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UNSUCCESSFUL CONQUEST AND SUCCESSFUL SUBORDINATION.
A Contribution to the Theory of Intersocial Relations*

I. Introductory assumptions

1. The idealizational theory of socialism in non-Marxian historical materialism considers, among other things, the influence of aggression upon the development of social relations in the societies dominated by triple-classes. In his work *On the necessity of socialism and the necessity of its decline*, L. Nowak distinguishes only one type of expansiveness, namely a successful aggression, i.e. the one whose result is a conquest, the elimination of the authority of the attacked country and its substitution with the aggressor's authority (Nowak 1984-85, pp. 135ff, also 1987). This approach (model V of the idealizational theory of socialism — see Nowak 1991) acquaintance with which is presupposed here, refers basically to the Soviet Union and the republics annexed to it: Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, etc. The differences between e.g. Ukraine and Poland are so significant that the model of a socialist empire is incapable of explaining the history of the countries being members of the socialist block, such as Poland or Hungary. A condition necessary for a more precise description and explanation of facts pertaining to the history of countries of the socialist block is to introduce some weaker intersocial relations into the model. A conquest is not the only type of expansiveness occurring in the social world. Besides that, not every expansion is successful and not every one must end in conquest, for it may aim merely at limiting the sovereignty of the attacked country. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish the following types of strong (1-2) and weal (3-4) expansiveness:

1 — successful conquest
2 — unsuccessful attempt at conquest
3 — successful subordination
4 — unsuccessful attempt at subordination.

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The article Nowak (1984-85) (cf. also 1991) considers only the type (1). The present work will consider the types (2) and (3). In other words, the present purpose is to analyze the influence of unsuccessful aggression aimed at conquest and a successful aggression aimed at subordination upon the development of social relations in the aggressor-society (S) and victim-society (S').

2. Expansiveness is a tendency of the class of rulers to regulate the external social relations. A *conquest* is a specific form of expansion, whose nature consists in the fact that the class of rulers of society S regulates the social life of the society S'. A conquest is most often connected with the elimination of the domestic class of rulers.

Another form of expansion is *subordination* which is realized through forcing into submission and not necessarily through aggression. It consists in the dominating class of rulers' taking over the control over a part of the sphere of regulation of the class of rulers of the subordinated society, rather than the whole of it. Thus, the sphere of ruling regulation in S' is divided into external and internal.

The degree of subordination of society S' is manifested in the ratio of the sphere of external regulation (control) of S' by the authority of S to the general sphere of ruling regulation in S'. Let us call the fraction which expresses the relation of the cardinality of these sets the *sovereignty index* of S'. If it equals 1, expansion takes the form of conquest; if it is higher than 0 and lower than 1, expansion takes the form of subordination. In the case of a (n ideally) sovereign country, this index equals 0.

3. I shall not consider *occasional aggression*, i.e. the one which does not result from the development of class relations in the aggressor-society, but which occurs as a result of operation of random factors, e.g., as a result of circumstances which weaken the victim so much that its subordination is possible irrespective of the stage of development of the aggressor-society.

4. The societies considered here constitute models constructed on the basis of the following idealizing assumptions (Nowak 1983, 1991).

(A) the society is divided into two political classes — citizens and rulers; no other social division is considered;

(B) the classes of rulers and citizens are not organized in any institutions;

(C) the influence of political doctrines upon the considered social processes is neglected;

(D) the effectiveness of the means of coercion is constant;

(E) the class of rulers has no separated forces of coercion;

(F) the considered society borders exclusively with other political societies.

5. I would also like to make an attempt at a partial modification of the concept of civil alienation. It is partial because a detailed analysis of this problem would go beyond the framework of the present paper, while the subject itself is worth developing in a separate work. Civil alienation is a relation between the number of civil actions regulated by the authority and the overall number of actions undertaken by the citizens. Civil alienation thus defined is not an adequate measurement of contradictions of interests between the authority and the citizens because the regulation of certain spheres of social life remains in the general social interest — e.g. defense against criminals, traffic regulations, etc. — let us call them *administrative functions* of the authority. The modified concept of civil alienation represents the difference between civil alienation (in the above sense) and administrative actions.

II. An unsuccessful attempt at a conquest

1. Let us now consider the effects produced in the attacked society S' by an unsuccessful aggression of a society from the 1st range of aggressiveness (all the specific notions and assumptions — cf. Nowak (1987), (1991)). Let us assume that the unsuccessful aggression lasts long enough to produce social changes in the existing development course of the attacked society S'. Let us analyze particular stages of the development of society S' — the victim of aggression.

(1) *The stage of increasing civil alienation.* An act of aggression forces the rulers to undertake additional ruling functions connected with their country's defense. However, since a conquest would deteriorate the position of the citizens, they accept without objections the introduction of stricter disciplinary rigours. Thus the limitations of the autonomy are considered as administrative actions of the authority. For that reason civil alienation (in the modified sense) remains at a constant level and may even become lower. In the latter case, we are dealing with a growing support for the authority of the attacked country. With the end of the aggression the "regulational credit" disappears — the rigours considered so far as administrative become ruling ones; civil alienation increases after the war.[1] This may provide an explanation (on this level of model concretization) why revolutionary situations occur in post-war periods.[2] A method which can enable the authority to avoid the effect of "post-war revolutions" is a successive decrease of a once administrative regulation

which turns into a ruling regulation as a result of ending the conflict. Ordinary mechanisms of competition begin operating anew which is also accompanied by the expansion of the sphere of social relations included in the ruling regulation. From national defenders the rulers again become oppressors who maximize the authority for its own sake. The social relations keep developing according to the standard model — revolution, civil loop or enslavement, the stage of cyclic lowering of the social status, etc.

(2) *The stage of primitive civil revolution.* Aggression takes place at the time of an open struggle between the citizens and the rulers of society *S'* and weakens the position of the latter even further. Threatened by a complete loss of authority, they make concessions in favor of the citizens' class, thanks to which the civil alienation is lowered to the level of the threshold of class peace. When the aggression ends, the rulers of society *S'* regain the social areas which they had lost previously as a result of concessions, thus leading to another increase of civil alienation. This brings about the outbreak of a revolution, which — in turn — means the return of the model on to the standard path of development.

(3) *The stage of enslavement.* The social life of *S'* is totally controlled by its rulers. At the moment of aggression the civil class perceives the aggressors as natural allies capable of eliminating the system of oppression. For this reason the rulers of society *S'* are ready to make significant concessions in favor of the civil masses. The limit of concessions is represented by the threshold of revolutionary unrest — further concessions would lead to a revolution. After the end of aggression the mechanisms of competition again lead to the increase of rulers' control over those spheres of social life from which the authority had to withdraw temporarily and the system returns to the ordinary path of development.

(3a) *The substage of effective totalization and self-enslavement of the authority.* A phenomenon characteristic for this stage of the development of a society is the enslavement of certain circles of the authority. In such a situation the aggressor is perceived as an ally not only by the declassed civil masses, but also by certain categories of rulers. In order to avoid the decomposition of the structure of authority, the ruling center stops the process of self-enslavement. This does not last long, however, because after the end of the aggression the mechanisms of maximization of authority for its own sake bring about self-enslavement of the class of rulers again.

(4) *The stage of cyclic declassations.* That stage consists of cycles, each of which includes a period of revolutionary disturbances and declassations. Aggression in the revolutionary period of a cycle entails concessions of

rulers which are proportional to the threshold of class peace and which eliminate in this way the causes of revolutionary protests. After the end of aggression the mechanisms of competition lead the system again on the standard path of development. Aggression in the declassation period of a cycle also brings about the rulers' concessions, although much smaller ones. Excessive concessions would lead to revolutionary disturbances and, therefore, the threshold of revolutionary disturbances is their limit. When the danger is averted, there occurs another declassation of citizens and the system returns to the standard path of development.

(5) *The stage of cyclic revolutions.* That stage also consists of cycles, each of which is comprised of two periods: the revolutionary period and the period of State control. In the revolutionary period of a cycle, aggression brings about concessions of the authorities which approach the threshold of class peace. At the end of aggression everything returns to the previous conditions. In the period of State control of the cycle, aggression does not lead to the concessions of the authorities because there occurs the well-known phenomenon of "revolutionary credit", whose fading at the end of aggression produces the effect of a "post-war revolutionary activity", of which we have already spoken.

By and large, an unsuccessful aggression brings about disturbances in the development of the attacked society which at the end of aggression returns to its normal development determined by the structure of internal relations. The stage of these relations at which aggression takes place determines the size of disturbance, i.e. the shorter or longer time of returning to the standard path of development.

2. Let us now consider what differences in the situation of the attacked society result from the fact that the aggression comes from the 2nd, rather than the 1st, range of aggressiveness. The reason for these differences is the fact that the degree of civil alienation of both societies — the aggressor and its victim — varies significantly. A high level of enslavement of the citizens of the aggressor deprives the citizens of the attacked country of any advantages resulting from the change of authority. What is more, in the case of a conquest their situation would deteriorate drastically. This fact does not incline the rulers towards making concessions and yet aggression entails quite a significant decrease in civil alienation. Even those acts of the authority that are of ruling nature are regarded as administrative. This "strengthened regulational credit" is the cause of lowering the level of civil alienation in stage (1), in the declassation period of the cycle of stage (4) and in the period of State control of the cycle of stage (5). In stage (2) and in the revolutionary periods of stages (4) and (5) the "strengthened regulational credit"

causes political alienation to drop on its own to the threshold of class peace, only to lead again to revolutionary disturbances after the cessation of aggression as a result of the effect of "post-war revolutionary unrest". In all of these cases, the fact that the aggressor is a "barbarous" country that treats its citizens much worse than the authority of the attacked country causes that, contrary to the variation discussed above, the authority of society S' does not have to make concessions in the face of aggression. On the other hand, it does have to make concessions when the aggression takes place at the stage of enslavement of society S'. Even then, however, the concessions of rulers in S' are smaller than in the situation when that society falls victim to the aggressor which remains in the 1st range of aggressiveness. In the former case the limit of concessions is the threshold of revolutionary unrest, while in the latter case it is the reduction of the level of oppression of one's own citizens to the level of oppression of the citizens of the aggressor-society. Otherwise the aggressor would be perceived by the citizens of S' as a "savior". However, the limit of concessions is always the threshold of revolutionary disturbances because further concessions lead to the outbreak of a revolution.

3. Finally, we must comment upon the situation of the aggressor who makes an unsuccessful attempt at a conquest. If aggressor S remains in the 1st range of aggressiveness, a successful conquest prolongs the state of social peace in S, because the rulers extend the sphere of the ruling regulation in the conquered country S', stabilizing social relations in their own country at least on the pre-revolutionary level. On the other hand, an unsuccessful aggression causes the weakening of the authority and precipitates the revolution. If the aggressor remains in the 2nd range of aggressiveness, then in the case of a successful aggression the class of rulers lowers alienation in S, thus eliminating the state of self-enslavement. On the other hand, an unsuccessful aggression weakens the center of authority and makes it possible to change it (through a military or political *coup d'état*, which the model is incapable of taking into account at the present level of concretization) in the way which at least weakens the state of enslavement.[3]

III. USSR — social results of two unsuccessful aggressions

The USSR underwent two aggressions in the years 1918-1921 and 1941-1945. The social results of the first of them can be roughly compared to those of the aggression at the stage of advancing civil alienation, while those of the second one — to the results of aggression at the stage of effective totalitarization and self-enslavement of the authority.

The intervention of the Entente superpowers has made it possible for the *bolsheviks* to extend Czeka, the organ of RKL for combatting counterrevolution and sabotage, which they did under the cover of protecting the gains of the revolution. In February 1918, the Red Army was formed; its official task was to fight the external enemy, but it was also used to suppress peasant revolts. The war created an opportunity to take over direct economic authority. The bases of war communism were created; Trotsky characterized them in the following way:

> The socially regulated work on the basis of the economic plan, which is binding for the entire nation, i.e. is compulsory for every worker in the country ... . The assumptions of work militarization are those forms of state coercion without which the substitution of the capitalist economy with socialism remains forever an empty slogan (after Kołakowski 1975, pp. 129-30).

The end of the war has brought the effect of "post-war revolutionary activity". The existing rigours, which had so far been somehow possible to explain, were becoming a constantly greater burden to the life of the society of Soviet Russia. The social moods are correctly understood by Dzierżyński who, during the 4th Conference of Czeka, said:

> The edge of terror is redundant to us now. Instead of arrests and searches ... we must find new methods with the use of which we could avoid mass searches and terror, carry out a permanent observation and uproot conspiracies, as well as destroy the hostile plans contrived by our enemies (after Lewickyj 1965, p. 39).

The attempts to preserve the principles of war communism have envenomed the social situation in the Soviet Russia, provoking mass uprisings of peasants and the revolt of seamen in Kronstadt. This has forced the *bolsheviks* to introduce NEP, but also to suppress the rioting masses. In that case at least some of the causes for the withdrawal from war communism and the introduction of NEP would be of an external nature.

The second aggression against the USSR took place in the years 1941-1945. It corresponds to the results of aggression in the sub-stage of effective totalitarianization and self-enslavement of the authority. The war brought about the concessions of the authorities in favor of the Soviet society. Above all, war needs limited the number of *Gulag* prisoners — 10% of the Red Army soldiers came from concentration camps (1.5 million) and their number constituted 15% of the total number of prisoners (*ibid.*, p. 145). This was accompanied by a general relaxation of the political atmosphere in the USSR, which is clearly

indicated by war memoirs. Transformations of social consciousness corresponded to the ideological policy of the authorities. Already in his first speach after the outbreak of the war, Stalin appealed to the feelings of patriotism. Instead of the language of the proletarian internationalist propaganda, he used ordinary human words: his speech included the phrase "Brothers and Sisters". During the years of war, Russian nationalist ideology went through a period of renaissance and turned back to the mythology of the figures of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Suvorov, Kutuzov, and others. The authorities also permitted the revival of the national consciousness of other Soviet nations, as long as it was not opposed to Russian nationalism. Aggressive atheism was given up. In September 1941 the League of Fighting Atheists was dissolved, while a year later the authorities agreed to a session of the synod of the Orthodox Church and the election of its patriarch (for the first time since 1924). A greater freedom of religion was secured also for other denominations — in 1943 the Central Management of Muslims was established in Taszkient (Carrere d'Enausse 1983, pp. 82-88).

The concessions of the authorities included also the economic sphere of social life: peasants from *kolkhozes* were allowed to sell their products on a free market, which brought them 90% of their income in return for extended day labor, while inhabitants of cities were allowed to own farms, the number of which increased from 5 million (1942) to 10 million (1943) (*Ibid.*, p. 90).

The war eliminated, or at least constrained, the wave of purges which periodically hit the party apparatus. It also diminished the role of Stalin. Such was the outcome of forming the Committee for National Defense, an institution established on June 23rd, 1941, which

> was supposed to surmount all hierarchies, ministeries, the army and even the party. The formation of that extraordinary institution clearly indicated the desire to give priority to the technical aspect of problems, thus loosening the political control, which caused various organs to act in a slow and complicated way (*Ibid.*, p. 91).

The victories of the Red Army made further concessions no longer necessary. After the end of the war, the authorities in the Soviet Union returned in their relations with the society to the methods of terror, partly given up during the war. Tightening the control of the party over the cultural life was later referred to as *"zhdanovscina"*. Economic relaxation was also terminated — the free market was eliminated, along with the excessively developed infields. In the years 1948-1949, 400 000 Lithuanians, 150 000 Latvians and 355 000 Estonians were deported from the Baltic states (*Ibid.*, p. 106).

The apparatus of the *bolshevik* party was again threatened by self-enslavement. In an attempt to counteract this phenomenon, the country increased its aggressiveness in the post-war years, an example of which is the blocade of Berlin or the war in Korea. It could also be one of the major causes of the revulsion in the policy of the communist parties in socialist countries which occurred in the years 1948-49. The growth of external regulation in the subordinated socialist countries, which absorbed not only numerous elements of the Russian authority, but also directly involved various Russian advisers and experts supervising the development of socialism, may be interpreted as an attempt to release the pressure of competition within the party apparatus. On the other hand, the purpose of political trials of communist activists charged with titoism and rightist-nationalist deviations in the 1950's was to break the opposition of the domestic structures of the communist authority against the increased penetration of the USSR into their internal affairs. Therefore, the main cause of the sovietization of the socialist countries must be searched for in the objective social relations within the soviet society, provoking increased aggressiveness of the authority, rather than in e.g. the character of Stalin or his collaborators.

The sovietization of the countries of Eastern Europe did not eliminate, however, the self-enslavement of the authority. New purges took place, while on January the 12th, 1952 the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR revived the death penalty. As a result of various "scandals" (the Crimean, Mingrelian and Leningrad ones) more than 2,000 party functionaries were killed (Lewickyj 1965, p. 167). The social effects of the war in the Soviet Union ended and the social situation returned to the point of departure.

IV. Successful subordination

1. We shall now consider subordination, i.e. taking over part of the sphere of ruling regulation in country S' by the rulers of the dominating country S. Let us determine the stages in the development of the society of S in which subordination dominates over conquest. There is surely a relationship here on which the higher the degree of subordination with which country S endangers country S', the greater is the resistance of S', i.e. the greater are the costs of expansion. Therefore, as long as there are conditions in country S for expanding the sphere of ruling regulation, the tendency of the authority of that country to conquest is lower than its tendency to subordination. Thus the tendency to subordinate S'

dominates in S over the tendency to conquer S' in the state of class peace and in the post-revolutionary state, but before declassation. Conquest dominates over subordination in the 1st and 2nd range of aggressiveness, while the total disappearance of aggressiveness is observed in the revolutionary period.

2. Subordination brings to the dominated society S' the growth of civil alienation caused by the phenomenon of "slave compensation". As a result of subordination by the rulers of S, the rulers of S' lose a certain part of their sphere of regulation in favor of the dominating class of rulers. In this way the subordinated rulers try to compensate for the lost part of their power by strengthening their control over the social life in S'.

3. I shall now consider the problem of the relation between the level of civil alienation and the degree of sovereignty of society S'. The sovereignty index of S' is not directly dependent upon the level of civil alienation, while civil alienation is dependent upon the degree of sovereignty as a result of the effect of "slave compensation", which we have already described. Here is the graphic representation of that situation:


Fig. 1. A – field of autonomous civil actions; B – sphere of ruling regulation; C – external sphere of ruling regulation of the dominating society; D – "slave compensation".

The growth of the degree of sovereignty depends upon the elimination of the field of external regulation C. This does not have to increase the field of autonomy A, because the field of internal regulation B may also increase, while A remains unchanged. The growth of civil alienation leads to the growth of field A at the sacrifice of field D ("slave compensation"),

B and, finally, also C. Thus, while the decrease in the degree of sovereignty is connected with the decrease in the degree of civil liberty, the growth of the degree of sovereignty does not have to be followed by the growth of civil autonomy. On the other hand, the growth of internal autonomy is followed by the decrease in the sphere of regulation of domestic rulers, leading them to resistance against the internal authority, or, in other words, to actions aimed at gaining independence.

4. Let us now consider the influence of "slave compensation" upon the line of development of the subordinated society S'. In the stage of civil alienation and in the period of state control of each cycle of the stage of cyclic revolutions, the effect of "slave compensation" contributes to a faster growth of civil alienation and, therefore, it provokes the outbreak of a revolution. In the stage of a primitive civil revolution and in the periods of revolutionary unrest of each cycle of the stage of cyclic declassations and cyclic revolutions, the phenomenon of "slave compensation" facilitates a more successful pacification of social protests. On the other hand, at the stage of enslavement this effect provokes self-enslavement of the authority, because regaining the lost part of the sphere of ruling regulation takes place at the sacrifice of certain circles of power, rather than at the sacrifice of the already enslaved citizens.

5. Finally, I would like to consider the following problem: when are the rulers of the subordinated country inclined towards regaining independence? It depends upon two conditions — the disappearance or decrease in the expansiveness of the class of rulers of the empire as a result of a civil revolution in the dominating country and, secondly, the time when the realization of "slave compensation" is excluded. The realization of "slave compensation" is impossible in two situations:

(1) when the revolutionary pressure of citizens rules out the realization of "slave compensation", making the rulers try to regain the external independence;

(2) when the totalization of social life causes the realization of "slave compensation" to be unfeasible, the rulers try to make themselves independent in order to extend the sphere of external ruling regulation over the sphere which had so far remained under the control of the metropolitan authority.

From what we have said above results that regaining independence may take place when the citizens allow for their total enslavement. Such an "encouraging" example was the case of independent, though internally totalitarianized Albania, or that of less enslaved and less sovereign

Romania. They may also regain independence when they force their rulers — through revolution — to grant them greater internal independence which is equivalent to the supremacy of social over national liberation.

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NOTES

[1] This growth does not have to be sudden. It depends upon the course of aggression, e.g. when the danger of aggression gradually decreases, which is accompanied by the elimination by the rulers of war rigors imposed upon the citizens. In this case the end of aggression has no significant influence upon the growth of alienation.

[2] "Post-war revolutionary activity" could be one of the sources of the *dekabrist* movement which ended in the 1826 uprising. "The reaction of Russia, which had constantly grown since the end of the Napoleonic wars, brought universal disapproval. It grew stronger and stronger, the more so that the great patriotic outburst in 1812 did not pass unnoticed. It left deep marks in the minds, particularly those of young representatives of noble intelligentsia. Breaking away from heavy oppressions ... the peasants organized spontaneous riots, while the unrest in the minds of the nobility had to be manifested in a different way" (Bazylow 1977, p. 70).

[3] I would like to remind that, in accordance with the adopted assumptions, I neglect the influence of national consciousness and political ideology upon the considered social process.

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SOCIAL SYSTEM, RATIONALITY AND REVOLUTION

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