Hegel’s Concept of Right
| dc.contributor.author | Horn, Christoph | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-29T11:17:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-08-29T11:17:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-07-28 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This article examines the foundations for the legitimacy of law from the perspective of Hegel’s philosophy. In a first step, Kant’s justification of law is discussed, as Hegel takes the Kantian model as a central point of (critical) reference. Then, in the Section 2, I discuss Hegel’s reasons for rejecting the main strategies of justification of the legal order: natural law, contractarianism and legal positivism. This is further followed by a discussion of the meaning and scope of Hegel’s contextualism, according to which there can be no practical normativity without a certain historical embedding. Finally, I describe a more traditional met-aphysical reading (supported among others by Kevin Thompson) that I consider to be the correct solution, contrasting it with Honneth’s theory of recognition and Bran-dom’s pragmatism. | pl |
| dc.identifier.citation | Ethics in Progress, 2022, Volume 13, Issue 1, s. 24-40. | pl |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2022.1.3 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2084-9257 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10593/26932 | |
| dc.language.iso | deu | pl |
| dc.publisher | UAM | pl |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | pl |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/pl/ | * |
| dc.subject | Hegel’s concept of the right | pl |
| dc.subject | justification of law | pl |
| dc.subject | natural law | pl |
| dc.subject | contrac-tarianism | pl |
| dc.subject | positivism | pl |
| dc.title | Hegel’s Concept of Right | pl |
| dc.title.alternative | Zum Begriff des Rechts bei Hegel | pl |
| dc.type | Artykuł | pl |