars show that in weak democ- racies and hybrid regimes, violations of democratic standards could be harbingers of autocratization, as leaders take advantage of the pandemic’s exceptional context to con- solidate power, sideline opposition, and silence critics (Edgell et al., 2021, p. 9) Study of International idea also shows the pandemic has thus had a particularly damaging effect on non-democratic countries (hybrid and authoritarian regimes) and their civic space (International Idea, 2021a, p. 1). The international idea (2020–2021) has collected valuable data during the pandem- ic in which countries elections were held, and what were voter turnout trends amid COVID-19, and which countries postponed elections. Such date makes it possible to analyze how democratic, authoritarian or hybrid countries acted in this case. Researchers from The University of Cambridge’ Centre for the Future of Democracy (CFD), have conducted the global overview of how the COVID-19 crisis has affected political beliefs. They found that faith in the democratic process has continued to falter but in same time may have reduced the political polarisation and support for populism (Foa et al., 2022, p. 2). Although the case of Georgia do not exactly coincide with these findings – as ar- gued below in section 3 of this paper. Some scholars argue that democratic countries responded more slowly to the pan- demic than autocratic regimes (Cheibub, Hong, Przeworski, 2020, p. 1). Georgia, which, compared to neighboring countries, took immediate action, deserved the praise of Free- PP 1 ’23 Impact of the Pandemic on Damaging the Democratic Process... 99 dom House and the international community. Other researchers argue that the slow re- sponse to the crisis in some countries was due to the presence in these countries of strong democratic institutions, so they could block non-democratic measures taken by the governments of these countries. Although, using the example of Georgia during the first wave of the pandemic, it was precisely the existing democratic institutions, such as the media and NGOs that, on the contrary, themselves incited the authorities to take quick restrictive measures. Some of the hypotheses or judgments that exist in the rapidly growing literature about the pandemic and its impact on democracy need to be carefully tested. Some scholars identify two main types of measures against COVID-19 that are con- trary to democratic principles: 1) Measures that restrict individual freedom (such as free- dom of movement, freedom of assembly, the restrictions of international or domestic travelling, the ban of public gatherings or strict ‘stay-at-home’ policies, etc. 2) Power concentration, i.e. the transfer of legislative powers from parliament to the government (Engler et al., 2021, p. 1080). Adaptation of Legislation to the Crisis Conditions Georgia followed the example of many other countries – during the first wave of the pandemic declared (on March 21, 2020) a State of Emergency and very soon, quarantine and a curfew throughout the country. Georgia closed its land borders as well as suspend- ed regular transnational air traffic. In Media commenting on the risks of the pandemic, the director general of the Infectious Diseases, AIDS and Clinical Immunology Research Center (under the Ministry of Health), slipped of the tongue and used a term associat- ed with totalitarianism: “the borders are closed by an iron curtain.” In Georgia, during a state of emergency, may be restricted the following rights: Human liberty; Freedom of movement; Personal privacy; Freedom of the expression; Fair administrative proceed- ings, Access to public information, Property; Freedom of assembly; Labor (Constitution of Georgia, 1995). It is positive that the state of emergency did not affect basic political rights: the activities of political parties, the media and freedom of speech or NGOs were not restricted, all political, social and judicial institutions operated as usual (although remotely) under conditions of the state of emergency. The pandemic has clearly demonstrated the presence in Georgia has a low legal cul- ture and lack of equality before the law – typical for hybrid regimes. Under the unprece- dented strict bans, one of the most important elements of democracy, the rule of law for all, has been violated. During the first wave of the pandemic in April 2020 when Geor- gians celebrated Orthodox Easter – The Georgian Orthodox Church refused to acquiesce to the emergency orders forbidding public congregations of more than three people and the curfew. The law and the authorities were powerless before the Church. During the second wave of the pandemic, in the local media was published a scandalous photo of Director General of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health of Geor- gia. The top official, who led the management of the pandemic in the country, categori- cally forbade crowded gatherings, weddings, etc. to citizens, but himself was caught in the fact how, together with many people, he spent time at a feast. 100 Beka CHEDIA PP 1 ’23 Pandemic for weakly the developed democracy of Georgia has become a dilemma – how could the country hold two very important elections under conditions of a state of emergency? According to International Idea in the period from 21 February 2020 until 31 December 2021: at least 80 countries and territories across the globe postponed national and subnational elections, out of which at least 42 countries and territories have decided to postponed national elections and referendums (International Idea, 2021b). Georgia also considered the option of postponing the elections to a later time, and it is paradoxical that the opposition was more actively supporting the postponement of the elections than the authorities. Paradoxically, during the first wave of the pandemic, when isolated cases of the disease were recorded in Georgia, most of the opposition, the me- dia and NGOs called on the authorities to declare a state of emergency. The paradox is that those social institutions that, as usual, play the role of watchdog, such as the media and NGOs, on the contrary, should have opposed the announcement of emergency mea- sures, especially on the eve of parliamentary elections. According to the Constitution of Georgia, during a state of emergency or martial law, general elections cannot be held. Therefore, the Georgian authorities lifted the state of emergency on the eve of the elec- tions and instead made several special amendments in a row (in 2020) to the law on pub- lic health which allows the authorities to impose certain restrictions without imposing a state of emergency. The new legislative instruments give the Georgian government the opportunity to use the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police to restrict such rights of citizens as, for example, the right to free movement, the right to assembly, property rights, labor rights etc. (Law of Georgia on Public Health, 2020). Immediately after the entry into force of these rules, a group consisting of lawyers filed a lawsuit in the country’s constitutional court, pointing out that these legislative changes contradict both the country’s constitution, international standards, and threaten the principles of de- mocracy and the separation of powers. The Constitutional Court of Georgia for the most part did not satisfy the lawyers’ claim, the court only recognized the restriction of labor rights as unconstitutional, and the possibility of all other restrictions have remained in force (Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, 2021). These legislative changes gave the authorities the opportunity to hold elections on time, although it became a dangerous precedent for legalizing the restriction of the fundamental rights of citizens without declaring a state of emergency. The authorities provided this leg- islative innovation to society as a temporary measure, as a kind of alternative to a state of emergency, in order to hold elections in the country without hindrance. These legislative changes came into force on May 2, 2020 and were extended several times. After the end of both elections, in December 2021, this controversial legislation was renewed again, which became a matter of concern in Georgia. If the opposition supported the declaration of a state of emergency, then the modification of the law on public health became unfavorable for them, since it can be used as a political instrument at any time against the activity of the op- position: Organization of rallies, demonstrations, etc. in the context of a prolonged political crisis that began after the end of the parliamentary elections. It should be noted that such restrictions have not been used in practice. After the parliamentary elections, several large opposition protests took place, but the authorities refrained from using restrictive measures. During COVID crisis as in certain countries – in Georgia have also been changes of electoral rules, although these were not related to the pandemic. Actually, according to PP 1 ’23 Impact of the Pandemic on Damaging the Democratic Process... 101 the political tradition of Georgia, before every election are changed the electoral legisla- tion and the constitution. The political elite, both the authorities and the opposition par- ties, before each election, try to initiate such changes in order to get the maximum benefit and the most convenient conditions for themselves during the elections. The pandemic coincided also with the next legislative and constitutional reform. The state of emergen- cy did not last long, but restrictions associated with the circulation of infection in the country limited the procedure for public discussion about the constitutional reform. If all of previous constitutional reforms were carried out in conditions of at least formally in a democratic environment with providing public debate, but in a pandemic, the involve- ment of civil society in this process was limited. Previously, out of 150 members of the parliament included 77 members elected by party lists and 73 members in the single-seat majoritarian electoral districts. According to the constitutional reform of June 2020 – the number of deputies elected by party lists increased to 120, and the number of majoritar- ian deputies decreased to 30. As a part of reform the electoral threshold lowered from 5 to 1 percent (Constitutional Law, No. 6500-RS, 2020). During the first wave all COVID regulations were strictly observed, and for viola- tions were actively fined. Later, on the eve of the 2021 local self-government elections, the government announced an amnesty and removed liability from those individuals (up to 40,000 people) and companies (approx. 45 companies) who were fined for violating the rules of wearing a mask, isolation or quarantine. Practically, the authorities used this amnesty (i.e. the theme of the pandemic) for political purposes – to bribe voters. Political Actors and Elections in Pandemic Reform of electoral laws and constitutions dramatically changed the landscape of political parties ahead of elections. Before the pandemic, 250 political parties were reg- istered in Georgia. As of February 2020 – until December 2021, another 25 new parties were registered in the country. Accordingly, during the pandemic, the number of political parties in Georgia reached 275 (National Agency of Public Registry of Ministry of Jus- tice of Georgia, 2021). Under the conditions the pandemic, far more political actors took part in parliamen- tary and Local Self-government elections than before the pandemic. The reduction in the electoral threshold has caused a dramatic growth in new parties participating in the elections. Noticeable the growth of candidates who were represented by electoral sub- jects: The number of party candidates has doubled, but during the pandemic the number of majoritarian candidates has sharply decreased. For the Parliamentary Elections 2020 were registered 50 electoral subjects, includ- ing 48 parties and two electoral blocs. Of these 50 electoral subjects, half took part in the elections for the first time. For the Parliamentary Elections 2020 were registered 6882 candidates nominated by party lists and 490 majoritarian candidates (Election Administration of Georgia, 2021, p. 7). For comparison: For the previous Parliamen- tary Elections which held before pandemic in 2016 were registered only 35 electoral subjects (19 political parties and 6 election blocs) and 53 initiative groups. There were registered 3524 party-nominated candidates and 816 majoritarian candidates (Election 102 Beka CHEDIA PP 1 ’23 Administration of Georgia, 2016, p. 9–10). For the Local Self-government Elections which held during the pandemic in 2021 were registered 43 parties and 68 initiative groups (Election Administration of Georgia, 2021, p. 38). For comparison: For the previous Elections of the Local Self-government which held before pandemic in 2017 were registered only 28 electoral subjects (Election Administration of Georgia, 2017, p. 10) (see table 1). Table 1 Before the Pandemic During the Pandemic Election Dates 2016 2017 2020 2021 Election Types Parliamentary Elections Local Self-govern- ment Elections Parliamentary Elections Local Self-govern- ment Elections Electoral Subjects 35 28 50 43 Candidates Nominated by Party Lists 3,524 12,902 6,882 20,623 Majoritarian Candi- dates 816 4,974 (+Mayor Candi- dates 369) 490 2,771 (+Mayor Candi- dates 239) According to International Idea during the pandemic voter turnout declines in 65 (65%) countries and increased in 35 (35%) countries (International Idea, 2021b). Geor- gia is one of those countries where the pandemic did nothing to prevent high voter turn- out. In recent years, political apathy has been clearly visible among Georgian voters and society: disillusionment with the work of political parties and distrust of the electoral process. There was a real danger that the pandemic could become an additional rea- son for the low voter turnout. The 2020 parliamentary elections and the 2021 local-self government elections were so critical to Georgia’s political system that voter turnout surpassed all negative expectations. After the 2012 parliamentary elections (when the Georgian Dream came to power) such high activity was recorded for the first time in 2020. During the 2020 parliamentary elections, out of the total number of registered voters (3,511,338) – 56.75% (1,992,891 citizens) took part in the elections (Election Administration of Georgia, 2021, p. 12). During the local government elections in 2021, out of 3,498,559 registered voters – 51.92% (1,815,776 voters) took part in the elections (Election Administration of Georgia, 2021, p. 72). Before the pandemic, Georgia held presidential elections in 2018, which were also of particular importance in terms of their significance: According to the constitutional reform of 2017, the country finally turned into a parliamentary republic, and Georgians in 2018 last elected the president by direct popular vote. During the first round of the presidential elections in 2018, out of the total number of registered voters (3,518,877 people), 46.83% of voters took part in the elec- tions, that is, 1,647,878. During the second round, out of the total number of registered voters (3,528,658) participated – 56.36%, that is, 1,988,787 (Election Administration of Georgia, 2019, p. 15–16). Comparison of these data shows that the pandemic did not frighten the citizens (as predicted) and the number of active voters in the pandemic was identical to the elections that were held before the pandemic. Traditionally, the interest of the Georgian electorate in different choices (presidential, parliamentary, local self-government) is expressed in a relatively different level of activity. PP 1 ’23 Impact of the Pandemic on Damaging the Democratic Process... 103 Georgian voters are characterized by relatively low activity during local self-government elections. Unexpectedly, in the context of the pandemic in the local government elections in 2021, 238,273 more voters took part than in the elections of the same type held before the pandemic in 2017. In 2017, voter turnout was only 1,577,503 (45.86% of registered voters) (Election Administration of Georgia, 2017, p. 6). As for the 2016 parliamentary elections before the pandemic, 51.94% of the registered 3,513,884 voters came to polling stations, that is, 1,825,054 people (Election Administration of Georgia, 2016, p. 12). Thus, during the parliamentary elections in the pandemic time, the activity was also relatively high, since in 2021 – 167,837 more citizens voted than in 2016 (see table 2). Table 2 Before the Pandemic During the Pandemic Election Dates 2016 2017 2018 2018 2020 2021 Election Types Parliamenta- ry Elections Local Self-gov- ernment Elections Presidential Elections (First Round) Presidential Elections (Second Round) Parliamenta- ry Elections Local Self-gov- ernment Elections Total Number of Eli- gible Voters 3,513,884 3,440,123 3,518,877 3,528,658 3,511,338 3,498,559 Voters Participating in the Elections 1,825,054 (51.94%) 1,577,503 (45.86%) 1,647,878 (46.83%) 1,988,787 (56.36%) 1,992,891 (56.75%) 1,815,776 (51.92%) There was an expectation that the Georgian dream would lose power after the expira- tion of two terms in October 2020 (Chedia, 2020, p. 1). Surprisingly, the ruling Georgian Dream party, as a result of the parliamentary elections in 2020 received 48.15% of the vote and retained a parliamentary majority and formed a one-party government. Another 8 parties managed to pass the electoral threshold and 7 of them variously receiving from 1 to 3.79%. The main opposition party has remained the United National Movement (party of the former President M. Saakashvili) which participated in the elections togeth- er with several parties as a single in a bloc and received 27.14%. During the Local Self-government Elections on October 2, 2021, voters elected 2,068 members of 64 representative bodies (through proportional as well as majoritarian contest) and 64 mayors, including 5 mayors of self-governing cities. The ruling party also complete- ly won the local-self government elections in 2021. Out of 64, only in one the small town – representative of the opposition became the mayor. In some representative bodies – coun- cil of municipalities and councils of cities – the opposition was able to gain a majority. Dualistic Policy with Populism, Manipulation and Polarization During the pandemic, in a short space of time in Georgia, two different types of elec- tions were held under completely different medical conditions and under two radically different crisis management policies: Relatively strict and relatively mild (see table 3). Relatively strict policy – coincided with positive COVID statistics and parliamentary elections. Relatively mild policy coincided – with negative COVID statistics and local self-government elections. A relatively strict policy was associated with the name of 104 Beka CHEDIA PP 1 ’23 Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, and it seems paradoxical that this policy enjoyed the support of the country’s civil society. At least the authorities managed to form a positive public opinion in their favor. Although Georgia is no exception, The University of Cam- bridge’s study shows that the first months of the pandemic saw many political leaders get a boost in ratings and it is a classic “rally round the flag” effect in troubled times (Foa et al., 2022, p. 15). During the pandemic, ruling Georgian Dream Party nominated a new Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili – associated with a relatively mild COVID policy. Paradoxically, his policy and results in managing crises in the society caused extremely negative public opinion and a flurry of criticism from the media and NGOs. According to the NDI public opinion poll, if in December 2020 the activities of Prime Minister Gi- orgi Gakharia were satisfied with 46% of the country’s citizens (NDI, 2020, p.45), then in December 2021, only 27% of the population expressed satisfaction with the work of Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili (NDI, 2022, p. 41). If we evaluate not the activities of two different Prime ministers, but the government as an institution, according to the latest data, two years after the start of the pandemic, half of the population of Georgia is satisfied with the actions of the government. It is obvious that discontent among the population has gradually grown and, accordingly, support for the current regime has weakened. If during the first wave of the pandemic 60% positively and 33% negatively assessed the actions of the authorities against the fight against the pandemic, then pub- lished data at the beginning of 2022 show that 50% of population had positive attitude about the actions of the authorities, and 43% – had negative attitude (ibidem, p. 49). Table 3 Period 2020 2021 COVID statistics Positive Negative Public Opinion about crisis management Positive Negative Crisis management style Relatively Strict Relatively Mild Ruling Party Georgian Dream Georgian Dream Prime minister Giorgi Gakharia Irakli Gaaribashvili Election Type Parliamentary elections Local Self-Government Elections The level of political activity from main political subjects Minimum Maximum Topic of public debate Pandemic Politics/ Political crisis The presence of populism High level High level Manipulating the pandemic topic High level (Main subject – Govern- ment and pro-government media) High level (from the opposition and pro-opposition media) Level of political polarization High level High level Main Political actors Medical Doctors (with political affil- iations) Politicians These two different policies during the pandemic were directly reflected in the dual- istic nature of the behavior of political actors: during a time of relatively strict politics, their level of political activity was minimal (unusual for Georgia) and this coincided with parliamentary elections and Gakharia’s rule. Due to the formed positive image of the authorities, the opposition announced a moratorium in the political struggle, all activities were canceled, including demonstrations. Opposition media and NGOs were forced to PP 1 ’23 Impact of the Pandemic on Damaging the Democratic Process... 105 accept the political agenda of the ruling elite. The maximum level of political activity (usual for Georgia) was evident during the relatively soft politics and this coincided with the elections of local self-government and with the administration of Garibashvili. The presence of populism in both cases during both strict and soft policies was very high. If over the world the pandemic fostered a sense of shared purpose and as argues some scholars that may have reduced the political polarization (Foa et al., 2022, p. 2). In Geor- gia during two different phases, the level of political polarization remained high. In the first case, the polarization of society was provoked by doctors with political affiliations. In the second case, these were directly politicians who returned to the forefront of the political struggle. In the first case, the topic of the pandemic dominated among the main topics of debate in the public sphere, in the second case, politics returned to the agenda. Comparative strict policy was based solely on the recommendations and advice of medical doctors. Politicians receded into the background, all major decisions were made by doctors. This created good ground for populism: government propaganda said that the authorities were conferring with professionals. In practice, the government has vol- untarily given doctors political power thereby jeopardized one of the principles of de- mocracy – the need for government accountability to the population. The population for the leadership of the country, as usual, elects not medical doctors, but a political team. In Georgia, during the first wave of the pandemic, all responsibility (even political) fell on doctors, and not on the ruling elite. In democratic regimes the authorities should bear political responsibility, not med- ical doctors. Due to the fact that in Georgia the population trusts the healthcare system and doctors more than politicians, this forced the political elite to resort to this populist decision in the context of the pandemic – to give “political powers” to medical doctors. According to public opinion polls, 73% of the population fully or partially trusts the healthcare system (NDI, 2022, p. 48). This phenomenon to some extent clearly reflects the global trend studied by Cambridge’ researchers which claim that during a pandemic – citizens increasingly favor technocratic sources of authority, such as having “non-polit- ical” experts take decisions (Foa et al., 2022, p. 11). The main Georgian political parties have added medical experts to their ranks. Doctors began to make political statements, clashed with politicians or with the media from a different camp. During the first wave of the pandemic, the authorities made every effort to turn a few leaders of the medical sector (who were tasked with managing crises) into moral au- thorities, and then turn these doctors into their party faces. When the BBC published an article titled “Coronavirus: How ‘three musketeers’ helped Georgia fight virus” (Demy- trie, 2020) the authorities gave this to society as their huge success. The nickname of the “Three Musketeers” by the international media has been given to three of the country’s top leaders of medical sector. Although during the second stage of the pandemic and under the conditions of another prime minister, the authorities turned away from the three musketeers. Populism during the comparatively mild policy of power of another prime minister was based on fierce competition with his predecessor and was expressed in ignoring the recommendations of doctors. The new propaganda of the authorities said: “If we obey the recommendations of doctors and completely close the country again, that people will die not because of a pandemic, but because of hunger.” When isolated cases of the disease were recorded in the country, under the relatively strict policy – a complete 106 Beka CHEDIA PP 1 ’23 lockdown and strict bans were introduced. Under the relatively mild policy, despite the dramatic epidemiological situation, the authorities refused to take emergency measures. The authorities even refused to introduce compulsory vaccination despite the categorical demands of doctors. When one of the leaders of public health declared that mandatory vaccination was inevitable, the prime minister categorically stated that he would not allow mandatory vaccination against the will of the population. According to the survey, the almost half of the Georgian population was against vaccination (NDI, 2022, p. 52), so government made a populist decision – not to introduce mandatory vaccination and thereby earn the sympathy of the majority of the population. There is very interesting finding: how the Georgian political market reacted to the pan- demic in a populist way and how it influenced the change in the political landscape to the pandemic. Many political parties have renewed their ranks with medical workers. As a result of the so-called pandemic elections of 2020, the parliament was formed in such a way that out of 150 members of the legislature, 12 deputies (8%) are medical doctors by profession. Conclusion and Findings The answer on the main research question of this study is clear: The Pandemic did not exacerbate the status of democracy in Georgia, but simply clearly revealed all the short- comings of the hybrid regime. Although in the long term there may appear concrete pre- requisites for strengthening the country more autocratic tendencies than democratization, since the pandemic related crisis has shown that the main political actors who are prone to populism are in full control and create the public agenda themselves, ignoring public. The pandemic crisis has caused negative political consequences in the process of democratization and nation-building, first of all, the fact that the growth of populism and a high level of polarization affected not only the political elite, but also the main polit- ical institutions such as the media and NGOs. The ruling political elite skillfully used Populist methods and manipulation of public opinion to in the pandemic to maintain power, and the opposition, parties and leaders to discredit the authorities. NGOs and the media in time of crisis instead of being a watchdog, which is an important element of democracy, they betrayed society and also used the pandemic to manipulate public con- sciousness. This has most damaged the image of these democratic institutions in Georgia during the pandemic. Society or population has demonstrated more commitment to the principle of democratic change of power and, despite the danger of a pandemic, has shown a high level of activity in its political participation in elections. Although the readiness of the legislation for the crisis was satisfactory, in the case of Georgia it loses practical significance due to the lack of the rule of law, low legal culture, and the unwillingness of privileged groups to obey common rules. The pandemic clearly showed citizens that there can be people in the country who are above the law, and this has undermined confidence in state institutions. The status of democracy in Georgia was damaged not by temporally introduce of the partial abandonment of certain rights of citizens, but by the selective use of these restrictions. Unfair political competition during the elections, before the pandemic also was characteristic of the political system of Georgia, although the pandemic opened up PP 1 ’23 Impact of the Pandemic on Damaging the Democratic Process... 107 new windows of opportunity for the political elite: the presence of COVID regulation was used to solve the political problems of the authorities for pre-election manipula- tions, when before the elections all those fined for violations of COVID regulations were amnestied. Author Contributions Conceptualization (Konceptualizacja): Beka Chedia Data curation (Zestawienie danych): Beka Chedia Formal analysis (Analiza formalna): Beka Chedia Writing – original draft (Piśmiennictwo – oryginalny projekt): Beka Chedia Writing – review & editing (Piśmiennictwo – sprawdzenie i edytowanie): Beka Chedia Competing interests: The author have declared that no competing interests exist (Sprzeczne interesy: Autor oświadczył, że nie istnieją żadne sprzeczne interesy) Bibliography Chedia B. (2020), Parliamentary Elections: Georgia at the Crossroads, “PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo”, no. 668, The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, Washington, DC, USA, https:// www.ponarseurasia.org/october-2020-parliamentary-elections-georgia-at-the-crossroads/. Cheibub J. A., Hong, Ji Y. J., Przeworski A. (2020), Rights and Deaths: Government Reactions to the Pandemic’. 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(2020), The Great Reset Public Opinion, Populism, and the Pandemic. Report. Centre for the Future of Democ- racy (CFD), https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The_Great_ Reset.pdf. Freedom House (2021), Countries and Territories, https://freedomhouse.org/countries/nations-transit/ scores. International Idea (2021a), The Global State of Democracy 2021. Building Resilience in a Pandem- ic Era, https://www.idea.int/gsod/sites/default/files/2021-11/the-global-state-of-democra- cy-2021_0.pdf. International Idea (2021b), Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections, https://www.idea.int/ news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections. Law of Georgia on Public Health (2020). Lührmann A., Edgell A. B., Grahn S., Lachapelle J., Maerz S. F. (2020), Does the Coronavirus Endan- ger Democracy in Europe?, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/23/does-coronavirus-endan- ger-democracy-in-europe-pub-82110. National Agency of Public Registry of Ministry of Justice of Georgia (2021), Register of Political Parties. NDI (2020), Public Attitudes in Georgia. Results of December 2020 telephone survey of The National Democratic Institute, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Georgia_December%20 2020%20Poll_ENG_FINAL.pdf. NDI (2022), Taking Georgians’s Pulse. Key Findings from December 2021 Telephone Survey of The National Democratic Institute, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Georgia%20 -%20December%202021%20poll_Eng_vf.pdf. Wpływ pandemii na trudności procesu demokratycznego w gruzińskim reżimie hybrydowym Streszczenie W hybrydowym systemie politycznym Gruzji, w realiach pandemii COVID-19, ludność podlegała kontroli i surowym przepisom. Pojęcia takie jak żelazna kurtyna, godzina policyjna itp. powróciły do słownictwa politycznego. Jak te symbole totalitarnej (sowieckiej) przeszłości mogą wpasować się w proces demokratyzacji? Jaka jest reakcja społeczeństwa, innych aktorów politycznych? Dlaczego i jak pandemia wpłynęła destrukcyjnie na demokrację w Gruzji? Czy grozi to rewizją koncepcji demo- kratycznego systemu politycznego, co będzie szczególnie trudne dla społeczeństwa posttotalitarnego? W niniejszym artykule autor poddaje analizie Gruzję, a w szczególności: jak instytucje polityczne, elity polityczne, społeczeństwo, media, legislatura państwa były gotowe na nową rzeczywistość i jakie po- lityczne konsekwencje miałby ten kryzys w procesie demokratyzacji i budowania narodu. Nieuczciwa rywalizacja polityczna podczas wyborów, wzrost populizmu, częściowa rezygnacja z niektórych praw, pogłębianie się polaryzacji itp. – czy to wyzwania związane tylko z pandemią, czy też zagrażały gru- zińskiej demokracji także w „normalnych” czasach? Słowa kluczowe: Gruzja, reżim hybrydowy, COVID-19, wybory, kryzys, populizm, standardy demo- kratyczne Article submitted: 07.03.2023; article accepted: 11.03.2023 Data przekazania tekstu: 07.03.2023; data zaakceptowania tekstu: 11.03.2023