Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, 2015, Tom 4, Nr 1

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Browsing Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, 2015, Tom 4, Nr 1 by Author "Huk, Marta Zuzanna"

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    Heurystyka strachu. Czy ambiwalencja lęku może być dla nas pouczająca?
    (Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza w Poznaniu Wydział Nauk Społecznych, Instytut Filozofii UAM, 2015) Tibaldeo, Roberto Franzini; Nowak, Ewa; Huk, Marta Zuzanna
    The paper assumes that fear presents a certain degree of ambivalence. To say it with Hans Jonas (1903-1993), fear is not only a negative emotion, but may teach us something very important: we recognize what is relevant when we perceive that it is at stake. Under this respect, fear may be assumed as a guide to responsibility, a virtue that is becoming increasingly important, because of the role played by human technology in the current ecological crisis. Secondly, fear and responsibility concern both dimensions of human action: private-individual and publiccollective. What the ‘heuristics of fear’ teaches us, is to become aware of a deeper ambivalence, namely the one which characterizes as such human freedom, which may aim to good or bad, to self-preservation or self-destruction. Any public discussion concerning political or economic issues related with human action (at an individual or collective level) ought not to leave this essential idea out of consideration.
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    Zaufanie a stosunki osobiste
    (Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza w Poznaniu Wydział Nauk Społecznych, Instytut Filozofii UAM, 2015) Budnik, Christian; Huk, Marta Zuzanna
    Trust is a pervasive phenomenon in our lives. We trust our family members and lovers, our physicians and teachers, our politicians and even strangers on the street. Trust has instrumental value for us, but at the same time it is often accompanied by risk. This is the reason why it is important to distinguish trust that is warranted or justified from blind trust. In order to answer the question how trust is justified, however, it is crucial to know exactly what is the fundamental nature of trust. In the paper, I reconstruct three accounts of trust that operate with the assumption that trust is fundamentally a mental state – the cognitivist account, the voluntaristic account and the affect-based account. I argue that all of these accounts make reference to deeply held intuitions about trust that are incompatible with each other. As a solution to this unfortunate dialectical situation, I suggest to give up the assumption that trust is primarily a mental state. Instead, I argue for a position according to which trust is best understood as a two-place predicate that characterizes a specific relationship in which we can stand to each other.