Ethics in Progress, 2021, Volume 12, Issue 2
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Browsing Ethics in Progress, 2021, Volume 12, Issue 2 by Subject "Fichte"
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Item Philosophy of the Deed. “Praxis” in Hegel and Posthegelian Discourses(UAM, 2021-12-31) Arndt, AndreasIn his Prolegomena to Historiosophy, published in 1838, August von Cieszkowski wrote that we are at the turning point in history, when facts turn into deeds. This raises the question of what is actually to be understood by the term “deed” [Tat] and why, the hour of the deed should have come precisely now. After focusing on Hegel’s concept of a history of freedom, I will present two models of understanding action and conclude by discussing their consequences. More specifically, I will undertake a search that will lead us – by way of a detour via Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit – to Fichte’s concept of the act of doing. That socio-political practice can be justified in this way, however, is denied by those who argue that society and politics in Hegel fall under the category of objective and not of absolute spirit. The alternative model of action that I will focus on, concerns action in relation to objects, or labour, a model that Hegel had already worked out in Jena, and that Marx will re-discover (rather than invent) and further develop.Item Striving for Freedom. Some Notes about Fichte’s Idealism(UAM, 2021-12-31) Alessiato, Elena Paola CarolaMoving from Fichte’s assumption that “the essence of the I is its activity”, this paper tries to analyze the meaning and implications of the idea of “activity” [Tathandlung] in order to explicate the peculiarities of Fichte’s critical, transcendental, and moral idealism. Fichte’s idea of activity will be examined with reference to such basic concepts as collision [Anstoss], interaction [Wechselwirkung], inter-determination [Wechselbestimmung], and striving [Streben]. However, it is freedom which frames and connects the core components of Fichte’s thinking and sets up the goal of his philosophy of action. What freedom accounts for, can be identified both at the transcendental level, in the internal dynamic of infinity and finitude constituting the subjectivity of the I, and at the moral and social levels of Fichte’s thought, as the goal of the human action in history and in the society. In assuming the unitary character of Fichte’s philosophical system, concluding remarks are developed concerning the moral meaning of the act of striving for freedom and, conversely, the immorality of attitudes and feelings such as fear, resignation, and fatigue.