Mózgi w naczyniu
dc.contributor.author | Albiński, Tomasz | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-14T07:37:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-14T07:37:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.description.abstract | Although there is a disagreement about how Putnam’s argument should be understood, it is possible to point to several elements of this argument which are common for many different reconstructions. In this paper I have tried to show that not all of them are unquestionable. And I want to propose a new way in which self-refutation of statement „I am a brain in a vat” may be understood. A form of this reconstruction is neutral for controversy about metaphysical realism or skepticism – it differs from the argument suggested by Putnam’s text. But I think that a story about envatted brains is simply a story about a language. | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.citation | Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, Tom 1 (2012) Nr 1, s. 81-92. | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.isbn | 2299-1875 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10593/5236 | |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii | pl_PL |
dc.subject | brains in vats | pl_PL |
dc.subject | Putnam | pl_PL |
dc.subject | realism | pl_PL |
dc.subject | Matrix | pl_PL |
dc.title | Mózgi w naczyniu | pl_PL |
dc.title.alternative | Brains in a vat | pl_PL |
dc.type | Artykuł | pl_PL |