Brożek, Bartosz2013-05-102013-05-102006Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 68, 2006, z. 1, s. 81-92.0035-9629http://hdl.handle.net/10593/6188The paper is an attempt to approach the so-called derivational conception of legal interpretation from a logical perspective. Some important doubts around the conception are presented. The most important one concerns the normative character of this model of interpretation and its field of applicability. The strongest argument supporting the conception formulated in the paper is that the use of classical logic for constructing a model of legal interpretation entails acceptance of the distinction that exists between a legal rule and a legal norm and therefore it leads to acceptance of the derivational conception itself. This argument is then criticised from the perspective of the so-called defeasible logics. The application of those logics enables one to undermine the basis on which the derivational conception is constructed.plArtykuł