The Rationality of Affirmation and Negation in Modern French Philosophy
dc.contributor.author | Drozdowicz, Zbigniew | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-05-08T12:00:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-05-08T12:00:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.description.abstract | This article refers to the rationality of affirmations and negations appearing in the philosophies of Descartes and Voltaire who can be treated as followers of previous traditions that separated these two modes of articulating rationality, including the traditions of antiquity. These modes became somewhat of a rule first for Socrates, and later for his disciple, Plato. However, Descartes and Voltaire slightly modified those traditions in order to adjust the rationalities they wrote about to the needs and expectations of their contemporaries. Voltaire negated, among other things, the rationality of Descartes’ philosophy, but there were also a significant number of critics before him who expressed similar opinions, such as Leibniz or Kant. | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.citation | Człowiek i Społeczeństwo, 34/2012, s. 199-208 | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.issn | 0239-3271 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10593/6131 | |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza | pl_PL |
dc.title | The Rationality of Affirmation and Negation in Modern French Philosophy | pl_PL |
dc.type | Artykuł | pl_PL |