SPÓŁDZIELNIA A KONCEPCJE NEOINSTYTUCJONALNE

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dc.contributor.authorŁawrynowicz, Jan
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-15T09:58:51Z
dc.date.available2013-07-15T09:58:51Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description.abstractThe article evaluates the usefulness of agency theory and property rights and Williamson’s transaction cost economics as a framework for discussing five major problems o f cooperatives. Property rights held by cooperative owners and delegation of decision-making authority from principal to agent impose a significant level o f conflict to the decision-making process, particularly involving the allocation o f resources. As a result o f this inherent conflict, the traditional cooperative exhibits five basic problems: free rider problem, horizon problem, portfolio problem, control problem and influence cost problem. This article also examines how these problems are overcome by New Generation Cooperatives.pl_PL
dc.identifier.citationRuch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 66, 2004, z. 3, s. 159-179.pl_PL
dc.identifier.issn0035-9629
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10593/6744
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherWydział Prawa i Administracji UAMpl_PL
dc.titleSPÓŁDZIELNIA A KONCEPCJE NEOINSTYTUCJONALNEpl_PL
dc.title.alternativeCOOPERATIVE AND THE NEOINSTITUTIONALISTS THEORIESpl_PL
dc.typeArtykułpl_PL

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Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, 2004, nr 3