Rorty and literature, or about the priority of the "wisdom of the novel" to the "wisdom of philosophy"
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1996
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Abstract
Richard Rorty’s approach to fiction results from its consistently - to use here his own opposition - "solidarity-related" account; the "other side", literary self-creation, remains programmatically and intentionally undiscussed with much seriousness. One can just get the impression that literature, and the novel in particular, has been burdened with heaviness of responsibility... Does in Rorty’s reflections the novel appear as a source of multifarious metaphors, of the whole worlds born out of the writer’s
imagination? Is there in it another dimension of the reality in which
mundane obligations no longer bind the human being and where one can give rein to usually hidden desires and passions? The answer is in the negative. The world of fiction of which Richard Rorty writes is a pragmaticized one - and fiction itself is supposed first to build, and then to defend a democratic, liberal order as one of utopias
feeding that order. On the other extreme, let us hasten to add, there is philosophy with its right to choose self-creation (the right given so willingly to these fragments of Derrida of which the most famous are perhaps the telecommunicational phantasies from The Post Card or quasi-polemics from Limited Inc.). The situation as outlined by Rorty might be described in the following manner: the writer has to be responsible (similar - although with a different
ideal to - Sartre’s conception of littérature engagée), the philosopher may indulge in certain irresponsibility - or rather certain irrelevance with respect to social problems. It is as if "poets" are returned back to polis after more than twenty five centuries and made to think about the state and laws, relieving at the same time at least some philosophers from the respectful Platonic duty of "enlightening the darkness" of the world. In today’s intellectual climate it is probably easier to accept a new role for philosophers
than to accept putting part of the burden of responsibility for the success of a contingent, like it or not, experiment of liberal democracies on the writer’s shoulders. Rorty thus seems to me to be making both one step forward and two steps backwards, as his pragmatism does not allow for leaving society at the mercy of
spiritless technocrats, social engineers of the future, when poets and philosophers no longrr have much to say. (The opposite
direction is taken by Jacques Derrida. He accords this "strange institution called
literature", as he writes, the right of tout dire, of saying everything, the power of breaking away from existing rules and conventions, of questioning and dislocating them.
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Richard Rorty, neopragmatism, new pragmatism, American philosophy, philosophy and literature, Milan Kindera, wisdom of the novel, betrayed testaments, public/private, public-private distinction, liberal ironist, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Consequences of Pragmatism, literary criticism, strong poet, strong misreading, democracy, Jacques Derrida, solidarity, self-creation, liberalism, liberal democracy
Citation
In: Marek Kwiek, Rorty’s Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought. Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM. 1996, pp. 185-210.