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# Bordering the Other

Mutual Relations of Poland and Germany  
from a Multidisciplinary Perspective



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## Introduction

Polish-German relations have been undergoing constant transformation for the last twenty years. The initial distrust, resulting from the historical developments of World War II, a semi-concluded border dispute and ideologically motivated conflicts, was replaced in the 1990s with politically conditioned normalization and reconciliation. This top-down process, aimed at the recognition of a peaceful and united Germany on the one hand and Poland's membership of the European Union on the other, soon also affected Polish and German citizens. But the changes in mutual perception and attitudes towards each other were considered much more demanding than the political normalization inspired by the elite.

The first phase of the above-described phenomenon was assumed to be completed by the eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004. Poles and Germans became a part of the same community, united not only by (most of) the four freedoms of the common market and the legal and institutional structures of the EU, but also by the awareness of belonging to the same space determined by specific political, cultural and civilizational norms. This was demonstrated in 2007 by the enlargement of the Schengen zone and the elimination of permanent border controls between both states. The dominant one-way logic of further development was however stifled by the 2005 elections in Poland and Germany bringing into power new forces that formed new ruling coalitions in both states. This resulted in strains in bilateral relations along the Berlin-Warsaw axis. The previously visible common interest in European matters started to erode. Additionally, some Poles and Germans started to be confronted with the issues that seemed to belong to the previous era: the commemoration

of post-war expulsion, labor market opening constraints, organization of relations with Russia and the asymmetry of potentials for further collaboration. A survey revealed a surprising fact for many: in 2007, of all EU states, Poland had the weakest relations with Germany. Twenty-three percent of Germans declared that they did not like Poland<sup>1</sup>. Fifty-six percent of Germans evaluated Polish policies as anti-German in the same year<sup>2</sup>. Forty three percent of Poles claimed that mutual relations were worse than in previous years<sup>3</sup>.

All this led to new types of reflections on mutual interrelations between Poland and Germany, as well as between Poles and Germans. Political debate was soon reflected in increased academic interest in the field. Many scholars attempted to measure, describe and predict the development of these interrelations, applying different disciplines and research methods and investigating different age and social groups in both states. For example, in the years 2001-2002 Instytut Badań nad Podstawami Demokracji [Institute for Research on the Foundations of Democracy] conducted a sociological research project on young Poles and Germans published four years later in the form of a volume edited by Krzysztof Kosela and Bernadette Jonda<sup>4</sup>. The Institute of Public Affairs monitored opinions on Poles and Poland among the Germans from 2000-2006<sup>5</sup>, and the perception of Germans in Polish eyes from 2000-2005<sup>6</sup>, it also investigated Polish opinions on bilateral relations after the governments changed in both countries in 2005<sup>7</sup>. In 2006, the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) presented one of its reports

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<sup>1</sup> Mannheimer Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> TNS Emnid for "Rzeczpospolita", June 22-23, 2007.

<sup>3</sup> M. Kochnowicz, *Polak Niemiec dwa bratanki*, "Gazeta Wyborcza", June 28, 2007.

<sup>4</sup> *Młodzi Polacy i młodzi Niemcy w Nowej Europie*, J. Kosela, B. Jonda (eds.), Warszawa 2005.

<sup>5</sup> M. Fałkowski, A. Popko, *Niemcy o Polsce i Polakach 2000-2006. Główne wnioski z badań*, The Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2006.

<sup>6</sup> M. Fałkowski, *Razem w Unii. Niemcy w oczach Polaków 2000-2005*, The Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2006.

<sup>7</sup> *Opinie Polaków o stosunkach polsko-niemieckich po zmianie rządów w obu krajach. Komunikat z badań*, The Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2005.

on opinions surrounding Polish-German relations<sup>8</sup>. In 2005, Agnieszka Kołodziej-Durnaś analyzed the possibilities of synergy of Polish and German organization cultures, proposing a different perspective and aspects of investigation<sup>9</sup>. In 2007, a political science approach was applied by Bogdan Koszel and his team in a volume on the new faces of partnership<sup>10</sup>. In 2008, Beata Pająk wrote a comparative monograph on Polish and German democracy<sup>11</sup>. Several publications on political culture in both states were prepared. Among others, in 2007, Gerd Meyer, Stanisław Sulowski and Wojciech Łukowski published a book in this field<sup>12</sup>. In the following year Anna Wolf-Powęska published a monograph on the culture of politics and memory in both states<sup>13</sup>. Wolfgang Michalka and Reinhard Schmook presented a volume on the history of neighborhood<sup>14</sup>.

The present volume belongs to the above-described trend for analysis of Polish-German interrelations in the years following 2005. However it aims at bringing a new quality to the body of research through form and method.

First of all, it is of Polish-German character both institutionally and individually. It is a result of the collaboration of the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland and Fachhochschule für Verwaltung und Rechtspflege in Berlin, Germany, together with Collegium Polonicum – a joint Polish-Ger-

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<sup>8</sup> *Opinie o stosunkach polsko-niemieckich. Komunikat z badań*, Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, Warszawa 2006.

<sup>9</sup> A. Kołodziej-Durnaś, *Pogranicze integrujące się – czy synergia polskiej i niemieckiej kultury organizacji jest możliwa?*, [in:] *Transgraniczność w perspektywie socjologicznej. Nowe pogranicza?*, Ż. Leszkowicz-Baczyńska (ed.), Zielona Góra 2005.

<sup>10</sup> *Polacy i Niemcy w XXI wieku. Nowe oblicza partnerstwa*, B. Koszel (ed.), Poznań 2007.

<sup>11</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka. Tradycja, teraźniejszość, perspektywy*, Poznań 2008.

<sup>12</sup> G. Meyer, S. Sulowski, W. Łukowski, *Kultura polityczna w Polsce i w Niemczech: wybrane problemy*, Warszawa 2007.

<sup>13</sup> A. Wolf-Powęska, *Polacy-Niemcy. Kultura polityczna, kultura pamięci*, Poznań 2008.

<sup>14</sup> *Schwierige Nachbarn? 300 Jahre deutsch-polnische Nachbarschaft*, W. Michalka, R. Schmook (eds.), Berlin 2007.

man academic institution. Therefore, the research team consisted of Polish and German scholars, specializing and experienced in German and Polish studies respectively.

Second, it is interdisciplinary in its approach, combining a historical perspective with a sociological, political science, cultural and anthropological approach. It was assumed in the project that Polish-Germans interrelations – being an extremely complex phenomenon – cannot be effectively explained in terms of a single discipline. Additionally, the English language was decided to be the language of publication. The intention was to overcome the limitations of the potential audience resulting from the fact that the majority of publications on Poland and Germany are published either in Polish or in German. This also allows for mutual interrelations to be considered not only as a local phenomenon but as a part of wider processes happening in Europe.

Finally, the book was intended to combine theoretical reflections with empirical findings. Poll-based research was conducted in both states using a relatively large sample, however it was not intended to be representative. Instead, different locations and age groups were to be reached. Detecting tendencies in specific groups was considered more important than obtaining a statistically correct picture of both societies.

We believe that the present volume will contribute to the Polish-German debate and will be an inspiration for many readers, leading to critical reflection as well as providing incentive for further research. We also hope that it will enable students and researchers from English speaking countries to explore a topic that has hitherto been closed off to them.



## Chapter 1.

### Comments on methodology

The present study is a comparative survey with all the resulting consequences. It is assumed in methodological literature that the essence of such surveys is to attempt to explain phenomena via their reasons. This means that when we observe the differences in behaviors, attitudes, or systems of values presented by the members of surveyed communities, we seek the reasons for those differences. Kazimierz Słomczyński emphasizes that international surveys, accompanied by historical ones, play a fundamental role in sociology. Their specific nature firstly concerns the fact that a given country is most often treated as a unit of observation; secondly, a given country or unit of observation is treated as context of internal processes, and thirdly, a given country is treated as an element, part of an international system. "In all these exemplary cases the specificity of intercountry comparative surveys is related to the fact that the data concerning countries are significant in the process of explanation since they refer to a certain system as a whole"<sup>1</sup>.

In the survey presented in this paper a country is treated as a unit of observation. The authors of the survey made this variable one of the most important independent variables, alongside the respondents' age.

The authors of every comparative survey encounter the issue of adequacy, time, the subject, investigation tools, and the objects of survey. Comparative surveys are usually assessed with respect to the criterion of comparability, called equivalence. Słomczyński distinguishes three kinds of equivalence. Firstly, the object equivalence, i.e. the equivalence of the units of observation with respect to the issues that are sig-

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<sup>1</sup> K. M. Słomczyński, *Międzynarodowe badania porównawcze*, [in:] *Encyklopedia socjologii*, vol. 2, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 1999, p. 238.

nificant for the survey. If our interest concerns the interdependence between the levels of social and economic development we can only compare the countries where relevant data are accessible. The issue of equivalence of measurement is most frequently encountered in surveys at the level of design of an investigation tool, such as a form of questionnaire or interview. The authors of the present survey faced this problem, in particular when requesting Polish and German respondents to indicate and assess the most important events in the history of mutual relations from the point of view of the impact they had on the mutual image. A similar problem emerged when seeking a German equivalent of a Polish proverb “As long as the world is whole, no German will be a brother to a Pole”. The issue of equivalent stimuli in the case of international surveys can refer to the search for comparative stimuli only. The third type of equivalence is temporal-and-process equivalence. It is an assumption that the objects of a survey are at the same stage of development (e.g. the respondents are of the same age, comparable places of residence). In the case of international comparative surveys it is most difficult to meet this criterion due to social and cultural differences that shaped the respondents. Let us assume that the objective of the survey is to establish regularities in the emergence of civic societies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. In this case we need to decide whether to investigate this process at the same time in different countries of the former Eastern Bloc or in every country separately. With respect to this particular study this problem could apply to a survey of political culture in Poland or in Eastern Germany, yet the authors purposefully chose to abandon a deeper analysis of this issue.

The authors of international comparative surveys relatively often refer to the convergence theory, which stipulates in most general terms that “the equivalence of living conditions in industrial countries generates such powers that gradually erase national or other differences”<sup>2</sup>. The importance of the convergence theory for the present

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<sup>2</sup>F. H. Tenbruck, *Jugend und Gesellschaft. Reihe Soziologie*, Freiburg 1962, p. 57.

study consists in the fact that the comparative analysis concerns two generations of Poles and Germans, who were subjected to the same (Poles and East Germans) stimuli before 1989, or to slightly different ones (Poles and East Germans vs. West Germans after the collapse of communism in 1989). The change of conditions, commenced at the breakthrough of 1989, made the conditions for the Polish-German dialogue equal. The researchers were convinced that “modernization [young Poles and young residents of Eastern lands opening to Western values – C.T.] would unavoidably result in a conversation between the West and East, that is that East German youth, and lingering Polish youth would follow Western Germany”<sup>3</sup>.

Convergence, cultural modernization, the assimilation of attitudes and values – each of these notions allows us to formulate new research fields, to identify new research perspectives that describe the transformations of mutual relations. These notions are also related to the discussion over the change of paradigm in researching Polish-German relations, to the idea of undertaking historians’, anthropologists’, and sociologists’ research that could break the barriers. It is also related to the limitation of the traditional approach which “traditionally emphasizes the antagonism and conflicts and limits the research of mutual influence of both cultures to the analysis of cases of Germanization/Polonization of some renowned representatives”<sup>4</sup>. The authors of this approach suggest that the ‘tradition of conflict’ be substituted by the “tradition of assimilation – acculturation”, which would provide a certain counterbalance to the so far predominant outlook on Polish-German relations that stressed conflict; a counterbalance that in particular could introduce the phenomena opposite to antagonism-conflict to the studies on Polish-German relations. In this approach, acculturation and assimilation are understood traditionally.

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<sup>3</sup> *Młodzi Polscy i młodzi Niemcy w nowej Europie*, K. Kosęła, B. Jonda (eds.), Warszawa 2005, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> A. Piotrowski, *Procesy akulturacji i asymilacji z punktu widzenia socjologii kultury, socjologicznej analizy procesów biograficznych i badań nad komunikacją międzykulturową*, [in:] *Procesy akulturacji/asymilacji na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim w XIX i XX wieku*, W. Molik, R. Traba (eds.), Poznań 1996, p. 25.

Andrzej Piotrowski states that as far as assimilation is concerned, it should be approached classically, according to the tradition “in which the processes of competition and conflict are first contrasted with the process of accommodation, understood as a temporary suspension of conflict in a loose balance of antagonistic powers that do not resolve it, and then, and deeper, the assimilation that terminates the conflict and is understood as ‘a process of mutual permeation and combination, where individuals and groups adopt the traditions, feelings and attitudes of other individuals and groups, and due to shared experience and common history they become the members of common culture’”<sup>5</sup>. When discussing the alteration of the research paradigm in Polish-German relations, Piotrowski suggests a departure from the *traditional* definition of borderland as an area inhabited by Poles and Germans, and the adoption of the attitude where borderland is a “comprehensive set of situations in which a different culture is contacted directly (in an interactive manner) or indirectly. According to these terms the prolonged Polish-German coexistence in the region of Łódź under the Russian partition needs to be considered a borderland equal to the group relations taking place in Silesia, Warmia and Masuria, but also to the personal relations developed in Polish-German marriages (families), whether living in the fatherland of one of the partners or ‘somewhere in the world’”<sup>6</sup>. The authors of the present research project adopted a similar approach when selecting the areas of research in Poland. Therefore one should expect that in the nearest future a clear change of terminology and notions will take place, where antagonism and conflict will be replaced with assimilation, whereas influence and shaping will be substituted by conversion<sup>7</sup>. The party

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 31.

<sup>7</sup> The issue of conversion emerged as a criterion to explain the course of social and cultural phenomena in the Polish-German borderland after 1989 when the parties of the discussion departed from cultural paradigm. Witold Molik states that Polish conversions among the German population were long neglected. German historians writing about German settlers in Poland in terms of their spreading higher German culture (Kulturträger) would a priori reject the idea that Polish culture could turn out to be attractive for a significant portion of their compatriots; A. Molik, *Procesy*

that seems to be particularly interested in the change of standards is Poland as the change on the one hand will make the partners the subjects, and on the other one should hopefully raise the interest of German society in their closest partner, located behind their eastern border, in terms of geography, history and culture.

To conclude the theoretical considerations one more comment is required. In studies that involve a survey of mutual perception there is always a risk that some aspects or events will be neglected, or the influence of others will be exaggerated. This is a significant reservation as at the time empirical material was collected (2005-2006) a number of *stimuli* occurred in Polish-German relations that could distort the result of any survey on mutual perception. The authors are convinced that in the case of this project the *date effect* was avoided since the empirical material was collected in Poland in the fall of 2005, that is shortly before the parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland, which resulted in the assumption of power by the groups that were highly critical of the Polish-German dialogue held in both countries after 1989. However, public opinion in Germany is barely influenced by the media commentaries on Poland and Polish politicians.

### **Survey organization**

The largest number of difficulties emerged at the stage of choosing the technique of data collection. The difficulties stemmed from several sources, including the most significant ones:

- respondents' dispersion,
- the development of investigation tools with respect of the issue of measurement equivalence,
- selection of respondents,
- financial provision for the survey.

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*asymilacyjne i akulturacyjne*, [in:] *Procesy akulturacji/asymilacji na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim w XIX i XX wieku*, W. Molik, R. Traba (eds.), Poznań 1996, p. 67.

From the very beginning it became obvious that the survey organizers would have to abandon the survey of representative samples in Poland and in Germany due to technical and organizational limitations. The authors were also aware that the results of the survey could not be treated as representative, but rather as a testing of assumed hypotheses.

Consequently, the most important independent variables were nationality of respondents and the age; the sample selection would only involve the need to select such individuals that are representative in view of these variables. The sample was selected by means of classical nonprobability sampling, i.e. purposive sampling.

Based on the assumption that they need to collect the information from the population that could not be reached directly, the authors of the research went for surveys conducted by means of a questionnaire form to be filled in by the respondents alone. Pollsters delivered the forms. Two respondent groups were surveyed that represented two generations: that of *parents*, whose ideas and attitudes to the phenomena we were interested in had been mainly shaped before 1989. The other generation, that of *students*, has been growing up under the circumstances influenced by the events of 1989 and later.

Polish and German students filled their forms in the presence of the pollsters in selected secondary schools in both states. The parental group received the forms via their children attending schools selected for the survey. The respondents in this group were the parents of students from classes not covered by the survey. The absence of *control* over parents, in the sense of potential exertion of pressure, or encouragement that could be applied with respect to the students (pollsters' presence when the forms were filled, direct presentation of the survey objective and the institutions conducting it, and the presence of teachers) resulted in number of returned forms which was lower than in the student group. The same applied to the failure to answer some questions. It should be mentioned here that there was no regularity whatsoever concerning the questions that were avoided.

## **Fields of research**

The present study involved three fields (research subjects).

The first one concerned the issues related to the influence of historical events on mutual perception. It followed from the conviction that historical determinants continue to exert a significant influence on the content of Polish-German relations and the form of Polish-German dialogue, although this influence is consistently decreasing. When the respondents were asked about the historical events that in their opinion had the largest influence on mutual relations, a clear tendency could be observed both among Poles and Germans: distant events have a decreasing influence on their mutual perception. When selecting such events there were concerns about whether both Poles and Germans would be familiar with them to the same extent; the survey has justified these concerns.

The second field concerned the issues related to the functioning of political and management culture as the determinants of mutual perception and interrelations. This research perspective was adopted due to the conviction that Polish-German relations in terms of mutual perception of the representatives of both nations become normalized, this means that apart from historical determinants we need to seek other factors that influence the mutual image and relations. This is corroborated by the results of the survey conducted both in Poland and in Germany.

This normalization to a large extent seems to be a result of Polish membership of the European Union. This membership introduced the issue of partnership in the mutual perception to the Polish-German dialogue. The issues related to the problem of partnership are the third component of the project.

## **Project questions and working hypotheses**

The authors of the survey assumed that the survey shall allow them to find the answers to several research questions:

1. Are history, stereotypes, political culture and asymmetry responsible for modern misunderstandings and conflicts? What is their role?
2. If so, which historical events, stereotypes and elements of political culture are the most influential in shaping mutual perception of Poles and Germans?
3. To what extent do nationality and age differentiate mutual perception as well as behavior?

They assumed that:

1. The role of history may be overestimated in the contemporary Polish-German relations, as are the stereotypes. On the other hand, cultural elements are (too) rarely mentioned in the analyses, as is asymmetry.
2. There is a clear asymmetry in mutual perception. Polish respondents' knowledge of Germany and common heritage that affects this mutual image is more extensive and concrete.
3. Different historical events, stereotypes and elements of political culture will be dominant in both nations and, maybe, even in each age group.
4. Respondents' age and nationality influences their attitude to the Polish-German rapprochement and interrelations as well as mutual perception.

### **Generational variation**

One of the basic questions in this project was the question of whether the image and perception of relations between Poles and Germans depends on the respondents' age. Therefore the survey covered youths aged 17-19 (students), and the generation of 40-year-olds (parents). This assumption was adopted owing to the conviction that modern youth, both in Poland and in Germany, is shaped under different social and political circumstances than its parents. With respect to German respondents this mainly concerns the reunification and the collapse of communism in the Eastern lands. In respect of Poland, as in the Eastern lands, the circumstances involved the collapse of commu-



nism, German acknowledgement of the border established alongside the Oder and Lusatia Neisse Rivers, and Poland's involvement in general European integrational trends, which were supported by Germany.

These changed conditions, alongside the altered climate of the dialogue, introduced subjects that were formerly concealed or manipulated in the debate. This comment mainly concerns the respondents from Poland and from the Eastern German lands (Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia), i.e. of the former German Democratic Republic. The manipulation or concealment mainly concerned the issues of the displacement of German populations from the lands granted to Poland in 1945. Before 1989 these issues were practically absent from the public discourse in Poland and in the former GDR. In Poland the issue of displacement was handled with a laconic statement that "the Germans left" these lands while those who stayed were the Germanized Slav, i.e. Polish population. The German side of the dialogue were frequently experiencing their first ever contact with Polish history. With reference to this issue, which is significant for this project, the Germans would observe that the inhabitants of the "former Eastern German lands" were mostly "subjectively" (fearing Ukrainian retaliation) or "objectively" (the requirement of assuming Russian citizenship) forced to leave their homeland. Unlike in Polish communist propaganda, they were not "repatriates" but rather the displaced, who "lost their fatherland" experiencing the same trauma as the Germans who had to leave Silesia, Pomerania or Eastern Prussia. The difference, however, was that that in Western Germany one could discuss this subject and cultivate one's national identity (*Heimatstreffen*).

For Poles this changed context additionally signified the need to acknowledge the fact that there are approximately one million people in Poland who have the right to claim German citizenship. Some 300,000 of them took advantage of this right as they joined German minority organizations, causing consternation, or even hostility ("they have eventually come out").

The same applied to Germans from the former GDR. There the displaced (*Umsiedler*) had no opportunity to belabor the harm of losing

their homeland either. Since the beginning of the 1990s this muffled discussion was manifested by rapidly increased revisionist, xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners residing in the *new lands*, including Poles.

### **Regional variation**

Despite the fact that the survey was not intended to be representative we decided to choose research locations accounting for the regional diversification of Poland and Germany. In Poland, the areas with different historical background were chosen, representing different historical and political patterns. The division with respect to the survey conducted in Germany seemed obvious. It was assumed that the *old* and *new* lands should be represented in the survey.

In the *new lands* the areas adjacent to the Polish border (Frankfurt an der Oder) were covered, as well as more remote areas (Suhl, Großhein). The survey area was selected on the assumption that the borderlands focus the problems of the neighboring nations like a lens, and these areas are some sort of a barometer of mutual relations. This found corroboration in the period that immediately followed the opening of the border on April 1, 1992. A whole range of both positive and negative phenomena could be observed that have exerted a prolonged influence on the mutual perception in this area. These phenomena involved: the emergence of marketplaces in Poland, increased traffic across the border crossings, a variety of pathologies (smuggling, prostitution, drug trafficking), and illegal employment of Polish workers. In the first period, this resulted in German borderlands in the symptoms of xenophobic aggression against Poles launched by the neo-Nazi youth, blaming Poles for the increased crime rate; the phenomenon of *juma* (the instances of shoplifting by juvenile Poles in Germany) was particularly infamous. Consequently, the inhabitants of borderland German towns protested against new border crossings fearing that an increased crime rate would follow the opening of a new crossing. The most spectacular example of such attitudes was the ob-

struction of the reconstruction of the bridge, demolished in 1945, which would join Forst and Zasieki.

The survey *inside* the former GDR was to demonstrate how true it is that the common fate and experience of Poles and Eastern Germans in 1945-1989 translates into their mutual perception. This assumption was significant, as negative phenomena are more intense in the areas that are adjacent to the border. The research conducted at the time of the German Democratic Republic and Polish People's Republic indicated that Poles were better perceived by the inhabitants of the regions more distant from the border. This seems to result from two factors. Firstly, in the borderlands Poles were buying consumer goods out thus contributing to the worsening of the living conditions of the indigent population. Secondly, a significant proportion of the population in this part of the borderland were the *displaced*, for whom the other side of the border was their *Heimat*.

The selection of survey locations on the Polish side of the border referred in turn to the concept of the three-fold understanding of the Polish-German borderland. This concept resulted from the analyses of the processes that occurred in the present Polish Western and Northern lands following 1945. These lands were the junction of Polish and German national, political, economic, and historical realms.

1. The first meaning of the notion of borderland refers to the lands adjacent to the border, these are the areas where the political, economic and geographical realms come in contact with the cultural realms. The process of social and cultural borderland emergence in these lands accelerated after 1989.

2. The second meaning of borderland refers to the place of the copresence of Polish and German history and culture (the areas of common cultural heritage): Pomerania (Pommern), Silesia (Schlesien), Warmia and Masuria (südl. Ostpreußen), the Lubuska Land (Ostbrandenburg), as well as Kashubia (Pommerllen) and Greater Poland (Prov. Posen).

3. The third meaning signifies the social and cultural borderland including the German part of the pre-war Polish-German borderland. These lands are inhabited by a culturally German population – Upper

Silesia (Oberschlesien), Warmia and Masuria (Ermeland, Masurenland), Kashubia (Pommerllen).

### **Description of the survey sample**

Organizers of the research decided to apply purposive sampling of respondents being aware that this decision would significantly influence the issue of representativeness of the results obtained. Yet, owing to the organizational factors, this method of research sample selection was applied. The fundamental criterion for respondents' selection concerned the research hypotheses adopted. Therefore, the sample involved young Poles (students) and adults (parents) from different provinces, and Germans from different lands of the Federal Republic of Germany.

A total of 743 respondents were surveyed, including 425 Poles – 270 students and 155 parents. On the German side 318 respondents completed the questionnaire forms, including 212 students and 136 parents. Polish respondents attended the final classes of comprehensive high schools, German ones were the students of last (or one but last) classes of corresponding high schools (*Gymnasium*). Adult respondents on both sides were the parents of the students attending parallel classes of those surveyed ones. This solution allowed us to avoid the situation where the students fill in the forms for their parents. These concerns emerged because while the students were filling their forms at school, the parents received the forms from their children at home.

The comments to be made following the assessment of the conduct of the survey are that the pollsters did not face any reluctance on the part of the students, all students present at school on the day of the survey agreed to participate in the survey without any serious reservations. The situation was slightly more complicated in the case of surveying parents, a definite majority of whom did not fill out the delivered forms. Out of 540 forms distributed (60 in each school), 291 were returned completed, which is quite a good response when compared to the number of returns of questionnaires mailed by post.

**Map 1.1. Regional variation of the survey sample**



The map (Map 1.1) illustrates spatial distribution of the localities where the survey was conducted at schools.

### **Polish sample**

Słubice is a borderline town hosting three most important border crossings (two road and one railroad crossing) on the Polish-German border. Słubice is only 80 km (50 miles) away from Berlin. In Słubice there is a large marketplaces intended to provide goods primarily to the German population. In 1992 Collegium Polonicum was founded in Słubice, a joint academic institution of the Viadrina European University in Frankfurt an der Oder. Numerous Polish-German meetings take place there whether on a national or regional level, as well as many

scientific conferences. This profile let us define Słubice as a Polish-German borderland town in the first meaning of borderland (social and economic).

The students from the final classes of a comprehensive high school and the parents from parallel classes were requested to fill out the questionnaires. A total of 52 forms were collected. Eighty percent were the students' questionnaires while only 20% (!) were those completed by the parents. In this group the ratio of returned questionnaires was by far the lowest (10 out of 60). This is quite puzzling, as the subject of the survey should be interesting for the respondents, as it frequently applies directly to them and they know it from practice.

The most numerous group of Polish respondents were the students and parents from a comprehensive high school in Kościan. Kościan is a town with a population of 25,000, located 42 km (26 miles) south of Poznań, the capital of the province. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century Kościan was a district town of a Prussian province, Posen, therefore it was assumed to belong to the Polish-German borderland in the second meaning (cultural heritage). Kościan Oskar Kolberg Comprehensive High School has been collaborating with the high school in Alzay since 1982. The survey was completed by 109 respondents, 45% of them were students and 55% – parents. The respondents were considerably interested in the survey as well as in the results.

Strzelce Opolskie is a district town located in the Opolskie Province, where the number of people admitting their German origin is the largest. Therefore, the town can be treated as representative for the Polish-German borderland in the third, social and cultural sense. During the latest elections to the local government the delegates of German minority won a majority of votes both in the district council and in the municipal council. Students from the final two classes at the Comprehensive High School and the parents from parallel classes took part in the survey, as in other cases. A total of 67 questionnaires were filled out, 69% by the students and 21% – by the parents. The group of students and parents from the German minority is underrepresented.

Another surveyed school was the Nikolaus Copernicus Comprehensive High School in Sokółka. Sokółka is a town of 20,000 in popula-

tion, located approximately 35 km (22 miles) from Białystok and 17 km (nearly 11 miles) from the border crossing with Belarus. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the town was under the Russian partition. A total of 130 questionnaires were distributed in the school and 122 were returned. Nearly 65% of the questionnaires were filled by the students and 35% by the parents. The high proportion of returns in this group of respondents is symptomatic. It can be explained by the fact that German issues seem interesting for this group of respondents. They are not 'exhausted' by the research into this subject, as is the case in Western Poland.

This explanation seems to find corroboration in the results of the survey conducted in the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński 4<sup>th</sup> Comprehensive High School in Limanowa. Limanowa is a town with a population of 15,000, located in the province of Lesser Poland. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century Limanowa was under the Austrian partition. There were 75 respondents in the survey there (a total of 90 questionnaires were distributed), with 72% of forms filled out by the students and 28% of the forms by the parents.

## **German part**

It should be mentioned here that it was more difficult to organize the survey on the German side of the border due to formal and legal restrictions, which are neither so numerous nor so strict on the Polish side. Another difference from the survey conducted in Poland was that German students were filling out their questionnaires in the presence of pollsters (Polish students of the Viadrina European University) and school teachers.

Frankfurt an der Oder is a town located in the Brandenburg state; it has a population of approximately 80,000. The town is across the river from Słubice. The survey was conducted in January 2006 in the Karl-Liebknecht-Gymnasium. In each of the groups of students and parents a total of 60 questionnaires were distributed, out of which 52 completed questionnaires were collected. In this group a perfect distri-

bution of returns was recorded with 50% of returns from the students and 50% from the parents. Among all the German locations of surveys, Frankfurt noted the lowest number of returns in relation to the distribution. A similar phenomenon applied to Słubice on the Polish side. This seems to strengthen the assumption of the *exhaustion* of borderland respondents with the research on mutual image. Yet this assumption would require deeper analysis.

Another German town where the survey was conducted is the town of Alzay with 18,000 inhabitants and located in Rheinland-Palatinate. The survey forms were distributed in March 2006 among the students of 12 classes of the Elisabeth-Langgasser-Gymnasiums, a partner school of Kościan high school. This seemed to be why additional questionnaires needed to be printed out in this group. The pollsters collected a record of 136 completed questionnaires with 86 (63%) completed by the students, and 50 (37%) by the parents (50 returns out of 60 distributed questionnaires).

The third town where the survey was conducted was Suhl, a town of approximately 50,000 inhabitants, located in the land of Thuringia. In May 2006 the survey was conducted at the Johann-Gottfried Gerdner-Gymnasium. Out of 62 forms collected there, 77% were completed by the students and 23% by the parents.

The last school to conduct the survey in June 2006 was the Werner-von-Siemens-Gymnasium in Großenhain. This town with a population of 16,500 is located 25 km (15.5 miles) from the capital of Saxony – Dresden. As was the case in all the other institutions, the questionnaires were distributed among 60 students and 60 parents. In this school the students were in the penultimate classes. A total of 68 completed questionnaires were collected, with 53% of questionnaires from the students and 47% from the parents.



## Chapter 2.

### **Historical determinants of Polish-German collaboration**

In the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium, numerous researchers and journalists dealing with the issue of Polish-German relations were presenting them as being at their best over the last two hundred years. Also, a tendency for a new outlook on mutual relations has prevailed. Instead of conflict-related rhetoric, events and facts were indicated that showed the mutual relations in a new light. However, it seems that the authors of these opinions feared that all the generalizations by the authors of scientific studies bear a huge risk of making the mistake of *over optimism*. The cautious assessments resulted from the conviction that Polish-German relations are exceptionally sensitive to all the stimuli which originate both outside and inside.

On the other hand, when the optimistic rhetoric collapsed, there emerged opinions that were skeptical towards over optimism. Zdzisław Krasnodębski cautioned against substituting one set of myths, such as the idea that the Germans are guilty of all evil, or that the Polish-German neighborhood is one of constant struggle, with others, such as the idea that the Poles are guilty of, or at least accomplices to the harm done to the *displaced* German.

The beginning of a new decade in Polish-German relations was marked by defining the Polish-German common interest. Even then, however, Artur Hajnicz forewarned that this common interest would only last as long as the parties consider it to be useful. In the early 1990s it was obvious that this common interest involved the future of Poland following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The common interest was defined by the then Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, to incorporate the issue of Polish

membership in the economic structures of the uniting Europe, and Poland's safety following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, particularly given the approaching reunification of Germany. Since the very beginning this safety was to be guaranteed by Poland's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty. It is worth emphasizing that there was an almost general consensus amongst Polish politicians with respect to this. Lech Wałęsa's concept of establishing a NATO-bis seemed to be an attempt to exert pressure on the West so that it did not delay its decision concerning the enlargement of the Pact by including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Germany was the *ambassador* for these objectives; yet when they were obtained a question was posed, what next? Although it is true that the climate of the dialogue changed when the left wing was in power, the change became still more radical after they lost the parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall of 2005. The condition of Polish-German relations is described by the notion of a *difficult neighborhood*, which already is a compromise, given the existence of more radical notions. The so-called *German card* has again become a highly significant element in using Polish-German relations as an instrument in the current political discourse in Poland. The coalition government of PiS-LPR-Samoobrona (Law and Justice – The League of Polish Families – Self-Defense) was repeatedly accused of using Poles' anti-German phobias in internal political disputes, the phobias formed in the period of the partition, and then deepened by the communists in the period of 1948-1989. For the communist authorities of the Polish People's Republic the *German bugaboo* was among the most important instruments used to integrate Polish society. It was used with particular intensity with respect to the inhabitants of the Western and Northern Lands, who were in danger of retaliatory and revanchist attitudes in the opinions of the opponents of Polish-German rapprochement. This is corroborated by the statement made by the spokesman of the Christian National Union (ZChN), the precursor of the League of Polish Families (LPR), who warned that German endeavors to introduce Poland to the European structures were "a camouflaged repetition of *Drang nach Osten*, a dangerous bridge to the

political unification of Europe. This may threaten national and cultural identity”<sup>1</sup>.

## Historical determinants of Polish-German neighborhood<sup>2</sup>

The fact that Polish-German relations were presented in very dark colors during the Polish People’s Republic was significantly stressed in the early 1990s. However, the facts do not clearly show that the understanding and dialogue are feasible. Studies were published that emphasized the contribution of German culture to the cultural development of Poland in the 16<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries, and proved that the Polish-German border, shaped at the end of the Middle Ages, was among the most stable borders in Europe. The studies also showed that Polish insurgents of November 1830 were received in Germany as the propagators of liberation ideas, etc. Yet it should be stressed forcefully that all these generalizations were like walking on thin ice, since even the smallest event to cast a shadow on these relations was interpreted as the symp-

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<sup>1</sup> C. Trosiak, *Pogranicze polsko-niemieckie po II drugiej wojnie światowej*, Poznań 1999, p. 161. [All quotations are translated from Polish for the purpose of this paper.]

<sup>2</sup> Polish historical, sociological and politological literature devoted to these issues is exceptionally extensive, and it would be difficult to develop any bibliography to make it both representative and exhaustive. Therefore, only the most important publications are indicated that were referred to at the stage of conceptualization and operationalization of the research issue. They include the following: A. Droß, *Deutschland und Polen in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Hannover–Dortmund 1964; L. Koćwin, *Polityczne determinanty polsko-wschodniemieckich stosunków przygranicznych 1949-1990*, Wrocław 1993; A. Wolff-Powęska, *Polacy wobec Niemców. Z dziejów kultury politycznej Polski 1945-1989*, Poznań 1993; *Od nienawiści do przyjaźni. O problemach polsko-niemieckiego sąsiedztwa*, F. Friedbert, W. Lipscher (eds.), Warszawa 1994; A. Hajnicz, *Ze sobą czy przeciw sobie. Polska-Niemcy 1989-1992*, Warszawa 1996; J. J. Lipski, *Powiedzieć wszystko... Eseje o sąsiedztwie polsko-niemieckim*, Warszawa 1996; H. Orłowski, *Polnische Wirtschaft. Nowoczesny niemiecki dyskurs o Polsce*, Olsztyn 1998; C. Trosiak, *Procesy kształtujące pogranicze polsko-niemieckie po II wojnie światowej*, Poznań 1999; *Schwierige Nachbarn? 300 Jahre deutsch-polnische Nachbarschaft*, W. Michalka, R. Schmoock (eds.), Berlin 2007.

tom of natural (i.e. hostile) German tendencies towards Poles. What was called German *ambassadorship* of Polish European aspirations by some, was called a concealed form of *Drang nach Osten* by others. In this line of thought German (German politicians') interest is not selfless, but rather it serves the return to the issue of reparation for the possessions lost by the *displaced* to be settled by Poland as a European Union member on the basis of international legal regulations. The authors of the concept of the 4<sup>th</sup> Republic<sup>3</sup>, which was to oppose the former manner of developing neighborly relations applied after 1989, chose as one of their main objectives granting Poland her appropriate place in Europe in general, and abandoning the policy of submissiveness in German relations. Consequently, the tone of the discussion and rhetoric returned to the period prior to 1989, or even 1971, when Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany were signing the agreement on the normalization of mutual relations.

In nearly every study that concerns the issue of Polish-German relations, or in the studies that describe the shaping and evolution of mutual stereotypes, the authors seek the events that influenced this process. It seems that for the purpose of such consideration two catalogues could be established, a Polish and a German one, to which references are made in the discussions. Both in the Polish and the German catalogues there are events that characterize the period of good mutual relations and events that characterize the crisis periods of mutual relations.

Both sides agree that among the events that significantly affected the mutual image was German colonization of the East. While in Germany it is presented as one of the greatest achievements of the German

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<sup>3</sup> A notion used as a political slogan during the parliamentary election campaign as well as the presidential election campaign in 2005. It was mainly used by politicians from the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party to describe an alternative to the undesirable phenomena of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Republic (1989-2005) – a period of political and economic transformation. The notion included, among other things: the removal of informal structures in politics and the economy, completing anti-communist verification of publicly active individuals, fighting corruption, moral and political renewal of social and political life based on national and Catholic values. The 4<sup>th</sup> Republic ended together with the Law and Justice party's parliamentary election defeat in 2007.

spirit, in Poland this process is assessed in different ways, depending on the quality of relations at a given time. The perspective of *Drang nach Osten*, Germanization and colonization predominates though, although after 1989 many studies were published that pointed to Poland's benefits in economic, cultural and civilizational terms that resulted from this process.

Another event to burden Polish-German relations is Prussian participation in the partition of Poland. In Germany this event is an element in the discussion on German territorial expansion, and it starts to re-emerge in the historical awareness of both Germans and Poles. Obviously, territorial expansion is assessed by the Germans as decidedly positive, as a significant element in the civilizing process of Eastern Europe. In Poland, the partitions mark the beginning of a sequence of events that eventually resulted in the extermination of the Polish nation by National Socialists, which in turn led to the exodus of nearly eight million Germans from the German lands assigned to Poland at the Potsdam Conference.

Other events that are significant for the mutual perception of history involve Poland's regaining of independence in 1918, and the consequent Polish-German dispute over the shape of Poland's western border, which resulted in the Wielkopolska Uprising and three uprisings in Upper Silesia, and a national plebiscite in the disputed areas of Upper Silesia, Warmia and Masuria. The German side diminishes the importance of the national independence uprisings in Silesia, apparently proven by Poland's defeat in the plebiscites. It is worth observing that the solution of the border issue had two adverse consequences; firstly, the attempt to change the *Versailles dictate* was the most important endeavor of German foreign policy in the interwar period; secondly, for the first time in history within the borders of the Polish state there was a German population assigned the status of a national minority, a population which lost its dominant position in the areas shared with Polish inhabitants. The relations with the German minority living in Poland are described in various ways that depend on the condition of Polish-German relations. Sometimes they are loyal citizens of the Polish state, sometimes they are a 5<sup>th</sup> Column. The latter perspective

seems to prevail, as shown after 1989, when a proportion of residents of Upper Silesia, Warmia and Masuria demanded that their German nationality be acknowledged. This demand generated serious aversion transforming into aggression in Poland. In the early 1990s graffiti such as the “German minority – the 5<sup>th</sup> Column” appeared on the walls of towns in Opolski Silesia and in the public debate.

It is beyond doubt that WWII, commenced by the aggression of Hitler’s Germany against Poland, and the outcome of the war Germany lost, was in the opinion of Poles and Germans the greatest burden in mutual relations. The dispute starts with the problem of German guilt for the atrocities committed against the Polish nation. In Poland the discussion of the harm experienced by the German nation in the course of their compulsory displacement, held in Germany with reference to the erection of the Center against Expulsions, meets with profound reluctance even in the circles that are open to dialogue and agreement. It is admitted that the human rights of German population were violated during the displacement, yet there is no consent that Poles should be blamed for the fate of Germans from the regions assigned to Poland at Yalta and Potsdam.

The collapse of Communism and reunification of Germany are the subsequent events that both Poles and Germans treat as highly significant for their mutual relations. Again, we are faced with different assessments of the origin and consequences of these facts. In Poland there are no doubts that the collapse of communism started with the events of the ‘Polish August 1980’, and the Polish Pope, John Paul II. Therefore, most Poles believe that Germany owes her reunification to Polish *Solidarity*. In Germany, however, the most important event leading to the breakthrough was the change in the Soviet Union’s highest echelon, leading to the processes of *perestrojka* and then to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, and the “fall of the iron curtain”. This is quite a distinct difference in the assessment of the reasons and outcomes of the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe.

The early 1990s brought altered conditions in the Polish-German dialogue. Germany was now reunited and Poland had regained independence. The pace of change was fast enough to keep both sides in

the first period preoccupied with their own business. A certain lack of concept of how to establish the relations under the new circumstances became apparent. Distrust could be experienced on the Polish side with reference to the German attitude to the issue of Germany's eastern border. This distrust was exemplified by the determined efforts to involve the Polish delegation in the *2+4 Conference* that was to decide the external conditions of the reunification, and by Polish society's consent to the Russian army remaining in Poland as the sole guarantor of the inviolability of the border on the Oder and Lusatia Neisse Rivers. Signing of the Polish-German treaties stabilized the situation and marked the beginning of the climate change in Polish-German relations. The representatives of the circles that started the dialogue in the mid-1960s, in the spirit of "we forgive and ask for forgiveness", met then<sup>4</sup>.

Here, we should make a point that is significant for the issue in question. At that time one could get the impression that the politicians were ahead of the societies with their visions of Polish-German collaboration. Such an assessment finds corroboration in the fact that the discussion on transborder collaboration (Stolpe's Plan) aroused controversies and disputes in Poland concerning the actual intentions of German proposals. The residents of German borderlands in turn were quite reluctant towards the Polish proposals to create new border crossings, since in their perspective they posed a threat to their employment security, and created a risk of various social problems. One could state that this attitude of limited enthusiasm for the development of transborder collaboration is still present on the German side. An example is provided by the referendum in Frankfurt an der Oder, in which the population of the town rejected the idea of German trams

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<sup>4</sup>In 1989 power was assumed by the representatives of those intellectual circles that were directly involved in Polish-German dialogue or were influenced by this dialogue that eventually resulted in the new German *Ostpolitik* developed in the mid-1960s. This policy was crowned by Willy Brandt's visit to Warsaw, during which a treaty on normalizing mutual relations was signed. It should be remembered, however, that the ground for this change was provided by the discussion on and the content of the famous Address of Polish Bishops to their German Brothers in Christ.

crossing the border and reaching dormitories of the Viadrina European University, and the marketplace on the Polish side of the border.

The 1990s and the beginning of this decade can be described as the period of excellent Polish-German collaboration. The EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen was a supporter of the EU enlargement with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland. On numerous occasions he would emphasize that he could not imagine the Union increasing the number of its members without Poland among them.

Another determinant in the Polish-German dialogue was Poland's accession to the European Union on May 1, 2004. The significance of this event for Polish society can be evidenced by the turnout during the *European referendum*. It amounted to 58.8% of those entitled to vote, which was the highest election turnout since 1989. A definite majority of voters (78.8%) were in favor of Poland's joining the Union.

The beginning of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is termed by Anna Wolf-Powęska as the period of saturation with history. This particularly applies to the year 2005, which marked the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of WWII, the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the letter of reconciliation by Polish and German bishops, the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the treaty on normalization of mutual relations between the Polish People's Republic and the German Federal Republic, and finally the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the *border treaty*, which regulated the most difficult problem in the Polish-German relations after WWII – that of the status of Polish western and northern lands. Celebrating all these anniversaries, both in Poland and Germany, one sought for the elements to define the common future. Yet the outcomes of such endeavors did not always correspond to the initial intentions. This search coincided with the change of political partners in the dialogue both in Poland and Germany. Although the partners stem from the same Christian-National ideological tradition, they are radically different in their assessment of history and the impact it has had on the present day.

Both Germans and Poles may voice their own standpoint without having to agree with Washington or Moscow. The consequence is the different assessment of what the year 1945 stands for both nations.



“There were many circumstances expressing the ambivalence of the year 1945 for Poles. The nation which was the first up in arms against the German invader and suffered enormous losses turned out to be victorious [...] After six years of the darkness of occupation another liberation came only to bring yet another loss of independence. [...] In recent years in Germany the victims of the enforced displacement have become the heroes of the greatest dispute in Polish-German relations. Deprived of a historical context, the individual accounts of those who lost their old homeland in the East carry great emotions. When the reasons for the forced displacements are negated whereas the consequences are legitimized, and history is treated as a separate, unrelated fact, it is easy to abandon all moral accountability”<sup>5</sup>.

While redefining their identity, the sovereign nations of Central Europe, including Germany, want history and refer to history in their search for this definition. Yet here they fall into the traps of history. Poles are proud of their history, whereas Germans are proud of their achievements, yet what is the pride of some does not have to be, and frequently is not approved of by others. Therefore the question arises whether we are doomed to fail in our search for dialogue formulas and ways to overcome differences. Zdzisław Krasnodębski claims that “the encounter of Poles and Germans will signify a meeting of two different (albeit not homogeneous) societies with differentiated (albeit not fully coherent or unified) symbolism. Such an encounter must mean that the differences are approved of and the fact that they can (albeit do not have to) lead to tensions, controversies, or even conflicts, is accepted”<sup>6</sup>.

The above remarks are significant insofar as the partners of the dialogue changed in 2005, as was mentioned above, and also the rhetoric they used altered. A journalist from the “Die Welt” weekly, Gerhard Gnauck, suggested that this altered situation be taken advantage of to define the objectives of Polish and German policy. He advises Poles

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<sup>5</sup> A. Wolf-Powęska, *Wojna i pamięć. Niemcy i Polacy poszukują w historii elementów nowej tożsamości*, “Dialog”, No. 69-70/2005, pp. 77-78.

<sup>6</sup> Z. Krasnodębski, *Ponowne sąsiedztwo*, [in:] *Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie*, L. Kolarska-Bobińska (ed.), Warszawa 2003, pp. 44-45.

that “Polish politicians should stop chanting it like a mantra that Germans want to ‘take the role of the WWII victims’. Such a generalization is not only factually doubtful but it also prevents any communication with a significant part of the German elite. Poland was to a large extent successful when protesting against the Center against Expulsions, and it managed to make German public opinion sensitive to her standpoint. Therefore Poland should gradually cease to turn to this issue and focus on the ‘Remembrance and Solidarity’ Network and other joint initiatives”<sup>7</sup>. He carries on by suggesting that the Polish elite should understand the European fears concerning the American policy in Iraq. He also warns Germans against becoming stuck in 19<sup>th</sup> century ideas concerning Central and Eastern Europe. To avoid this they ought to “depart from the orientation towards the elite of Petersburg (at present this would be Moscow), that has been predominant since Bismarck. They need to learn and understand that democratization and stabilization of EU’s immediate neighbors [...] is not only a recommendable model, but it also is in their own interest. Berlin and Warsaw could make a significant contribution to designing a new Eastern policy of the EU”<sup>8</sup>.

Piotr Buras in turn states that “both in Poland and Germany it is the debate on the new concept of state that provides the realm for both countries to search for the answer to another key question of the future – the question about their place in Europe. Without an efficient and functioning state Poland will not be able to take full advantage of her historical opportunity of permanent development and modernization. Without a profound reconstruction of the welfare state and an improvement in the federal system Germany will not regain her role of the flywheel of European integration, and it will not generate new stimuli but rather malcontent whimpering”<sup>9</sup>.

As mentioned above, at the beginning of the period when the determinants of the Polish-German dialogue changed, the society could not

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<sup>7</sup> G. Gnauck, *Zwycięstwo “partii zero-jedynkowej”?*, “Dialog”, No. 72-73/2005/2006, p. 27.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>9</sup> P. Buras, *Jakie państwo, jaka Europa?*, “Dialog”, No. 72-73/2005/2006, p. 19.

keep up with the politicians. Since the mid-2000s, however, the situation has seemed to be in reverse, and it is the politicians who cannot keep up with the societies' expectations. This particularly concerns Polish right-wing and nationalist politicians given the obvious asymmetry of the mutual importance of both countries and the advantageous position of Germany.

In 2006 the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) conducted research ordered by the Institute of Public Affairs and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which clearly demonstrated that the results of elections held in Poland and Germany in the fall of 2005 did not change Poles' attitude to the importance of collaboration between the FRG and Poland for the economic progress of the latter. "A great majority of Poles want to collaborate with Germans and they are ready to compromise. Polish society does not share the highly critical picture of current Polish-German relations prevailing in the Polish public debate. A vast majority, 4/5 of respondents, positively assessed the condition of Polish-German relations. Polish society is optimistic with respect to the future perspective of mutual relations with the neighbor across the Oder River after the elections in Poland and in Germany. Poles tend to think that the governments of Angela Merkel and Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz should contribute to improved Polish-German relations"<sup>10</sup>.

Poles perceive Germans as the most important partners of Poland in each of the following three realms: political, economic and military, with particular emphasis on the development of economic collaboration. The authors of the quoted report conclude: "A vast majority of Poles (72%), including a large portion of the Law and Justice (PiS) electorate, think that Poland in her relations with Germany should 'be orientated towards collaboration and achieving compromise' rather than 'to a decided protection of her own interests'. One more time the attitudes of the society turn out to be different from experts' attitudes

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<sup>10</sup> *Opinie Polaków o stosunkach polsko-niemieckich po zmianie rządów w obu krajach*, report from the survey of the Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2006, pp. 2-3.

and from politicians' statements. The observers of Polish and German foreign policy point to numerous tensions and serious conflicts of interests between both countries. After PiS and President Kaczynski won the elections, the commentators on both sides were expecting new tensions in Polish-German relations. In the case of the great coalition government in Germany, the experts' assessments were more pessimistic than it was initially assumed. Nonetheless, Polish society is expecting further improvement of the relations between both countries, which are already considered quite good. Poles do not perceive Germany to be a threat, and they are ready to collaborate with their neighbors across the Oder River"<sup>11</sup>.

To conclude this part of consideration on the burden of history in the mutual relations it needs to be reiterated that although the importance of this factor must not be disregarded, it should not be overestimated either. Poles are becoming increasingly more pragmatic, and they cannot be manipulated by selected knowledge about Germans since at present there are many communication channels to verify this knowledge. It is similar in Germany, where maintaining an archaic picture of Poland as a backward and belligerent country will not stand up to a confrontation with reality. It could be mentioned that Poles visit Germany most often of all countries, and that millions of Germans visit Poland every year.

If the history and events from the common Polish-German past need to be an element in creating an identity, maybe one should look for such configurations and perspectives in the research and in the presenting of research results that could be used for better mutual understanding.

The most explosive issue in the discussion of our shared past is that of the moral aspect of displacement. It seems an ideal field of research into the shared Polish-German historical fate that could also be contributed by other partners from Central and East Europe.

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 7-8.

## The problem of asymmetry

The notion of asymmetry, understood as imbalance, is exceptionally often referred to when describing the condition of Polish-German relations. The notion is particularly frequently used after 2004, i.e. when Poland became an EU member. There was an expectation in Poland that the mutual relations would move towards partnership and equivalence. Poland is particularly allergic to the discussion of the future of an enlarged European Union which refers to the *old* and *new* EU members, and to a *two-speed Europe*, or the countries that are the EU's core. Poland sees a threat of marginalization of new EU member states, including Poland, in this approach. This mode of thought became particularly apparent during the discussion on the methods of voting in the Council of the European Union and decision making in the Council. At the successive summits of the European Union Poland stood strictly by the provisions of the Treaty of Nice, which grant Poland a larger number of votes when compared to the stipulations of Lisbon Treaty and – what is most important – does not radically increase the number of Germany's votes.

However, it seems that when discussing the asymmetry one should observe its two dimensions at least. One is objective (economic capacity, population and area), where the issue of imbalance between Poland and Germany is hardly disputable. The other dimension of the asymmetry is a subjective dispute concerning the role, significance, influence, and mutual relations.

It is worth observing though that this problem is mainly raised by Polish participants of the dialogue as the asymmetry is obvious in Germany. Polish expectations that Germany will treat Poland as an equal partner, or even more – the greatest political partner in Eastern Europe, or frankly speaking – a partner which is more important than Russia, are incomprehensible and they frequently arouse irritation, which used to take the form of mockery or ridicule of the leaders of Polish politics leading to intensified mutual aversion.

When looking at the problem of asymmetry from the point of view of Kowalski and Schmidt, however, we seem to face more permanent

changes resulting from the long-term, multifaceted Polish-German conflicts. In his comments on the results of the 2004 study of mutual perception Ireneusz Krzemiński observes that “since 1990 we have been faced with a permanent transformation of a negative image of Germany and Germans into an increasingly more positive one [...]. Many Polish researchers claim that this positive stereotype of a German is strong enough not to be threatened by the temporary changes of public sentiment, such as [...] a very serious approach to Erika Steinbach’s initiative, or the establishment of the Prussian Trust. They awoke fear or even anger, yet they clearly do not lead to the change of the stereotype, despite the negative assessment of German initiatives”<sup>12</sup>. What can and actually should make Poles anxious is the level of knowledge of young Germans about the past of their own nation, their knowledge about Poland and Poles in general. Krzemiński emphasizes that it is surprising to what extent German assessments and declarations of sympathy change in correspondence with establishing a direct contact with Poland and Poles. The principle is very simple here – an ordinary visit to Poland usually changes the image of the country. It is puzzling that these direct contacts shape the opinion about a given person, yet they do not translate into a changed image of the whole nation. This concerns both Germans and Poles.

### **The areas of asymmetry**

What is most striking is the lack of knowledge about each other, or – more importantly – the lack of interest among West Europeans in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe. “The surveys the Institute of Public Affairs conducted in Austria, Spain, Sweden, France, the UK, and Germany have led to very similar conclusions. Firstly, Western societies know extremely little about our country and the transformations taking place here: 50-70% of respondents have no opinion whatsoever concerning modern Poland – they simply know nothing

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<sup>12</sup>I. Krzemiński, *Asymetria postrzegania*, “Dialog”, No. 68/2004, p. 15.

about Poland and Poles, or they have ambivalent opinions [...]. Only 30-50% of surveyed societies have some ideas of Poland and Poles. Swedes and Spaniards have the least determined opinions whereas Germans and Austrians have the most clearly shaped ones”<sup>13</sup>. Poles find it difficult to accept this ignorance and unwillingness to change this state of affairs particularly among Germans, the more so as these two nations have been neighbors for a millennium, and they are bound by a variety of ties. Nearly a half of Poles claim that they have an acquaintance or relative living in Germany with whom they maintain regular contacts. Stefan Garsztecki identifies the areas where the asymmetry of knowledge is particularly noticeable. In his opinions they involve “the difference between the positive image of Poland among the political and economic elite, and a negative one, following from the lack of knowledge about Poland, among German society. Another realm of asymmetry occurs between a generally negative image of Poland and the definitely improving picture of Germany in Poland. [...] The third realm concerns the gap in the level of prosperity, although Germany still holds a completely distorted image of Polish backwardness”<sup>14</sup>.

Another field of asymmetry concerns the attitude to history, particularly to modern history. This difference has already been mentioned; the same events are interpreted in different ways in Poland and in Germany. The discussion about the *German victims* of WWII is treated in Poland as the German attempt to write history anew. The experience of WWII, and then being abandoned by the West and left to communists has made many Eastern Europeans believe that their expectations of some form of compensation are justified. This line of thought is particularly strong in Poland which formally belonged to the winners (with the fourth army fighting on the Allies’ side), but which should

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<sup>13</sup>L. Kolarska-Bobińska, *Odmienność osławiana*, [in:] *Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie*, L. Kolarska-Bobińska (ed.), Warszawa 2003, p. 10.

<sup>14</sup>S. Garsztecki, *Obraz Polaków w Niemczech: stare i nowe stereotypy*, [in:] *Polacy i Niemcy na drodze do partnerskiego sąsiedztwa*, D. Bingen, K. Malinowski (eds.), Poznań 2000, pp. 61-62.

actually be considered among the defeated (loss of territory and political sovereignty).

Yet another realm where the differences between Poles and Germans are noticeable is the attitude to the EU, the role of individual states, the essence of integration processes, EU's further enlargement, and the attitude to trans-Atlantic relations. Poland is convinced that the EU is a spiritual community of sovereign subjects whereas Germany mostly emphasizes the concept of the EU as a federation. This difference of attitudes resulted in the dispute over the Constitutional Treaty for Europe that Polish right-wing politicians would have gladly abandoned altogether. Germany was particularly irritated with Polish concern with the division of seats in the EU Council. The essence of Polish attempts was to maintain the status quo stipulated in the Treaty of Nice with respect to the number of seats granted to Germany. Germany treats Polish obstinacy as ingratitude since Germany is the most important contributor to the EU budget while Poland is the greatest beneficiary.

Although the above realms of asymmetry do not exhaust the list of potential differences in Polish and German attitudes to the issues that are important for both sides, they seem to cover the most significant ones in the description of differences in the mutual image. The research of this subject is reassuring though – the range of asymmetry has recently been decreasing. Mateusz Falkowski, the author of the study of the mutual perception of Poles and their neighbors states that “a certain asymmetry can be observed in the changes of the mutual images, such as the images of Poles and Germans. The change of historically rooted stereotypes concerns the image of Germans in Poland to a much greater extent than vice versa. In German society it is more difficult to notice the revision of a negative image of Poles. Poland continues to be perceived in Germany (and in other Western states) as a distant and civilizationally backward country, as the East”<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> M. Falkowski, *Polska jako Wschód i jako Zachód*, [in:] *Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie*, L. Kolarska-Bobińska (ed.), Warszawa 2003, p. 269.



## Polish-German and German-Polish stereotypes

Seeking the explanation of the social origin of stereotypes and their functions researchers (sociologists, social psychologists, political scientists) usually refer to historical experience of the communities which generate the images of other communities. The analysis of the social function of stereotypes inevitably leads to the research into the process of shaping group (national) self-awareness. Since stereotypes have this function they unavoidably lead to the analysis of a defensive and mobilizing function of stereotypes. It seems that in the process of shaping of Polish-German stereotypes their most important function is the ideological-political one, which consists in the “creation of a system of symbols, beliefs and views serving certain group interests. Research interests shift here from the processes that occur in individual mentality and in microsocial relations to mass phenomena of macro-social nature, which refer to the whole social system”<sup>16</sup>.

Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania states that besides examining social functions of stereotypes all studies of stereotypes examine how common they are in the awareness of group members. This issue is particularly significant when the subject of our interest is the stereotype of the member of a different ethnic or national group, or the stereotype of a group as a whole. This is the situation we face when studying Polish-German stereotypes. The author points to several regularities here. The first one is the tendency to distinguish one’s own group from others, the second one consists in the hierarchization of other groups that our group comes into permanent relations with; the third type of regularity is the tendency to assess other groups in terms of two dimensions – with respect to morality and efficiency. The former refers to the behaviors, attitudes and the system of values of the members of the group subjected to assessment, the latter to their achievements, skills and abilities. It seems that this distinction is particularly significant in the analysis of Polish-German stereotypes, which are frequently de-

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<sup>16</sup> A. Jasińska-Kania, *Socjologiczne aspekty badań nad stereotypami*, [in:] *Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie*, L. Kolarska-Bobińska (ed.), Warszawa 2003, p. 22.

scribed as ranging from envious admiration to distance. Admiration concerns the dimension of efficiency whereas distance the mental and national features ascribed to Germans.

The above comments serve the function of introducing the analysis of changes in the mutual image. Since the early 1990s numerous conferences, seminars, workshops, and youth meetings have been held in Germany and in Poland, and millions of Poles and Germans cross the border every year. One would be tempted to trust that all this leads to the change of the mutual image. Is it really so? As is usual the case in such deliberations the answer cannot be as unambiguous as the question. Although the tendency of changes is permanent, their pace is extremely slow and fluctuates in response to the political situation. The changes usually are the outcome of political relations between Poland and Germany. It seems that before 2007 we were at the stage of a breakdown, not to say a collapse. Parvitz Rostampour and Wolfgang Melzer write that Poles “are among the most disliked nations, although they could be expected [...] to rank in the middle”<sup>17</sup>. Here, it seems interesting to refer to the statement by Wojciech Wrzesiński, who observes that the “internal transformation that started in Poland in 1980 seemed to be more significant for the change of German stereotype in Poland and for its demythologization, meaning going beyond the stereotype of the enemy and relating it to the reality, than the changes that occurred a decade earlier in the interstate political relations”<sup>18</sup> (when Poland and GDR signed the treaty of normalization of mutual relations).

As he explains the above statement, Wrzesiński seems to be justified in his claim that in the early 1980s there started democratic changes in Poland that turned out to be permanent. They have supported the dialogue which in turn results in the prejudices and phobias of the interlocutors being overcome. It seems that we can accept it that

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<sup>17</sup> P. Rostampour, W. Melzer, *Transkulturelle Empatie und Auflösung von Nationalitätsstereotypendurch Jugendbegegnung?*, [in:] *Zwischen Kulturen. Pädagogische und sozialpädagogische Zugänge zur Interkulturalität*, M. Gemende, W. Schröder, S. Sting (eds.), Weinheim 1999, p. 140.

<sup>18</sup> M. Tomala, *Polacy Niemcy, wzajemne postrzeganie*, Warszawa 1994, p. 39.

under democratic conditions the dialogue on the determinants of mutual relations is more moderate and it is only restricted by the interlocutor's level of culture, the knowledge and research of the subject. However, at the same time any opinion can be voiced, even the most absurd one, and it will have its sender, and will find its recipients.

What is particularly significant in the studies on how Polish-German and German-Polish stereotypes are created and shaped is the fact that after the democratic transformations in Poland and eastern parts of Germany joint research teams can and do emerge. It is difficult to overestimate the methodological consequences of this fact because joint research provides profound opportunities for comparative analyses. The survey described in the present paper is an example.

The results of the survey used for the description of the mutual stereotype were provided by the studies conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs in Poland in 2000 and in 2005. We learn from these studies that "the image of Poland and Poles among German society includes more negative elements and it is less crystallized than the correspondent image of Germans in Polish society. Speaking about Poland or Polish-German relations Germans give ambivalent answers or have no opinion definitely more often than Poles. Nearly 20% of Germans have no associations related to Poland and Poles. When they do mention any associations the negative ones definitely predominate. However, some positive changes in the image of Poland and Poles occur. The survey conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs six years ago showed that Poland was perceived as a distant and civilizationally backward country. Although still significant, this element of the image is becoming less and less important. The proportion of those speaking of Poles as being backward fell from 44% to 32%. More and more often Germans point to the laboriousness of Poles or to economic growth in Poland. The awareness of the transformations that have occurred in Poland after 1989 slowly increases among Germans. So far German society tended to point to Poland's civilizational distance rather than to the dynamic Polish transformations. One could take a risk of claiming that these transformations are slowly becoming a part of Poland's image. The belated positive reaction to the eco-

nomic and political changes of the 1990s could partly result from Poland joining the EU in May 2004. Not only have Poles started to participate in the EU policies but also they have symbolically crossed the border of the West, they have become the 'club members'. Despite all the German fears, including those related to their labor market, this may help abandon the stereotype of a backward country from 'the outside'. Yet it is still far from a deeper change and the complete abandonment of a negative image. Maybe one way to achieve this is by stimulating German interest in Poland, in particular by visits to Poland. Studies show that persons who personally visited Poland after 1989 (30% of adult Germans) have a better perception of Poland and Poles"<sup>19</sup>. Thus one can compare how far the recent events which have contributed to the collapse of political dialogue have affected the mutual image.

## **Stereotype of a Pole**

Xymena Dolińska, the author of the report on the study conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs, states that "Germans are relatively more open to Poles in the realm of personal contacts rather than with respect to community dimension. [...] When examining the image of a typical Pole, indicated by Germans, we are struck with its ambivalence, dullness, and indeterminacy that oppose the opinion that Germans hold a crystallized image of their neighbor. With respect to nearly all the features a definite majority of respondents (41-53%)

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<sup>19</sup>The public opinion survey this paper is based on was conducted under the project "*Poland-Germany. The mutual image of Poles and Germans under the conditions of their joint membership in the EU*" by Robert Bosch Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Foundation for Polish-German Collaboration and under the auspices of Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The survey was conducted by TNS-Emnid company between April 29 and May 5, 2006 on a representative sample of 1009 persons aged 14 and more. The survey of the image of Poles in Germany was also conducted by TNS-Emnid on a representative sample of 1000 persons aged 14 and more.

pointed to the middle of the scale, avoiding a clear assessment, whether positive or negative<sup>20</sup>.

Therefore the studies corroborate the above-mentioned dependence that in direct contacts Germans more often perceive Poles positively, yet it does not translate to a changed image of Poles as a national group.

The picture of a Pole that emerges from this study is relatively indeterminate; the only features indicated by Germans are religiousness and backwardness, whereas Germans do not have a clear opinion with respect to other features, such as the attitude to work, tolerance, efficiency, responsibility, and love for democracy. A Pole's image is definitely a borrowed one; this means that it is not a product of one's own contacts as only 31% of respondents have visited Poland at least once. The study also shows a relatively small interest in Poland as indicated by the answers to the question about the will to spend holidays in Poland. Only 33% of respondents admitted to be willing to go there.

## **The stereotype of a German in Poland**

Germany as a country is relatively well known to Poles. The image is not so neutral emotionally. Nearly 47% of respondents have been to Germany at least once. Poles have the following typical associations with Germany: it is a country of law and order (58% of indications), prosperity (36%), the country we share difficult history with (34%). The authors of the survey show that in the assessment of Germany one can observe a cohesive picture of the country and man: law and order (characteristics of the country) are created by disciplined and hard-working people (stereotype of Germans). The image of a typical German is clearly divided into the merits of competence and efficiency and moral inadequacies Poles attribute to Germans. "With respect to the 'human' (or 'moral') traits our attitude to Germans is [...] ambiva-

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<sup>20</sup> X. Dolińska, *Polska – Niemcy*, [in:] *Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie*, L. Kolarska-Bobińska (ed.), Warszawa 2003, p. 219.

lent. In the opinion of Poles Germans tend to be intolerant and unfriendly. The image of a German is clear and unequivocal with respect to a single dimension – a ‘German as a worker’. It should be emphasized that Poles have always respected Germans for these traits”<sup>21</sup>.

A relatively high degree of ambivalence (indeterminacy) expressed by Poles when describing moral features may indicate the increase of their sympathy for Germans, which has been recorded in numerous studies since 1989. The change of the attitude is particularly observable among the young generation.

When we compare the results of studies conducted in 2000 and those from 2005 we can notice individual differences that seem to result directly from the changed conditions (Poland joining the EU, the change of political climate in Poland). “When compared with the 2000 study, the group of responses that associate Germany with the place of work or the opportunity to work was clearly more distinct. However, a general conclusion is that the differences are not significant, and the principal elements of Germans’ image as well as the variables that account for these differences are relatively stable. It is usually assumed that the level [...] of sympathy and aversion is related to the social and demographic variables, although their influence is weaker than in 2000. It is surprising how irrelevant education and the place of residence are. They are not significant in this context. The age brackets are more significant. The aversion is the highest in the oldest group of respondents – those aged 65 plus – amounting to 31%. This is not only related to the attitude to Germans and the experience of the generation that remembers the war. Other studies also indicate that younger respondents are more prone to declaring their sympathy to other nations. It is not true, however, that these are the youngest respondents who declare the greatest sympathy. [...] The relations with Germans also influence the level of sympathy. One of the important findings of the study is statistical dependence between the visits in Germany and the level of sympathy. The more frequent the contacts the greater sympathy is declared. Political preferences do not affect the level of sym-

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 255.

pathy for Germans. However, we can observe that the level of aversion is higher among the respondents declaring right-wing preferences (26%) than among left-wingers (21%)<sup>22</sup>. Yet the results of the study conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs in 2000 show that the variables of “age, education or sex do not exert significant influence on the image of a typical German among Polish society. However, there is a relation between the social status and the type of professional occupation and the perception of Germans. The owners of manufacturing or servicing enterprises and the representatives of management emphasize the positive traits of Germans with respect to ‘competence’: responsibility, discipline and efficiency”<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> M. Fałkowski, *Razem w Unii. Niemcy w oczach Polaków 2000-2005*, survey report developed by the Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2006, pp. 28-29.

<sup>23</sup> X. Dolińska, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

## Chapter 3.

### **Historical determinants – survey results**

Recently, it has repeatedly been indicated that the mutual perception of Poles and Germans has changed. However, we decided to run a project to investigate to what extent historical conditions continue to influence this mutual perception. The question is quite significant, as after the change of government in 2005, Poland has implemented a so-called *historical policy*. Although the government changed again in 2007, the ruling coalition of Civic Platform and the Polish Peasant Party (PO-PSL) has continued the policy of their predecessors. This is likely to result from the fear of being accused of a lack of patriotism by the Law and Justice party (PiS). The policy towards Poland's neighbors, initiated in 2005 by the coalition of Law and Justice, the League of Polish Families and Self-defense (PiS-LPR-Samoobrona), meant making more frequent historical references in our relations with Germany and Russia. Consequently, both the interest and knowledge of Polish-German relations a part of Polish society (usually the better-educated part) has appears to have increased. The *historical policy* is also taken advantage of in political disputes on a variety of topics, particularly with respect to European issues. Our survey covered students of the final year in comprehensive or senior high schools and their parents. It was assumed that both in Poland and Germany these social groups are characterized by above-average knowledge of the subject and openness to the topics we were interested in. Therefore, it should be observed that these groups are not representative of either Polish or German society.

The principal difficulty we faced was to select such historical events that the respondents on both sides of the border would be familiar with, and which would be significant for the mutual perception of Poles and



Germans. We were forced to select some events that were shared by both groups of respondents (e.g. Hitler's aggression on Poland in September 1939, German support for Polish ambitions to join the EU), whereas others should only be common to the Polish respondents (e.g. the German colonization in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries). The Polish respondents were requested to assess 21 events, whereas the German ones were to assess 14 (Graph. 3.1.).

The general conclusion from the analysis of the answers is that both Polish and German respondents were familiar with a majority of the events we had selected. It could be observed in both groups that they were less familiar with the remote historical events, which had not been experienced by the respondents directly. However, we can only talk about them being less familiar with them. It appears that many respondents, especially among the Germans, declared having a higher awareness of historical events than was actually the case. This may have resulted from their positive attitude to the subject of the survey, and the intention to present themselves in a better way to the researchers. Another reason could be a certain political correctness of the German respondents towards a new EU member.


The respondents were requested to assess the importance of a given event to Polish-German relations.

The Polish students declared (Graph 3.2.) that the event that had the most negative influence on Polish-German relations was the German aggression on Poland in September 1939 (95% of responses), followed by Prussian participation in the partitions of Poland (89% of responses), and the Prussian Germanization policy (84% of responses).


The events that were assessed to have had the greatest positive influence on Polish-German relations involve German humanitarian aid for Poland during martial law (91% of responses), German support for Polish efforts to join the EU (89% of responses), and the election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope (87% of responses).

Like the Polish students, their parents (Graph 3.3.) chose the same three events that had an adverse impact on Polish-German relations: German aggression on Poland in September 1939 (96% of responses),


**Graph 3.1. The awareness of historical events which are significant to Polish-German relations**



**Graph 3.2. The assessment of historical events on Polish-German relations by Polish students**



**Graph 3.3. The assessment of historical events on Polish-German relations by Polish parents**



the partitions of Poland at the turn of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries (90% of responses), and Prussian Germanization policy (88% of responses).

The ranking of events that had a positive impact on Polish-German relations was slightly different. This group indicated the acknowledgement of the border on the Oder and Lusatia Neisse Rivers by the Germans to be the most important event (92% of responses), followed by the election of Karol Wojtyła as the Pope (95% of responses), and German humanitarian aid for Poland during martial law (94% of responses).

The German students ranked the events (Graph 3.4.) that were most burdensome to Polish-German relations as follows: German aggression on Poland (94% of responses); the compulsory displacement of Germans from the territories granted to Poland after 1945 (76% of responses), and the address of Polish bishops (20% of responses!). Such a high ranking of the address is quite surprising and it appears to follow from a lack of knowledge of what the address was about. It should be explained that the respondents were initially asked to decide whether they were aware of a given event and then to assess its influence on Polish-German relations.


This group of respondents assessed the collaboration during the 1997 flood<sup>1</sup> to have had the biggest positive influence on Polish-German relations (97% of responses). The aid extended by Poles to refugees from the German Democratic Republic in 1989 ranked second (94% of responses), to be followed by Germany's humanitarian aid for Poland during martial law (93% of responses).

German parents were the fourth group of respondents (Graph 3.5.). Their assessment of the two events that have had the most adverse impact on Polish-German relations corresponded to those indicated by the students, i.e. German aggression on Poland in September 1939


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<sup>1</sup> In summer 1997, Poland was affected by one of the most terrible natural disasters in the last decade – the *millennium flood*. The River Oder basin – including the border part of the river – was heavily damaged by water. The threat for both Polish and German sides of the border resulted in increased cooperation of institutions and individuals from Poland and Germany and contributed to the creation of elements of a cross-border community.

**Graph 3.4. The assessment of the influence of historical events on Polish-German relations by German students**



**Graph 3.5. The assessment of the influence of historical events on Polish-German relations by German parents**



(91% of responses) and the compulsory displacement of Germans from the territories granted to Poland after 1945 (82% of responses). The third choice concerned Poland's return to the Northern and Western Lands (28% of responses), which meant that the Germans had lost their eastern provinces. It seems understandable that this event has a different ranking than in the student group. It concerns events that the parents of students' parents had experienced themselves, so they were most likely to have been communicated between the generations.

Among the events that have had a positive impact on Polish-German relations, the parents indicated the Polish-German collaboration during the flood in 1997 (94% of responses as well). The respondents indicated the acknowledgement of the border on the Oder and Lusatia Neisse Rivers to rank second (84% of responses). It is somewhat surprising that the German parents considered Willy Brandt's visit to Warsaw in December 1970 to be a significant event that affected Polish-German relations (92% of responses). The treaty concerning the basis for normalizing mutual relations was signed then. It can be assumed that such a high assessment of this event does not so much concern the visit itself, but rather the fact that it was a part of the new German *Ostpolitik*, which consisted of the establishment of a political dialogue between Germany and the Eastern Bloc countries. The visit was the first political contact between Poland and Germany at this level since the end of World War II.

The above-presented results of our survey show that there are not profound differences in the assessment of the influence certain events have had on the condition of the Polish-German relations, whether between Polish or German parents or students. The only significant difference concerns the assessment of the "compulsory displacement" of Germans from the lands that were granted to Poland after 1945. They were assessed to have had an adverse influence on Polish-German relations by 82% of the German parents and 78% of the German students. The difference appears quite obvious, as these events were more *direct* for the generation of German parents (concerning their parents or grandparents), thus they have become an important element of family identity and history.



The conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the answers show that there is no profound generation difference, whether among the Polish or German respondents, with respect to their assessment of historical events influencing the mutual perception. It should be noted that both respondent groups gave a very good assessment of Polish-German relations (over 60% were positive in all the groups). Therefore, it appears that the belief in the eternal hostility between the two nations can no longer justify the condition of current relations, at least to the extent which it could do so before 1989.

The respondents were requested to indicate those events which, in their opinion, had the most profound influence on mutual relations (Table 3.1.).

**Table 3.1. The significance of selected historical events indicated by the respondents most frequently (the events that were most frequently indicated by each group of respondents)**

	<b>Polish students</b>	<b>Polish parents</b>	<b>German students</b>	<b>German parents</b>
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Place</b>	Aggression of Hitler's Germany on Poland on September 1, 1939	Aggression of Hitler's Germany on Poland on September 1, 1939	Aggression of Hitler's Germany on Poland on September 1, 1939	Aggression of Hitler's Germany on Poland on September 1, 1939
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Place</b>	Baptism of Poland	Baptism of Poland	Poland's return to the Western and Northern Lands	Willy Brandt's visit to Warsaw in 1970
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Place</b>	The Battle of Tannenberg	The Battle of Tannenberg		The election of Karol Wojtyla as Pope

**Table 3.2. The significance of selected historical events indicated by the respondents most frequently (how often the events ranked as 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>)**

	<b>Polish respondents</b>	<b>German respondents</b>
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Place</b>	Aggression of Hitler's Germany on Poland on September 1, 1939	Aggression of Hitler's Germany on Poland on September 1, 1939
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Place</b>	German support for the Polish efforts to join the EU	Willy Brandt's visit to Warsaw in 1970
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Place</b>	The election of Karol Wojtyla as Pope	German support for the Polish efforts to join the EU


The analysis of the data in this table indicates quite significant differences between the Poles and the Germans concerning the selection of the most important events (Table 3.2.). The Poles refer to historically remote events, as well as to those, which in their opinion have had an adverse impact on mutual relations. The German respondents in turn, refer to more modern events. For all groups of respondents, the German aggression on Poland in September 1939 is the most significant historical fact that has had an adverse influence on mutual perception.

The three events that were most often indicated by the Poles involve the German aggression on Poland in September 1939, Germany's support for Polish efforts to join the EU, and the election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope. The German aggression was most frequently indicated by the German respondents as well, to be followed by Brandt's visit (!), and Germany's support for Polish efforts to join the EU.

The most frequent question asked when investigating mutual perception was the one about attitudes to the proverb "As long as the world is whole, no German will be a brother to a Pole" ("Jak świat światem, nie będzie Niemiec Polakowi bratem"). Since the proverb is known in Poland, the Germans were requested to assess the German translation of this statement that obtained the form: "Germans and Poles will never be friends".

Two profound differences between the Poles and the Germans need to be pointed out when analyzing the answers to this question (Graph 3.6.). The first one concerns the greater skepticism of the German parents with respect to Germans 'making friends' with Poles (the difference amounts to 10% when compared to the German students). What is crucial, however, is that only approximately 6% of the German respondents agreed with the statement in the question. The Polish respondents are more skeptical (both parents and students). Nearly 33% of respondents (in both groups) agree with the proverb, whereas only approximately 35% think otherwise. Analyzing the answers given by the respondents from various towns one can notice that the parents and students from Alzay are most optimistic, as 76% of them disagree with the statement that Poles and Germans cannot be friends.

**Graph 3.6. Do you agree with the view that Germans and Poles will never be friends?**




When we compare our result with those collected by other research teams, we conclude that at the time of our survey there was an increased tendency in Poland to distance oneself from Germans. Yet, the level of this distancing was clearly lower than that before 1989. This downturn of an increasing tendency is beyond doubt a consequence of the Polish-German political dialogue after 2004, when the Polish-German common interest (Polish membership in the EU) was achieved, and the new actors entered the stage, particularly in Poland (Law and Justice and the League of Polish Families).

The above question is in line with that concerning the feasibility of Polish-German reconciliation.

As was the case with the previous question, the German respondents are more optimistic as nearly 65% of them answered yes, both among the parents and the students (Graph 3.7.). Approximately 50% of Polish respondents answered yes. Those who stated their disbelief in the feasibility of the reconciliation were mainly Polish, including 9% of students and 8% of parents, who claimed it was impossible to overcome the historical roots of conflict. The main reasons indicated by the respondents involved the feeling of historical injustice between Poles and Germans (the displacement, the loss of eastern lands). Another

**Graph 3.7. Is reconciliation between Poles and Germans feasible in your opinion?**



reason why it is impossible to remove the barriers to mutual positive perception is the psychological difference between both nations. The optimists point to the new opportunities arising from Polish membership of the EU, where Poland is becoming Germany’s partner, or at least Polish respondents expect it to. The German respondents emphasize the need to overcome historical problems, which is accomplished by Polish membership in the EU.

In order to investigate how the representatives of either nation perceive the nations as neighbors, we asked the respondents to rank the neighbors of Poland and Germany in terms of their economic importance (Table 3.3.).

**Table 3.3. The most important business partner**

	Polish students	Polish parents	German students	German parents
<b>1st Place</b>	Germany	Germany	Switzerland	Switzerland
<b>2nd Place</b>	Russia	Russia	Luxembourg	Luxembourg
<b>3rd Place</b>	Czech Republic	Czech Republic	Poland	Poland

There was no internal diversification within either national group. Both Polish students and their parents indicated Germany as the most important business partner among Poland's neighbors, Russia ranked second, and the Czech Republic – third. Surprisingly, Ukraine ranked only fourth as a business partner despite the good atmosphere in Polish-Ukrainian relations at the time of the survey. This probably means that the Polish respondents have a rational assessment of business partnership. Despite the emotional bond with Ukraine, aiming at economic and – consequently – political independence from Russia, the respondents are aware that the Russian Federation continues to be the most important business partner in the East, owing to its supply of energy resources and sales markets for consumer goods.

The results were somewhat surprising when it comes to the German respondents. Switzerland ranked first as a business partner both among the students and their parents, followed by Luxembourg and Poland. The result is puzzling since both groups of German respondents indicated France as the most important political partner in another section of the survey. Nevertheless, France was *only* fourth as a business partner. The low ranking position of Austria is also meaningful; it can be justifiably said that this is a consequence of historical events.

The high third position of Poland in the ranking needs commenting on. The result appears to have been affected by the fact that the survey was conducted by a Polish-German team, while a portion of German respondents (Alzay) had taken part in the youth exchange program with Poland (Kościan). Surveys conducted by other research teams have not confirmed such a high position of Poland as a business partner of Germany.

The issue of the distance between the groups of Poles and Germans was handled in the question about who the respondents would invite to a birthday party (a question asked of the German respondents), or to a Christmas Eve supper (a question asked of the Polish respondents). It was assumed that the tradition in Poland and Germany is to invite those who are emotionally closest to such parties (Table 3.4.).

**Table 3.4. The closest friend**

	<b>Polish students</b>	<b>Polish parents</b>	<b>German students</b>	<b>German parents</b>
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Place</b>	Czech	Czech	Swiss	Luxembourgish
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Place</b>	German	German	Pole	Swiss
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Place</b>	Slovak	Lithuanian	Luxembourgish	French


Regarding the Polish respondents, the highest ranking of Czechs was a relatively huge surprise; Germans ranked second (!), and Slovaks ranked third in the group of students, whereas Lithuanians were third in the parent group. As in the explanation of Poland's high ranking as a business partner of Germany, the explanation for a relatively high ranking of Germans among the guests invited to Christmas Eve supper by the Polish may be that a relatively large group of respondents (31.8% of respondents from Alzay and Kościan) are at schools which collaborate in the youth exchange programs. This is not to mean, though, that all the students from Alzay or Kościan took part in the exchange program, or that all the parents received a youth from a Polish or German school respectively in their homes.

Since 2005 a dispute has continued in Poland about the extent to which historical events should be taken into account in the current political dialogue. We asked a direct question about whether historical events should be referred to at Polish-German meetings (Graph 3.8.).


The answers to this question quite clearly diversify both groups of respondents; the differences inside the groups are irrelevant. The Poles indicated very clearly that historical events should only be taken into account when the dialogue partners misinterpret them. This answer conceals the accusation that Germans "are trying to write history anew". Over a half of German respondents, whether parents (55%) or students (52%), claimed that historical experience should be taken into account during current discussions.

The issue of the role of history in current relations was complemented by the question about the attitude to the German initiative to build the Center against Expulsion in Berlin (Graph 3.9.). At the time

**Graph 3.8. Should history be taken into account in mutual relations?**



**Graph 3.9. The attitude to the erection of the Center against Expulsion in Berlin**






of the survey this issue was the most *sensitive* one and the one referred to in political disputes in Poland.

The analysis of the answers to this question let us conclude that both Polish and German respondents were relatively united in the assessment of this project. This mainly concerned the view that such a center should be founded under the auspices of the European Union (approximately 20% of answers in all groups of respondents), and that Germans should have the right to commemorate the victims of compulsory displacement. A distinct difference concerned the accusation that the project was a German attempt to “write history anew”. Nearly 20% of the Polish respondents expressed this view, but they were only supported by 4% of the German respondents. According to 17% of the German parents and 5% of the students, the conflict over the Center against Expulsion could worsen mutual relations. Twelve percent of the Polish respondents, parents and students alike, were of the same opinion.


Apart from the Center against Expulsion, another bone of contention in Polish-German relations at the time of the survey was the issue of German citizens’ purchasing of real estate in Poland and the access of Poles to the German labor market. Asking these questions we assumed that they indicated mutual attitudes, which have been shaped by history (the predominant Polish fear is that “they will buy us out”, “they will disturb the order”, whereas the main German fear is that “they will take our jobs from us”). The Polish respondents answered the question whether they would permit German investors to purchase various types of real estate (Graph 3.10.).

The parents are definitely more cautious when it comes to giving Germans an opportunity to purchase real estate in Poland. Both groups agree that the ban on purchase should mainly concern the banks; 60% of respondents expressed this opinion in both groups. The difference concerned the purchase of land and farms; 60% of the parents and 40% of the students were against it (Graph 3.11.). This is probably a reflection of the disputes that occurred in Poland during the EU campaign, when the adversaries of Polish EU membership pointed to the threat of the buyout of buildings, land and farms, leading to the loss of Polish sovereignty, mainly in the West and North.

**Graph 3.10. Polish parents – Germans should be allowed to buy in Poland**




**Graph 3.11. Polish students – Germans should be allowed to buy in Poland**



The German respondents answered a question whether the Poles should have access to work in Germany.

**Graph 3.12. Polish access to work in Germany**




The answers to this question were quite surprising as over 60% of the respondents (!) agreed. Only 21% of the parents and 17% of the students were against granting the access to work. To justify the negative answer, the respondents pointed to a high unemployment rate in Germany and a high number of foreigners who already were in Germany seeking employment. It appears that such a high support for the opportunity for legal employment of Poles in Germany is a consequence of the specific nature of the group of German respondents. The students are not affected by this problem for now, and a majority of German parents have secondary (18%) or higher (36.1%) education, so their professions are not threatened by any foreign competition. It is obvious that among the respondents with lower education and those living closer to the border (Frankfurt on Oder, Großhein) such approval for foreign employment is lower.

The last substantive question asked in the *historical* part of our questionnaire was the question concerning the assessment of Polish-German relations (Graph 3.13.).

If we divide the suggested scale of 6 points into the answers grouped into those ranging from 0 to 2 (0 – very bad, 1 – bad, 2 – moderately

**Graph 3.13. The assessment of the current Polish-German relations**



bad) and those ranging from 3 to 5 (3 – moderately good, 4 – good, 5 – very good), the answers are distributed as follows: Polish students (30%:70%), Polish parents (23%:77%), German students (25%:75%), and German parents (28%:72%). Nevertheless, the moderately good category predominates in all groups of respondents: Polish students (59%), Polish parents (49%), German students (53%), and German parents (65%).

A general conclusion drawn after the analysis of the answers to this question is that a majority of both Polish and German respondents had a positive opinion about Polish-German relations then. The assessment was not highly enthusiastic, though. It should be emphasized that the positive assessment of relations by Poles is puzzling as it was made after quite a loud campaign in Poland aiming at a transformation of *common interests* into *common targets*, which did not have to coincide. They may indicate the alienation of the political elite from the needs and objectives indicated for Polish-German relations by society, or the animators of all kinds of Polish-German initiatives for rapprochement or even reconciliation of both nations. This assumption may be justified by the results of other surveys.

## Chapter 4.

# **Political culture and the culture of management. Implications for Polish – German interrelations**

### **Introductory remarks**

Polish-German relations are said to be among the most difficult in Europe. A century of lasting hostility culminated during the Second World War and was followed by the shift westwards of the border, expulsion of populations and the isolation of the two states (or actually three states: Poland, Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic). The reconciliation process after 1989 normalized relations, however Polish-German *difficulties* are still visible, both in bilateral interrelations and on multilateral platforms, especially the European Union.

Polish-German differences are usually described and analyzed from the perspective of either historical factors or (im)balance of interests<sup>1</sup>. Consequently investigations into mutual interactions are often conducted from a historical perspective as well as of any similarity or difference of interests. However a different approach might bring a strong explanatory value to understanding the peculiarities of Polish-German relations, especially relations within the European context. This involves looking at the political culture and the culture of management.

The main aim of this research is to investigate a framework for Polish-German relations from the point of view of political and cultural structures. Concepts of political culture and culture of management are employed to explain the reasons for the specific nature of their re-

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. M. Piechocki, *Polsko-niemiecko-rosyjskie kontrowersje wokół Gazociągu Północnego*, [in:] *Polacy i Niemcy w XXI wieku. Nowe oblicza partnerstwa*, B. Koszel (ed.), Poznań 2007.

lations. One of the initial assumptions states that both the political cultures and cultures of management are different for individual Poles and Germans and consequently for the two states which is visible in the mutual contacts between them. Thus, the aim here is to present some theoretical remarks, verify them from own poll-based research in the dynamic approach and additionally explain the phenomena with the support of other existing empirical research data. Historical factors and events as well as the nations' interests are thus suggested to be insufficient explanations for understanding the problems between the two nations and states. They rather form the bases for mental constructions which lead to different perspectives on the two sides interrelations.

The political culture approach is based here on the classical theories of Sidney Verba, Gabriel Almond and Lucian Pye as well as their successors, including Teija Tiilikainen.

Political culture (as defined by Verba and Almond) shall allow us to explain – among other things – the eagerness for political participation, advancement in civil society building as well as structural elements which determine the possibilities for development (but also limiting the implementation) of certain solutions in both societies and states. This part is concluded with an analysis of resistance cultures that complete the Polish and German peculiarities. Tiilikainen's theory will, on the other hand, be useful in examining Polish and German differences on European issues. The concept enables us to reject the use of explanations that see the different European strategies of Poland and Germany as a simple result of differences in short term political and economic aims.

Further divagations are based on Hofstede's methodology of measuring differences in management cultures with their practical consequences. This part was designed to distinguish the factors differentiating organizational cultures. Five cultural dimensions are presented here, of which three have been chosen to be examined and discussed more closely. The highly measurable indicators in this part are expected to bring relevant explanatory value to the investigation and contribute to the support for the main hypothesis of the research.

The theoretical approach described is supplemented and developed by a poll-based research conducted in the form of questionnaire-based

interviews. As already described in *Chapter 1. Comments on Methodology*, target groups in Poland and Germany were constructed based on age, which was considered to be the main variable. (Two age groups: 17-19 (called *students* in the text) and over 40 (called *parents* in the text) were distinguished.) It was assumed that socialization time may play a crucial role in political culture and the internalization of cultures of management. The acceleration in European integration in the 1990's, together with the cultural, social and human reopening of the continent's borders (leading to the almost unlimited flow of ideas and intellectual and normative standardization) seems to be the most important element in socialization. The latter group was exposed to primary socialization in the pre-intensive-integration period. It was then to a lesser extent influenced by similar factors to the younger group. The former group was socialized primarily during the peak of European integration efforts, absorbing ideas and solutions of a similar (European) nature. This investigation will enable us to discover how the societies' openness and standardization processes, brought about by European integration, have influenced certain different features of Polish and German societies. Both nations' political cultures and cultures of management as well as their dominant elements in the two age groups (together with existing static empirical research) are verified.

The analysis is based on a set of research questions. They consist of the following problems:

1. What factors have been of the highest importance for the cultures of management and creation of differences in the political cultures of Poland and Germany?
2. Is the difference gap widening or narrowing and what are the transformation tendencies in various age groups?
3. To what extent is the European integration process a factor modifying differences and enabling cooperation from the perspective analyzed?

Introductory assumptions enable one to formulate preliminary hypotheses. The following ones constitute the research agenda here:

1. Historical legacies, followed by political transformation and European integration in both cases, has produced an observable form of

political culture and culture of management. In Poland and Germany the elements of these two phenomena differ in form, content and time of conduct.

2. European integration and an *opening process* have been narrowing existing differences. Younger generations shall represent similar tendencies having been exposed to similar influences in a similar way. Older generations will represent, on the other hand, different then younger patterns in both fields.
3. Polish and German individuals present mental differences visible in the field of political culture and the culture of management. These have practical consequences in different aspects of life, especially political life in its internal and external aspects. They also make Polish-German cooperation difficult in certain areas.

It is important to emphasize that the empirical part of the investigation was conducted not representatively. However, it was intended to cover different fields representing various traditions in both states. The given results thus present an averaged approach, combining regional characteristics in both cases. In Germany they were citizens from western and eastern areas. In Poland the groups came from those areas controlled in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by Prussia, Russia and Austria as well as from ex-German territories after 1945 and the interwar Polish provinces. The authors are conscious that different traditions in political culture and the culture of management are represented within both states, however averaged data still represents a very important set of information for analyzing both states, and can contribute to explaining the states and societies differences and interrelations.

## **Political culture**

Political culture is – according to Sidney Verba<sup>2</sup> – “a system of empirical beliefs, symbols and values that define situation where political ac-

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<sup>2</sup>S. Verba, *Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture*, [in:] *Political Culture and Political Development*, L. Pye, S. Verba (eds), Princeton 1965.



tion takes place”. It provides us, then, with a subjective orientation in politics and refers to “cultural patterns in a specific state”<sup>3</sup>. Lucian Pye defines it as a “sum of the fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge that give form and substance to political process”<sup>4</sup>. Following Almond and Verba, political culture refers to a political system that has been internalized in the learning process, and contains feelings and estimations<sup>5</sup>. They are acquired in the process of socialization to non-political roles and the social system. Almond and Verba enumerated three types of political culture: parochial, subjective and participatory. The first one is defined by individuals with low knowledge about the system as well as expectations and involvement towards it. In the case of the second one, citizens have knowledge and sensitivity towards the authorities’ activities and the functioning of the system but they still do not participate in social and political life. In the third form consciousness is followed by involvement.

In the two subsequent parts Polish and German political cultures are described together with their roots and evolution.

## Poland

According to Karol Janowski<sup>6</sup>, during the communist period, Polish political culture could be described as a composite one, containing elements of three presented types. The collapse of communism pushed the culture more into a participatory. However the society is still characterized by a relatively low level of knowledge about the system and unsatisfactory levels of participation. Additionally inter-group loyalty often dominates, e.g. within labor union organizations or the Church,

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<sup>3</sup> V. D. Mamadouh, *Political culture: a typology grounded on Cultural Theory*, “GoeJournal”, No. 43/1997, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> L. Pye, ‘*Political Culture*’ in the *Encyclopedia of Democracy*, S. Lipset (ed.), London and New York 1995, pp. 965-969.

<sup>5</sup> A. Jabłoński, *Kultura polityczna i jej przemiany*, [in:] *Studia z teorii polityki, Tom II*, A. Jabłoński, L. Sobkowiak, Wrocław 1998, p. 180.

<sup>6</sup> K. Janowski, *Kultura polityczna, Podstawowe pojęcia oraz ich znaczenie i użyteczność*, “Przegląd Politologiczny”, No. 1/2002, pp. 106-107.

public life is highly ideologized. Some scholars, e.g. Wiesław Bokajło<sup>7</sup> stress even parochial elements in Poland as being dominant.

The actual socialist period in Poland, despite its authoritarian character, represented many non-subjective elements. These partly resulted from the previous legacies, but partly from the character of the system.

Previous legacies include aristocratic democracy and *golden freedom* – the two main features of the so-called the First Republic and its political system. The Polish state was built on aristocratic parliamentarianism, where about 10% of the population belonged to the nobility and were equipped with political rights enabling them to participate in political life. Together with local assemblies (*sejmik*), an elected monarch and its weak position, the system could be described as democratic and participatory in comparison to the dominant patterns of that time in Europe. The partitions at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century reversed the model. Poles lost their state and became the inhabitants of neighboring states (Austria, Prussia and Russia) organized according to the absolutist pattern<sup>8</sup>. This led to resistance on at least three levels: political (participants of political life opposed the limitations of their role under the new circumstances), national (Poles versus alien occupiers) and economic (own economic interests confronted with the exploitative objectives of the ruling powers). The resistance model differed in the different parts of a divided Poland as a result of the differing political conditions. In the western (Prussian) Polish provinces a *positive* approach dominated, stressing economic and social development as being most important in fighting for autonomy and independence. In the eastern (Russian) Polish parts unsuccessful political opposition led finally to a series of uprisings and the creation of a military resistance culture. Southern Poland (Austrian) developed its autonomy successfully, which was especially visible in cultural life. The 19<sup>th</sup> century created attitudes of Poles that were then based on the ab-

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<sup>7</sup> W. Bokajło, *Studia z teorii polityki, kultury politycznej i myśli politycznej*, Wrocław 1996, p. 82.

<sup>8</sup> M. Kosman, *Kultura polityczna – kultura historyczna*, Poznań 2009, p. 14.

sence of trust towards the state (that was considered something external and alien). Insubordination and resistance was then considered positive or even patriotically desirable. The society (nation) was perceived as standing in contradiction to the state. On the other hand, the partitioning powers expected Polish citizens (similarly to their own citizens) to be the loyal receivers of orders in a hierarchically organized system. Subordination dominated their internal patterns.

An independent Poland, after regaining its independence in the interwar period, was trying to change the existing patterns. However this short episode of statehood was interrupted by the Second World War, the German occupation finally followed by the Soviet domination in the Cold War period using a local Polish autocratic regime. Once again the patterns created in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were revived. The process of social alienation was additionally strengthened by the elimination of (political, intellectual and urban) elites: they were partly exterminated during the war or in the early post war years, partly emigrated or remained in Western states. Again opposition came to be considered as patriotic and thus positive.

The character of the communist system in post-war Poland was not coherent, though, and this resulted in some participatory elements in the Polish political culture. This duality was visible in the clear division into the public and private spheres. The former was dominated by an undemocratic system, the latter by privately spread rules and norms. The ruling regime was generally considered illegitimized and the opposition movement was relatively strong<sup>9</sup>. On the other side, several social groups strongly benefitted from the new communist situation which also contributed to their support for the system. This was visible especially in some of rural areas. Elements of the parochial culture remained there. Both official (state backed) and some unofficial (opposition) activities led to participatory elements arising<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup>R. East, J. Pontin, *Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe*, London 1997, pp. 13-16.

<sup>10</sup>B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka. Tradycja, teraźniejszość, perspektywy*, Poznań 2008, p. 117.

Opposing the system became one of the most visible elements of participation. The mass character of the opposition included different forms: religious involvement<sup>11</sup>, the illegal press and printing, distributing or reading books, self-organization, especially in labor unions, and finally strikes, demonstrations, confrontation with security forces, and so on, the 1980 Solidarity movement could be treated as an extension of the process that led to the collapse of communism as a result of mass protests (but also more favorable international conditions than in the case of previous rebellions)<sup>12</sup>.

1989 is considered the beginning of the political transformation aimed at creating a western style liberal democracy<sup>13</sup>. This was related to the main direction of independence policy of Poland – integration with the western world and the limitation (elimination) in this way of the Soviet (Russian) threat. Integration required the application of set democratic standards. This was impossible, though, without changing the individual's approach to the system – the political culture represented by them. A *well functioning democracy* was even included in the *Copenhagen criteria* – the formal set of requirements that had to be fulfilled as a precondition of EU membership<sup>14</sup>. The consolidation of democracy, however, was difficult due to at least three factors: (1) the legacy of alienation from state structures resulting, among other things, in a low level of participation in political life, (2) the simultaneous economic transformation that ejected individuals from previous occupations or positions which had provided them with a living (or helped them survive), and finally (3) the necessity of overcoming the syndrome of resistance in favor of positive involvement. Additionally, the civil society, a product of decades of ongoing processes in western European states, was to be constructed within a couple of years in Poland, together with the other changes described

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<sup>11</sup> F. Plasser, P. Ulram, *Measuring Political Culture in East Central Europe. Political Trust and System Support*, [in:] *Political Culture in East Central Europe*, F. Plasser, A. Pribersky (eds.), Avebury 1996, p. 17.

<sup>12</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem.*

above. This made the aim very challenging (but on the other hand this change was surprisingly fast<sup>15</sup>).

After 1989, the state became *its own* (similar to its authorities) for the first time since the beginning of World War II. However, the society was used to another reality. It was used to contesting the system (considered as imposed and alien): on the one hand electoral participation had not made any sense, on the other hand staying at home had expressed opposition towards the system. Now suddenly participation was to be useful (was to enable a real influence on the system) and needed, as an exemplification of support towards the system. Additionally participation started to be presented not only as a (personal) political right but also as a civic obligation. A citizen should vote. However, differences between various social groups have been observable after 1989. Men tend to be more eager to participate in elections than women, older people more than younger, better educated than those with a more basic education, richer than poorer<sup>16</sup>. Beata Pająk describes the tendencies in the changing face of protest in Poland after 1989. She shows that the readiness to participate in strikes dominates among the labor force whereas protests, petitions, etc., prevail among better educated individuals. The former declare at the same time a lower support for democracy, the latter much higher<sup>17</sup>.

An economic transformation was initiated along with the political one<sup>18</sup>. The necessity dictated shock therapy, based on abandoning the centrally planned economy and establishing a free market one. This led to social diversification and – especially at the beginning – to pauperization. Growing unemployment, falling wages and delaborization of the economy was accompanied by corruption and the enrichment of narrow elites. These processes made individuals concentrate more on

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<sup>15</sup>I. Bernik, *Political Culture in Post-Socialist Transitions: Radical Cultural Change or Adaptation on the Basis of Old Cultural Patterns?*, Frankfurter Institut für Transformationsstudien, No. 9/2000, p. 6.

<sup>16</sup>B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibidem*.

<sup>18</sup>B. Wegener, *Political Culture and Post-Communist Transition – A Social Justice Approach: Introduction*, “Arbeitsbericht” No. 69, Berlin 2000.

the economic conditions of life and distrustful towards new elites, including political elites. The economic growth<sup>19</sup> created in the second part of the 1990s and in the 2000s gave a chance for Poles for a better life. Individuals tended then more to consume than to participate<sup>20</sup>. Being a consumer was much more attractive than being a citizen; it brought the individual closer to the desired western style of life. At the same time new challenges required citizens to make decisions. This was related first of all to the European integration process. In 2003 Poles had to decide in a referendum on the future of the state, mobilizing voters to become involved in the event. At the same time a generational difference became visible. Younger people, socialized after the collapse of communism were much less influenced by all the factors characteristic of the cold war reality. On the other hand this was the first generation in modern Polish history that was strongly exposed to direct influences from the west, due to widespread language abilities, possibilities for travel and the effects of globalization.

Positive involvement instead of resistance is the final element to be analyzed. Under the condition of the lack of an enemy-alien, opposition towards the system became pointless. Additionally, wide involvement was finally possible (on the one hand unlimited establishment of non-governmental organizations and membership of bodies, on the other hand new levels of elective bodies and institutions multiplied elections and gave more chances to co-decide on various aspects of public life, starting from local life, through to regional, national and finally European life) so participatory attitudes started to be considered as positive. This change in opinions was not necessarily followed by individual behavior. One of the features of Polish political culture was a higher level of declarations than action. In poll-based research there is always over a dozen percent more answers declaring participation than really occurs. Expressing passiveness is unpopular, and the opposite – planning involvement is appreciated.

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<sup>19</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

<sup>20</sup> B. Biskup, *Polacy niegłosujący – zawiedzeni, zmęczeni czy niezainteresowani?*, [in:] *Kultura polityczna w Polsce i w Niemczech: wybrane problemy*, G. Meyer, S. Sulowski, W. Łukowski (eds.), Warszawa 2007.

Individuals are conscious of the importance of participation (are informed of how the system (should) work) but do not necessarily employ this consciousness.

One of the results of these tendencies was a growing share of individuals involved in non-governmental organization activities. In the late 1990s about one third of Poles declared such membership. This indicator was relatively low in comparison to Western European states of about two thirds on average. Also, about one third simultaneously declared following political events on TV. When analyzing citizen activity Paweł Śpiewak concludes that “there is a substantial difference between short-time spontaneous break out and organized activity, requiring long work and collaboration”<sup>21</sup>. What dominates in research outcomes is still overwhelming distrust towards the state, its institutions and representatives. A majority of individuals do not identify themselves with any political party<sup>22</sup>. Many scholars pay attention to the fact, that historical experiences in this respect were strengthened in the first years after the collapse of communism. Similarly to the 1990s, also in the 2000s the number of individuals declaring that they feel they have influence over public issues of state was less than 12%. Almost half of the people thought they had no influence. This percentage was higher than 34% in the case of local issues, local governance was then much more visible and accessible in the eyes of Poles, showing the success of territorial reform from the point of view of democratic consolidation and the formation of a participatory political culture<sup>23</sup>. The central level has one more negative aspect in the opinions of Poles. They have a negative opinion of the political class. It is evaluated as untrustworthy, dishonest and concentrated on its own interests. Poles still believe that democracy is the best form of governance compared to all the rest, though<sup>24</sup>. Additionally, the percentage of supporters of democracy was almost constantly growing during the two decades of independence and Poles were one of the most pro-democ-

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<sup>21</sup> Quotation after: B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

<sup>22</sup> F. Plasser, P. Ulram, *Measuring Political Culture...*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>23</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

<sup>24</sup> F. Plasser, P. Ulram, *Measuring Political Culture...*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

atic societies in the region<sup>25</sup>. At the same time, a majority of respondents are dissatisfied with how democracy works in Poland. Here, on the other hand, the number of unsatisfied people has generally been growing in the 1990s and 2000s<sup>26</sup>.

An interesting element of the changes in Polish political culture is the level of European influence. Together with the European Union's enlargement in 2004 Poles became entitled to stand and vote in European Parliamentary elections and orient themselves towards European institutions. Two scenarios were expected. First, that the European sphere would be considered different from the national one, more western and therefore more trustworthy, interesting and better fitting Polish expectations. This should result in high participation in European life (including elections). Second, that it would be considered as a continuation of national politics, albeit located even further from the citizen, which is equivalent to *less important*. Participation, interest and trust will then be even lower than in national politics.

## Germany

German political culture is considered much closer to the participatory model. However east-west differences are still visible. Consciousness of the functioning of the system is relatively high, system based mechanisms have also been developed. The eastern provinces are still in the transformation process towards the participatory model, though.

The main legacy of German political culture in the 1950s was the authoritarian Nazi period together with a long tradition of vertically oriented and hierarchical social structures.

Mediaeval tendencies among town dwellers and the nobility to decide for themselves may be described in Germany as similar to the processes visible in other European territories. However two factors are

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<sup>25</sup> A. Mungiu-Pippidi, *Revisiting Fatalistic Political Cultures*, "Romanian Journal of Political Science", Vol. 3, No. 1/2003, p. 6.

<sup>26</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.



considered as crucial for the later developments of German political culture: the reformation and introduction of absolutism.

The Lutheran denomination that was established mainly in the eastern and northern parts of the German states, introduced the rule of subordination of the individual to the authorities. This alienated them from political life and led to the authorities dominating the system. Individuals were not supposed to oppose their rulers and interfere in public life. Work (ethics), destiny and (social) order constituted the most important elements of the system. This – among others – paved the way for absolutism as a form of political system (however more liberal tendencies were also present<sup>27</sup>). Serfs were not considered mature enough to co-decide, a monarch had to take responsibility for them. The administration and army (with obligatory service considered an honor and a socialization mechanism) were developed as pillars of the state system. Simultaneously a legal system was developing, creating procedure-based mechanisms with judicial protection of citizens. The dominant role of the state and trust in it were both strengthened during the 19<sup>th</sup> century by Germany unification (eventually not civic but state-organized) and industrialization that led to the domination of this state in Europe. In the interwar period Germans experimented with liberal democracy, creating the so-called Weimar Republic. Its political instability and economic inefficiency resulted in collapse, and the discredit of democratic solutions. The Nazi regime, short-lasting but very repressive, employed the authoritarian heritage in creation of a totalitarian state.

One has to remember the divisions in German political culture in the pre-war period that was related to regional differentiation. Western and southern provinces were much more liberal and antiauthoritarian (which was visible, among other things, in the introduction at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century of relatively democratic election systems) than the northern and eastern ones. They were additionally much more civic and opposed the dominant order.

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<sup>27</sup> U. Hof, *German Associations and Politics in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century*, [in:] *The Transformation of Political Culture. England and Germany in the Late Eighteenth Century*, E. Hellmuth (ed.), London 1990.

The western part of Germany was one of five states investigated in the 1960s by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. The passiveness of the society's political and social participation resulted in classifying it as subject (authoritarian). The cognitive aspects of political culture were comparable to the United States of America or United Kingdom, however active participation was much lower (which was explained, among other things, by the totalitarian experience). Citizens' eagerness to oppose local government in cases of bad legislation was relatively high (over 60%) but in cases of resisting central authorities the same action would be undertaken by less than 40%, much lower than in those other two states. German culture was named then as an *administrative* one – citizens were conscious of their rights but were hesitant in participating in its creation. Almost half of Germans declared membership of different organizations (a comparable level to the USA and UK) but their involvement was not very deep. Those results were confirmed by research carried out, among others, by Ralf Dahrendorf and Juergen Habermas. Germans were described as *unpolitical* and authoritarian with (passive) participation in formalized structures<sup>28</sup>. Additionally, a lack of trust of the new German authorities to *the German common man* (afraid of developments similar to in the Weimar Republic) limited individuals' influence on public issues. Some instruments of direct democracy were never introduced, e.g. direct presidential elections or federal referendum<sup>29</sup>.

Two factors that contributed to the change of German political culture were the student revolts in the 1960s and terrorism in the 1970s<sup>30</sup>. This moved Western Germany to a participatory type (of a type which has been claimed by many scholars to work much better nowadays than the Anglo-Saxon ones). Germans became more proud of their political system (especially democracy), but much less proud, on the other hand, of their nationhood. Interest in politics was constantly

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<sup>28</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>30</sup> R. Schmitt, *From 'Old Politics' to 'New Politics': Three Decades of Peace Protest in West Germany*, [in:] *Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Age*, J. R. Gibbins (ed.), London 1989.

growing, similarly to the society's ability to organize resistance and the membership levels in non-governmental organizations. Analyzing the data from the 1980s and 1990s and comparing Western and Eastern Germany, however, differences are visible. (Eastern Germany started the process of democratization and changes in political culture only after the collapse of communism, earlier it had experienced communist autocracy and displayed weak opposition tendencies<sup>31</sup>.) The non-involvement index was about 20% higher in the East. The 1990s were characterized on the other hand by a decreasing level of electoral participation<sup>32</sup>, which may be explained by growing disappointment towards political parties and structural changes in German society (a similar phenomenon has been visible in several Western-type democracies). Democracy was declared the best form of government by almost 90% of Germans in the West and 70% in the East<sup>33</sup>.

Between the 1970s and the 2000s the resistance culture was changing in Germany as well<sup>34</sup>. Protest behavior declarations showed that demonstrations in the form of petitions or boycotts were declared by many as more and more acceptable. At the same time illegal protests were rarely accepted<sup>35</sup>. In Eastern Germany opposition attitudes were rare<sup>36</sup>.

Acceptance of extremist parties grew in the 1990s and was more visible among young people than older ones, especially in the former German Democratic Republic. This also reflected new political conflicts within the German society<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> R. East, J. Pontin, *Revolution and Change...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-140.

<sup>32</sup> M. Eilfort, *Zniechęceni, wyobcowani obywatele? – elektorat nieuczestniczący w wyborach jako wyzwanie dla demokracji*, [in:] *Kultura polityczna w Polsce i w Niemczech: wybrane problemy*, G. Meyer, S. Sulowski, W. Łukowski (eds.), Warszawa 2007.

<sup>33</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-76, 78.

<sup>34</sup> R. Schmitt, *From 'Old Politics' to...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-193.

<sup>35</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>36</sup> R. East, *Revolutions in Eastern Europe*, London–New York 1992, pp. 64-69.

<sup>37</sup> F. Pappi, M. Terwey, *The German Electorate: Old Cleavages and New Political Conflicts*, [in:] *Party Government and Political Culture in Western Germany*, H. Döring, G. Smith (eds.), London 1982.

Changes in German political culture were one of the results of the new order after the Second World War. The deliberate policy of the western alliances led to changes in socialization and education patterns in Federal Republic of Germany. They were based on three principles: replacing hierarchical structures and *order* with egalitarian solutions. Pupils were to be socialized as future citizens not subjects – this was related to the (implicit) subordination problem. And finally *political education* as one of the courses promoting and explaining democracy in the schooling system. The student protests extended these changes from the younger generation to adults as well. Since then the whole institutional system has been employed to influence pro-democratic and pro-participatory attitudes<sup>38</sup>.

The advancement of democratic consolidation has also had external consequences for Germany, especially in perceptions of the desired foreign policy pattern. This is especially visible in the European integration process. Internalization of the external (European) sphere results in participation in European political activities and growing trust in European institutions. Germans are also interested in European politics, searching additionally for Europe-wide recognition of their new political profile, corresponding with the European spirit and breaking away from their own old heritage. This is embodied in expressions of European solidarity and the presence of soft values in German politics towards other states and nations within the EU.

### **Political culture in the European integration process**

One of the followers of the classical theorists was Teija Tiilikainen<sup>39</sup>. Her research explains different patterns of social organization using state-centric, liberal and communitarian traditions (following subsequently Lutheran, Calvinist and Catholic cultures) that resulted in re-

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<sup>38</sup> B. Pająk, *Demokracja polska i niemiecka...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-84.

<sup>39</sup> T. Tiilikainen, *Europe and Finland. Defining the National Identity of Finland in Western Europe*, Aldershot 1998.

publican, national and liberal states. This is very helpful in explaining the different priorities of Poland and Germany in the European integration process.

Tillikainen's theory assumes that the external relations pattern of a given state can follow one of these previously mentioned traditions:

1. State-centric, where national interest as well as statehood are the most important determinants of external activities;
2. Liberal, where eagerness to collaborate is utilized and depends on the gains that can be achieved much more than on other factors;
3. Communitarian, which concentrates on international cooperation, allows dual identification and identity<sup>40</sup>.

State-centric cultures are hesitant about the deepening integration process, as the nation state remains for them the most mature and simply the best form of political development. Liberal cultures are expected to participate in different forms of integration if they expect the gains to be bigger than if they standing aside. Finally, for communitarian culture states, integration is a positive process *per se*, embodying the principle of universalism and unity in certain aspects.

Poland, representing the Catholic tradition, is described as an example of a communitarian political culture. Germany on the other hand is culturally rooted in both Lutheranism and Catholicism, and thus represents features of both the state-centric and communitarian models.

Additionally, there is another pattern of resistance in the three mentioned types of culture. In the state-centric one, of Lutheran rules, it was one of obedience. Individuals were to be subordinated to the ruler, resistance was not accepted. Authority was on the other hand responsible for taking care of individuals; it knew best what the most suitable solutions were and could grant individuals specific rights. In a liberal culture it was individuals who ceded rights to the authorities, legitimizing its existence and prerogatives in this way. In communitarian states opposition is possible when rulers break the values that constitute the existing order. A bad ruler may be opposed<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem.*

## **Poll-based research**

The key element of empirical investigation in the field of political culture was participation in Poland and Germany. The first question in this section aimed at determining if participation in elections is more a right or an obligation for respondents. This was followed in the next question by examining the frequency of declared participation in elections. Further question deepened the findings to show the interviewees' involvement in different types of elections (central, local, etc.). The results presented were verified in the following question by investigating respondents' opinions on the importance of different elections.

The next question indirectly checked the various levels of importance of elections for the respondents by checking their opinions on allowing second nation members (Poles and Germans) residing in the interviewee's state to participate in certain types of election. It showed the degree of openness to interrelations resulting from the European integration process.

The further group of questions traced another aspect of political culture – building a civic society: the role and participation in non-governmental organizations. Opinions on the importance of those structures were found as well as membership declarations collected. Also the reasons for passiveness were investigated.

The last section of this part was to describe the reaction type – the dominant resistance culture in both states. Here, one of the questions examined experience in protest demonstrations, and another declarations on reactions in case of collectively unsatisfactory change – the potential for reaction.

## **Culture of management**

The culture of management theory by Geert Hofstede<sup>42</sup> proposes a theoretical explanation of cultural differences and supports them with

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<sup>42</sup> G. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations, Sage 2003; G. Hofstede, *Cultures and Or-*

empirical evidence. Also, the practical consequences of these findings and the model used are described by him and his followers. The main subject of research is the culture dominating in a given political unit (in practice a state). Hofstede introduces five dimensions of cultural behavior. They dominate in a given culture type in the form of actions taken and interrelations engaged in. They are: Power Distance Index, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance Index and Long-Term Orientation.

The Power Distance Index (PDI) concentrates on inequality and the degree to which it is accepted in a society. "It shows how far those who are lower in the hierarchy agree on privileges that is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally". Inequality is then more designed as a bottom up process not top down one. "It suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders. Power and inequality, of course, are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that 'all societies are unequal, but some are more unequal than others'"<sup>43</sup>.

Individualism (IDV) confronted with collectivism describes the dominance of separate or integrated activities in the society. "On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty"<sup>44</sup>. Importantly, the concept of collectivism is used here in a more social than political meaning. Individualism has strong implications for loyalty towards group(s) as well as for (self)subordination eagerness and is related to safety, too.

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*ganizations: Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival*, New York 1996.

<sup>43</sup> Geert Hofstede *Cultural Dimensions*, <http://www.geert-hofstede.com/>.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*.

Masculinity (MAS) is compared to femininity. It presents the gender roles dominating in a given society. “The assertive pole has been called ‘masculine’ together with aggression, ambition, social status, etc.; and the modest, caring pole ‘feminine’”. The latter are supplemented usually by mutual care and assistance, empathy, and so on. “The women in feminine countries have the same modest, caring values as the men; in the masculine countries they are somewhat assertive and competitive, but not as much as the men, so that these countries show a gap between men’s values and women’s values”<sup>45</sup>.

Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) reveals patterns of coping with the unknown. “It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations, especially when the risk level is difficult to estimate. Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising, different from usual”. Some cultures tend to decrease this discomfort “by strict laws and rules, safety and security measures, [...] the opposite type, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to”<sup>46</sup>.

Long-Term Orientation (LTO) is compared with a short-term orientation where the earlier is related to “thrift and perseverance and the later to respect for tradition, fulfilling social obligations, and protecting one’s ‘face’”.

Hofstede’s research, especially his five dimensions assume that every type of national culture influences a given organization’s management and its behavior<sup>47</sup>. This model was initially a subject of economic studies and expressed a tendency of investigating the cultural factors behind company managements. However its social implications were soon discovered quickly and social scientists enthusiastically applied it. Also political scientists have been looking for cultural explanations for political processes and the suggested theory could be helpful in explaining dominant ideas and behavior both at citizen and state level. It

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>47</sup> L. Czarkowska, *Antropologia ekonomiczna: Elementy teorii*, Warszawa 1999, p. 37.



is thus useful for comparing both Poland and Germany as well as Poles and Germans.

The five cultural dimensions presented have strong explanatory value when applied to the case of Poles and Germans as well as Poland and Germany. They are also visible in mutual relations strategies and behavior. Empirical research describes then the following values of different aspects of both cultures:

**Table 4.1. The values of five cultural dimensions in Poland and Germany<sup>48</sup>**

	<b>PDI</b>	<b>IDV</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>UAI</b>	<b>LTO</b>
Germany	35	67	66	65	31
Poland	68	60	64	93	32

**Source:** M. Ostrowski, *Plemiona Europy*, “Polityka”, No. 16/2003.

The Power Distance Index, similar to the other indicators is scaled from 1 to 100. An increasing score reflects more acceptance of inequalities whereas lower results indicate dominating equality patterns. Poland scored 68 and Germany 35. The Polish result locates this state among the more hierarchical cultures with dominant support for vertical solutions. Germany, on the other hand, belongs to the group of countries with more horizontal structures. That could suggest that internally Poles would more readily prefer greater privileges for individuals located higher in the social structure (who are richer, hold higher positions, are more entitled, etc.) in favor of those located lower in society. Similarly in external relations, an acceptance for the domination of stronger and bigger actors could be expected. However, in both spheres there are legacies undermining the study results shown in the indicators: the internal and external resistance against the authorities as well as democratic traditions.

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<sup>48</sup> The indexes for Germany found in literature present the same value. In the case of Poland different authors may quote different values (e.g. Kołodziej-Durnaś writes about: PDI 73, IND 65/81, MAS 58, and UAI 66). This results from the fact that the research was conducted later by many authors using different methodology.

Germany on the other hand belongs to partnership oriented cultures, and one might expect preferences stressing equality in both internal and external relations, that is among individuals as well as among states. Here, however, there are also counter tendencies: an undemocratic heritage, immigration and assimilation problems as well as the present demands for a new (adequate) role in international relations.

Individualism difference ranks from 60 in the case of Poland to 67 in the case of Germany. This makes Polish culture a slightly more collective than the German one, but both still belong more to the individualistically than collectively oriented ones.

The Uncertainty Avoidance Index is the third dimension where the results for Poland and Germany differ, in this case significantly. It is 93 for the former and 65 for the latter. New, unknown situations are considered as much more dangerous by Poles than by Germans and are treated rather as a threat than as an opportunity or challenge in their positive meanings.

The Masculinity and Long Time Orientation results are very similar in the case of both cultures. They are therefore dominated by male features and a more short-term orientation.

The Power Distance Index differences would indicate different foreign policy strategies, including different integration patterns. In Germany decisions should be based on wide consensus and public debate with a rather minor role of the leaders. Other states should be considered in German society as partners. In Poland on the other hand political elites play a more important role in the decision making process with strong influence over other individuals. Eagerness to compromise ought to be more limited and the perception of other states is determined by their position in the European order.

Slightly higher German Individualism is visible in the greater pressure placed on the role played by individuals. In Poland, on the other hand, the community position is stressed.

The Masculine nature of both cultures is visible in the strong articulation of both states interests and the dominance of the *own group principle*, together with a tendency to improve the own group/state position in comparison to others.

Higher Uncertainty in the Polish case is reflected in the strong tendency to create formal structures in order to deal with new situations as well as to postpone decision making. The simultaneously low level of respect towards the law is an element of Polish political culture, also visible among the elites (which serves as a justification for similar behavior dominating among society)<sup>49</sup>.

### **Poll-based research**

Due to the limitations of this investigation it was decided to empirically research only three of the described dimensions of management cultures: the Power Distance Index, Individualism and Masculinity. The intention was to verify the data in the field of inter-individual relations as well as in the political context, especially on the inter-state level.

The Power Distance Index was traced in three questions of the quantitative form-based research. The first one asked about acceptance of special treatment given to individuals occupying higher positions. The second question concerned the issue of whether larger and older EU member states should have a more prominent position in mutual relations with the other states in the EU context. Finally, the last question in this part was intended to show the relationship between salary level and inequalities in professional contexts. It was expected that – following the Polish hierarchical orientation and German low level index – Poles would accept privileges to top level individuals while Germans would tend to oppose them. Poles should accept the dominance of the larger and older states within the EU and Germans rather not. Finally, payment diversification should be chosen by Poles whereas a more egalitarian approach should be visible among Germans.

Individuality was to be tested by next three questions. First one revealed acceptance of flat or progressive taxation (in case of the latter

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<sup>49</sup> K. Janowski, *Między integracją a konfliktem. W kregu refleksji nad kulturą polityczną Polaków*, "Przegląd Politologiczny", No. 3-4/2000, p. 78.

with an option of devoting money for common needs). Second investigated the importance of the EU level and national level by an evaluation of which interests should be of primary importance in a state's agenda. Last question collects information on opinions whether a well functioning team or independent individuals are of key importance in professional activities. In the case of those three questions no bigger differences were expected (especially in comparison to the previous ones) between the two nations, however some variations would not be surprising, especially between age groups. Flat taxation should be preferred. State interests should dominate over European ones in both cases (slightly stronger in the German case). Individuals should be declared as more important in work than a team (again more visibly in Germany).

The masculinity level is checked in the last question in the survey. Here the respondents were asked if political parties should implement a compromise-led approach or be more win oriented. Following Hofstede's empirical investigation, respondents from both sets shall similarly prefer the more autocratic approach in their strategies.

## Chapter 5.

### **Political culture and the culture of management – survey results**

The assumptions presented in *Chapter 4. Political culture and the culture of management. Implications for Polish – German interrelations*, were verified by poll-based research. In the following section the results will be presented and discussed. Some elements of this section have been already published in the Polish language version<sup>1</sup>.

#### **Political culture**

Most of the Polish survey participants declare their perception of elections as an obligation that is very important or important (Graph 5.1.). A majority of German respondents perceived it as a citizens' right that is important. On the other hand a total number of Germans seeing elections as very important and rather important obligations is comparable. As a result Poles see them first of all as an obligation while Germans see them as both an obligation and a right. A very small number of both Poles and Germans declare that elections are rather unimportant or unimportant.


Age differences are also visible in declarations. Both among Poles and Germans a younger group stresses obligation more (a total of 83% and 60% respectively) than an older group (a total of 77% and 50% respectively). With respect to the right the tendency was the opposite: students 15% and 51% to parents 19% and 55%). It means that the

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<sup>1</sup> See: J. Jańczak, *Pozahistoryczne determinanty różnic i wzajemnego postrzegania się Polaków i Niemców*, [in:] *Narody w Europie. Tożsamość i wzajemne postrzeganie*, L. Zieliński, M. Chamot (eds.), Bydgoszcz 2007, pp. 179-191.

**Graph 5.1. Participation in elections**

**Participation in elections is in your opinion:**




younger generation in both states stresses an obligation a little bit more, whereas the older stress the right more than the young do.

The question concerning the actual involvement in political life reveals different patterns than the results of the previous question (Graph 5.2.). German respondents declare they participate in elections (almost) always (about 90%) more frequently than their Polish counterparts (70%). The group of *sometimes participants* is bigger in Poland than in Germany. It is visible in both age groups. On the other hand, similarly to the previous question, there are age group differences. In both cases more parents than students declare that they participate (almost) always. The older generation is then more active than the younger one. What is striking is that about 25% of Polish students vote never/rarely or sometimes.


In the case of the following *electoral participation* graphs only the parents' declarations will be presented. This is because of the fact

**Graph 5.2. Frequency of participation in elections**




that a majority of the students – due to their age – had no opportunity to participate in all types of elections.

**Graph 5.3. Parents' participation in local elections**



80% Polish and over 90% German parents claimed to always attend local elections. The number of those never/rarely voting is comparable (Graph 5.3.).


**Graph 5.4. Parents' participation in Land elections**



A very similar participation is declared by German parents in the case of Land elections. Almost 90% of them claim to participate (almost) always (Graph 5.4.).

It is important to mention here that Land and local elections are held together in Germany, at different times in various lands. However, the federal character of this state and consequently the role of Lands as political units equipped with many state-like competences resulted in asking two questions in the questionnaire about local and Land elections.


**Graph 5.5. Parents' participation in parliamentary/Bundestag elections**






Regular participation in parliamentary/Bundestag elections is declared again by 90% of German and 75% of Polish parents. The number of those never/rarely participating is similar. Polish parents much more frequently participate only sometimes (Graph 5.5.).

**Graph 5.6. Parents' participation in the EU Parliamentary elections**



The Euroelections are the only ones where only slightly more than 70% of German parents declare that they participate (almost) always. At the same time the number of Poles here is below 60%. What is interesting is that about 15% of Germans and 18% of Poles say they never/rarely vote (Graph 5.6.).

**Graph 5.7. Parents' participation in presidential elections**



The highest level of participation declarations is achieved among Polish parents in the case of presidential elections (Graph 5.7.). About 88% declare that they vote (almost) always, and only 2% informed that they never/rarely participate.

**Table 5.1. Importance of given elections**

	<b>Polish students</b>	<b>Polish parents</b>	<b>German students</b>	<b>German parents</b>
<b>No. 1</b>	Presidential elections	Presidential elections	Parliamentary/Bundestag elections	Parliamentary/Bundestag elections
<b>No. 2</b>	Parliamentary elections	Elections to the local government	Elections to the EU parliament	Elections to the local government
<b>No. 3</b>	Elections to the EU parliament	Parliamentary elections	Elections to the local government	Elections to the EU parliament

For Polish respondents, regardless of age, the presidential elections are the most important, in the case of German voters, parliamentary were seen as more important than those at federal level (Table 5.1.). In both cases the EU Parliament elections were more important among students than parents.

Comparing the declarations of interviewees to the actual turnout in different elections in Poland and Germany (Table 5.2.) the following conclusions may be presented.

Declared participation in elections in Poland is usually 30-40% higher than the actual turnout. At the same time, where more important specific elections are considered, the lower the gap between declarations and behavior (presidential – about 30%, parliamentary, local – about 34%, European – about 40%). In the case of Germany the gap is much smaller, ranging between 13-35% (Bundestag elections – about 13%, European – about 25% and local/Land – about 35%), however the gap decrease pattern is also visible to some extent. Additionally, it is important to remember that the sample is not representative and the behavior in the investigated groups may be different than the state-wide statistical data show.

**Table 5.2. Turnout in elections in Poland and Germany  
(latest two elections in each category before the research period)**

<b>Elections</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>Germany</b>
<b>Local</b>	1998 – 48% 2002 – 44.23%	2004 Brandenburg – 56.4% 2004 Saxony – 59.6% 2004 Thuringia – 53.8% 2006 Rheinland-Palatinate – 58.2%**
<b>Land</b>	–	2004 Brandenburg – 56.4% 2004 Saxony – 62.2% 2004 Thuringia – 53.8% 2006 Rheinland-Palatinate – 58.2%**
<b>Parliament/Bundestag</b>	2001 – 46.29% 2005 – 40.57%	2002 – 77.65% 2005 – 79.08%
<b>EU Parliament</b>	2004 – 20.87%	1999 – 43% 2004 – 45.21%
<b>Presidential</b>	2000 – 61.12% 2005 – 49.47%/50.99%*	–

\* First/second round.

\*\* In the Lands where poll-based research was conducted.


**Source:** Poland: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza.

The importance sequencing of elections in Poland corresponds to the turnout level (a phenomenon especially visible among the parents). In the case of German respondents a similar phenomenon may be observed.

Poles are conscious of the importance of elections and declare their participation although they do not always actually participate. Among Germans, this gap is smaller and the participation level much higher. Germans are closer, then, to a participatory political culture, while Poles represent some features of a subjective one. Here, participation is more frequently considered as an obligation, seen as important but this knowledge is not necessarily followed by involvement.


Acceptance of the participation of Germans who live in Poland in local elections is slightly higher among Poles than the acceptance of the participation of Poles who live in Germany among Germans (Graph 5.8.). Age differences are also visible here. Permission is

**Graph 5.8. Should Poles residing in Germany as EU citizens be allowed to participate in elections in Germany? Should Germans residing in Poland as EU citizens be allowed to participate in elections in Poland? Local elections**




slightly more frequently expressed by the younger generation than by the older one. The most reluctant group are German parents (34%), when compared to the other groups (25-28%).

**Graph 5.9. Should Poles residing in Germany as EU citizens be allowed to participate in elections in Germany? Land elections**



In the case of Land elections the percentage of German respondents accepting Polish voters ranged between 34% in the case of parents and 43% in the case of students (Graph 5.9.). On the other hand 50% of the former and only 36% of the latter group was against it.


**Graph 5.10. Should Poles residing in Germany as EU citizens be allowed to participate in elections in Germany? Should Germans residing in Poland as EU citizens be allowed to participate in elections in Poland? Parliamentary and Bundestag elections**




In the case of parliamentary and Bundestag elections a general tendency was similar yet stronger (Graph 5.10.). German respondents were much more reluctant than the Polish ones and younger generations were more propitious. The most hesitant group was German parents with 24% being proponents and 60% opponents. The most accepting group was Polish students – 43% and 44% respectively.

Euroelections are the ones where the acceptance for another nation’s participation is the highest (Graph 5.11.). Here the level of approving Germans is higher than in the case of Poles. Again, the younger generation is more consenting than the older one. The most positive group are German students (84% yes, 6% no) the least one – Polish parents (63% yes, 21% no).

**Graph 5.11. Should Poles residing in Germany as EU citizens be allowed to participate in elections in Germany? Should Germans residing in Poland as EU citizens be allowed to participate in elections in Poland? EU Parliament**



**Graph 5.12. Should Germans residing in Poland as EU citizens be allowed to participate in elections in Poland? Presidential elections**



Finally, the permission of Polish respondents to let Germans living in Poland vote in Presidential elections is around 40% in both age groups, where a negative opinion is expressed by 44% of parents and 50% of students (Graph 5.12.).

Concluding, the acceptance for another nation's participation in elections was the highest in the case of Euroelections (63%-84%). In the case of local elections supporters still prevailed in every group. German respondents are balanced in the case of Land voting. In the case of parliamentary elections Polish opinions are balanced, while Germans are rather skeptical. In the case of presidential voting Polish respondents are rather negative or negative. Comparing these findings to the *importance of elections* and *participation declaration* it is visible that the higher the rank of the given elections, the more skeptical the respondents seem to be with regard to allowing another nation's citizens to vote. In every case the younger generation is more consenting than the older one. With the exception of Euroelections Poles are more open than Germans.

Comparing the presented findings to other existing research wider tendencies could be confirmed. Research by The Institute of Public Affairs reveals that between 2000 and 2006 the level of Germans accepting Poles as town council members grew from 47 to 55%<sup>2</sup>. Another report from the same institution shows that 52% of Poles would oppose a German person in the same role in Poland, however this indication drops among better educated and younger categories of respondents<sup>3</sup> as is the case in the presented project. Forty-one percent had noting against it, which contrasted with only 27% in 2000<sup>4</sup>. Jan Garlicki, in his research, presents the level of acceptance for participation in parliamentary elections. Here, Polish opposition is at a level of 69%, compared to 54% in Germany<sup>5</sup>. Compared to other fields, political activity is most difficult to accept for both Polish and German societies.

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
<sup>2</sup>M. Fałkowski, A. Popko, *Niemcy o Polsce i Polakach 2000-2006. Główne wnioski z badań*, The Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2006, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup>M. Fałkowski, *Razem w Unii. Niemcy w oczach Polaków 2000-2005*, The Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2006, p. 30.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 31.

<sup>5</sup>J. Garlicki, *Tożsamość europejska Polaków i Niemców oraz poziom akceptacji procesów integracji Europy*, [in:] *Młodzi Polacy i młodzi Niemcy w Nowej Europie*, J. Kosęła, B. Jonda (eds.), Warszawa 2005, p. 102.

**Graph 5.13. Importance of Non Governmental Organizations (associations, foundations, sport clubs, charity organizations, etc.) for local community problem solving**




The role of NGOs is perceived as important or very important by about 90% of the respondents (Graph 5.13.). The most skeptical or indifferent towards their role were Polish parents, while the most favorable were Polish students. German parents were slightly more convinced about NGOs than German students were.

A strong difference is visible between Poles and Germans where comparing the number of individuals being members of NGOs (Graph 5.14.). About 78% of Polish respondents and only about 58% of German respondents declare to be members of no organization. At the same time almost a half of those Poles and only a small percentage of Germans declare that they would like to join an NGO. Only about 22% of Poles and about 42% of Germans participate in such organizations' activities, mainly in one or two. Only in the category *many organizations* do Poles dominate over Germans, especially young Poles. What is interesting when comparing the cumulated results for age groups in both nations, is that German parents are more active (53%) than German students (38%), whereas in Poland both groups



**Graph 5.14. Membership of an NGO**




are similarly active (20% and 23% respectively). In the groups declaring a willingness to get involved the younger generation prevails in both nations (Poles 43% to 28%, Germans 12% to 4%). Polish parents and German students are the most hesitant towards NGO activity at the level of about 50%.

A similar question asked of a representative group of young Poles and Germans (15-24 years old) by Krzysztof Kosała and Bernadette Jonda revealed similar results. Here, only 17% of young Poles and about 25% of young Germans belong to traditional organizations<sup>6</sup>.

Concluding the last two questions, the German respondents declare the importance of the third sector, which is backed up by their engagement, Polish respondents see the relevance but seem to be much more passive. Again consciousness is not followed by acting.

<sup>6</sup> M. Grabowska, E. Siellawa-Kolbowska, K. Kosała, T. Szawiel, *Szansa na dobre sąsiedztwo. Wyniki międzynarodowych badań porównawczych na temat młodzieży polskiej i niemieckiej*, "Dialog", No. 74-75/2006, p. 29.

**Graph 5.15. Reason for non-involvement in NGOs**




When declaring the reasons for non-involvement in NGO activities (Graph 5.15.) the main one pointed to by Poles and Germans was the lack of time (44% and 46%). It was mentioned a little bit more often by the older than by the younger generation. The second, also similarly frequently chosen, option was the lack of an interesting organization in the place of residence. Age differences were much more visible here. Young generations picked this answer more frequently (33% and 38% respectively) than the older one (21% and 23%). The lack of organizations was selected mainly by Poles, especially young (26%) and rarely by Germans (6%). Germans more often declared that financial limitations caused their absence from NGOs (around 23%) than Poles, where it was a reason for 15% of students and 8% of parents. The lack of importance was pointed to by about 10% of respondents, similar to both national and age groups.

When commenting on the presented declarations an additional remark should be made: the differences in the third sector involvement may result from a less developed range of NGOs in Poland, as re-

flected in the lower number of registered NGOs as well as in their much more limited activities, resulting from a lower level of financial support. On the other hand, this may not be the main factor behind the lower level of involvement and the argument of the absence of (interesting) organizations may only be an excuse justifying passiveness.

**Graph 5.16. Participation in demonstration**

**Have you ever participated in a demonstration?**




Polish and German respondents who have never taken part in that form of protest differ in numbers, around 85% and 50% respectively (Graph 5.16). The percentage of those who do not plan to change this is similar in both cases, about 35%. Many more Poles than Germans do not exclude participation in a demonstration in the future (which again shows that – contrary to the Germans – Poles’ declarations are not necessarily followed by action). In the case of active respondents Germans have participated in demonstration(s) much more frequently (about 50%) than Poles (about 25%). Age differences in both cases reveal a higher level of parents’ activity compared with students, in the case of Germans 56% to 47%, in the case of Poles 28% to 8%. On the

other hand the percentage of students who do not want to demonstrate is in both cases lower than that of parents (30%-37%) and who want to do so in the future higher. Mirosława Grabowska in her research comes to similar conclusions<sup>7</sup>. The presented data may show that the parents belong to the generation that changed the system in both states whereas the younger generation has had fewer opportunities to express dissatisfaction in this way.

**Graph 5.17. Reaction to an unfavorable change in working conditions**

**You are in the following situation: suddenly the conditions of your work changed unfavorably. How would you react?**



The difference in Polish and German respondents seems to be visible with respect to this question (Graph 5.17.). Poles declare a much more active reaction than Germans. Condition change acceptance is almost two times more frequently declared by German respondents than by Polish ones. When declaring opposition to the change Poles

<sup>7</sup>M. Grabowska, *Młodzież wobec demokracji i polityki*, [in:] *Młodzi Polacy i młodzi Niemcy w Nowej Europie*, J. Kosela, B. Jonda (eds.), Warszawa 2005, pp. 158-159.

start to prevail in writing petitions or writing petitions and demonstrating as well as just demonstrating. On the other hand, with the exception of German approval for changes, petition writing as well as petition writing and demonstrating are the most frequently declared behaviors in both national groups. Less frequent are unconditional acceptance followed by demonstrating. The presented data appears to confirm – at least at a declaratory level – a higher eagerness among Poles to rebel. However, this eagerness will probably not be transformed into action.


Differences are also visible in the age groups of both nations. More reserved reactions are more visible in the case of the older generation in both national groups. The most striking is the difference in declared acceptance between German students (16%) and parents (42%). In the latter case this behavior is at the highest level of all the German parents' declarations, making the most typical reaction. The more active the reaction, the higher the dominance of the younger generation in both nations. Again, the difference is the most visible in the case of Germans and petition writing together with protesting (47% and 9% respectively) but in the case of Poles the tendency is the same (53% and 35% respectively). Generally, German parents are the most moderate and Polish students are the most radical.

## **Culture of management**

Poles and Germans express similar tendencies regarding the way of treating individuals located higher up in the professional hierarchy (Graph 5.18). First of all, in both groups a very small percentage declared that they should be given more respect than others (about 5%). A majority of the answers concentrated on expressing respect and equal treatment. In the case of the answer that they should be respected Germans dominate (about 43%) over Poles (about 32%). In the case of the answer that they should be treated in the same way as other individuals the Polish average was about 60% whereas the German was 47%, meaning that the former stressed the principle of equality a little bit

**Graph 5.18. Position and privileges**

**Individuals occupying higher positions...**




more. Generally egalitarian treatment dominated in the answers to this question.

Age group differences are rather difficult to be perceived with the exception of the *more respect* answer. Six percent of Polish parents chose this option (only 1% of Polish students) and no German parents did. In both national groups the answer *treated with respect* was supported by slightly more parents than students.

When comparing the equality and inequality of states in the EU (Graph 5.19.), Polish respondents stressed the former more frequently (about 89%) than Germans (about 59%). In the case of opinions that some states should be more important than others it is not the length of membership that determines the response (4% of Poles and 10% of Germans) but the size of a given state. Here Germans (about 18%) think that bigger states should have more influence on EU decisions than small states. Only about 6% of Poles express a similar opinion.

There are also clear age differences in declared answers. The younger generation in both national groups is more egalitarian than the

**Graph 5.19. Relations between EU member states**




older one. A similar treatment of all the states is expressed by 90% of young Poles and 87% of older Poles, and 66% and 49% of Germans respectively. A different status due to different size is declared by 1% of young Poles and 8% of older Poles, and 18% and 23% of Germans respectively. The young Poles are more egalitarian than the more hierarchical German parents.

A very interesting tendency is visible when investigating the differences in salary determinants among Poles and Germans (Graph 5.20.). Only 9% of Polish respondents marked personal skills as the main desirable determinant, compared with 45% of Germans. Poles on the other hand chose diligence and involvement more frequently (about 81%) than Germans (about 71%). Salary similarity regardless of the above-mentioned factors was marked only by 9% of Poles and 8% of Germans.

Age differences were usually not striking. The older generation in both national groups supported diligence and involvement more frequently (4-6% difference) and payment equality less frequently, especially in the case of Germans (9% difference). Personal skills were

**Graph 5.20. Salary determinants**




slightly more often chosen by Polish students than parents. Among German respondents the tendency was opposite (39% to 51%).

So, looking at the first three questions examining PDI, it may be stated that almost none of the assumptions resulting from the index values were confirmed. Poles are even more equality oriented in comparison with Germans when privileges for individuals are considered. At the interstate level they also favor similar treatment of member states more than Germans do (which reflects Poland’s being a middle-sized state and a new member of the EU). Only in the case of salary diversification do Poles follow the general pattern of the index, here, on the other hand, Germans stress privileges for higher personal skills. The PDI is not reflected in the examined question as a pattern explaining Polish-German differences.

A very similar number of Poles and Germans declared that taxes (Graph 5.21.) should be similar for everyone (23% and 29% respectively) and that – and this opinion prevailed – richer individuals should pay more than poorer ones (cumulated results 77% and 79% respec-



**Graph 5.21. Tax distribution**




tively). In the latter category more Germans than Poles accepted this solution unconditionally (33% to 41%), more Poles than Germans thought that tax diversification is acceptable only if higher taxes are devoted to the needs of the poorer (44% to 37%).

More complicated are the declarations made within both age groups in each of the nations. Similar taxation is accepted a little bit more frequently by younger generations (4-5% difference). In the case of unconditional higher taxation for the rich, the younger generation is much more in favor than the older one which is especially visible among Polish respondents (39% to 27% respectively). In the case of conditional taxation in both cases parents dominate over students in choosing this answer (Poles 51% to 34%, Germans 43% to 33%). By way of comparison, the findings of the research carried out by Tadeusz Szawiel are interesting here: here about 40% of young Germans “are

prepared to pay higher taxes for social services from the state. In Poland – much less (30%)”<sup>8</sup>.

**Graph 5.22. Relations between EU member states**



About 7% of German and 4% of Polish respondents said that the EU member states should care first of all for their own national interests (Graph 5.22.). Much more diversified were the answers stressing the taking care of communitarian interests (about 17% of Germans and 46% of Poles). Seventy-six percent of Germans and 50% of Poles expressed the opinion that states should worry about national and European interests to a similar extent. What is striking is the strong pro-European attitude of Polish respondents. It may demonstrate either the elements of a communitarian culture, with a strong emphasis put on the European community in Poland, or an idealistic approach resulting from the very early stages of the European debate in this state.


<sup>8</sup> T. Szawiel, *Młodzież polska i niemiecka: podstawowe wartości a przekonania i zachowania polityczne*, [in:] *Młodzi Polacy i młodzi Niemcy w Nowej Europie*, J. Kosęła, B. Jonda (eds.), Warszawa 2005.

There were almost no differences in both age groups' answers in the examined nations.

It is important to know that in the light of existing research, for Germans the EU is primarily an economic community, not a political one<sup>9</sup>. Consequently, German interests have a similar character. At the same time, 40% of Germans were of opinion that Poland was pursuing her own interests within the EU at the expense of other member states<sup>10</sup>. Simultaneously, 72% of Poles declare that a compromise oriented policy is more important for them than the priority of their own interests<sup>11</sup>. They see also Germany's role in the EU as a compromiser<sup>12</sup> and would like Poland to form a long-term coalition within the EU with Germany<sup>13</sup>.

**Graph 5.23. Team vs. individuals at work?**

**What is in your opinion most important at work?**



<sup>9</sup> M. Fałkowski, A. Popko, *Niemcy o Polsce...*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 11.

<sup>11</sup> *Opinie Polaków o stosunkach polsko-niemieckich po zmianie rządów w obu krajach. Komunikat z badań*, The Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2005, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> M. Fałkowski, *Razem w Unii. Niemcy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>13</sup> CBOS report, 4-7.08.2006.

A majority of both Poles and Germans (91% and 82% respectively) declared that a well-functioning team is much better than good, independent professionals (Graph 5.23.). Only 4% of Poles and 9% of Germans were of the opposite opinion. In both national groups (more visible in the case of Germans) students were slightly more pro team oriented than their parents were.

Summing up the findings from the IND questions, it has to be stated again that the index assumptions were not confirmed. A flat taxation preference was not visible; in fact, quite the opposite, redistribution is preferred in both Poland and Germany, which is more at a similar level. In the case of state interests' dominance within the EU half of the interviewed Poles and 17% of the Germans pointed at EU interests as those that should be first taken into consideration by the member states. Also a well functioning team was chosen as much more important than individuals in both national groups, with Poles stressing this element more than the Germans again.

Comparing these findings to other research, they appear to confirm Agnieszka Kołodziej-Durnaś's statement that "despite limited individualism among Germans, there is a strong feeling that an 'organization is a common good'" and Polish culture contains a "high ratio of community feeling"<sup>14</sup>.


Similarly to the previous question both Germans and Poles strongly stress the cooperation of political parties as the more desired model than their individual activity (Graph 5.24.), questioning the masculine character of both cultures. That option was chosen by 74% of the former and 85% of the latter. Sixteen percent of Germans and only 5% of Poles preferred an individual implementation of one's own ideas.

Age differences were not visible among German respondents and slightly differed among Polish ones, making the younger generation more cooperative (about a 5% difference).

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<sup>14</sup> A. Kołodziej-Durnaś, *Pogranicze integrujące się – czy synergia polskiej i niemieckiej kultury organizacji jest możliwa?*, [in:] *Transgraniczność w perspektywie socjologicznej. Nowe pogranicza?*, Ż. Leszkowicz-Baczyńska (ed.), Zielona Góra 2005, p. 291.

**Graph 5.24. Strategies of political parties**



## Conclusions

In concluding the poll-based research presented here, several elements need to be stressed.

Political participation is considered by both Poles and Germans as something important, however for Poles it is more an obligation than for Germans. Declared participation in elections in Poland is usually 30-40% higher than the recorded turnout; in Germany this indicator is lower, at a level of 13-35%. Germans and Poles are conscious of the role of political participation but their real activity (visible in the turnout level) differs.

European integration has brought about several consequences for political culture. In the case of Poland, the Euroelections have not changed anything, failing to enhance participation visible in the turn-

out (they have the lowest turnout in comparison to both other Polish elections and the Euroelections in Germany). European elections seem to be remote from the citizens which results in their relatively low interest. In both states the Euroelections – both in declarations and in practice – are among the less important of the different types of elections. At the same time, the declared eagerness of Poles and Germans to allow *second nations' citizens* to vote in these elections is high. The more important the elections, the lower the acceptance of foreign participation. The prevailing feeling is that important elections should be limited to the participation of fellow citizens, whereas less important ones may be open to neighbors.

The declared and actual electoral participation comparison also reveals another rule: both Poles and Germans are conscious of the importance of participation but among Germans this awareness is far more reflected in actual behavior. Also the questions on the importance and membership of NGOs confirm this finding as well as do the models of resistance cultures. Despite Polish traditions of resistance and their declared eagerness to take radical actions it is the Germans who carry out active opposition. Germans are therefore much closer to a participatory political culture, whereas Poles display some elements of a subjective one.

Poles in their declarations display a strong element of a community integration culture. Acceptance for Germans voting in Poland is higher than in Germany for allowing Poles to do the same. Poles also believe in EU interests more strongly than the Germans do. Their integration culture on the other hand seems to have several elements of a state-centric culture (however, it has to be stated here that the territorial logic of the German sample, of provinces with a Lutheran, and consequently a state-centric heritage, dominated: Saxony, Thüringen, Brandenburg vs. Rhineland-Palatinate).

The culture of management failed to provide a sufficient explanation for Polish-German differences. In the case of the PDI, the hierarchical character of the Polish culture contrasted with the much more egalitarian German culture was not confirmed in the fields investigated with respect to individuals, member states positions within the

EU and professional behavior. The IND revealed a collective approach dominating in both national groups looked at, rather than the expected individual one. A high level of masculinity was not confirmed and both Poles and Germans preferred a collaborative approach by political parties. In one of the three indexes Poles and Germans turned out not to be as different as they were expected to be, while in all of them they expressed more soft/compromise oriented/collective values and preferences than they were expected to. This may result from the compromise related atmosphere of the European integration process leading to another type of negotiation culture.

Another aim of the survey was to test age differences resulting from different socialization conditions. In a definite majority of questions asked of both age groups, the students' answers clearly differed from the parents' answers. Usually both young Poles and Germans represented the same *direction of difference* from their parents' opinions. In the opinion of the students, in contrast to the parents, elections were more an obligation than a right, they were less active in elections, ranked the Euroelections higher in the hierarchy than their parents did, and were more eager to let the other nations vote in various elections in their own state. Young generations have less experience with demonstrations but declare a more radical reaction to undesirable changes than their parents. Students are more egalitarian than their parents, slightly more collective and less masculine.

The arguments presented confirm that an age difference exists in both states. Younger generations, both in Poland and Germany, represent many similarities and the same direction of changes in comparison to their parents. This could be treated as a result of similar socialization conditions – European integration dominating during their lifetime, leading to the internalization of similar norms and values.

## Chapter 6.

### **Polish-German partnership – survey results**

This chapter is devoted to the issue of partnership from the perspective of Poland's membership in the European Union.

The subject appears to be significant in as much as the subject of conditions of Poland's membership in the European Union was among the hottest issues in the campaign concerning the *European referendum* in Poland. The most spectacular manifestation of this campaign was the slogan *Nice or death*. It reflected the expectation that owing to her demographic and economic potential from the very beginning Poland, as a new EU member state, should assume her earned position among the *medium-sized* European states with respect to the number of votes in the European institutions. We may remember that Poles compared themselves to Spain most eagerly then, and the status Poland was attempting to assume was to be comparable to that Spain was holding.

What was also important for this chapter concerned the position of Poland *vis-à-vis* Germany. The declarations of the strategic Polish-German partnership, so typically referred to while describing Polish-German relations in the 1990s, were dead and buried. Mutual relations came to be perceived as a win-lose game, where the gain of one party translated into the loss of the other one. This was the impression one could get listening to, or reading about the Polish and German election campaigns in 2005. The parties began to firmly pronounce their interests and sought allies among other EU countries to implement these interests. The dividing line was, and apparently still is, determined by how long a country has been an EU member, and has taken the form of a split into *old* and *new* member states. The change of the ruling elite in Poland and Germany in 2005 only supported



this tendency. Particularly in Poland, after a conservative and populist coalition: Law and Justice (PiS) – The League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defense (Samoobrona) came to power, Germany and German policy, as well as European policy, became the target of fierce attacks. The Germans were openly accused that their representation of Polish aspirations toward Europe was aimed at a highly pragmatic objective. After Poland joined the European Union it apparently was to be easier to make certain claims towards Poland, in particular those concerning the status of German property left in the West and North of Poland. Kai-Olaf Lang from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) [Foundation for Science and Policy] in Berlin was critical about Poland's one-year-long membership in the European Union with respect to the development of mutual relations. In his opinion, the enlargement of the European Union was to open a new chapter in the partnership between Germany and Poland. It was hoped that Poland's membership in the EU would facilitate the equality of rights, balance, abandonment of asymmetry and freer, more relaxed contacts between the two states. It was expected that in the multilateral framework the German-Polish relations would become increasingly *normalized*, and the crushing burden of the past would transform into a discourse that takes history into account and makes both states realize their mutual interdependence and the necessity for tight collaboration<sup>1</sup>.

The key issue for this topic is the notion of partnership applied by researchers into international relations, among others. A commonly approved definition of *partnership* that describes inter-state relations is almost impossible to find in the literature on the subject. In the European context, partnership is understood both as a principle and a tool to support further integration, always multi-level and multi-dimensional. Multi-level means involving stakeholders from national, regional and local levels that enter relations on a par with one other. Multi-dimensional means that partnerships tackle all kinds of issues

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<sup>1</sup>Kai-Olaf Lang, *Czas na nowy realizm. Perspektywy stosunków polsko-niemieckich w Unii Europejskiej*, "Dialog", No. 69-70/2005, p. 19.

that might help the stakeholders involved to build common visions and shared objectives for the future.

### **Polish-German partnership: introductory remarks**

A significant observation needs to be made at the very beginning in order to identify the fundamental reasons for the differences in the results of surveys conducted in Poland and in Germany. Owing to the role and significance Germany plays in the relations with Poland, Polish respondents' responses refer to the reality they indirectly or directly experience to a greater or smaller extent, whereas German respondents make more frequent references to their opinions or intentions. All surveys of Polish-German relations confirm that Poles visit Germans more often, and they have more direct contacts with Germans more frequently. This asymmetry becomes obvious when the significance of Germany for Poland in various fields (economic, political, and cultural) is compared to that of Poland for Germany. Germany is Poland's most important business partner, a highly significant political partner whose cultural meaning is also considerable (e.g. the conviction about German punctuality, solidarity, frugality and administration). One only needs to speak about the political importance of Poland for Germany, which is not reciprocal.

In the conclusions on this part of the report we will try to verify the results of the surveys conducted by our team, comparing them to the results obtained by other research teams. This is one of the ways to evaluate the accuracy of empirical research conducted in social conditions.

In our questionnaire the issues related to partnership were expressed in twelve questions that can be grouped in three sections:

- the first, concerning the assessment of mutual relations between Poles and Germans,
- the second, intended to determine the respondents' attitudes to the membership of their states in European Union structures,
- the third, directly related to the issue of partnership in the context of Poland's and Germany's EU membership.

In order to analyze the issue of partnership the questions from the first part of the questionnaire can also be taken into account. They indirectly concerned the issue of partnership between Poles and Germans, whether in general terms (the question about the most important business partners between the given country's neighbors) or on a personal level (the question about *feasting* at a common table). The analysis of responses to these questions is presented in the chapter on the significance of historical factors shaping Polish-German relations.

The quantitative analysis of the results concerning this field was performed by Professor Erwin Seyfried and Birgit Achterberg from Fachhochschule für Verwaltung und Rechtspflege in Berlin, which after a merger with another Berlin university in 2009 is nowadays called Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin (Berlin School of Economics and Law).


### **Assessment of mutual relations between Poles and Germans**

As mentioned above, the purpose of the first group of questions in this research field was to examine assessments of Polish-German relations. Both Polish and German respondents were requested to answer the question of their assessment of current relations between the two states (Graph 6.1.).

Here we can see that over two thirds of Polish students (66.3%) perceive these relations as “quite good” whereas only 2% deem them to be “definitely good”. A similar distribution of responses was recorded among Polish parents. While they pointed to the “quite good” response more frequently (74%) they were as reserved as the students in assessing these relations as “very good”. This recorded difference can be explained with their longer experience than the student group.

The assessment of Polish-German relations expressed by German respondents (in both groups) is definitely more unambiguous; 80% assessed them as good (30% chose the “quite good” reply whereas 50% went for “definitely good”).

**Graph 6.1. Assessment of Polish-German relations**



The comparison of responses to these questions provided by the national groups allow us to conclude that both German parents and German students assess mutual relations as “definitely good” more frequently than their Polish counterparts.


When we compare the responses to this question with the results of a nationwide survey conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) in November 2005, our results are confirmed. In this survey 2% of respondents assess mutual relations as “very good”<sup>2</sup>. This response is nearly identical with our results.

Another question in this group of questions examining the assessment of mutual relations concerned the assessment of mutual stereotypes and prejudices (Graph 6.2.).

Polish respondents, whether students or parents, more frequently chose the response indicating that Poles are more prejudiced against Germans (38%), while 25% chose the opposite response. The differ-

<sup>2</sup> M. Fałkowski, *Razem w Unii. Niemcy w oczach Polaków 2000-2005*, The Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2006, p. 36.

**Graph 6.2. Assessment of mutual prejudices between Poles and Germans**



ences between the two groups of Polish respondents are statistically insignificant.

The distribution of responses among German respondents is quite interesting; like the Poles they indicated that Germans are more prejudiced against Poles (45%), while only 10% of Polish respondents indicated that Poles are more prejudiced against Germans. The differences inside the German group are statistically insignificant. The comparison of responses in age groups confirms the results.

### **Attitudes to the European Union**

The project assumed that Poland’s accession to the European Union has influenced Polish-German partnership. Therefore it seemed natural to examine the attitudes of Polish and German respondents to the EU membership of their respective states.


Survey results indicated that nearly 82.6% of Polish students and 77% of parents approved of Polish membership in the European Un-

ion. These results are comparable to those obtained from German respondents as 71.4% of students and 75% of German parents have a positive attitude towards German membership of the European Union. German parents are definitely more convinced that German membership of the European Union is beneficial for their country: the “definitely advantageous” response was chosen by as many as 50% of respondents. The same response was indicated by 8.6% of Polish parents who tended to choose the less certain response “quite advantageous” (68.4% of replies compared to only 20% among the Germans). The same situation occurred in the group of students, where 55.2% of German students, compared to 18.5% of the Polish ones, chose the “definitely advantageous” response.

Another question asked of respondents when examining their attitude to the European Union concerned the assessment of Poland’s accession to European Union structures (Graph 6.3.).

Both Polish parents and Polish students positively assessed Poland’s accession to the European Union (over 80% of respondents

**Graph 6.3. Respondents’ attitudes to Poland’s membership of the European Union**




in each group selected the “quite positive” and “very positive” responses). Positive assessments prevailed also in the German group, although a slight differentiation could be observed between German students (71% of positive assessment) and German parents (79% of positive assessments). The difference may result from the fact that in the opinion of German students the Poles who appear on the German labor market are first and foremost their competitors.

### Partnership in Polish-German relations

Here the survey results are directly related to the issues of partnership. The first question in this section of the questionnaire asked whether Germans treat Poles as partners.

**Graph 6.4. Are Poles treated as partners by Germans?**



The analysis of responses (Graph 6.4.) to this question shows that Polish respondents are not certain in their assessment of the German

treatment of Poles as partners. Slightly over 45% of all respondents indicated the “slightly disagree” (7.6%) and “strongly disagree” (37.5%) responses. Forty percent (40%) of respondents replied “slightly agree” (39%) and “strongly agree” (1%). The differences inside the group are statistically insignificant. It appears that the “slightly agree” attitude is maintained also with respect to this question.

German respondents asked to assess whether the Germans treat the Poles as partners are also indeterminate. Over 50% indicated that this is not the case (4.5% – “strongly agree”, 45.5% – “slightly agree”). Forty-eight percent (48%) are of the opposite opinion. There is a difference between the group of students and parents choosing the “slightly agree” response (27% and 19% respectively).


The comparison of responses to this question allows us to conclude that German parents have a higher opinion of Germans treating Poles as partners than Polish parents. It is also significant that a higher proportion of German parents (50% of German vs. 35% of Polish parents) chose the “slightly disagree” response. This indicates that despite their indeterminateness in the assessment of partnership between Poles and Germans they tend to indicate a response which is cognitively less unequivocal, although their general assessment of the partnership is more negative.

Another question in the questionnaire reversed the subject when the respondents were asked how Poles treat Germans (Graph 6.5.).

The results are definitely more clear-cut with respect to the assessment of partnership by Polish respondents. The differences are also noticeable within the national group. Only 26% of Polish respondents claim that Poles do not treat Germans as partners, including 32.5% of students and 15.7% of parents. Fifty-five percent (55%) of Polish students are of the opposite opinion as in their opinion Poles treat Germans as partners; as many as 73% of Polish parents are of the same opinion. The relation between age and response to this question in the group of Polish respondents is highly significant statistically. In our opinion, this difference results from the dissimilar experiences of each group in contacts with Germans. The comparison of present experience to the relations between Poles and Germans during the time of the



**Graph 6.5. Are Germans treated as partners by Poles?**




two German states and a non-sovereign Poland seems to account for this difference.

It could be expected that the same question asked of German respondents would produce more positive results. This was the case as only 17.5% of German respondents replied with “strongly disagree” (1.9%), or “slightly disagree” (15.6%). As many as 80% of respondents were of the opposite opinion.

The comparison of both national groups with reference to the age variable leads to highly interesting conclusions. Polish parents are more reserved in their assessment of Germans treating Poles as partners. The “slightly agree” response was indicated by 51.3% of German parents, compared to 65.4% of Polish parents. The “strongly agree” response was indicated by 30.3% and 7.2% of German and Polish parents respectively. The differences between Polish and German respondents in the student group are noticeable, yet not as significant.

Another question concerned our respondents’ assessments of Poland’s membership of the European Union (Graph 6.6.).

**Graph 6.6. Respondents' assessment of Poland's membership of the European Union**




The responses to this question allow us to conclude that Poland's accession to the European Union is assessed as definitely positive in the group of both Polish and German respondents. Once again this question confirmed that the Poles choose the "quite positive" response more often (68% vs. 23%). It should be noted that the results obtained for this question in both national groups are nearly identical (after the "strongly negative" response is added to the "quite negative" one, and the "slightly positive" is added to the "strongly positive" one).

The assessment of Poland's influence on the European Union's development confirmed the formerly ascertained tendency of German respondents to perceive Polish perspectives and importance for the European Union in a definitely more positive manner than their Polish counterparts (Graph 6.7.).

Nearly 53% of Polish respondents indicated the minor influence of Poland on the European Union, 27% of respondents were of an oppo-

**Graph 6.7. Assessment of Poland’s potential to influence the European Union**



site opinion. Twenty-one percent (21%) chose the “hard to say” response. The differences inside the groups were negligible.


Polish potential to affect the operation of the European Union was assessed as high by 47.5% of German respondents with a slightly more optimistic attitude of parents. Poland’s influence was assessed as insignificant by 51.9% of German respondents. It should be noted that only 0.6% of all German respondents chose the “hard to say” reply.

German respondents appear to be more optimistic (a relatively high index of indications of a high position of Poland in the EU) and realistic as they can clearly subscribe to one option or another (trace indications of the “hard to say” response).

A significant question, which to a certain extent verified a majority of the earlier questions, concerned the influence Germany has on the European Union in comparison to Poland’s impact (Graph 6.8.).

Polish respondents appear to be realistic since a vast majority (77.9%) indicated the response: “German influence will be greater”.

**Graph 6.8. Comparison of Polish and German potential to influence the European Union**




The response “the influence of both countries will be comparable” was indicated by 20.5% of respondents; the last response, saying that Polish influence will be greater was indicated by 1.7% (!) of respondents. The differences occurring between Polish parents and Polish students were statistically insignificant. The realistic attitude of Polish respondents is also shared by their German counterparts. The responses of Polish and German respondents are nearly identical.

Do Poland and Germany have common interests they could achieve by their membership of the European Union? This was another question we asked of our respondents. In this way we wanted to verify the belief formulated in the media that the period of strategic partnership was over, being replaced by a determined pursuit of national interests.

As was the case in the former questions, respondents’ age had no influence on the responses. In the group of Polish respondents as many as 63% stated that such common interests exist whereas only 17% of respondents disagreed. Among German respondents 78% agreed with the statement while 18.6% were of the opposite opinion.

**Graph 6.9. Do Poles and Germans have common interests in the European Union?**




This question confirmed the formerly observed tendency of Polish respondents to choose the “hard to say” and “slightly agree” responses more often. Polish respondents turned out to be more optimistic about the future of Polish-German relations within the European Union than the political class ruling in Poland at the time.

The next question was supposed to go deeper than the former one. It concerned the influence Poland’s membership in the European Union could have on mutual relations between Poles and Germans (Graph 6.10.).

The differentiation of parents’ and students’ responses in the Polish group is statistically insignificant. A vast majority of Polish respondents (73.8%) is of the opinion that membership will have an advantageous impact on the mutual perceptions of Poles and Germans, while only 5.1% are of the opposite opinion. Only 21.2% of respondents have no opinion in this respect.

**Graph 6.10. Assessment of the influence of Poland's membership of the European Union on Polish-German relations**



The responses of German respondents are not significantly diversified, either. However, their attitude to the future of mutual Polish-German relations is definitely more optimistic: nearly 91% said that these relations would improve, while only 6% were of the opposite opinion. The comparison of responses once again confirms the statement that Germans assess the future of mutual relations with more hope for success. There are also fewer indeterminate people among them as only 3% were uncertain which response to indicate.

In the section devoted to the questions about partnership, the respondents were also asked which countries would be their most important partners in the future (Table 6.1.). The respondents were to indicate three countries. The analysis of the order of indications leads us to some interesting conclusions.

**Table 6.1. Which country will be Poland’s most significant partner?**

	<b>Polish students</b>	<b>Polish parents</b>	<b>German students</b>	<b>German parents</b>
<b>Place 1</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Germany</b>
<b>Place 2</b>	USA	Ukraine	Czech	Russia
<b>Place 3</b>	Ukraine	Russia	Russia	Czech Republic

Polish students and parents alike indicated Germany as the most important partner of Poland. Then students chose the United States, while parents indicated Ukraine, then Ukraine and Russia were indicated respectively.

As far as number one is concerned, the indications of Polish respondents conformed to these of German students and parents. German students pointed to the Czech Republic as Poland’s partner number two, while their parents indicated Russia there, these indications were reversed for Poland’s third ranked partner (the students indicated Russia and parents – the Czech Republic). On the basis of these results it can be concluded that only Polish students dream the “American dream”. Parents, who chose the closest neighbors, “had their feet firmly on the ground”.

The respondents were also requested to indicate Germany’s most significant partners (Table 6.2.). The purpose of this question was to compare to what extent the indications of Poles and Germans would differ and to what extent they would coincide.

**Table 6.2. Which state will be Germany’s most significant partner?**

	<b>Polish students</b>	<b>Polish parents</b>	<b>German students</b>	<b>German parents</b>
<b>Place 1</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>
<b>Place 2</b>	Russia	Russia	USA	USA
<b>Place 3</b>	Poland	Great Britain	China	Austria

All respondent groups indicated France as the most significant partner of Germany, followed by Russia, indicated by both Polish students and parents. Polish students ranked Poland to be the third most signifi-

cant partner for Germany, while their parents pointed to the United Kingdom.

German students and parents pointed to the United States as the second partner, and China ranked third among German students, while their parents indicated Austria. This seems to result from the conviction of German youth that the rising Chinese market will be increasingly more attractive for Germany. Parents seem to be more conservative in this respect. It could be expected that the significance of Poland as Germany’s partner would not be very high and the results confirmed that.

Our assumption that our respondents would select the countries according to their significance for Poland or Germany does not have to be correct. Therefore the responses to this question were analyzed with respect to how often a given country was indicated (Table 6.3., Table 6.4.).

**Table 6.3. Who will be Poland’s most significant partners according to Polish respondents?**

State	Number of elections	Percentage of total number of choices (1148)
Germany	270	23.9%
Russia	149	13.3%
Ukraine	123	11.0%
USA	121	11.0%
Great Britain	109	9.8%
Czech Republic	88	7.6%
France	80	7.2%
Other Western European states	72	6.0%
Other Eastern European states	35	3.0%
Lithuania	34	3.0%
Slovakia	33	2.9%
Asian states	11	0.9%
African states	4	0.4%
<b>Total:</b>	<b>1148</b>	<b>100.0%</b>



**Table 6.4. Who will be Poland's most significant partners according to German respondents?**

State	Number of elections	Percentage of total number of choices (776)
Germany	268	34.5%
Russia	128	16.5%
Czech Republic	111	14.3%
Other Western European states	70	9.0%
France	68	8.8%
USA	53	6.8%
Other Eastern European states	34	4.4%
African states	11	1.4%
Other states	8	1.0%
<b>Total:</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

The above comparison shows that when we analyze the sequence in which our respondents were selecting the countries it generally corresponds to the frequency with which they pointed to a given country (or a group of countries). Polish respondents ranked Germany first as Poland's partner (24% of all indications), Russia came second (13.4%) and Ukraine and the United States shared the third position (11% of indications each). German respondents indicated Germany as Poland's most significant partner (34.5%!), Russia ranked second (16.5%) and the Czech Republic third (14.3%).

We were consistent in comparing our respondents' opinions with respect to Germany's most significant partners (Table 6.5., Table 6.6.).

In the opinion of Polish respondents Germany's main partner is France (30.6% of indications), Russia ranked second (17.3%) and the United Kingdom – third (14.4%). This group of respondents indicated Poland as the fourth most significant partner of Germany. German respondents, similar to the Polish ones, ranked France as the first (26% of indications), the United States came second (18.2%) and West European countries (except for those formerly indicated) came third. In the German survey Poland ranked relatively high, in fifth (7.4%), following Russia (8.1%).

**Table 6.5. Who will be Germany's most significant partners according to Polish respondents?**

State	Number of elections	Percentage of total number of choices (1038)
France	318	30.6%
Russia	180	17.3%
Great Britain	150	14.4%
Poland	126	12.1%
Other Western European states	85	8.1%
Austria	59	5.7%
Italy	55	5.2%
USA	41	3.9%
Netherlands	39	3.7%
Asians states	11	1.0%
Africans states	4	0.4%
<b>Total:</b>	<b>1038</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 6.6. Who will be Germany's most significant partners according to German respondents?**

State	Number of elections	Percentage of total number of choices (815)
France	212	26.0%
USA	149	18.2%
Other Western European states	82	10.0%
Russia	66	8.1%
Poland	61	7.4%
Great Britain	57	6.9%
Austria	56	6.8%
China	54	6.3%
Netherlands	37	4.5%
Asians states	22	2.7%
Other Eastern European states	15	1.8%
Other states	4	0.5%
<b>Total:</b>	<b>815</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

The analysis of responses to these questions shows clearly that both the Polish and German respondents have a realistic assessment of the situation of both countries. It is symptomatic that both these groups indicate their neighbors as the most significant partners, followed by other European countries, mainly members of the European Union.

“Polish” indications were undoubtedly influenced by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, hence the relatively high position of this country. It is equally meaningful that Poles placed their Eastern neighbors relatively highly, despite the fact that politicians from the ruling parties at the time trod a path of confrontation with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus in particular. Once again, the results of our surveys demonstrated the different outlooks of society and the political class. When considering the responses of German respondents indicating Germany’s partners a similar discrepancy between society and the political elite is observed with respect to the relatively high position of the United States, while we were witnessing a crisis of German-trans-Atlantic relations mainly related to the Iraq war at that time.

### **Concluding remarks**

The most significant difference we observed when analyzing the responses of Polish or German respondents pertains to the fact that German respondents chose the “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree” response much more frequently than Polish respondents. The latter went for the “slightly agree” or “slightly disagree” response. The situation is similar with respect to the “hard to say” response, which can be treated as an avoidance or lack of opinion. This concerns both parents and students. This is quite curious because the German certainty is incomprehensible when we consider that the Poles are not a nation the Germans know particularly well or are especially interested in.

There might be a number of explanations for this difference. First, the Poles are less certain than the Germans (a cultural and mental difference) when expressing their opinions. Second, the issues that are in-

directly related to Poland's membership in the European Union were relatively 'new' to the Polish respondents, as a result of the shorter perspective Poles were able to refer to (only a year of membership). Third, Polish uncertainty lies in the distrust which is still present in mutual relations.

The positive responses from Germans might have been influenced by a social desirability bias, which means that the respondents might have replied in a way that is accepted as favorable for themselves or for others. Their answers might have been guided by their hopes to overcome the past and their feelings of guilt towards the Polish because of the cruelties of the Nazi regime.

To fulfill our promise, we would like to exemplify the accuracy of some of the results obtained in our survey by reference to the results of other surveys conducted in Poland or in Germany. When assessing the significance of Germany in the European Union, Polish respondents had no illusions about it prevailing over the significance of Poland. Such a distribution of responses to the question concerning German influence on European matters can be interpreted as a kind of 'realistic attitude' by Polish respondents. This does not entail Polish approval of this situation, though. This can be confirmed by the results obtained by the researchers from a Polish-German research team, who collected responses to the question of whether Germany and France should play a leading role in the European Union. The researchers from the TNS-Emnid-Institut<sup>3</sup> in Bielefeld asked this question of the Poles and Germans in 2004. The survey was conducted on a representative sample. On the basis of the results produced by this survey it can be concluded that the German-French pairing is not enthusiastically welcomed by Polish respondents. The statement that these states "should assume the leading role" is supported by 47.8% of German respondents and only 5.4% of surveyed Poles. This should be borne in mind before one formulates an excessively optimistic assessment of "Poland's consent to her place in the ranks". Another manifestation of Pol-

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<sup>3</sup> *Poznajcie sąsiada*. A survey of a German periodical *GEO Special* (August/September 2004), "Dialog", No. 68/2004, p. 10.

ish sensitivity was the reaction of Polish society to the words uttered by President of France, Jacques Chirac, who said that “Poland had missed a good opportunity to keep quiet” after Poland, accompanied by seven other EU states, provided political and military support to the American intervention in Iraq. One can imagine how much stronger Polish reaction would have been had such a statement been made by the Chancellor of Germany.

The same pertains to the result we obtained concerning the mutual relations which follow from Poland’s membership of the European Union. While politicians claimed it was necessary to move from the rhetoric which emphasized strategic partnership to that stressing the necessity of declaring one’s national interests in a strong manner, Polish respondents firmly highlighted the common interests Poland and Germany have in the European Union. The results of a survey conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) confirm our results. This conclusion can be drawn when comparing the answers asked in these two surveys: What should Poland be primarily driven by in her relations with Germany? Should she concentrate on defending her interests fiercely (20% of indications), should Poland rather concentrate on cooperation and compromise (72%! of indications)<sup>4</sup>. These results again confirmed that the ‘political elite’ tend to become divorced from society when it comes to an assessment of Polish-German relations. It turned out that the rhetoric of election campaigns in Poland (frequently hostile towards Germany) and in Germany (indifferent towards her closest neighbor) differed from social expectations, at least in Poland. Polish society was looking forward to a further improvement of Polish-German relations, even though they were assessed as quite good anyway. It appears then, that it was only because of the low turnout at the elections that the groups that resorted to anti-German rhetoric won the opportunity to exercise power. Two years later, the society verified the results of the elections in 2005, taking into account the status of relations with her neighbors (Germany and Russia),

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<sup>4</sup>M. Fałkowski, *Koniec czy powrót historii? Wzajemne postrzeganie Polaków i Niemców po rozszerzeniu Unii Europejskiej*, “Dialog”, No. 76/2006, p. 63.

among others, and elected groups that were less radical in their policies towards Russia and – particularly – Germany.

Researchers from the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) asked a question similar to ours, concerning Poland's partners. The respondents were requested to indicate two countries on the provided list which they considered to be Poland's most significant partners<sup>5</sup>. In the light of this survey, Germany is the most significant business partner for Poland, followed by Russia and the United States. When compared to our survey, the United States assumed a higher position, and it was also indicated as a significant political and military partner. Germany ranked second as a political partner and third as a military one. The ranking of Great Britain was also high (third position as a political partner and second position as a military one). Here, one can clearly observe the outcomes of the dispute between Poland and other countries of the *old* EU (France) following Poland's involvement in the Iraqi conflict (alongside Great Britain).

The final conclusion that emerges from the results of our surveys pertaining to the field of partnership is that German respondents in both age groups are clearly more optimistic in their assessment of current Polish-German relations and their future. This result seems to have been affected by the social and demographic profile of respondents but also by a social desirability bias on the side of the German respondents. The research sample involved students in the final grade of comprehensive high schools and the parents of their colleagues at the same level. It can be assumed with considerable probability that in the future a majority of these students will enter higher education and, consequently, will be more open to contacts with the representatives of other nations, integrated via the institutions and mechanisms of the European Union.

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 65.

## Conclusions

This volume was intended to answer the questions posed in the introductory parts as well as those in each thematic section. The empirical data collected, together with its interpretation, enabled the authors to formulate the following conclusions.

### History

In the field of historical determinants, the asymmetry in mutual relations between Poles and Germans has been confirmed. Poles have more extensive knowledge on Germans and Germany than Germans on Poles and Poland. This results from (but also contributes to) the fact that for the interviewed Germans relations with Poland are much less important than relations with Germany are for Poles. Additionally, there is a close relationship between distance in time and knowledge of historical facts among German respondents. They know more recent facts much better than more distant ones. Germans are also much more optimistic than Poles about the development of future Polish-German relations. On the other hand, Polish society seems to be much more moderately oriented towards Germans than Polish political elites. The example of the Center against Expulsion proves that *the German argument* may be an element of an internal political debate, not necessarily a part of the dominant discourse in relations with a neighbor.

It is difficult to determine age group differences. Younger generations tend to know less about common historical events than their parents, but seem to be more positively oriented, stress reconciliation and friendship more. However, those differences are not large.

## **Political culture and culture of management**

In the field of political culture and the culture of management it should be stated that differences between the two nations are visible. German political culture is largely a participatory one, while the Polish culture still manifests elements of subject type. As a result, the involvement of Poles in public life is much more limited than that of Germans. The European integration process has confirmed increasing openness to second nations; however, in the fields considered relevant (i.e. the most important elections) individuals from the other state are not warmly welcomed. Despite Poles perceiving themselves more as *rebels*, it is the Germans who are more likely to be active in opposing authorities. On the other hand, they are more moderate in their declarations for the future. Poles believe in European integration and seem to represent a more communitarian integration culture than the Germans, who are more pragmatically oriented.

The culture of management in this survey failed as a useful explanation for Polish-German differences. Perhaps this results from the fact that the indicators were constructed for business structures whereas it was social and political elements that were tested here. Poles and Germans turned out to be more similar than had been expected and represented more soft/compromise oriented/collective values and preferences than exhibited in previous investigations.

Age group differences in both states were confirmed. The younger generations in Poland and Germany were less publicly active than their parents, more open to other nations, and more EU oriented. They were also more egalitarian than their parents, slightly more collective and less masculine. The *European period* of socialization may possibly explain their orientation.

## **Partnership**

In the field of partnership, asymmetry is again one of the most visible elements in the survey. Polish interviewees seem to understand and



accept the fact that for Germany Poland is not as important as Germany is for Poland. All the subcategories pointed out that the role of Germany in the European Union is more important than that of Poland. They also see the eastern enlargement of the EU as a factor positively contributing to Polish-German relations. Poles and Germans also believe that their countries have common interests which should be developed. Positive attitudes to each other are dominant and they contradict the attitudes of the elites. What is also relevant, no serious age group differences are visible here. Contrary to the field of the political culture, here both generations may be said to similarly experience the context of eastern enlargement as a phenomenon new for both of them. The divisions of opinions (as a consequence of public debate) cut across national lines not age.

## **General findings**

In summing up these conclusions, the following needs to be reiterated. Historical factors play a much more important role in the debates among the political elites than in public opinion in Poland and Germany. On the other hand, the differences in cultural structures and European integration form a set of influential elements in bilateral relations. The relations are asymmetric; both nations are aware of this fact and seem to accept it. A variety of the elements under analysis was found and manifested themselves in a different (unequal) manner in each group. The age of the respondents in many cases influenced their opinions and behavior.

Additionally, several further findings need to be presented here. Poles, in comparison to Germans, seem far more moderate in selecting extreme opinions in bilateral relations. They more frequently choose answers starting with “rather...” Germans, on the other hand, tend to be more *strong-minded* in their choices. However, Polish opinions seem to be much more deeply rooted in knowledge and experience, while the German ones seem to reflect a form of political correctness or even artificial politeness, as in the expression of hopes for a com-

mon future that might help to overcome existing feelings of guilt about the past and the cruelties of the Nazi regime.

### **Further research**

This project and its findings not only present and explain several elements related to Polish-German relations but also suggest further research possibilities. At least three of these need to be enumerated.

As some of the assumptions in the fields investigated were not confirmed, the question arises of whether a more representative sample should be taken into consideration. We obtained the data characteristic of two socio-cultural groups. Differences between Polish and German attitudes were identified and also differences dependent on age (socialization period) were visible. However, our respondents represented specific social groups, characterized, among other things, by a certain education level/educational aspirations. This, on the other hand, located them in a certain place in the labor market, social ladder, and so on. In other social groups we could expect different knowledge, behavior and attitudes. For example, young people attending vocational schools might consider the other nation as a threat to the labor market and be much more exposed to negative stereotypes. Similarly, large metropolises and rural areas were not covered by our investigation. Then, the interests, frequency of contacts with *others* and dominant norms and values may be different than in our sample. Further diversification of interviewees should give a more complex and complete picture of the field.

The second postulate relates to regional differentiation of opinions and behaviors in Poland and Germany. A more detailed comparative look into the variations among different locations in Poland and Germany could reveal not only a more puzzle-like pattern of mutual relations but could also confirm the patterns of regional differentiation in both states. Are Poles from the eastern, western and southern parts of the state (and Germans from the western and eastern provinces) different in their opinions, behavior and values from those in other parts of

the countries? Is physical distance (reflected in the frequency of contacts) reflected in more open attitudes towards each other? Additionally, as the example of Kościan and Alzay shows, intensive contacts between territorially distant towns may result in more positive opinions towards each other.

The third direction of further research could involve finding correlations between the phenomena revealed and more empirical manifestations of interactions in different fields. Here, the question should be posed as to what extent the elites in both states are aware of the dominant beliefs among their respective societies. What role do they play in everyday collaboration on different levels: local, state and European? Do the key players in mutual relations influence beliefs and opinions or are they a product of them? And finally, what is the relationship between internal politics and mutual relations between the two countries?



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