Peitho. Examina Antiqua, nr 1(2), 2011
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Item Divine Command and Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro(Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM, 2011) Koehn, GlenWhile Socrates was in his own way a deeply religious man, the Euthyphro is often thought to provide a refutation of the divine command theory of morality: the theory that what is morally good is good because it is divinely approved. Socrates seems to suggest that what is holy or pious (ὅσιος) is pleasing to the gods because it is holy, and not holy because it pleases them. Thus the dialogue is sometimes presented as showing that what is morally good and bad must be independent of the divine will. I argue that matters are not so simple, since there are several ways in which the gods could help determine which acts are good, for instance, by disposing certain human affairs which are relevant to moral decisions. Moreover, Socrates suggests that he has obligations to the gods themselves, and these obligations would have to depend in part on what pleases them. It follows that the dilemma which Socrates poses to Euthyphro (pious because loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because pious) does not offer two mutually exclusive alteratives. There are various ways for the preferences of such gods to help determine which acts are adequate for moral praise or blame. It could therefore hardly be the case that religious doctrines, if true, are irrelevant to the content of morality. Knowledge of the gods’ preferences, if such knowledge were available, would be of importance to moral theory. Socrates himself does not deny this, nor should we.Item Hosion, eu dzen und Dikaiosune in der Apologie des Sokrates und im Euthyphro(Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM, 2011) Dottori, RicardoWhile linguistic and analytical interpretations of the Euthyphro are usually circumscribed to two passages of the dialogue (Euthphr. 10 a 2–11 b 1), there is a general tendency to disregard the distinc¬tion between the ὅσιον and the θεοφιλές. Consequently, one makes hardly any attempt to understand Plato’s criticism of religion. The concepts of θεραπεὶα τοῦ θεοῦ and ἀπεργασία provide us with the possibility of positively characterizing piety and distinguishing it from pure love affection. Contrary to the views of Schleiermacher and Gigon, but following Willamowitz, the present paper shows that the idea of service to the god consists in the doric harmony of Λόγος and Ἔργον, combined with various duties and services to the state. While this is precisely what justice is, the criticism of religion is not solely negative. Through justice, the ὅσιον becomes elevated to εὖ ζῆν and the highest ἀγαθόν in private as well as in public dimension. Without justice, one is left with the neccessity to flee to the other world and embrace the ὁμοούσια with the god, as shown in the Theaetus. If that is the meaning of Socrates’ death, then the idea resembles Kant’s postu¬late of the immortality of the soul, for in both cases one is faced with the neverending task of realizing the highest good. The question is whether it is possible to realize the δικαιοσύνη in a political life. Plato considers the issue in his the Republic, Sophist, Statesman and Laws. In the Statesman, justice is the primary goal of any political life that can only be attained through cultivting the divine relationship of harmoni¬ous elements in the ὅσιον. It is here that Plato’s doctrine of the ὅσιον becomes completed.Item Il metodo adatto per Eutifrone: una calma distanza(Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM, 2011) Candiotto, LauraThe present paper aims to discuss how the Socratic method operates with Euthyphro inside the Euthyphro. The first part of the article focuses on the character’s description, upon which it moves to analyzing the very method itself not only in terms of its argumentative form but also in terms of its psychological and social aspects. Euthyphro is shown to have been a supporter of religion that was entirely incapable of living up to the religious ideals that he so confidently advocated for. Through his portrayal of Socrates’ refutation of Euthyphro, Plato seeks not only to redeem his teacher but also to criticize the then society. When describing the Socratic method, the present paper proposes to view it with a “calm distance” on the grounds of the fact that the distinctive feature of the method consists in creating an emotional distance between Socrates and Euthyphro. The purpose of such a strategy is to make Euthyphro realize the weakness of his position and embrace the purification through the socratic elenchos.Item Some Remarks on the Nineteenth Century Studies of the Euthyphro in Poland(Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM, 2011) Mróz, TomaszThe present paper examined how Polish philosophers, historians and classicists understood and interpreted Plato’s Euthyphro in the 19th century. The article provides evidence for a twofold interest that Polish readers had for the dialogue in this period. Firstly, Catholic think¬ers focused on the ethical issues of the dialogue and supported the reviv¬al of the Scholasticism, confirming, at the same time, the vitality of Plato’s thought. Secondly, the text of Plato’s opusculum was a conveni¬ent didactic material for various teachers of the Greek language: while the Euthyphro gave them the opportunity to raise ethical and logical issues, they also taught philosophy on the basis of this dialogue.Item Un Socrate che non ascolta: per esempio nell'Eutifrone(Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM, 2011) Rosetti, LivioWalter Kohan has recently observed that Socrates does not seem particularly interested in the opinions of his interlocutors. Consequently, the philosopher is not really involved in a peer to peer relation with them, but rather embarks upon the task of annihilating their ideas. With the situation being as it is, the image of Socrates as a champion of dialogue begins to wobble. While the present paper aims to discuss these claims, a number of issues needs to be accounted for. First of all, the Socratic dialogue does begin in a characteristically symmetrical way, but it becomes more and more asymmetric as the elenchos begins to appear. This is due to the fact the elenchos makes the interlocutors defensive, whereas Socrates can attack freely. Given that, Kohan’s claims seem justified and enlightening, but they should not be regarded as conclusive, since one must neither forget nor undervalue how innovative it was to replace monologue speeches with one-to-one dialogues which offered the opportunity of being involved in unforeseeable conversations.