Senofane e il “non sapere di sapere”

Abstract

An examination of Xenophanes’ fragment DK 21 B 34 shows how it to some extent anticipates what is known in contemporary epistemologi-cal debate as the “Gettier problem.” According to the argument underly-ing this problem, it is not enough to have a “justified true belief ” in order to be able to say that one has “knowledge.” As Xenophanes’ text has it, even if one were able to say something true, one would not know it yet. This is because, according to Xenophanes, no one is capable of grasping the evident truth of things, since only conjectures about everything are available. But while conjectures cannot rise above the level of pure opin-ion, they are not all equal: as DK 21 B 18 recognizes, they are perfectible. But what is the basis of this position, which oscillates between scepti-cism and fallibilism? Since perfectibility never reaches the end (namely the truth), this progress is infinite: the basis of Xenophanes’ epistemol-ogy may therefore be his physics of the infinite, which, however, is itself only a conjecture. This entails the risk of self-refutation. To avoid this peril, the doctrine of Parmenides will have to batten down the hatches