Spór pomiędzy Sądem Najwyższym a Najwyższym Trybunałem Administracyjnym w przedmiocie wykładni art. 126 Konstytucji marcowej w świetle polityki wyznaniowej Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej.
| dc.contributor.author | Fastyn, Arkadiusz | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-06T12:19:49Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-03-06T12:19:49Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The decision about of the political system to be implemented in Poland after it regained independence in 1918 was largely determined by the existing legal systems of the states that had earlier occupied Poland’s territories. The task before the Polish legislators was therefore to evaluate the existing laws and to decide how they were finally to be eflected in the March Constitution, of which Article 126 was of capital importance. That article provided, among other things, for reconciliation, before the first anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution, of the laws that were binding in the occupant states with the new legislation provided by the Constitution,. The Supreme Court and the Highest Administrative Court had different opinions as to the model according to which the harmonisation of the two was to be done. The Supreme Court’s stance was that the provisions of the Constitution had a direct influence on the binding legal order and therefore the regulations that were contradictory to or incompatible with its provisions were automatically ineffective. Thus the Constitution itself was to play the harmonising role in the whole process. The Highest Administrative Court, on the other hand, claimed that the discrepancies, if any. were to be resolved by relevant legislation that needed to be adopted. The model proposed by the Supreme Court prevailed. The conflict between the existing laws inherited from the occupant states and those included in the March Constitution was particularly acute in the sphere of religious policy and its regulations. The analysis of the judicial decisions arrived at pursuant to Article 126 shows that its provisions were construed in a manner that served the current political interests of the Polish state. Certain solutions of the former legal system regarding the state’s policy towards religion turned out to be very useful and in line with Poland’s policy once it had regained independence. They allowed the completion of goals that were concurrent with the policy of the former occupant states. Thus, paradoxically, once independent, the Polish state benefited from them. They served the Polish interests and were therefore frequently relied on, leading to the actual suspension of some of the principles of the March Constitution. | pl_PL |
| dc.identifier.citation | Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne, 2011, z. 2, s. 113-147. | pl_PL |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0070-2471 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10593/2214 | |
| dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Poznańskie sp. z o.o. | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | II Rzeczpospolita | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Sąd Najwyższy | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Najwyższy Trybunał Administracyjny | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Konstytucja marcowa | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Prawo wyznaniowe | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Polityka wyznaniowa | pl_PL |
| dc.title | Spór pomiędzy Sądem Najwyższym a Najwyższym Trybunałem Administracyjnym w przedmiocie wykładni art. 126 Konstytucji marcowej w świetle polityki wyznaniowej Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. | pl_PL |
| dc.title.alternative | DISPUTE BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE HIGHEST ADMINISTRATIVE COURT REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF ART. 126 OF THE MARCH CONSTITUTION IN LIGHT OF THE RELIGIOUS POLICY OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF POLAND. | pl_PL |
| dc.type | Artykuł | pl_PL |