Why Can´t We Regard Robots As People?
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Date
2018
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Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM
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Abstract
With the development of autonomous robots, one day probably capable of
speaking, thinking and learning, self-reflecting, sharing emotions, in fact, with the raise of
robots becoming artificial moral agents (AMAs) robot scientists like Abney, Veruggio and
Petersen are already optimistic that sooner or later we need to call those robots “people”
or rather “Artificial People” (AP). The paper rejects this forecast, due to its argument based
on three metaphysical conflicting assumptions. Firstly, it is the idea that it is possible to
precisely define persons and apply the definition to robots or use it to differentiate human
beings from robots. Further, the argument of APs favors a position of non-reductive
physicalism (second assumption) and materialism (third assumption), finally producing
weird convictions about future robotics. Therefore, I will suggest to follow Christine
Korsgaard’s defence of animals as ends in themselves with moral standing. I will show
that her argument can be transmitted to robots, too, at least to robots which are capable
of pursuing their own good (even if they are not rational). Korsgaard’s interpretation of
Kant delivers an option that allows us to leave out complicated metaphysical notions like
“person” or “subject” in the debate, without denying robots’ status as agents.
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Keywords
artificial people, moral agency, non-reductive physicalism, materialism, ends in themselves, animals
Citation
Ethics in Progress, Volume 9 (2018), Issue 1, pp. 44-61
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ISBN
ISSN
2084-9257