ZNACZENIE KONSTYTUCYJNEJ ZASADY PODZIAŁU WŁADZY DLA PRAWA KARNEGO MATERIALNEGO
Loading...
Date
2006
Authors
Advisor
Editor
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Wydział Prawa i Administracji UAM
Title alternative
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS FOR SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
Abstract
Legal issues in criminal law from the point o f view of the constitutional principle of the separation
of powers could only be given in outline here. Four main issues have been discussed. Firstly,
whether the legislator is entitled, and if he can, to what extent, to invest into the executive power
with the task of determining the grounds (constituting) criminal responsibility, and more precisely,
the interpretation of the nullum crimen sine lege principle in the context of article 31 clause 3 and
article 42 clause 1 of the Constitution. Secondly, whether in Poland's constitutional system (order)
exist instruments which a legislator could use to check the scope of criminalisation. Here, the dispute
concerning the right of criminal courts to disregard, at their own discretion, the norm arising
from an Act or ordinance, if such a norm is found to be in conflict with the Constitution. Thirdly, an
attempt has been made to determine the level of judicial competence that may be vested in the
criminal court to establish the attributes of a prohibited act. And fourthly, the level to which the
legislator is authorised to propose absolutely determined punishment has been analysed, followed
with a question whether such punishments are in line with the separation of power-based jurisdiction
of courts appointed to administer justice.
Description
Sponsor
Keywords
Citation
Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 68, 2006, z. 2, s. 323-335.
Seria
ISBN
ISSN
0035-9629