Opposizione e verità: l’enigmatica via di Parmenide
Loading...
Date
2013
Authors
Advisor
Editor
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM
Title alternative
Abstract
In Parmenides’ B 8 37–41, we find a question that raises a difficult problem: how can Parmenides handle the opposition between “being and not” (i.e. being and not being) in the same way as the oppositions which characterize the mortals’ opinions? This question is especially relevant for answering the following theoretical question: how do we to treat the fundamental philosophical question of oppositions at large? To answer these question we need to reinterpret some major points of Parmenides’ thought: the second part of his poem, but also the identification of πέλειν and εἶναι in B 6 8, as well as other passages of the poem. But, above all, the question makes us introduce some distinctions within the concept of negation and, consequently, between the difference and negation. This allows us to distinguish the affirmation of the truth of being from the negation of the negation of being (i.e. the negation of non-being). This distinction has a major philosophical relevance, as can be seen by referring it to such thinkers as Plato, Hegel and Heidegger.
Description
Sponsor
Keywords
Parmenides, Not-Being, Negation, Difference
Citation
Peitho. Examina Antiqua, nr 1(4), 2013, s. 105-124.