

Policies and Politics of the European Union

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Jarosław Jańczak

De-Europeanization and Counter-Europeanization as Reversed Europeanization. In Search of Categorization

1. Introduction

Acceleration of the European integration process in the last decades has led to increasing interest in mechanisms determining its pace and shape. A linear approach, characterized by one-direction developments, was the main approach for functional and neofunctional schools considering the *spill over* mechanism as the most convincing explanation for integration logic. This perspective was then undermined by more realistically oriented scholars, also concentrating on integration defeats. This resulted in the *spill around* and *spill back* models that – by also including unsuccessful elements – explained the process much more completely.

In a very similar way the concept of Europeanization was proposed, explaining how the European Union's beliefs, solutions and norms are planted at the national level. Further contributions have put into question the Europeanization process as a one-way phenomenon. However this seems to be much more rare approach. As Eduard Soler i Lecha marks investigating the reasons of such a situation, "*little attention has been paid to the process of «de-Europeanization»*" despite the fact, that "*Europeanization process can be followed by a de-Europeanization phases*"¹. He points to two reasons for this situation: the exceptional character of de-Europeanization in comparison to Europeanization mainstream and the tendency among scholars to stress successes in a project that is (usually) supported by them. Some researchers, however, treat Europeanization and de-Europeanization as two sides of the same process, labelling it (not necessarily intentionally) as (de)Europeanization². Even recognizing the non linear character of Europeanization, the *reverse process* is hardly categorized, usually named (and used) as de-Europeanization. This, notwithstanding, does not seem to be sufficient as forms and patterns of the reverse process differ significantly.

The aim of this article is to define and categorize the phenomenon of the reverse process of Europeanization. The main question addressed here is why Europea-

¹ E. Soler i Lecha, *Turkey's reluctant involvement in ESDP: Europeanisation as a round trip*, Second Global International Studies Conference (WISC) Ljubljana, July 23-26, 2008, p. 2.

² R. Amiya-Nakada, *From the 'Rescue of the Nation State' to the Emergence of European Spaces*, paper presented during at the EUIJ-Kansai Workshop on "New Research Horizons of the History of European Integration", May 10, 2008 in Toyonaka (Osaka), pp. 3-10.

nization is not of a linear character? The main thesis claims that reversed process results either from context factors or actor-actor interaction. Analyses will concentrate on the European Union (EU) and nation states as the most important players supplemented by sub-national actors creating state's policies.

This article develops already published works of the author, using parts and arguments of them to explain the presented phenomena³.

2. Europeanization

In order to define a reversed process, the initial process must be described. Despite the fact that many authors have been working on Europeanization, there has been no widely accepted definition of this process. Johan Olsen distinguishes five ways of understanding Europeanization: "*changes in external territorial boundaries; governance institutions developed at the supranational level; influencing and imposing supranational at the sub-national and national levels; exporting governance procedure and policy specific for EU beyond EU borders; and a project of a political nature aimed at intensifying the unification of the EU*"⁴. All of them link Europeanization with the European Union and assume a change going into "*more European*" character. As the main interest of this article is the relationships between the EU and nation states, the meaning of Europeanization will be narrowed and will follow Roberta Ladrech, who defines it as a process where "*EC political and economic dynamics [become a] part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making*"⁵. Similarly Johan Olsen, points out that Europeanization "*[...] implies adapting national and subnational systems of governance to a European political center and European-wide norms*"⁶. Change defined by adaptation to the EU standards seems to be the most important determinant of this process. Additionally two actors shall be recognized: *Europeanizationee* – the subject of Europeanization that is a state (with regard to the objects of Europeanization – polity, politics and policies as they are built by norms and ideas, institutions and other actors⁷) absorbing ideas and adapting them to the set level, and *Europeanizationeer* – the EU being a source of change and setting the level. *Europeanizationee* may be differentiated into four categories: EU member states, candidate states, neighbouring states and other states (Figure 1). Different Europeanization tools may be applied in each of the types and consequently different efficiencies may be achieved.

³ J. Jańczak, *Przeciweruropeizacja jako kategoria badawcza w studiach nad procesami integracji europejskiej*, [in:] *Europeizacja – mechanizmy, wymiary, efekty*, A. Paczeński, R. Riedel (eds.), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Oslo-Toruń-Wrocław 2010, pp. 93-105.


⁴ K. E. Howell, *Developing Conceptualisations of Europeanization: Synthesising Methodological Approaches*, Queen's Papers on Europeanization, no. 3, 2004, p. 8.

⁵ R. Ladrech, *The Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France*, "European Journal of Common Market Studies", no. 1, 1994, pp. 69-88.

⁶ J. P. Olsen, *The Many Faces of Europeanization*, ARENA Working Papers, WP 01/2, p. 3.

⁷ J. Jańczak, *Przeciweruropeizacja jako...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

Figure 1. Europeanization



Source: Author's concept.

In the case of member states, Europeanization results from both legal norms transference as well as social-constructivistly understood changes in identity. This process seems to be the *easiest one* due to the legal-institutional character of the EU's mechanisms and high level of interrelations.

Candidate states are exposed to a conditionality mechanism – in order to be accepted to the European club they have to fulfil specific conditions – adjust elements of their own systems to the EU standards. Europeanization is often then of external character. Its efficiency is relatively high, but mainly due to the *stick and carrot* mechanism. Additionally it might mean only imitation of the original solutions, as the ideas originating from the European centers do not necessarily meet local conditions⁸.

Neighbouring states are exposed to Europeanization by policies addressed to them (e.g. European Neighbourhood Policy). In case of less developed neighbours (compared to the EU average) there are some elements following the conditionality mechanism, however much weaker than in the case of candidates (as much less is offered to them). More developed states in the neighbourhood are usually bound by various agreements imitating full membership and consequently stimulating Europeanization (e.g. Norway, Iceland, Switzerland).

Other states are a subject of bilateral relations and Europeanization is limited here to the persuasion in given fields, e.g. human rights protection, environmental problems and democracy promotion.

3. Reverses in Europeanization

Eduard Soler i Lecha defines de-Europeanization “as a process in which previous impetus to converge with EU norms and the willingness to get involved in EU policies slows down and can even take an opposite direction. The most radical form of de-Europeanization

⁸ *Transformation of Ideas on a Periphery*, J. Kanerva, K. Palonen (eds.), Helsinki 1987, p. 9.

would imply that [...] country, not only decides to stop complying the EU *acquis* and stops any reform in that direction but e.g. even uses its assets in order to hamper the elections"⁹. He claims that one reason domestic actors can overturn the Europeanization process, among others, is when costs are too high compared to gains¹⁰. Similarly this article's author claims in his previous works that counter-Europeanization is the "influence of territorial and systemic contexts [...], that results in reverse (slowing down, stopping or regress) of European transformation of a system"¹¹.

Two names are applied here: de-Europeanization and counter-Europeanization. Their usage suggests a very similar meaning containing three possible scenarios (slow down, stop or going back) and assumes that both may result from similar sources. It will be claimed however in this article, that for analytical purposes, differentiation of both concepts is justified because of their meaning and the mechanisms behind it.

Systematization of de-Europeanization and counter-Europeanization requires first of all defining both concepts. It is intended then first, to investigate the semantic character of both words and then to interpret them in the field of Europeanization.

De-Europeanization and counter-Europeanization are grammatically built on the basis of the already described concept of Europeanization and prefixes changing its meaning. Both prefixes, *de-* and *counter-*, play a semantic role based on reversal of the original state/process. However their meaning is different. *De-* is "used to indicate privation, removal, and separation"¹². It indicates that something is "opposite (deindustrialization = becoming less industrial)", and at the same time "removed (debone the fish = remove its bones) or reduced (the government have devalued the currency)"¹³. *Counter-*, on the other hand, is used as "contrary to the right course; in the reverse or opposite direction" in the meaning of "in opposition or response to"¹⁴. It means then "done or given as a reaction to something, especially to oppose it (e.g. counteract = to reduce or prevent the bad effect of something, by doing something that has the opposite effect)"¹⁵.

De- implies then that specific state was achieved/existing in the given field and concentrates on its erosion. In political science it has been recently used to describe e.g. erosion of Russian and Soviet systems in Central and Eastern Europe: de-Russification¹⁶ and de-Sovietisation¹⁷. *Counter-* focuses on reaction and its direction opposing specific action. Political scientists apply it e.g. in studying revolutions

⁹ E. Soler i Lecha, *Turkey's reluctant involvement...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 4, 10.

¹¹ J. Jańczak, *Przeciwoeuropeizacja jako kategoria...*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

¹² *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language. Second Edition*, New York 1987, p. 551.

¹³ *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*.

¹⁴ *The Random House Dictionary of...*, *op. cit.*, p. 461.


¹⁵ *Longman Dictionary of...*, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ S. Bychkov Green, *Language of Lullabies: The Russification and De-Russification of the Baltic States*, "Michigan Journal of International Law", vol. 19, no. 219, 1997.

¹⁷ E. Rindzeviciute, *From Authoritarian to Democratic Cultural Policy: Making Sense of De-Sovietisation in Lithuania after 1990*, "The Nordic Journal of Cultural Policy", vol. 12, no. 1, 2009.

as counter-revolutions¹⁸. The semantic meaning of de-Europeanization (Figure 2) stresses then reduction of Europeanization (often to the previously existing state, sometimes to the new one) as a process and expresses transformation from an already existing European level towards non-(less-)European.


Figure 2. De-Europeanization



Source: Author's concept.

The semantic meaning of counter-Europeanization (Figure 3) underlines reaction to Europeanization as a form of interaction. Here there is a tension not only between European and non-European norms and values but also between the original and new solutions.

Figure 3. Counter-Europeanization



Source: Author's concept.

Consequently, the earlier concept assumes that the erosion is caused by a set of factors, the second claims that there are actors acting and actors reacting – opposing the first ones. Additionally, the first of the schemes is two-dimensional as de-Europeanization – being a process – requires time. The second is one-dimensional, reaction does not analyze changes in time.

In the case of reversed Europeanization both prefixes approach the problem differently.

¹⁸ F. Morrow, *Revolution and counter-revolution in Spain, including The civil war in Spain*, Pathfinder Press, New York 1974.

4. De-Europeanization

De-Europeanization concentrates on becoming less European, reducing the already achieved/existing level. Sometimes it is used in a non-EU context: it is considered as a process affecting non-European states with European roots and cultural-political heritage (however not resulting from the EU led Europeanization but from previous developments). For example “*Argentina, through the MERCISUR project for regional integration, established new relationships with the peripheral countries of South America, particularly with Chile, Uruguay and Brazil. In this way, Argentina was taking part in ‘a process of Latin-Americanisation’ [and] de-Europeanization*”¹⁹. Latin-Americanization then is a manifestation of de-Europeanization – removal of European identity elements in favour of the new, regional ones. This approach however – as not related to the European integration process – will be skipped in further discussions.

In the case of EU related erosion of the already achieved/existing state of issues, de-Europeanization may be observed in various fields. Here the central question then is how the reduction is manifested and what factors model its shape? It will be claimed that several forms may be observed: refocusing, customization, priority re-setting and withdrawal.

4.1. Refocusing

Refocusing is a manifestation of the *softest* reduction of an already achieved level. It is visible in a situation where the already achieved public interest in the European integration is reduced and replaced either by the old agenda or the new topics. This is visible e.g. in mass media. As field studies prove, de-Europeanization of the public sphere is considered as a contradiction to the “*normative assumption that political and economic European integration should be accompanied by increasing media attention for other European countries*”²⁰, and empirically it is visible in the decreasing interest of national media of some EU members in other European states and the EU.

Refocusing is visible especially in the EU member states and intensifies in post-accession periods.

4.2. Customization

The second manifestation of de-Europeanisation is customization²¹. It is based on adjusting the Union to its own needs, making it more useful from the national point

¹⁹ P. González Bernaldo, F. Jedlicki, *Representations of Europe among Argentine migrants in Spain*, Visions of Europe in the World, EuroBroadMap, Work Package 3: Migrants and Borders, Draft version – 30th March 2009, p. 6.

²⁰ C. Brantner, A. Dietrich, F. Saurwein, *Europeanisation of National Public Spheres: Empirical Evidence from Austria*, Draft version 1.0 prepared for presentation at the First European Communication Conference 24-26 November 2005, Amsterdam, p. 24.

²¹ H. Ojanen, *How to Customise Your Union: Finland and the “Northern Dimension of the EU”*, “Northern Dimension Yearbook”, 1999, pp. 13-14.

of view by its own constructive propositions. Territorially it may be expressed e.g. by proposing dimensions to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and in this way making the Union more northern²², eastern²³ or southern²⁴. In the case of system influence, it is based on penetration of the EU with norms, values and solutions of a given state and consequently *X-ization* of the EU instead of Europeanization of state X is specific field. Nordization of the European alcohol approach could be given as an example here²⁵.

Customization is usually the case of member states, however some attempts may be already identified during the accession negotiation phase. It brings the solutions back partly to the previously existing state, partly however introducing new ones.

4.3. Priority resetting

Priority resetting affects states that after successes in Europeanizing specific fields are going back to the previous solutions or prefer the new alternatives over the European ones. It results from the fact that initial enthusiasm was not supplemented by expected gains or costs incurred proved to be too high. Consequently new priorities, reducing the previous European ones, are set and implemented.

De-Europeanization in this manifestation does not have to be limited to one field, it may be a more general tendency. Germany is, according to some researchers, in the process of de-Europeanization²⁶, visible especially in the post-Kohl period²⁷. It is understood as a "*process of change which is most significantly marked by changing German decisions and policies as well as change in Germany's Europeanized identity in such a way that state interests are accorded precedence over (state-transcending) 'European' interests*"²⁸. In the case of new member states, priority resetting may result from imitation when a conditionality mechanism is applied. When the *stick* is no longer there, return to the previous solutions is visible.

²² W. Wessels, *Introduction: The Northern Dimension as a challenging task*, [in:] *Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP*, G. Bonvicini, T. Vaahtoranta, W. Wessels (eds), Helsinki 2000.

²³ M. Łapczyński, *The European Union's Eastern Partnership: Chances and Perspectives*, "Caucasian Review of International Affairs", vol. 3(2), Spring 2009.

²⁴ A. Lorca, *The Mediterranean Union: A Union in Search of a Project*, Working Paper, no. 13, 2008.

²⁵ P. Kurzer, *Can Scandinavian member States play a leadership role in the EU? The case of alcohol control policy*, "Scandinavian Studies", Fall 2002.

²⁶ P. Buras, "Europa uda się wspólnie". *Zmiany w niemieckiej polityce europejskiej a rola Niemiec w Unii Europejskiej*, "Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny", no. 1, 2007, pp. 36-38.

²⁷ W. E. Paterson, *Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?*, "European Research Working Paper Series, University of Birmingham", no. 15, 2006, p. 17.

²⁸ G. Hellmann, *Lamed Power: Germany and European Integration*, [in:] *Germany's EU Policy on Asylum and Defence. De-Europeanization by Default?*, G. Hellmann (ed.), Houndmills, Basingstoke 2006, pp. 166.

In sectoral policies de-Europeanization is described as “*impossible in highly EU institutionalised areas, like trade policy*”²⁹, but occurring in the less organised areas such as Common Foreign and Security policy, where e.g. some of the members prefer to support the United States than to continue backing the EU’s position on specific international issues.

De-Europeanization does not have to affect only member states of the EU. Sometimes candidates are for a long time – such as Turkey – adopting European solutions but the *carrot* (membership) is still not offered³⁰. This leads to disappointment and looking for alternatives (Turkey as a bridge between the West and the East, Turkey as a Middle East power, etc.). Also neighboring states may experience reduction as the priorities change. Post-Orange-Revolution Ukraine introduced several democratic reforms. Unrequited aspirations for opening the European window led to the pro-Russian camp’s return to power and redefinition of political aims resulting in a decrease of some of the already achieved solutions.

4.4. Withdrawal

The most far-reaching example of de-Europeanization as a reduction of already reached solutions is withdrawal from the EU. It might be visible in leaving the Community (for example as Greenland decided to do in 1986³¹) or not entering after negotiating and signing the accession treaty (e.g. Norway that two times, after reaching compromise on entry conditions, stayed outside as the result of referenda³², finally participating in some forms of the European integration such as the Schengen zone or European Economic Area). Some sectoral withdrawals are also presently discussed, e.g. leaving the Eurozone and reintroducing their previous currency (debate in Slovakia).

Reduction refers in this example again to the member states and candidates.

4.5. Towards a de-Europeanization model

De-Europeanization, understood as erosion of an already achieved/existing level (in the process of Europeanization), affects mainly those states where the EU influences have been the strongest: members and candidates. In two other categories it is much less observable. It is manifested in at least the four described ways, where the most se-

²⁹ G. Escribano, A. Lorca, *The Ups and Downs of Europeanisation in External Relations: Insights from the Spanish Experience*, “Perceptions”, Winter 2004-2005, p. 156.

³⁰ H. Hubel, *The EU’s Three-level game in dealing with Neighbours*, “European Foreign Affairs Review”, no. 9, 2004, p. 358.

³¹ S. Berglund, *Prison or Voluntary Cooperation? The Possibility of Withdrawal from the European Union*, “Scandinavian Political Studies”, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, pp. 156-160.

³² T. Bjørklund, *The Three Nordic 1994 Referenda Concerning Membership in the EU*, “Cooperation and Conflict”, vol. 31, no. 1, 1996.

rious – withdrawal – is the least frequent one. Reduction brings the given field back to the previous solutions or proposes new ones, still alternatives to the EU propositions.

When trying to answer the question of factors modelling de-Europeanization two explanations may be proposed:

De-Europeanisation happens *by-default*³³. This approach stresses its character as a not-intentionally led project (that then does not follow realistic perspective), but rather a consequence of changing contextual factors. Erosion is the outcome of new conditions.

An alternative approach would concentrate on initiators as those who give impetus to the destruction process. This perspective leads directly to the counter-Europeanization concept.

5. Counter-Europeanization

Counter-Europeanization focuses on the reactions of some actors that intend to oppose/reverse the experienced process. *Counter-Europeanizationers* means actors who react and oppose the Europeanization process. Who counteracts? At least three types of players may be enumerated: inter-system, inter-European and external³⁴.

5.1. Inter-system actors

Inter-system actors are visible especially among the EU member states, candidate states and – much less – neighbouring and other states. In the group of member states and candidate states, Euro-skeptically³⁵ oriented institutional and non-institutional actors dominate. They might be governments, political parties³⁶, churches, interest groups, social groups and even individuals. Euro-skepticism is usually driven by political and social cleavages expressing modernist – anti-modernist divisions (mainly Central European members³⁷ and candidates) or deepening – weakening of integration (mainly Northern members³⁸ but also developed neighbours).

The earlier idea based on the assumption shared by parts of society and elites is that local, original order is in fact much better than the new one coming from the European centers. Counter-Europeanization was then expressed e.g. in a negative campaign before accession referenda or slowing down ratification of the Lisbon

³³ G. Hellmann, R. Baumann, M. Boesche, B. Herborth, W. Wagner, *De-Europeanization by Default? Germany's EU Policy in Defense and Asylum*, "Foreign Policy Analysis", no. 1, 2005, p. 150.

³⁴ J. Jańczak, *Przeciw europeizacji jako kategoria...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105.

³⁵ T. Beichelt, *Euro-Scepticism in the New Member States*, "Comparative European Politics", vol. 2, no. 1, 2004.

³⁶ V. A. Schmidt, *Democracy in Europe: the EU and national politics*, Oxford 2006, p. 216.

³⁷ M. Deborah, E. D. Stevick, *Europeanization in the 'other' Europe: writing the nation into 'Europe' education in Slovakia and Estonia*, "Journal of Curriculum Studies", vol. 41, no. 2, 2009.

³⁸ T. Tiilikainen, *Europe and Finland. Defining the Political Identity of Finland in Western Europe*, Aldershot/Hants 1998.

treaty. Sometimes a specific solution is implemented but without *real understanding*, only imitating the original idea³⁹.

The latter reacts to the sovereignty losses that is one of the main values in the northern political culture⁴⁰. Additionally, in the case of candidate states, one more phenomenon might be found: the already mentioned reaction to the unsatisfying pace of negotiation. As the example of Turkey proves a too long and difficult entry to the EU, together with the lack of realistic membership perspective might result in a tendency of counter proposals – regional integration around other norms, values and solutions – offered by disappointed actors.

In the case of neighboring and other states internal actors, their reaction results from local specifics and often competition towards the EU. In neighboring states representing a higher level of development than the EU standards, the model is similar to the member states. In case of the other sub-categories, very often opposition towards everything that originates from Europe is considered as rooted in European colonialism and anti-colonial movements. European influences are then on the one hand weak due to lack of effective Europeanization tools, and on the other are structurally opposed because of existing legacies. The changing global order, with the diminishing role of Europe additionally encourages and strengthens the reaction of internal actors, who became heirs of a long lasting local tradition of resistance.

5.2. Inter-European actors

A traditional division of actors influencing specific processes would contain internal (inter-system) and external players. However the EU as a political unit as well as European integration as a process has led to a situation where except from those two, additional, inter-European actors shall be enumerated. They combine external (from the perspective of the member state) and internal (belonging to the European inner-space) elements. As examples Euro-skeptic factions of the European Parliament shall be mentioned as well as pan-European Euro-skeptic political parties that stand for seats in Euro-elections, e.g. Libertas⁴¹. They are *counter-Europeanizationers* using Europeanized circumstances of the EU's political system.

5.3. External actors

External actors dominate among the neighboring states (those representing a lower level of development than the EU) as well as the other states. They are usually states

³⁹ G. Dimitrova, *The limits of Europeanization: Hegemony and its misuse in the political field of Bulgaria*, "Southeast European and Black Sea Studies", vol. 2, no. 2, 2002.

⁴⁰ T. Tiilikainen, *Europe and Finland. Defining the Political Identity of Finland in Western Europe*, Aldershot/Hants 1998.

⁴¹ P. Manow, *National Vote Intention and European Voting Behavior, 1979-2004 Second Order Election Effects, Election Timing, Government Approval and the Europeanization of European Elections*, "MPIfG Discussion Paper", no. 11, 2005.

or non-state actors (often representing states' interests however). They usually oppose Europeanization in some other territories that are considered by them as their influence or interest zones. They are motivated either by interests or by ideology. Very often those zones correspond with the civilizational divisions in Huntingtonian meaning⁴². In case of neighbors, Eastern European and North African states shall be enumerated. They belong accordingly to the Orthodox and Muslim civilizations (considered as the original ones) with different than European norms, values and solutions. The EU competes there with Moscow or Teheran that try to strengthen counter-Europeanization movements with the help of both direct assistance and indirect influences (religious movements, language policy, activity of various organizations, etc.). Europeanization is seen then as a manifestation of European imperialism and conflict with non-European civilizations, with the battlefield on the territory of the EU neighboring states, belonging originally to non-EU space.

In case of other states where external actors dominate, Asian and African ones shall be mentioned. Russian and Chinese involvement offers states of both regions alternative solutions, usually supported with investment/aid instruments. Especially the economic expansion of China into Africa, which is not limited by political constraints, contradicts European demands for democratization that preconditions financial aid. This results in African states preferring Chinese investors and the Chinese government is considered as an easier (one that does not require changes but often even maintains local autocratic solutions) and more effective partner, especially compared to the difficult EU. Additionally, change is not necessary so original solutions norms and values might be preserved.

Other states and external actors examples could again be analyzed as a manifestation of the changing global order. Europe (as part of the Western World) is no longer the leading power worldwide. The polycentric model is also reflected in the fact that European influences are opposed in different parts of the globe by other emerging powers with growing aspirations and potential enabling them to implement those aspirations.


5.4. Towards a counter-Europeanization model

Summarizing the presented categorization, it might be stated that analysis of negative reaction to Europeanization from the point of view of reacting actors leads to their differentiation into internal and external ones (Figure 4).

Internally driven counter-Europeanization dominates in the member states and candidates as well as neighbors partly. External actors oppose Europeanization in EU neighbor states as well as other states.

⁴² S. P. Huntington, *Zderzenie cywilizacji*, Warszawa 1997.

Figure 4. Internal and external counter-Europeanization



Source: Author's concept presented in: J. Jańczak, *Przeciwoeuropeizacja jako kategoria badawcza w studiach nad procesami integracji europejskiej*, [in:] *Europeizacja – mechanizmy, wymiary, efekty*, A. Paczeński, R. Riedel (eds.), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Oslo–Toruń–Wrocław 2010, p. 105.

6. Conclusions

Approaching Europeanization as a non-linear phenomenon leads to differentiation of the reversed process into de-Europeanization and counter-Europeanization. While the former focuses on erosion (in the given context), the latter stresses interaction (between actors Europeanizing and opposing Europeanization). De-Europeanization then is much more visible among the member states and candidates, where Europeanization has reached a specific level. Counter-Europeanization on the other hand is also similarly visible in neighboring and other states, however their sources differ and may come from inside and outside. Internal reaction dominates again among the EU member states, candidates and partly neighbors, external reaction is relevant in neighbors and other states.

The systematization of reaction to Europeanization presented in this text does not end the debate and requires further research. One of the most important elements for further investigation seems to be the interrelation between counter-Europeanization and de-Europeanization.