The Changing Patterns of Policy Making in Japan Local Policy Initiative of Okinawa Prefecture in the 1990s. 2 アダム・ミツキエビッチ大学 オリエント・シリーズ ボホロディチ・ベアタ著 日本の政策決定過程の変容 １９９０年代沖縄県のローカル・イニシアティブの事例研究 ポズナニ 3 ADAM MICKIEWICZ UNIVERSITY IN POZNAŃ SERIES ORIENTALISTYKA NR 2 BEATA BOCHORODYCZ The Changing Patterns of Policy Making in Japan Local Policy Initiative of Okinawa Prefecture in the 1990s. POZNAŃ 2010 4 ABSTRACT. Bochorodycz Beata, The Changing Patterns of Policy Making in Japan. Local Policy Initiative of Okinawa Prefecture in the 1990s. [Zmieniające się modele polityki w Japonii. Lokalne inicjatywy polityczne w Prefekturze Okinawy w latach 90. XX wieku]. Adam Mickiewicz University Press, Poznań 2010. Seria Orientalistyka nr 2. Pp. 259, tables and figures. ISBN 978-83-232-2164-7. ISSN 1730-8771. Text in English with a summary in Polish. The research analyzes central-local relations of government in Japan focusing on Okinawa prefec- ture, and in particular on the process of formulation and negotiation of the Program for Autonomic Modernization of Okinawa (Kokusai toshi keisei kōsō) in the 1990s. It was the most comprehensive regional development plan that had ever been proposed by a local government in Japan. The de- tailed conclusions identify factors that enabled formulation of projects on the local and national levels, their consecutive setting on the central government agenda, and also those factors and assi- milation methods, which shaped the final outcome of the local initiatives on the national level. The main hypothesis of the thesis is that the process of globalization and regional integration in East Asia on one had, and on the other, the activities of local and other political actors aiming at accelera- tion of decentralization and liberalization of the economy – have had far reaching consequences for the centralized system of the regional development planning in Japan. Key words: local autonomy in Japan, regional planning in Japan, Okinawa, local and national deci- sion making in Japan, local and national policy making in Japan Beata Bochorodycz, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Wydział Neofilologii, Katedra Orientalis- tyki, 61-485 Poznań, ul. 28 Czerwca 1956, nr 198; e-mail: beata.bochorodycz@amu.edu.pl Recenzent/Reviewer: prof. dr hab. Edward HaliŜak Publikacja dofinansowana przez Rektora Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, Wydział Neofilo- logii UAM oraz Katedrę Orientalistyki The publication this book has been financed by the Rector of Adam Mickiewicz University, Faculty of Modern Languages and Literature of AMU and Chair of Oriental Studies Praca wydana z materiałów powierzonych przez Autorkę The book published based on the materials provided by the author © Beata Bochorodycz 2010 This edition © Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2010 Redaktor techniczny/Technical editor: Dorota Borowiak Łamanie komputerowe/Text formatting: Danuta Kowalska ISBN 978-83-232-2164-7 ISSN 1730-8771 WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU IM. ADAMA MICKIEWICZA W POZNANIU ul. Fredry 10, 61-701 Poznań tel. 061 829 46 46, faks 061 829 46 47 www.press.amu.edu.pl e-mail: press@amu.edu.pl Ark. wyd. 21,00. Ark. druk. 16,25 DRUK I OPRAWA: ZAKŁAD GRAFICZNY UAM, POZNAŃ, UL. H. WIENIAWSKIEGO 1 5 Contents ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 7 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 9 CHAPTER 1. Japanese Political Actors and Institutions ................................................... 25 1. The Emperor and the Diet ............................................................................ 26 2. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet ........................................................... 30 3. Political Parties ............................................................................................... 33 4. Civil Service .................................................................................................... 39 5. Interest Groups .............................................................................................. 43 6. Local Governments ........................................................................................ 47 7. Mass Media ..................................................................................................... 52 CHAPTER 2. Okinawa in the Japanese System of Decision Making ............................. 56 1. Policy Making Patterns ................................................................................ 59 2. Procedures of Policy Making ...................................................................... 62 3. Budgetary Process ........................................................................................ 65 4. Regional Development Policy for Okinawa .............................................. 70 5. Outlines of Okinawa Prefecture ................................................................. 74 CHAPTER 3. The Project for Return of the Military Bases: Local Initiative and the Prime Minister-led Policy Pattern ................................................................ 83 1. Policy Change under the New Progressive Governor Ōta ..................... 85 2. The Rationale for the Local Policy .............................................................. 88 3. The First Reorganization of the Prefectural Office ................................... 91 4. The Rape Incident and the Proxy Refusal by the Governor .................... 93 5. The Second Reorganization of the Prefectural Office .............................. 97 CHAPTER 4. The Deregulation Project: The Politicians-led Policy Pattern .................. 103 1. The New Cabinet of Hashimoto and his Okinawa Policy ....................... 103 2. Policy Process of the Deregulation Project in the Prefecture .................. 107 3. The Ministerial Evaluation of the Deregulation Project .......................... 111 4. Negotiations on the Tokyo-Naha Airfare Reduction ............................... 113 5. The Clash of the Ministries and the LDP over the Airfare Reduction ... 115 CHAPTER 5. The Modernization Projects: The Corporatist Pattern of Policy Making ...... 120 1. Public Commitment of the Prime Minister to Okinawa Development . 121 2. The Proxy Compliance by Governor Ōta .................................................. 125 6 3. The Third Reorganization of the Prefectural Office ................................. 126 4. The Corporatist Arrangements for the Modernization Projects ............. 130 5. Negotiations on the Allocation of the Special Adjustment Fund ........... 134 CHAPTER 6. The All-Okinawa FTZ Plan in the Prefecture: The Pluralist Pattern of Policy Making .................................................................................................. 141 1. The Inter-Party Agreements on the Okinawa Development .................. 142 2. Negotiations on the Revision of the Special Law on Land for the U.S. Military Use .................................................................................................. 144 3. The Tanaka Report on the FTZ Measures ................................................. 148 4. Public Debate on the FTZ in the Prefecture .............................................. 151 5. The FTZ and the Idea of Autonomy (jiritsu) ............................................. 155 CHAPTER 7. The FTZ Plan in Tokyo: The Zoku Politicians-led Policy Pattern ........... 159 1. The Conflict within the Prefectural Governing Coalition ....................... 160 2. The Second Public Commitment of the Prime Minister to Okinawa Development ................................................................................................ 161 3. The Electoral Upheavals in Nago City ....................................................... 166 4. The Influence of the LDP Institutions on the Local Policy ...................... 169 5. The Postponing Strategy of the Ruling Party ........................................... 180 CHAPTER 8. The Okinawa Development Plan for the 21st Century: The Bureau- cracy-led Policy Pattern .................................................................................. 183 1. New Prime Minister Obuchi and his Okinawa Policy ............................. 184 2. Change of the Prefectural Policy under the New Conservative Gov- ernor ............................................................................................................... 187 3. The Quid Pro Quo Agreement on the Relocation of the Military Bases ............................................................................................................... 191 4. National Policy Making of the Local Policy .............................................. 192 5. Local Participation in the National Policy Making Process .................... 195 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 200 Appendixes ............................................................................................................................ 211 References ............................................................................................................................. 231 List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ 256 List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... 257 Zmieniające się modele polityki w Japonii. Lokalne inicjatywy polityczne w Prefekturze Okinawy w latach 90. XX wieku (Streszczenie) .................................... 258 7 List of abbreviations ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| CO Cabinet Office (Naikakufu) DFAA Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Bōei Shisetsuchō) EA Environment Agency (Kankyōchō, until 2001) ev.ed. Evening edition (of the newspapers; in the references) FSA Financial Service Agency (Zaimushō) Guntenkyō Council for Military Land Conversion and the U.S. Base Problems (Okinawaken Gunyōchi Tenyō Sokushin Kichi Mondai Kyōgikai) HC House of Councillors (Sangiin) HR House of Representatives (Shūgiin) Jichirō All Japan Local Government Workers Labor Union (Nihon Zenkoku Jichi Dantai Rōdō Kumiai) JNPEA Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association (Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai) LDP Okinawa Special Research Council Liberal Democratic Party Okinawa Comprehensive Promotion Policy Special Research Council (Okinawa Ken Sōgō Shinkō Taisaku ni Kan- suru Tokubetsu Chōsakai) NLA National Land Agency (Kokudochō; until 2001) LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyū Minshutō, or Jimintō) METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Keizai Sangyōshō) MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Mombu Kagakushō) MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Tsūsanshō; until 2001) MOAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Nōrin Suisanshō) MOC Ministry of Construction (Kensetsushō; until 2001) MOE Ministry of Education (Mombushō; until 2001) MOEv Ministry of Environment (Kankyōshō) MOF Ministry of Finance (Ōkurashō; until 2001) MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimushō) MOHA Ministry of Home Affairs (Jichishō) MOHLW Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (Kōsei Rōdōshō) MOJ Ministry of Justice (Hōmushō) MOLIT Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (Kokudo Kōtsūshō) MOPT Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (Yūseishō; until 2001) MOT Ministry of Transport (Unyushō; until 2001) MOW Ministry of Welfare (Kōseishō; until 2001) NLA National Land Agency (Kokudochō; until 2001) ODA Okinawa Development Agency (Okinawa Kaihatsuchō; until 2001) 8 Okinawa Development Law Special Measures Law for Okinawa Promotion and Development (Oki- nawa shinkō kaihatsu tokubetsu sochihō) Okinawa Development Plan Okinawa Promotion and Development Plan (Okinawa shinkō kaihatsu keikaku) Okinawa U.S. Military Land Reversion Law Special Measures Law Concerning the Return of Land Used by the U.S. Military in Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawaken ni okeru chūryū gunyōchi no henkan ni tomonau tokubetsu sochi ni kansuru hōritsu or Gunten tokusohō) OPC Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyōgikai) OSK Okinawa Seisaku Kyōgikai (Okinawa Policy Council; used in the refer- ences) OT Okinawa Times PA Police Agency (Keisatsuchō) PMO Prime Minister Office (Sōrifu; until 2001) RSH Ryūkyū Shimpō SAF special adjustment fund SDPJ/SDP Social Democratic Party of Japan/Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshutō) SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SOMU Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Sōmushō) STA Science and Technology Agency (Kagaku Gijutsuchō; until 2001) Tochiren Okinawa Prefecture Union of the Owners of Military Land (Oki- nawaken Gunyōchi Nado Jinushi Rengōkai) Tōzeichō The Liberal Democratic Party Research Commission on the Tax System (Jimintō Zeisei Chōsakai) UERI Urban Economic Research Institute (Kokusai Toshi Keizai Kenkyūjo) Zensō Comprehensive National Development Plan (Zenkokudo sōgō kaihatsu keikaku) 9 Introduction ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| The processes of globalization and of regional integration have intensified since the end of the Cold War (Hurrell 1998: 53-38). In East Asia,1 they manifested themselves in various forms of macro-level intergovernmental arrangements,2 as well as in micro-level economic zones. The latter embraces parts of sub-national regions across borders.3 The processes also stimulated interest in local tradition, customs, and language, leading further to a revival of local and ethnic identities that were previously often ignored or stigma- tized as “parochial.” In comparison to Europe, the regional integration in East Asia has been proceeding much slower. Several factors can be accounted for this situation. The region covers a vast area and encompasses diverse people, religions and socio-political and economic systems. More significantly, acute threats to regional security exist in the region. The two most important of these threats arise from the unresolved divisions of the Cold War era and the related fo- cuses of tension. One is on the Korean Peninsula owing, in particular, to the policy of communist North Korea (e.g., development program of nuclear ________________ 1 Following the usage by the UN and other international organizations, this thesis adopts the broader definition of East Asia (Gawlikowski 2004: 18-21). 2 The inter-governmental organizations include: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1989), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, 1992), East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC, 1993), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), ASEAN + 3 (Japan, PRC, South Korea), East Asia Summit (ASEAN + Japan, PRC, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India), and previously established: Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1967), Pacific Free Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD, 1968), Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC, 1968) and Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC, 1980). For the discussion of institutional arrangements in the region, see HaliŜak (1999: parts III and IV). 3 The sub-regions include: Greater South China Economic Zone (Guangdong and Fujian in PRC, Hong Kong), Baht Economic Zone (or Indochinese Economic Zone; Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar), Japan Sea Rim Zone (or Japan Sea Rim Economic Zone; Japan, South Korea, Russian Far East, PRC), Taiwan West Coast Economic Zone (Taiwan, Fujian in PRC), Yellow Sea Rim Economic Zone (North PRC, South Korea, North Korea), and Growth Triangle (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand). 10 weapons). The other is in the Taiwan Strait, where both sides (Taiwan and PRC) substantially increase their armaments (HaliŜak 2004: 34-74). There are also numerous unresolved border conflicts. Nevertheless, the process of re- gional integration, which has been labeled as “soft” (focused on economic relations) – has had far-reaching consequences for national policies (Scalap- ino et al. 1988). These processes were very important for Japan as a great economic power operating in the region and in the world. Already in the mid 1980s, the Japanese central government4 reoriented its development policy, putting forward the goal of “internationalization” (kokusaika) (HaliŜak (1991: 81-98). The national strategies for development, which are formulated in the Na- tional Comprehensive Development Plan (Zenkokudo sōgō kaihatsu keikaku, known under the abbreviation Zensō), reflected that policy shift. The Fourth Zensō adopted in 1987 set the target of creating “multi-polar land structure” (takyoku bunsan kokudo). According to that plan, particular regions were to foster local economic development, taking advantage of the cross-border exchange. Following the centrally-set directives, local governments implemented the “internationalization” policy that resulted primarily in the development of infrastructure (e.g., for transport). In terms of creating a basis for auto- nomic development, the outcomes were disputable. Nevertheless, the ideas of “internalization,” “globalization,” and “integration” have taken deep roots both in national policies as well as in popular perception. Furthermore, local communities realized that globalization and regional integration create opportunities for autonomic development of local economy, particularly for peripheral communities bordering neighboring countries. Economic devel- opment, on the other hand, meant for the local governments also decreasing financial dependency on the central authorities. At the same time, on the domestic front in Japan, other correlated proc- esses of decentralization, administrative reforms, and deregulation have been gaining momentum. Japan, like several other East Asian countries, has been categorized as a “developmental state” (Johnson 1995; Gilpin: 2001: 316-333). The term implies that the central government plays a crucial role in planning national development strategies, as well as shaping social and economic policies (Gawlikowski 2004: 24-27). This centralized system of government in Japan was established in the Meiji era (1868-1912), and in a ________________ 4 In Japanese, following the Anglo-American tradition, the term “government” (seifu) in a broad sense signifies the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, including (the Cabinet, bureaucracy, and the ruling party), while in a narrow sense, only the executive (Cabinet). The usage in this thesis follows the broader meaning of the term. 11 slightly modified form (although under constitutionally very different framework), survived postwar reforms of the American occupation authori- ties. The first signs that the system became dysfunctional became visible in the late 1980s. The corruption scandals that erupted, such as the Recruit scandal in 19875 or Sagawa Kyūbin in 1992,6 revealed the existence of cozy relations between bureaucracy, politicians and big business. Many people started questioning the morals of bureaucrats, traditionally trusted and re- spected, as well as of the politicians. And finally, in the beginning of the 1990s, the “bubble economy” burst (Wood 1993), plunging Japan into the most severe and prolonged recession since the Pacific War.7 The government introduced several measures to tackle the situation,8 and further initiated other reforms aimed at transformation of the system. The legislative process directed at reforming central-local relations and in- creasing local autonomy began in 1993. The Diet adopted the policy of the Promotion of Local Decentralization (Chihō bunken suishin). The issue was set thereby on the governmental agenda, and the consecutive discussions and consultations resulted in approval of Decentralization Laws (Chihō bunken ikkatsuhō) in July 1999. The decentralization reforms were implemented on 1 April 2000, but the situation of local governments has not changed dra- matically since the introduction of the reforms. For example, the most dis- puted issue of transferring a larger portion of centrally-collected taxes to local governments for their discretion, remained unresolved. Nevertheless, the need for further decentralization and an increase of local autonomy has ________________ 5 The Recruit scandal was an insider trading and corruption scandal that involved many prominent politicians (Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru, former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami Takao) and business leaders. The chairman of Recruit – the real estate and telecommunications company based in Tokyo – offered a number of shares in a Recruit subsidiary, Cosmos, to politicians and others shortly before Cosmos went public in 1986. Following the public offering, each individual involved in the scheme gained average profits of ¥66 million. As a result of the scandal disclosed in 1988, Takeshita’s Cabinet was forced to resign. 6 The Sagawa Kyūbin scandal involved a Tokyo-based parcel delivery and courier service company, Sagawa Kyūbin, that has been linked to yakuza, the organized crime syndicate in Japan. Company officials provided an illegal contribution of ¥4 million to the LDP Vice Presi- dent Kanemaru Shin, a political patron of the Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi. The scandal forced Japan’s most powerful politician, Kanemaru, to resign from his party post and leave his seat in the House of Representatives. 7 Following the Japanese historiography, the term “Pacific War” (Taiheiyō sensō) refers here to military operations in the Asia-Pacific initiated by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec. 1941 (8 Dec. in Japan). The operations ended with Japan’s surrender on 15 Aug. 1945. The term “Second World War (WWII)” signifies the military operations in Europe and North- ern Africa between 1 Sept. 1939 and 9 May 1945. 8 In Aug. 1992, the Miyazawa Cabinet announced a 10 trillion yen emergency stimulus package to boost the economic recovery. 12 become widely accepted among political actors and the general public. And if the processes of globalization and regional integration provided strategies for development for sub-national regions, the process of decentralization, or more precisely, the argument for a need to decentralize and to increase local autonomy has become widely used for legitimizing various political actions. In the context of these two powerful forces at work, the Program for Autonomic Modernization (Kokusai toshi keisei kōsō, literally, Program of the international city formation)9 undertaken by the Okinawa prefecture is of special importance. In the early 1990s, the prefectural government formu- lated the long-term Program for Autonomic Modernization, and partially succeeded in implementing it due to several factors discussed in the con- secutive chapters. In light of existing theories of central-local relations in Japan, it was difficult, however, to explain the Okinawan initiative. Ac- cording to the prevailing theories, which are referred to as the vertical con- trol model and the interdependency model,10 there was no room in the Japanese decision-making system for such an undertaking. According to the vertical control model, which is associated with the early postwar studies of a prominent Tokyo University professor, Tsuji Ki- yoaki (1953; 1992: 144), local governments are controlled by the central bu- reaucracy via several means. These include: (1) the authority ascribed by provisions of law, which requires the governors and mayors to carry out the centrally-decided policies; (2) centrally-distributed finances; (3) issuing of approvals and permissions; (4) dispatch of personnel from the central min- istries and agencies (hereafter referred to as “ministries”) to the prefectures for a certain period of time, which helps to administer local implementation of the national standards (Tsuji 1983: 37-55); and (5) better access to infor- mation, technical expertise, research facilities, and also better-educated personnel (discussed further in chap. 1). According to this model, therefore, ________________ 9 The name Kokusai toshi keisei kōsō was used by the prefectural office to designate the en- tire set of projects discussed below. The literal translation in English is unclear, and for that reason, the name “Program for Autonomic Modernization” was adopted (see Fig. A-1 for the outline of the Program). 10 Both terms of vertical administrative control and interdependency model (also called “overlapping authority,” “horizontal” or “lateral political competition”) were coined and elaborated by Muramatsu (1997: 27-54, 124-144). Muramatsu distinguishes also a sub-model of horizontal political competition, which was juxtaposed by the horizontal political cooperation model by Richard Samuels; but as Samuels (1983: 244) explains, the main difference between his and Muramatsu’s model is the emphasis on lateral cooperation rather than competition in trans-local relations. Because that distinction does not directly relate to the discussion of local autonomy in this thesis (since both models focus on local-local relations), for purposes of clar- ity, discussions of both sub-models were omitted from this paper. 13 the local governments function as executive branches of the central authori- ties. On the other hand, the interdependency model advocated by another well-known Japanese scholar, Muramatsu Michio,11 posits that, within the above-mentioned legal and administrative constraints, local governments can exhibit independence. In other words, it is possible to have structural centralization and local autonomy (Muramatsu 1997: 139). According to Muramatsu, local governments can exhibit independence in deci- sion-making by selecting subsidized projects and later modifying those projects according to their preferences at the implementation stage. The autonomy of local governments in policy making in the second model mainly involves, therefore, the decision whether to respond to the centrally-formulated policies, or whether to modify those policies during their implementation. Such autonomy, however, seldom involves decisions to formulate “purely local policies” (Reed 1986: 165) – that is, policies created by the local governments in response to local needs, which are referred to as “autonomy of policy initiative.” In consequence, as Muramatsu comments himself, the localities are predominantly concerned with distributive poli- cies,12 especially in the form of subsidies. The case of the Program for Autonomic Modernization demonstrates, however, that the local initiative in policy making of comprehensive regional development is, indeed, viable. Questions therefore arise about the factors that contributed to the initiative, and the methods of policy formulation used by the local government, which is not normally equipped for this kind of undertaking. The case also poses questions about the strategies employed by the local actors existing under the centralized system of policy making, vis-à-vis the central authorities, to implement the local policies. The research embodied in this paper attempts to provide answers to these questions, setting forth the hypothesis that the processes of globaliza- tion and regional integration in East Asia, as well as of decentralization domestically, are having far-reaching consequences to the centralized sys- ________________ 11 The proponents of this model include: Aqua (1980: 353), Flanagan (1980: 427-444), Samuels (1983: 243-247). Even the more recent research of the local-central relations in Japan, such as, for instance, the policy network analysis by Hiromoto Masayuki (1996, 1997), is based on the Muramatsu’s model of interdependence. 12 Muramatsu actually uses the term “policies of redistribution” without specifying its meaning. The inclusion of subsidies under this term, however, indicates that he means “dis- tributive policies” (Muramatsu 1987: 164), as that term is most commonly defined by policy process theorists. For the definition of distributive and redistributive policies, see for example, Lowi (1972: 298-310, 1964: 677-715, 1970: 314-325); Ripley (1985: 57-91); Ripley et al. (1991: 16-24). 14 tem of decision-making in Japan. The study also aims to illustrate how the local governments function in Japan, and what their relations are like with the central authorities. The significance of the Program for Autonomic Modernization as a case study can be summarized as follows. First, it provides a test case for the prevailing explanation that local governments follow the cen- trally-formulated policies rather than initiate their own policies for com- prehensive regional development. Second, the case is instructive for inves- tigating and identifying conditions under which an independent local policy making – that is, formation of a policy concerning local community by the local government on its own initiative – is viable. Third, a study of the broad scope of issues involved in the policy making process for Okinawa allows for a thorough examination of assimilation strategies that the central gov- ernment employed towards demands made by local actors. The broad scope of issues studied here concerns regional economy, history, culture, society, national security affairs, as well as the variety of policy initiatives contained in the Program that were successfully carried into implementation. Fourth, the proposals of the Program for Autonomic Modernization influenced na- tional policy making. It provided, for instance, the idea for special zones (tokku) for structural reforms, one of the landmarks of the Koizumi Junichirō Cabinet (2001-2006). Hence, this case study is also instructive for investi- gating the origins and characteristics of the present trends for structural re- forms, and more generally, for investigating local influences on national policy. Finally, the existing research on the Program for Autonomic Moderniza- tion is limited at present to description of the policy content,13 or to the economic aspects,14 while the policy process has been omitted. This first de- tailed examination of the policy process for the Program for Autonomic Modernization illuminates the origins of the Program, the participating ac- tors and the conflicts among them, the bargaining strategies, and the final outcomes. It also identifies a set of factors that influenced the policy on par- ticular stages. The research therefore attempts to fill the gap in the academic literature on the Program for Autonomic Modernization, and furthermore, contribute to a theoretical understanding of policy process and local autonomy in Japan. ________________ 13 For the content description of the Program for Autonomic Modernization, see Ōshiro (1997: 139-151), Sakaguchi (1997: 151-168), Shiroi (1997: 169-202). 14 An economic analysis of the Program for Autonomic Modernization has been under- taken by: Shinjō (1998: 359-385), Makino (1997: 197-283), Momose et al. (2002: 81-118), Miyagi (1998: 30-34). 15 Studies of Japanese Politics, Foreign Relations, and Economy in Poland The issue of central-local relations in Japan – the subject of this thesis – has not yet drawn much attention of researchers in Poland. With the exception of the description of the Japanese constitutional framework by Krzysztof Karolczak in System konstytucyjny Japonii (1999: 47-50), which among others, introduces the articles of the Japanese Constitution relating to local auton- omy (art. 92-95), not much more has been published on the subject (Leszczyński 1996: 97-99). Similarly, the literature on Okinawa has been scarce, with only two monographs written in the early 70s and 80s (Pawlak 1971, Wolny 2004). By contrast, there is a wealth of literature on Japanese domestic politics on the national level, the foreign policy, and particularly, the economy. First, in the area of domestic politics, recent research has been focused on such issues as: the development of the Japanese political system, its charac- teristics, and the structural reforms of the 1990s. The most comprehensive account of Japanese political, economic, and social development since the Meiji era is presented by Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska and Katarzyna Starecka in Japonia (2004). The authors discuss the process of introducing modern Western-style institutions in the late nineteenth century (constitution, par- liament, political parties), the rise of militarism in the 30s and 40s, as well as the evolution of the so-called “55 system” (gojū gonen taisei) during which the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP; Jiyū Minshutō) held power from 1955 until 2009 only with short breaks.15 The Japanese political system has been given considerable attention partly due to the fact that the Western-style institutions were introduced in a culturally different environment. The features of the political system in- clude: the existence of power elite referred to as the “iron triangle” of the ruling LDP politicians, bureaucrats and big business, as well as a “small triangle” of the LDP intra-party fractions, parliamentary groups of special- ists in certain areas (so-called “policy tribes” or zoku giin), and powerful party individuals (Karolczak 2004). Given the different cultural background, Krzysztof Karolczak argues that democratic institutions introduced after the war by the American occupation authorities have functioned as a façade, or tatemae, without true substance of honne, although the author also warns ________________ 15 On the Japanese party system see: Shibata (2000), Starecka (1999). 16 against applying western concepts indiscriminately to non-western societies (Karolczak 1998: 67-76).16 One of the most controversial issues relating to the Japanese political system has been the role of the state. The traditional school of interpretation, based on the idea of a strong state, is presented by Anna Ząbkiewicz in In- stytucje i wzrost gospodarki Japonii (2006). The author concludes that, in spite of the present economic problems that call for drastic reforms, especially in finances and banking, the introduction of liberal Anglo-American systems might be difficult due to the slow process of changes in mentality that ulti- mately determines functioning of institutions. On the other hand, Jolanta Młodawska challenges the idea of the strong state (Młodawska 1999: 235-246, 2001, 2002: 173-181), contending that the influence of the central government varies across policy areas.17 The author points out that while the bureaucracy provides general direction for development, it is the interaction between politicians and business representatives that shapes the practical realization strategies. Recently, the topic of structural reforms has become one of the most dominant in light of the serious political, economic, and social problems that Japan has been facing since the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century. Krzysztof Jasiecki (1998: 77-100) points out that, politically, the ongoing changes involve a shift from a homogeneous to a more pluralistic society, while economically, the changes demonstrate a weakening of the role of the bureaucracy and a strengthening of the private sector. In the case of the administrative reforms, Sławomir Wysocki (2002: 149-155) demon- strates that the changes involve a shift of power from bureaucratic agencies to politicians, particularly to the Prime Minister and his office. Second, in the area of Japanese foreign policy and international relations, generally two issues have received focus: Japan’s priorities in foreign policy, and relations with specific partners (USA, China, Russia, South and North Korea, and Poland). Japan’s foreign policy, according to Władysław Góralski, has been relatively stable since the end of the Pacific War, dominated by the efforts to protect the Japanese national economic interests. Furthermore, the second important feature of Japan’s foreign policy relative to national secu- rity has been the centrality of the Japan-US security alliance, which has been evolving towards a greater partnership that is more “equal burden-sharing,” with increased independence of decision-making on the part of Japan ________________ 16 For a discussion of western concepts in relation to Asian-Pacific cultures and the prob- lems they create (although not specifically Japan), see Gawlikowski (1998: 9-52). 17 The particular area of technology import during the high-speed economic development that was supervised by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is analyzed by Romanowski (1999). 17 (Góralski 1998: 101-130, HaliŜak 1999: 150-166). Such continuity of policy, as posited by Edward HaliŜak, was due to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitu- tion, which renounces Japan’s right to war as a way of solving international disputes, and the possession of an army (HaliŜak 2004: 99). The end of the Cold War, the diminishing role of the US as the Japanese “defense um- brella,” as well as the perceived threat of growing Chinese influence, led Japan to reorient its foreign policy, giving rise to its aspiration of becoming a leading regional political player (Potocka 2004: 90-110). Such aspirations, however, are undermined by several unresolved issues related to Japan’s territories and its wartime activities (e.g., the colonization of Asia, the Nanking massacre, and “comfort women”; Rowiński 2004: 123-160). An- other barrier for assuming such a role, as HaliŜak argues (2004: 135, 1999: 150-166), is Japan’s “ambiguously defined identity,” which can be explained as Japan’s negation of being an “Asian” nation, but its not being a “Western” one either. Ultimately, this ambiguous identity undermines Japan’s legiti- mization for assuming the role of a regional leader. If Japan’s relations with the United States, built on the mutual security alliance, have been relatively stable since the Pacific War and are predicted not to substantially change in the future (Góralski 1984, 1976), Japan’s rela- tions with China have been dominated by the economy, particularly after signing the Peace Treaty in 1978 (Jakimowicz 1999: 33-48, 2002: 124-139). The political relations between the two neighbors have stayed “cool,” as asserted by Robert Jakimowicz (2004: 199-211), occasionally becoming “hot,” stirred by the issues of Japan’s war responsibilities, history textbooks or the territo- rial dispute over the Senkaku (Chin. Dioyutai) islands (HaliŜak 2004: 67-69). The territorial dispute over another group of islands, the southern Kurile, has become the core of Japan’s problems with Russia, which ultimately prevents normalization of relations between the two neighbors that have not yet signed a peace treaty (Potocka 1999: 49-79, Wojtkowiak 2000, HaliŜak 2004: 65-67, Rowiński 2004: 130-132). In comparison to the stable military alliance with the US, strengthened by a strong economic and cultural exchange, and dynamic economic rela- tions with China and other countries in East Asia (Potocka 2004: 105-110), Japan’s interest in Poland has been relatively limited (Pałasz-Rutkowska et al. 1996; Pałasz-Rutkowska 1998). The situation will probably not dramati- cally change in the future, although Góralski posits that further intensifica- tion of relations could occur in the areas of trade and investment if Polish authorities undertake proper steps (Góralski 1998: 101-130). Third, among the three areas of domestic and foreign politics and economy, the economy has been given utmost attention, with three issues being of particular interest: (1) the factors contributing to Japan’s “economic 18 miracle” and stagnation in the 1990s; (2) international economic policy; and (3) Japan’s management style. Among the factors that contributed to Japan’s spectacular economic growth, Jerzy Grabowiecki (2000) names: postwar re- forms of the socio-economic system and government economic policy that led to the accumulation of high savings and investment, gradual liberaliza- tion of economic relations with foreign countries, and the international situation (Drelich-Skulska 2002: 166-176). The burst of the “bubble economy” caused by speculations on the price of land and stocks, and the prolonged recession, weakened the country (Bilski 2002; Jackowicz 2001), but Japan still remains one of the leading economies in the world (Kaja 1996). Japan’s foreign economic policy has undergone significant changes, as argued by Jan Bossak and Bogusława Drelich-Skulska (1990), from protec- tionism, particularly during the high-speed growth era (from mid 1950s to early 1970s), to the gradual liberalization that began in the second half of the 80s. In addition, HaliŜak (1991) contends that the following added to gradual liberalization: structural reorientation from exports towards stimulation of domestic demand, private consumption, and increasing imports, foreign direct investments and aid. The position of Poland in those relations, as noted, has been small, and to improve the situation, Drelich-Skulska (2004: 325-336) suggests that Polish companies would have to develop new means to attract Japanese capital and learn business strategies to enter the Japanese domestic market. The companies would also have to transform their offers that, at present, consist of standard products for which international com- petition is very high.18 Finally, one of the major factors contributing to Japanese economic suc- cess has been the Japanese work organization and management style. As to the significant features of the Japanese work organization, Jarosław Wit- kowski (1998, 2003) points to the underlying philosophy of continuous im- provement, or kaizen, as well as the structure of keiretsu, which are enterprise groups of large manufacturers, their suppliers and distributors, and big banks. Furthermore, keiretsu operate based on such systems as: just-in-time (JIT), total quality management (TQM), and distribution signaling system, or kamban. In addition to the philosophy of kaizen (Wasilewski 1997), Lesław Wasilewski (1992) discusses several other methods that are commonly used in Japanese organizations: the bottom-up initiative and approval system of ringi, consensus-seeking through informal discussions of nemawashi, the importance of middle-rank managers, and long-term planning. If the cul- tural elements of the Japanese system are difficult to transplant to a cultur- ________________ 18 On earlier Polish-Japanese economic relations, see Bossak (1978); Łukaszuk (2004: 256-258). 19 ally different environment, the other methods (e.g., JIT, TQM) have already proven to be of universal value, increasing the competitiveness of various companies around the world. The Methodology For the reconstruction of the political processes involved in the elaboration of the Program for Autonomic Modernization, this study applies the revised model of the multiple streams. This model was originally used by John Kingdon (1995) to analyze the policy making in the U.S. at the national level (Zahariadis 1999: 73-93), but in this research, it is extended to the local and central-local levels.19 Kingdon’s model is particularly useful for logically organizing facts, and for explaining factors related to policy initiation and agenda setting. Its explanatory power has been successfully tested on case studies outside the United States (Zahariadis 1995), but not yet on Japan. According to Kingdon’s model, policy is a collective output formed by the push and pull of several factors that can be categorized into three streams: (1) the politics stream that consists of elections, public mood, inter- ests group campaigns, partisan or ideological distribution in legislative or- gans, and changes of administration; (2) the problems stream that is data about various problems facing a given community, which are brought into focus by routine monitoring (e.g., changes in governmental expenditures), research studies, political pressure, or dramatic events; and (3) the policy stream that includes various ideas and solutions to policy problems. The streams are independent unless a “policy window,” also called a “window of opportunity”20 opens and permits the “policy entrepreneurs”21 to couple the streams and push with their policy initiatives. This results in setting the issues on the governmental decision agenda.22 Hence, in addition ________________ 19 The research does not discuss in detail the implementation and evaluation stages, but focuses only on the first stages of problem recognition, agenda setting, policy formation, and policy approval (legitimization or decision-making). For a discussion of the policy stages, see for example, Lasswell (1956: esp. 1-23), Dror (1989: 32-57), Miyakawa (2000: 145-147, 169-204). 20 A policy window (window of opportunity) is a temporal stimulus for choice or an op- portunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to draw attention to their special problems (Kingdon 1995: 154). 21 Policy entrepreneurs are advocates of certain policies who are “willing to invest their re- sources (time, energy, reputation, and money) to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon 1995: 179). 22 The decision agenda is a list of items the government is planning to execute. Kingdon differentiates it from the public agenda, which consists of items that are of concern to the wider 20 to the coupling of the three streams, the existence of “policy entrepreneurs” becomes a sine qua non. Within the local policies covered in this study, the “policy entrepreneurs” included both local and national actors. The former were the initiators of a given policy (policy as a solution to a particular local problem). The latter, however, represented local policies on the national level as “acting policy entrepreneurs,” being involved in the process for po- litical reasons (e.g., meeting local demands under political pressure). As a result, the local policies, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate, often changed to suit the personal, partisan or other organizational interests of national actors. Nevertheless, in the absence of a national “policy entrepre- neur” in support of a local policy, the chances of that policy being set on the governmental decision agenda decreased, even when a policy window was open. The policy windows are opened by compelling problems in the stream of problems or by events in the stream of politics (Kingdon 1995: 172-179). They close when policymakers feel that they have addressed the issue sufficiently, that they have failed to generate action, or that there is no available alterna- tive. Closing of policy windows also happens when the persons whose presence opened the window are no longer in power, or when the crisis or focusing event has expired (Kingdon 1995: 168-172). In the case of the Pro- gram for Autonomic Modernization, the analysis shows that, while focusing events and changes in administration opened policy windows, compelling problems related to the U.S. military bases provided the prefectural gov- ernment with bargaining cards vis-à-vis the central government. Those cards allowed setting the locally-initiated policies on the governmental decision agenda. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that once a policy window was opened, the success of the locally-initiated policies was determined by three factors: the interaction between the governmental decision-making structures (the bureaucracy and the ruling party), the will of the national executive leaders to exercise political leadership, and the negotiation skills of local actors. Materials and Sources The reconstructions and analysis of the policy process for the Program for Autonomic Modernization have been based on the text analysis of various primary sources. These include, among other sources: plans, programs, and projects, governmental documents, prime ministers’ general policy speeches, ________________ public, and the formal agenda, which consists of items to which the government is paying attention (Kingdon 1995: 3-4). 21 party platforms, records from the Diet, and records from the prefectural as- sembly and deliberation committees. Since this is the first reconstruction of the policy process of the Program, the study extensively relies on numerous unpublished internal documents of governmental agencies provided by the Okinawa Affairs Office in the Cabinet Internal Affairs Office, and the Oki- nawa prefectural government. All those documents have been photocopied and are available for examination upon request. To make the complex policy process of the Program for Autonomic Modernization more transparent, detailed figures and tables of each policy initiative were prepared and are included in the Appendix. In reconstructing the policy process for the Program for Autonomic Modernization, the press coverage of the two major local newspapers, the Ryūkyū Shimpō and Okinawa Times (both published in Naha city), provided invaluable materials. These were verified whenever possible with other sources. It is important to note that the two newspapers dominate the local market,23 and perceive themselves as the voices of the Okinawan society. Such a perception often translated into the newspapers functioning as a “watch dog” of both the central and local governments (as well the Ameri- can government), which resulted in detailed accounts of governmental ac- tions and behaviors. The newspapers were therefore exceptionally useful in providing specific information for the analysis of the policy process. In addition, several intensive, in-depth interviews with the key actors involved in the Okinawa policy process were conducted, the majority of which were recorded. The interviews were often several hours long and were conducted over a four-year period. Interviews with other important actors that were published in daily newspapers and magazines were of help, as well. Finally, specialized accounts, statistical data, and academic studies, predominantly in Japanese, were also relied upon in conducting the research for this thesis. Overview of the Chapters The first two chapters of this thesis provide an introduction to the Japanese system of policy making. Chapter 1 introduces Japanese political actors and institutions, while chapter 2 outlines the decision-making system of Japan ________________ 23 Among the 1,365,465 Okinawans and 496,375 households as of Jan. 2006, the Okinawa Times had a circulation of 207,549 (Jan. 2006) and the Ryūkyū Shimpō had a similar circulation of 205,086 (March 2006). http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/toukeika/; http://ryukyushimpo.jp/ info/page-96.html; http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/com/gaiyou.html (28.08. 2006). 22 and the position of the Okinawa prefecture in that framework. Subsequent chapters discuss the policy formation and decision-making process of the Program for Autonomic Modernization, which has been divided for ana- lytical purpose into six phases. Each phase is centered on one of the follow- ing projects contained in the Program: Project for Return of the Military Bases, Deregulation Project, Modernization Projects, All-Okinawa Free Trade Zone (FTZ) Plan,24 and the final Okinawa Development Plan for the 21st Century, prepared by the central government (see Fig. A-1 for the structure of the Program). In addition, each phase exhibits distinctive char- acteristics of several patterns of decision making in Japan. Chapter 3 discusses factors contributing to the prefecture’s decision to initiate the Program for Autonomic Modernization and the formation proc- ess of the first part – the Project for Return of the Military Bases (Nov. 1990 – Jan. 1996). Chapter 4 describes the formation of the Deregulation Project (Jan. – Aug. 1996), which was to introduce several deregulation measures to stimulate local development. It examines factors that led to the Project’s ad- journment by the central bureaucracy, as well as those that allowed imple- mentation of one item – the Tokyo-Naha airfare reduction. Chapter 5 ex- plains the creation of the Modernization Projects (Jan. – Nov. 1996), investi- gating factors that allowed some of the proposals to be set on the national decision agenda, and those that shaped the final policy output. Chapter 6 analyzes the circumstances that led to the formation of the All-Okinawa FTZ Plan (Jan. – Nov. 1997), after its initial version in the Deregulation Project was blocked by the central bureaucracy. This plan contained the most radi- cal proposals for deregulation measures, including the idea of the prefec- ________________ 24 The prefectural government formed three other plans not analyzed in this research: (a) the Basic Plan of the International City Formation: Towards Realization of “the 21st Century Grand Design” (Kokusai toshi keisei kihon keikaku: “21 Seiki Okinawa gurando dezain” no jitsugen ni mukete) in May 1997 – hereafter cited as the Basic Plan of the Program for Autonomic Mod- ernization; (b) Towards Realization of the program of the international city formation (Kokusai toshi keisei kōsō jitsugen ni mukete) in May 1998 – hereafter cited as Towards Realization of the Program for Autonomic Modernization; and (c) the Okinawa Policy Proposal Towards the 21st Century (First Draft): Pacific Crossroad of Okinawa (21 seiki ni muketa Okinawa seisaku teigen [Daiichiji an], Pashifikku kurosurōdo: Okinawa) in Feb. 1998 – hereafter cited as Pacific Crossroad of Okinawa. The policy process of these plans is not discussed in detail because the latter two plans were not approved by the prefectural government as an official prefectural policy (due to a stalemate between Tokyo and Okinawa and a consecutive change of governors). These plans were not, therefore, submitted to, or negotiated with, the central government. The Basic Plan of the Program for Autonomic Modernization, on the other hand, which was submitted to the central authorities in May 1997, was part of the policy process of the Modernization Pro- jects, and the projects funded by the first special adjustment fund. For that reason, the Basic Plan is not treated separately. 23 ture-wide free trade zone. The chapter also identifies factors that contributed to the setting of this plan on the national decision agenda. After the submission of the All-Okinawa FTZ Plan to the central gov- ernment, the process moved entirely on the national level. Chapter 7 outlines the assimilation of the All-Okinawa FTZ Plan by the central government (Nov. 1997 – March 1998), particularly in the LDP intra-party organs. It identifies methods that shaped the final policy outcome. Chapter 8 then presents the final phase – the formation of the Okinawa Development Plan for the 21st Century (July 1998 – Aug. 2000) by the central government. That plan was to induce approval of the intra-prefecture military base relocations, and terminate the Program for Autonomic Modernization by creating a substitute symbol for it. The concluding chapter recounts the analysis made throughout this the- sis concerning local policy formation and final policy output. The chapter also reviews the types of assimilation methods employed by the central government towards local policy initiatives, and reexamines patterns of policy making in light of the findings of this research. The thesis concludes by stating that the Program for Autonomic Modernization can be perceived as one of the first harbingers of change that the powerful forces of global- ization and regional integration in East Asia, on one hand, and the domestic process of decentralization, on the other, are bringing into the system of policy making of local development in Japan. Editorial Note Japanese names are given in Japanese order, the surname first, followed by the given name. When, however, books by Japanese authors were published in English with the author’s name written according to the European and North American norm (first given name followed by the family name), that publication order is preserved. Japanese names and other terms are tran- scribed in the Hepburn system, which applies a line over a vowel (e.g., ō) to signify long vowels, except for some words (e.g., Tokyo, Kyoto) that are commonly used in English literature without that symbol. Chinese terms are transcribed according to the pinyin system, and simplified by the omission of tonal symbols, which has been adopted by the UN and other international organizations. All translations of quotations, terms, names, and titles from Japanese into English are by the author, unless specified otherwise. 24 Acknowledgement I am deeply grateful for comments and critique I received from Professor Krzysztof Gawlikowski of the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, whose assistance was invaluable, and Professor Toyonaga Ikuko of Waseda University in Tokyo. For providing materials used in this thesis, I would like to thank Fumoto Reiji of the Okinawa Pre- fectural Government, Maedomari Hiromori of the Ryūkyū Shimpō, Kōzuma Takeshi of the Urban Economic Research Institute (UERI), and Adachi To- shio of the office of Okinawa Affairs in the Cabinet Office. 25 CHAPTER 1 ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Japanese Political Actors and Institutions The economic changes that followed the period of high-speed economic growth [1954-73] resulted in the plu- ralization of interest groups. If one considers the ties be- tween interest groups on the one hand and administrative agencies of the central government and the zoku MPs in the LDP on the other to constitute the major nexus of the policy process, then this nexus, too, has become multidimensional (Abe et al. 1994: 50). The Constitution, which came into effect on 3 May 1947, transformed the prewar political system of Japan. In a country where the emperor was con- sidered a God, the new Constitution proclaimed that sovereign power re- sides with the people. Following Abraham Lincoln’s famous proposition in the Gettysburg Address of 1863, “government of the people, by the people and for the people,” the document stated in the preamble that “Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people.”25 The Consti- tution introduced separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. A democratic system was thereby es- tablished. The actual functioning of the democratic institutions was to un- dergo substantial changes parallel to those the Japanese economy and soci- ety would experience in the years after the Pacific War. In the system of public policy making in Japan in the 1990s, the primary actors included political parties, civil service and interests groups. Borrow- ing a term from American politics, the Japanese popular political commen- ________________ 25 The Japanese Constitution is available both in English and Japanese on the home page of the office of the Prime Minister. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_ government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (1.08.2006). 26 tary labeled the three as the “iron triangle.” While in the 1950s and 1960s the term was to some degree substantiated, in the 1990s policy making in Japan was characterized by “the existence of disaggregated policy communities, [and] of a multiplicity of iron triangles” (Curtis 1999: 54). In the Japanese political system, other political entities such as the emperor, the Diet, the prime minister and the cabinet, the courts, local governments, mass media, research and consulting institutions, etc., also constitute important parts. Their influence however varies across policy stages and policy areas, while some of them play only minimal roles in the policy process. 1. The Emperor and the Diet The 1947 Constitution assigned the emperor the role of “the symbol of the State and unity of the people,” which differs substantially from the pre-war position of the source of sovereign power. The emperor performs quite a wide range of duties, such as: attestation of the appointment and dismissal of the cabinet ministers (including the premier), of the chief judge of the Supreme Court and of the ambassadors previously designated by the Diet, promulgation of amendments of the Constitution and of other legal docu- ments (laws, cabinet orders and treaties), convocation of the Diet, dissolu- tion of the House of Representatives, proclamation of the Diet elections, awarding of honors, and receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers (art. 7). In reality however, the duties have only ceremonial significance and the emperor has not influence over their content. The Constitution itself explic- itly forbids the emperor to have any “power related to the government” (art. 4). The Imperial House Law further stipulates the rights and duties of the emperor and his family. The emperor never makes any comments on po- litical matters or participates in any kind of political negotiations (unlike, for example, the monarch in Thailand). In spite of that, as a symbol of Japan the emperor is highly respected by the majority of people. If there is any taboo in Japanese public life, it is the negative news about the emperor, the imperial family or the responsibility of Emperor Shōwa26 for the Pacific War (al- though there exist to some extent discussions on both topics).27 ________________ 26 Emperor Shōwa is known outside of Japan as Hirohito, which is his given name. Refer- ring to emperors, the Japanese never call them by their given names, but use the terms “the Emperor” (Tennō) or “His Majesty the Emperor” (Tennō Heika). Shōwa (Enlightened Peace) is the name of the era that Hirohito reigned over (1926-1989). It is also his posthumous name. The tradition of naming the era after the emperor and of giving the deceased a new name came from China and originally the two names differed. From the Meiji era (1968-1912), the two 27 According to the 1947 Constitution, “the highest organ of state power” is the Diet (Kokkai), which takes precedence over the executive branch (Richardson 1997: 127-151; Karolczak 1995). The Diet designates the prime minister from among the Diet members and the judges of the Supreme Court, approves the national budget, ratifies international treaties, and sets formal proposals for amending the Constitution. The Diet is divided into two chambers: the lower House of Representatives (Shūgiin), and the upper House of Councillors (Sangiin). The former has substantially greater author- ity, being able to introduce “no-confidence motions” against the cabinet (although the cabinet can also dissolve the House of Representatives) or pass a bill without the approval of the Upper House (if resubmitted to the House of Representatives and approved by two thirds of the members present). There are three categories of Diet sessions: ordinary, extraordinary, and special, of which the ordinary session, convened once a year in January (for 150 days), plays the central role. During that session, the Diet approves the next year’s budget and passes the laws necessary to implement it. The House of Representatives is composed of 480 members, of whom 300 are chosen in single-seat constituencies and 180 by proportional representa- tion. In the latter system the seats are distributed to party members accord- ing to the proportion of the vote received by the party in a given electoral block (there are 11 national blocs which according to size return between 6 and 30 members). The members of the House of Representatives are elected to four-year terms. The cabinet may dissolve the House before the end of a full term, which has been a common practice in Japan. The House of Coun- cillors has 252 members, of whom 100 are elected by proportional represen- tation in a single nationwide electoral district and 152 from 47 prefectural constituencies, each returning 2 to 8 members. The members of the Upper House are chosen for six-year terms. Half of the members are chosen every three years, and remain in their positions even in case of the dissolution of the Lower House. The basic electoral organizations of Japanese Diet members, and par- ticularly but not exclusively of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), are local support groups (kōenkai). That is not a party organization, which on the local level is weak (Curtis 1971: 126-178). The kōenkai function ________________ names became the same (although when referring to the monarch, Shōwa is always used in the phrase Shōwa Tennō or Shōwa Emperor). The present era of Emperor Akihito (reign 1989-) is called Heisei (Universal Peace). The year 2010 is Heisei 22. 27 There are a variety of tabloids that specialize in gossip, including ones about the royal family. Nevertheless, the tone of the reporting about the royal family in Japan is quite different from the scandalous style of that regarding, for instance, the British royal family. 28 as a pipeline through which Diet members can deliver benefits to constitu- ents and through which the support group can channel funds and other support to the legislator. The support groups, often divided into sub-groups, are presided over by the local assembly members. In big cities, the number of non-aligned voters has been on the increase, but in overrepresented rural areas, where old-style politics still prevail, the kōenkai are of special signifi- cance. In the paternalistic father-child relations (oyabun-kobun), local people are consistently loyal to their Diet member. In exchange, they become fa- vored recipients of a bigger share of government benefits. The most re- markable examples are the electoral districts in Niigata prefecture of the ex Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (1972-1974) and in Shimane prefecture of the ex Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru (1987-1989). The districts were at one time the top recipients of public works spending per capita nationally. The importance of local loyalties is also reflected in the practice of second gen- eration Diet members who “inherit” seats from fathers or fathers-in-law. Hence, as the popular saying goes, to win elections in Japan, one needs three bans: a well organized support group in the constituency (jiban), a briefcase full of money (kaban) and a recognizable name (kamban). Article 41 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that the Diet “shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.” In practice, however, Diet functions are of a limited nature. One of the problems is that the policy process in the Diet is very short. Strict time limitations are imposed by institutional cus- toms such as a long recess of the ordinary session in December and January, recess in the committees other than the budget committee, and fixed week- day deliberations. As a result, twelve out of 150 days of the ordinary session are available for each committee deliberation, and only 50 days, or 50-80 hours, a year for plenary sessions. Negotiations are conducted mostly in the Diet Affairs Committee of each party and the Diet steering committees of both houses – the Rules and Administration Committees. The Diet functions, therefore, primarily as “a checking, criticizing, and legitimizing mechanism” more than as a deliberative body (Knoke et al. 1996: 237; Iwai 1988: 126-131). On the other hand, the Diet is the place where the most dramatic events of Japanese politics take place. Almost as if to compensate for the quiet consensus- and harmony-oriented character of political negotiations in Ja- pan, the Diet provides the general public with political drama. Among the most spectacular are the tactics of the opposition parties to block controver- sial bills on which agreements could not have been reached. They include: the “cow walk” (gyūhō), the “sit-in” (suwarikomi) or even a physical assault on the chairperson of a given Diet committee in order to stop that person from announcing approval of the bill. The “cow walk” is a very slow walk in 29 the Diet during the voting on a bill. Each Diet member has to go the Speaker of the House and give his voting tag, white for “yes” and black for “no.” The walk takes hours since each member of the opposition party takes one step in one or more minutes. The sessions often last till early morning hours. This strategy is particularly effective when the Diet’s regular session is ap- proaching its end. The “sit-in” tactic is used for blocking entrances to the rooms of the Diet committees to prevent approval of a bill. The opposition party members usually sit down on the floor close to each other until they are removed by guards. All of these tactics, needless to say, are not usual methods of negotiations and are used only occasionally. Nevertheless, they spice up the political scene and draw public attention to particular policy problems. Both Houses of the Diet have a permanent committee system. Fourteen standing committees correspond to ministry functions, four others to the cabinet, audit, discipline and steering. Special committees correspond to agencies or concern some other special issues (e.g., disaster planning). The positions of the standing committee chair are apportioned based on party representation in the Diet and are appointed by the Speakers of the Houses. Among the committees, the most important are the Diet Steering Committee of both houses that control the passage of legislation through the Diet. The Committees set the schedule for debates and votes both in Diet committees and plenary sessions. Most importantly, decisions are made unanimously, which as discussed below, gives the opposition parties leverage in the form of a potential veto. In the Lower and Upper Houses of the Diet there exist Special Commit- tees for Okinawa and the Northern Territories (Okinawa Hoppō Mondai Iinkai). As the name indicates, the Committee deliberates bills relating to these two areas. The Committees were first establishes on 17 February 1967 as a Special Committee for Okinawa and other Issues and changed to the present name during the 50th Diet session on 3 August 1968. When the committees were created, Japan had not solved the territorial problems of the four northern islands and the Ogasawara islands for which comprehen- sive measures were necessary. The creation of the committee responded to those circumstances and thereby the committees deal with all territorial disputes and Okinawa issues at the same time. Like Diet functioning in general, the influence of the committee is of a limited nature in the process of policy making. Courts and Audits. The judicial system has not played, in general, an important role in Japanese policy making. It is comprised of the Supreme 30 Court, High Courts, District Courts, Family Courts and Summary Courts. The Supreme Court is vested with the highest judicial power, the authority to rule on constitutionality. The Court has tended in practice, however, to take a neutral position on political issues. This makes court procedures rather a formality, and has been labeled as “judicial passive-ism” or “judicial neutralism,” especially after political struggles in the 1950s (Muramatsu et al. 2001: 235-239). In every prefecture there is one District Court and Family Court, while the entire Japan is divided into nine regions with one High Court for each region. There is also the Board of Audit (Kaikei Kensain) which is a constitutionally independent organization to check the final ac- counts of the State and other public corporations and agencies. Like the courts, the Board has not become an important actor in policy making. 2. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet The cabinet is the supreme decision-making organ of the executive branch of government. It is headed by the prime minister and is comprised of not more than 17 ministers of state, including ministers without portfolios and the Chief Cabinet Secretary (for the structure of the Japan’s executive branch see Fig. A-2). More than half of the ministers have to be Diet members. The prime minister has the right to appoint and dismiss ministers of state (ko- kumu daijin), represent the cabinet, submit bills, report on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet, and also supervises various admin- istrative branches. The cabinet performs its duties through meetings (held on Tuesdays and Fridays), the agenda of which is coordinated through admin- istrative vice-ministers at a conference held one day before the cabinet meeting. The cabinet can issue cabinet ordinances (seirei), while the highest decisions, so-called Cabinet decisions (kakugi kettei), are reached unani- mously. This norm of unanimity, which is deeply rooted in Japanese culture, can be observed in various institutions discussed below. The underlying belief is that unanimous decisions produce better results because they en- force group cohesion. Moreover, all parties involved in the deliberation process partake in the decision, which makes them more committed to its execution. Consultations and negotiations among group members, so-called nemawashi,28 usually begin prior to the official decision, and can take a very long time. ________________ 28 Nemawashi or buttonholing is a common practice of broad consultations before taking action that literally means “binding the roots of a plant before pulling it out” (Vogel 1975: xii-xiii). 31 As part of administrative reforms, in January 2001 the executive branch underwent reorganization (Fig. A-2), in which twenty two ministries and one office of the prime minister (Sōrifu) were reduced to ten ministries and one office of the cabinet (Naikakufu). The reform strengthened the cabinet’s functions and the prime minister’s overall policy leadership. The cabinet is also comprised of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (Naikaku Hōseikyoku), the National Personnel Authority (Jinjiin) and the Security Council of Japan (Anzen Hōshō Kaigi). The Cabinet Secretariat is in charge of the arrangement of the cabinet agenda, general coordination of the policies, and the collection of information and research. The secretariat is headed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Naikaku Kambō Chōkan), one of the most influential positions in the government, known as “the wife of the prime minister” or “the guardian of the cabinet” (Gotōda 1990: 2). The Cabinet Legislation Bureau reviews proposed bills, drafts of Cabinet orders and treaties, and expresses legal opinions to the cabinet, the prime minister or each minister. In the absence of court decisions, the Bureau, as well as other ministries, has broad authority to interpret the law. National Personnel Authority is in charge of national civil service. The Security Council of Japan deliberates important matters on national defense and measures to be taken in case of emergencies. Taken together, the Cabinet Office, the ministries, agencies and commissions are known as the central government offices (chūō shōchō). The personnel of those offices up to administrative vice ministers are selected on the basis of national public service examinations, not political appointment. The public examination system was introduced to preserve political neutrality of the administrative organs. Formally, the prime minister is the most powerful actor in the executive branch, vested with the right to choose and change the ministers in the Cabinet. However, the leadership of the prime minister has been compli- cated by the division of formal institutional structures stipulated in the Constitution, informal structures that developed under the long-term LDP rule, as well as culturally-rooted norms, such as the seniority system (num- ber of elections to the Diet). The informal structure include factions and the “tribe” politicians within the LDP, bureaucratic sectionalism, the consen- sus-seeking tactics of the opposition parties employed in the Diet, and the influence of mass media. The seniority system is used to select members for the cabinet and party positions. Thus in reality, the prime minister has often been a “weak and passive figure” and not an important agenda setter (Ha- yao 1993: 201). At the same time, the prime minister can play a central role in bringing about change in policy “by taking a well-defined issue that is al- ready on the agenda and giving it enough energy to reach a resolution” 32 (Hayao 1993: 26-27). The prime minister posses several resources that vary from stage to stage. In the policy formation stage, he or she can influence the agenda by making public commitments, or by appointing people to gov- ernment councils responsible for developing proposals. In the legitimization stage, the prime minister can influence the decision by appointing people to important party and government posts, the latter right granted by the Con- stitution. The prime minister can also refer to the informal lever of backup by his faction (Hayao 1993: 189-191). Except for special cases nevertheless, the prime minister usually has to take into account the decisions of his party organs and opinions of the faction leaders and party elders (see chap. 2). In addition, there is a cultural preference in Japan for leadership that is not overly autocratic (Richardson 1997: 104). Under the Prime Minister Office, the Okinawa U.S. Base Problems Se- cretariat (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Mondai Jimukyoku) in the Cabinet Internal Affairs Office was created in June 1996 to supervise several discussion fo- rums for Okinawa-related issues. The office, renamed in September 1996 the Okinawa Affairs Office (Okinawa Mondai Tantōshitsu),29 supervised: (a) the Okinawa U.S. Base Problems Council (created by Prime Minister Mura- yama); (b) the Working Committee to Resolve Issues Concerning Total Re- turn of Futenma Air Station, known as the Futenma Task Force (Futenma Hikōjō no Henkan ni Kakawaru Sho Mondai no Kaiketsu no tame no Sagyō Iinkai), created on 8 May 1996; (c) a private advisory body to Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku, the Discussion Group Concerning Okinawa U.S. Bases Hosting Municipalities (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Shozai Shichōson ni Kansuru Kondankai), known as the Shimada Group after its chairperson Professor Shimada Haruo from Keio University, formed on 19 August 1996; and (d) the Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyōgikai) established in 1996, which served as the main forum for local-central discussions on lo- cal development policies (see chap. 5). These institutions functioned as the main channels of communication between the prefecture and the central government. Without them, the local government would have had to make requests to each ministry separately and decisions would be susceptible to bureaucratic, not political, control. ________________ 29 At its peak, the number of staff increased to fourteen people, but during the stalemate over the relocation issue in 1997 the number was cut to ten, and among five counselors on loan from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Defense Agency and Okinawa Development Agency, only two stayed (RSH 28.06.1998). 33 3. Political Parties The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Although not formally ascribed by provisions of law, political parties, and particularly the Liberal Democratic Party, have greatly influenced the policy process in Japan until 2009 when it lost power to the opposition Democratic Party (Minshutō). The LDP one-handedly held power between 1955 and 1993, and again between mid 1994 and 2009 in coalition with various parties (see Tab. A-1). The LDP is considered a “conservative” party but in expanding its base support, it be- came a catchall party in which interests across a broad spectrum are repre- sented. These interests include big business, small business (family-based), farmers, white-collar workers and those workers who do not belong to labor unions. The latter traditionally had supported opposition parties (discussed below). Within the LDP, the broadest powers are vested with the “big four”: the party president, the secretary general (kanjichō), and the two chairpersons of the Policy Research Council (Seimu Chōsakai, popularly abbreviated to Seichōkai) and the General Council (Sōmukai). The Policy Research Council is the main policy-making body, which conducts “research and initiates new policy measures.” The party regulations (art. 42, par. 2) stipulate that “all bills approved by the party have to be first deliberated at the Policy Research Council.” The Council exercises thereby enormous influence over the con- tent of the policies, and could be compared to the “pre-parliamentary legis- lative” institution (Richardson 1997: 68). The Council comprises twelve permanent divisions (bukai) that correspond to ministries, twenty-four re- search commissions (chōsakai), and fifty-nine special committees (tokubetsu iinkai) for deliberations and formulation of policies. At the same time, al- though various subunits of the Policy Research Council do exercise sub- stantial influence over the content of policies, the divisions rely to a high degree on information and data from the ministerial bureaus as the secre- tariats of the divisions employ only a few people (Nakano 1997: 237-238). On a regular basis therefore, the party organs and ministerial bureaus cooperate closely on preparing the policy proposals. Moreover, the chairing posts of the divisions are often occupied by the “tribe” Diet members, discussed be- low, and thus the factional struggles for those posts constitute an important element of intra-party politics. Within the Policy Research Council, a twenty-member Policy Delibera- tion Commission (Seichō Shingikai) makes final decisions on proposals submitted by each division. The proposals are forwarded then to the General Council for the final party decision. The Commission is comprised of mem- 34 bers30 who served as a cabinet minister or a chairperson of one of the divi- sions in the Policy Research Council. Among the commissions, the LDP Re- search Commission on the Tax System (Jimintō Zeisei Chōsakai, popularly known as Tōzeichō), chaired in the period under study by Yamanaka Sa- danori, is particularly influential, shaping the structure of the entire national tax system (Kishiro 1985: 77). The major decision-making body of the LDP is the General Council, which has to approve all legislative bills, the budget draft, and treaties sponsored by the cabinet, as well as appointments. The Council meets twice a week to decide on important policy matters and consists of 30 members.31 The meetings of the General Council, during which important administra- tive, diplomatic, political, economic and social problems are discussed, are also attended by all the major top executive members of the party.32 Other important elements of the party structure are factions (habatsu) and the “tribe” Diet members (zoku giin). The origins of the factions are at- tributed to the previous electoral system for the Lower House, the me- dium-sized, multi-member districts. It forced LDP candidates to compete against each other for seats in the same district (Masumi 1995: 205-232; Kohno 1997: 92-115). The primary purpose of the factions is: to select the party president who usually becomes Japan’s prime minister, to allocate the most important posts in the party, the cabinet and the Diet committees, and to financially support candidates in elections. The factions were formally disbanded in December 1994 due to the criticism that they were breeding grounds for money politics and corruption. They reappeared under a new name of study groups (kenkyūkai or kai). A faction has to have about forty members for its boss to become party president. Positions in the party and in the cabinet are distributed among the faction members based on the senior- ity system, namely, the number of times a given politician has been elected.33 Although there are exceptions to this rule, those decisions are usually highly contested, which proves that the system is still intact. Furthermore, the open ________________ 30 The Commission consists of: the chairperson, acting-chairperson and deputy chairper- son of the Policy Research Council, 15 members from the Lower House and 5 from the Upper House. 31 It included 15 members from the Lower House, seven from the Upper, and eight members that were selected by the party President from among members of both houses. 32 It included the Secretary General and the Chairpersons of the Policy Research Council, the Diet Affairs Committee, the Party Organization Headquarters, the Public Relations Headquarters, and the General Assembly of LDP Members in the Upper and Lower Houses. 33 For a House Committee member or vice chair of a Policy Research Council committee it has to be two times, for vice minister, three times, for chair of a Policy Research Council divi- sion, four times, for House Committee chair, five times, and for a minister, six or more times (Kohno 1997: 95). 35 conflicts between faction leaders have not been uncommon. The most fa- mous are the Kaku-Fuku war of Tanaka Kakuei (PM: 1972-1974) and Fukuda Takeo (PM: 1976-1978) in the 1970s, and the conflicts between Takeshita Noboru (PM: 1987-1989) and Shin Kanemaru (one of the most powerful kingmakers in LDP history), and Takeshita Noboru and Miyazawa Kiichi (PM: 1991-1993) in the 1980s. The Obuchi/Hashimoto faction, which is relevant to the period under study, was a successor to the Tanaka and Takeshita factions (later renamed Heisei Kenkyūkai or Heisei Study Group). It was the biggest faction in the Diet. In August 1996, the faction had 65 members in both Houses (out of a total of 315 LDP Diet members), in February 1997, 82 members (out of 350), and in August 1997, 84 members (out of 373). It included, among others, such prominent figures as: Obuchi Keizō, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Kajiyama Seiroku, Muraoka Kenzō, Nonaka Hiromu, Suzuki Muneo, Inoue Kichio, Sakano Shigenobu, Okabe Saburō, Matsuura Isao, Uesugi Mitsuhiro, and Okano Yutaka. As many as nine members from this faction joined the 19-member LDP Okinawa Special Research Council that actively partici- pated in deliberations on the All-Okinawa FTZ Plan (Nihon Seikei Shim- bunsha Aug. 1996: 407-409, Feb. 1997: 433-434, Aug. 1997: 432-434). The presence of such prominent party members testified to the importance of the Okinawa issue for the ruling party and its biggest faction at that time. The second important element of the LDP party structure, and one of the most significant in the entire policy making process in Japan, has been the “tribe” Diet members (zoku giin). The term zoku (literally “tribe”) refers to those LDP Diet politicians who possess significant influence in a specific field, and exercise that influence for the protection and benefit of particular interest groups or ministries.34 By commitment to the same policy area over a long time, the zoku politicians developed expertise and practical experience about that particular area and enough seniority in the party to have access on a continuous basis to the ministry in charge of the given policy (Curtis 1999: 53-55). Those policy areas cover not only the competence of one min- istry but also narrow issues within the ministry. There are, for instance, zoku for not only education, health, finance, agriculture, forestry, postal services, labor, construction, and transport, but also for air transportation, tobacco, and even sewage. The zoku politicians usually occupy the posts of chairper- sons of the LDP divisions and commissions in the Policy Research Council and also of the Diet committees (Satō et al. 1986: 93). For that reason, they ________________ 34 Nakamura Akio modified that perception adding that the function of the zoku Diet members is not only to represent and protect the interests of those particular groups but also to coordinate or even at times to curb their interests (Nakamura Akio 2001: 215-216). 36 ultimately shape the content of the policies that are formulated in the sub-units of the Council and in the Diet, although, as noted, usually in close cooperation with the ministerial bureaus (see also chap. 2). The channels of communication between the zoku and particular interest groups are usually well established. The zoku politicians function in general as “political agents of the special interests, intermediating between individuals and groups in civil society and the bureaucracy” (Curtis 1999: 53). The causes of the emergence of the zoku Diet members were attributed to several factors such as changes in the international environment and in do- mestic socio-economic structures that took place in the beginning of 1970s (Inoguchi et al. 1987: 21-29). As a result of those changes, Japanese society became more diverse and interest groups more pluralistic. To reflect those interests and gain support from them, and at the same time to gain leverage over the bureaucracy in negotiations, the LDP politicians gained knowledge and expertise in particular policy areas. As a consequence, the importance of the LDP and the Policy Research Council rose in relation to the bureaucracy that had dominated policy making in the years soon after the Pacific War. Among various zoku groups, the three most powerful are the trade and in- dustry tribe (shōkō zoku), the agriculture and forestry tribe (nōrin zoku) and construction tribe (kensetsu zoku), which, combined, were given the nick- name the “three honorable branch families” (gosanke) (Inoguchi et al. 1987: 182-182, 185-188, 192-194). The transport (unyu zoku) and finance tribes (ōkura zoku) that are relevant to this study belong, however, to a different category of zoku. They usually strongly support the policies of the related ministry, with many members of such tribe recruiting from among ex-bureaucrats of that ministry (Inoguchi et al. 1987: 189-192, 205-209). The second type of zoku usually represents, therefore, the opinions of their re- spective ministry. In the case of Okinawa, it is difficult to point to the existence of any par- ticular zoku group. Nevertheless, there existed inside the LDP a group of Okinawa sympathizers (Okinawa shimpa) or Okinawa experts (Okinawa tsū). The members of that group claimed deep involvement in the Okinawa issue, phrased as a “sentiment toward Okinawa” (Okinawa e no omoi) or “passion- ate sentiments for Okinawa” (Okinawa ni atsui omoi) (RSH 4.04.1999; 5.04.2000). They exercised, or at least publicly declared, their willingness to exercise political leadership in favor of the prefecture. The group was not unified and the media labeled particular politicians as Okinawa sympathiz- ers based on their long involvement in Okinawa related issues (e.g., Kaji- yama Seiroku, Nonaka Hiromu, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Obuchi Keizō). Among those “sympathizers” there were prominent zoku members, such as Yama- 37 naka Sadanori, the long-term boss of the LDP Research Commission on Tax System and the first Director General of Okinawa Development Agency. Yamanaka greatly influenced the policy process of the All-Okinawa FTZ Plan. The other LDP institutions in charge of Okinawa-related matters, dis- cussed in consecutive chapters, included the Okinawa Policy Subcommittee (Okinawa Taisaku Shōiinkai) within the Research Commission on the Tax System. The Subcommittee dealt with special tax measures introduced in the free trade and other special zones in Okinawa. The Okinawa Promotion Council (Okinawa Shinkō Iinkai), under which the provisional Okinawa Comprehensive Promotion Policy Special Research Council (Okinawaken Sōgō Shinkō Taisaku ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Chōsakai) was established, was in charge of development policies. Furthermore, the permanent Special Committee on Military Bases (Kichi Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai), as the name suggests, dealt with issues concerning military bases. In the period under study, the committee did not play an important role in regard to military bases in Okinawa as the consecutive prime ministers (Murayama and Hashimoto) took the initiative in regard to this matter. Details on the re- alignments and transfers of military bases in Okinawa were negotiated by U.S.-Japan inter-governmental committees (e.g., Special Action Committee on Okinawa or SACO). The number of intra-party institutions related to Okinawa proves the political significance of the prefecture for the ruling party in the period under study. The Opposition Parties. The 1990s in Japan was a period of sudden and very often unexpected changes, not only in the number of new parties es- tablished, but also in the types of alliances that were formed between them (see Tab. A-1). The term “opposition party” refers here to the non-LDP par- ties: Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyōsantō, 1922), the Japan Socialist Party (JSP),35 Clean Government Party (Kōmeitō, 1964, changed to Kōmei between 1994-1998), New Kōmeitō (Kōmei Shintō, 1994), Japan New Party (Nihon Shintō, May 1992-1994), New Party Sakigake (Shintō Sakigake, June 1993, changed to Sakigake in Oct. 1998), Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitō, June 1993-1994), New Vision Party (Shintō Mirai, April 1994), New Frontier ________________ 35 Japan Socialist Party, Nihon Shakaitō (JSP) changed its English name to Social Democ- ratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) in 1991 but the Japanese remained unchanged till 1996 when it became Shakai Minshutō or Shamintō as it is popularly known, Social Democratic Party. Thus, JSP refers to postwar period until 1991, JSP/SDPJ to 1991-1996, and SDP to after 1996. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) is a splinter of JSP formed by the right-wing members in 1960. 38 Party (Shinshintō, Dec. 1994-1998), Liberal Party (Jiyūtō, April-Dec. 1994),36 Democratic Party of Japan (Sept. 1996, Kan Naoto, Hatoyama Yukio), Liberal Party (Jiyūtō, 1998, Ōzawa Ichirō), and New Conservative Party (Hoshutō, 2000). Many of these parties formed coalition governments with the LDP becoming “a ruling party,” discussed in the following chapters (see Tab. A-1). Under the 38-year LDP rule, the role of the opposition parties was much stronger than one could expect from the fact that the LDP from 1955 to 1989 almost exclusively dominated both Houses.37 It has been referred to as the “implicit influence” (Iwai 1988: 122; Cox et al. 2000: 1-21) The power of the opposition parties lies in the norms and the structure of the Diet, which in- cludes the session system, the two chambers system and the committee sys- tem, all of which put “time” pressure on the ruling party (Iwai 1988: 126-139). Sessions are very short, and bills once introduced in a session automatically die unless passed by the Diet. The extension of the sessions is decided by the parliamentary factions in both houses of the Diet, customarily by a unani- mous decision. All of these enable the opposition to delay deliberations and therefore block bills if the LDP does not include their demands. Moreover, the schedules of the plenary sessions are decided by the Diet Committees on Rules and Administration (Giin Un’ei Iinkai) which comprises members of ruling and opposition parties – also customarily by a unanimous decision 90.38 As a result, the LDP and opposition parties have been cooperative in lawmaking. That can be observed in the high rate of agreement on cabinet bills, which has been on average 78.8% between 1947 and 1996, and in a higher rate of substantial revisions of cabinet bills (18.8%) which accommo- date demands from the opposition (Masuyama 1999: 297, 300). This be- hind-the-scenes policy coordination between ruling and opposition parties became institutionalized even to a higher degree under the consecutive coa- lition governments, with the cabinet of the Socialist Prime Minister Mura- yama securing 100% passage rate of cabinet-sponsored bills (Nonaka Naoto 2000: 109-117).39 ________________ 36 It was formed by former members of the LDP Watanabe faction. 37 The LDP secured a majority in the twelve elections to the House of Representatives elections between May 1958 and Feb. 1990, with only three exceptions (Dec. 1976, Oct. 1979, and Dec. 1983). 38 The recent study by Kawato Sadafumi (2002: 7-40) showed that the majority vote deci- sions have been increasingly gaining in significance since the 1980s. 39In this context, Ronald Hrebenar (2000: 302) commented that Japanese politics in the 1990s was characterized by a style of negotiations and compromise between LDP and other parties. 39 4. Civil Service The influence and importance of the civil service,40 popularly referred to in Japanese as bureaucracy or kanryō (without the pejorative connotation), has been widely acknowledged (Misawa 1967: 5-33; Masumi 1969). The civil service system was established in 1885 with the introduction of the cabinet system to Japan. The 1947 Constitution provides that the prime minister, representing the cabinet, exercises control and s