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THE POWER OF IDEAS. THE INFLUENCE OF HASSAN AL-BANNA AND SAYYID QUTB ON THE *MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD* ORGANIZATION¹

This article examines the conceptions of the political thoughts of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, two of the most important Arab theorists of the Muslim world during the twentieth century. They are often considered as Islamists or radical Islamists. While al-Banna was the theoretician of the *Muslim Brotherhood* and is represented by the mainstream of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, Qutb's writings are represented by the militant Islam movements. This article also attempts to account for some of the differences between the two theorists' views. The article aspires to widen the spectrum of political science and give insight to Western knowledge. In addition, this article focuses on the most significant ideas of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, what similarities and differences exist, what each leader's contribution has been, and how these ideas continue to affect the *Muslim Brotherhood* movement until today.

***MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD* – BACKGROUND**

Following the deep ideological crisis within the Muslim world during the nineteenth century, thinkers such as al-Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935) attempted to find creative solutions that would rescue the Muslim world from the superiority of the West. Rashid Rida developed the concept that a great disaster has fallen upon the Islamic world due to Salafist theory being neglected. Consequently, Rida developed a new theory based on the writings of Ibn Taymiyya, stating that the only way to strengthen the Islamic world is to return to its greatness. The development of this theory leads one to conclude that there was a need to return to the original roots of militant Islam. In addition to these developments, political and social circumstances strengthened the control of the West across the Middle East and Northern Africa, dividing the Muslim world and leaving it extremely weakened and struggling with severe internal problems (Barack, 2012: 25, 28–33).

The *Muslim Brotherhood* was one of the most influential political organizations in the Muslim world during the twentieth century. The development of the *Muslim Brotherhood* followed the deep ideological crisis within the Muslim world after the caliph-

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ate's dissolution following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1925. The dominance of European powers in the Middle East deepened the crisis and became the platform to H. al-Banna founding an organization known as The *Muslim Brotherhood* (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*). It was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) in the Suez Canal city of Ismailia; after three years, al-Banna moved the organization to Cairo. Henceforward, the organization expanded dramatically – from five branch offices in 1930, to fifteen offices in 1932, up to three hundred branch offices by 1938, which represented 150,000 members in total. The *Muslim Brotherhood* represented religious and social reforms during its first years, when only in the late thirties the organization began to engage in politics. The actual entry into politics began when the Brothers presented candidates for the parliamentary elections in 1941. In 1949, the *Muslim Brotherhood* organization had over two thousand offices throughout Egypt and 600,000 active members (Munson, 2001: 488–490).

The transformation of the *Muslim Brotherhood* from a religious mass movement to a modern political party was due to electoral politics that began in the eighties. This political move shows the weakness of the *Muslim Brotherhood's* position, but on the other hand serves as a conspicuous tactical move, aiming to seize power at the first available opportunity – all a part of H. al-Banna's grand plan (El Ghobashy, 2005: 374).

Different approaches exist among the founders and the second generation, the latter giving priority to the expansion of the organization and preferring to keep the *Muslim Brotherhood's* political and social program as vague as possible. In late 2005, the *Muslim Brotherhood* gained 20% of the seats in the Egyptian parliamentary elections, its highest potential percentage in history. Following this achievement, in January 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian Authority elections as a direct outcome of the Muslim Brotherhood's success in the Egyptian elections (Altman, 2007: 11, 18–20, 23).

As part of the aftermath of the Arab Spring in June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt. This was perceived as threatening in terms of Islamic legitimacy. The Supreme Guide Muhammad Badie publicly declared (in late 2011) that the ultimate goal of establishing the caliphate was close at hand. This statement clarified to many Muslim countries that their current regimes were under existential threat. Saudi Arabia and other Arab states realized that a potential threat has risen, which could cause an Iranian revolution, thus obstructing the Muslim order in the Middle East (Monier, Ranko, 2013: 118).

THE INFLUENCE OF HASSAN AL-BANNA ON THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Hassan al-Banna was born in 1906 to a religious family, in the town of Al Mahmoudiyah in the west of the Nile. At the age of twelve, he studied at the teaching school in Damanhur. In 1923, he moved to Cairo in order to continue his studies at the teachers training college, Dar al-Ulum. In 1927, he graduated and was posted as a teacher in the city of Ismailia. He also served as a preacher in cafes to young people who have forgotten the values of Islam; al-Banna also preached in mosques. In 1949, H. al-Banna was assassinated (Barack, 2012: 19).

Among the many Islamists, the most eminent martyr of modern history is Hassan al-Banna. H. al-Banna is often known as *Imam Shahid*, though, in contrast to many martyrs, he was not a fighter, and was assassinated while unarmed on the streets of Cairo. Today, H. al-Banna is widely revered, and the martyrdom of the *Imam Shahid* remains a core component of the *Muslim Brotherhood's* thought, which also contains a strong missionary orientation (Halverson, 2007: 545).

Since the forties, al-Banna became a leader of the Muslim nation in many Egyptians' eyes, and his notion, that the fight for Egyptian independence must precede any other political struggle, was widely accepted. All traditional groups still feel a great commitment to the tradition of H. al-Banna (Mura, 2012: 81–82).

The main influence of al-Banna on the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian society is that he succeeded in uniting Egypt around the declaration *Islam hooah al-hal (Islam is the solution to all Muslim ills)*. This innovative approach declares that Egyptian poverty, powerlessness and lack of dignity results from failing to adhere to Islam and the adoption of Western values (Enein, 2003: 27). In the aftermath of Hosni Mubarak's fall from power in February of 2011, the traditional slogan was altered from "Islam is the solution" to "A civil state" (Feder, 2014: 2). The principles of Hassan al-Banna:

- The main goal of the *Muslim Brotherhood* is to spread the *da'wah* (a call to believe in God) outside of the organization and unite the Muslim world on this idea – to create a caliphate. This means the creation of a unified Islamic world;
- Building a Muslim state according to the *Muslim Brotherhood's* policy; preparing Islamic society for Islamic rule, which would be the first step to Islamization;
- Creation of an [ideal] Muslim family by educating children on the way of Islam and building a community network to support each other (Enein, 2003: 30).

The radicalization of the *Muslim Brotherhood* was due to three main factors. The first is the charismatic leadership of H. al-Banna. The second factor that led to the use of violent tactics was the radicalization of H. al-Banna. The third factor was frustration. After H. al-Banna's acts proved as unsuccessful and the *Brotherhood* did not create any major changes in Egyptian society, frustration grew and led to acts of violence (Rinehart, 2009: 983).

Al-Banna greatly influenced Sayyid Qutb, who became, after the death of al-Banna, the new ideological leader of the *Muslim Brotherhood*. He continued to develop al-Banna's concept: That Islam is the only solution to all the problems in the Muslim world. He merged this notion with the views of Maududi. The plan demanded total reformation of Egyptian society (Bromley, Melton, 2002: xvi).

The *Brotherhood's* founder, H. al-Banna, suggested that a mass Islamic community might act as an advisory council. Some of these ideas have been tried in Iran with local committees and other institutions (Rubin, 1990: 146). Henzel argues that the thinkers who shaped al-Qaeda's ideology were Al-Afghani, Rida, al-Banna, Qutb, Faraj, and al-Zawahiri (Henzel, 2005: 78).

To summarize, H. al-Banna ordered the establishment of an Islamic State by Islamization. He argues that the Islamic Caliphate must be religious, a fact that would unite the Muslim community. The influence of al-Banna on the *Muslim Brotherhood* was enormous, he motivated the expansion of the organization by building many branches around the world, including in Jordan, Syria, the Gulf countries, Europe, the United

States and many more. Al-Banna also had great influence on Abd-al-Salam Faraj, a group leader who planned the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. He influenced Sayyid Qutb, who later became a theoretician of radical Islamic ideology. Additionally, al-Banna influenced the development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which rebelled against al-Assad in the eighties. He was also of great influence to al-Qaeda – after the Egyptian regime exiled members of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, they came to Saudi Arabia and spread the teachings of al-Banna to Osama bin Laden.

HE INFLUENCE OF SAYYID QUTB ON THE *MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD*

During the thirties and early forties of the last century, Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) became a famous Egyptian writer and intellectual who was respected in the Egyptian literary criticism field as a supporter of new trends. Qutb was born in a small village (Musha) near Asyut in Upper Egypt; he was born to a religious family. When he reached the age of 15 years, he went to live with his maternal uncle, Ahmad Husayn Uthman, in Cairo, in order to finish his secondary education. When he became 21 years old, he graduated teachers college, and in 1933, when he was 27 and after graduating from Dar al-Ulum, he joined the Ministry of Education and was employed as a teacher. Until the age of 33, Qutb's writings were mostly literary criticisms, poetry and articles. From 1939 to 1948, he published a few books concerning several Islamic religious approaches. Following the intervention of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi, Qutb was sent to study in America. In 1952, Nasser and the Free Officers needed Qutb to assist them in their struggle against the monarchy of King Farouk. Qutb joined the Brotherhood in February of 1953 (Khatab, 2001: 460–461).

After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952, Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood expected Nasser to continue his cooperation with them as he did before the Revolution. However, Nasser soon realized the threat the Muslim Brotherhood posed, and after a failed assassination attempt on him in 1954, Qutb and thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested (Berman, 2003). Qutb was sentenced to 15 years in prison and consequently adopted a critical perspective against the regime. In his writings, he expressed his emotions and reflections on the psychological and physical torture he endured while in prison. Qutb's writings explain his disappointment in the military government and conclude that the degeneration of Muslim society is a result of adopting Western values. After Qutb was released for a short period of time in 1964, he was arrested again in August 1965, sentenced to 10 years in prison and finally hanged in 1966 (Loboda, 2004: 2).

In prison, Qutb wrote most of his Islamist works: *In the Shade of the Qur'an*, *Social Justice in Islam*, *Hadha'l-Din (This Religion is Islam)* and *Al-Mustaqbal li-hadha'l-Din (The Future of This Religion)*. Later on, he wrote *Al-Islam wa Mushkilat al-Hadara* (Islam and the Problems of Civilization) and a two-part philosophical work, *Khasais al-Tasawwur al-Islami wa Muqawamatuhu (The Characteristics and Values of Islamic Conduct)*. In 1964, he finished working on *Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq (Milestones)* (Soage, 2009: 190–191).

According to Martin Kramer, Qutb had adopted the idea of establishing an Islamic state from Abul A'la Maududi. Furthermore, Qutb ordered to establish a vanguard of believers, which would separate itself from non-believers and condemn Muslims who have lost their faith by starting a holy war against them. Kramer claims that Qutb placed the first foothold for fundamentalist ideology against imperialism (Kramer, 1996: 37–47).

Qutb's book – *Milestones* – is considered by many as the most influential book in the Muslim world during the twentieth century. The book's primary significance is its great influence on militant Islamic groups from the seventies of the previous century until today.

The main militant groups who turned to terrorism are: The Jihad organization, which assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, the rebels that fought against Hafez al-Assad in Syria in 1982, the GIA in Algeria that slaughtered masses during the civil war in the nineties, Hamas since the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987, and the greatest impact was unquestionably on al-Qaeda's in the United States in 2001. The *da'wah* was a fundamental doctrine of the *Muslim Brotherhood* in Egypt, but was not permitted by the Egyptian authorities, which is why Sayyid Qutb ordered to replace the *da'wah* with *Jihad* (Wiseman, 2011: 16–18).

The influences of the *Milestones* manifest impacted many generations of activists. Thus, the book was translated into many different languages, becoming a bible of sorts for Jihadist groups in the last forty years (Ross, 2008).

William Shepard argues that the doctrine of *Jahiliyyah* (pre-Islamic ignorance) was developed by Sayyid Qutb and has become one of the central principles that represents the contemporary militancy that directly affected Khomeini's revolutionary philosophy, *Vilayat-e Faqih*. Qutb embraced the notion of *Jahiliyyah* from Abul A'la Maududi and developed it to the new *Jahiliyyah* (Shepard, 2003: 522).

In "Milestones", Qutb wrote: "Our foremost objective is to change the practices of this society. Our aim is to change the Jahili system at its very roots, this system which is fundamentally at variance with Islam and which, with the help of force and oppression, is keeping us from living the sort of life which is demanded by our Creator" (Mehri, 2006: 35).

In this quote, Qutb instilled the idea that it is the duty of all true Muslims to act to eradicate the roots of *Jahiliyyah*. This idea made a deep impression on many militant groups who exercise violence against their regimes. The term *Jihad* among non-Muslims often interprets as 'a holy war' or Islamic Radicalism. Many Muslims argue that the holy war is just a small aspect of *jihad* and is less important than others; they emphasize the greater *jihad*, which is the *jihad* directed towards one's desires. After much research, David Cook's book *Understanding Jihad*, concludes that *jihad* undoubtedly means a physical war) Moller, 2007: 193–194).

To sum up, Qutb's ideology continues to significantly influence the Muslim Brotherhood until today. Proof of this is in the fact that Qutb's ideas have been employed by political movements in different ways, such as the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the transnational *jihad* against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and September 11th later on. Qutb's writings demonstrate the social and political struggle against the oppression of the Muslim people during the twentieth century.

CONTRIBUTION OF HASSAN AL-BANNA AND SAYYID QUTB TO THE *MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD*

Al-Banna is considered one of the most important Muslim figures who promoted the resurgence of Islam. After the great ideological crisis in the Muslim world, al-Banna founded an organization that gave great hope to the Egyptian people as well as many Muslims around the world. Many hoped that there would finally be a solution to all the prevailing issues. Following the notable absence of charismatic leader al-Banna, the *Muslim Brotherhood* extremely radicalized its actions against Egypt and other countries. Another consequence stemming from the absence of the leader was a mass emigration of members of the Brotherhood to Europe, Canada, the United States, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Subsequently, the revolutionary teachings of Hassan al-Banna spread to many countries around the world (Sorrentino, 2011: 2).

The *Muslim Brotherhood* began operating in America in the sixties. The organization quickly realized that American social and political liberties would enable it to easily spread al-Banna's doctrine (Fradkin, Haqqani, Brown, 2008: 96, 98, 104).

The *Brotherhood* became an ally of Anwar Sadat in his battles with the leftists. His cooperation with them would later cost him dearly. The *Brotherhood's* relations with H. Mubarak were equally volatile; the two sides shared an uneasy truce during the nineties. Under Mubarak's rule, more conservative Brotherhood members engaged with non-Islamist dissidents in opposition of the regime. Younger members, however, pushed for a more aggressive outreach to the secular world, not unlike the way al-Banna had challenged the religious world. The Youth Movement, as it is known, was organized on *Facebook* and had particular appeal among Egypt's angry and unemployed youth; thousands of demonstrators eventually led to H. Mubarak's deposition (Glain, 2011: 23).

Al-Banna, founder and leader of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, was a charismatic leader who influenced many Muslims with an innovative approach – a return to Islam as it was during the period of the Prophet in the seventh century AD. Al-Banna wrote a number of epistles that greatly affected many Muslim leaders in Egypt and the Muslim world in general.

Al-Banna wrote: "Islam is a comprehensive system, concerned with all aspects of life. It is country and homeland, government and *umma* [Muslim community]. It is ethics and power, mercy and justice. It is culture and law, knowledge and judiciary. It is matter and wealth, gain and prosperity. It is *jihad* [holy war] and *Da 'wah* [call to Islam], militia and idea. It is true creed and correct worship, indistinctively."

One can clearly see that al-Banna states *da 'wah* as a central element to implementing the *Sharia*. Al-Banna also states that *jihad* is another central element that could help achieve the goals that have not been achieved with *da 'wah*. After the assassination of al-Banna, Muslim Brothers, Mohammed al-Ghazali, Abd al-Qadir and al-Awda developed al-Banna's ideas into what became known as Islamic Socialism, an alternative to both capitalism and communism (Soage, 2009: 294–296, 298).

Al-Banna contributed greatly to numerous radical Islamic group leaders, for example, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who founded the infamous terror organization Tanzim al-Jihad, and bin Laden, who studied at the University of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, where

as a student of Sayyid Qutb's brother Muhammad Qutb, he was introduced to the political thought of the *Muslim Brotherhood* (Hansen, Kainz, 2007: 57).

Sayyid Qutb is considered by many as the most influential Islamic politician after the Cold War. His execution by Nasser's regime in 1966 granted him the title of Martyr in modern Islam. The results of these actions had various consequences: Qutb's writings influenced the main Islamic movement on the one hand, and on the other, they greatly influenced the Islamic extremists as well. Qutb's ideas impacted political movements, such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the resistance of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, and many other movements in the name of Islam (Samiei, 2009: 37–38).

Observing the way Qutb's writings were interpreted by the *Muslim Brotherhood* contributes an interesting viewpoint, because even within the *Muslim Brotherhood*, much controversy exists regarding the interpretation of his writings. For one thing, in 1969, al-Banna's successor, General Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi, wrote "Preachers" (Not Judges) in prison, stating that he supports the concept of Maududi and Qutb, namely, the condemning of unbelievers. But then again, the third General Guide of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, Umar al-Tilmisani, unequivocally argues that Qutb only represented himself, not the *Muslim Brotherhood* (Soage, 2009: 198).

According to Uthman, Qutb's revolution was not only religious in a sense of terror identical to Osama bin Laden. He claims that Qutb's ideas were also against the suffering and oppression of the Egyptian people. Qutb influenced family values, social and political Islam conditions of Egyptians, including the position of Muslim women. The downfall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 was a cornerstone for the Islamic movement and proved to the West that Qutb's ideas propose a different kind of fight, other than terrorism (Uthman, 2012: 100). *Hamas* is a branch of the *Muslim Brotherhood* in Egypt, and even after the Arab Spring, still bases its actions on the ideology of Qutb, which claims that there is no solution other than the battle of *jihad*. According to Qutb, the Crusaders and Jews are the new *Jahiliyyah* and in fact represent all that is evil. Qaradawi, one of the greater advocates of Qutb, justifies the *jihad* against the United States and the Jews (Bassam, 2010: 16).

Qutb did not condone violence, as was expressed in Egypt during the seventies and eighties and later developed into a global violence promoted by O. bin Laden. For Qutb, *jihad* should be directed towards the corruption of Muslim regimes (El Aswad, 2012: 267).

The Salafi Islamist movement was founded in the nineteenth century and is based on the interpretations of Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb, who became the ideological father of all contemporary militants. Most Salafis are not Jihadists, but modern Jihadi ideology interprets the ideology of the Salafi movement as an order to use violence as a legitimate tool for political change (Nielsen, 2012: 4).

Qutb answers all Muslim writers who see *jihad* as a central problem of Islam, and quotes from the Quran to show that the Islamic religion abstains from using violence:

"When writers with defeatist and apologetic mentalities write about 'Jihad in Islam', trying to remove this 'blot' from Islam, then they are mixing up two things: first, that this religion forbids the imposition of its belief by force, as is clear from the verse" (Qutb, 2006: 66).

The above quote presents the basics of Islamic philosophy – how Islam does not support violence. However, Qutb’s response to those who see *jihad* as a ‘blot’ on the Muslim world; it seems there is a problem when it comes to ideological interpretations.

Qutb affected the *Muslim Brotherhood* uniquely: The new generation of the Muslim Brotherhood rejects his worldview, it has adapted to the new socio-political era. In contrast to the groups who had adapted his approach, in their eyes, the Arab Spring was a reaction to the socio-economic influences of modernization and the failures of nationalism and socialism. Qutb’s concept of *Jahiliyyah* not only legitimized the struggle against the state, but also provided a solution to the contradictions of Egypt’s modernization. The new generation of the *Muslim Brotherhood* differs from the radical groups, which criticizes their choice to run in the parliamentary elections, to cooperate with the state. The new generation defines this phenomenon as the “Bankrupt Brotherhood” (Weber, 2012: 518).

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AL-BANNA AND QUTB

Similarities: Al-Banna and Qutb were both born in 1906, both of them grew up in religious families, and both were educated in Dar al-Ulum. They both worked as teachers for the Egyptian Ministry of Education, both had a strong desire to make a significant change in Egyptian society, especially by educating the younger generation in Islam. Both al-Banna and Qutb strongly opposed the Western presence in Egypt and claimed that the ills in Muslim society appeared due to the adoption of Western values. They were the most prominent leaders of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, and they both died in tragic circumstances – al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 and Qutb was hanged in 1966. To this day, both are considered martyrs in the Muslim world. Most of the activity of al-Banna and Qutb took place in Cairo, which was the center for all fields of activity in Egypt. Both are considered ideologues that have had a great impact on the development of contemporary militant Islam.

Differences: Al-Banna is considered the founder of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, the leader who formed the organization in its early stages. Qutb, however, is considered an ideologue of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, a figure who has developed al-Banna’s ideologies into contemporary Islamic extremism. In the first half of the forties, Qutb began returning to Islam, while until that time he was engaged in literature; al-Banna had already established the *Muslim Brotherhood* by then and participated in a number of Islamic social reforms that influenced Qutb’s orientation to Islam. Al-Banna’s worldview was always very determined and coherent, while Qutb, after his trip to the US and a long period of incarceration, experienced a radicalization of his own perceptions. While al-Banna preached pan-Islamism and didn’t oppose pan-Arabism and Egyptian nationalism, Qutb opposed Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism because he believed that Islam is for all.

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This study introduced the approach of al-Banna and Qutb and how they evolved over the years. Al-Banna founded the *Muslim Brotherhood* following the deep ideolog-

ical crisis in the Muslim world. He was a charismatic figure who helped implement many principles, such as *da'wah* and *jihad*, which influenced and continue to influence generations of successors. Qutb is considered the ideological successor of al-Banna; both have been directly linked to the development of contemporary Islamic Radicalism. Al-Banna and Qutb are together considered the pillars of Salafist development and contemporary Islamic revival. This article shows a direct link exists between the ideology of the *Muslim Brotherhood* developed by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb's formulation to a multi-interpretative level.

Al-Banna believed that the establishment of the Islamic state is the foundation for solving all Muslim problems. Qutb went even further in his Islamist political manifesto, "Milestones", by declaring that all modern Muslim governments are a part of the new *Jahiliyyah*. Qutb condemned all Muslims that do not subscribe to his doctrine and stated that the only way to overcome *Jahiliyyah* is through *Jihad*.

In answer to the article's question, namely, whether Qutb and al-Banna's ideas still have actual impact on the *Muslim Brotherhood*: The influences of al-Banna and Qutb on the *Muslim Brotherhood* during the Arab Spring and subsequently were as follows: On the one hand, the youths were fed up with the way of al-Banna and Qutb, and via *Facebook* led riots in the Arab world. This was a completely secular revolution that expressed the youths' great anger against the prevalent difficult economic situation. On the other hand, until this day, many young people are still influenced by the philosophies of al-Banna and Qutb, and act on a path of violence to achieve their goals.

The following quote supplies an excellent answer to the article's question. Al-Banna writes in the "Holy War" epistle: "Oh Brothers! The nation that knows the craft of death, and knows how to die in an honorable way, God has given it a life of happiness in this world and immortal pleasures in the afterlife. What is this false likeness that humiliates us if not the love of this world and hatred of death; prepare yourselves for a mighty act, and long for death, so that life can be given to you. Know there is no escape from death; it happens only once and if you make sure it is in God's way, it will be your gain in this world and a reward in the afterlife" (Barack, 2012: 260).

Qutb writes in "Milestones": "This movement uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs, and it uses physical power and Jihad for abolishing the organizations and authorities of the Jahili System which prevents people from reforming their ideas and beliefs, but forces them to obey their erroneous ways and make them serve human lords instead of the Almighty Lord. This movement does not confine itself, to mere preaching to confront physical power, as it also does not use compulsion for changing the ideas of people" (Qutb, 2006: 65).

The quotes presented above show precisely what a metaphoric description is. To clarify, al-Banna describes generally and metaphorically how *Jihad* is acceptable in Islam, while Qutb solemnly condemns *Jahiliyyah* and argues that there is an urgent need to fight it with *Jihad*, but immediately afterwards states that there is no use for force in overthrowing *Jahiliyyah*. The examples above are instructive examples, which unambiguously present the meaning of the 'power of ideas'. Even though al-Banna and Qutb did not directly intend the use of violent, many contemporary militant groups interpret their writings as preaching violence. These facts reinforce the attitude that extreme ide-

ology, based on complex words, can be very dangerous. The description above unequivocally exemplifies what the significance of metaphorical ideas is, a notion the West often tends to find difficult to understand; this shows how many Muslims consider leaders such as al-Banna and Qutb as figures that represent the pure Islam, as well as how, for the sake of the aforementioned metaphorical ideas, they are willing, until today, to sacrifice their lives.

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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the ideological influences of Egyptian leaders Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb on the *Muslim Brotherhood*. Al-Banna and Qutb are considered by many scholars as prominent thinkers in the Muslim world of the twentieth century. They have had a major impact on Islamic extremism in modern times, and have dealt with a number of religious and social issues, which exist in Islamic discourse until today. On the one hand, many of their writings were written metaphorically, while on the other hand, their writings are interpreted by many as explicit orders to exercise violence. This article examines whether Qutb and al-Banna's ideas still have actual impact on the Egyptian *Muslim Brotherhood*. The aim is to make a case for assuming a new standpoint, which will add to the wider research knowledge.

SILA IDEI. WPŁYW HASSANA AL-BANNA I SAYYIDA QUTB NA BRACHTWO MUZUŁMAŃSKIE

STRESZCZENIE

W artykule poddano analizie wpływ Hasana al-Banny oraz Sajjida Kutba na ideologiczny rozwój egipskiego *Bractwa Muzułmańskiego*. Zarówno jeden, jak i drugi ideolog są zaliczani jako jedni z najbardziej znaczących XX-wiecznych myślicieli świata muzułmańskiego. Ich kon-

cepcje nadal mają wpływ nie tylko na współczesny radykalizm islamski, ale także na ważne problemy religijne i społeczne, które do dzisiaj nie straciły na aktualności. Głównym zamierzeniem badawczym niniejszego artykułu jest refleksja nad współczesnym znaczeniem koncepcji H. al Bany i S. Kutba dla założeń programowych *Bractwa Muzułmańskiego*.