Browsing by Author "Skubiszewski, Krzysztof"
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Item Karta Gospodarczych Uprawnień i Obowiązków Państwa(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1981) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofThis Chatter is part of the effort to establish a new international economic order which would change the present unsatisfactory relationship between the North and the South. It is not the first normative recommendation by the U. N. General Assembly to define the various rights and duties of States in the economic sphere. However, in comparison with earlier instruments it constitutes the most systematic and exhaustive treatment of the subject. The work on the Charter began in 1973 and the developing countries did not consent to continue negotiations beyond 1974. Consequently, as no consensus was reached of the whole of the draft before that date, the final text has been approved by the Assembly against the votes of 6 and with the abstention of 10 industrial States representing the free market economy. As an act of the Assembly the Charter is a recommendation and not an enactment of law. It repeats some rules that are part of customary international law, yet its emphasis has been laid on the establishment of new law. In view of this aim the absence of consensus is a serious handicap, though a number of provisions secured a universal or nearly universal approval. The Charter has a normative tendency which finds expression in its language. The Charter's concept of rights and duties is not one of ful equality. The Charter grants better protection to developing countries and proclaims several rights, privileges and preferences in their favour. A certain weakness of the Charter is its avoidance of the broader implications relating to the foundations and the functioning of international community.Item Nieznane poglądy sędziego Bohdana Winiarskiego na zagadnienie obywatelstwa i opieki dyplomatycznej(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1987) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofJudge Winiarski was unable to take part in the last stage of the second phase of the Nottebohm case decided by the International Court of Justice in 1956. He was thus prevented from appending to the judgement his dissenting opinion. He subsequently wrote down a statement of his views, dated 15th June 1955, and circulated it among the members of the Court and some other jurists. The present contribution briefly presents Judge Winiarski's unpublished views against the background of the Court's judgement. Friedrich Nottebohm was German by birth domiciled in Guatemala. In 1939 he acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein. The Court found that the naturalization conferred on Nottebohm could not be invoked by Liechtenstein against Guatemala, and Liechtenstein was not entitled to exercise its protection in favour of Nottebohm against Guatemala. Consequently, the Court held that the claim submitted by Liechtenstein was inadmissible. Judge Winiarski disagreed. According to him, between 1940 and 1944 the Government of Guatemala regarded Nottebohm as a national of Liechtenstein, and — as a result — an official relationship arose between the two Governments. That relationship concerned the right of diplomatic protection. The naturalization of Nottebohm by Liechtenstein was lawful, while the Hague Court cannot pronounce on the interpretation and application of municipal law when done by the supreme organs of the country. Each country decides on the regularity of the naturalization brought under its laws, and the naturalization of Nottebohm remained within the domestic jurisdiction of Liechtenstein, though Judge Winiarski did not deny that there might be situations where naturalization was governed by treaties or other rules of international law. Nor did Nottebohm solicit the Liechtenstein nationality fraudulently. Having established that the naturalization of Nottebohm was valid in both municipal and international law Judge Winiarski criticized the Court for not admitting that Liechtenstein had the right to exercise its diplomatic protection with regard to Nottebohm. Any non-recognition of nationality and of the resulting right of diplomatic protection could only be based on reasons that follow from international law. The concept of effective nationality and the concept of the real connection with the naturalizing State were of strictly limited relevance in international law. Various factors adduced by the Court in this context were not conclusive in law. In particular, they did not follow from international law and were too subjective to find support in judicial decisions. In Judge Winiarski's opinion the Court's judgement went beyond positive law. Judge Winiarski also criticised the "unexpected formalism" of the Court in considering it unnecessary to have regard to certain new documents filed after the closure of the written proceedings. The Court thus deprived itself of the possibility of verifying some further facts that were alleged. The examination of these facts could have thrown new light on the admissibility of the claim submitted by Liechtenstein. Judge Winiarski thought that the Court should have adjourned the oral proceedings.Item Odpowiedzialność międzynarodowa za pieniądz okupacyjny(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1960) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofItem POLSKA I STOLICA APOSTOLSKA PRZED ROKOWANIAMI NAD KONKORDATEM(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 2006) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofBetween October 1989 and March 1993, contacts between Poland and the Holy See prepared the ground for the negotiations which culminated in the signing of the Concordat agreement on 28 July 1993. After the breakthrough of 1989, both Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki and President L. Wałęsa chose the Holy See as the first port of call of their official visits. In so doing they emphasised the role of Pope John Paul II and the Catholic Church in Poland's emancipation. A draft convention on the relations between Poland and the Holy See already existed as a result of talks between the Communist Government and the Polish Episcopate in 1987-1988. When the breakthrough occurred, negotiations had not yet reached the level of the Holy See. The draft convention, however, became irrelevant when the political situation in Poland changed and the Communist Party lost power, which meant that a new text had to be drafted. The Holy See suggested that discussions on that text be postponed. Nonetheless, in the talks between the new Government and the Holy See, both sides continued to systematically emphasise the need for a concordat. Those talks resulted in a common vision on the relations between the State and the Church. Both parties agreed that the State and the Church, though independent and autonomous, would work together towards the development of the human being and for the common good. This common stand paved the way for a concordat. The Holy See submitted a draft of a concordat in October 1991. In the same year general elections were held in Poland but political instability in 1992 delayed discussions on it. Poland submitted its draft in March 1993 and suggested that draft as the basis for negotiations. The Holy See accepted that suggestion and negotiations started on 3 April 1993Item Prawo PRL a traktaty(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1972) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofLa Constitution de la Pologne de 1952 ne contient aucune norme qui régirait les rapports entre le droit interne polonais et les traités conclus par la Pologne. On n'y trouve également aucune indication implicite à propos de ces rapports. Il y a des codes et des lois qui, dans leur champ d'application, précisent leurs rapports avec les traités, tels les codes de la procédure civile ou pénale, la loi sur l'aviation civile, la loi sur les transports, le droit international privé, etc. Mais ce ne sont que des exceptions peu nombreuses au silence général du droit au sujet des rapports entre celui-ci et les traités. Depuis que la Constitution de 1952 est entrée en vigueur, la transformation d'un traité en droit interne n'a plus lieu. En effet, cette Constitution a aboli ce qui constituait l'élément principal de la transformation, notamment la loi votée par la Diète et autorisant le chef d'Etat de procéder à la ratification du traité en question. Malgré l'absence de la transformation, il n'y a pas toujours d'obstacle pour qu'un traité, dûment accepté par la Pologne, soit appliqué par le juge ou par le fonctionnaire administratif, mais sa nature par rapport au droit interne et sa place exacte dans l'ordre juridique polonais restent peu claires, quoique la doctrine ait essayé de résoudre ce problème. Pourtant, les interprétations et les postulats de celle-ci ne pénètrent pas trop souvent dans la sphère de la jurisprudence ou de la pratique administrative. Les indications à propos de la solution d'un conflit éventuel entre le traité et la loi sont encore moins précises. Pour ces raisons, on ressent le besoin d'un amendement de la Constitution dont le but serait d'ajouter à celle-ci quelques règles mettant au point les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international, y compris les traités. De telles règles porteraient sur le devoir des organes de la République d'appliquer les coutumes et les traités internationaux, sans que les normes du droit des gens soient transformées, par un processus formel, en normes internes. Le conflit entre les deux ordres juridiques devrait être résolu en faveur de la norme internationale.Item Prawo wojny i neutralności w świecie współczesnym(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1967) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofL'application contemporaine du droit de la guerre se heurte à différentes difficultés. Il y a d'abord la clause de solidarité ou si omnes qui limite l'applicabilité des convention de La Haye. La codification ultérieure ne connaît qu'une clause plus simple, celle de la participation ordinaire, tandis que les convention de 1949 et de 1954 prévoient même la possibilité de leur opération dans les relations avec un pays non contractant. Il arrive fréquemment aujourd'hui que les États qui se trouvent en conflit armé évitent de lui donner le nom de guerre et continuent à maintenir entre eux des relations diplomatiques, consulaires, etc. En ce cas une partie du droit de la guerre, notamment les règles se rapportant à la conduite des hostilités et à la protection des victimes de guerre trouvent application. Un autre problème contemporain est la discrimination entre les belligérants. Faut-il opter pour l'abandon de l'égalité des parties si l'une d'elles est agresseur? Il semble qu'on puisse discriminer seulement dans le droit de la guerre économique et dans le droit de la neutralité. Bien sûr, la responsabilité de l'agresseur quant aux conséquences de son agression en tant qu'acte illicite reste entière. Enfin, l'apparition des forces armées internationales telles que l'ONUÇ pose la question de leur statut dans le droit de la guerre; il n'est pas douteux que ce droit, malgré un certain nombre de difficultés, s'applique aux forces de l'ONU ou d'une autre organisation internationale chargée des fonctions militaires. Pendant des conflits armés d'un caractère non-international des règles du droit de la guerre trouvent application ou par la reconnaissance internationale du groupe qui combat le gouvernement constitutionnel ou sur une base indépendante d'une reconnaissance quelconque, telle que l'article 3 des conventions de Genève de 1949. Le comportement des belligerents dans les guerres du XXe siècle, tout spécialement pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, a causé une crise grave dans le droit de la guerre et de la neutralité. Le développement de la technologie moderne de guerre continue à approfondir cette crise. Le nombre et la qualité des cas de violations des lois de la guerre mettent en doute la nature et la fonction de ces lois comme ius cogens. Malgré les commandements du droit coutumier et conventionnel, les belligérants se considèrent entièrement libres de choisir les moyens de nuire à l'ennemi. Les pratiques de la guerre totale ont fait disparaître le principe de l'humanité, y inclus le défense de causer des maux superflus, et en liaison avec l'emploi des armes nucléaires ces pratiques se trouvent à l'origine de l'eclipse de telles différenciations de base comme la différence entre les membres des forces armées et la population civile, celle entre les objectifs qui sont et qui ne sont pas défendus, celle entre les objectifs militaires et non-militaires, enfin celle entre les pays, personnes et biens ennemis et les pays, personnes et biens neutres. La solution de la crise qui englobe le droit de la guerre et de la neutralité se trouvent non plus dans une révision du droit contemporain ou dans son adaptation aux attrocités des hostilités modernes, mais dans le développement du droit qui gouvernera le désarmement et les mécanismes obligatoires du règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.Item Umowy sojusznicze Polski a Karta Narodów Zjednoczonych(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofItem Uprawnienie państw do samoobrony a Karta Narodów Zjednoczonych(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1962) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofItem Wzajemny stosunek i związki pomiędzy prawem międzynarodowym i prawem krajowym(Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM, 1986) Skubiszewski, KrzysztofThese relationships concern primarily the binding force and application of international law in the State, including the respect for that law by State organs and individuals. Municipal law can also have a place in the international legal order, and international organs occasionally apply that law. While the latter problem is more restricted in its weight and dimensions, the impact of one law on another and their interactions are considerable. Parliamentary democracy and its workings have brought the domestic implementation of international law to a head, especially in view of the possibility of legislating internally through the medium of treaties. Penetration of the internal legal order by international law meets with various obstacles: gaps in the regulation of the procedural aspect by municipal law; inertia of the domestic organs; supremacy of municipal laws (statutes) for State courts; ignorance of international law; difficulties in identifying the relevant rule of that law. The choice of method to be adopted to implement international law inside a State is left to that State's legal order and practice. There is a variety of procedures. Some consist of the reception by the domestic law of various rules of international law whereby the latter are made part and parcel of the body of municipal Jaw. One such method is transformation of an international legal rule into a municipal one; transformation can be either particular or general. Other procedures result in the direct applicability of the international legal rule in the domestic system: the rule operates as an international on in the internal legal system. In case, of conflict between an international rule and a municipal rule primacy of the former is absolute on the international legal plane. On the other hand, in the domestic sphere various solutions have been adopted, and it is not unfrequent that in practice the municipal law will prevail. This undesirable effect of a certain autonomy of municipal law does not free the State from international responsibility for violation of its international obligations.