Ethics in Progress, 2019, Volume 10, Issue 2
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Browsing Ethics in Progress, 2019, Volume 10, Issue 2 by Subject "AI"
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Item The Ethical Significance of Human Likeness in Robotics and AI(Wydział Filozoficzny UAM, 2019) Remmers, PeterA defining goal of research in AI and robotics is to build technical artefacts as substitutes, assistants or enhancements of human action and decision-making. But both in reflection on these technologies and in interaction with the respective technical artefacts, we sometimes encounter certain kinds of human likenesses. To clarify their significance, three aspects are highlighted. First, I will broadly investigate some relations between humans and artificial agents by recalling certain points from the debates on Strong AI, on Turing’s Test, on the concept of autonomy and on anthropomorphism in human-machine interaction. Second, I will argue for the claim that there are no serious ethical issues involved in the theoretical aspects of technological human likeness. Third, I will suggest that although human likeness may not be ethically significant on the philosophical and conceptual levels, strategies to use anthropomorphism in the technological design of human-machine collaborations are ethically significant, because artificial agents are specifically designed to be treated in ways we usually treat humans.Item The Status of Robots in Moral and Legal Systems Review of David J. Gunkel (2018). Robot Rights. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press(Wydział Filozoficzny UAM, 2019) Ginszt, KatarzynaDavid J. Gunkel in his latest book Robot Rights presents the opportunities and challenges of integrating robots into moral and legal systems. The research question asked by the author is “Can and should robots have rights”? Following the Humean distinction between “is” and “ought”, Gunkel creates four statements that either opt for or against incorporating robots into legal discourse. The four modalities group contrasting opinions developed by different scholars on the subject of the eponymous robot rights. The author provides readers with yet another alternative approach to the question of legal recognition of robots which is based on Levinasian philosophy.